The Nature of Suárez´s Metaphysics. Disputationes Metaphysicae and their Main Systematic Strains

STATĚ Studia Neoaristotelica 6 (2009) / 1 99

THE NATURE OF SUÁREZ’S METAPHYSICS DISPUTATIONES METAPHYSICAE

AND THEIR MAIN SYSTEMATIC STRAINS

Daniel Heider

Suárez’s metaphysics is comprehensively presented in the two-volume Dis-putationes metaphysicae (1597), which are considered to be the first complex systematic elaboration of metaphysics, processed independently of the model of Aristotle’s text.1 In my survey I shall present, what I consider to be, seven fundamental features of Doctor Eximius’ metaphysical system.2 Of course I shall be far from exhausting all of the doctrines and the systematic elements in the Disputationes in this paper. What I intend to do is to establish my overview basically on the seven opening disputations of the first volume of the corpus (DM 1: De Natura Primae Philosophiae seu Metaphysicae; DM 2: De Ratione Essentiali seu Conceptu Entis; DM 3: De Passionibus Entis in Communi, et Principiis Ejus; DM 4: De Unitate Transcendentali in Communi; DM 5: De Unitate Individuali, Ejus-que Principio; DM 6: De Unitate Formali et Universali; DM 7: De Variis Distinctio-num Generibus), further on DM 31 (De essentia entis finiti ut tale est, et illius esse, eorumque distinctione) and on some other passages from the rest of the dispu-tations as well. Though it may be said that such a selection sets aside plenty of important aspects of Suárez’s highly nuanced project, I contend that the first seven disputations, together with DM 31, represent the very core of Suárez’s metaphysical system. Because of the fact that Francisco Suárez is a boundary figure between scholasticism and early modern philosophy, most of these

1 A slightly modified version of the paper was presented at the International Conference

“Francisco Suárez, S.J. (1548–1617): Last Medieval or First Early Modern?” at the University of Western Ontario (London) in Canada (September, 2008). All in all the survey is the “fruit” of the analyses contained in my dissertation Suárez’s metaphysics. From the Concept of Being via Trans-cendental Unity to the Kinds of Transcendental Unity, Faculty of Philosophy & Arts, Charles University, Prague 2007.

2 Because of the length of the paper I shall not quote in extenso, but shall bring in just the (often “rough”) location (no. of disputation, no. of section and, facultatively, no. of paragraph) from Disputationes metaphysicae (further only DM). I shall not mention the editor and the place of the edition because the transcribed electronic version of the text is already available (see e.g. ·http://www.salvadorcastellote.com/investigacion.htmÒ).

Daniel Heider THE NATURE OF SUÁREZ’S METAPHYSICS

100 Studia Neoaristotelica 6 (2009) / 1 STATĚ

features can, in my opinion, be at best described as tendencies, rather than as fixed and static properties.3 The given trends can be designated as follows:

(1) “Univocalization” of the concept of being and transcendental properties

(2) “Reification” of the act-potency doctrine (3) “Ontologization” of individuality (4) “Conceptualization” of the Scotist perspective (5) “Existential” character of the concept of being (this is the only

feature formulated “statically”) (6) “Epistemologization” of metaphysics (7) “Methodologization” of metaphysics

I. “UNIVOCALIZATION” OF THE CONCEPT OF BEING AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROPERTIES

The propensity toward univocalization of the notion of being is already apparent in Suárez’s treatment of the basic questions concerning the object and the nature of metaphysics in general. The infinite being (God) of whom the simple concept of being is not predicated (as Aquinas would have said) the principle and cause of being (standing outside the object of metaphysics), but is above all a part (indeed, the principal part) of that simple concept’s proper object, being.4 If finite and infinite beings, as well accidents and substances, are all beings as such (ut sic), then all coordinate members of the simple concept of being are “beings” in a single univocal sense of the term. The univocalization of the concept of being is the consequence of Suárez’s striking emphasis on the absolute unity of this concept.5 Its absolute unity is integrally connected with Suárez’s critique of Cajetan’s views on the analogy of proportionality. Cajetan’s (and some other Thomists’) claim that the concept of being is only one in a certain respect (secundum quid), and not entirely (simpliciter) is for Suárez nothing else than the reduction of the concept of being to a merely “extrinsic” analogy, sc. a metaphor – and metaphors, as Suárez repeatedly emphasizes, have no place in scientific metaphysics.6

3 The fact that Suárez stands between the ages is suggested by the recent José Pereira’s book

on Suárez’s philosophy called Suárez. Between Scholasticism & Modernity, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 2007.

4 DM 1, 1, 26. 5 DM 2, 1–2. 6 DM 28, 3.



Suárez’s insistence on the unity of the concept of being is also important for his reasoning about transcendental properties in general, sc. for the question of the “conceptual addition” of transcendental properties to being. Although, in some respects, his general theory of transcendental properties seems to be nearer to Thomism than to Scotism – he rejects the Scotist real (ex natura rei) distinction between being and its properties – Suárez´s view that transcendental unity has a negative character is one of the obvious conse-quences of his univocalization of being. All his noteworthy arguments against the positive character of the “addition” of transcendental unity to being have a deeper markedly Scotist foundation and are connected with the overall sup-pression of the participative metaphysics of Aquinas.7

A second consequence of Suárez’s tendency to univocalize the concept of being is evident in his solution to the ancient Aristotelian aporia concerning the compatibility of two prima facie incompatible metaphysical principles, sc. “the Axiom of Convertibility” (being is convertible with the One) and “the Axiom of Division” (namely that being is divided into the One and the Many).8 In his solution Suárez elevates being and transcendental unity from the level of dividing members to the level of a divided member. Inasmuch as being, as convertible with the transcendental One, abstracts both from “the mode of perseity” (the substantial mode) and “the mode of inaleity” (the accidental mode), it becomes, in a certain respect, indifferent to its determinative modes.9

Suárez’s univocalizing tendency also leads him to affirm a single univocal concept of individuality, applicable to finite material, immaterial, and infinite being; this univocally conceivable individuality results from the principal incommunicability (incommunicabilitas) of each individual. Consequently, God becomes, to a great extent, an individual like any other.10 Univocalization also plays an important role in Suárez’s solution to the problem of the principle of individuation of substances and accidents. If one concept of being is predi-cated in the same way of substance and of accident, a single principle can individuate both.11

II. “REIFICATION” OF THE ACT-POTENCY DOCTRINE

The second significant feature of Suárez’s metaphysical system is its “reification” of what, in other metaphysical systems, might be considered

7 DM 3, 1, 11. 8 As for Aristotle see his Metaphysics 1054a20–26. 9 DM 4, 5. 10 DM 5, 1, 2. 11 DM 5, 6–9.



a mere “principle”. This tendency is immediately related to Suárez’s well-known criticism of the real distinction between essence and existence of finite beings. With his assumption that a real distinction is the distinction of two things, Suárez comes close to his rejection of a real distinction between essence and existence.12 As soon as existence ceases to be the last act, which comes to the essential hylemorphic composite as an ultimate perfection, one gets ipso facto the “reification” of the intrinsic principles of a given composite. With the assumption of the real identity of essence and existence, the particular intrinsic principles come to be incomplete substances or incomplete beings, which can consequently be supernaturally conserved in being without the correlative part. Prime matter ceases to be pure potency in the absolute sense, because it is already marked by an “entitative act”: it is pure potency only in relation to the “formal act” that provides the substance with its sortal mark. As really different things, the hylemorphic parts require certain unification; this is provided by the substantial mode of unification.13 Suárez’s drift to reification is closely con-nected with his “modism”, which bears relation to his repeated exercise of a modal distinction.14

Reification has also far-reaching consequences for Suárez’s treatment of the issue of principle of individuation. From the above-mentioned “univoca-lization” of the individual unity Suárez concludes that the general and uniform principle of individuation must be a whole entity (entitas tota). That is why he puts forward a detailed criticism of all “partial” doctrines, which give one solution to the principle of individuation, e.g. of material substances, and an-other for the question of the principle of individuation of accidents or imma-terial substances. Suárez’s reification affects not only his doctrine of substantial parts of a composite but also his view of accidents. The reification of accidents entails, among other things, a doctrine of the latitude of accidental forms, of which Suárez makes use when dealing with the metaphysico-physical dis-cussion of the individuation of accidents.15

III. “ONTOLOGIZATION” OF INDIVIDUALITY

The determination labeled as “ontologization” of individuality comes forth in Suárez’s reflections over the relationship among transcendental, individual and quantitative unity insofar as the last term is the label of the unity of an ontological aggregate (the accident of quantity plus substance). This aggregate

12 DM 31, 6. 13 DM 13, 4–5. 14 DM 7, 1, 16. 15 DM 5, 6–9.



(quantitative) unity is for Suárez a merely extrinsic unity, which belongs not to substance as such, but only to the elementary aggregates.16 Transcendental uni-ty – intrinsic and entitative unity, extensionally identical with individual unity – is understood as the unity pertaining to substances and accidents, which are taken separately, not aggregately. The accident of quantity taken in itself is thus considered to be a certain determination of transcendental unity to a particular kind of being, sc. quantity. That is why its quantitative unity relates to trans-cendental unity as the inferior to the superior concept (which states that all quantitative taken separately is transcendental; but not all transcendental unity is within this quantitative unity). However, the quantitative unity of an aggre-gate – not the quantitative unity as the particular contraction of transcendental unity – is not a primary focus of Suárez’s metaphysical enquiry. The main concern applies to intrinsic entitative unity.17

The essential moment of entitative unity is only the negation of intrinsic division, not a second “respective” (or transcendentally relational) aspect, sc. division from the others. This second intensional aspect is considered by Suá-rez to be an undesirable element of the “externalization” of individuality. Even God, Suárez says, before the creation of the world, was (entitatively) one indi-vidual quite independently of anything else’s being. That is why Suárez refuses the definition of individuality based on a real distinction from some other item’s actual being.18 The theory that focuses primarily on quantitative unity cannot be considered as the adequate answer to the question of the intrinsic principle of individuation. No accidental or “extrinsic” factors can be an ele-ment of an individual being’s internal ontological constitution. No accident, not even as the term of a transcendental relationship, can be the part of the principle of individuation. Consequently, prime matter, as a substantial part of a composite, can be individuated neither by quantity, nor by substantial form. Conversely, substantial form cannot be individuated by substantial matter.19

Suárez’s drive to “ontologize” individuality coheres with his general em-phasis on individuality.20 Aside from the fact that he begins his overall expo-sition of the kinds of transcendental unity with an analysis of individual unity, certain “singularism” is apparent in his above-mentioned reification of act and

16 As for the typology of unity see DM 4, 3. 17 DM 4, 9, 8–11. 18 DM 5, 1. 19 DM 5, 6. 20 One can see this trend also in his bottom-up analysis of “the eternal” theological problem

of harmonization between the human free will and the Divine grace. As the majority of the Jesuit confreres he starts from the evident fact, which is our free will, not, as the majority of Thomists would do, from the First Principle.



potency. His emphasis on individuality is also noticeable in his epistemology, especially in his theory of the direct knowledge of material individuals by means of their proper intelligible species. The considerable difference between Suárez’s theory (together with the doctrine of the sympathy of all cognitive faculties) and the Thomists’ conception is important for the interpretation of Suárez’s doctrine of universals as a non-Thomist version of moderate realism. That means it is the version, which is not explicitly grounded in the concept of the real distinction between essence and existence.21

IV. “CONCEPTUALIZATION” OF THE SCOTISTIC PERSPECTIVE

While many aspects of Suárez’s metaphysical system are inspired by the metaphysics, natural philosophy and epistemology of John Duns Scotus, Suá-rez’s thought nevertheless contains a markedly anti-Scotistic strain. This is no doubt due to his acceptance of “Ockham’s Razor”. The norm not to project onto reality distinctions that arise only in our thoughts and in our speech is the central regulative principle of the entire Disputationes Metaphysicae. One flagrant manifestation of this normative principle is Suárez’s reduction of Scotus’ formal distinction to the mere conceptual distinction with the foundation in a thing.22

Suárez’s open anti-Scotism can already be seen in his forceful critique of the “compositional” analysis of the determination of the notion of being, according to which this concept receives its determination through a compo-sition of being as such (a purely determinable element) with the intrinsic modes of finiteness and infiniteness (purely determinative elements), which are the modes that differ ex natura rei from being as such.23 A “conceptualization” of the Scotist perspective is also at work in Suárez’s rejection of the so-called denominative or derivative sense of the term “being”, extensively employed in Scotus’ transcendental analysis.24 A further not insignificant instance of this tendency is the Jesuit’s rejection of Scotus’ doctrine of the real distinction between being and transcendental properties.25

Suárez’s unequivocal rejection of Scotus’ more strongly realist version of moderate realism is basically rooted in his concept of the ontological status of individual difference (haecceitas).26 This concept is, in fact, determinative for

21 DM 6, 6. 22 DM 7, 1, 13. 23 DM 2, 6. 24 DM 2, 5. 25 DM 3, 1. 26 DM 5, 2.



a number of Suárez’s solutions to the metaphysical problems, such as the onto-logical status of formal and universal unity,27 the nature of the distinction between metaphysical grades,28 and the relationship of the universal unity to the intrinsic principles of a material composite.29 By a dialectical disambi-guation of the original thesis that an individual difference adds something real and positive to a common nature, Suárez arrives at a specific exposition of the term “addere”. When individual difference adds to a common nature some-thing real and positive it is not by the addition of something real to something real, but only by the addition of something real to something merely concep-tual, though having a foundation in an extra mental thing.30

V. “EXISTENTIAL” CHARACTER OF THE CONCEPT OF BEING

In contrast to a “modernist” interpretation of Suárez’s metaphysics as a science concerning only essence, as what is thinkable (cogitabile), I am positive about the fact that the actual existence is of the importance for Suárez’s meta-physics. Real essence (essentia realis), which at the same time constitutes the adequate object of Suárez’s metaphysics, is not explained merely as that which is free of logical non-contradiction, but also as that which is capable of (has “aptitude” for) actual existence. One reason why Suárez considers the logical non-repugnancy insufficient to explicate the term “real essence” is that the so-called second intentions (second-order concepts) cannot – despite their logical non-repugnancy – be taken as real essences. That is why I resist the inter-pretations of Suárez’s metaphysics, which reduce it to the doctrine of mere logical possibilities.31

The “existential” nature of Suárez’s notion of being is apparent in his notion of “aptitudinal being” – derived by special abstraction from the notion of actual existence – which does not exclude the actual existence, but only leaves it aside.32 For this reason the notion of aptitudinal existence can in no way be identified with the notion of possibility. The emphasis on Suárez’s notion of the actual existence becomes apparent in Suárez’s doctrine of pos-sible beings.33 Unlike some recent commentators of Suárez’s Disputationes,34

27 DM 6, 1-2. 28 DM 6, 9. 29 DM 6, 11. 30 DM 5, 2. 31 DM 2, 4, 7. 32 DM 2, 4, 9. 33 DM 31, 2. 34 „The Disputationes Metaphysicae of father Francis Suarez make amply evident the truth

that the host of Avicenna is still haunting scholastics’ lecture halls“ – T. J. Cronin, S.J.: Objective



I claim that for Suárez the ontological status of possibles ought to be interpre-ted as identical with that of the divine essence, rather than with that of some transcendentally possible “diminished” beings. This “existential” emphasis has also the important consequence for the exposition of Suárez’s famous treat-ment of the problem of eternal truths. I am positive about the fact that the eternal truths have only a “veritative” being, which does not require any foun-dation in some sort of shadowy truth-making essential beings.35

VI. “EPISTEMOLOGIZATION” OF METAPHYSICS

By the “epistemologization” I mean a wider sense of the term, i.e. “dealing with concepts”, not a more specific one, which is connected with the issue of justification of our beliefs. Although the feature of “dealing with concepts” has been implicitly present in the previous sections, I think that it must be pre-sented as a separate and explicit trait of Suárez’s metaphysical system, because it is highly relevant for Suárez’s solutions to many metaphysical propositions.

Suárez, though in many respects rather conservative, truly anticipates the early modern period; it is no surprise then that he exemplifies two paradigma-tically modern tendencies of philosophical thought. The first concerns the inclusion of a certain epistemological agenda to the sphere of metaphysics. The given tendency is noticeable in the Disputationes as early as in the analyses of the nature, object and unity of metaphysics. The main reason why Suárez refuses to claim that from a logical point of view metaphysics is the science not of the lowest species, but of the subalternate species (like mathematics, which is further divisible into geometry and arithmetic) is the following one.36 Although he says that the things, which are treated in metaphysics, e.g. immaterial sub-stances and God, are cognized by a different type of abstraction from matter (this sort of abstraction is necessary) than the type of abstraction, which con-cerns “things” like substance in general, accident in general or transcendental properties (this sort of abstraction is, so to speak, permitted rather than neces-sary), they all, as Suárez says, coincide in their “ratio scibilis”. According to our knowledge and reasoning, Suárez holds, we cannot distinguish the sort of ab-straction that concerns transcendental properties from the sort that concerns immaterial reality. This is because of the fact that our only access to the imma- being in Descartes and Suárez, Rome: Gregoriana University Press 1966, p. 41. Something similar is also stated by J. P. Doyle: „So Suarez tells us on numerous occasions that such possible essen-ces are real in themselves and that propositions based upon them are true not because God knows them; rather He knows them because they are real and true in themselves“ – J. P. Doyle: “Suárez on the reality of the possibles“, in: Modern Schoolman 44 (1967), p. 32.

35 DM 31,12,38–47. 36 DM 1,3,2.



terial sphere is by means of the concepts referring to transcendental properties. Moreover, “ratio scibilis” is also “objectum scibile”, which forms the unitary basis for Suárez’s metaphysics.37

Suárez’s tendency to import epistemology in the above-mentioned sense into metaphysics is the matter of fact throughout the whole Disputations. An example of this – preliminary and scarcely perceptible, but noteworthy – is contained in the discussion of the concept of being. There Suárez remarks that metaphysical enquiry ought to begin by analyzing the logical status not of the objective concept of being (which, on my “realist” interpretation is identical with an aspect of the extra mental object itself), but only of its formal concept (which is the mental act of grasping the objective concept). The reason is that according to Suárez we are more familiar with the formal concept than with the objective concept. In my view it suggests nothing less than a certain degree of determination of objective truth by the subjective state of our mind.38

As for the treatment of universal and formal unity I am positive about the fact that Suárez was not (as it is often claimed39) a conceptualist, but, as I have already mentioned, a kind of moderate realist. Though he presents his theory of universals by means of the term of the so-called universale metaphysicum40 he does that in the purely epistemological section while dealing with the theories of the psycho-genetic formation of universal concepts.41 This formation of the metaphysical universal is grounded in the distinction between two types of abstractive knowledge. Whereas the direct cognition – as an extrinsic denomi-nation – does not, unlike the Thomists’ theory, imply the formation of a being of reason, the second, namely reflexive cognition does imply that consequence. While the first type of knowledge produces the metaphysical universal, the second type constitutes for Suárez universale logicum.42 Whereas the metaphysical universal is for Suárez an absolute universal or (so to speak) a Platonic idea that can exist only thanks to our rational concept and precise abstraction – and as such it is the foundation for the logical universal – the logical universal is, so to speak, a respective universal, which is by the mind related to the individuals from which it has been abstracted.

37 DM 1, 3, 10. 38 DM 2, 1, 1. 39 L. Mahieu: François Suarez. Sa Philosophie et les rapports qu´elle a avec sa Théologie,

Paris 1921, p. 523; Wilhelm Kolter claims: „Suarez will in seiner Universalienlehre wohl bewusst gemässigter Realist sein, neigt aber in seinen übrigen philosophischen Grundanschauungen sehr stark zum Nominalismus“ – W. Kolter: Die Universalienlehre des Franz Suarez, Inaugural Disser-tation, Freiburg 1941, p. 151.

40 DM 6, 8, 3. 41 DM 6, 6. 42 DM 6, 8, 4.



On my realist interpretation, Suárez’s views on extrinsic denomination,43 and the objective notion of being naturally entail his well-known exposition of the so-called intrinsic analogy of attribution (an exposition that ultimately becomes the overall model for the composition of the whole two-volume Metaphysical disputations), a type of analogy that is essentially dependent on the absolute unity of the concept of being. But in spite of its absolute unity, Suárez holds that it is not perfect, as the ordinary categorical universals, like e.g. a man and a horse are. This is because of the fact that being is not predicated of inferior natures pari passu, but only according to a “prior/posterior” scheme. While it is suggestive of God and substance primarily, it is also suggestive of finite beings and accidents only in relation to the first analogates. This difference in “logico-metaphysical descendence” is on the one hand made pos-sible by a certain denomination from our intellect, and, on the other, by the intrinsic and essential inclusion of the concept of being within the inferior natures themselves.44 Accordingly, the concept of being cannot be regarded as a tenuous quasi-actual whole, but only as a potential whole that intrinsically includes all inferior natures.45 This duality of the notion of being would not be possible without Suárez’s notion of the objective concept of being, which is based on the concept of the extrinsic denomination, and consequently on the theory that accentuates the active role of a cognitive subject.46

VII. “METHODOLOGIZATION” OF METAPHYSICS

Apart from the strictly methodological structure of the whole Disputationes metaphysicae – while the first twenty seven disputations of the first volume deal with being as such and with its properties and causes, the second volume of the same amount of disputations treats the special “modes” of being as such (finite and infinite beings, material and immaterial things, substances and acci-dents) – the focus on a method is a salient feature of Suárez’s analysis of the key phrase “real essence”. Metaphysics for Suárez deals with ens inquantum ens reale, which is real essence.47 As I have said above, the abstraction from the actual existence in the concept of “real essence” does not immediately imply the widening of the objective domain of Suárez’s metaphysics from the field of actual beings to the field of the actual beings plus possible beings;48 rather its function is methodological. The abstraction from the actual existence permits

43 DM 54, 2, 10–14. 44 DM 2, 5. 45 DM 1, 2, 12. 46 DM 28, 3. 47 DM 1, 1, 26. 48 DM 2,4,9.



the application of a priori demonstrative procedures to individual actual beings themselves. This is important because the actual existence as such includes the mark of contingency, which is irrelevant to the Aristotelian scientific procedure that seeks only the universal, the unchangeable and the necessary.49

One of the most important manifestations of the “methodological abstrac-tion from actual being” is discoverable in Suárez’s general theory of transcen-dental properties. While interpreting “real essence” as the essence that abstracts from the actual being, Suárez cannot consider an actual being as the first con-cept and as the starting point of his transcendental analysis.50 It is also why the point of departure of Suárez’s analysis, i.e. “being” (ens), is to be identified with “thing” (res) and why “thing” cannot be for the Spanish Jesuit one of being’s transcendental properties.51 It is just this methodological abstraction from the actual existence that appears to be explicitly decisive for Suárez’s dismissal of Aquinas’ transcendental genesis of the first concepts (the so-called the firsts) and implicitly for his reasoning about the transcendental unity and its kinds.52

The above-mentioned overview of the main strains of Suárez’s metaphy-sical system is the clear testimony that Suárez’s metaphysics can be considered neither as simply Thomist, nor as Scotist or Nominalist. All the main streams of the late medieval scholastic philosophy are inherent in his philosophical wri-ting. Nevertheless, all seem to be connected organically, not eclectically, to form the last discrete scholastic philosophical “-ism” in the history of the scho-lastic thought. The particular feature of the Spanish Jesuit’s metaphysics is also given by the palpable anticipation of the modern “main-stream” philosophy, which is manifested by his versatile emphasis on singularity and on the metho-dological priority of the subjective states of affairs. However, at the same time it must be added that the whole project still remains in the preserve of the traditional scholastic philosophy.

49 DM 2, 4, 13. 50 DM 4, 7. 51 DM 3, 2, 3. 52 The elaboration of the paper was supported by the Grant Project no. IAA908280801

“Metafyzika v současné analytické filosofii a její souvislosti s metafyzikou novodobého aristo-telismu“ (GAAS 2008–2009). I would like to thank David Svoboda for pointing out some phrasing obscurities. My thanks also belong to Dr. Patrick Feehan for a thorough proofreading of the paper.



SUMMARIUM

De indole Suarezii doctrinae metaphysicae

Tractatio proposita septem principales proprietates Francisci Suarezii doctrinae metaphysicae de-scribit: scil. “univocalisationem” conceptus entis eiusque passionum; “reificationem” actu et potentiae, “ontologisationem” individualitatis, “conceptualisationem” Scotisticae doctriane, “existentialem” natu-ram conceptus entis, “epistemologisationem” et “methodologisationem” metaphysicae. Quarum cum quinque priores bene intra scholasticam traditionem maneant, relictae duae iam methodologicam priori-tatem subiectivitatis, qua philosophia modernorum insignitur, praesignant.

Translatio: Lukáš Novák

SUMMARY

The nature of Suárez’s metaphysics

The paper presents seven basic features of Francisco Suárez’s metaphysics. They are as follows: “Univocalization” of the concept of being and transcendental properties, “reification” of the act-potency doctrine, “ontologization” of individuality, “conceptualization” of the Scotist perspective, “existential” character of the concept of being, “epistemologization” and “methodologization” of metaphysics. Whereas the first five are indicated as remaining in the preserve of the traditional scholastic philosophy, the last two are taken as portending the methodological priority of the subjective states of affairs of early modern “main-stream” philosophy.

Mgr. Daniel Heider, Ph.D. is an assistant professor of philosophy at the Department of Philosophy and Religious Sciences,

Faculty of Theology, University of South Bohemia, České Budějovice (Budweis), a research worker at the Department for the History of Older Czech and European Philosophy,

Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, and the Head of the Joint Research Group for the Study of Post-Medieval Scholasticism

of the two abovementioned institutions. Address: TF JU, Katedra filosofie a religionistiky, Kněžská 8,

370 01 České Budějovice, Czech Republic E-mail: [email protected]

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The Nature of Suárez´s Metaphysics. Disputationes Metaphysicae and their Main Systematic Strains