The Sociology of Corruption: The collective African culture and corruption in the public sector

Journal of Public AffairsVolume 16 Number 3 pp 279–293 (2016)Published online 5 January 2016 in Wiley Online Library(www.wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/pa.1587

■ Academic Paper

A socio-cultural approach to public sectorcorruption in Africa: key pointers forreflection

Emmanuel Yeboah-Assiamah1*, Kwame Asamoah2,Justice Nyigmah Bawole2 and Issah Justice Musah-Surugu2

1School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch Campus, South Africa2Department of Public Administration & Health Services Management, University of Ghana BusinessSchool, Legon-Accra, Ghana

*CorPublPrivaE-ma

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The public sector of many African countries is notoriously corrupt; cultural inclinations and socialization processeslargely have a tendency to lead public officials into actions that may amount to corrupt practices. Providing seven(7) key pointers for reflection, this study explores public sector corruption in African countries by examining theinterplay between culturally acceptable norms and professional expectations of public officials. The public official,by these two unparalleled expectations, tends to walk on a tight rope which often results in ethical dilemma andconflict of interest. The study adopts Riggs’ prismatic-sala model and uses the case of Ghana and traditional proverbsto explain the cultural context within which Ghanaian public official ought to operate. How can one combine thesecultural expectations with professionalism? To what extent does the ‘collectivity culture’, ‘culture of gift giving andacceptance’, ‘extended family system’, ‘ethnic loyalty’ and ‘unfettered respect of the aged’ downplay professionalbureaucratic and ethical principles? Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

‘They said a man expects you to accept “kola” from himfor services rendered, and until you do, his mind is neverat rest.... A man to whom you do a favor will not under-stand if you say nothing, make no noise, just walk away.You may cause more trouble by refusing a bribe than byaccepting it’ (Okwonkwo, in Achebe, 1960)

…the extended family system with its web of relativesgives rise to patronage: the official is expected to findjobs for some members of the extended family eitherhis own outfit or elsewhere (Gyekye, 2013)

respondence to: Emmanuel Yeboah-Assiamah, School ofic Leadership, Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch Campuste Bag X1 South Africa.il: [email protected]; [email protected]

yright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

INTRODUCTION

Responding to an Afrobarometer Survey (2014) bythe Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) which reports on public sector corruptionon sector-by-sector basis, the Deputy Commissionerof Police (DCOP) Kofi Boakye, Commander of theAshanti Regional Police greatly attributed publicsector corruption to the cultural setting of theGhanaian people. He explained that corruption lies‘within that sentiment of gratitude and reciprocityso we shouldn’t simplify it in terms of money collec-tion… we should look at reciprocity, the issues ofnepotism [and] the issues of old-boyism and allthese things which are a bigger issue than collectingbribes’1. The phenomenon of public sector corrup-tion has received attention and been treated seri-ously in the literature of public administration. It

280 E. Yeboah-Assiamah et al.

has been more widespread in underdevelopedcountries often with weak democratic institutionsand systems which tend to reduce their develop-ment and progress making their human develop-ment indicators unpalatable (Justesen & Bjørnskov2014; UNDP, 2008). This point has summarily beenposited by Myint (2000) that ‘corruption is mostprevalent where there are other forms of institu-tional weaknesses, such as political instability,bureaucratic red tape, and weak legislative andjudicial systems’ (Myint, 2000:56). The phenomenonof corruption—whatever form it takes, bribery,nepotism, extortion, fraud and embezzlement—hasbeen addressed from varying perspectives; fromthe transactional perspective (Ryvkin & Serra,2011; Barr & Serra, 2010; Kaufmann & Vicente,2011; Yeboah-Assiamah et al., 2014); from the levelof economic development and institutional devel-opment (Paldam, 2002) and from the rationalizationperspective (Anand et al., 2004). For instance,Anand et al. (2004) argue that organizations and in-dividuals tend to accept and perpetuate corruptionby attempting to rationalize and justify their actionsas non-criminal, justified or found in a situationthey can hardly contain or control. Various notionsand assessment of corruption are worthwhilebecause they tend to provide diverse analytical toolsto conceptualize and tackle the phenomenon fromdifferent perspectives.

Although the phenomenon has been addressedvariously, the literature on corruption has not givenmuch attention to cultural explanations, forinstance, Paldam (2002) in his cross country analysisof corruption across different regional blocs arguedthat culture is not so strong a candidate to explainvariances of corruption; he put it succinctly that‘I have found little basis for the belief that corruptionis so deeply embedded in the culture of the society asto be unchangeable (Paldam, 2002: 238). Variousapproaches to corruption fail to acknowledge thefact that the propensity for public officials to becorrupt or drivers of corruption in many Africansettings is not purely selfish and private butprofoundly social in character, shaped by largersocio-cultural assumptions about power, privilegeand responsibility (De Sardan, 1999; Rosen, 2002).Although not in Africa, a recent study by Jávor andJancsics (2013) carried out in Hungary found outthat corruption occurs in all facets of the organi-zation; line managerial, middle management leveland at the upper management by each of theseusing different techniques. Their study revealed that

1http://myjoyonline.com/news/2014/December-11th/i-lose-appetite-when-crime-is-committed-kofi-boakye.php.

Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

even where mechanisms exist to check corruption, in-dividuals at the various levels of the organization havetheir own machinations to side-step and trick the sys-tem to have their corrupt way through. The argumentis that where socio-cultural and personal motives posepressure on the official to engage in favoritism andunethical practices, the control systems and due pro-cesses are easily rendered inefficient, deactivated andsuspended (Yeboah-Assiamah &Alesu-Dordzi, 2015).An in-depth contextual analysis of the African

setting would point out that the very fabric of lifeof the African people are engrained with localproverbial sayings and wits coupled with certainpractices which are culturally acceptable and pro-moted vehemently to ensure togetherness. But whenthese penetrate the official milieu of public adminis-tration, they tend to cause abuse of office and couldbe viewed as corruption. These tendencies in mostcases bond individuals in the organization togetherwhich provides some form of ‘covering for colleaguesand bosses’ because people have a sense of comrade-ship and collectivity culture. The strong attachmentto extended family system and ethnic ties encouragesnepotism, recruitment that does not encourage repre-sentative bureaucracy. This inadvertentlymay lead tothe formation of informal networks which may easilydecontrol organizational regulatory circuits andsystems in which each crucial control mechanism isdeactivated (Javor, 2008).With strong attachment to its culture and heri-

tage, what appears not well treated in the literatureis the extent to which the culture of African peoplefrom the traditional setting could permeate theformal operations of public officials. The argumentis that what occurs in the social or traditional settingeasily transcends into the offices of African publicsectors. This point finds place in Hofstede andHofstede’s (2005) conceptualization of culture asthe mental software, which suggests that the samemind which has already been developed from thetraditional setting with societal values and tradi-tional cultural underpinnings is going to be usedto partly run rational public organizations. Humanbeings are borne with a clean slate ‘tabula rasa’;their first point of socialization is the family whichwill inculcate societal cherished values into the childwho would later receive formal education and growto become a public administrator. What appearsparadoxical is that the expectations of a publicadministrator tend to be different from what he haslearnt from his African cultural society; whilst his tra-ditional people expect certain behaviors and values—such as favoring their own—from the official, hisoffice or professionalism demands neutrality, dueprocess and professionalism. The cultural construct

J. Public Affairs 16, 279–293 (2016)DOI: 10.1002/pa

http://myjoyonline.com/news/2014/December-11th/i-lose-appetite-when-crime-is-committed-kofi-boakye.php

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Sociology of corruption 281

and attachment of individuals and societies greatlyinfluences the overall behavior of its public officials;this is because the officials are recruited from the verysociety whose values then become the ‘software’ topower the various programs ‘human beings’ andalso to run the organization.We, therefore, argue that, in an attempt to really

understand public sector corruption in Africa, ithas to be addressed from the cultural perspective.This is because, that becomes a starting point forall the other explanations to thrive. For instance,Yeboah-Assiamah et al. (2015) view corruption fromthe transactional perspective and argue that if theprocess is to be complete, the context, actors, thesystems and processes involved are calculatedbefore the transaction occurs. The authors arguethat, corruption could be initiated by either the pub-lic official (corruptee) or the corrupter after carefullyassessing the actors and the context. Institutionalweaknesses, laxities in judicial and legislativesystems as argued by Myint (2000) could well be ex-plained by the ‘mental software’ of public officials.There have been instances where even systems thathave proven more effective, later becomes neutral-ized, relaxed and some abrogated because theywere preventing other people from transacting theircorrupt deeds (see Jávor & Jancsics, 2013; Ayee,2000).Cultural orientations of individuals have various

ramifications on the tendency to engage in actionswhich might appear to be corruption. Culturaltendencies of individuals that have received widerattention in the literature are individualism andcollectivism, which provide an indication of theextent to which an individual emphasizes on his orher own ambition, or the ambitions of his or hersection, group or society (Bochner, 1994; Hofstede,1980; Triandis, 1995, 1996). For instance, with thesetwo as basis, Triandis and Gelfand (1998) conceptu-alize four typologies of cultural orientation: hori-zontal individualism, vertical individualism,horizontal collectivism and vertical collectivismwith each of them having different impacts oncorruption and corruption control. For instance,collectivist cultures disapprove of whistleblowing,because it disrupts the unity of an organization(Brody et al. 1998). Culture of collectivism ends uprecruiting individuals of some sort usually throughattraction–selection–attrition model which ends upforming a formidable squad or cliques that can also‘eat up’ the technical quality and the goals of theorganization (Jávor & Jancsics, 2013). A study byHouse et al. (2004) observed that in sub-SaharanAfrica, people and for that matter leadership aregenerally high on humane orientation. This suggests


that people exhibit high concern for and sensitivityto others, especially, family and friends and tend torate these even more important than the self (Houseet al., 2004 cited in Northhouse, 2013).The Ghanaian culture provides various indicators

that are potential candidates for public sector cor-ruption. There are various proverbs and wits whichin the cultural setting, tend to foster brotherlinessand forge alliances with one another. However, ifthese proverbial sayings transcend into the formalwork of individuals in the public or private office,they may have a tendency to promote corruptionbecause rules and due process may become side-stepped and compromised. In other words, if thissame ‘mental software’ is used to interpret andtransact business in formal capacities of publicofficials, it tends to create ambivalence betweenprofessional expectation and cultural backgroundof officials which could corrupt their actions. Thispaper assesses public sector corruption from thesociology of African setting using insights from theGhanaian case. Drawing from the Ghanaian cultureusing local proverbial sayings, the study discusseshow socio-cultural practices and expectations tendto encourage public sector corruption in Africa. Cor-ruption is conceptualized to include bribery, kick-backs, extortion, fraud, graft, nepotism, favoritism,collusion, falsification of records and unscrupulousskewing of rules and processes (see Morris, 2011).

METHODOLOGY

The study mainly adopts the retrospective literatureanalysis of qualitative research approach. It drawsextensively on existing literature and secondarysources in explaining and exploring how the cul-tural underpinnings of Ghanaian people contributeto public sector corruption. According to Creswell(2013), we conduct qualitative research because aproblem or issue needs to be explored; we alsoconduct qualitative research because we need acomplex, detailed understanding of the issue. Thestudy draws extensively on several secondarysources of data including magazines, newspapers,scholarly books, journal articles and reports toanalyze and explain the cultural undertones ofcorruption in Africa’s public sector drawing specificpointers from the Ghanaian setting. To really getadditional insight into the Ghanaian culture, we fur-ther visited four relevant libraries of the Universityof Ghana; the Linguistics Department, AfricanStudies and Sociology Departments. Additionally,we visited the Africana section of the Balme Libraryof the University of Ghana. In arriving at the local



proverbial sayings, we visited and interviewed fivetraditional leaders from the Techiman TraditionalArea which is among the Akan ethnic group—themost dominant ethnic group in Ghana. The discus-sion section appears mainly exploratory and pro-vides pointers to stimulate further empiricalstudies to collect data and test the extent to whichthese variables become candidates for public sectorcorruption.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ANDLITERATURE REVIEW

Prismatic-sala model

A theory is a body of concepts or variables thatexplain societal challenges and mostly underpinresearch studies. The ‘fused-prismatic-diffracted’also known as the ‘prismatic-sala’ model by Riggsunderpinned the study. Fred Riggs made a greateffort in searching for an objective and effectivemodel for analyzing public administration in devel-oping regions. ‘Prismatic’ typifies developing coun-tries, which lie in a mid-point between traditional(undeveloped) and advanced (developed) coun-tries. This suggests that prismatic society is neitherpurely traditional nor purely advanced; althoughtraditional, it has adopted some features from thediffracted (developed) societies.

Riggs (1964) explained three key featuresassociated with prismatic societies: formalism,heterogeneity and overlapping. By heterogeneity,it refers to the situation where both modern andtraditional structures and practices exist side byside; where Western type administrative institu-tions exist, the accompanied administrativebehavior is guided by ascriptive motivations ofa traditional society.

By formalism, he explained it to mean the degree ofdiscrepancy between formally documented laws/regulations/procedures and their actual observance/actual behavior. This will help explain why the rulesprescribe recruitment based onmeritocracy, but actualappointments may be made on the basis of non-meritconsiderations, including obligation to relations andfriends, and other socio-cultural concerns.

By overlapping, he explains that although bothmodern and traditional structures carry out func-tions, the work of the modern institutions or admin-istrative systems aremainly influenced by traditionalstructures like religion, the family and other culturalpractices. Three of the five dimensions of overlap-ping are more relevant to this study: nepotism, polynormativism and poly communalism. Nepotism


refers to the extent to which social obligationsinfluence public officials in the recruitment andpersonnel function of public administration. Polycommunalism refers to the simultaneous but antago-nistic existence of several ethnic, religious, racial andlinguistic groups in the prismatic society who tend toexert pressure on their fellows in formal publicposition to seek favor. Poly normativism refers tothe existence of traditional norms and ways of lifealongside seemingly modern norms in prismaticsocieties. These elements have serious implicationson the corruption in the public administration ofdeveloping African societies.

Hofstede’s dimension of culture

In a classical assessment, Hofstede (1991) in anonion diagram model provides in-depth discussionof culture. He analyses culture to entail four basicelements: values, rituals, heroes and symbols.By symbols, culture represents words, gestures,

pictures or objects that convey a specific messageor understanding which is only familiar by individ-uals who belong to that cultural fraternity.He explains rituals to mean collective activities

that are technically superfluous in reaching desiredoutcomes, but which within a culture are consid-ered as socially acceptable and significant. Theseactivities are therefore carried out not for their ownsake. This includes ways of greetings and payingrespect to elders among others.Heroes are persons, living or dead, real or imagi-

nary who are cherished and highly recognized bya certain culture whose renowned characteristicsserve as role models for people’s actions.The author classifies these three elements as

practices.

Value systemHofstede maintained that at the heartbeat of peo-ple’s culture is their value system. He explainedvalues to mean broad tendencies or propensity toprefer certain states of affairs over others. Valuesdetermine how individuals or groups conceptualizeone entity from the other. For instance, evil vs good,paradoxical vs logical and rational vs irrationalamong others. This suggests that the value systemof society or a people provides a frame for sievingthrough what is socially acceptable and what isunacceptable.What appears problematic is thatmostpeople have their value system firmly developed byage 10 and difficult to amend or reform (Hofstede,1991) See figure 1 below.


Figure 1 Onion diagram of culture (source: Hofstede, 1991)


Discussion

This section discusses the various value systems,rituals, heroes and symbols of the African peoplewith emphasis on Ghanaian context which appearto be high potential candidates for public sectorcorruption. The main cultural elements to bediscussed are organized and presented under thesethemes: collectivity and power distance; gift system;inheritance/extended family system; unfetteredrespect for age; ethnic allegiance and loyalty andundue respect for the rich.

High sense of ‘collectivity’ and degree of ‘powerdistance’

On Hofstede’s 6-D model, a cursory assessmentindicates that African countries generally fall quitelow on ‘individualism’ indicator. This indicatormeasures the extent to which societal members areinterdependent on one another; a low score on‘individualism’ suggests that such a society is highon ‘collectivity’ which means there is a high levelof inter-linkages among societal members. On thedimension of power distance, African countries are

Figure 2 African culture towards ‘ind


notoriously very high on this indicator. Powerdistance refers to the degree to which subordinatesof organizations of a country expect and accept thatpower is distributed unequally. This means thatboth subordinates and superiors within the saidculture endorse and live by the inequality betweenthem (http://geert-hofstede.com).There is, however, a sharp contrast between

African culture and that of the advanced Europeanor North American culture which is more individu-alistic and does not endorse power distance.Figures 2 and 3 provide two contrasting cultural

tendencies between African countries and Deve-loped, mostly OECD countries. The figures depictan inverse relationship between power distanceand individualism indicators between the tworegions. The lower a culture scores on individual-ism, the higher it scores on power distance. Thefigures suggest that whilst African countries scorequite low on ‘individualism’ they score high on‘power distance’ whilst reverse is the other region.Scoring low on individualism suggests that theculture is more collective and high bond amongsocietal members which have implications fororganizational members to be more likely to shieldone another. A high score on power distancesuggests that the African culture is a type thatmay utterly accept authority without necessarilyquestioning the rightfulness of leaders’ actions.These two scores have serious implications forthe public sector of the continent which usuallyencourages the corruptibility of leaders andorganizational members. This point is summarilyexplained by what the DCOP posited in theintroduction of the paper that ‘corruption lies“within that sentiment of gratitude and reciprocityso we shouldn’t simplify it in terms of money

ividualism’ and ‘power distance’


http://geert-hofstede.com

Figure 3 OECD countries culture towards ‘individualism’ and ‘power distance’


collection”…“We should look at reciprocity, theissues of nepotism [and] the issues of old-boyismand all these things which are a bigger issues thancollecting bribes”’1. Collective culture makes it quitedifficult for individuals to report wrong doings andtend to easily condone or shield corrupt colleagues(see Ekpo, 1979; Jávor & Jancsics, 2013).

The crucial question is, what accounts for thisstrong sense of collectivity and reciprocity? Weattempt to answer this by carrying out in-depthanalysis of the cultural expectations and traditionalwise sayings among the Akans of Ghana.

Proverb: Dua bata bo), ne twa ye twa naLiterally: It is difficult to cut a tree which is too

close to a rock or stone.Connotation: When trying to cut the tree you will

hit the stone with your cutlass and dull the blade.When a close friend hurts you, you will not or shouldnot forsake them, don’t leave them to their owndestiny or dealwith themharshly. Youwill not be ableto jettison them because of your feelings for them.

Proverb: Benkum dware nifa, nifa dware benkumLiterally: The left hand baths the right hand,

whilst the right also baths the left hand.Connotes: This suggests that each one should be

their brother’s keeper even in times of trouble. Thisproverb is usually cited when people want unduefavor from public officials or when an official wantsto do something where it needs the assistance orcollaboration of others.

Proverb: Akok) baatan tia ba na )nkum baLiterally: The hen steps on the chick but does not

kill itConnotation: Even if someone engages in uneth-

ical or corrupt act, it is better to caution him ratherthan exposing him to be fired.


Proverb: Wo ba ne gu wo nsa so, yepepa na yentwaLiterally: If your child defecates on your lap, you

clean it but don’t cut that part awayConnotation: It is better to give people second

chances even when they engage in vices, you justhave to give them caution rather than takingharsher punitive measures. This means that it isbad to throw away the baby with the bath water;it is not the best of options to hand over indicted in-dividuals to face the full rigors of law and sanction.

Proverb: Wo se akyi nye wo de a, eho ara na wotafereLiterally: If the back of your teeth (gum) is not

sweet, it is still where you lickConnotation: If a closer ally offends you or the

organization, you cannot forsake himProverb: Wo nnua nnye a, wo nnua ara no noLiterally: Even if your brother is not good, he is

still a brotherConnotation: This teaches that we do not forsake

our brethren when they get themselves into trouble;we should show solidarity and even if possibleprotect and cover him or her. It would be bad toreport or forsake a brother simply because he hasbeen indicted. Still show him affection.

From the proverbs and practices of Ghanaiansindicated above, one would not be surprised whyGhana scored 15 on individualism; her score of 15indicates that the Ghanaian culture is low on indi-vidualism which implies that it is high on collectiv-ity, and generally a ‘collective one’. This suggeststhat Ghanaians exhibit a high sense of interdepen-dence and homogeneity among its people. Theyusually tend to see themselves as a group and notas individuals—what affects one, affects all—anddo empathize generally with one another, even ifan individual commits an offense. Ghana also scored



80 on power distance which suggests that theGhanaian culture accepts hierarchical order becausepower distance assesses the extent to whichsubordinates of organizations within a countryexpect and accept that power is unequally distributed.People naturally would accept authority howeverporous or ill the directives and practices of leadershipwithout necessarily challenging or being assertive.The two tendencies and cultural orientations—

high on collectivity and power distance—suggest thatin the midst of corrupt attitude or malfeasance atthe top, subordinates mostly would not question orwould find it difficult to even report or blow thewhistle. People also have a tendency of providing‘safe haven’ or shielding their colleagues when onegets into trouble or corrupt scandal. Put differently,collectivist culture has high tendency to cultivateand nurture lower ethical standards (see Banfield,1958; Hooper, 1996; Husted, 1999). Scholars such asEkpo (1979) provide that in such context, organiza-tional members tend to owe allegiance to their socialgroups over their responsibility to act as rationalbureaucrats (see also Gould & Amaro Reyes, 1983;Tanzi, 1994). This point has further been advancedby Getz and Volkema (2001) that, in collectivistcultures public officials have a tendency to form anetwork of friends and family to establish formida-ble relationships that catalyze unethical or corruptdealings. In their study which used correlation andregression analysis, Getz and Volkema (2001), how-ever, found no clear relationship. In a recent study,Jávor and Jancsics (2013) observed that corruption inmost public organizations is as a result of dominantcoalition between line, middle and senior manage-ment. They argue that ‘without the help of themiddle-level, top executives would not be able tomanage the entire corrupt transaction; the top candeactivate several internal and external controls, butthe middle elaborates the corrupt contract’s technical,economic, and legal parameters’ (Javor & Jancsics,2013: 28). This suggests that collectivity and familiarityamong people in organization have a high tendency tolead to formation of dominant coalition within therank and file of the administrative setup.

Gifts system

The preponderance of gift giving and expectations inthe African culture tends to cause greater potentialethical dilemmas for public officials in these settings.In the African culture, gifts are revered and viewedas sacred which portrays the giver as kind and ap-preciative. It presents a kind of goodwill on the partof an individual visiting the elders or chiefs’ palace.Failing to offer or accept gift for service offered you


and service rendered respectively, tends to causemany relationship challenges. For instance, particu-larly among the Yorubas of Nigeria, the society hasa culture of reciprocity which manifests itself ingiving ‘thank you gifts’ after they have received afavor or service they deem worthwhile. Achebe(1960) in his bestselling novel No longer at Ease,Okonkwo the protagonist made an important asser-tion which succinctly explains the African concept ofgift giving and expectation

‘They said a man expects you to accept “kola” fromhim for services rendered, and until you do, his mindis never at rest.... A man to whom you do a favor willnot understand if you say nothing,make no noise, justwalk away. You may cause more trouble by refusing abribe than by accepting it’ (p.80).

This kind of culture, if it permeates the formaladministrative setting, could be conceptualized ascorruption; meanwhile the intention of the givermay not reflect an act of corruption but purely cul-tural fulfillment. From the foregoing, it suggests thatgifts expectations are normal, and refusal to givegifts tends to make an individual not cultured or doesnot know his culture properly, which also suggeststhat refusing a gift in the African setting is problem-atic because it is an anathema to relationships. InGhana, gift-giving is a part of social solidarity inorder to maintain harmony and peace across allspheres of society. In a typical Akan tradition ofGhana, gifts are considered sacred and exhibit thecharacter of the giver as generous, kind andcivilized. It would be highly bad of you to visit thechief’s palace or priest’s shrine empty handed. It isalso unacceptable in the culture to reject gifts whichwill have several implications. Typically, gifts are notto be refused or rejected in most Ghanaian societiesbecause it is considered an offense to do so. Thediscussion above finds support in the followingAkan proverbs:

Proverb: ‘Yemfa nsa pan nko ahenfie’Literally: We do not go to the chief’s palace

empty handedImplications: It is very unusual to visit the chief or

the priest in the shrine without any gift which sug-gests that providing gifts to individuals in positionsof authority is a sign of respect and homage. It affirmsthe legitimacy and suggests your submission to theauthority of the office and person you are visiting.

More problematic is, there is no excuse toexonerate oneself from not honoring payment ofgifts to individuals in authority. Whether theindividuals have or do not have, they are expectedto show something ‘small’ within their capacity



which is a symbol of knowing ones culture. In mostcases, the elders through this proverb would putforward that:

Proverb: ‘Nwansena nni hwee koraa no, )popa ne nsam’Literally: Even the housefly which has nothing at

all, tends to flap its palmsImplications: this suggests that even the poor and

vulnerable, out of their misery and poverty need tostrive and get something to give to the relativelyaffluent or rich officials in positions of authority. Thismakes gift giving paradoxical in Ghana whereusually the poor, vulnerable and affected in societygive to the rich (see also Justesen & Bjørnskov, 2014).This is illustrated in Figure 4.

This culture of gift expectation tends to permeateinto the mindset of personnel in public sectors ofGhana who may be tempted to view their officesas ‘palaces’ where it is bad to visit or seek ser-vices without providing gifts to the public officer.Similarly, the one who wants to receive a serviceor who has received a service sees it as bad if heor she does not offer appreciation. What is prob-lematic about this is that, gifts have the tendencyto create the desire for reciprocity which maycompromise rational decision processes of publicofficials (Torfason et al., 2013). This softensgrounds which will facilitate the transactionalmodel of corruption (see Yeboah-Assiamah et al.,2014). For instance, in a recent study, Justesenand Bjørnskov (2014) conducted a regressionanalysis of afrobarometer report from 18 sub-Saharan African countries; the findings revealthat it is the poorer in society who are frustratedto pay bribes more frequently than the wealthier

Figure 4 Figure Culture of gift ex


and affluent class. It is no wonder why corruptiontends to perpetuate the disparity between thehaves and haves-not which leads to higher degreeof stratification among citizenry (Di John, 2010)

Direct endorsement of reciprocity: recipe for‘kickbacks’ and misappropriation

More related to the point above, the Ghanaiansociety tends to encourage individuals to expectreciprocity for the good services they have provided.In other words, it may be unacceptable if you helpsomeone achieve a success and you refuse to takean honor or part of the proceeds. In most cases,people who excel very well are given chieftaincytitles in their communities or dashed plots of land.This is very good as it encourages people to do goodto society; but it becomes bad when peopleabusively practice this in the office. For instance,the Ghanaian people have these sayings whichcould encourage kick back and corruption:

Proverb: ‘nea wapoto ama no afe no, onkyiri se ode nensa bomu bi’

Literally: It is not wrong for the one who groundthe stew to have a taste of it

Connotation: When people have this in theirmindset, if they are able to generate some revenuesfor the country or their organizations, it would notbe wrong to spend part.

Proverb: nea oyi ewoo no, otafere ne nsaLiterally: the onewhomakes honey, licks the hands

The implication of the two proverbs above is that,people have to show appreciation to those who help

pectation and extortion



them secure jobs, contracts and other services in thepublic sector. Directly or indirectly, one is told by hisculture to show reciprocity or seek reciprocity fromindividuals or the organization. For instance, onemay easily be judged right in his mind to take partof revenues collected because his culture tells himto ‘lick the hands after extracting the honey’. It isno wonder why society and public opinion mostlyspeak in favor of the corrupt in society. Peopleusually see nothing wrong if someone works hardand ‘chops’ or spends part of the returns. This, weargue needs a cultural re-orientation. With the firstproverb, it is very common to hear people exonerat-ing politicians who misappropriate state fundsbecause ‘if they grind it, it is not wrong to have ataste; and also the one who makes honey will neces-sarily lick the hands’. That is, people find it difficultto understand why those who work in public officesshould not buy vehicles and mansions because thepeople will tell you that ‘do not spare the stick andallow the dog to bite you’.

Inheritance system/extended family system

In the African context, people pay particular atten-tion to the extended family and inheritance systemwhich tends to exert pronounced burden and res-ponsibilities on public officials. The matrilineal andpatrilineal inheritance systems propel the few fam-ily members in public positions to secure propertiesand assets to safeguard the security of their familymembers. Every official you see has an extendedfamily where various people such as cousins, nieces,grandparents, uncles among others look up to himor her for a living. On the face value, you wouldbe tempted to view an official as one entity, perhapswith a wife and few children; however, deep-seatedis a host of other members of families whose welfareis a responsibility of the few in the family who haveexcelled and become public officials or seen the‘brighter light’. People who have some form ofincome are directly or indirectly responsible for thewelfare of their entire family; in most cases it wouldbe unacceptable if an official would want to say hisincome is insufficient. People in the village have aperception that those who live in the cities or whowork in public offices are rich and any excuse givenwould be unacceptable. Although, unjustified, thisputs enough stress and pressure on officials to useother unorthodox means to augment their incomeand living. People are tempted to enter into dealsto bring extra income. This tendency encouragesnepotism and favoritism in the recruitment andselection into the public sector of Ghana and most


developing African countries. Because people havea feeling of responsibility in catering for their rela-tives, an alternative is to secure jobs for most of thesedependents so that they can earn a living and taketheir troubles away (see also Gyekye, 2013). Gyekyebrings the argument home by arguing that a publicofficial “…takes advantage of his official status andcommits acts of official corruption;… the extendedfamily system with its web of relatives gives rise topatronage: the official is expected to find jobs forsome members of the extended family either hisown outfit or elsewhere” (Gyekye, 2013:88). In sodoing, public officials sidestep rules and due processwhich is a form of corruption; corruption is concep-tualized as any behavior or action that results in theviolation of established rules for personal gain andprofit (Sen, 1999: 275); any action that digresses from“the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique)pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules againstthe exercise of certain types of private-regardinginfluence” (Nye 1967:419).The rationale is that, by empowering them, they

will also reduce the responsibility burden. Anyattempt at understanding nepotism and favoritismin Ghana should observe this phenomenon verywell, in people’s quest to secure jobs and favors forfamily and friends whether qualified or not, theytry all means to get in touch with at least an individ-ual who knows someone, then further introduced toanother who also knows someone closest to therecruitment and selection process. This creates anepotism/favoritism causal chain or flow chartwhich often ends at the door steps of the publicofficial. This point had been observed by De Sardan(1999) in his treatise on Africa where his findingsmade him conclude that ‘woe betides the man whoknows no one, either directly or indirectly’ (DeSardan, 1999:41). The commitment to secure the goodof our relatives is not discretionary but culturallymandatory. This is viewed in the following Akanproverbs.

Proverb: ‘nea orepe ade ako kotoko no, yenye no aboro’.Literally: the one who wants something to go to

Kotoko (home), we ought not to obstructProverb: ‘Adze pa wo fie a oye’Literally:When good thing is in the home (family),

it is better and preferredProverb: ‘Wo nsa akyi beye wo de a ente se wo nsa yam’.Literally: If the back of your palm will be sweet,

it cannot be compared to the inner partProverb: ‘Wontumintowonsonongumfa ahabannyehyem’Literally: You cannot remove or throw away

your intestine and replace with leaves



Implication: the implication of these cultural pro-verbial sayings are that, they tend to communicateor send signals to public officials that if there isany favor, or any opportunity, they should firstconsider giving to their close relatives and friends.This also may promote nepotism, favoritism and atendency to side-step of laid down rules to seekthe interest of close ties.

Unfettered respect for age

Another culture of Ghanaians that encouragescorruption and indiscipline at the workplace isunfettered respect of the aged. Age is associatedwith wisdom, and even if the aged is not in author-ity, the young officer in authority needs to approachthe aged with modicum of circumspection. This is avery beautiful culture which is part of the socializa-tion process; people are taught to speak to theelderly with some respect, and it is even bad toreproach the elder. This message is inherent in thefollowing Akan proverbs:

Proverb: Panin enni hwee koraa no, )w) abakyeLiterally: The elder who has nothing at all, has

longer stay on earth than youConnotation: This suggests that people in

authority must treat older subordinates with someflexibility. This may make it quite difficult for ayounger manager to effectively control an oldersubordinate which may make indiscipline permeatethe organization

Proverb: Abodwese betoo anint)nwiiLiterally: The beard even though long came to

meet the eyebrowConnotation: No matter your position in the

organization, you still cannot compare yourself tothe old or aged. There is a tendency for youngerofficials to be lenient with older subordinates evenif the latter engages in unethical practices.

Proverb: Wo tenten ene wo papa pe a, enkyere se wone no eye pe

Literally: Even though you may be as tall as yourfather, it does not suggest you are his co-equal

Connotation: You could be the superior or boss,but you cannot be equal with the older subordinates.In cultural terms and thinking, older people in theorganization who by virtue of age or longer stay inthe organization hold a notion that they are worthyor more relevant even than their superior who isrelatively younger or newer in the organization.

Although these cultural values are inculcatedinto growing Africans to promote respect for the


elderly in society, this habit when it enters into theformal offices or bureaucracies tends to breedpaternalism at the workplace. In a typical organiza-tion where there are subordinates who have socialstanding, such as local chiefs, elders, church leadersamong others, how effectively could a young leaderor manager who is professionally the boss butsocially a subordinate discipline these ones? The of-fice, which is mainly run on bureaucratic principlesof hierarchy, discipline and chain of commands, theissues of age or one’s social status ideally should beout of the question. This appears difficult to upholdin most offices of the Ghanaian public sectorbecause people have been trained at home tounduly respect and succumb to elders even if weare at the apex of administration; therefore, even ifan elderly person engages in acts that amount toindiscipline; the superior who is relatively youngerin most cases has to approach it with tact lestpeople will tout him or her as arrogant. It iscommonplace to find out in several offices wherepeople are called names such as Nana (chief), Togbui(chief), Wofa (uncle), Auntie among others; thisbreeds paternalistic relationships in the organizationthat tends to bond them together in an informal waythat facilitates the transactional process (see Yeboah-Assiamah et al., 2014).

Ethnic allegiance and loyalty

In Ghana, people tend to owe strong allegiance andloyalty to their ethnic groups before the state.People view their ethnic group members as brothersand sisters and are encouraged to help them outthrough fair or foul means. This is typically observedduring recruitment and selection, admission pro-cesses where people have tendencies to favor theirkinsmen and women. This is so because ethnicgroups are underpinned by philosophies that tendto bond them together such as the Onua/nyobroo/mmabia philosophies of the Akans, Ewes andNortherners respectively. This leads to the formationof ‘clects’ (to borrow from Riggs, 1964) and informalgroupings in the organization with traditional out-look which has a tendency to lead to suspicionsamong workers, and collision and tension amongperceived groups. What is problematic about this isthat, officials will feel free to perpetrate any corrupttransaction because they know they have peoplearound who would shield them or not blow anywhistle. In other words, this leads to the formationof informal networks and cliques who can easilyengage in clandestine activities in the organizationby carefully deactivating the formal control and check



mechanisms (Jávor 2008). This ethnic allegiance has atendency of defying the principle of representativedemocracy suggested in the Directive Principles ofState Policy enshrined in chapter six of Ghana’s1992 Republican Constitution. Section 35 (5) (6)directs the State to actively devise mechanisms andcreate incentives that reduce sectional and discrimi-natory practices within the Ghanaian society, andfor that matter, public sector of Ghana.However, this role has been very difficult

because of the cultural allegiance of people; whatdo the following cultural wits suggest to theiradherents?

Proverb: Wo se akyi enye wo de a, eh) ara na wotafereLiterally: Even if the back of your teeth (gum) is

not sweet, that is where you still lick.Proverb: ‘Wo kurom p3t3 di wonam a, 3bi ka’Literally: If the vultures of your hometown eat

your meat, at least they will spare or leave partProverb: Kuntun hwan a n’akyiri ara na ek).Literally: At long last, or when things go bad,

you will get back to your roots or hometownConnotation: The proverbs above suggest that

no matter how it may be, one should try his possiblebest to serve and favor his townspeople because, inthe end, it is where you would turn your eyes to.Even if the candidate is less qualified but ethnicman, his mediocrity may be preferred to an alien’scompetence; this may have implication for medioc-rity and unprofessionalism in the public sector ofmany developing African countries.

Respect for the rich?

The Ghanaian culture has greater regard and respectfor affluence, wealth, status and riches. Societyunduly reveres affluent individuals and groupswithout necessarily questioning the source ofwealth or power. It becomes a disease or sociallyunacceptable if people work for several years andcannot point to a vehicle or building; no amount ofexplanation would go down well with your tradi-tional people. What appears problematic is that theymay be tempted to compare your status or situationwith probably a young official who entered thesector within a relatively shorter period to makeyou feel unworthy. This has sunk into the heads ofprospective public sector job seekers who have apre-conceived mind of becoming rich within ashorter period through whatever means. Societycherishes wealth and frowns on poverty or lack. Thisis evidenced by these cultural wits:

Proverb: yenk)te aduro mmra a, eno ara ne ahahanLiterally: Herb is the only source of medicine


Connotation: Whatever that will be done, moneyis key; money makes everything

Proverb: Sika ye abranteLiterally: Money makes one a gentlemanConnotation: One should strive and get wealth

or riches.

CONCLUSIONS

From the discussion above, this study drawsconclusions and proffers useful recommendationsthat are relevant to administrative practices ofdeveloping African countries, whether public orprivate administration.First, the Ghanaian culture is generally a ‘collec-

tive one’ which has become so as a result of thesocialization process and the kind of cultural teach-ings given to growing individuals. This is evidencedin the wise sayings and proverbs of the people. Thisfeeling of oneness leads to the kind of wantonbelongingness and bond between people whicheasily results in the formation of informal sects inthe organization which can easily make corruptionand unethical practices normalized and easier totransact.Second, most public officials may not only be in-

trinsically corrupt but pressure from the traditionalpeople or society exerts exogenous pressure on theirfellow ‘sala man’ (to borrow from Riggs) who wouldbe left with no choice but to succumb. Officials, inmost cases would have to side-step the rules tofavor their own people because of pressure fromtheir poly communal groups in society.Finally, we conclude that overall corruption scan-

dal in society is a product of individuals’ selfishdesires for riches and/or status and the exogenouslysolicited corruption/favor from societal memberswhich mainly emanates from the public officer’ssocial affiliations.

Policy suggestions

From the above conclusions, the following recommen-dations would be very useful in addressing publicsector corruption in developing African societies.

National and cultural reorientationFirst, there is a need for national and cultural reori-entation within the Ghanaian society. This activityneeds to be embarked upon through a collaborativeapproach (from planning, through executionphases), involving stakeholders from differentfacets of society. This should include but not limited



to the Government, Religious groupings, NationalHouse of Chiefs, Political Parties, Civil SocietyOrganizations and media. On a national televisionspanning for about two to three weeks, and onperiodic basis, representatives from these sects needto reiterate and echo to their members that culture isnot to be used in the offensive manner; we do nothide behind culture of oneness to derail the stateand its resources. All these groups should makecommitments and pledge their support to thecourse of not pleading on behalf of any individualwho engages in corrupt scandals. This will perme-ate the rank and file of the society because Ghanaianpeople take inspiration from their leaders.

The role of the media is very critical in expos-ing any influential individuals in society whowould want to plead or seek unscrupulous favorfrom public officials. Rules should be made toapply objectively so that no unwarranted pressuremounts on public officials. Genuine commitmentfrom chiefs, priests and political elites would caterfor and help address the exogenous pressure thatcomes to public officials. The role of the media iscritical in supervising this process by helpingthrow sunshine on any action; they should nameand shame any authority that seeks undue favorfrom officials, or begs on behalf of a reprimandedindividual or groups of individuals.

Citizenship and ethical trainingAlthough there is a debate on whether ethics couldbe taught or not, critics cite Samuel Johnson whoclassically posits that ‘do not be too hasty to trustor to admire the teachers of morality; they discourselike angels, but they live like men’2. This paper,however, agrees with Peter Caws who explains thatethical training could positively influence mostorganizational members3. We argue for a holisticapproach to inculcate ethical awareness andimplications of public sector corruption to all publicsector officials. We argue that ethical trainingcoupled with practical case studies tends to createawareness among participants who in most casesmay be prompted on how to approach ethicaldilemma. Most people are not aware of ethicalimplications, and a holistic training would makethem know that one cannot hide behind his boss,subordinates or colleagues to get exonerated. Thereis individual responsibility and accountability inwhatever corrupt act we engage in. Although some

2Quoted by Peter Caws, ‘On the Teaching of Ethics in a PluralisticSociety’, Hastings Centre Report 8(5), October, 1978.3Peter Caws, ‘On the Teaching of Ethics in a Pluralistic Society’,Hastings Centre Report 8(5), October, 1978.


actions might be collective or a syndicate, eachparticipant or actor would inadvertently accountfor his part in the deal. People should be giventhis kind of citizenship and ethical training rightfrom the infancy or childhood stage with emphasison the positive connotation of the rich Africancultural practices of solidarity and collectivity andthe ideal meaning and usage that engendernational growth.

Monetary promises for whistle blowersThe study revealed that whilst the Ghanaian cultureranks high on ‘collectivity’ which suggests that peo-ple are bond to one another, the Ghanaian cultureequally reveres wealth and riches. This suggests thatany attempt to get an insider to provide informationrequires monetary inducement. This suggests thatfor whistleblowing—effective anti-corruption strat-egy—to be effective requires providing incentivesto the whistleblower. In Ghana, the WhistleblowerAct, Act 720 of 2006 has some economic incentivesto motivate whistleblowers. Sections 20 to 25 of theAct provide and discuss how people whose disclo-sures of corrupt acts will be rewarded from a Fund.In the Bible, if monetary incentive could propelJudas Iscariot to betray Jesus Christ, his greatestconfidant, this mechanism will be powerful espe-cially in African countries where poverty is endemic.In Ghana’s Act 720, Section 24 provides that ‘Awhistleblower whose disclosure results in the recovery ofan amount of money shall be rewarded from the Fundwith (a) ten percent of the amount of money recovered(b) the amount of money that the Attorney-General shall,in consultation with the Inspector-General of Police, de-termine’. However, this information appears to eludethe citizenry because there has not been adequateeducation on the Act and the rewards thereof. Thepolicy has not been effective because there has notbeen any evidence or media report of any disclosurewhere the informant has been rewarded; to our utterdismay, various whistle blowers have rather becomevictimized and even sidelined (see Domfeh &Bawole, 2011 for two clear cases of victimization).Implementation of the policy has been slow andsluggish which might make one to perceive that ef-fective implementation would reveal various actionsby senior bureaucrats and politicians who havetherefore sought to make the law toothless bulldogor perhaps make it unpopular.

Intensifying anti-corruption institutions and third sectorapproachAnti-corruption institutions must be adequatelyempowered and allowed to operate freely withoutany political machinations. Institutions on public



procurement, whistleblowing, economic and orga-nized crimemust be enforced to the latter and shouldnot spare the ‘big fish’ lest it loses its legitimacy. Toaugment the role of the formal political institutions,the role of non-state actors is imperative. This meansnon-governmental organizations, labor unions, thinktanks, media, civil society organizations as well asopposition parties have an active role in exposingcorruption in the public sector.

Strict enforcement of representative bureaucracyThe directive principles of state policy (Chapter sixof Ghana’s 1992 Constitution) direct policy actorson how policy making and actions should be carriedout. Section 35 (5) directs the state to ensure a justand fair society by (i) promoting a spirit of loyaltyamong Ghanaians that overrides sectional, ethnicand other loyalties; and to (ii) achieve reasonableregional and gender balance in recruitment andappointment to public offices. This suggests thatrecruitment into public offices in Ghana should inthe end lead to a workforce that is highly diversifiedand well balanced to be a ‘representative bureau-cracy’which is a microcosm of the Ghanaian society.However, favoritism and nepotism lead to skewedworkforce that is unbalanced which tends to favorpeople from particular groups and sections of soci-ety. There is therefore a need to pragmatically ensurethat recruitments take into account merit andreasonable balance. A workforce is well balanced ifthe composition of employees reflects or typifiesthe very society within which the organizationoperates. In other words, the employees shouldexhibit diversity in terms of inter alia, gender,religion, ethnicity or race, region, and politicalaffiliation as far as practicable. A balanced work-force provides an internal surveillance mechanismbecause it becomes difficult to determine thecorruptibility of other employees.

Regular reposting and exchange between ministries,departments and agencies (MDAs)More importantly, longevity of one’s stay at a partic-ular office or organization breeds familiarity, socialsolidarity and bond which may make corruptiontransaction quite easier. For instance, Yeboah-Assiamah et al. (2014) explain corruption as a transac-tion between actors who share a relationship, and theprocess becomes effective after each actor carefullyassesses the context, content, process and the per-ceived behavior of the other actor involved as wellas how the system operates. Regularly transferringand bringing relatively newworkforce would reducethe nature and propensity for corruption to thrivebecause it will take time for one to study the


corruptibility of a new worker, or perhaps one maynot know the agenda of a new employee; perhapshe could be planted to serve as a whistle blower.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

Emmanuel Yeboah-Assiamah is a Ph.D. candidatereading Public Management and Development Plan-ning at the School of Public Leadership, StellenboschUniversity, South Africa. He is concurrently aTRECCAFRICA scholar participating in a Transdisci-plinary Complexity Studies in Sustainability in sameinstitution. Prior to this, Emmanuel had obtained anMPhil in Public Administration and also started aPh.D. course work in Public Administration andPolicy Management at the University of GhanaBusiness School where he also served for two yearsas a Graduate Research and Teaching Assistant.Emmanuel obtained a B.A. in Political Science withGeography & Resource Development fromUniversity of Ghana with first class honors and wasappointed a Teaching Assistant in Political Sciencein 2010/2011. The author also holds a single subjectdiploma in HRM from ICM-UK. His researchinterests include public sector leadership, governanceand institutions; decentralization and localgovernance; privatization and urban service delivery;environmental governance and sustainability withfocus on complexities. E-mail: [email protected];[email protected] Asamoah (Ph.D.) is a Lecturer and the

Ph.D. Coordinator in the Department of PublicAdministration and Health Services Managementat the University of Ghana Business School. Heholds a Ph.D. in Public Administration from JacksonState University in the USA and a Master’s degreein Public Administration from University of Ghana.Dr. Asamoah teaches Public Policy Analysis,Applied Public Policy Analysis, Advanced PublicAdministration, Issues in Public Administrationand Public Sector Human Resource Managementat the graduate level. His main research interests in-clude Public Policy Analysis, Decentralization, Hu-man Resource Management, and OrganizationalDevelopment. E-mail: [email protected] Nyigmah Bawole (Ph.D.) is a Senior Lecturer

and Head of Department of the Department of Pub-lic Administration and Health Services Manage-ment, University of Ghana Business School, Legon.Dr. Bawole obtained a Ph.D. in Development Policyand Management from the Institute for Develop-ment Policy and Management, University ofManchester, UK. He holds an MPhil, BSc. Adminis-tration and Diploma (Public Administration Major)degrees from the University of Ghana Business



School obtained in 2006, 2003 and 1999 respectively.Dr Bawole teaches Management of NGOs, Ethics inAdministration and issues in Public Administration.E-mail: [email protected]

Issah Justice Musah-Surugu is a PhD candidate read-ing Public Administration and PolicyManagement atthe University of Ghana Business School. He holdsMSc in Sustainable Development, a BSc in Adminis-tration and Diploma from the same University.Justice has served as a Teaching and Research Assis-tant in the Department of Public Administrationand Health Services Management, University ofGhana and he is currently President of the GraduateStudents Association of Ghana, Legon-Branch. Hisresearch focus includes sustainable developmentand growth, decentralization, governance andpoverty. E-mail: [email protected]

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Documents

The Sociology of Corruption: The collective African culture and corruption in the public sector