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AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY: COURCE NOTES

1. Introduction

The meaning of philosophy and place of African philosophy. (See Joseph I. Omoregbe, “African

Philosophy: Yesterday and Today,” in E. C. Eze. African Philosophy: An Anthology, pp. 3-8).

Philosophy is a reflective activity that begins with the experience of wonder:

a) About human life

b) About the world around us.

This experience would lead to the raising of some fundamental questions. One is philosophizing when one

reflects on those fundamental questions in search for answers. Human experience is therefore source of a

reflective activity; source of philosophy.

i) Experience of oneself as a human being (subjective) or

ii) Experience of the world around one (objective).

Early Greek philosophers’ reflective activity triggered in them “wonder” or “amazement” as they observed

the world around them. e.g., the immensity of space; the immensity of the universe; the amazing variety of

things; the idea of time; the ceaseless changes taking place; continuity amidst all the changes; basic unity in

the midst of diversity; the seasons of the year; the heavenly bodies and their orderly movement, etc.

Immanuel Kant later, in his Critique of Practical Reason, remarked that he was filled with wonder by the

starry sky above and the moral law within referring both to the world outside the human person and the

reality within the person. The world within the human person should also trigger wonder leading to

questions and reflection in search for answers.

The experience of the subjective phenomena of the human being reveals the marvels and complexity of the

human person: -the shortness of human life; -the wide range of possibilities of life; -human being’s elevated

status over the rest of nature; -human’s power and weakness; -human’s experiences of joy, suffering,

success and failure; -the experiences of finitude, misery, decease and death, etc. The result of such

experience is philosophy; this was for instance the case with Bhudha’s philosophy which resulted from his

reflection on suffering. Reflection on the human being and condition leads to questions such as what kind of

creature is human being so powerful and yet so weak, so great and yet so miserable? Thus the human

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creature becomes a problem to itself; a mystery –what is the origin of human beings? What is their destiny?

Why are they here? What happens when the human person’s existence ends?

Wonder and reflection on reality is natural to human beings. Persons of every culture and time as long as

they are normal human beings reflect on fundamental issues and problems of reality and try to give answers

to those problems. They deal with basic issues like the origin, meaning and destiny of the things around

them; the origin, nature, meaning, and destiny of human beings and human life, etc. Such reflections and

attempted answers lead to philosophy. The tendency to reflect on fundamental questions is part of human

nature which is rooted in the human being’s instinct of curiosity, the instinct or desire to know. The German

philosopher Karl Jaspers claims that “man cannot avoid philosophizing” and hence in a sense, every human

being is a philosopher, at least, potentially. In a strict sense, however, a philosopher is a person who devotes

most of his or her life and time, in a frequent and habitual manner, reflecting on the basic issues and

problems about human beings and about the world. People who do so are philosophers whether or not they

follow the Western method of philosophizing characterized by logic, analysis, and clarification of terms;

even if they have not preserved and transmitted their thought in writings. It is important here to make a

distinction between philosophy and its mode of transmission and preservation without undermining the

importance of writing. Those who, in any civilization, were particularly struck with “wonder” at the marvels

and complexities of the human being or the physical universe, and frequently devoted a good deal of time

reflecting on the fundamental questions arising from such wonder constitute the philosophers of their

civilizations. Thus the essence of philosophy is wonder and reflection on reality/experience, which can take

different forms.

African Philosophy is the thought and practice of African Philosophers who have devoted a good deal of

their life and time, in a frequent and habitual way, reflecting on the fundamental issues and problems of

Africa or about Africa. As long as we admit that Africans are human beings, we have also to admit that they

reflect on the basic problems of life, and there would be some who would devote much of their life and time

on such an activity. These latter are philosophers whether or not their philosophy is preserved in writings.

How can we know their thought then? We have fragments of their philosophic reflections, ideas and world

views transmitted to us through formulas of wise sayings, through proverbs, stories, social political

organizations, mythologies, religious doctrines and practices, etc. These philosophical reflections, ideas and

world views are evidences of deep philosophical reflections by some gifted individual thinkers who were the

African philosophers of the past; the African counterparts of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Kant; Hegel, etc.

Unfortunately, they have not being acknowledged or recognized simply because of lack of written record.

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The question of African Philosophy, arose precisely because of the denial to Africans not only of philosophy

but also of the capacity for logical and rational thought.

2. Conventional traditional view of the African mind/mentality.

Great philosophers of the Modern period including David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and G.W.F. Hegel

advanced the views that Africans were incapable of logical and rational thought. In his philosophy of

history, Hegel considers Africa to be outside of history because Africa has not attained the age of reason.

And because Africa lacks reason, it has no history, development and culture. Consequently, the African

cannot have religion beyond magic and sorcery simply by the fact that he/she cannot conceive God; -a

typically abstract and rational activity. Likewise, he/she has no idea of morals and hence no morality either.

Modern scholars of social sciences developed further the Hegelian views as to confine the African thought

to a primitive mentality which, according to Lucian Levy-Bruhl is pre-logical. Such mentality can entertain

contradictions and confusing ideas without much concern. Similar views were supported and advanced by

Diedrich Westermann in his book The African Today, 1934, 1969, John Colin Carothers in his The Mind of

Man in Africa (1972) and other anthropologists and scholars of human and social sciences.

The denial to Africans of the capacity for rational thought, logic and philosophy came about as part of a

Western ideology which was used to justify slavery, imperialism and colonialism. Different scholars of

history have now shown that the Ancient world of Greeks and Romans had a better model of conceiving,

understanding, and presenting Africans than the denigrating and racist model of the Modern Age. Martin

Bernal in his Black Athena presents two models: what he calls the Ancient Model and the Aryan Model,

asserting that the former acknowledged the contribution of Africans and Asians to the Greek and Western

civilization while the latter suppresses such truth and there is ample evidence in the accounts of historians

and thinkers of the antiquities.

3. Advocacy for the existence of African Philosophy

A) Connections between ancient Greek thought and ancient African thought: -a cultural and philosophical

link between Egypt and Greece. Two main theses: i) African origin of Greek philosophy as advocated by

Martin Bernal, Henry Olela, George G.M. James, etc., ii) Greek origin of African philosophy as advocated

by Claude Sumner in respect of the Ethiopian philosophy. Both conclude that the African mind and thought

is philosophical. -African origin of Greek philosophy is considered more fruitful for elaborating African

philosophy. Two claims are advanced: i) Egypt-Nubia philosophical texts belong to Africa’s intellectual and

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tradition,” and are not merely “religious” or “ethno-philosophical” endeavours. The first known reflections

on the world, nature and humankind of this tradition created “the conditions for the birth” of Greek

philosophy; ii) The philosophical systems, literature and orature (oratory) of black Africa and pharaonic

Egypt are identical and belong to the same cosmogonal and mythological matrix. (See Jacques Habib Sy,

“Theophile Obenga: At the forefront of Egypto-Nubian and Black African Renaissance in Philosophy” in

Egypt Revisited, by Ivan Van Sertima (editor). New Brunswick, USA/London: Transaction Publisher, 1989,

1995. Pp.277-285.

B) Trends in contemporary African philosophy: as elaborated by H. Odera Oruka:

1) Ethnophilosophy- focuses on logic and rationality as the distinguishing features between African and

Western thought. African thought is said to be intuitive, collective, synthetic and emotional whereas

Western thought is rational, analytical, individualistic, etc. This trend revolves around the ideas and

methodology began by P. Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy”

2) Professional philosophy advocated by university teachers who hold a universal view of philosophy which

is determined by its form and method. They use the same standards of Western philosophy to judge the

validity of African philosophy thus ending up denying philosophy to traditional Africa.

3) Sage philosophy: A mid-way solution between ethno-philosophy and professional philosophy. It affirms

the importance of the “indigenous” thought while recognizing the specific form and method of philosophy.

Proper application of universal standards by which any thought would qualify as philosophy would show

that traditional Africa as any human tradition qualifies for philosophy as well.

4). Nationalist and ideological or Liberation philosophy. This trend advocates for a total liberation of Africa:

- political, economic, social, and intellectual liberation. It consists of the nationalist leaders of independence

struggle and of the newly independent states.

C) Other classifications: Theophile Obenga:

1. The “culturalist” stream which undertakes a philosophic approach to African realities

2. The “hermeneutic” stream which exploits African language, art and symbols using modern Western

techniques.

3. The “diachronic” stream which elaborates the history of African philosophy as a subject area of

research and instruction

4. The “functional” stream wants to include science and technology in Africa’s social, economic and

cultural realities. It wants to establish the fundamental perspectives of a new epistemology.

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D) A comprehensive historical classification of African philosophy

1. Pharaonic Egyptian philosophy where concepts of wisdom-maat-ethics are significant

2. The thinkers and philosophers of Alexandria, Cyrene, Carthage and Hippo.

3. Maghrebian philosophy

4. The medieval philosophical schools of Timbuktu (University of Sankore) Gao and Jenne. Note

should be taken here on the Ethiopian philosophy

5. Modern and contemporary African philosophy

4. Some selected thinkers of the trends in contemporary African philosophy

a. Ethnophilosophy

Placede Tempels

A Belgian Catholic priest, born in 1906; worked in D.R.C in 1930s and 1960s among the Baluba people.

Wrote on Bantu philosophy in 1945 and published it in French in 1959 as La philosophie Bantou which was

translated into English in 1969 as Bantu philosophy.

Tempels starts with the conviction that abstract thought was a permanent feature of traditional Africa. This

abstract thought concerned the ontology which underlies uniform and enduring behaviour of the Africans

exemplified in their language, religion, customs, morals, laws, etc.

Argument: The existence of the uniform and enduring behaviour inevitably points to the existence of an

underlying ontology. There is therefore a need to reconstruct the ontology of the Bantu by a careful study of

the universal and permanent behaviour of the Bantu (Baluba) His Bantu Philosophy is a result of such study.

The aim of the study according to Tempels was to equip the “colonials of good will” with a useful tool to

carry out their “civilizing mission” more efficiently and effectively. This civilizing mission required

adaptation so as to ground the new “higher civilization” on the “kernel of truth” within the indigenes. Failure

to do so would either cause the mission to suffer rejection or produce half-baked “evoloués cut off from their

African roots, who are no more than “pseudo-Europeans without principles, character, purpose, or sense;

negation of civilized beings.

Main points of Bantu Philosophy:

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1. Bantu ontology: Reality is seen as a universe of “forces” in contrast to the Western universe of

“atomic” beings. Force is not separate from being; force is being and vice versa. There is a hierarchy

of forces from God, the highest and supreme force, to the forces of the world of organic things. The

principle of primogeniture, that is, rank according to age applies in this ontological order. There is an

interdependence of forces whereby they reinforce or diminish each other. There is a dynamic view of

reality.

2. Bantu wisdom: Epistemology is dependent on ontology. True knowledge and wisdom is the

knowledge of the forces. Since being is force and knowledge is a faculty of being therefore

knowledge is force. As there is a hierarchy of forces so is knowledge. Philosophic knowledge is of

the general nature of forces and principles governing their interaction. It is universal, indubitable,

and unanimous. Scientific knowledge is of unique nature and behaviour of individual forces,

possessed by specialists such as hunters, fishermen, and diviners. It is specialized, dubitable, and

controversial. Supernatural knowledge “surpasses the capacity of every kind of created being.”

3. Bantu psychology: It is about the theory of the human being, the muntu. Africans believe in the

creation of the world which is centred on muntu. The human being is the most powerful of all

created beings. Distinct from all other creatures, the human being is an active force since like the

creator, exercises the vital force.

4. Bantu ethics: Moral and legal rules are grounded on the ontology of a hierarchically-ordered

universe. They are objective rather than subjective or conventional. Right, good and justice are

defined in terms of reverence for the ontological hierarchy. Wrong, evil, injustice are defined in

terms of irreverence. The ontological order is the clearest expression of God’s will. The worst crime

is killing by sorcery; it is the ultimate irreverence for the overarching good of the ontological order.

Reinforcement of the living persons is the centre of the created universe. Redressing different forms

of irreverence for the ontological order is possible through restoration of the crimes committed

against equals, e.g. by compensation. There is no restoration for crimes committed against superior

forces such as ancestors and God. There is only a possibility of redress by a communal propitiatory

offerings and ritual purification as a sign of renewed acknowledgement of human subordination to

superior forces.

It should be noted that despite the fact of Tempels’ arguing strongly for the existence of an African

philosophy based on the African systems of thought he still considered such mode of thought radically

different from Western thought process. He would claim, for instance, that it is impossible for the Bantu

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to comprehend the basic laws of science such as the principle of the uniformity of nature. Thus Tempels

is criticised as still promoting the thesis of primitive mentality.

Likewise, he considered the Africans as unconscious of their philosophy and hence unable to express it

systematically unless a European like Temples comes to their rescue. Some critics of Tempels have

therefore seen him as continuing the conventional view of the Africans by euphemistically calling

philosophy what others such as Hegel and the modern thinkers had found to be irrational and illogical.

There is also a problem with Tempels’ claim that Bantu ontology of vital forces is dynamic whereas his

concern was the stability, the lack of change in the pagan’s behaviour which caused the Christian or the

evolués easily reverting back to their traditions despite the fact of their apparent conversion and

acquisition of Western education.

John Mbiti: Born in Kenya, studied at the Universities of Makerere (Uganda), Barrington (U.S.A), and

Cambridge (England) –Ph.D. in theology. Was chairman of the Department of Philosophy and Religious

Studies –Makerere; Visiting professor at Harvard, Union Theological Seminary; and at Universities in

Switzerland where he also worked for the World Council of Churches. Has written extensively and his

best well known book is African Religions and Philosophy (1969, 1990). African philosophy follows

from an analysis of African Religions. Contrary to the conventional view that primitives had no religion,

Mbiti argued that the African is notoriously religious, that is, religion is found in all the departments of

the African life. Religion is an ontological phenomenon. It pertains to the question of existence and

being. Human person in Africa is a deeply religious being living in a religious universe.

The Concept of Time is a key to explaining the African religious ontology. It is a heavily

anthropocentric ontology; centred on human interests.

Categories of the African religious ontology:

1. God: Ultimate explanation of the genesis and sustenance of all reality.

2. Spirits: extra-human beings and spirits of human beings dead long-time ago.

3. Human being: those who are alive and those to be born

4. Animals and plants: the remainder of biological life

5. Phenomena and objects without biological life

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The anthropocentric ontology is a complete unity or solidarity which nothing can break up or destroy.

The concept of time is crucial for the understanding of African religions and philosophy:

1. The traditional African concept of time is a two-dimensional phenomenon, with a long past (Zamani)

a present (Sasa) and virtually no future. This is different from the Western linear concept of time

with an indefinite past, present, and infinite future.

2. Future events which are certain to occur or if they fall within the inevitable rhythm of nature, best

constitute only potential time not actual time. Actual time is what is present and what is past.

3. Time has to be experienced in order to make sense or to become real. A person experiences time

partly in his/her own individual life, and partly through the society which goes back many

generations before his/her own birth. What is in the future cannot make sense since it has not been

experienced.

Mbiti’s findings are based on analyses of myths and languages. He claims that there are no myths about

future in Africa and that African verb tenses which refer to the future cover only a period up to six months

and at most not beyond a year. This conception of time with virtually no future has some implications for the

Africans’ understanding of Christian eschatology.

Evaluation

Lacking tense verbs referring to the future in a language does not mean the people lack a clear conception of

the future. It could only mean that people do not have much concern for the future. Not bothering about the

future and not having a future are not logically equivalent.

Mbiti has been criticized for over generalization of what he found in two Bantu groups of East Africa, the

Kamba and Kikuyu to all the Bantu and Africans. In this respect, Kwame Gyekye contends that both

concrete and abstract notions of time are expressed by the Akan language notwithstanding the fact that time

is regarded as a concrete reality. Further, it is difficult to imagine a community without a future conception

of time by the fact that the people constituting it necessarily have common values, hopes and aspirations

which are to be realized in the future. Thus Mbiti’s conception of time can only be understood to mean that

the future was not of much pre-occupation for the Africans.

Gyekye cites Jesus’ injunction to his followers not to be anxious about their future needs yet would still

conceive and hope for their future salvation and eternal life.

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Alexis Kagame’s study of time was also concerned with mainly Bantu languages but his familiarity with

Sudanic languages makes his study relevant to the Sudanic zone as well. Some conclusions:

1. Time has to be experienced to be real. Traditional Bantu identify time only in terms of events they

deem worthy of attention.

2. Time is “anonymous” unless it is occupied by an event that gains at least some human attention. The

languages have no substantive to designate time “in the abstract sense”, that is, without an event.

3. Future time is, as in Mbiti, “merely a projection of our minds.”

a. Individual is limited in making projections into the future because of the fact of contingency.

An individual’s life span is rather short.

b. For a community, future time is “infinite” –projections go well beyond a single year.

Regardless of the death of individuals the community would continue into the distant future.

c. Future is less real for the individual than the present and the past.

d. Each language has its own terms for the remote past, but Mbiti is less than accurate in his

characterization of the past using the Kiswahili word “Zamani”.

e. There is no concept of eternity as the totality of duration. Such a notion is instead expressed

as “all the days;” i.e. each day as a continuous or undefined time.

f. The past influences the present through the intervention of “dead” ancestors.

g. Time is “stamped” or marked by events:

i. Units of time composing a day is marked by events commonly occurring at the same

recurrent part of the day, e.g., first milking for a pastoral people.

ii. Units of time composing a year by recurrent seasonal events e.g. no rain, light rain,

etc.

iii. A year is stamped by a completion of a large, significant cycle, e.g. one harvest to the

next

Robin Horton:

Comparing Traditional African Religious thought and Scientific thought. Horton attempted to establish

similarities as well as differences between the explanation of traditional religious thinking and the

contemporary scientific thinking.

A. Similarities

1. Both treat physical objects as “manifestations” of unobservable, theoretical entities; e.g., ancestors, spirits

and gods, for traditional explanation and electrons, atoms, molecules for scientific explanation.

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2. Both treat puzzling phenomena as explainable in terms of the causal action of theoretical entities; e.g., .in

tradition, a granary which falls and injures a person will be explained in terms of termites plus physical

intervention by a spirit as a punishment for some previous act of social disorder. In science, a disease that is

restricted to a certain division of a hospital will be treated as resulting from some source of infectious germs

unique to that division. Hempel (1966) –a case of Ignaz Semmelweis at Vienna General Hospital

B. Differences

1. Theoretical entities of traditional religion are described in terms of personal features, whereas those of

science in terms of impersonal. The aim in both is to bring order, unity, harmony, etc.

2. The protocols for inquiry are different.

a) Whereas in tradition there is no alternative to belief in spiritualistic word views, in science all beliefs are

subject to significant challenge and subsequent modification.

b) Whereas in tradition any significant challenge to belief is considered inappropriate, in science major

scientific theories have been challenged by alternatives. Geocentric world view was challenged by

Heliocentric view. In tradition, unfavourable test data were automatically explained away by other allied

beliefs; e.g., failure of traditional leader’s spiritualistic prescription will be attributed to the loss of control in

communicating with appropriate spirits. In contrast, scientists expect and invite challenges to every belief;

there are foundation beliefs to change in response to unfavourable data.

3. Reasons for the difference between inquiry protocols are based on the differences between the respective

socio-economic contexts.

-Western world: development of trade patterns that produced a significant amount of migration to and from

substantially divergent cultures. This factor was less in tradition. -There were urban centres in which people

were closely packed together in contrast to the traditional world. -In the Western world there were two

reasons for better understanding competing explanatory theories:

a) Institutionalization of the method of science is effective at improving understanding.

b) The benefits involved in allowing one’s fundamental beliefs to be subject to refutation and

replacement offset the costs.

In traditional world there is no felt need for better understanding substantially competing theories; no

institutionalized methods of science; no engagement in serious critical reflection. Thus the world view of the

traditional Africa is closed whereas that of science is open.

Barry Hallen: Analytic philosophy and traditional thought: A critique of Robin Horton (1977). Hallen

contends that critical reflection, contrary to Horton’s claims, can flourish in a single traditional culture. The

Yoruba, for example, have significantly competing “factions.” Traditional herbalists give spiritualistic

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prescription cure while believing in a natural cure, namely, knowledge of the medical properties of various

herbs. Hence some traditional Africans were critically reflective.”

Reflective criteria as advocated by Karl Popper-Three stages:

1. Identification of a tradition as tradition

2. Awareness of functional significance of the tradition by virtue of which it is deemed important or

unimportant.

3. Awareness of at least one significant alternative to the tradition, and use of “some critical basis” to

choose between the tradition and the alternative.

The Yoruba Babalawo met the criteria elaborated by Popper. For example, for “chief Z” a Yoruba Babalawo

(onisegun- (herbalist known as “father of secrets”) in a tradition known as Orisa worship, -Successes are

attributed to the intervention of some spirit or divinity (Orisa) –Chief Z conforms to the worship even when

he knows the efficacy of his herbal medicine –again because of the traditional African desire for humility in

their experts and that–there is expectation that empirical knowledge combined with spiritualistic

intervention is more powerful than empirical knowledge alone.

There is a recognition of a significant alternative to the tradition, namely, that of discontinuing it. Its

continuation is to avoid undesirable consequences such as jealousy which would undermine professional

status. Therefore, conflicting worldviews is not necessary for developing critical power.

According to Hallen, Horton takes an overly narrow-minded analytic approach to traditional African

thought: –that simply describes it in terms of contemporary scientific concepts. Other approaches are

possible such as Quine’s view that each culture’s language is a theory “that defines meaning and order.”

Thus traditional African thought is a source of original justifications and explanations, especially ethical, of

behaviour.

Kwame Anthon Appiah agrees with some of the claims of Robin Horton as regards the characteristics of

traditional religious explanation, namely the personal character of explanation, and employs Aristotle’s

notion of final cause to supplement Horton. He asserts that traditional Africans were aware of significant

competitors to their explanatory hypothesis but what was lacking were the institutions necessary for

“adversarial” style of scientific theory; e.g. published and repeatable peer review. He makes a distinction

between rationality and reasonableness. The former means that one is disposed to react to evidence and

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reflection by changing beliefs in ways that increase their likelihood to being true. -objective. The latter

means a sincere attempt to be rational.

How can Africans be reasonable in their beliefs in spiritualistic explanations? It would not be proper to treat

them as “symbolic” rather than literal as John Beattie and Emile Durkheim proposed. Contending that false

beliefs cannot survive and since beliefs in spiritualistic interventions have survived without being literally

true, they must be symbolic. But traditional Africans treat their beliefs as literal, and have a clear notion of

symbolic representation.

The reasonableness of traditional Africans comes from:

1. Use of auxiliary hypotheses “in reasonable defence of their beliefs.”

2. Favourable evidence concerning the theory comprising these beliefs; e.g. that spirits exist-priest go

in trance, people get better after spiritual remedies; people die from the action of inimical spirits.

3. Lack of alien, alternative point of view makes it reasonable to adopt the traditional world view.

b. Profession Philosophy

Paulin Hountondji: Born in Benin where he was also a former minister for education.

Hountondji belongs to the Professional school of African philosophy, which started in the 60s and drew its

supporters from professionally trained philosophers. Among its adherent are Odera Oruka, Kwasi Wiredu,

and Peter Bodunrin. It is a school patterned on the Western notion of philosophy. It contends that philosophy

is engrained with argumentation and criticism. The school focuses on the meaning and justification of the

word philosophy. It regards logic as the only tool for philosophizing. Furthermore philosophy is

individualistic –it is a personal reflection on specific issues and concepts that are problematic to an

individual. Philosophy is modern and scientific; it should accommodate and utilize developments in

knowledge and technology. Professional philosophers tend to repudiate tradition in favour of modernity.

Hountondji’s main ideas are found in his book African Philosophy: Myth and Reality (1983). There he

outlines some standards for any thought whatsoever to qualify as philosophy. These are (a) criticality; that

is, philosophy should be based on reason and evidence; (b) scientific character –that philosophy is a result of

rational and empirical inquiry rather than mystical, spiritual or occult pursuits; and (c) individuality –that

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philosophy is always an individual enterprise. With these standards he examines and dismisses the work of

Tempels and similar writings as ethnophilosophy. Those were mere myths rather than philosophy.

Ethnophilosophy, according to Hountondji, is “a pre-philosophy mistaking itself for metaphilosophy, a

philosophy which, instead of presenting its own rational justification, shelters lazily behind the authority of a

tradition and projects its own theses and beliefs on to that tradition.”

What is African Philosophy for Hountondji?

1) Texts written by Africans, dealing with philosophical problems, and designated as philosophy by

their authors.

2) Ethnophilosophies by African authors could be considered but most of them lack scientific rigour to

qualify as philosophy. The thought of Ogotemmeli as recorded by M. Griaule, for example, has a

better chance than Tempels’, Mbiti’s and Kagame’s literature.

3) Philosophy is more an activity than a system. It is a process that expresses itself in history.

4) Philosophy is necessarily connected with science. As science is characteristically hypothetical so

should philosophy be; it is the love of wisdom rather than the accomplished wisdom per se.

5) There is no traditional African philosophy because in traditional African societies there was no

recorded, systematized and integrated form of knowledge –there was no science.

6) Ethnophilosophy is a double negation of philosophy –a collective, spontaneous, unreflective, and

implicit world view.

Marcien Towa: “Conditions for the Affirmation of a Modern African Philosophical thought.” Translated by

Alaster Gashaw; in African Philosophy: The Essential Readings. Edited by Stenay Serequeberhan, (St. Paul,

MN.: Paragon House, 1991)

1. Critique of ethnophilosophy in line with professional philosophers. For Towa the central problem is

that ethnophilosophy’s interest is theological. It “discovers in the African tradition the principle

dogmas of the so-called “revealed” religions: exclusive monotheism, providence, etc.,

Ethnophilosophy is as stiff as the dogmas it propagates.

2. Critique of Hountondji and professional philosophers for reducing philosophy to epistemology.

Hountondji excludes African thought in the name of scientificity and literacy. This contrasts studies

like those of Cheik A. Diop and T. Obenga who demonstrated the existence of both sophisticated

thought and writing in ancient Africa (Egypt). In a way Hountodji helped to advance the primitive

mentality thesis against which African philosophy was trying to fight.

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3. Methodological conditions for the unblocking of African philosophy.

a. Clearing prejudices about African philosophy: One should avoid making an essential link

between the concepts philosophy and African. Such link should never be made by any

culture, group or civilization as was done by Heidegger who claimed that philosophy was

Greek and Western in essence. “In the concept of philosophy, there is no essential link with

any particular civilization. The predicates Greek, German, European or African that qualify

philosophy relate to it only in a contingent manner.”

b. Definition of philosophy: “The thought of the essential, the methodical and critical

examination of that which, in the theoretical order or in the practical order, has or should

have for humanity a supreme importance.” Towa sets this as the general and formal definition

of philosophy. Similar to the requirements by the professional philosophers a thought will

qualify as philosophy only when it meets the standards of the formal definition.

c. “The term African philosophy does not signify a particular philosophical conception that

would specifically be African and would then team up with Africanity or negritude. Does not

refer to a particular content; it refers back to the general concept of philosophy.” It

designates an intellectual course of action that conforms to the purely formal definition of

philosophy. Thus “African philosophy is the exercise by Africans of a specific type of

intellectual activity (the critical examination of fundamental problems) applied to the African

reality.” Defining philosophy as the thought of the essential then preserves the specificity of

the philosophical approach without excluding African from the kingdom of philosophical

thought.

c. Sage Philosophy or Philosophical Sagacity: H. Odera Oruka (See “Sagacity in

African Philosophy” in African Philosophy: The Essential Readings, pp. 47-62.)

Problems:

1. Disagreement in the definition of African Philosophy; e.g. the questioning of the literacy or origin

criteria.

2. Professional philosophy is not genuinely African. It is a philosophy treated from a typically Western

stand point –logic, argumentation, individuality, science, criticism, rationality and similar principles.

3. The word African philosophy is only used in the ideological or debased form when applied to the

hitherto called African philosophy. Thus traditional Africa was considered a place incapable of

having philosophy. Philosophical sagacity claims that even in traditional Africa there were and still

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exist individuals who are capable of critical, coherent and independent thinking. This philosophy

therefore retains the basic tenets of the professional school –rigor and universality of philosophy, but

focuses on individuals who are still being guided by the traditional African life and thought.

Oruka started in 1974 researching on the thoughts of traditional Kenyan Sages with the aim of

identifying individuals of traditional Kenya who were wise in the philosophical didactic sense. Then he

wrote their thoughts on paper as a proof of the existence of genuine African philosophy in the proper and

technical sense of the word. Sage philosophy or philosophical sagacity refers to thoughts having or

showing insight and good judgement and thoughts of persons acknowledged as wise by their respective

communities. It is a body of basic principles and tenets that underlie and justify the beliefs, customs and

practices of a given culture. Sage philosophy and sagacity can mean the same thing.

Need to make distinctions to clarify the uniqueness of Oruka’s “philosophical sagacity.”

1. Sage philosophy: popular folk sagacity, that is, well-known communal maxims, aphorisms, and

general common sense truths. Any well instructed person in the community will know that. This

consists of first order truth claims (absolute?) whose specialist is the sage who wants to maintain the

social order and explain its thought without going beyond the premises and conclusions of the

culture. Ogotemmêli and the Yoruba Onisegun are such Sages.

2. Philosophic Sagacity: An expounded wisdom and a rational thought of some given individuals

within the community. This is a critical reflection on the first order which can show rebellion against

conformity and anachronism. It is sceptical of communal consensus as well as it is open-minded and

rationalistic.

The task of the philosophic sagacity is to examine the question: was traditional Africa a place where no

persons had the room or mind to think independently and at times even critically of the communal

consensus?

Answer: There are individuals who are critical and independent thinkers who guide their thought and

judgement by the power of reason and inborn insights rather than by authority of communal consensus.

These are the sage philosophers.

d. Nationalist and-Ideological, or Liberation Philosophy.

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This trend is built on the thought coming from nationalist leaders of independence struggle and leaders

of the newly independent African nations. There is tension between their nationalism and Pan-

Africanism and therefore the preference to use the term liberation philosophy. It is about liberation from

colonialism and restoration of African dignity and identity. It is also liberation from the evils of diseases,

hunger and poverty. Further it is an economic liberation from neo-colonialism and exploitative capitalist

system. The radical branch of this trend adopted socialism –African socialism as the guiding ideology.

Others [Jomo Kenyatta and L. S. Senghor] were more moderate and accommodative of capitalism.

Thinkers of the Liberation Philosophy trend include Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Leopold Sedar

Senghor, Aime Cesaire, Amical Gabral, Franz Fanon, G. Nasser, Nelson Mandela, Kenneth Kaunda,

Jomo Kenyatta, etc.

Nkrumah- Consciencism; Nyerere-Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism; Mandela- The struggle is my life.

Nkrumah and Nyerere:

Similarities

1. Both based their political philosophy on communalistic principles of pre-colonial African

societies. True freedom includes a mental liberation and a return to a genuine and authentic

traditional African humanism. These leaders have, however, been criticized of anachronism

and of romanticizing the Africa’s past.

2. Both were strong advocates of single-party system of government as opposed to Western

model of democracy, expressing the desire to forge unity out of the different ethnic groups.

This approach contradicted values such as equality and discussion –The alternative would be

the idea of a movement or no-party politics like that of Y. Musoveni (Gbagadegisen).

3. Both advocated equality or egalitarianism as the basic value which would necessarily lead to

socialism

4. Both were strong Pan-Africanists. Nkrumah favoured immediate centralized continental unity

while Nyerere looked for a gradual approach. [Cassablanca group and Monrovia group

respectively].

Differences:

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1. Nkrumah based his socialism on the theory of metaphysical materialism whereas Nyerere did not

state the ontological basis for his theory of Ujamaa although the metaphysics of the human nature

seems to be implied in his views.

2. Nkrumah thought that the class struggle (even violent conflicts in some cases) might be a

necessary means for implementing socialism in contemporary Africa. Nyerere preferred a more

reconciliatory approach of universal brotherhood.

Pan-Africanism: (See James N. Mburu. Thematic Issues in African Philosophy (Nairobi: Acacia

Publishers, 2003). The term Pan-Africanism was coined and first used at several Pan-African

Congresses attended by African scholars in Europe and America. The Congresses were held in

Paris (1911), London (1921 and 1923), New York (1927) and Manchester (1945). It is a political

movement that started in the 1920s with the purpose to promote unity in all its possible

dimensions; geographical, cultural, economic, political, scientific, etc. The first president of

Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah (1909-1972) was a major force behind this movement which became a

continental philosophy in 1960s.

The aims of Pan-Africanism (Kwame Nkrumah)

1. To explore ways and means of consolidating and safeguarding political independence.

2. To strengthen the cultural and economic ties between African countries

3. To decide on the workable arrangements for helping fellow Africans still subject to colonial

rule

4. To examine the central world problems of how to secure peace.

These aims can be achieved only if there is unity among African nations. There was however a

difference in the way the African leaders understood the concept of unity. The group called the

Monrovia Group of nations understood unity in terms of autonomy of nations. “African unity

should be a loose grouping of sovereign and autonomous nations held together by unity of action

and aspirations. Another group called the Casablanca Group of nations understood unity in

terms of control. African unity should be based on central control of basic political structures

and institutions such as defence, economy and foreign policy. Although Nkrumah favoured the

control model of unity, it was the autonomy one which won the day leading to the creation of the

Organization of African Unity (O.A.U) in 1963. O.A.U has now become African Union (A.U)

with the objective of evolving into achieving the control model vision.

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There is need to reconcile the two meanings of unity to achieve a solid and stable Pan-

Africanism. Both control and autonomy, namely, command and discipline on the one hand and

freedom and spontaneity on the other, are needed for the edification of the African nations.

Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism

This is the most important book of Nyerere’s writings. It contains the central essay –Ujamaa- which

explicates Nyerere’s philosophical and political thought and three other essays, “The Arusha Declaration,”

“Education for Self-reliance,” and “Socialism and Rural Development.” The Arusha Declaration is a call to

action, a putting into practice the philosophy of Ujamaa. The other two essays were written later to clarify

further the theory and praxis of Ujamaa.

What is Ujamaa or African socialism? It is an attitude of mind. An attitude of mind here would mean a

vision and philosophy of life as distinct from a standard political system or pattern. The latter is an

interpretation and implementation of the former.

“Socialism like democracy is an attitude of mind. In a socialist society it is the socialist attitude of mind, and not the rigid adherence to a standard political pattern, which is needed to ensure that people care for each other’s welfare.”

Basic principles associated with Ujamaa socialism

1. The human person is the purpose of all social activity

2. Equality is the basic assumption of life in society. Nyerere considers this as the core and essence of

socialism.

3. Upholding of human dignity

4. Democracy –both in terms of political choices and control and economic decisions and

responsibility.

5. A socialist society consists of workers only and hence everybody has obligation to work. This also

offers the basis for common ownership of the basic means of production. This conviction of Nyerere

is expressed in his article “Leaders must not be Masters” (Chukwudi Eze, pp. 77-80). Instead of a

society of masters and servants/slaves one should aim at building a society where everyone is his/her

own master.

Values which must be emphasized in a socialist organization and teaching:

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1. The spirit of co-operation rather than competition

2. The pre-eminence of service over personal acquisitiveness, wealth and knowledge. This should be

done without undermining individual freedoms for, “the purpose of socialism is to enlarge the real

freedom of man, to expand his opportunity of living in dignity and well-being.”

Some highlights of Nyerere’s political thought:

1. Freedom and autonomy of the individual. Related to Nyerere’s advocacy of equality, human dignity,

and democracy.

a. Human equality is based on the fact of our common humanity, of which rationality is a

distinctive feature, that is, the capacity for knowledge and freedom. Affirmation of equality is

presupposed in Nyerere, given the wide acceptance of the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights.

b. Human equality and human dignity go hand in hand since the former is based on the belief

that every human person has the same dignity (intrinsic worth) as any other. At the core of

dignity is the fact that every human person is of intrinsic value, defined by the rational nature

of the person endowed with power, knowledge and freedom. Nyerere’s desire to safeguard

the rights of the individual needed to be delicately balanced with his advocacy of socialism

which tends to focus on or privilege the good of the group.

c. Democracy is also related to freedom and autonomy. For Nyerere, “Democracy means that

people must be able to choose freely those who govern them, and in broad terms determine

what the government does in their name. It means that the government must be accountable

to the people; it must also be responsive to views expressed freely through a political

machinery which the people can understand and use.” His ideal democracy was that of

ancient Greece which, according to Nyerere, is still being practiced in some traditional

African societies

“Democracy in Africa or anywhere else is the government by the people. Ideally it is form of government whereby the people – ALL the people- settle their affairs through free discussion. The appropriate setting for this basic or pure democracy is a small community. The city states of ancient Greece, for example, practiced it. And in African society, the traditional method of conducting affairs is by free discussion. Mr. Guy Clutton-Brock, writing about a typical African community, puts it neatly in the sentence… “The elders sit under a big tree, and talk until they agree.” In larger communities, however, government by the people is possible only in a modified form… After pure democracy, the next best thing is Government by people’s representatives.”

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2. Metaphysics and the nature of religious faith. Nyerere’s views on metaphysics and religion seem to

have been very much influenced by Western liberal thought acquired through his Western education.

He insists that socialism does not need a metaphysical or religious doctrine to be true, and that

religion is an individual or personal affair not to interfere with public policy.

3. Advocacy of secular socialism and secular state. This is exemplified by Nyerere’s dictum that “the state

has no religion but the people of Tanzania have religion.” He at once advocates the doctrines of the

separation of state and religion and the freedom of religion. Obviously, in a reality where different

religions exist, it is a practical and prudential matter for politics to take a neural stance in relation to all

religions.

4. Social contract as a source of the political community. It would seem that in a democratic society

where people discuss freely they will arrive at a rational consensus about how they want to be

governed. The question is whether political society or community comes about as a natural

development or as a matter of an agreement; convention.

5. Ujamaa socialism is “moral politics.” Instead of being a mere political ideology or an economic

theory, Ujamaa is first of all a political thought aiming at building a moral society of which economy

is one of the important components. In fact, according to Nyerere, socialism is “a commitment to the

belief that there are more important things in life than the amassing of riches, and if the pursuit of

wealth clashes with things like human dignity and social equality, then the latter will be given

priority.”

6. The African-ness of Nyerere’s socialism:

a. It is built on African traditions and values

It is modelled on the African family –the extended family

b. It is opposed both to capitalism and doctrinaire socialism

Ujamaa, then, or familyhood, describes our socialism. It is opposed to capitalism, which seeks to

build a happy society on the basis of exploitation of man by man; and it is equally opposed to

doctrinaire socialism which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict

between man and man.

Nyerere is very clear about the reasons for his using the term ujamaa: “The word ujamaa was chosen for

special reasons. First, it is an African word and thus emphasizes the African-ness of the policies we intend to

follow. Second, its literal meaning is ‘family-hood’, so that it brings to the mind of our people the idea of

mutual involvement of the family as we know it.”

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Nelson Mandela: The straggle is my Life

Life: Was born in 1918 in the ruling family of Tembuland in the Transkei, South Africa. (See P. English

and K. M. Kalumba pp. 335 ff.

1. Freedom Charter

a. Preamble

b. The people shall govern

c. All national groups shall have equal rights

d. The people shall share in the country’s wealth

2. Freedom in our lifetime: Mandela’s commentary on the Freedom Charter. FC is not a blueprint for a

socialist state; it seeks a transfer of power to all the Africans irrespective of class rather than

advocating the working class and peasant domination; it is not opposed to profit motif, i.e.

capitalism. It calls for certain nationalisation to correct the evils of apartheid and address the many

needs of the impoverished majority.

3. The Rivonia trial, 1963-1964: Second Court Statement, 1964. Mandela gives a summary of his

political philosophy grounded on the demands of the freedom charter.

a. Reiterates the argument that FC is not a blueprint for a socialist state

b. All post-apartheid nationalisations were meant to take place within an economy of private

enterprise

c. Expression of admiration for democracy,

d. A denial of being a communist;

e. An acknowledgement of collaboration with the communists during the anti-apartheid

struggle.

Excavating Africa in Western Discourse (D. A. Masolo, African Philosophy in Search of Identity. Pp.

147-193.) A new school of thought in the study of African thought (in general) and African philosophy (in

particular). Source: Franz Crahay’s lecture and article: “Le decollage conceptuel: conditions d’une

philosophie bantou.” (1965) (Conceptual take off: Conditions for an African Philosophy)

Aim: Examine the nature and form of African intellectual practice in its historical emergence and

conditioning. Philosophy is seen as one form of discourse among others.

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Claim: to produce a system of philosophy in Africa one needs to reconstruct African discourse at the

speculative (decollage) level: -Identify and then use conceptual schemes =basic principles of reasoning-

indigenous to Africa.

Followers of the school: Fabien Eboussi-Boulaga; Marien Towa; Meinrad Hebga, and V. Y. Mudimbe. A

group of varied thinkers but united in their critique of ethno-philosophy as a product of Western power or

knowledge. Production of ethno-philosophy expresses the epistemological roots of:

-the deep social, political, and cultural crisis of Muntu, the African person (Eboussi-Boulaga)

-African’s continued servitude to Western domination (Towa)

-Africa’s dependence on Western tulelage (Hebga)

--the invention of Africa at the margins of Western knowledge (Mudimbe).

Concern: (1) To expose the politics that produced ethno-philosophy as its inferior margin, its negative

reflection awaiting assimilation

(2) To describe for African gnosis the course for a deliverance from the politics of marginalization,

which produce the passive image represented in ethno-philosophy and in the entire present philosophical

discourse in Africa.

Kwasi Wiredu: Truth and the Question of African Philosophy

Wiredu’s on ethnophilosophy: Moderate position in comparison to Hountondji and Towa. He acknowledges

a significant difference between traditional forms of knowledge and modern scientific forms of knowledge.

But the two historical cultural contexts are not irreconcilable. Ethnophilosophy is a pre-scientific and pre-

industrial thought which will have no direct relevance to the modern African who has adopted modern

patterns of living. -use of modern machinery and modern techniques of acquiring knowledge. However, in

the field of philosophy modern African philosophers can fruitfully “integrate their individual reflections

upon African material, -themes contained in traditional African systems of thought- Their philosophical

enterprise would be informed in spirit and methods by the canons of Western philosophy.

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Important question: What is the relationship between the modern African philosopher and (1) his enterprise?

(2) the traditional thought system?

The urgent problem for Wiredu is not whether or not traditional thought systems were philosophical, but the

need to address some of the central ideas which may lead to the improvement of the conditions of life for

Africans today. (p.224) “Wiredu considers analytical philosophy as a therapy for African thought.” (Ibid.)

Weredu’s position on African philosophy includes his critique of Hountondji’s anti- ethnophilosophy

school. Wiredu’s view on the role of philosophy in contemporary Africa: “Our societies are being rapidly

changed by industrialization,” he says, “and if we wish to understand this change and control its direction,

[then] we must adopt new ways of thinking, a new outlook upon man, society and nature.”(Masolo p.232).

Wiredu is criticized, particularly by Henry Odera Oruka, for giving little or no role to traditional thought in

constructing African philosophy today. Oruka’s remedy is philosophical sagacity. Wiredu himself has

shown greater interest in traditional thought especially by using his analytic skills to directly analyse and

discern different concepts and conceptual categories in traditional thought. (Ibid)

The scope of African Philosophy:

From ancient Africa to ancient Greece: Henry Olela:

1. The foundation of Greek and hence Modern Western philosophy can be traced to Africa -to ancient

Egypt, which is the cradle of Western civilization. This assertion would surprise and shock many

scholars because of a long history and tradition that intellectual tradition especially philosophy

originated with the Greek thinkers.

2. Africans and Babylonians had elaborated educational systems and had speculated about their world

views long before the Greeks. The educational system and philosophical thought of the Greeks were

founded on the African and Babylonian ones.

3. The account of an African educational system: The Ancient Egyptian education system. It consisted

of seven stages of which one would proceed from one to the next after passing an examination. At

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the end of the final stage, the seventh, the student would become a prophet, a priest, almost god-like.

Students were introduced to all secret mysteries at this final stage.

4. Plato’s educational system, especially, in the Republic reveals compatibility with the ancient

Egyptian Educational System. In the early years up to age eighteen, corresponding to the first three

stages of ancient Egyptian educational system, students would learn first, reading and writing,

physical education, and literature; then mathematics and geometry. They were taught arithmetic,

plane and solid geometry, astronomy and dialectics between the ages of twenty and thirty. They

learnt dialectics between the ages of thirty and thirty-five followed by fifteen years of practical

experience in subordinate offices. Those who qualify after passing all the tests become philosophers

who are quite similar to the Egyptian prophets described as blessed and god-like.

5. The prophets were required to practice the cardinal virtues of fortitude, temperance, wisdom, and

justice -Fortitude: Not to submit to fear or pain -Temperate: to be balanced in one’s judgment-

Wisdom: pure intelligence at the end of the stages of education- Justice which is identical with god

Maat in the Egyptian of antiquity calls for a correct approach and attitude to issues -final stage of

one’s soul.

6. Plato identifies the same four cardinal virtues in the state and in the individual in his Republic.

According to him the essence of wisdom is good counsel and deliberation and resides in the rulers.

Courage or fortitude preserves right opinion under any circumstances be it fear, pain, suffering or

pleasure. It is the virtue of soldiers. Temperate or self-control is a sort of harmony in society or in the

individual. Justice maintains and guarantees the functioning of the other three virtues.

7. Plato had long contact with Egypt something he fully acknowledges but is mysteriously ignored by

subsequent scholars even the so-called Plato’s specialists. In Plato’s own words as found in Plato in

Sicily, he did “study after serving in Egypt, hampered by an illness which at least brought me the

knowledge and kindness of priests, who taught me something of the divine basis of her society, and

its relation to the heavenly circuits.” [cf. G. R. Levy, Plato in Sicily (London: Faber and Faber), 25-

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6]. Thus Plato’s education system and his views on the just society governed by philosopher kings

are a reflection on his visit of Egypt and its influence. Moreover, in The Statesman Plato claims that

only those who belong to the priestly caste could become kings.

8. Olela’s research also shows that the whole of the pre-Socratic thoughts are only appendices to the

Egyptian (Babylonian) thought.