The Politics of Higher Education - Hong Kong University Press

The Politics of Higher Education

The Imperial University in Northern Song China

Chu Ming-kin

Hong Kong University PressThe University of Hong KongPokfulam RoadHong Konghttps://hkupress.hku.hk

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ISBN 978-988-8528-19-6 (Hardback)

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Acknowledgments ixAbbreviations xiChronology xiiiNote on Ages, Dates, and Other Conventions xiv

Introduction 1 “Dynamic” institutional history 3 Competing agendas of different agents 7 Structure of this book 13

1. The Gradual Transformation of the Metropolitan Schools 16 From aristocracy to meritocracy: Transformation of the Directorate

School 18 Higher elites’ apathy towards government education 25 Transformation of directorate lecturers: From classical to literary experts 31 Change in literary style and prevalence of active political commentaries 40 Summary 46

2. Foreshadowing Major Reforms: The Interim Transition 48 Two educators: Sun Fu and Hu Yuan 50 Classical skepticism and pluralistic teaching 53 Prose at Imperial University and the 1057 departmental examination 61 Continuation of a cyclical pattern of student attendance 65 Summary 71

3. The Politics of Reform at the Imperial University 73 The school promotion initiatives 74 Wang Anshi and the educational reforms 82 Solidifying moral culture through higher education 91 Realization of student advancement through the metropolitan schools 96 The complaint of Yu Fan and the punishment of the implicated officials 100 The emperor’s attitude and the rise of autocracy 103 Promulgation of the Yuanfeng school regulations 108

Contents

viii Contents

Expansion of the Three Hall system 111 Summary 118

4. Factional Politics and Policy Reversals 120 Critiques of the Three Hall system at the Imperial University 121 Personnel changes and policy reversals under the anti-reformers 130 Emperor Renzong: An exemplar for imitation 139 The reforms restored 143 Summary 150

5. Recruiting Moral Officials: A New Experiment 154 Promulgation of the countrywide Three Hall system 155 The politics in a world without prefectural examinations 161 Abolition of school promotion and the emperor’s motive 176 Summary 180

6. Contesting Political and Ideological Control 181 Imposing political and ideological control in government schools 182 Dissidents in government schools 190 Downfall of the intellectual orthodoxy 196 Student activism and loyalism at the brink of Song collapse 199 Summary 207

Conclusion 210 Legacy 215 Future prospect 218

Bibliography 221Index 252

Note: This table lists all Northern Song emperors; era names are listed only when they are mentioned in the main text and footnotes.

Northern Song dynasty (960–1127)

Taizu 太祖 (927–976, r. 960–976)Taizong 太宗 (939–997, r. 976–997)Zhenzong 真宗 (968–1022, r. 997–1022)

Xianping 咸平 (998–1003)Jingde 景德 (1004–1007)

Renzong 仁宗 (1010–1063, r. 1022–1063)Mingdao 明道 (1032–1033)Jingyou 景祐 (1034–1037)Baoyuan 寶元 (1038–1039)Kangding 康定 (1040–1041)Qingli 慶曆 (1041–1048)Jiayou 嘉祐 (1056–1063)

Yingzong 英宗 (1032–1067, r. 1063–1067)Shenzong 神宗 (1048–1085, r. 1067–1085)

Xining 熙寧 (1068–1077)Yuanfeng 元豐 (1078–1085)

Zhezong 哲宗 (1077–1100, r. 1085–1100)Yuanyou 元祐 (1086–1093)Shaosheng 紹聖 (1094–1097)Yuanfu 元符 (1098–1100)

Huizong 徽宗 (1082–1135, r. 1100–1125)Jianzhong jingguo 建中靖國 (1101)Chongning 崇寧 (1102–1106)Daguan 大觀 (1107–1110)

Qinzong 欽宗 (1100–1161, r. 1125–1127)

Chronology

Introduction

An emperor does not rule a country alone. He needs to recruit officials to assist in governing the realm. The Song founder inherited a civil service examinations system originating in the Sui dynasty (581–618) that rose to prominence in the Tang dynasty (618–907), whose chief purpose became the selection of deserving candidates for public service. Yet the extent to which the examination system could select genuinely capable and morally upright officials was always in question, since it evaluated candidates based primarily on written work, not personal conduct. In reaction, some officials in the Northern Song (960–1127) argued that government schools should play some role in the official recruitment process to better guaran-tee the moral comportment of students. Fan Zhongyan 范仲淹 (989–1052) and his fellow reformers in the mid-eleventh century were pioneers in this regard, as they reiterated the importance of a prolonged assessment of students’ moral character at prefectural schools. He says succinctly in his 1044 memorial:

Nowadays, teaching is not rooted in schools and scholars are not examined in villages, it is therefore impossible to investigate thoroughly the reality behind reputations. Examiners restrain candidates by proclaiming their philological short-comings and students concentrate merely on recitation and memory, as a result human talent proved underutilized. This is common knowledge among critics. We have assessed various opinions and selected those most beneficial today. Nothing is better than making local scholars educate local students in schools. Prefectures and counties could then identify student conduct and cultivate poten-tial. Thus we offer rules for establishing schools, executing guarantees and recom-mending candidates.”1 今教不本於學校，士不察於鄉里，則不能覈名實；有司束以聲病，學者專於記誦，則不足盡人材。此獻議者所共以為言也。謹參考眾說，擇其便於今者，莫若使士皆土著而教之於學校，然後州縣察其履行，則學者修飭矣。故為設立學舍，保明舉送之法。

The eminent statesman Wang Anshi 王安石 (1021–1086), in his famous “Ten Thousand Words Memorial” (Wan yan shu 萬言書), submitted in 1058 to Emperor Renzong (1010–1063, r. 1022–1063), addressed the shortage of men of talent. He

1. XCB, 147.3563 and SHY, XJ, 3.23b. Translation is made with reference to Chaffee, The Thorny Gates of Learning, 68.

2 The Politics of Higher Education

proposed a personnel system based on the model of the ancient sage kings,2 high-lighting the historical mission of government schools as training grounds in state-craft for prospective officials:

In ancient times, the Son of Heaven and feudal lords had schools extending from the capital down to the districts and villages. Officers of instruction were liberally selected with utmost care. Court affairs, rites and music, and legal punishments were all subjects that found a place in the schools. What the students observed and learned were the sayings, the virtuous acts, and the ideas underlying the govern-ance of the entire empire. Men unqualified to govern the empire would not receive an education, while those able to govern never failed to receive an education. This is the way to conduct the education of men.3 古者天子諸侯，自國至於鄉黨皆有學，博置教導之官而嚴其選。朝廷禮樂、刑政之事，皆在於學，士所觀而習者，皆先王之法言德行治天下之意，其材亦可以為天下國家之用。苟不可以為天下國家之用，則不教也。苟可以為天下國家之用者，則無不在於學。此教之之道也。

Located in the Song capital of Kaifeng, the Imperial University (taixue 太學) was a testing ground for idealistic scholar-officials like Fan Zhongyan and Wang Anshi to put their educational visions into practice. Fan made studying at the Imperial University a precondition for participation in the civil service examina-tions; Wang transformed higher education in the capital into an alternative channel for recruiting officials, even as he elevated the university as the primary vehicle for promoting his own scholarship as orthodoxy. Reformers in the early twelfth century expanded the school promotion scheme to government schools countrywide, in an attempt to develop the schools as the sole channel for recruiting officials, and eventually displacing the examination system.

Yet many officials were skeptical about empowering government schools to select officials. In the views of two eleventh-century scholar-officials, Su Shi 蘇軾 (1037–1101) and Liu Ban 劉攽 (1023–1089), the civil service examination system per se was not problematic in terms of recruiting talented officials. More crucial was that the emperor be prudent in appointing officials to oversee the selection process.4 Su Shi argued that “schools nowadays should follow practices from the past, so that institutions of the former king are retained in our time.”5 今之學校，特可因循舊制，使先王之舊物不廢於吾世 Contending that government schools were at best secondary sources for official recruitment, the Imperial University and local gov-ernment schools, in the eyes of Su Shi, were nothing more than places for students to cram the necessary techniques for passing examinations. Liu Ban was even more pessimistic about the utility of government schools in cultivating talent: “Education

2. For a comparison between the educational ideals of the Qingli reformers and Wang Anshi, see Smith, “Anatomies of Reform,” 157–61.

3. WJGWJJZ, 2.27. Translation is adopted and modified from de Bary, Sources of Chinese Tradition, 1:415.4. Su Shi, Su Shi wenji, 25.725.5. Su Shi, Su Shi wenji, 25.724.

Introduction 3

that scholars receive at home is sufficient for them to become talented people. Why do they need to turn to teachers in government schools to do so?”6 士修之於家，足以成材，亦何待學官程課督趣之哉？ Hence, Liu strongly opposed government schools as places for recruiting officials.

Institutional changes at the Imperial University in the Northern Song vacil-lated between Liu Ban’s conservative views and the enthusiasm of reformers in the early twelfth century who believed that government schools should play a posi-tive role in official recruitment.7 Such changes involved the various “cohabitants” of the Song state: the emperor, policy-making institutions like academicians and the council of state, plus the literati elite teaching at and students studying at the Imperial University.8 How did these various groups interact and shape the Imperial University? This is the core question that this book aims to answer.

“Dynamic” institutional history

This book addresses the politics of higher education in the Northern Song. How did different agents—emperors, court officials, teachers, and students—compete over different agendas in the arena of metropolitan education? In other words, to paraphrase Harold Lasswell’s (1902–1978) interpretation of politics, “who got what, when, and how?”9 I focus primarily on the Imperial University and occasionally the Directorate School (guozi xue 國子學) and the School of the Four Gates (simen xue 四門學). But the other more technical institutions in metropolitan Kaifeng—paint-ing, calligraphy, medicine, mathematics and law—lie beyond the scope of this study.

Previous studies of Song education have often conceived of the Imperial University as a static institution and have framed questions within the context of either institutional or social history. Scholarship in East Asian languages has dis-cussed various institutional features of the Imperial University during the three periods of educational reform under Emperors Renzong, Shenzong (1048–1085, r. 1067–1085), and Huizong (1082–1135, r. 1100–1125), including its organizational structure and curriculum, the regulations governing the selection and appointment of staff members, and the admission and promotion of students.10 Scholarly works

6. QSW, 69:29.7. Lee, Government Education, 231–49.8. For a discussion of the concept of “cohabitants of the Song state,” see Smith and Ebrey, “Introduction,” 5–7.9. See Lasswell, Politics.10. Sheng Langxi, “Songdai zhi daxue jiaoyu,” 1–30, 1–22, 1–29 and 1–19; Zhao Tiehan, “Songdai de taixue,”

317–56; Wang Jianqiu, Songdai taixue yu taixuesheng; Liu Boji, Songdai zhengjiao shi, 791–911; Song Xi, “Songdai taixue de qucai yu yangshi,” 135–55; Zhu Chongsheng, “Songdai taixue fazhan de wuge jieduan,” 445–86; “Songdai taixue zhi qushi ji qi zuzhi,” 211–60; Lee, Songdai jiaoyu sanlun; Zhang Bangwei and Zhu Ruixi, “Lun Songdai guozixue xiang taixue yanbian,” 241–71; Yuan Zheng, Songdai jiaoyu, 101–216 and “Beisong de jiaoyu he zhengzhi,” 265–88; Miao Chunde, Songdai jiaoyu, 68–77; Chen Xuexun, Zhongguo jiaoyushi yanjiu, 231–301; Jiang Xiaotao, “Cong sanci xingxue kan beisong guanxue jiaoyu yu keju xuanshi de xianghu guanxi,” 259–77; Terada, Sōdai kyōikushi gaisetsu, 1–208; and Kondō, Sōdai Chūgoku kakyo shakai no kenkyū.


in the West have gone beyond the study of institutional structures by discussing the social and intellectual impacts of Song educational institutions, covering not only the Imperial University but the civil service examinations, local government schools, and academies across the country.11 The extent to which these institutions facilitated social mobility,12 the development of local elites,13 and the Learning of the Way (Daoxue 道學) has also been examined in existing scholarship.14

This study seeks to reframe discussions about the Imperial University within an intensely politicized context. It builds on recent insights into the “new politi-cal history” for the Song, which moves away from earlier scholarship that focused mainly on static institutions, major events, emperors, and ministers. The “new political history” focuses instead on the “social, political, and institutional processes (dynastic and cross-dynastic); on relationships and tensions between individuals, collectives, and institutions; on the networks within which and the places where politics were made; and on the impact of a broad range of factors on institutional development and political decision making including rituals, discourses, and politi-cal theoretical writing as well as the will and word of individual politicians.”15 In addition to political networking and power relations, the “new political history” emphasizes the political process behind decision-making at the national level through an examination of the conflicts and contests between power groups ranging from the sovereign above to the lowest-level bureaucratic institutions below.16

Influenced by the “new political history” paradigm, Hirata Shigeki 平田茂樹 adopted the Annales school’s concept of “total history” to understand politics through the integration of multiple perspectives that include systems, places, and networks, while examining the concrete networks and relationships operating behind politics.17 Fang Chengfeng 方誠峰 delineated how politics evolved in the late

11. Chaffee, The Thorny Gates of Learning and “Sung Education,” 286–320; Lee, Government Education and “Sung Schools and Education before Chu His,” 105–36; Walton, Academies and Society in Southern Sung China; and De Weerdt, Competition over Content.

12. Chaffee, The Thorny Gates of Learning, 182–84 and “Sung Education,” 286–320; Lee, Government Education, 209–15; Kracke, “Family Vs. Merit in Chinese Civil Service Examinations under the Empire,” 103–23 and Chen Yiyan, Beisong tongzhi jieceng shehui liudong zhi yanjiu.

13. See Hartwell, “Demographic, Political, and Social Transformations of China, 750–1550,” 365–442 for an overview of elite localization in the Song period. For detailed case studies of elites in different localities, see Hymes, Statesmen and Gentlemen and Way and Byway for elites in Fuzhou; Davis, Court and Family in Sung China; Lee, Negotiated Power; and Walton, “Kinship, Marriage, and Status in Song China,” 35–77 for elites in Mingzhou; Bossler, Powerful Relations for elites in Wuzhou; Clark, Portrait of a Community for elites in Fujian; and Ong, Men of Letters within the Passes for elites in Guanzhong.

14. Walton, “The Institutional Context of Neo-Confucianism,” 457–92 and Academies and Society in Southern Sung China; De Weerdt, Competition over Content; Chaffee, “Chu Hsi in Nan-k’ang,” 414–31 and “Chu Hsi and the Revival of the White Deer Grotto Academy, 1179–1181 A.D.,” 40–62.

15. Quoted from Watts and De Weerdt, “Towards a Comparative Political History,” 3. See also Deng Xiaonan, “Zouxiang huo de zhidushi,” 497–505; Hirata, “Riben Songdai zhengzhishi yanjiu shuping,” 40–63; Huang Kuanzhong, Zhengce, duice, 1–14; and Wang Ruilai, “Duoyuan liti, tuichen chuxin, 411–20.

16. See Teraji, “Sō dai seiji shi kenkyū hōhō shiron,” 80 for a definition of political process. Teraji used this concept of political process to study early Southern Song politics under the reign of Gaozong. See Teraji, Nansō shoki seijishi kenkyū.

17. Hirata, Songdai zhengzhi jiegou yanjiu.

Introduction 5

Northern Song through a nuanced study of political culture and institutions,18 while Zhou Jia 周佳 studied such factors as political situations and customs, prominent figures and events, as well as power relations to see how they impacted the daily operation of the state at the central level.19 Two recent works by Hilde De Weerdt and Peter Lorge in the West have also adopted this new paradigm. The former delin-eated the structural changes in Song society at institutional, legal, and cultural levels and examined how the networks of information sharing among literati elites helped consolidate the Southern Song empire,20 while the latter examined the political and military processes that created the Song dynasty and discussed how the interaction between war and politics formed Song culture and institutions.21 This study of the Imperial University and the agents involved in its development has gained insights from the above works under the paradigm of “new political history.”

Despite the sophistication of earlier studies on the Imperial University as an institution, they often slighted the roles that individual political actors played and the ways in which the Imperial University actually functioned. The ways in which the Imperial University evolved during the intervals between the three reforms—the two decades between the Qingli (1041–1048) and Xining (1068–1077) reforms and the Yuanyou (1086–1093) period between the reforms of Shenzong and Zhezong (1076–1100, r. 1085–1100)—have yet to be sufficiently addressed. This study aims to fill these gaps by emphasizing the continuous development of the Imperial University. It focuses on the process by which the institutions operated and elucidates upon the dynamic interplay among different political actors and their agendas. The institutional evolution of the Imperial University over the Northern Song is detailed in the sections on “Honoring Confucius” (Chongru 崇儒), “Official Functions” (Zhiguan 職官), and “Civil Service Selection” (Xuanju 選舉) in the Draft of Documents Pertaining to Matters of State in the Song Dynasty (Song huiyao jigao 宋會要輯稿, hereafter Draft of Documents). Although compiled in the Qing (1644–1911), the work is considered a primary source, as it draws mainly upon surviving court archives from the Song.22

Another frequently cited source is the Long Draft of the Continuation of the Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Governance (Xu zizhi tongjian changbian 續資治通鑑長編, hereafter Long Draft), the most comprehensive chronicle of the Northern Song by the highly regarded Li Tao 李燾 (1115–1184). Containing excerpts from official sources like the Veritable Records (Shilu 實錄) and National Histories (Guoshi 國史) compiled by the Song court,23 the Long Draft not only delineates the political

18. Fang Chengfeng, Beisong wanqi de zhengzhi tizhi yu zhengzhi wenhua.19. Zhou Jia, Beisong zhongyang richang zhengwu yunxing yanjiu.20. De Weerdt, Information, Territory, and Elite Networks.21. Lorge, The Reunification of China.22. For a brief description of the Draft of Documents in English, see Hervouet, A Sung Bibliography, 177–78. For a

detailed textual history of this work, see Wang Yunhai, Song huiyao jigao yanjiu and Song huiyao jigao kaojiao; Chen Zhichao, Jiekai “Song huiyao” zhi mi.

23. For a comprehensive survey of the development of Song official historiography, see Cai Chongbang, Songdai xiushi zhidu yanjiu.


context in which the institutional changes took place, but also depicts the roles of different political actors in connection with the changes.24 Yet there are also limita-tions to surviving sources. Firstly, most parts of the Long Draft covering the reform eras—1068–1070 in the Shenzong reign, 1094–1098 in the Zhezong reign, and the entire reigns of Huizong and Qinzong (1100–1161, r. 1125–1127)—are no longer extant today. So, less comprehensive chronicles as well as other genres of historical works have to be consulted in order to faithfully reconstruct the past, including works in the formats of “Topical Narratives” (jishi benmo 紀事本末) and “Outline and Details” (gangmu 綱目).25 Secondly, most surviving sources are deeply influ-enced by the Learning of the Way movement, popular in the Southern Song, which proved instinctively hostile to the reforms in general, often altering earlier texts to advance its conservative interpretation of the past.26 Yet such biases in surviv-ing texts do not completely thwart our ability to reconstruct Song political history. A nuanced comparison of these sources in factionalist rhetoric,27 as shown in our treatment of the diverse assessments of the university’s development in the 1050s (chapters 2 and 4), shows how the reformers and anti-reformers competed over his-torical interpretations, which deepens our understanding of Song factional politics. In fact, the transformation of the Imperial University in the Northern Song was a process of contestation and negotiation among different political agents whose interests often differed, details of which are scattered in voluminous biographical, epitaphic, and anecdotal sources.28

24. See Hervouet, A Sung Bibliography, 72–75 for a brief bibliographical note of the Long Draft in English by Shiba Yoshinobu 斯波義信. For discussions of the compilation, structure, editions, and historical value of the Long Draft, see Hartman, “Chinese Historiography in the Age of Maturity,” 51–52; Sudō, “Minami sō no sumomo tō to zoku shi osamu toori kan chouhen no seiritsu,” 469–512; Pei Rucheng and Xu Peizao, Xu zizhi tongjian changbian kaolüe. For detailed chronological biographies of Li Tao, see Wang Deyi, Li Tao fuzi nianpu; and Wang Chenglüe and Yang Jinxian, Li Tao xuexing shiwen jikao, 3–35.

25. The Huangsong tongjian changbian jishi benmo 皇宋通鑒長編紀事本末 by Yang Zhongliang 楊仲良 (thir-teenth century), who rearranged chronological entries of the Long Draft into topical narratives, offers the most comprehensive thematic survey of late Northern Song history. For a detailed textual analysis of Yang’s work and its relationship with the Long Draft and the Learning of the Way movement, see Hartman, “Bibliographic Notes on Sung Historical Works,” 177–200. On the basis of Yang’s work and other sources, a Qing scholar Huang Yizhou 黄以周 (1828–1899) reconstructed the lost entries of the Long Draft in his Xu zizhi tongjian changbian shibu 續資治通鑑長編拾補, which also serves as a valuable reference for late Northern Song history. For outlines of major events in the late Northern Song, see Chen Jun’s Huangchao biannian gangmu beiyao 皇朝編年綱目備要 or shorter chronicles like the Huangsong shichao gangyao 皇宋十朝綱要 by Li Zhi 李埴 (1161–1238) and the Songshi quanwen 宋史全文 by an anonymous author. For studies of Chen Jun and his work, see Xu Peizao, “Huangchao biannian gangmu beiyao kaolue,” 450–69, and Hartman, “Chen Jun’s Outline and Details,” 273–315.

26. For detailed discussions of how Southern Song Learning of the Way scholars and their moral values influ-enced Song historiography and projected an increasingly gloomy image of the subjects associated with late Northern Song reformist administrations, see Hartman, “The Reluctant Historian,” 100–148; “Chen Jun’s Outline and Details,” 273–315; “A Textual History of Cai Jing’s Biography in the Songshi,” 517–64; and “The Making of a Villain,” 86–105.

27. See Levine, Divided by a Common Language and “Terms of Estrangement,” 131–70, for discussion of faction-alist rhetoric in the Northern Song. Recently Cong Ellen Zhang has discussed how factional politics influ-enced the writing of epitaphs in the Northern Song. See Zhang, “Bureaucratic Politics and Commemorative Biography,” 192–216.

28. In addition to the biographies in the official history Song shi 宋史, which was compiled in the Yuan period,

Introduction 7

Competing agendas of different agents

The founding emperors of the Song were aware of the potential threat posed by their subordinates to their supreme authority over state administration. Hence, a constitutional division of civil and military authorities as well as “an institutionally embedded system of checks and balances” were installed for the sake of avoiding the arbitrary exercise of state power.29 In the arenas of education and examination, Song emperors appointed examiners on an ad hoc basis and installed measures of ano-nymity in examinations in order to prevent their subjects from manipulating the recruitment channel to promote favoritism, the end result being a great aggrandize-ment of the emperors’ power.30 In addition, emperors also assumed direct control over the final selection and ranking of candidates after the palace examination (dianshi 殿試) was adopted in 973, which allowed the evolution of personal bonds between the sovereign and prospective officials.31

Yet some officials in privileged positions still managed to exploit the examina-tion system to pursue their own interests, as John Chaffee has shown, managing to help their relatives obtain credentials through informal channels like “avoidance examinations” (bietou shi 別頭試) particularly in the Southern Song.32 The emperor’s dominance over the recruitment of officials was further challenged after implemen-tation in the 1070s of the university’s Three Hall system (sanshefa 三舍法). Under this scheme, students were divided into three categories: newly admitted students were assigned to the Outer Hall (waishe 外舍). They could then be promoted to the Inner Hall (neishe 內舍) and gradually to the Upper Hall (shangshe 上舍). Upper Hall students with outstanding academic results and proven moral conduct could be nominated for office without passing the civil service examinations. Teachers in the metropolitan schools, like examiners before them, were empowered to nomi-nate outstanding students to become officials.

some works by Song contemporaries like Zeng Gong’s 曾鞏 (1019–1083) Long Ping ji隆平集, Wang Cheng’s王稱 (twelfth century) Dongdu shilüe東都事略, Du Dagui’s 杜大珪 (twelfth to thirteenth centuries) Mingchen beizhuan wanyanji 名臣碑傳琬琰集, and a number of Southern Song local gazetteers 地方志 also contain more primary biographical accounts. For discussions of the historical value of the above works, see Wang Ruilai, “Long Ping ji shiyi,” 8–34; Shu Renhui, “Dongdu shilüe” yu “Songshi” bijiao yanjiu; Cai Chongbang, “Songdai Sichuan shixue jia Wang Cheng yu Dongdu shilüe,” 23–29; He Zhongli, “Wang Cheng he tade Dongdu shilüe,” 249–68; Hargett, “Song Dynasty Local Gazetteers and Their Place in the History of Difangzhi Writing,” 405–42; and Dennis, Writing, Publishing, and Reading Local Gazetteers in Imperial China, 1100–1700. Apart from biographies, anecdotal as well as epitaphic sources that are either newly excavated or reprinted in anthologies of Song literati are also invaluable primary sources of Song people. See Huang Kuanchung, “Songshi yanjiu de zhongyao shiliao,” 143–85 and Schottenhammer, “Characteristics of Song Epitaphs,” 253–306. For studies of Song anecdotal sources as well as their compilation, circulation and historical value, see De Weerdt, “The Production and Circulation of “Written Notes” (biji),” 19–47 and Zhang Hui, Songdai biji yanjiu. See also Ding Chuanjing, Songren yishi huibian for an excerpt of anecdotal sources of Song people, which is translated as A Compilation of Anecdotes of Sung Personalities by Djang and Djang.

29. Smith, “Introduction,” 21.30. Chaffee, The Thorny Gates of Learning, 182.31. Araki, Sōdai kakyo seido kenkyū, 284–89; Miyazaki, China’s Examination Hell, 74–75; Zhu Shangshu, “Songdai

keju dianshi zhidu kaolun,” 109–10.32. Chaffee, The Thorny Gates of Learning, 95–115.


With university teachers diluting the sovereign’s supremacy over official recruitment and senior officials exploiting the Imperial University to perpetuate their networks, how did Song emperors respond? The following dictum of Emperor Zhenzong (968–1022, r. 997–1022) suggests a common tactic of emperors to counter the problem: “It is important to have people of different opinions stirring each other up, so that no one dares to do wrong.”33 且要異論相攪，即各不敢為非 Emperor Renzong skillfully implemented his father’s teachings in the political realm by balancing the power of civil officials with that of imperial in-laws and military generals, to a degree that neither of them became dominant enough to undermine imperial authority.34 To what extent did the successors of Zhenzong and Renzong adhere to this principle, which became enshrined in the “Family Instructions of the Ancestors” (zuzong jiafa 祖宗家法),35 in order to counter their subjects’ clout within the university?

The topic of the Song emperors’ assertion of supreme authority in the educa-tional realm raises the widely discussed but unresolved question of whether the Song period gave rise to autocracy,36 and more specifically how autocracy evolved over the course of the Song. In an era when senior statesman Wen Yanbo 文彥博 (1006–1097) dared to proclaim, “Your Majesty does not share the country with the common people; your Majesty shares it with scholar-officials”37 為與士大夫治天下，非與百姓治天下也, how did Song scholar-officials, namely elites who helped

33. XCB, 213.5169. The translation is adopted and modified from Smith, “Shen-tsung’s Reign and the New Policies of Wang An-shih,” 363.

34. Ho Koon-wan, Panlong fufeng.35. For discussions of how the “Ancestors’ Family Instructions” of Song emperors impacted on Song political

culture, see Deng Guangming, “Songchao de jiafa he Beisong de zhengzhi gaige yundong,” 124–43; Deng Xiaonan, Zuzong zhifa; Lamouroux and Deng, “The ‘Ancestors’ Family Instructions’,” 79–97.

36. In his renowned periodization of Chinese history, Japanese historian Naitō Torajirō 內藤虎次郎 (1866–1934) highlighted the transformation from the aristocratic Tang dynasty to the autocratic Song dynasty as one of the most salient features of the transition from a medieval to modern China. This hypothesis was further elaborated by his student Miyazaki Ichisada 宮崎市定 (1901–1955), who concluded that institutionalization of autocracy, signified by the emperor’s assumption of ultimate responsibility over decision making, was completed in the early Song. See Naitō, “Gaigua di Tang Song shidai guan,” 10–18; Miyazaki, “Dongyang di jinshi,” 153–241; Lau Nap-yin, “Hewei Tang Song biange,” 125–71; and Luo, “A Study of the Changes in the ‘Tang-Song Transition Model’,” 99–128. For a recent discussion of how the hypothesis of Tang-Song transition evolved and its impact on the scholarship in connection with the Tang-Song period, see Li Huarui, Tang Song biange de youlai yu fazhan. Chinese historian Qian Mu 錢穆 (1895–1990) also contended that over-centralization of power in the monarch at the expense of the chief councilor in the Song period was propitious for the later growth of despotism. See Qian Mu, “Lun Songdai xiangquan,” 455–62; Guoshi dagang, 554–56 and Zhongguo lidai zhengzhi deshi, 76. In his critique against Karl Wittfogel’s (1896–1988) environmentally deterministic proposition of oriental despotism in Chinese history, Frederick Mote (1922–2005) also showed the rise of autocracy in the Song period with reference to the realm of political thought. Echoing Qian Mu, Mote elaborated how the brutalization of the Yuan (1271–1368) government ultimately led to the peak of despotism under the founding emperor of the Ming (1368–1644). Contrarily, John Dardess argued that it is inappropriate to label the Song emperors, many of whom had obscure personalities and failed to exert able leadership during dynastic crisis, as autocrats, though he concurred with the view that autocratic rule had been entrenched under the Ming founder. See Mote, “The Growth of Chinese Despotism,” 1–41 and Dardess, Confucianism and Autocracy and “Did the Mongols Matter?” 111–34.

37. XCB, 221.5370.

Introduction 9

the emperor to govern, respond to the emperor’s rising power? Case studies since the 1980s have offered a range of views on the matter.

Deng Xiaonan 鄧小南 and Christian Lamouroux have argued that the scholar-officials managed to limit the sovereign’s power through their manipulation of the family instructions to which Song emperors needed to adhere.38 Based on his comprehensive study of the interaction between Emperor Zhenzong and his coun-cilors, Wang Ruilai 王瑞來 argued that the power of the emperor was in decline in the Song period, as the administrative role of the emperor was constrained by the bureaucratic system. In this way, the emperor had merely become the symbolic head of state.39 Contradicting Wang Ruilai’s supposition about the merely symbolic functions of the emperor, Zhang Qifan 張其凡 and Zhang Bangwei 張邦煒 stressed the emperors’ dominance in political affairs as evidence of their rising power. At the same time, scholar-officials’ power appears to have been ascendant, based on the added administrative responsibilities entrusted to them. It was the interdependence of their power relationship that explains why emperors and scholar-officials ruled the realm in complementary, rather than antagonistic, fashion.40 Paul Smith argues that this “consolidation of executive authority in the inner court, comprised above all by the sovereign and his chief councilors,” began to take shape when the New Policies (xinfa 新法) were launched in the 1070s and continued to grow till the end of the Southern Song.41

In contrast with views about the rising power of scholar-officials, the emperor’s supremacy in Song politics has also been posited by many scholars, although con-sensus has yet emerged on when autocratic rule “matured” or reached its apex for the dynasty. Liu Jingzhen’s 劉靜貞 study of the implementation of imperial power under the first four Song emperors suggested that autocracy was basically attained through the centralizing of monarchical powers by the end of the second reign, with this autocratic system of government winning a wide acceptance among scholar-officials.42 Through a nuanced analysis of the palace examination questions from 1070 onwards, Peter Bol showed how autocracy rose to new heights when pro-reform emperors attempted to transform society through universal kingship and activist governance based on ancient models.43 In his study of early Southern Song politics, James T. C. Liu showed how the imperial whim of Gaozong (1107–1187, r. 1127–1162) was realized through initially the rapid reshuffle of councilors and

38. Lamouroux and Deng, “The ‘Ancestors’ Family Instructions’,” 79–97; Deng Xiaonan, Zuzong zhifa; Lamouroux “’Old Models’,” 291–319.

39. Wang Ruilai, Sōdai no kōtei kenryoku to shitaifu seiji; “Lun Songdai huangquan,” 144–60; “Lun Songdai xianggquan” 106–20; and “Zouxiang xiangzhenghua de huangquan,” 208–31. For discussions of Song scholar-officials’ attempts to restrain the emperor’s power, see Cheng Minsheng, “Lun Songdai shidafu zhengzhi dui huangquan de xianzhi,” 56–64.

40. Zhang Qifan, “Huangdi yu shidafu gongzhi tianxia shixi,” 114–23; Zhang Bangwei, “Lun Songdai de huang-quan he xiangquan,” 60–68.

41. Smith, “Introduction,” 26.42. Liu Jingzhen, Beisong qianqi huangdi he tamen de quanli.43. Bol, “Whither the Emperor?” 103–34 and “Emperors Can Claim Antiquity Too,” 173–205.


subsequently the long tenure of the emperor’s absolutist surrogate.44 Gaozong’s suc-cessor, Xiaozong (1127–1194, r. 1162–1189), also preferred to reinforce imperial powers, as seen in his personal involvement in personnel appointments at nearly all levels, ranging from fiscal management to military affairs and border policies. Xiaozong’s absolutist rule, to employ Lau Nap-yin’s term, can also be seen in his inclination toward favoritism, such that opposing views from his senior administra-tors or remonstrance officials received short shrift.45

Diverging views on the nature of Song government with respect to the power dynamic between emperors and scholar-officials, I suspect, may originate from dif-ferent definitions of autocracy among scholars. As Bao Weimin 包偉民 has pointed out, “autocracy” in Western languages often “refers to a form of oligarchy in which a ruler takes direct control of administrative power,” whereas in Chinese, it refers to a ruler who acts arbitrarily or presides over an absolutist political system.46 This work engages the scholarly discussion of autocracy in the Song from the perspec-tive of the emperor’s involvement in the development and administration of the Imperial University, which can be characterized across the spectrum from nonin-terference in university affairs in the late reign of Renzong, to assiduous concern for educational development under Taizu (927–976, r. 960–976), who frequently visited the metropolitan schools, and ultimately to overwhelming dominance under Shenzong. Shenzong not only formulated a set of comprehensive school regulations to safeguard the emperor’s supreme authority and limit the purview of university personnel over the recruitment of officials, but he also collaborated with his sub-ordinate censors to remove potential challengers from the university (chapter 3). Shenzong’s intervention in university affairs became a vehicle to enforce an absolut-ist government, one checked by neither nongovernmental nor intragovernmental forces. Unlike those censors who assisted the sovereign to assert imperial authority in exchange for political rewards, the group of anti-reformers of the Yuanyou reign chose to compete with the monarch in the educational realm intent on constraining unlimited imperial powers (chapter 4). Subtle contests and collaborations between emperors and scholar-officials, particularly in the last five decades of Northern Song, shows that autocracy did not develop in a linear fashion, while shedding new light on the power relations between rulers and subjects.47

Apart from addressing the struggle between the sovereign and scholarly elites, this work discusses how scholar-officials competed and negotiated among them-selves, at both the individual and collective levels. Divided by ideological and politi-cal differences, senior courtiers like Ouyang Xiu 歐陽修 (1007–1072) and Wang

44. Liu, China Turning Inward.45. Lau Nap-yin, “The Absolutist Reign of Sung Hsiao-tsung.”46. Bao Weimin, “Review of Emperor Huizong and Late Northern Song China,” 264–65.47. For an analysis of the constraints of ministerial and monarchical power in the Song period, see Cheng

Minsheng, “Lun Songdai shidafu zhengzhi dui huangquan de xianzhi,” 56–64. See also Zhang Bangwei, “Lun Songdai de huangquan he xiangquan,” 60–68 for a discussion of the power relations between emperors and councilors.

Introduction 11

Anshi and eminent university figures like Shi Jie 石介 (1005–1045), Sun Fu 孫復 (992–1057) and Hu Yuan 胡瑗 (993–1059) attempted to exert their ideological influence at the university through the promotion of their preferred writing styles and/or classical exegeses. Some were more successful than others, depending on the support they garnered and the resistance they met. Besides, the ways in which their works and deeds were represented to posterity also affected their intellectual legacies, which varied from time to time. The developmental trajectory of the learn-ing of Wang Anshi, which began to dominate the intellectual arena starting in the mid-1070s until its demise in the mid-1120s, helps to illustrate the matter. Drawing upon insights from earlier works that studied how institutions shaped the Learning of the Way movement in the Southern Song,48 this book examines how Wang Anshi exploited the Imperial University to promote his own school of thought. It also dis-cusses how “heterodox” scholars, such as some early thinkers of Daoxue, contested state orthodoxy.

Competition among scholar-officials at a collective level was exemplified by factional clashes between reformers and anti-reformers.49 How far did factional politics filter down to the university campus? Driven by their vision to transform society through an expansion of state institutions, the reformers preferred expand-ing government education and transforming it into a channel to recruit officials. Contrarily, anti-reformers in the mid-1080s, under the lead of Sima Guang 司馬光 (1019–1086), generally revered the cumulative wisdom from the past.50 Perceiving that social custom can be improved through the perfection of a government’s struc-ture and operation and deeming the creation of new institutions unnecessary, they opposed the launch of a school promotion system and advocated reforms within the existing examination system.51 Institutional changes at the Imperial University from the 1070s onwards were partly driven by the contending views of the two factions and their relative power at court. The rise and fall of a particular faction was mani-fested not only in policy revisions, but also in the reshuffling of staff members in administrative bureaus. Personnel changes at the Imperial University (see chapters 3 and 4) suggested another common point among the reformers and anti-reformers alike. Apart from adopting a similar political rhetoric to denounce their political opponents,52 the two factions were both keen to exert their influence on the univer-sity’s environment through intermediaries—teachers in the school.

48. Linda Walton explored the relationship between the rise of the Learning of the Way and the academy move-ment, while Hilde De Weerdt examined how political and intellectual groups interacted in the examination field and shaped examination standards. See Walton, Academies and Society in Southern Sung China and De Weerdt, Competition over Content.

49. Levine, Divided by a Common Language; Luo Jiaxiang, Pengdang zhizheng yu Beisong zhengzhi; Shen Songqin, Beisong wenren yu dangzheng; Xiao Qingwei, Beisong xinjiu dangzheng yu wenxue; and Tu Meiyun, Beisong dangzheng yu wenhuo.

50. Ji, Politics and Conservatism in Northern Song China, 2.51. Bol, “Government, Society, and State,” 184–85. Bol’s article offers a comparison of the political visions between

Wang Anshi and Sima Guang, the respective leader of the reformers and anti-reformers. 52. Levine, Divided by a Common Language and “Terms of Estrangement,” 131–70.


Yet teachers were not mere pawns of the reformist and anti-reformist leaders, as they did not necessarily agree with the values held by their superiors. Moreover, they had their own agendas in mind. How to better equip students for examinations, for example, was a common problem that many lecturers faced, since the reputa-tions and career prospects of teachers depended on the performance of students in the recruitment exercises. The interests of teachers also diverged when some of them intended to impose upon the metropolitan schools their preferred literary style, classical interpretations, pedagogy and teaching style. Under such circum-stances, teachers at the Imperial University needed not only to discuss, cooperate, or compete with their peers, but also to negotiate with higher authorities.

The primary objective for most university students was to enter officialdom. To maximize their chances of success in the school promotion system, some ambitious students exhausted every possible means, even bribery, to court the favor of teach-ers and influential officials. In contrast, some students withdrew from their studies and resorted to alternative channels when they perceived that the institutional settings of the metropolitan schools worked against their interests.53 “Aristocratic” youths in the Directorate School, as we will see in the first chapter, preferred private tutoring and “protection privilege” (yin 蔭) to government education.54 One student, Huang You 黃友 (1080–1126), even considered volunteering for war in the northwest against the Tangut Xi Xia (1038–1227) as preferable to studying at the Imperial University. 55 Other frustrated students, rather than withdraw from school, appealed directly to the throne proposing top-down reforms that could better serve their interests. More daring students criticized influential court officials and gov-ernment policies, ignoring the potential consequences for their career prospects. Such diverse, sometimes contradictory, agendas not only shaped the behavior of students, but they also occasionally forced institutional change upon the Imperial University and elsewhere.

Over the course of the Northern Song, emperors, court officials, teachers, and students competed and negotiated over the above agendas in the university envi-ronment, which lead to changes in educational policies that occurred neither in a linear nor a progressive fashion but back-and-forth due to ongoing resistance. Policy changes at a politicized Imperial University to be discussed in this mono-graph shed light on subtle power struggles between emperors and their subjects as well as factional disputes within the bureaucracy over ways to perpetuate political influence. Apart from analyzing Song politics through a top-down perspective that

53. For studies of the lives and activities of students in Song government schools, see Miyazaki, “Sodai no daigakusei seikatsu,” 365–401 and Lee, “Life in the Schools of Sung China,” 45–60 and Government Education, 173–96.

54. The “protection” privilege allowed senior officials to confer official rank upon their kinsmen. See Lo, An Introduction to the Civil Service of Sung China, 102–9; Ebrey, “The Dynamics of Elite Domination in Sung China,” 502–6 and Hartman, “Sung Government and Politics,” 55–57 for brief surveys of this method of entry in English. For detailed discussions, see You Biao, Songdai yinbu zhidu yanjiu and Umehara, Sōdai kanryō seido kenkyū, 423–500.

55. SS, 452.13269.

Introduction 13

focuses mainly on how court politics filtered into the university environment, this study also takes a bottom-up approach by exploring the responses of teachers and students to the state’s imposition of political and ideological controls in order to see how they contested political authority. It aims to offer not only a more comprehen-sive understanding of Song politics on issues like the degree of autocracy and the complexity of factionalism, but also a new framework to analyze political institu-tion and policy formulation in premodern China.

Structure of this book

The six chapters of this book follows largely a chronological order, which better con-textualizes the interactions of different agents that shaped the institutional evolution of the Imperial University to avoid anachronistic arguments. Chapter 1 discusses how the Song court and university personnel responded to the diverse learning atti-tudes of two groups of students—scions of senior officials given to be dismissive of government education and commoners keen on pursuing education—for the first ninety years since the dynasty’s founding. It shows that several “reforms” at the met-ropolitan schools in the mid-1040s, among them the detachment of the Imperial University from the Directorate School, the stipulation of a mandatory attendance requirement, and the convergence of school curriculum and examination topics, were in fact changes that evolved from earlier attempts to satisfy the needs of com-moners while increasing the motivation to learn among “aristocratic” youths.

By the 1040s, the gap between the school curriculum and examination topics was gradually bridged. Thirty years later in the 1070s the reformers installed the Three Hall system at the Imperial University to combine government education with recruitment of officials. Through an examination of the roles that three promi-nent scholars—Hu Yuan, Sun Fu, and Ouyang Xiu—played in the university envi-ronment, chapter 2 considers the extent to which the Imperial University inherited earlier trajectories of development to lay the foundation for future political reforms. Ouyang Xiu’s high-handedness in banning the Imperial University writing style (taixue ti 太學體) on the departmental examination (shengshi 省試), I would argue, represents a response to the pluralistic intellectual atmosphere at the university that the lecturers Hu and Sun had pushed to newer heights. The manner in which Ouyang advanced his intellectual agendas in the dual arenas of examination and education very likely inspired Wang Anshi to adopt similarly high-handed tactics two decades later.

Chapter 3 discusses the installation of a school promotion mechanism at the Imperial University in 1071 as a product of negotiation and compromise between emperor Shenzong and reform-minded scholar-officials. Implementation of the Three Hall system triggered an increasingly politicized Imperial University, signified by Wang Anshi’s elimination of dissenting lecturers while exploiting educational institutions to promote his own school of thought. The final part of this chapter


discusses the response of the emperor to Wang Anshi’s dominance. By removing Wang’s disciples from teaching positions and installing a comprehensive regula-tory framework to administer the metropolitan schools, the emperor reclaimed his authority over official recruitment.

After the death of Shenzong in 1085, most of the reform measures in education and examinations were abolished when the anti-reformers held sway in the court. Chapter 4 shows how the anti-reformers mythologized the Imperial University in the 1050s as an ideal prototype, which served not only as a basis to criticize the Three Hall system but also as a tool to limit the prerogatives of the teenage emperor Zhezong. Yet when Zhezong resumed personal rule in 1093, he reinstated and further expanded Shenzong’s practices at the Imperial University, through which imperial authority was reinforced once again. Frequent reversals of university per-sonnel, school curriculum, and examination topics in less than two decades are manifestations of fierce contests among different factions at court.

To recruit more morally upright officials, emperor Huizong, with the help of his chief councilor Cai Jing 蔡京 (1047–1126), extended the Three Hall system at the Imperial University empire-wide in the early twelfth century. Chapter 5 traces the actual implementation of this recruitment channel in connection with the metro-politan schools. It reveals that some apathetic and corrupt administrators exploited the systems to pursue their personal agendas, thereby corrupting the idealistic poli-cies of the Song court. In response to the dominance of court surrogates, Huizong initially attempted to reclaim imperial authority in the educational realm and ulti-mately abolished this idealistic project in 1121 as he could no longer benefit from it.

Chapter 6 offers a critical analysis of the effectiveness of the political and ideo-logical control that Cai Jing imposed at government schools through a prosopo-graphical survey of teachers and students in the Imperial University. Despite the fact that teachers were required to report the illicit deeds of students, some of them did not fully adhere to the regulations as prescribed by Cai Jing. As a result, some students were indulged to circulate prohibited works and even criticize government officials and policies, which culminated in student protests and appeals in 1126. Compared with Cai Jing’s failure, Huizong’s efforts to recruit morally upright offi-cials proved not to be in vain after all, since some students demonstrated their loyal endeavors to save the Song in the midst of the Jurchen invasions.

After summarizing the principal findings and major arguments of this book, the concluding chapter discusses the legacy of the Three Hall system and the modern implications of the Northern Song experiments to recruit moral officials. The Imperial University was a site where different political actors competed over their agendas, which included the assertion of imperial authority, the elimination of political opposition, the imposition of strict morality, the nomination of outstand-ing students, and the hope to enter officialdom. Competition and negotiation over these agendas led to changes in educational policies that impacted on the univer-sity’s development, which did not occur in a linear or progressive fashion, but rather

Introduction 15

back-and-forth due to ongoing resistance. Moreover, how the Imperial University actually operated also redefined the agendas of different actors and influenced their decisions and behavior. This case study of the fluid political processes revolving around the Northern Song Imperial University showcases the subtle interactions between institutions and agents in pre-modern China.

In 1085/3, the most powerful supporter of the New Policies, Emperor Shenzong, perished.1 His nine sui son successor, posthumously known as Emperor Zhezong, was too young to govern. Dowager Empress Gao高太后 (1032–1093), the mother of Shenzong and grandmother of Zhezong, hence acted as regent. For the sake of establishing her own authority, she summoned veteran officials like Wen Yanbo, Sima Guang, and Lü Gongzhu who served in the court of her deceased husband, Emperor Yingzong, to lead the government.2 Well-known for their aversion towards the New Policies, most of the reform measures were denounced and then abol-ished.3 As for education and examinations, what critiques were launched against the Three Hall system and in its defense? The first part of this chapter discusses how the anti-reformers attempted to detach official recruitment from schools through an examination of their proposals to rectify the metropolitan schools.

Despite sharing an archenemy in common—the reformers under the lead of Cai Que—and a similar vision that school education should nurture moral integ-rity, the anti-reformers should never be treated as a coherent group. Instead it was a loosely organized coalition, within which three distinctive factions named after their geographical region had traditionally been identified, namely the Shuo 朔 faction from Hebei, the Luo 洛 faction from Luoyang 洛陽, and the Shu 蜀 faction from Sichuan.4 The extent to which changes in educational policies and university personnel relate to the rise and fall of different factions, particularly at the begin-ning of Dowager Empress Gao’s regency in 1085–1086 and Emperor Zhezong’s assumption of personal rule in 1094, will be examined in this chapter.

1. SS, 16.313.2. Fang Chengfeng, Beisong wanqi de zhengzhi tizhi yu zhengzhi wenhua, 8–10.3. Levine, “Che-tsung’s Reign (1085–1100) and the Age of Faction,” 484–509; Ji, Politics and Conservatism in

Northern Song China, 165–80; Luo Jiaxiang, Pengdang zhizheng yu Beisong zhengzhi, 84–145.4. Levine, “Che-tsung’s Reign (1085–1100) and the Age of Faction,” 509–31 and Divided by a Common Language,

99–125; Luo Jiaxiang, Pengdang zhizheng yu Beisong zhengzhi, 146–71; and Wang Zengyu, “Luo, Shu, Shuo dangzheng bian,” 114–34. Recently scholars have advocated revisiting the nature of factional conflicts in the Yuanyou period. See Fang Chengfeng, Beisong wanqi de zhengzhi tizhi yu zhengzhi wenhua, 59–80; Hirata, “Songdai pengdang xingcheng zhi qiji,” 110–14; and Leung Sze-lok, “Beisong pengdang zhengzhi yanjiu moshi de huigu yu zhanwang,” 47–62.

4Factional Politics and Policy Reversals

Factional Politics and Policy Reversals 121

The previous chapter shows that Emperor Shenzong held sway over the process of recruiting officials after a comprehensive regulatory framework was installed to limit the purview of university professors. How did the anti-reformers react to such an autocratic legacy upon the death of Shenzong? This chapter discusses the ways in which the anti-reformers asserted their authority over the newly enthroned emperor, including the imitation of a “mythologized” Imperial University of the late Renzong era when the Song government maintained a laissez-faire attitude, the abolition of the regulations that were detrimental to learning customs in the metropolitan schools, and the restoration of the emperor’s visit to the Imperial University. How successful were these attempts in limiting Zhezong’s authority is then evaluated.

Critiques of the Three Hall system at the Imperial University5

In 1086/I2, right policy monitor (you zhengyan 右正言) Zhu Guangting, a disciple of Hu Yuan and a pioneer of the Luo faction, memorialized the emperor requesting to install prominent teachers as professors at the Imperial University. He detailed the reasons as follows:

In order to establish a peaceful foundation for the country, your subject perceives that the most urgent need is talent. To successfully nurture all talent under heaven, nothing comes before schools. How could talent be available if the court focuses on recruiting them, but not nurturing them? Nowadays the Imperial University and local schools, despite promising to promote talent, fail to nurture them primarily for lack of prominent teachers. For prominent teachers, their classical knowledge enables them to understand thoroughly the meaning of the sages, their conduct and righteous deeds serve as an exemplar for others to follow, and they genuinely take teaching and nurturing as their own responsibility. 立國家太平之基本者，莫急於人材。養天下人材之成就者，莫先於庠序。朝廷務要廣求人材，而不素為之養，則何由而得？今上庠與州郡學校雖名為興賢，而無養人材之實，所以然者，盖無名師之故也。夫所謂名師者，其經術足以窮聖藴，其行義足以為人表，又能至誠以教養為已任者是也。

Previously during the reign of Renzong, Hu Yuan was ordered to oversee the Imperial University. At that time most scholars followed his example, and hence lots of talent was successfully nurtured. But this situation does not exist today. How could a vast country extending to the four seas suffer from an insufficiency of people? The problem lies in lacking the will to identify talent. Schools nowadays do not emphasize rites and righteousness in their teaching and nurturance, caring only for harsh prohibitions and punishments. For the Classics that students studied or the conduct that they exhibited, it is hard to distinguish students who genu-inely understand from those who just blindly follow regulations. School officials

5. The following discussion of the metropolitan schools in the Yuanyou era has made reference to Terada, Sōdai kyōikushi gaisetsu, 112–21; Yuan Zheng, Songdai jiaoyu, 32–36.


just care for themselves and act cautiously, trying to avoid infringing upon those prohibitions. They hardly have spare time to study rites and righteousness! This should not be the situation at the Imperial University, the vanguard for promoting virtue. Now the court has almost eradicated all problematic regulations, but the formulation of superior policies is still imperceptible. To establish superior poli-cies, we must first and foremost appoint prominent teachers and promote schools that nurture talent. The vanguard for virtue should originate in the capital, and the wind will soon sweep all under heaven. 昔在仁宗朝，詔胡瑗典太學。當是時，天下學者翕然向風，所以成就人材為多，至今未見其繼者。豈國家之大，四海之廣無其人？患在不求之也。今庠序之中，不見以禮義教養，唯見以苛禁繩治。其所習經術，所修行義，孰為發明，孰為觀法，學官者區區自顧，苛禁之不暇，奚暇治禮義哉！甚非所以為首善之地也。今朝廷所去弊政幾欲盡，而所修善政未甚聞。臣以謂所修善政，莫先於置名師、興學校以養人材，首善自京師，而風動天下。

I humbly beg Your Majesty to order officials to widely recruit true Confucian scholars of wide repute for appointment at the Imperial University, empowering them to take teaching and nurturing as their own responsibility. The problematic Three Hall system as well as those harsh prohibitions should be abolished. When rites and righteousness are emphasized in the teaching of scholars, talent would naturally be nurtured and Your Majesty’s foundation for Grand Peace erected. Your subject sincerely hopes that Your Majesty can address this matter of benefit for all people under heaven.6 伏望聖慈詔大臣博求真儒為天下所共推者，使主太學，以教養為己任，罷三舍之弊法，去一切之苛禁，専務以禮義教養多士，自然可以成就人材，為陛下立太平之基本。臣願陛下留神，天下幸甚。

Hua Zhen 華鎮 (1052–ca. 1113), a former university student who was nomi-nated by two anti-reformers Sun Jue and Feng Ji 豐稷 (1033–1107) for the post of university professor in the late 1080s,7 also echoed Zhu Guangting’s proposal to install prominent teachers at the Imperial University. According to Hua, the failure of government schools to nurture talent owes much to the marginal quality of teachers. As a result, students were not pleased to the depths of their hearts and hesitated submitting themselves to teachers who lacked virtues.8 Instead of holding the teachers responsible, Zhu Guangting attributed the poor teaching at the elite institution to the harsh prohibitions and punishments imposed by the reformers. According to Zhu, these measures had inhibited the growth of a healthy learning environment. Partly for this reason, Zhu sought to abolish the Three Hall promo-tion system. So what were the harsh prohibitions to which Zhu referred? And what problematic elements in the Three Hall system necessitated its abolition? Although

6. SCZCZY, 79.861–62; QSW, 92:373.7. See QSW, 122:359–60 for evidence of his study at the Imperial University. The biographical sketch of Hua

Zhen, written by his son Hua Chucheng, recorded that he was nominated by Sun Jue and Feng Ji to serve as University professor in the late 1080s. See QSW, 192:56–57.

8. QSW, 123:76.

Factional Politics and Policy Reversals 123

details are lacking in Zhu’s memorial, the discussion of other officials will provide some clues.

Likely in response to Zhu’s memorial, an edict was issued in 1086/I2, ordering leading officials to nominate two deserving candidates as teachers at the metro-politan and prefectural schools.9 But the crucial issue of abolishing the Three Hall system had yet to be touched upon. Nevertheless, minor revisions in the Three Hall system were underway. On the recommendation of left policy critic (zuo sijian 左司諫) Wang Yansou 王巖叟 (1043–1093), a close ally of the leader of the Shuo faction Liu Zhi, the court ordered in 1086/3 that the vice-director of education and univer-sity professors be in charge of the university’s yearly public test. As stipulated in the reform package in 1079, this examination related to promotion from the Outer to the Inner Hall. For the sake of impartiality and fairness, the court had designated officials other than directorate personnel to oversee its operation. However, Wang Yansou challenged the cost-effectiveness and worthiness of such arrangement, noting that 42 officials, 107 clerks, and 237 assistants were involved in the public test in 1086. As in the civil service examinations, students had to be sequestered for a month in the examination hall, with the court responsible for their subsist-ence. But only three, fourteen, and eight students were promoted from the Outer Hall to the Inner Hall in 1083, 1084 and 1085 respectively—a very modest yield. Moreover, the outcome of public test in the university appeared far less important relative to the civil service examinations, leaving costs unjustified by consequences. Wang therefore argued that the court should restore operation of the public test to carefully vetted directorate personnel.10

After persuading the court to revise the public test, Wang Yansou further pro-posed in 1086/5 rescinding the mandatory one-year attendance requirement at the Imperial University. According to existing regulations, students were required to study at the university for a minimum of one year in order to be eligible for the university’s nomination examination, an easier gateway to the higher level depart-mental examination in view of its generous nomination quota of six hundred.11 However, strict enforcement of the attendance rule led to delayed progress for certain students. Wang indicated that some poor students had to wait three more years for the next cycle of civil service examinations just because they failed to meet the minimum attendance requirement due to one day of absence. Some students who had returned late from their leave of absence were required to sit for the uni-versity’s readmissions examinations, failure at which caused students to be disquali-fied from the university’s nomination examination. Wang therefore requested that the minimum attendance requirement be abolished, and that all former university students be qualified for the nomination examination at the university. He further requested the Directorate of Education to allow students who had cumulatively

9. XCB, 370.8944; SS, 17.321.10. See XCB, 371.8991–92; SHY, ZG, 28.11; SS, 17.321 and 165.3911.11. XCB, 301.7325 and 310.7525.


studied for one year since 1080 to take the upcoming nomination examination. These several requests were approved and implemented in 1086/7.12 Interestingly, history repeated itself. In the aftermath of the Qingli reform forty years ago, a similar minimum attendance requirement at the university was abolished. The lifting of the requirement implies that school education was no longer deemed necessary to cultivating moral virtues in examination candidates. Neither was the university per se the ideal venue for scrutinizing candidates’ conduct. In the view of some anti-reformers, the role of the Imperial University should be similar to the Directorate School prior to the Qingli reform as merely a place to prepare students for the civil service examinations.

Paralleling the re-emphasis on the civil service examinations, the Three Hall system at the Imperial University became a primary target of the anti-reformers. Wang Yansou fiercely criticized it in a memorial in 1086/4. Echoing the view of Zhu Guangting as quoted above, Wang associated the Three Hall system with the poor learning customs at the Imperial University:

There are regulations appealing in name, but tormenting in practice. There are actions with good intentions, but hard to implement. The Three Hall system is of this sort. After the establishment of the Three Hall system, despite having students of estimable talent and extraordinary abilities, we have yet to see them success-fully selected and recruited for office. Nevertheless, the harmful effects of keen competition have surfaced. Rampant bribery, the downside of keen competition, results in a flourish of judicial reviews and litigations, which ultimately leads to complicated rules against suspicious deeds. As a result, professors are fatigued by clerical minutia while students are harmed by literary rules and regulations. The natural way of nurturing talent has yet to be revitalized, and wholesome learning at the school has nearly ceased to exist, which caused knowledgeable men to sigh.13 法有為名則美而行之則艱，事有用意則良而施之則戾者，三舍是也。三舍之法立，雖有高材異能，未見能取而得之，而奔競之患起。奔競之患起，而賄賂之私行；賄賂之私行，而獄訟之禍興；獄訟之禍興，而防猜之禁繁。博士勞於簿書，諸生困於文法，非復渾然養士之體，而庠序之風或幾乎息，此識者之所共歎也。

Wang then went on to express his vision of an ideal Imperial University:

Your subject believes that schools are places to gather and nurture groups of talented men, shaping their career ambitions while cultivating their repute. In this way, students can study in a relaxed manner to prepare for the civil service examinations. No alternative recruitment channel to the civil service examinations should exist, as multiple paths distract students and incite competition. When stu-dents concentrate on the benefits or detriments of their daily activities, it proves detrimental to the ideal of nurturing virtue and the way, and fails to promote

12. XCB, 377.9149–50; SS, 165.3911.13. XCB, 374.9059.

This book addresses the politics of higher education in Imperial China during the Northern Song period. Building on recent insights in new political history, this book focuses on the fluid political processes revolving around institutional changes and interactions between the different political agents involved. Similar to its European counterparts, where struggles between emperors and popes as well as chancellors and bishops helped shape universities in medieval Europe,1 the development of the Imperial University in Northern Song China was a product of negotiation and competition between emperors, scholar-officials, teachers, and students. Different agendas such as the assertion of imperial power, the elimination of political oppo-sition, the imposition of ideological control, the nomination of students, and the hope to enter officialdom competed in the university environment, which in turn shaped the development of the school. In addition, the way in which the Imperial University actually operated also redefined the agendas of different actors and influenced people’s decision and behavior. Previous chapters have highlighted the inextricable ties between politics and higher education and illustrated the subtle interactions between institutions and agents in Northern Song China with refer-ence to the Imperial University.

The development of the Imperial University did not occur in a linear or pro-gressive fashion: it underwent gradual transformation for a century after the found-ing of the dynasty, then rapid growth in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries with several interruptions in between, and ultimate decline after the 1120s. The detachment of the Imperial University from the Directorate School in the 1040s was a continuation of earlier ad hoc measures of the Song court to satisfy the lower elites’ demand for education, representing the transition from aristocracy to meri-tocracy. Another sign of ongoing transformation was the convergence of the school curriculum and examination topics, which was aimed at attracting more students to study at the metropolitan schools. In addition, reformers in the 1040s ques-tioned the effectiveness of the existing examination system in selecting talented and morally upright officials. They proposed a mandatory attendance requirement for students who studied in government schools prior to examinations and envisaged

1. Pedersen, The First Universities.

Conclusion

Conclusion 211

that a prolonged assessment of students’ moral character would better guarantee the quality of prospective officials. Despite the fact that this requirement had only been in force for less than a year, it laid the foundation for a radical reform at the metropolitan educational institutions in the 1070s.

With limited government intervention, university lecturers in the 1050s like Hu Yuan and Sun Fu put forward their preferred style of writing and classical inter-pretation without much constraint. Yet this pluralistic intellectual environment in the university was not appreciated by everyone. Some scholar-officials attempted to impose a standard to unify diverse practices, as Ouyang Xiu advocated his pre-ferred ancient prose style of writing in the departmental examination in 1057. Such a vision to unify custom was partially realized after Wang Anshi came to power in the 1070s. With the help of his disciples who served as lecturers at the Imperial University and the full endorsement of Shenzong, Wang managed to promulgate his own classical interpretations as the state orthodoxy in 1075.

Around the same time, the majority of scholar-officials reached a consensus on reforming the education and examination system: they aimed to recruit officials with integrity by transforming the recruitment mechanism and making government education more universally available and morally informed. The collected appeal of the scholar-officials managed to convince Emperor Shenzong, who endorsed the implementation of a school promotion mechanism at the Imperial University in 1071, likely because he was reassured of his supreme authority over the recruitment of officials under the newly established Three Hall system. In reality, the disciples of Wang Anshi who served as lecturers at the Imperial University were actually in control of the recruitment process, as they were empowered to nominate outstand-ing students to become officials. In response to a student’s complaint of unfairness in university examinations, Shenzong removed the lecturers who promoted favorit-ism and hence eliminated the residual influence of Wang Anshi that was a potential threat to his authority. For the sake of reclaiming power over official recruitment and preventing his subordinates from manipulating school promotions, Shenzong restricted the power of university personnel and installed a comprehensive set of school regulations in the early 1080s.

But the accession of a child emperor after the untimely death of Emperor Shenzong reignited the hopes of scholar-officials seeking greater autonomy from the monarch. Apart from downsizing the Three Hall recruitment channel, the anti-reformers, under the cloak of reviving the ideal of moral education in schools, also abolished restrictive regulations—the former emperor’s tool to ensure autocratic rule. In order to exert their influence over the teenage emperor, the anti-reformers persuaded Zhezong to imitate certain mythologized practices of his great grandfa-ther Renzong like studying diligently and adapting a laissez-faire attitude in govern-ance. They also urged Zhezong to visit the Directorate of Education, during which the emperor’s authority would be succumbed to the intellectual authority of the scholar-officials. Yet after the matured Zhezong assumed personal rule in 1093, he


reinstated and further expanded his father’s practices at the Imperial University, through which imperial authority was reinforced once again. Fierce factional con-flicts among scholar-officials also made the situation increasingly favorable to the emperor, as Ari Levine suggested, “factionalists appealed directly to the throne to promote their allies and to purge their adversaries, employing rhetoric that imag-ined the court as the ultimate source of ethical and political authority and empow-ered the monarch as the ultimate arbiter of personnel and policy decisions.”2

Even though the Three Hall system was expanded to government schools countrywide under the reign of Emperor Huizong, apparently fulfilling the ideal of recruiting morally upright and talented officials through government schools, school officials in the early twelfth century could no longer manipulate students’ promotion to officialdom as their predecessors did in the early 1070s. Yet Cai Jing managed to extend his political influence through his manipulation of recruitment channels like the Directorate School, placement examinations, and protection privileges. In response, Huizong exhausted other means to reassert the emperor’s authority in education by way of repeated issuance of imperially handwritten edicts. The ongoing presence of palace examinations in the face of school reforms and the heightened presence of Daoism on the university campus were also manifestations of the emperor’s authority in the educational realm. The ultimate abolition of the Three Hall system in 1121, I would argue, was a result of this subtle power competi-tion between the emperor and senior officials such as Cai Jing, since the emperor no longer deemed the pragmatic educational institutions as essential to strengthen his authority.

The development of the Imperial University in the last five decades of the Northern Song unveiled subtle power struggles between emperors and scholar-offi-cials in the university environment. Earlier depictions of either linear ascendance or decline in imperial power have oversimplified the conflict-riddled relationship between Song emperors and scholar-officials. Echoing a wide range of nuanced case studies about the relationship between rulers and ministers throughout the course of the Song period,3 this study shows that the relative power of emperors and scholar-officials varied from time to time under different circumstances. Neither side dominated the political arena throughout the entire course of the Northern Song. The active engagement of Emperors Shenzong and Huizong in the university environment corroborates Peter Bol’s suggestion that autocracy rose to a new height when pro-reform emperors attempted to transform the society through universal kingship and activist governance with reference to the ancient model.4 In contrast, imperial authority was constrained under circumstances like the accession of a

2. Levine, Divided by a Common Language, 2.3. See Wang Ruilai, Sōdai no kōtei kenryoku to shitaifu seiji; Liu Jingzhen, Beisong qianqi huangdi he tamen

de quanli; Liu, China turning inward; and Lau Nap-yin, “The Absolutist Reign of Sung Hsiao-tsung” for examples.

4. Bol, “Whither the Emperor?” 103–34 and “Emperors Can Claim Antiquity Too,” 173–205.

Conclusion 213

child emperor, as shown in the anti-reformers’ attempts to exert their influence over Zhezong. These findings reveal the complexities of Song political culture and help integrate the Song period into the scholarly discussion of the relationship between rulers and ministers within the longer span of Chinese history.

Competition and negotiation existed not only at the level between emperors and scholar-officials, but also among scholar-officials themselves, depending on whether their agendas converged or diverged. The reformers who promoted the New Policies and the anti-reformers who criticized the reform measures are usually considered as two distinct groups with almost nothing in common in terms of their political agendas. This study shows that majority of scholar-officials in the court in the late 1060s, among them Wang Anshi and Lü Huiqing who fervently promoted the reforms as well as Sima Guang and Lü Gongzhu who later became leaders of the anti-reformers, considered that the education and examination system had to be changed, though their opinions differed in how the reforms should be carried out. Yet when educational reforms were still under deliberation, the New Policies launched in the 1070s under the stewardship of Wang Anshi had already invoked fierce criticisms, some of which came from university lecturers and students. As a means to silence opposition and ensure ideological conformity among the group of prospective officials, Wang Anshi replaced those incumbent lecturers who were skeptical of the New Policies with his cronies and students. This led to the Imperial University becoming a battlefield of factional contests, in which reformers and anti-reformers alike competed to promote their own interests. This is attested to by the reshuffling of teachers at the Imperial University whenever a faction gained or lost power in the court. After the anti-reformers came to power in 1086, they replaced lecturers who had been appointed by the reformist government with their own followers like Zhang Lei, Lü Dalin, and You Zuo. When the reformers regained dominance in the court in 1094, they removed from office the lecturers who were closely associated with the anti-reformist administration. Instead candidates who obtained examination credentials during the reform eras were appointed to teach-ing positions at the Imperial University, on the assumption that they would adhere to the reform measures and the teachings of Wang Anshi. In addition, the reform-ist administration also planned a reshuffle of university students in the late 1090s with an aim to eliminate potential challengers of the reforms. The subtle changes of personnel at the Imperial University were manifestations of fierce factional contests, which extended beyond the court and affected the intellectual engagements of late Northern Song scholars in general.

As discussed in chapter 3, Wang Anshi exploited the government education system and promulgated his own New Commentaries as the standard for the civil service examinations and school curriculum in the 1070s. After a brief suspension during the anti-reformist Yuanyou era, the scholarship of Wang Anshi continued to enjoy the state’s patronage for another thirty years when the reformers were in power. The reformist administration in the early twelfth century even imposed


ideological control through the prohibition of other competing schools of scholar-ship such as the one of Su Shi and Cheng Yi. Yet certain school officials did not wholeheartedly support this reformist agenda. In turn, some students exploited loopholes in regulatory enforcement and smuggled works of prohibited writers into the school campus. Some disciples of the Cheng and Su brothers even managed to pass the examinations by slightly changing their writing style for the sake of appearances. All these show how “heterodox” scholars in the school environment contested the ideological orthodoxy.

Despite the differences in intellectual orientation between Wang Anshi and the Learning of the Way scholars—the former focused more on political reformism while the later emphasized moral cultivation,5 their attempts to reform social mores and to promote their own ideological beliefs are similar. Cheng Hao had a vision of unifying morality somewhat akin to Wang Anshi. Yang Shi, director of education in 1126, set out to assert the supremacy of the Cheng brothers through his manipula-tion of the university environment. Even though the ideals of these forerunners had yet to be received positively by the court and society during their lifetimes, their efforts somehow shaped the strategies of their followers in the Southern Song to promote the Learning of the Way against its rivals.6

The primary objective of students was to join the civil service, and the court somehow satisfied their interests through the establishment of the metropolitan schools, initially preparing them for examinations and subsequently offering them an alternative channel to enter officialdom. Located in the heart of Kaifeng, south of the imperial palace, the Imperial University was close to the Song court. The state envisioned that students could get closer to government officials serving and residing in the capital, allowing the former group to familiarize themselves with the latter’s lives and duties. Yet the agendas of the court and students did not always coincide, particularly between the group of outspoken students and the political authorities that attempted to suppress dissidents. Echoing the ascending status of policy essays in the civil service examinations and the rising power of speaking officials who concurrently supervised the Directorate of Education in the 1030s and 40s, the trend toward commenting on politics soon became in vogue at the metro-politan schools. The opinion power held by scholars inside the metropolitan schools remained a potential challenge to court officials and even emperors. The removal of directorate lecturers who were accused of indulging students’ criticisms against the New Policies in the 1070s and the banishment of a university student named Chen Chaolao who outlined fourteen “crimes” of chief councilor Cai Jing in the 1100s were just two of the many suppressions initiated by the reformist administra-tion against dissidents at the Imperial University. Yet stringent political measures

5. De Bary, “A Reappraisal of Neo-Confucianism,” 81–111; Bol, “This Culture of Ours” and Neo-Confucianism in History.

6. For a detailed discussion of how the Learning of the Way dominated the examination field in the Southern Song, see De Weerdt, Competition over Content.

academician (xueshi 學士), 3, 76, 82, 87academicians-in-waiting (daizhi 待制), 76academy, 4, 21n30, 51n10, 93

academy movement, 11n48Biyong 辟雍 academy, 159–61, 163,

165–71, 174–77, 184, 191, 194–96Suiyang (Yingtian prefectural) academy,

38, 39, 41accountant (zhubu 主簿), 32, 37, 38, 96, 143Advanced Institutes (guange 館閣), 76, 80,

117advanced scholar (jinshi 進士), 18, 19, 24,

25, 32, 34–39, 43, 47, 67, 73, 75, 76, 86, 94, 95, 112, 114, 131, 135, 136, 145–47, 151, 152, 182, 183, 186, 189, 193–96, 202advanced scholar in classical meaning

(jingyi jinshi 經義進士), 136advanced scholar in classical meaning

and literature (jingyi shifu jinshi 經義詩賦進士), 136

Advisory Office (jiangyi si 講議司), 159Analects of Confucius (lunyu 論語), 81, 100,

129, 146Ancestors’ Family Instruction (zuzong jiafa

祖宗家法), 8, 116ancient prose (guwen 古文), 40–42, 49,

62–64, 72Anecdotes of Eminent Statesmen Under

the Three Reigns (Sanchao mingchen yanxinglu 三朝名臣言行錄), 74

Anlu 安陸, 36anti-reform, 73, 89, 90, 130, 138, 143, 144,

189anti-reformer, 6, 10, 11, 14, 46, 107,

119–22, 124, 130, 132–46, 148–53, 155, 184, 185, 188, 211, 213

anti-reformist administration, 157, 213anti-reformist leader, 12, 134, 189

appointments made by theSecretariat-Chancellery (tangchu 堂除),

114n189Ministry of Personnel (buzhu 部注),

114n189assistant councilor (canzhi zhengshi 參知政

事), 17, 37n114, 101–3assistant rector (xuelu 學錄), 70, 71, 86,

108–10, 114, 129, 145, 166, 168, 195Attached Verbalization (Xici 繫辭), 61authoritative commentaries, 55, 91, 94autocracy, 8–10, 13, 103, 119, 142, 152n160,

212autocratic rule, 8n36, 9, 117, 152, 211autocratic emperor, 141, 155

avoidance examinations (bietou shi 別頭試), 7

Award and Celebration Compound (xiqing yuan 錫慶院), 30, 96

Ban Gu 班固 (32–92), 147, 186Baoyuan 寶元 (1038–1039), 57Bi Zhongyan 畢仲衍 (1040–1082), 108Bi Zhongyou 畢仲游 (1047–1121), 151Biyong. See academyBook of Ceremonies (yili 儀禮), 31n79Bozhou 亳州, 102Buddhism, 34, 41n139, 53, 55, 129Bureau on Classical Meaning (jingyi ju 經

義局), 94

Index

Index 253

Bureau of Military Affairs (shumi yuan 樞密院), 117, 200

Bureau of Personnel Evaluation (shenguan yuan 審官院), 27

Bureau of Policy Criticism (jianyun 諫院), 44, 45, 60, 97, 117, 134

Cai Jing 蔡京 (1047–1126), 14, 108, 131, 154–59, 167–69, 175, 176, 178–84, 187–92, 198, 200, 201, 207, 208, 212, 214

Cai Bian 蔡卞 (1058–1117), 109, 131, 148, 195

Cai Mao 蔡楙, 201Cai Que 蔡確 (1037–1093), 102, 103, 107,

108, 120, 130calamity (zai 災), 190Cao Chongzhi 曹崇之 (1082–1125), 193,

194Cao Tanglao 曹唐老, 193capital rank (jingguan 京官), 31, 32Cen Xiangqiu 岑象求, 136censor (yushi 御史), 10, 44, 76, 87, 90,

91n62, 99, 107, 130, 138, 139, 181, 187, 191, 199, 208censorial officials, 44n154, 45, 150, 208executive censor (yushi zhongcheng 御

史中丞), 60, 102, 125, 131, 136, 198, 205n143

investigating censor (jiancha yushi 監察御史), 144, 186

palace censor (dianzhong siyushi 殿中侍御史), 201

probationary investigating censor (jiancha yushi lixing 監察御史裏行), 102

Censorate (yushi tai 御史臺) 44, 45, 102, 103, 105–7, 117, 134

Central Secretariat (zhongshu sheng 中書省), 162

Chang Zhi 常秩 (1019–1077), 80, 88Changzhou 常州, 146, 166Chao Buzhi 晁補之 (1053–1110), 132n53,

185, 187chaos (luan 亂), 190

Chaowen Institute (chaowen guan 昭文館), 76

Chen Bian 陳抃, 207Chen Chaolao 陳朝老, 191, 208, 214Chen Cisheng 陳次升 (1044–1119),

148n148, 149Chen Dong 陳東 (1086–1127), 182, 199,

200, 202, 206, 208, 209, 215, 217Chen Gongfu 陳公輔 (1077–1142), 186n29,

192Chen Guan 陳瓘 (1057–1121), 147, 188n45,

189, 195, 196Chen Guoting 陳過庭 (1071–1130), 198Chen Kui 陳葵, 183Chen Liang 陳亮 (1143–1194), 58Chen Lie 陳烈, 63, 65, 72, 80Chen Shidao 陳師道 (1053–1101), 132Chen Xiang 陳襄 (1017–1080), 76, 79, 80Chen Xiong 陳雄, 102Chen Xu 陳旭 (later renamed Chen

Shengzhi 陳升之) (1011–1079), 65Chen Yuyi 陳與義 (1090–1138), 197Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032–1085), 58, 76–78,

82, 91, 151, 214Cheng Ju 程俱 (1078–1144), 171Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107), 68, 80, 126–30,

136–40, 149, 150, 157, 185, 191, 193–95, 198, 202, 214

chief councilor (zaixiang 宰相), 8, 9, 14, 33, 36, 37, 60, 73, 74, 85n45, 87, 93, 94, 107, 108, 119, 138n89, 141, 143, 154, 155, 157, 158, 167–69, 175, 178–81, 183, 187, 189, 190, 192, 197, 200, 205, 214

Chizhou 池州, 191Chong Shidao 种師道 (1051–1126), 200,

201Chongning 崇寧 (1102–1106), 155, 156,

160, 181, 184, 185, 193, 195Chu 楚, 206civil service examination, 1, 2, 4, 7, 19–23,

25, 26, 28, 36, 40–43, 48, 49, 60, 63, 66–69, 71, 75, 77, 79, 80, 82, 86, 92, 95, 98, 99, 109–12, 114, 118, 123, 124, 127, 133, 134, 151, 154, 157, 161–64, 171, 173, 176, 178, 179, 182, 184, 197, 213–16

254 Index

questions in civil service examination:discussion (lun 論), 39, 41n143, 43, 47,

58, 67, 86, 88, 137, 149, 165policy essay (ce 策), 39, 43, 44, 47, 58,

63, 67, 80, 86, 93, 159, 165, 183, 186, 197, 214

civil service selection (xuanju 選舉), 5classical commentaries, commentaries and

exegeses, 53–55, 56, 58, 61, 91, 137classical meaning (jingyi 經義), 52, 57, 165,

191, 196, 197commenting

on court affairs, 118on current affairs, 43, 58, 73on politics, 181, 208, 209, 214on state affairs, 45

communal nomination (xiangju lixuan 鄉舉里選), 82, 161, 164, 180

Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Governance (Zizhi tongjian 資治通鑑), 134, 147, 148, 185, 189, 195, 203

confession building (zisong zhai 自訟齋), 184, 185

Confucius 孔子 (551–479 BCE), 61, 84, 106, 116, 134, 142, 143, 159, 160, 163, 177, 188, 204

controller-general (tongpan 通判), 51n15, 158, 166, 197

Correct Meaning of Mencius (Mengzi zhengyi 孟子正義), 34

court rank (chaoguan 朝官), 22n82, 31county school (xianxue 縣學), 29, 65, 156,

159, 164Crow Terrace Poetry Case (wutai shian 烏

台詩案), 107Cui Song 崔頌 (919–968), 18Cui Yan 崔鶠 (1057–1126), 181Cui Yizheng 崔頤正, 34

Daguan 大觀 (1107–1110), 185, 195danger (wei 危), 190Daoism 33, 34, 41, 53, 129, 175n116, 212Daoist Classics/texts, 31, 175, 177, 178, 197Daoist priest, 175n118, 205Daozhou 道州, 191

demonstrator (xueyu 學諭), 86, 114, 137, 170

Deng Guan 鄧綰 (1028–1086), 96Deng Su 鄧肅 (1091–1132), 172, 191, 208departmental examination (shengshi 省試),

13, 20, 21, 24–26, 28, 31, 41–43, 49, 60, 61, 63, 65–68, 72, 77, 81, 98, 111, 112, 114, 118, 123, 133, 144, 145, 149, 158, 163, 164, 178, 186, 187n33, 191, 193, 211

Ding Anchang 丁安常 (1078–1142), 192Ding Teqi 丁特起, 203, 204Ding Zhigu 丁執古, 109director of education (guozi jijiu 國子祭酒),

27, 33, 42n144, 126, 128, 129, 131, 136, 139, 143–45, 157, 171, 172, 177, 186, 189, 190, 196–98, 201, 202, 206, 214director of Biyong, 166director of the Imperial University, 166

Directorate of Education (guozi jian 國子監), 16–30, 32–34, 36, 37, 39, 45, 50, 51, 60, 61, 66, 68, 69, 71, 76, 77, 87, 95, 96, 97, 99, 103, 108, 109, 112, 113, 115–18, 123, 126, 133, 137, 142, 143, 146, 150, 167, 170, 203–5, 208, 211, 214–16directorate examination (guozi jian shi

國子監試), 16, 20, 22–24, 27–29, 64, 66–69, 97, 114, 133, 145

Directorate School (guozi xue 國子學), 3, 12, 13, 18–32, 34, 36, 37, 39, 41–43, 48, 50, 51, 55, 56, 59, 61, 66, 67, 69, 79, 109, 124, 140, 155, 166–68, 175, 176, 210, 212

directorate supervisor (pan guozi jian 判國子監), 17, 35, 36, 45, 47, 71, 76, 79, 80, 87, 88, 92, 93, 97, 98, 101–4, 108, 109, 117, 137, 180, 190

Dong You 董逌 (ca. 1079–1140), 205–7Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 (179–104BCE),

186Dowager Empress Gao 高太后 (1032–

1093), 120, 133, 143–45, 152, 154, 157Dowager Empress Liu 劉太后 (969–1033),

34, 36Dowager Empress Xiang 向太后 (1046–

1101), 155, 182

Index 255

Draft of documents pertaining to matters of state in the Song Dynasty (Song huiyao jigao 宋會要輯稿), 5, 110, 111n169

drafting official of the Secretariat (zhongshu sheren 中書舍人), 76, 113n183, 117, 183, 189, 218

Du Fu 杜甫 (712–770), 187, 190Du Minqiu 杜敏求 (1039–1101), 144Duke of Zhou 周公 (ca. 1100 BCE), 46, 84,

85, 156

Eastern Office of Appraising Officials (shenguan dongyuan 審官東院), 108

education intendants (tiju xueshi 提舉學事), 162, 165, 169, 174

Eight Virtues of Conduct (baxing 八行), 193Elaboration of the meaning of venerating the

king in the Annals (Chunqiu zunwang fawei 春秋尊王發微), 50, 55

elementary school (xiaoxue 小學), 75, 102, 156, 167, 216

Encouraging Learning (quanxue 勸學), 113evil ministers (jianchen 姦臣), 103examination cohort (tongnian 同年), 186executory rank (xuanren 選人), 31expelling the barbarians (rangyi 攘夷), 55,

197Explanations of Characters (zishuo 字說),

146, 147, 188, 191, 192, 197

facilitated degree (te zouming 特奏名), 104factional blacklist (dangji 黨籍), 184family biography (jiazhuan 家傳), 194n81Fan Bailu 范百祿 (1030–1094), 142Fan Chunren 范純仁 (1027–1101), 60, 143Fan Chunyou 范純祐 (1024–1063), 60Fan Qiong 范瓊 (?–1129), 205Fan Tang 范鏜 (1073 jinshi), 108Fan Zhen 范鎮 (1008–1088), 35, 39, 59Fan Zhongyan 范仲淹 (989–1052), 1, 2, 17,

38, 39, 45, 46, 50–53, 60Fan Zuyu 范祖禹 (1041–1098), 141, 185Fang Shao 方勺 (1066–1141), 116Feng Dao 馮道 (882–954), 192Feng Ji 馮檝 (1075–1152), 199Feng Ji 豐稷 (1033–1107), 122, 131, 143

Feng Yuan 馮元 (975–1037), 32n82, 34, 37Fiscal Commission (zhuanyun si 轉運司),

112–13fiscal intendant (zhuanyun shi 轉運使), 32,

38Five Classics (wujing 五經), 55, 74, 75, 166,

216Book of Changes (yijing 易經), 31n79, 39,

53, 55, 61, 68, 125, 160, 166, 196Book of Documents (shujing 書經),

31n79, 32, 53, 94, 143, 160, 166, 177Book of Odes (shijing 詩經), 53, 63, 94,

100, 166, 177Records of Rites (liji 禮記), 166, 196Spring and Autumn Annals (chunqiu 春

秋), 50, 55, 56, 60, 62, 68, 133, 134, 146, 147, 151, 155, 186n29, 188, 192, 197

Flower and Rock Network (huashi gang 花石綱), 172, 200

Four Books (sishu 四書), 216Fuchuan 富川, 38Fu Bi 富弼 (1004–1083), 39, 46, 51, 60, 72,

74

Gaozong 高宗 (1107–1187, r. 1127–1162), 4, 9, 10, 85, 192, 207, 218

Gate of Eastern Splendor (donghua men 東華門), 200

Gate of Extreme Ritual (duanli men 端禮門), 184

Gate of Southern Fragrance (nanxun men 南薫門), 204

Ge Shengzhong 葛勝仲 (1072–1144), 159Geng Nanzhong 耿南仲 (?–1129), 171–72,

200Gong Yuan 龔原 (1039–1105), 89, 102, 105,

106, 144, 146, 196Great Completion Hall (dacheng dian 大成

殿), 160Gu Lin 顧臨 (1028–1099), 70, 126Guan Shichang 管師常, 80Guan Zhong 管仲 (?–645 BCE), 198Guangzhou 光州, 97Guo Zhen 郭稹 (ca. 1000–ca. 1040), 36–38Guo Zhizhang 郭知章 (?–1111), 144

256 Index

Gushi 固始, 97

Hall for Venerating Worthies (zhuanxian tang 尊賢堂), 129

Hall of Enlightenment (mingtang 明堂), 160, 175

Hall of Primary Excellence (shoushantang 首善堂), 56

Hall of the King Wenxuan (wenxuanwang dian 文宣王殿), 159, 160

Han Chuan 韓川, 186Han Cuiyan 韓粹彥 (1065–1118), 143Han dynasty/period (206 BCE–220 CE), 34,

50, 54–56, 76, 78, 186, 187Eastern Han (25–220), 63, 186Western Han (206 BCE–9 CE), 160

Han Jiang 韓絳 (1012–1088), 138Han Qi 韓琦 (1008–1075), 46, 50, 72, 143Han Wei 韓維 (1017–1098), 76, 77, 91Han Yu 韓愈 (768–824), 34, 40, 84Hanlin academician (Hanlin xueshi 翰林學

士), 37n114, 60–61, 117, 189–90He Dazheng 何大正, 182, 183He Lie 何烈, 204He Qun 何羣, 42He Shengzhi 何升之, 183He Tan 何郯 (1004–1072), 45He Zhengchen 何正臣 (1039–1099), 102,

103, 108He Zhizhong 何執中 (1044–1117), 188Hebei 河北, 46, 86, 87n53, 120Hedong 河東, 86, 87n53Hejian 河間, 200Henan 河南, 37, 193Hengzhou 衡州, 183High Court of Justice (dalisi 大理寺), 150Historical Records (shiji 史記), 38, 147History of the Han Dynasty (hanshu 漢書),

147, 186History of the Song Dynasty (Songshi 宋史),

19n14, 57n45, 103, 110n165, 111n169Honoring Confucius (chongru 崇儒), 5Hou Meng 侯蒙 (1054–1121), 179Hou Penglao 侯彭老, 183Hu Anguo 胡安國 (1074–1138), 194, 195

Hu Su 胡宿 (995–1067), 51Hu Yin 胡寅 (1098–1156), 171, 190, 205Hu Yuan 胡瑗 (993–1059), 11, 13, 48–53,

55–61, 65, 66, 68–72, 75, 96n88, 121, 126, 127, 129, 139, 140, 148, 211, 219Teachings of Hu Yuan, 57

function (yong 用), 57literature (wen 文), 57substance (ti 體), 57

Hua Zhen 華鎮 (1052–ca. 1113), 122, 131Huang Feng 黃豐, 206Huang Gui 黃珪 (?–1139), 167Huang Lian 黃廉 (1034–1092), 99, 101Huang Lü 黃履 (1032–1101), 97, 103Huang Shang 黃裳 (1044–1130), 174Huang Shicheng 黃時偁, 204Huang Tingjian 黃庭堅 (1045–1105), 185,

187, 193, 194, 203Huang Yin 黃隱, 138, 139Huang You 黃友 (1080–1126), 12Huang Zhe 黃哲, 201Huizong 徽宗 (1082–1135, r. 1100–1125), 3,

6, 10, 14, 104, 148, 154–57, 159–62, 164, 166–68, 170, 172–88, 190, 191, 193, 194, 199, 204–7, 212

Huzhou 湖州, 51, 52, 57, 60

Imperial University (taixue 太學), 2–6, 8, 10–15, 17–21, 23n44, 24, 26, 30, 31, 33, 40, 42, 45, 46, 48–53, 55, 58, 60, 61, 65–82, 85–95, 98–102, 109–19, 121–33, 135–40, 142–45, 147–52, 154, 155, 157–61, 164–71, 175–77, 181, 183, 184, 186, 189, 190, 192–96, 202, 203, 205, 208, 210–15, 217–18, 220

campus, 11, 18, 21, 25, 27, 29, 30, 40, 41, 44, 45, 47, 61, 68, 70, 75, 77, 94, 96, 105, 109, 137, 138, 145n127, 157, 159, 162, 173, 183, 193, 195, 201, 202, 204, 207, 209, 212, 214

Imperial University style (taixue ti 太學體), 13, 41n143, 62–64, 72, 91

imperially brushed handwritten edicts (yubi shouzhao 御筆手詔), 155, 172, 174, 178, 190, 212

Index 257

Inner Hall (neishe 內舍), 7, 65, 66, 77, 86, 87, 95–99, 102, 110, 112, 114, 123, 149, 157–59, 162, 165, 167, 176, 189

Inspector in Chief of the Metropolitan Cavalry Command (majun duyuhou 馬軍都虞侯), 30

Internal Classic (neijing 內經), 175investigating censor (jiancha yushi lixing 監

察御史), 144, 186

Jia Bin 家彬, 145Jia Changchao 賈昌朝 (998–1065), 36, 37,

39Jiang 絳, 22n36Jiang Jing 蔣靜 (1079 jinshi), 160Jiang Qi 江琦 (1085–1142), 191Jianzhong jingguo 建中靖國 (1101), 41, 50,

155Jiao Qianzhi 焦千之 (?–ca. 1101), 68n101,

89Jiaozhi 交趾, 186Jiayou 嘉祐 (1056–1063), 64, 98, 128, 140Jin dynasty (1115–1234), 199, 204, 205, 215Jin Junqing 金君卿 (ca. 1050), 66Jingde 景德 (1004–1007), 25Jingdong 京東, 38, 86, 87Jingxi 京西, 86, 87Jingyou 景祐 (1034–1037), 42Jingzhao 京兆, 75judicial inspector (sifa canjun 司法參軍),

169

Kaifeng 2, 3, 16, 18, 22, 24, 61, 66, 70, 71n112, 77, 101, 102, 109, 115, 118, 150, 159, 176, 192, 200, 201, 203–5, 207, 214

Kaifeng prefectural examination, 66, 67, 69, 97, 132, 133

Kangding 康定 (1040–1041), 42King Tang of Shang 商湯 (ca. 1675–1646

BCE), 84King Wen of Zhou 周文王 (ca. 1152–1056

BCE), 84King Wu of Zhou 周武王 (?–1043 BCE), 84Kong Anguo 孔安國, 53Kong Yingda 孔穎達 (574–648), 55

Later Jin (936–947), 18Later Zhou (951–960), 18, 25, 31n79Learning of the Way (Daoxue 道學), 4, 6,

11, 68, 77, 214lecturer (zhijiang 直講), 16, 17, 26, 27, 31,

32, 34–39, 45–49, 53, 56, 58, 59, 60, 63, 70, 72, 73, 76, 87, 88, 92, 93, 95, 98–100, 102, 103–6, 108, 109, 111, 113, 114, 119, 130, 131, 214

left policy critic (zuo sijian 左司諫), 123left executive assistant of the Department of

Ministries 尚書左丞, 178legitimate succession to governance (zheng-

tong 政統), 84legitimate succession to the Confucian way

(daotong 道統), 34, 84, 85n44Lei Guan 雷觀, 202Li Bai 李白 (701–762), 187, 190Li Bangyan 李邦彥 (?–1130), 172, 200, 202,

203Li Ding 李定 (1028–1087), 88, 92, 93, 108,

109Li Duanxing 李端行, 192Li Gang 李綱 (1083–1140), 200, 201Li Gefei 李格非, 132Li Gou 李覯 (1009–1059), 55, 58, 59Li Jia 李嘉, 170Li Jie 李誡 (1065–1110), 159Li Qiu 李璆 (?–1155), 167Li Tao 李燾 (1115–1184), 5Li Tuo 李梲, 201Li Xin 李新 (1062–1125), 171Li Yan 李彥 (?–1126), 200Li Yanzhang 李彥章, 187Li Zhi 李至 (947–1001), 31, 33Li Zongmeng 黎宗孟, 89Lian Hengfu 練亨甫, 93Lian Shunbin 連舜賓, 36Liang Sicheng 梁師成 (?–1126), 177, 200Liang Shimeng 梁師孟 (1020–1091), 89Liao dynasty (907–1125), 37, 44n153, 46,

199Lie Zi 列子, 165Lin Lingsu 林靈素 (1075–1119), 175n118Lin Xi 林希 (1035–1101), 88n56Lin Yan 林岩, 178

258 Index

Lin Yu 林遹, 149Lin Zi 林自, 145, 147, 148, 189Liu Anjie 劉安節 (1068–1116), 149, 157Liu Anshang 劉安上 (1069–1128), 149, 195Liu Anshi 劉安世 (1048–1125), 132Liu Ban 劉攽 (1023–1089), 2, 3, 76, 77, 81,

185Liu Caishao 劉才邵 (1086–1158), 193, 207Liu Chang 劉敞 (1019–1068), 75, 109n163Liu Cheng 劉拯 (?–ca. 1112), 145Liu Ji 劉幾 (later renamed Liu Hui 劉輝)

(1030–1065), 64Liu Jue 劉珏 (1078–1132), 182Liu Kai 柳開 (948–1001), 40, 54Liu Meng 劉蒙, 71Liu Mianzhi 劉勉之 (1091–1049), 193, 207Liu Qi 劉琦, 91n62Liu Siming 劉嗣明, 189, 190Liu Yi 劉彝 (1017–1086), 57Liu Zhi 劉摯 (1030–1097), 100, 115, 123,

125, 126, 130, 135, 136, 143, 144, 150Liu Zongyuan 柳宗元 (773–819), 34Long Draft of the Continuation of the

Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Governance (Xu zizhi tongjian changbian 續資治通鑑長編), 5, 6, 19n21, 57n45, 101, 110

lower class (xiadeng 下等), 165Lu Deming 陸德明 (556–627), 31n79Lu Dian 陸佃 (1042–1102), 89, 93, 106Lu Guan 路瓘, 171Lu Huizhi 陸徽之, 183Lu Kai 陸愷 (1060–1124), 169Lu Sui 路隨 (776–835), 36Lu Tong 盧侗 (?–ca. 1078), 89Lu You 陸游 (1125–1210), 53Lü Dafang 呂大防 (1027–1097), 143Lü Dalin 呂大臨 (ca. 1046–1092), 131, 185,

213Lü Gongzhu 呂公著 (1018–1089), 58,

76–79, 82, 91, 120, 213Lü Huiqing 呂惠卿 (1032–1111), 76, 80, 94,

95, 213Lü Tao 呂陶 (1031–1107), 138Luo 洛 faction, 120, 121, 130, 132Luoyang 洛陽, 120, 149

Luzhou 廬州, 169

Ma Duanlin 馬端臨 (1254–1323), 30, 185Ma Juan 馬涓, 185Ma Yuan 馬援 (14 BCE–49CE), 186Man Zhongxing 滿中行, 105managing affairs (zhishi 治事), 52mandatory attendance, 13, 17, 18, 28, 46,

210Mao You 毛友, 172Mei Hao 梅灝, 109Mei Yaochen 梅堯臣 (1002–1060), 58, 59,

63, 65, 72Mencius 孟子 (372–289 BCE), 34, 54, 84,

160, 188Mencius, 53, 71n112, 100, 129, 146, 197middle class (zhongdeng 中等), 165military affairs commissioner (shumi shi 樞

密使), 36Military Commission (zhizhi si 制置司),

217Mingdao 明道 (1032–1033), 57Mingzhou 明州, 217minimum attendance, 29, 123, 124Ministry of Personnel (libu 吏部), 79, 113,

114, 168Ministry of Rites (libu 禮部), 19, 36,

43n148, 68, 117, 125–27, 136, 157Morning Gathering Compound (chaoji

yuan 朝集院), 96

Nankang 南康, 166National Histories (guoshi 國史), 5national youth (guozi 國子), 19New Commentaries on the Three Classics

(Sanjing xinyi 三經新義), 95, 96, 119, 146, 147, 185, 188, 192, 196, 198, 213

New Policies (xinfa 新法), 9, 73, 82n32, 83, 88, 89, 92, 94, 95, 104, 107, 118–20, 131, 138 140, 141, 143–46, 148, 152, 156, 183, 188, 195n88, 208, 213, 214

New Tang History (Xin Tangshu 新唐書), 137

Ni Tianyin 倪天隱, 55Nie Shan 聶山 (later renamed Nie Chang 聶

昌) (1079–1127), 201–2

Index 259

Nine Classics (jiujing 九經), 32Northern Wei dynasty (386–535), 23Notes of the Eastern Pavilion (Dongxuan

bilu 東軒筆錄), 101

official functions (zhiguan 職官), 5ominous (xiong 凶), 190“On school education” (yixue zhuang 議學

狀), 74Orally transmitted meanings of the Book of

Changes (Zhouyi kouyi 周易口義), 55Outer Hall (waishe 外舍), 7, 77, 86, 92–94,

96, 97, 102, 108, 110, 112, 123, 149, 157–59, 162, 165, 177, 184

Outline and Details (gangmu 綱目), 6Ouyang Xiu 歐陽修 (1007–1072), 10, 13,

38–43, 45n160, 49, 52–54, 56, 60–65, 68, 72, 74, 75, 83n36, 91, 157, 211

Pacification Commission (xuanfu si 宣撫司), 217

palace censor (dianzhong siyushi 殿中侍御史), 201

Palace Command (dianqian si 殿前司), 201, 202

palace examination (dianshi 殿試), 7, 41n143, 60, 64, 93, 98, 116, 135, 164, 165, 167–69, 178, 183, 191, 212palace examination question, 9, 103–5,

178Pan Tesong 潘特竦 (1082–1139), 173parallel prose (pianwen 駢文), 40, 41n140Peng Ruli 彭汝礪 (1041–1094), 98, 99, 135Phonetic Meaning of the Mencius (Mengzi

yinyi 孟子音義), 34placement examination (quanshi 銓試),

155, 176, 180, 212policy critic (jianguan 諫官), 44, 76, 88,

199, 208policy critic-adviser (jianyi dafu 諫議大夫),

75 132, 145political commentaries, 40, 47, 90, 183prefectural examinations (jieshi 解試), 20,

21, 24, 25, 29n71, 31, 43, 67, 69, 77, 97, 98, 109, 111, 112, 114, 132, 133, 144,

149, 158, 161, 162–64, 167, 168, 176, 177, 178

prefectural judge in regional defense (fangyu tuiguan 防禦推官), 130

prefectural school (zhouxue 州學), 1, 29, 33, 51, 52, 60, 65, 75–79, 87, 95, 113n186, 114, 117, 118, 123, 131, 132, 146, 156–59, 162–66, 168, 169, 173, 174, 196

prestigious degree (zhike 制科), 82talented and upright (xianliangfangz-

heng 賢良方正), 82n29frank admonition (zhiyanjijian 直言極

諫), 82n29probationary investigating censor (jiancha

yushi lixing 監察御史裏行), 102, 107professor (boshi 博士), 68, 74, 75, 80, 87, 95,

99, 113, 114, 119, 121–25, 122, 125, 129, 131, 132, 137, 139, 143–47, 152, 163, 166–68, 170, 173, 175, 186, 189, 193–97, 206

protection privilege (yin 蔭), 12, 25, 27, 28, 175, 176, 179, 180, 212

promotion review (mokan 磨勘), 166public opinion (gongyi 公議), 90, 127, 128Puli 普利 Buddhist monastery, 18Puzhou 濮州, 51

Qi Chongli 綦崇禮 (1083–1142), 197Qi Lun 戚綸 (954–1021), 21, 22Qi Tongwen 戚同文 (904–976), 38Qiang Yuanming 強淵明 (?–1124), 189Qianzhou 虔州, 51Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE), 78, 187Qin Guan 秦觀 (1049–1100), 95, 132, 185,

188Qingli 慶曆 (1041–1048), 2, 5, 17, 18, 29,

31, 42, 47, 51–54, 59, 60, 63, 75, 91, 96, 124, 140

Qinzong 欽宗 (1100–1161, r. 1125–1127), 6, 197, 199–201, 203–6, 217, 218

Qizhou 蘄州, 102Quan Bangyan 權邦彥 (1080–1133), 177

reader (jiangshu 講書), 31reading club (shuhui 書會), 69, 70

260 Index

Rebuttal of the New Commentaries on the Three Classics (Sanjing yibian 三經義辯) 197

Records of the Imperial University (shangxi-ang lu上庠錄), 52n19

rector (xuezheng 學正), 70, 71, 86, 101, 108–10, 114, 129, 130, 145, 159, 166, 168, 195

registrar (cheng 丞), 96, 103, 166regret (hui 悔), 190regular degree (zheng zouming 正奏名), 104Ren Zhonghou 任忠厚, 183Renzong 仁宗 (1010–1063, r. 1022–1063),

1, 3, 8, 10, 16, 28, 33, 34, 36, 41, 42, 44, 46, 48, 49, 51, 58, 59, 68, 69, 72, 91, 98, 109, 116, 121, 137, 139–43, 152, 208, 211, 220

reviewing policy adviser (jishi zhong 給事中), 169

right policy monitor (you zhengyan 右正言), 121

Rites of Zhou (Zhouli 周禮), 31n79, 53, 88, 94, 95, 100, 109, 156, 166, 187

rites to honor Confucius (shidian 釋奠), 143, 204

School of Law (lüxue 律學), 19, 20, 26, 37n113

School of Literature (guangwen guan 廣文館), 19–21, 26, 133, 144, 145, 151

School of the Four Gates (simen xue 四門學), 3, 19, 23, 24

Secret Pavilion (mige 祕閣), 76, 117Secretariat-Chancellery (zhongshu menxia

中書門下), 79, 86–89, 94, 114, 117Selections of Refined Literature (wenxuan 文

選), 34Shaanxi 陝西, 86, 87Shang dynasty/period (ca. 1766–1050

BCE), 84Shang Yang 商鞅 (390–338 BCE), 198Shang Yi 商倚, 132Shangguan Jun 上官均 (ca. 1043–1120),

134, 138Shao Bi 邵必 (1006–1069), 59Shao Kang 邵亢 (1014–1074), 35

Shao Yong 邵雍 (1011–1077), 129Shaosheng 紹聖 (1094–1097), 144, 147, 148,

195Shen Changqing 沈長卿, 203Shen Jichang 沈季長 (1027–1087), 89,

101–3, 105Shen Kua 沈括 (1031–1095), 64Shen Yuqiu 沈與求 (1086–1137), 192Shen Zhu 沈銖 (?–1098), 102, 105Sheng Qiao 盛僑, 70, 139Shenzong 神宗 (1048–1085, r. 1067–1085),

3, 5, 6, 10, 13, 14, 57, 73, 74, 76, 82, 83, 85, 90, 91, 94, 95, 98, 99, 101, 103–10, 113–16, 118–21, 130, 133, 138, 140–42, 144, 145, 147, 150–52, 154–57, 160, 161, 163, 166, 167, 188–90, 195, 211, 212

Shi Jianzhong 士建中, 41, 50Shi Jie 石介 (1005–1045), 11, 39–42, 45–47,

50, 54, 58, 59, 61, 62, 73Shizong of Later Zhou (921–959, r.

954–959), 18Shu 蜀 faction, 120, 132, 151Shu Dan 舒亶 (1042–1104), 102, 108Shucheng 舒城, 38Shun 舜, 54, 83–85, 89, 141, 171, 187Shuo 朔 faction, 120, 123, 132Sima Guang 司馬光 (1019–1086), 11, 24,

59, 67, 76, 77, 83n36, 91, 120, 134, 137, 147, 151, 185, 189, 195, 203, 213

Sima Qian 司馬遷 (ca. 145–86 BCE), 147, 186

Six Dynasties period (220–589), 34six halls (liutang 六堂), 216six thugs (liuzei 六賊), 199Song learning (Songxue 宋學), 34, 49,

53–55, 208Song Minqiu 宋敏求 (1019–1079), 76Song Qi 宋祁 (998–1061), 17n6, 27, 29n71,

35–37, 39Song Qiyu 宋齊愈 (?–1127), 197Song Xiang 宋庠 (996–1066), 36, 37speaking officials (yanguan 言官), 45, 214State Finance Commission (sansi 三司),

30, 97student attendance, 16, 34, 47, 65, 67,

69–71, 73

Index 261

Su Che 蘇轍 (1039–1112), 117, 134Su Jia 蘇嘉 (?–ca. 1128), 74, 88, 89,

105n139, 118, 143Su Shi 蘇軾 (1037–1101), 2, 76, 77, 81,

107, 132, 135, 143, 151, 181, 185, 187, 193–95, 198, 203, 207, 214

Su Song 蘇頌 (1020–1101), 76, 80, 81, 88, 91, 143

Su Xiangxian 蘇象先 (1091 jinshi), 88n56Sui dynasty (581–618), 1, 187Suiyang 睢陽, 38Sun Di 孫覿 (1081–1169), 146, 194, 201,

206Sun E 孫諤, 102, 106Sun Fu 孫復 (992–1057), 11, 13, 45, 49–51,

53, 55, 56, 58–61, 68–70, 72, 211, 219Sun He 孫何 (961–1004), 21Sun Hong 孫鈜 (?–1127), 206Sun Jue 孫覺 (1028–1090), 60, 71n112, 75,

76, 122, 126, 130–32Sun Sheng 孫升, 130Sun Shi 孫奭 (962–1033), 32–37, 39, 47Sun Shutong 孫叔通, 184, 185Sun Xi 孫錫 (991–1068), 35surveillance agencies (jiansi 監司), 158suspecting the Classics (yijing 疑經), 54n28suspecting the Commentaries (yizhuan 疑

傳), 54n28Suzhou 蘇州, 51, 60, 183

Tai Mountain 泰山, 39, 50, 51Taiyuan 太原, 200Taizong of Tang 唐太宗 (599–649, r.

626–649), 83Taizong 太宗 (939–997, r. 976–997), 32, 40,

116, 142Taizu 太祖 (927–976, r. 960–976), 10,

18–20, 25, 116, 142“Take No Ease” (wuyi 無逸), 143, 160Tan Zongyi 檀宗益, 108Tang Dynasty Mirror (Tangjian 唐鑑), 185Tao Yuanming 陶淵明 (365–427), 187Teachings of the Duke of Wei, the chief

councilor (Chengxian Weigong tanxun 丞相魏公譚訓), 88n56

temple school (miaoxue 廟學), 56

“Ten Thousand Words Memorial” (wanyan shu 萬言書), 1, 49, 83, 140

Teng Zongliang 滕宗諒 (991–1047), 51Textual Explanations of Classics and Canons

(jingdian shiwen 經典釋文), 31n79Three Hall system (sanshefa 三舍法), 7, 13,

14, 49, 69, 73, 86, 88, 90, 92, 98, 104, 108, 109, 111, 115, 118, 120–27, 132, 143, 147, 148, 150, 151, 154, 157, 161, 163, 172, 197, 211, 212, 215, 216, 218countrywide Three Hall system, 155,

173, 176, 177, 179, 180, 196, 216Tian Kuang 田況 (1005–1063)Tian 16, 29Tianfu (936–943) era, 18Tong Guan 童貫 (1054–1126), 200Topical Narratives (jishi benmo 紀事本末), 6

unify morality and customs (yidaode tongfengsu 一道德同風俗)

Unofficial History (yeshi 野史), 88n56unorthodox style (bianti 變體), 18, 40–44,

47, 61, 62, 64upper class (shangdeng 上等), 79, 126, 165upper class students in the Upper Hall

(shangshe shangdeng 上舍上等), 165, 167–69

Upper Hall (shangshe 上舍), 7, 75, 86, 87, 96–99, 101–3, 110–12, 114, 133, 144, 145, 149–51, 157–62, 164, 165, 167, 169, 182, 186, 190–92, 194, 196, 197

upright (zheng 正), 183

various subjects (zhuke 諸科), 19, 32, 35, 37venerating the king (zunwang 尊王), 54, 55Veritable Records (shilu 實錄), 5, 195n88vice-director of education (guozi siye 國子

司業), 116–18, 123, 126, 128, 129, 131, 136, 138, 139, 143–46, 171, 173, 177, 195, 201, 202, 205

Wang Anli 王安禮 (1034–1095), 100Wang Anshi 王安石 (1021–1086), 1, 2, 11,

13, 46, 49, 58, 65, 72, 73, 82–86, 88–95, 100, 104–7, 117, 119, 130, 131, 134, 137–40, 142, 144–47, 152, 153, 160, 181,

262 Index

188, 190, 192–99, 203, 207, 208, 211, 213, 214, 217classical commentaries of Wang Anshi/

Wang Anshi’s classical commentaries, 95, 137, 194

disciple/student of Wang Anshi, 130, 144, 146

learning of Wang Anshi/Wang Anshi’s learning, 11, 93

teachings of Wang Anshi/Wang Anshi’s teachings, 131, 139, 144, 146, 147, 153, 181, 188–99, 207

Wang Che 王徹, 32Wang E 王諤, 133, 134Wang Fu 王黼 (1079–1126), 200Wang Gongchen 王拱辰 (1012–1071),

96n88, 142Wang Gui 王珪 (1019–1085), 76Wang Junyi 王俊義, 175n118Wang Juzheng 王居正 (1087–1151), 193Wang Li 王礪 (?–1015), 38Wang Mang 王莽 (45 BCE–23 CE, r. 9–23),

88, 89, 160Wang Pang 王雱 (1044–1076), 92–95, 146Wang Ruohai 汪若海 (1101–1161), 204, 207Wang Ruyi 王汝翼, 89Wang Shiyong 王時雍 (?–1127), 200–202Wang Tao 王綯 (1074–1137), 193Wang Tinggui 王庭珪 (1080–1172), 193,

207Wang Tingxiu 王庭秀 (?–1136), 194Wang Xi 王瀆 (978–1033), 38Wang Xie 汪澥 (1041–1116), 190Wang Yansou 王巖叟 (1043–1093), 123,

124, 126, 136, 150Wang Yanzhi 王沇之, 101–3, 105, 106Wang Yingchen 汪應辰 (1118–1176),

194n81Wang Yu 王愈, 103Wang Yucheng 王禹偁 (954–1001), 40Wang Zeng 王曾 (978–1038), 33Wang Zhu 王洙 (997–1057), 26–28, 36–39,

67Wang Zongchu 王宗濋, 201, 202Wei Chuhou 韋處厚 (772–828), 36Wei Shoulong 韋壽隆, 171, 177

Wei Tai 魏泰, 101Wei Xian 魏憲 (1068–1140), 171well versed in classical learning and morally

upstanding (jingming xingxiu 經明行修), 145

Wen Yanbo 文彥博 (1006–1097), 8, 60, 120Weng Yanshen 翁彥深 (1079–1141), 196,

197wicked (xie 邪), 183Works Written by Mr. Lü in a Private

Institute (Lüshi jiashuji 吕氏家塾記), 69, 74

Wu Chong 吳充 (1021–1080), 35Wu Ge 吳革 (?–1127), 206Wu Kui 吳奎 (1011–1068), 60Wu Min 吳敏 (1089–1132), 191, 197, 200,

202, 203Wu Ruo 吳若, 202Wu Shili 吳師禮, 145Wu Shiren 吳師仁, 132, 145n127Wu Tingzuo 吳廷祚 (918–971), 206Wu Yin 吳絪 (1056–1109), 160Wu Zetian 武則天 (624–705, r. 690–705),

88, 89Wu Zhongfu 吳中復 (1011–1078), 69Wu Zhu 吳銖, 207

Xi Xia (1038–1227) dynasty, 12, 16n4, 30n76, 46, 156

Xia Song 夏竦 (985–1051), 36, 46Xianping 咸平 (998–1003), 25Xie Liangzuo 謝良佐 (1050–1121), 193, 195Xing Bing 邢昺 (932–1010), 27Xining 熙寧 (1068–1077), 5, 90, 111, 118,

119, 137, 146, 156, 166, 171Xu Jiang 許將 (1037–1111), 101, 102, 105Xu Kui 徐揆 (?–1127), 203, 204Xu Ren 徐仁, 206Xue Ang 薛昂 (1055–1134), 147, 148, 186,

189Xue Jixuan 薛季宣 (1134–1173), 52n19Xiaozong (1127–1194, r. 1162–1189), 10Xuzhou 徐州, 132

Yan Fu 顏復 (1034–1090), 88, 89, 157Yan Hui 顏回 (521–490 BCE), 160

Index 263

Yan Shu 晏殊 (991–1055), 38Yan Zhong 晏中 (1056–1107), 166Yang Anguo 楊安國, 56Yang Guangfu 楊光輔, 33Yang Hui 楊誨, 203Yang Huizhi 楊徽之 (922–1000), 26Yang Shen 楊忱 (1024–1062), 59Yang Shi 楊時 (1053–1135), 194, 195, 197,

199, 202, 214Yang Xiong 揚雄 (53 BCE–18), 192Yang Yi 楊億 (974–1020), 25, 26, 40, 41, 63Yang Yuan 楊愿 (1101–1152), 206, 207Yanzhou 兗州, 33, 39Yao 堯, 54, 83–85, 89, 141, 171, 187Yaozhou 饒州, 101Ye Jingwen 葉景文, 109Ye Mengde 葉夢得 (1077–1148), 186Ye Shi 葉適 (?–1074), 93, 94, 98Ye Shi 葉適 (1150–1223), 117Ye Tangyi 葉唐懿, 102Ye Tao 葉濤 (?–1100), 89, 102, 103, 105,

130, 143, 144Ye Yuan 葉源, 186Yi Yin 伊尹 (1648–1549 BCE), 46Yin Shu 尹洙 (1001–1047), 28Yingtian 應天, 38, 39, 41, 132, 207Yingzhou 潁州, 132Yingzhou 瀛州, 130Yong Xiaowen 雍孝聞, 183You Zuo 游酢 (1053–1123), 131, 144, 195,

213Yu 禹, 54, 84Yu Fan 虞蕃, 74, 100–105, 107, 108, 113,

119, 125, 138Yu Fen 虞蕡, 109Yu Jing 余靖 (1000–1064), 29, 30Yu Juewen 余覺民, 204Yu Zhong 余中, 101Yuan Bohu 元伯虎, 102Yuan Jiang 元絳 (1008–1083), 101–3Yuan Mo 袁默, 109Yuan Qining 元耆寧, 101, 102Yuanfeng 元豐 (1078–1085), 90, 93, 108,

109, 111, 114, 116, 128, 131, 132, 136–38, 143–45, 149–53, 156, 166, 168, 171, 176, 177

Yuanfu 元符 (1098–1100), 148Yuanyou 元祐 (1086–1093), 5, 10, 120, 121,

130, 131, 133–38, 140, 143–46, 148–52, 155, 157, 161, 184, 185, 188, 189, 193, 194, 196, 199, 207, 213

Yunzhou 筠州, 117

Zeng Bu 曾布 (1036–1107), 88, 150, 156Zeng Gong 曾鞏 (1019–1083), 42, 64,

113n183, 132n53, 157Zeng Ji 曾幾 (1084–1166), 195, 196Zeng Zhao 曾肇 (1047–1107), 89Zezhou 澤州, 192Zhai Si 翟思 (?–1102), 130, 143Zhan Wen 詹文, 146Zhang Bangchang 張邦昌 (1081–1127),

171, 205–7Zhang Duanli 張端禮 (1082–1132), 172Zhang Dun 章惇 (1035–1105), 130, 148,

156Zhang Fangping 張方平 (1007–1091), 28,

42, 43Zhang Gang 張綱 (1083–1166), 192Zhang Gongbi 章公弼, 101Zhang Guan 張觀 (985–1050), 22Zhang Hu 張琥 (later renamed Zhang Zao

張璪) (1040–1093), 88, 93, 108, 109Zhang Hui 張輝, 195Zhang Jun 張浚 (1097–1164), 205Zhang Lei 張耒 (1054–1114), 132, 185, 187,

213Zhang Shangying 張商英 (1043–1121),

167–69, 178, 190Zhang Shunmin 張舜民, 70Zhang Tangqing 張唐卿 (1010–1037), 41Zhang Yinliang 張寅亮, 182Zhang Zai 張載 (1020–1077), 129, 195Zhao Ding 趙鼎 (1085–1147), 205Zhao Gai 趙槩 (996–1083), 60, 72Zhao Gou 趙構 (1107–1187, r. 1127–1162).

See GaozongZhao Ji 趙佶 (1082–1135, r. 1100–1125). See

HuizongZhao Xiao 趙霄, 195Zheng Gu 鄭轂, 193

264 Index

Zheng Juzhong 鄭居中 (1059–1123), 101, 167, 178

Zheng Mu 鄭穆 (1018–1092), 131Zheng Xuan 鄭玄 (127–200), 53Zhenzong 真宗 (968–1022, r. 997–1022), 8,

9, 22, 25, 31, 33, 34, 40, 44, 116, 142, 208Zhezong 哲宗 (1077–1100, r. 1085–1100),

5, 6, 14, 104, 120, 121, 130, 136, 141–46, 148–55, 157, 168, 186, 190, 195, 211, 213

Zhong Shimei 鍾世美 (?–ca. 1102), 100, 101Zhongshan 中山, 200Zhou Chang 周常, 103, 105Zhou dynasty (ca. 1050–771 BCE), 23Zhou dynasty (690–705), 88Zhou Jia 周佳, 5Zhu Changwen 朱長文 (1039–1098), 132,

147

Zhu Fu 朱服 (1048–ca. 1105), 116–18, 130Zhu Guangting 朱光庭 (1037–1094), 49,

121, 122, 124, 132Zhu Hongzhi 朱拱之 (?–1126), 201Zhu Mengshuo 朱夢說, 172, 191, 206Zhu Mian 朱勔 (1075–1126), 200Zhu Song 朱松 (1097–1143), 191Zhu Xi朱熹 (1130–1200), 74Zhuang Anchang 莊安常 (1072–1146), 170Zhuang Zi 莊子 (369–286 BCE), 175Zou Gai 鄒陔 (1092–1153), 173, 174Zou Hao 鄒浩 (1060–1111), 150, 182, 195,

196