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The Limitations and Potentialities of Green Marketing

ABSTRACT: The potential of green marketing and its limitations in solving society’s

environmental problems are evaluated. The streams of research in the green marketing area are

reviewed and their assumptions and efficacies are discussed. While green marketing has some

positive societal outcomes, on its own it is an insufficient solution to societal environmental

problems in general and humanity’s existential threat from climate change in particular. The

roles and responsibilities of business, citizen-consumers, and government in contributing

environmental solutions are analyzed and discussed.

KEYWORDS: green marketing, environmental marketing, social responsibility,

environmentalism

Reference this article as follows:

Wymer, W. & Polonsky, M. (2015). The limitations and potentialities of green marketing. Journal of Nonprofit

& Public Sector Marketing, 27(3), 239-262.

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the ability of green marketing to provide a

solution to environmental problems which requires an integrated approach. We will begin this

evaluation by first defining or conceptualizing green marketing (Cairncross, 1993). Then, we

will discuss the limitations and potentialities of major societal actors: business, citizen-

consumers, and government (Weisbrod, 1975). Understanding these three actors is important as

their interactions and interdependencies influence the effective operation of macromarketing

systems (Prothero & Fitchett, 2010). Finally, we discuss some conclusions regarding the

appropriate role of green marketing as a solution-provider to major threats to earth’s ecosystems

on earth. We discuss how the potential of green marketing might be facilitated in an integrative

manner in order to produce more favorable outcomes. The scope of our analysis focuses on

issues in developed markets, as issues within developing markets create additional challenges.

CONCEPTUALIZING GREEN MARKETING

In beginning our discussion of green marketing, it is important to recognize that policies

relying on market activities and economic exchanges to solve environmental problems are

usually derivations of free-market environmentalism (Anderson & Leal, 1991). A market-based

perspective sees the government’s role as minimal, essentially limited to enforcing contracts and

tort laws (Trebilcock & Oacobucci, 2003). In free-market environmentalism, the role of citizens

is reduced to that of consumers (Kotler, 2011). The key societal actor is the profit-oriented

business that outperforms its competitors by being more responsive to consumer preferences

(Olssen & Peters, 2005). Assumptions of these market-based theories are that private ownership,

rather than public ownership, ensures that property is cared for in the optimum manner and that

resources are used most efficiently. While many firms focus on “profit-making” rather than

maximizing social value (Prothero & Fitchett, 2010), building social value (including

environmental value) is also argued to be a way that firms can improve their overall performance

(Porter & Kramer, 2006). Another assumption of these market-based solutions is that consumers

demand goods and services that result in the greatest good for society (Metzger, 2003). Others

have argued that it is government’s responsibility to facilitate and manage this process, given the

diverse and competing interests of the actors in the environmental debate (Pellizzoni 2004).

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Authors have previously suggested that it may be possible to green capitalism (Porter &

Kramer, 2006; Prothero & Fitchett, 2010). While we could not find examples in which the

theoretical free market solved a pressing environmental problem, there are instances in which

government interference in the markets, such as market-based regulation, have been helpful in

reducing environmental degradation. For example, the Australian government set a date in 2007

in which incandescent light bulbs could no longer be sold (Tonzani, 2009). Neither the business

sector nor consumers engaged in any substantial protests at this restriction on business and

consumer choice.

In our discussion, we avoid framing green marketing as having the ability to solve all our

environmental problems. Complex environmental problems require complex solutions. It is

more beneficial to discuss green marketing as a component of an overall system-wide solution to

our environmental problems (Prothero, McDonagh & Dobscha, 2010). The issue becomes, then,

to what extent green marketing serve as a vehicle for solving environmental problems.

GREEN MARKETING

What is now known as green marketing was originally called ecological marketing in the

early 1970’s (Fisk, 1974; Henion & Kinnear, 1976). From a popular or practitioner perspective,

green marketing refers to the marketing of products and services that are presumed to be

environmentally preferable to others (Green Marketing, 2014). From a scholarly research

perspective, green marketing refers to the “analysis of how marketing activities impact on the

environment and how the environmental variable can be incorporated into the various decisions

of corporate marketing” (Chamorro, Rubio, & Miranda, 2009, p. 223). Peattie (2001) defines

green marketing as “marketing activities which attempt to reduce the negative social and

environmental impact of existing products and production systems, and which promote less

damaging products and services” (p. 129).

The interest in green marketing within the academic research community has ebbed and

flowed over time (McDonagh & Prothero, 2014). There was surge in interest in the 1990’s and

this later declined only to increase again more recently. The recent trend in green marketing

research integrates green marketing into the broader framework of corporate social responsibility

(Chamorro, Rubio, & Miranda, 2009). This change is the result of a shift in thinking from green

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marketing as a type of consumerism (1970’s to 1990’s) to green marketing as a societal

responsibility of the business sector (Porter & Kramer, 2006).

There is an important tension and contradiction in thinking among green marketing

scholars, which assumes that the outcomes of green marketing are always virtuous. Hence, it

may be assumed that the means through which society achieves the virtuous end matter little. If

the business sector is primarily interested in increasing profits, but a side effect of its activities is

good for the environment, then we should appreciate the side effect and continue to support the

business activities that produced it. In other words, it is not important how we achieve our

desired outcome, a healthy and sustainable environment, but rather, that we do achieve it. Stated

another way, the means do not matter, only the end result.

Some researchers take a business advocacy perspective, arguing that green marketing is

attractive because it is profitable (Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006), although others argue that

business responsibility (including greening) is an imperative for business to justify its existence

(Werther & Chandler, 2005). Taking a more balanced approach, some researchers combine the

profit motive with social responsibility (Elkington, 1997; Kotler, 2011; Porter & Kramer, 2006).

Using examples like a drop in an oil company’s stock price from a disastrous oil rig explosion

and oil well blow-out, it is argued that acting environmentally unfriendly is unprofitable (Cronin

et al., 2011). Market incentives, as this logic goes, favor pro-environmental corporate decisions

(Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006). For example, promoting oneself as ‘green’ increases consumer

preferences as well as justifies company decisions in charging premium prices for green brands

(Ramirez, 2013). Thus, going green is sometimes purported to be a win-win situation -- both

business and the environment benefit (Gordon, Carrigan & Hastings, 2011). In the following

analysis, we will evaluate these assumptions, claims, and arguments in greater detail.

Drucker (1958) viewed the purpose of marketing to be “…the process through which the

economy is integrated into society to serve human needs” (p. 252). Industry, government, and

consumers have long been recognized as the three primary economic actors in a society (Berle &

Means, 1991; Gilbert & Kahn, 1996; Schweinitz, 1964; Weisbrod, 1975) and drivers of

capitalistic markets (Prothero & Fitchett, 2010). Hence, our framework for examining the

potentialities and limitations of green marketing will be guided by the roles of these three

primary economic/social actors. Since we are examining green marketing’s potential to help

solve environmental problems, we necessarily take a macromarketing perspective (Hunt, 1976;

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Moyer, 1972). That is, we are interested in examining green marketing’s effects on society

(Sheth & Sisodia, 2005; Varey, 2010). This contrasts with the tendency of some prior research

which takes a micromarketing perspective, being mainly concerned with the well-being of the

marketing organization (Hunt & Burnett, 1982).

We will examine each actor’s role with respect to green marketing, as well as each’s

limitations and potential for solving our environmental problems. We begin our analysis with the

business sector.

THE BUSINESS SECTOR

Humanity needs the business sector to implement sustainable production in order to

protect earth’s life systems. Ideally, sustainable production produces zero waste. Pure

sustainable production uses 100 percent renewable inputs. Although pure sustainability is

unattainable in practice, industry can practice continuous improvement to reduce its waste and to

increase the proportion of production inputs that are renewable (Peattie, 2001; Porter and van der

Linde, 1995). The aim of integrating environmental activities and production processes might be

better stated as continually reducing environmentally harm.

Green Marketing Leads to Profitability

Some researchers argue that continuous improvement toward sustainable production

results in greater profitability (Coddington, 1993; Mirvis, 1994; Porter & Kramer, 2006; Porter &

van der Linde, 1995). It is reasonable to believe that there are examples in which this true, at

least up to some threshold level of improvement. Producers generally avoid actions in which

reducing waste and increasing renewable inputs increases costs more than any additional revenue

that may result (marginal costs exceed marginal revenue).

While sustainable production results in less harm, it has been argued that for marketing to

effectively address environmental issues there has to be a re-conceptualization of marketing that

better integrates societies’ quality of life as distinct from satisfying individuals’ wants (Varey,

2010). Thus, while environmental benefits may accrue from corporate action, seeking these

benefits does not drive corporate action.

Figure 1 illustrates the limits of business’s voluntary sustainable production. Our

assumptions are: (1) there may be some facets of production in which reducing waste or

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increasing renewable inputs are profitable (e.g., Porter and van der Linde, 1995), and (2) a

business that voluntarily adopts pure sustainable production would be unprofitable (Friedman,

1970). In Figure 1, the circle on the left represents production that is profitable to a business.

The circle on the right represents pure sustainable production. The area in which the circles

overlap represents the proportion of sustainable production that is profitable to the business. This

argument assumes that firms measure performance using financial measures. While there are

alternative holistic approaches to measuring corporate performance such as using a triple bottom

line (TBL) (Penaloza & Mish, 2011), corporate executive decisions are strongly influenced by

financial market projections and compensation incentives based on those projections (Gray &

Milne, 2002). Unfortunately relying on financial measures as performance indicators isolates

and externalizes the environmental harms caused by the organization. Firms typically do not

have measures that account for environmental outcomes and, thus, managers rely on artificial

anthropocentric creations (i.e. money and finance) to assess their actions (Polonsky, 2011).

The discussion thus far portrays the business sector as composed of amoral profit-

maximizing organizations which typically do not have a holistic approach for measuring

performance that incorporates environmental value (Polonsky, 2011; Varey, 2010). This is

obviously not always the case. Some firms may have values that support decisions that reduce

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environmental harm (Kotler, 2011). Ray Anderson, CEO of Interface (a carpet manufacturer) is

known as an advocate for improving the sustainability of production (Anderson, 1999). In

general, however, while firms and their managers recognize that greening of activities is

important for society, corporate action appears not to assign this recognition a priority (Kiron et

al., 2015).

Multiple Stakeholder Perspective

The business literature has more recently adopted a broader stakeholder perspective

(Freeman, 1984) as a way to assess social issues such as green marketing (Cronin, Smith, Gleim,

Ramirez, & Martinez, 2011). The general idea is that decision-makers take into consideration not

only the profit effects of their decisions, but also how their decisions will be perceived by groups

whose views decision-makers regard (Polonsky, 1994; Prothero, McDonagh & Dobscha, 2010;

Rivera-Camino, 2007). Stakeholder groups may include consumers, competitors, governments,

nonprofit organizations, investors, supply chain partners, employees, society, or the environment

itself (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Starik, 1995).

Without debating the degree to which corporate executives’ decisions reflect a concern

for various stakeholders, a central facet of the multiple stakeholder management theory is that an

executive acts as an impartial judge, balancing the concerns of various stakeholders to arrive at a

fair and just decision. Unfortunately corporate decision-makers are not impartial judges, but

employed corporate agents who have incentives to focus their energies toward satisfying two

primary stakeholder groups: the board of directors and the major stockholders (Hunt & Auster,

1990; Varey, 2010). Hence, the decision process is only balanced to the degree that executive

self-interest is protected (Polonsky & Scott, 2005). Furthermore, cheating (breaking the rules) is

rampant among the corporate elite because often the rewards are great and the risks are minimal

(Hayes, 2013).

Even if one concedes that business decision makers are increasingly adopting a more

prosocial stakeholder perspective (Bansal & Roth, 2000; Sheth & Sisodia, 2005), this does little

to negate the fact that industry’s green marketing efforts are insufficient to solve the world’s

environmental problems (Varey, 2010). Referring again to Figure 1, if we assume that businesses

are willing to reduce their profits in order to reduce environmental harm (a tenuous assumption),

this means that a portion of total production will fall outside of the profitable production circle,

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potentially existing solely in the sustainable production circle. The degree to which a business is

willing to operate outside of its profitable production domain is limited by (1) the potential for

bankruptcy, (2) the willingness of business owners to tolerate lower profits, and (3) the

willingness of executives to forgo profit-based compensation incentives (Berrone & Gomez‐Mejia, 2009).

Given the incentives, it is unlikely that most corporations would operate unprofitably or

under-profitably (Klassen, 2001). However, some companies may sacrifice short term profits if

they perceive green marketing initiatives as a foundation for future growth or if they believe that

economics of scale will make green investments profitable in the future (Menguc & Ozanne,

2005). It may be more probable for a proprietorship, small business, or closely held corporation

to operate in a manner that sacrifices some profits in order to express personal values such as

operating in a more environmentally conscious manner. Unfortunately for humanity, the

preponderance of environmental damage is caused by large corporations. For example, just 90

companies are responsible for two-thirds of global warming atmospheric emissions (Goldenberg,

2013). Hence, the organizational form least likely to weigh societal harm into decisions has the

greatest ability to harm society.

Social Responsibility

Some researchers argue that the business sector has accepted or should accept a social

responsibility that transcends its fiduciary responsibility to its owners (Menguc & Ozanne, 2005;

Porter & Kramer, 2006; Werther & Chandler, 2005). Ideas of corporate/business social

responsibility are diverse but generally adopting values associated with avoiding harming people

or the environment (Penaloza & Mish, 2011). A number of social issues such as social justice,

human rights, and environmentalism are often included in conceptualizations of corporate social

responsibility (Banerjee, 2007). A plausible theory for how the corporate sector will undergo the

major moral transformation required to adopt the values embedded in corporate social

responsibility has been missing from the scholarly literature (Crane, 2000), although this topic is

increasingly being broached (Prothero, McDonagh & Dobscha, 2010; Varey, 2010).

It is ironic that researchers seem to be primarily interested in the influence of corporate

social responsibility on corporate financial performance (Cronin et al., 2011) and significantly

less on the environmental and social impact of corporate activities (Gray & Milne, 2002). There

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appears to be a tacit belief among some researchers that corporations may be interested in

appearing to be socially responsible if it is profitable to do so, with some suggesting this type of

strategic philanthropy is the way that corporate social responsibility should be directed

(McAlister & Ferrell, 2002). Fortunately, an increasing number of marketing academics see

social responsibility as an imperative of business (Kotler, 2011; Prothero, McDonagh &

Dobscha, 2010; Varey, 2010).

The research interest in the potential profitability of social responsibility may be a cynical

acknowledgement that the core values of executives remain focused on profits instead of human

rights, social welfare, and environmentalism (Babiak & Hare, 2006; Polonsky, 2011). Support

for this cynicism is evident by corporate efforts to keep potential regulatory initiatives purely

voluntary (Newton & Harte, 1997), even during an “era of global neoliberalism [in which] the

role of governments seems to be more closely allied with business interests than ever before”

(Banerjee, 2007, p. 91). Hence, the majority of corporate social responsibility efforts continue to

emphasize profitability as the primary desired outcome (Banerjee, 1999).

The strong corporate resistance to government regulation is evidence that corporations

want the ability to limit their environmentalism within the boundary of their self-interests. For

example, if a corporation really held environmentalism values, it would be rational for that pro-

environment corporation to lobby for (rather than against) government regulation. This is

because the pro-environmental corporation would benefit in two ways from government

environmental regulation. First, the pro-environmental corporation’s competitors would lose any

cost-saving advantage they might have from less sustainable production. Second, requiring an

industry to reduce environmental harm would be congruent with the environmental values of the

pro-environment corporation. Most corporations’ strenuous resistance to government regulation

would appear to suggest that environmentalism is not an important value. Tensions between

industry and environmentalists still to exist, even though some researchers have argued that a

green economy may drive economic development (Pretty, 2013).

The business sector is generally quite unwilling to solve the environmental problems it

causes, because of its short-term focus and its failure to use systems thinking (Polonsky, 2011).

Managers within the business sector appear to be primarily interested in increasing short-term

profits. Hence, much corporate green marketing is less about sustainable production than about

appealing to consumer segments or promoting a green image as a public relations tactic.

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There are exceptions to these general tendencies, with some businesses being based on

environment-improving foundations. One might argue that this exception applies to firms that

make or market energy/water-saving devices, recycling technologies, or the application of

environmentally friendly versions of existing product lines. For example, the Tesla and Fisker

Automotive companies produce a range of luxury electric and hybrid sports cars. By virtue of

their product lines, companies like Tesla and Fisker Automotive manifest a greater proportion of

environmentally friendly values than the typical corporation. While their cars are priced at a

premium and target wealthier customers, Tesla and Fisker’s products may place some market

pressure on the car industry to design more environmentally friendly features into their product

lines. The development of niche ‘responsible’ firms may be critical for developing the market,

where these environmental innovations are subsequently adopted by competitors (Eiadat, Kelly,

Roche & Eyadat, 2008). The spread of such environmental innovations to other manufactures

would be similar to innovations within the wheel of retailing, where innovative practices

ultimately become the norm across the sector, thus greening may spread across an industry over

time. For example, at the 2015 Detroit Motor car show all major manufactures have a variety of

hybrid or alternative fuel vehicles on display (Associated Press, 2014)

While there are some attempts to reduce producers’ negative environmental effects, it

appears the business sector in general is quite limited in its willingness to solve the broader

environmental problems it causes. The business sector is primarily interested in increasing

profits. Hence, green marketing is less concerned about sustainable production than about

appealing to certain consumer segments. Some argue that green consumerism can solve our

environmental problems because consumer demand can motivate changes in corporate behavior

that benefit the environment (Kleindorfer, Singhal, & Wassenhove, 2005; Prothero & Fitchett,

2000; Prothero et al., 2011; Sheth, Sethia & Srinivas, 2011). We will evaluate this argument in

our next section.

GREEN CONSUMERISM

Some marketing scholars have viewed green marketing as the promotion or marketing of

a product based on its environmental performance (Charter & Polonsky, 1999). Proponents of

green consumerism generally assume if green products are available, consumers will switch to

them from their currently preferred brands. The argument’s reasoning is that green marketers

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will be rewarded in the marketplace by consumer preference (Lee, 2008; Vandermerwe & Oliff,

1990) because consumers with environmental values will switch to brands that are associated

with these values (Prothero et al., 2011; Sheth, Sethia & Srinivas, 2011). This, in turn, creates an

incentive for other marketers to implement green marketing, creating a virtuous cycle. For

example, there was a consumer outcry over the tuna fish industry’s side effect of killing dolphins

when fishing for tuna. A leading tuna producer introduced a dolphin friendly change in their

fishing process that was rapidly copied by most firms and these changes in fishing practices were

ultimately enshrined in regulatory policy (Wright, 2000).

Although public opinion surveys find that citizens are concerned about environmental

issues (National Geographic, 2012), their purchase behavior with respect to green products has

been lackluster (Peattie & Crane, 2005; Wong, Turner, & Stoneman, 1996). In practice, citizen

environmental concerns have not translated into a widespread insistence on green consumer

brands (Schrum, McCarty, & Lowrey, 1995) or a wholesale abandonment of environmentally

harmful behaviors. There is often this attitude-behavior gap (Bamberg & Möser, 2007;

Thøgersen, 2004). It appears that a green brand attribute is not sufficiently important to motivate

widespread brand switching behavior (although there is probably a consumer segment that is

highly responsive to green brand attributes), especially when the green attribute is coupled with

premium pricing (Drozdenko, Jensen & Coelho, 2011).

More recent research has suggested that green marketing can go further as it may, in fact,

be a form of social marketing (Rettie, Burchell & Barnham, 2014); which might include

demarketing (Varadarajan, 2014), voluntary simplicity (Craig‐Lees & Hill, 2002), or undertaking

less harmful actions, such as shifting from car ownership to using shared cars or public

transportation (Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012). These approaches all assume that consumers can exert

their power to shape corporate environmental behavior (Varey, 2010).

Consumers typically report in surveys that they would prefer green products (National

Geographic, 2012), all other things being equal. In practice, however, consumers “…will not

sacrifice their needs or desires just to be green” (Ginsberg & Bloom, 2004, p. 79). Of course

there are some consumer segments that have strong environmentalist values, the ability to afford,

and the motivation to actively search for green products and brands. However, there is scant

evidence that there is widespread consumer demand for green products sufficient to create

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meaningful profit incentives for industry to produce more green products (Rex & Baumann,

2007).

It has been argued that part of the problem is that consumer decision processes impede

consumers’ ability to truly value the natural environment, as they lack a system perspective or

long-term thinking (Polonsky, 2011). However, there are some consumer segments that have

strong environmentalist values and the motivation to actively patronize green products and

brands (Craig‐Lees & Hill, 2002). For example, adoption of car sharing, energy efficiency and

other environmental initiatives are examples of green consumer behaviors gaining market share,

although in many cases these behavior changes result in other individual benefits such as cost

savings and thus the benefits from environmental behavior change can be multifaceted. There are

unfortunately numerous examples in which consumer demand did not result in widespread

adoption of green goods. For example, Deja-Shoe was an environmental shoe company that won

numerous awards, but went bankrupt. On the other-hand the Fisker and Tesla automotive

companies seem to be performing well with automobiles targeting affluent consumers. We are

unaware of any research that identifies the extent to which the environmental focus drives these

high-end customers. The high-end innovations are indeed important, as this communicates high

value, rather than cost saving motivations. In many cases early environmental innovations were

perceived to be lower quality (Drumwright, 1994). Thus, premium greening positions

environmental innovations positively, offering a broader reputational benefit.

Researchers and policy makers cannot assume that since most consumers are unwilling to

pay premium prices for green products they have little regard for environmental quality.

Consumers may have insufficient disposable income to allocate a portion of their scarce

resources to pay premium prices to reward green producers.

Unfortunately, consumers may also believe that even if they were to pay premiums for

green products, the environmental impact of their product choices would be insignificant.

Consumers may conclude that corporations are looking out for their own self-interests and so

should they or that environmental protection is the government’s responsibility since it has the

authority to enact and enforce laws and regulations. Alternatively, consumers might believe that

there are more effective ways for them to contribute to improving the environment than

switching to green brands, such as consuming less (Craig‐Lees & Hill, 2002). Clearly, assuming

that consumers’ lackluster response to green brands indicates a disregard for the environment is

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specious. The link between underlying values and purchase/consumption behavior needs to be

examined further in future research. All things considered, however, it is certainly better to have

some green products available than no green products available.

While in recent years green demand may not have mushroomed to great heights,

consumers do seem more intent on reducing their environmental impact and firms seem better

able to meet these needs in a way that delivers functional value propositions (Kotler, 2011). It

would of course be more environmentally and socially beneficial for consumers to choose green

alternatives or to change their lifestyles (Sheth, Sethia & Srinivas, 2011). This might include

buying more locally-produced goods, using cars less frequently and purchasing goods that

minimize environmental costs over their lifecycles, rather than focusing on lowest costs or

instant gratification.

Green marketing needs to assist consumers to improve their decision making, which

could include reductions in demand, thereby limiting and reducing the waste and negative

environmental effects they cause. Broader lifestyle changes would result in greater societal

benefits than would accrue if all consumers were to simply switching to green brands.

Unfortunately, most profit-seeking corporations will not welcome reductions in consumer

demand and there continue to be fewer commercial de-marketing campaigns in contrast to the

consumer de-marketing that is promoted by nonprofit and public-sector organizations. Profit

seeking businesses may find it unthinkable to promote a reduced demand for their brands. As

such, if green marketing results in increased consumption because consumers believe their

behavior is less harmful (Catlin and Wangm, 2013), there could in fact be an increase in the

overall environmental burden rather than a reduction in environmental harm (Kotler, 2011).

In some sense the fallacious propositions of well-meaning green marketing proponents

result from expecting “greed to be good.” That is, as long as green brands are being marketed to

consumers, it should not matter that producers may be achieving greater profits. In this case, the

end justifies the means. However, inequities would arise if these innovations are priced higher at

the same time as they target consumers who have limited resources, thus creating potential

environmental inequities based on incomes. Of course there are instances were innovations

targeting lower income consumers, especially in developing countries, may in fact be more cost

effective as well (Darvishi & Darvishi, 2013). Thus, green innovations are not exploitive on their

own.

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Expecting green marketing to make substantial gains in solving environmental problems

is likely to be unrealistic. Producers want more profits and are hesitant to voluntarily increase

their costs to achieve more sustainable production. Producers want to increase profits and may

price green brands at a premium. The premium pricing, in turn, limits the appeal of green brands

to but a small consumer segment that is environmentally conscious and has sufficient disposal

income to pay price premiums (Ramirez, 2013).

Free-market solution proponents assume that the interests of business and society are

aligned. Although there are some social problems for which this assumption may be true, for

most environmental problems this assumption appears to be unfounded (especially given that the

evaluation of environmental problems and solutions does not focus on the environmental

integrity of outcomes). What society needs from consumers to help address environmental

problems is much more than altering their brand preferences.

Environmental protection needs consumers to reduce their consumption, reuse rather than

replace their goods, and to recycle rather than discard their product waste (EPA, 2014.) In our

current business paradigm, these consumer behaviors are undesirable by producers. Society

needs its citizens to buy less. Producers want citizens to buy more. Society needs consumers to

reduce their consumption through greater reuse and less consumption. Producers want citizens to

increase their consumption. There are conflicts between the interests of society and the interests

of producers/individuals, resulting in macro-micro conflicts.

GOVERNMENT

The social contract between citizens and government is manifest when citizens create a

government and give it sovereignty so that the government will promote the general welfare of

society rather than special interests of a few (Varey, 2011). It is reasonable to believe that

societal problems that are caused by micro-macro conflicts are the responsibility of government

to solve. It is the responsibility of citizens to make sure that their government is fulfilling its

responsibilities (Prothero & Fitchett, 2000). When government fails to meet its obligations to

citizens, citizens need to organize and reform a government that is either unable or unwilling to

promote the general welfare and address societal problems.

When government enacts environmental laws it is the responsibility of citizens and

corporations to submit to governance in order to realize the desired environmental outcomes

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(Polonsky, Binney & Hall, 2004). There is the added complexity that in most cases there is not a

universal view on what actions will generate the most positive outcomes. For example, the

debate as to how to address global warming has resulted in a range of alternative political and

policy approaches, with alternative parties advocating their approach as the best one (Bulkeley &

Mol, 2003).

Often, the key motives of those who would resist efforts to protect the environment are

protectionist in nature. That is, opponents of environmental protection often seek the protection

of polluting industries (Graham, 2010). Governments do, however, sometimes act in ways to

restrict economic benefits to industry in favor of environmental outcomes that benefit society

(often with limited degrees of corporate and consumer dissatisfaction). The example of

numerous governments banning incandescent lights in favor of alternative technologies

(Tonzani, 2009) has resulted in few protests, whereas protests by both consumers and industry

opposing carbon tax legislation have been more prevalent. There are also examples of social

engineering which have evoked limited citizen backlash. One of the most extreme examples

would be the Chinese one-child policy, which severely restricted reproductive freedom, limiting

population growth and, in turn, directly impacting the natural environment by preventing “300

million greenhouse gas emitters” from being born (Engelman, 2009, p. 29). While the Chinese

policy was unpopular, especially in rural areas, the populace generally complied with the policy.

It is unclear that such a policy could have been implemented in a more democratic society like

the U.S.

As another example of noncompliance with government policy, even when implementing

more benign policies such as agricultural pest control, governments have has been unable to get

farmers to fully support programs that are in their best financial and environmental interest

(Polonsky, Binney & Hall, 2004). Of course, one could argue that it is the responsibility of

government to enforce compliance with laws and regulations (Pellizzoni, 2004). From this

perspective, noncompliance could be viewed as a type of government failure.

Conservative governments do sometimes intervene in the market economy when they see

these markets failing to operate effectively (although in most cases this government intervention

is motivated because of harm to consumers and firms rather than harm to the environment)

(Sheth & Sisodia, 2005). To what extent citizen-consumers will accept government policies that

restrict free choice? For example, in many countries local councils have imposed weight-based

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waste disposal costs, which encourage consumers to dispose of goods more responsibly and to

consume less (Dahlén & Lagerkvist, 2010). Such actions provide incentives for citizens to act in

their self-interests (leveraging monetary motivations of consumers) in an effort to achieve a

prosocial outcome that benefits society.

There may be other instances in which governments disrupt markets, producing positive

outcomes with limited impact on consumer choice. For example, in many jurisdictions

regulations are placed on automobile fuel efficiency and emissions. The positive outcome arises

for consumers then purchasing cars that have reduced operating costs and thus financially benefit

consumers. All suppliers (i.e., auto manufactures) face the same constraints with respect to

improving fuel efficiency and, thus, regulations stimulate innovation and benefits for all. In other

instances governments intervene through offering tax incentives or subsidies that reduce the

costs of decisions, such as having lower car registrations cost (or taxes) associated with hybrid

automobiles (Gallagher & Muehlegger, 2011), or tax rebates for people who install solar panels

on their homes (Van Benthem, Gillingham, & Sweeney, 2008). Such incentives may not be

viewed as free market distortions, but they do effectively alter demand by reducing the costs of

environmental options. These examples demonstrate areas in which government can minimally

involve itself in capitalist markets and create incentives that motivate individual economic actors

to behave in a more prosocial, environmentally friendly manner (effectively, reducing the micro-

macro conflict). These are, in effect, governmental green marketing initiatives that may have the

potential to make sustained improvements in the environment.

What can motivate governments to take a more active role in protecting the environment?

Will consumers, who focus on their self-interests, demand governmental action that may increase

taxes or consumer prices? Will industry continue to use its influence to impede governmental

environmental initiatives? Will crony capitalism continue to protect polluting industries (perhaps

explaining why countries like China have been better able to impose radical policy solutions to

social issues than most western nations)? Will governments be proactive in addressing

environmental problems or will they continue react to pressure from constituents and special

interests (Wright, 2000)?

17

DISCUSSION

To the extent that marketing and consumerism can improve conditions, green marketing

should be encouraged. However, it seems clear that some government interventions, whether it is

manifested through social marketing or through legislation, are needed to solve these problems.

Given that many environmental problems are not caused or solved within national boundaries,

policy solutions need to be coordinated trans-nationally. Countries like Tuvalu cannot undertake

on its own volition actions to reverse or forestall global warming to protect itself from extinction

(Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012). Only international solutions to environmental problems will have

any chance of success (Hannam, 2014), and it may be too late for the small island nation.

Governments need to create incentives to encourage innovations in industry and to

change consumer behavior (Clemens, 2006). Achieving a sustainable planet requires

governmental decisions that are antithetical to neoliberalism and crony capitalism. It requires an

ideological shift to protect the environment and society (Polonsky, 2011) rather than to protect

economic growth through the activities of multinational corporations, but also requires

integrative actions across all environmental stakeholders. Treaty and trade agreements that

protect corporations’ ability to harm the environment while promoting firms’ micro interests

clearly have no place in an environmentally-focused approach to governmental intervention.

It is unclear to what extent governmental action can result in a sustained values change

without a combination of both incentives and regulations (Rothschild, 1999). Thus, while well

designed and implemented laws may prohibit inappropriate corporate behavior, broader social

marketing and even educational programs would be needed to assist consumers in understanding

and responding to their role in the environmental harm cycle. As such a more integrated system

is needed to bring together actors within and across sectors. Government may have the ability to

influence the economic system in this way, although there have been some instances of where

NGO’s have been able to motivate significant change in environmental action and behavior of

firms and governments (Guay, Doh, & Sinclair, 2004; Zyglidopoulos, 2002).

Given the difficulties facing policy development in developed countries, one can only

imagine that within developing countries there will be greater challenges (Darvishi & Darvishi,

2013). Consumers from developed nations want the same consumer choices and benefits

enjoyed by their counterparts in more developed regions (Ger & Belk, 1996). It seems unfair to

citizens from developing nations to forego material improvements in their standards of living in

18

order to address environmental problems primarily caused by developed industrial nations

(Galeotti & Lanza, 1999). While some developing countries like China do have the ability to use

non-market forces more readily to address social issues, other developing countries seem to be

embracing the free-market approach with all its negative environmental consequences (UN,

2014).

It is tempting to assume that the current context of neoliberal government policy and

transnational corporate power occurred naturally. It did not, but was the consequence of decades

of political decisions and intentional government policies (Gourevitch & Shinn, 2005). Can we

assume that government regulation within the current context is the only remedy? This is not

necessarily the case. It is important to realize that other forms of capital ownership are possible

and may produce less societal harm than the current overemphasis on capital ownership by giant

multinational corporations. For example, worker cooperatives are a form of ownership in which

the organization’s decisions are made democratically by managers and workers. Reversing the

trend toward privatization, government ownership of some industries is possible. Government

ownership may be particularly beneficial to society in resource extraction industries or monopoly

industries (Wolff, 2012).

The macro-macro conflicts discussed throughout this paper often produce substantial

environmental harm. Marketing across the economic system needs to be transformative and

needs to improve society and human welfare, moving beyond a profit maximizing myopia.

Indeed, the motive of some green marketers is the promotion of the general welfare. Perhaps

green marketing scholars could increase their examination of the effectiveness of actions on

consumers’ and firms’ environmental impact, rather than whether brand preferences or sales

increase (Prothero et al., 2011). Perhaps marketing can evolve to become truly concerned with

the creation of social and environmental value, embracing the triple bottom line approach. Even

in doing this, one does need to question the extent to which the free market can address

environmental and social issues. We are not suggesting that central planning is the only solution.

However, given that the underlying assumptions of a free market rarely exists (i.e., many sellers

and buyers, perfect and free information, where resources can freely move between markets),

marketing-based solutions to major societal problems do appear to be quite limited.

19

RESEARCH PRIORITIES

There are several research topics in need of further investigation. Enhancing our

understanding on these issues would inform our green marketing planning for greater

effectiveness. Furthermore, additional research in these areas would also bring greater clarity to

our understanding of the appropriate role for green marketing in helping to address our many

environmental problems. Research into how to best coordinate activities that brings about

environmental improvements through the market system is warranted. Such research would need

to be multi-pronged, given that any policy would have varying effects with the relevant

stakeholders. This could mean that policies would need to be more integrated across actions, but

that different drivers would need to be used to motivate change by each. Targeted actions could

equally result in failure of actors to respond. For example, in Australia’s failed carbon tax

initiative the government imposed taxes on energy generation, but then provided subsides to

consumers to cover (at least partly) increased costs. As such, while energy providers may have

been encouraged to improve performance, there was less incentives on consumers to modify

behavior.

One topic in need of additional research pertains to clarifying our understanding of

consumer and corporate preferences for green products and products produced by green

producers. Prior research has emphasized marketers’ ability to appeal to green consumers,

referring to consumers with strong environmental values (Rex & Baumann, 2007). What is

needed, however, is a better understanding of how to increase the preference for green products

for the mass market rather than just for the green consumer segment. Prakash (2000) discussed

the need to understand if consumers viewed green brand attributes as hygiene or motivating

factors. If consumers view green product attributes as motivating factors, then industry has an

incentive to increase the proportion of green attributes. Free market mechanisms may work in

this situation. However, if consumers view green attributes as hygiene factors, then they would

expect a certain level of green attributes as a standard feature of the product and would perceive

non-green products as sub-standard. If non-green consumers view green attributes as neither

motivation nor hygiene factors, then a consumer demand-driven incentive for further industrial

greening may be absent. It may also be important to move beyond looking at consumers’

decisions with respect to one product or behavior and look at their overall environmental impact.

Extensive research has found that consumers are inconsistent in their greening (Thøgersen,

20

2004). Thus, the focal question may not be why do consumers purchase green brands, but rather

what motivates consumers to more strongly consider the environmental effects of their

decisions?

Another topic that needs further research support concerns alternative forms of capital

ownership. A tactic assumption in the green marketing literature is that the phenomenon exists

in the context of capitalism exemplified by private ownership of production (Prakash, 2002).

Would alternate forms of ownership provide business models that less myopically emphasize

profits and little else? In additional to private ownership of production; there is public,

nonprofit, and employee ownership alternatives (Picard & van Weezel, 2008). Comparisons

between privately-held production and alterative models with respect to their response to

environmental issues would add to our knowledge of this important area. This would also need

to consider what models of alternative ownership might be most successful, which may also

consider integrated sectorial initiatives. For example, governmental increases to the cost of

automobile registration might be needed to encourage consumers to consider using public

transport or private company car sharing schemes.

Another topic for future research would add to our understanding of increasing the anti-

consumption or conservation sentiment among consumers. Even the more environmentally

responsible firms continue to base their marketing strategy on increasing sales by increasing

brand preference for their green products (Kotler, 2011). However, increasing total consumption

(even if the products are green) exacerbates rather than ameliorates our environmental problems

(Kotler, 2011). At the micro-level, the “…marketer is a professional builder of sales volume…”

(Kotler & Levy, 1971, p. 74). At the macro-level, the combinatory effect of industry

micromarketing that emphasizes demand growth creates destructive societal overconsumption.

Are there conditions under which private business would have incentives for de-marketing

(Wansink & Huckabee, 2005)? Is there a means of changing consumerism to anti-consumerism?

There is little research on this topic (Wright & Egan, 2000).

Finally, it is important for more research on green marketing to take a macromarketing

perspective rather than a micromarketing perspective (Kilbourne & Beckmann, 1998). In their

review of the green marketing literature; Chamorro, Rubio, and Miranda (2009) found that most

green marketing research had a managerial perspective. More research that examines the

influence and interdependence of industry, consumers, and government with respect to solutions

21

to our environmental problems would be helpful, as the scope of environmental problems require

broad-based integrative solutions.

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