The Kyrgyz Republic's Liminal Media: assessing a journalistic rite of passage

The Kyrgyz Republic’s Liminal Media:assessing a journalistic rite of passage

JOSEPH MANZELLA and LEON YACHER Southern Connecticut State University, USA

ABSTRACT In the Western world, the Kyrgyz Republic has been depicted as a democratic success story. Indeed,unlike other Central Asia nation states, the Kyrgyz media appears on the surface relatively free. This paperexamines the Kyrgyz press in the context of journalistic ideologies, and suggests that the republic’s media is goingthrough an important transitional phase, the central stage of a journalistic rite of passage. Part of that transitionalprocess is an ongoing ideological tug-of-war that awaits resolution. It is suggested that such resolution may occuronly when the press becomes economically self-sustaining.

KEY WORDS: Kyrgyz Media, Rite of Passage, Journalistic Ideologies

Introduction

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991

affected the world in ways that require ongoing

evaluation. Recent events have caused further

and faster modifications of thinking than have

been previously considered. Virtually all aspects

of life in the former Soviet Republics have

resulted in prospects that have yet to yield a

measurable pattern in any institution that can

be defined as stable. Rapid change leads to

transformative change and this process is likely

to continue for years to come. Relative stabiliza-

tion seems unlikely in the near future, in part

because the Soviet collapse was sudden, but also

by virtue of the many transformations through

the processes of globalization then and now.

It is no revelation that mass media in the

former Soviet Republics remain in turmoil. It is

with this in mind that we propose to look at the

mass media, and more specifically the news

media, in what is considered one of the most

stable of the former republics, the Kyrgyz

Republic. The purpose here is to attempt to

explicate the role that the news media plays

in the country that has been defined as the

darling of democratic principles in Central Asia

(Anderson, 1999). The analysis here is based on

a variety of scholarly and popular publications

complemented by field visits and interviews

held in various parts of the Kyrgyz Republic

over a period of several months during 2003.

In concert with the nation’s international

reputation, the press of the Kyrgyz Republic

appears to function within the raw template

of the Western free press, in that independent

news organizations are permitted to function

freely and the government does not overtly

engage in media suppression. On the other

hand, the former Soviet Republic has no insti-

tutionalized national independent news media

that represent any significant counterbalance to

the dominant sociopolitical structure, which in

some significant ways is rooted structurally in

the Soviet era and has been described as

‘‘authoritarian’’ despite its international reputa-

tion (Melvin, 2002, p. 182).

As journalist Alexander Kim (see below) has

observed, the ideology of the Western press,

rooted in notions of free speech and political

independence, is still a radical concept not

shared by all newspeople in the Kyrgyz Republic

nor by the political elite. Yet there are examples

of attempts at free press models, attempts that

suggest an ongoing ideological tug of war that

awaits resolution. In this context, we view the

news media as a transitional form in the global

schema of news production, and the struggle

Journalism Studies, Volume 6, Number 4, 2005, pp. 431�443

ISSN 1461-670X print/ISSN 1469-9699 online # 2005 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/14616700500250321

with the political order as a metaphor for a

broader national search for identity.

History, Nostalgia, Transformation

Globalization compresses time and space. As

such, exposure to information, circumstances

and events previously ignored or censored has

widened. The speed by which information

moves, too, has accelerated well beyond what

was imagined just a few years ago.

For the area presently defined as the former

Soviet Union the paths followed by the now 15

independent republics differs as much as the

heterogeneity of their backgrounds and geogra-

phies (Kolstø, 2000). Notwithstanding, the le-

gacy of the Soviet system over its 70-year history

has deeply marked, and still infuses, some

sociocultural systems in the region. This scheme

cannot be ignored nor underestimated. Recently,

nostalgia has returned among the citizenry in

some venues for Communist-era sociocultural

patterns. According to recent reports in cities

such as Omsk and Moscow many ordinary

citizens wished the old system back. One young

man did not understand and lamented as to

why there was a need to have more than one

political party represented in the forthcoming

regional elections. It should be noted that

several reports that have been published have

argued that while the old system is missed, the

Communists are not necessarily benefiting in

the elections (Myers, 2003, p. 3).

It is likely that it will not be long before

confrontations surface on key issues concerning

leaders of the various governments and the

public. Of note is the situation in 2004 facing

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and the

country’s richest man, who was been jailed for

reasons related to tax evasion. Most insiders,

however, argued that the motive behind Mikhail

B. Khodorkovsky’s detention was purely poli-

tical. Government officials saw his behavior as a

direct challenge to the power elite. In a different

setting, the citizenry of Georgia forced president

Eduard Shevardnadze to resign for a variety of

reasons, though the leading cause is reported to

be alleged improprieties related to the Novem-

ber 2003 parliamentary elections. Reporting by

a Georgia TV news channel is said to have

contributed to the resignation (Cheterian and

Makhatadze, 2003).

Whether the above conflicting examples are to

be interpreted as part of the growing pains of

post-Soviet times or of a growing disorder

awaits further examination. Most former Soviet

Republics face significant challenges, none of

which can be minimized at any level.

Furthermore, these kinds of events occur with

a degree of frequency elsewhere, but there is no

arguing that the region encompassing the former

Soviet Union has a certain uniqueness. That

issues of sociocultural and national identity differ

in the region as a whole is a given. What has

become obvious to many observers is that even

within regions that appear geopolitically related,

the differences are significant. The interests

shown by nation-states found in the Caucasus

are not the same as those of Central Asia. The

Baltic region is oriented toward Europe, as

evidenced in 2004 when Estonia, Latvia and

Lithuania joined the European Union.

Furthermore, the sudden birth of 15 republics

encompassing a sizeable area of the world has

generated an unparalleled search for national

identity. Secondly, the basic organizational

structure (i.e., the military, the KGB) that unified

the Soviet Union ended. Also, the pressure

of internal autonomy became an issue that

confronts every one of the former republics

(Breslauer, 1994, p. 216).

There are a number of criteria that can be used

to assess the direction followed by a specific

society as it proceeds forward and develops a

sense of identity and raison d’etre . An important

barometer of a given social order is the role that

mass media play and the degree of efficiency by

which they inform the public. Equally important

is the trust that people put upon the information

reported by the media. Government, through

legislation and behavior, can play a crucial role

in the process. Consequently, the transforma-

tions of mass media, particularly the news

media, may signify the state of transformation

of the sociocultural and political order.

Media, Change and the Kyrgyz

With a few of its immediate neighbors, the

Kyrgyz Republic is uniquely situated. Unlike

432 JOSEPH MANZELLA and LEON YACHER

other former Soviet Republics, the Kyrgyz

Republic is for the first time in the history of

the Kyrgyz peoples experiencing independence.

Although strong hints of independence move-

ments can be traced back to 1986 in the Soviet

Union (Roy, 2000, pp. 125�6), the Kyrgyz, like

their immediate neighbors, did not expect nor

wish independence (Gleason, 1998, passim ).

Throughout time, Kyrgyz ethnic groups have

been part of other political entities (Manz, 1998).

The Kyrgyz can trace their existence as far

back as 2000 years, yet until 1991 independent

political status eluded them. Today Kyrgyz

identity has repeatedly asserted itself in the

Soviet and post-Soviets era through various

efforts to raise the status of the Kyrgyz language

vis-a-vis Russian (Chotaeva, 2004).

The nation’s leadership faces challenges

wrought by the potential that independence

signals and by the persistence of the Soviet

legacy, which is strongly ingrained in Kyrgyz

society. Throughout most of their history, the

ethnic Kyrgyz have experienced subjugated

status and followed the lead of others. Nomadic

until Soviet policies forced people to not only

become sedentary but also were strongly en-

couraged to settle in urban areas. Bishkek,

known as Frunze during Soviet times, grew 96

percent between 1959 (220,000) and 1970

(431,000). During the same period, Osh, second

largest city in the Kyrgyz Republic, grew 85

percent to 120,000 from 65,000 (Harris, 1971,

pp. 120�2). Today, the ethnic Kyrgyz are the

titular peoples in their own country and other

ethnic groups, such as the Russians, Ukrainians

and Tatars have been relegated to minority

status (see e.g. Chinn, 1996). Meanwhile, the

urbanization process continues as young people

from rural areas seek the benefits of urban

life (Boots Allen, 2003, p. 8). In spite of that

and in comparison to other areas of the world,

the Kyrgyz Republic is still relatively rural in

character. Approximately 34 percent of the

population is urban (Haub and Cornelius, 1999).

The lack of self-determination encourages the

status quo. Although democratic processes have

been introduced faster than in neighboring

countries, including a constitution, the reality

may be proving otherwise. However, it is clear

that openness and access to Westerners since

1991 has been unparalleled. During the Stalinist

era, the Soviet Union was closed to outsiders

and Central Asia even more so. Even after,

admittance was limited (Harris, 1998, p. 555).

Changes brought forth by independence, of

course, have benefited mass media, and the

proliferation of print media has exposed people

to a vastly different worldview. The opening of

society in part is reflected in news coverage.

Sensationalist newspapers are sold side by side

with those that are conservative in viewpoint.

For editors and field journalists the past decade

has been one of learning, exploring, and dis-

covering.

However, the road to a free and independent

media has not been without its emergent trou-

bles and some would argue significant setbacks.

The arrival of independence brought a new-

found sense of media coverage, encouraged by

outside forces, and the media attempted to take

on a personality that would mirror the media in

the west. Coverage that was increasingly more

sensationalist and partisan in nature became

quickly accepted as a sign of freedom.

The nature of that freedom, however, has been

variously interpreted. In a June 2003 interview,

Khaliljan Khudaiberdiev, president of Osh TV,

noted that after the Soviet collapse the nation’s

media had only a surface understanding of a

free press and that reporting tended to be

unbalanced. Consequently, the government

used the mistakes of the media to close media

outlets. Although the media has evolved some-

what, he said there was still a limited notion of

the role of a free press. Khudaiberdiev added

that his understanding of the role of the media

has evolved over time. That role, he said, is ‘‘to

cover objectively what is going on; to be a

mediator between people and government; to

inform of the government’s activities but that

means getting all sides of the story.’’ Assistance

from abroad also has had mixed results. He

noted that since the ‘‘war on terrorism’’ the

United States has been blind to the Kyrgyz

government press crackdown. He added that

the closing of the newspaper Moya Stolitsa is a

signifier of this (see case study below).

Like Khudaiberdiev, Kyias Moldokasymov,

director of the Kyrgyz Republic’s branch of

Radio Liberty, said that the partisan nature of

KYRGYZ REPUBLIC’S LIMINAL MEDIA 433

news has left the media open to criticism

because, ‘‘The independent press gives the gov-

ernment an excuse to crack down by providing

one-sided information that is not always accu-

rate. The independent media need to be careful

about proving information before printing.’’

Radio Liberty, which opened in 1992, repre-

sents one of the few broadcast outlets to feature

oppositional news. Once accused of ‘‘informa-

tion terrorism’’ by a government official, the

station features regular daily news segments

and employs about 30 journalists. Moldokasy-

mov said Radio Liberty’s international status

allows it the freedom to criticize the political

establishment.1 Such criticism, however, usually

takes the form of news forums or round table

discussions featuring both government officials

and oppositional spokespeople.

Radio Liberty’s news approach, however, did

bring heat. Two reporters were arrested. One

journalist was tied to a tree and kept there for

several hours by what Moldokasymov claims

was an attempt at government intimidation.

Moldokasymov notes: ‘‘We overcame these dif-

ficulties and now government officials come to

the studio for interviews.’’ Moldokasymov said

the station has an audience of a half million and

is educating its audience to the notion of free

speech.

Government officials learned early in the

republic to take advantage of journalistic errors

and abuses at the expense of common sense and

objective presentation. Thus the issue of free

speech was examined, and although laws were

passed in the early 1990s that protected journal-

ists so long as the country’s leadership was

immune from coverage, by 1997 the government

of President Akayev was closing down publica-

tions that did not reflect the viewpoint of the

political elite (International Press Institute (IPI),

2003 [1997 review]). In one case, the newspaper

Kriminal was shut down after two issues were

identified by the government as unacceptable.

The paper was accused of violating non-verified

or false information and for printing insulting

allegations and offending government officials

(IPI, 2003 [1997 review]). Journalists that re-

ported objective news were jailed or sent to a

labor colony. In fact, the Kyrgyz Republic

became the first former Soviet republic to send

a journalist to jail for libel (IPI, 2003 [1997

review]).

Strong relations with Russia prevented the

entrance of a Turkish reporter into the Kyrgyz

Republic. Ramazan Ozturk annoyed Russian

authorities by his reporting secretly from Chech-

nya. Ozturk had also interviewed rebels from

the breakaway region (IPI, 2003 [1997 review]).

Kyrgyz officials sent the reporter back to Istan-

bul on the flight that departed Bishkek within

two hours of his arrival.

Since 1997, the grip by the government has

grown stronger. More laws were passed, many

of which were worded vaguely enough to

provide judges wide interpretations of the law.

For example, on January 1, 1998, the passing of a

law ‘‘protecting the honor and dignity of the

President,’’ is increasingly being used to prose-

cute journalists that report on issues that gov-

ernment censors find objectionable (IPI, 2003

[1998 review]). In other words, truth is second to

protecting the president’s honor and dignity.

Other laws, some capricious in nature, were also

passed allowing for the closing down of news-

papers. Coincidentally, in each case the shut

down newspapers happen to belong to the

opposition (IPI, 2003 [1998 review]). Some of

the laws are contradictory, however, the govern-

ment uses these laws to its advantage and

discretion.

Print media is not alone in being targeted by

the government. In 1999, Osh TV faced arbitrary

decisions from the government that affected its

ability to report on the events of the region.

After being given a nine-month license, while

other stations were given five-year terms, the

ethnic Uzbek owners were granted a frequency

that is less accessible to the listener. After

objecting for these actions, the station was given

an additional six-month period of broadcasting.

However, the inconveniences and costs resultant

from these events prevented the station from

having a normal working broadcasting day (IPI

2003 [1999 review]). It is not unusual for tax or

fire inspectors to enter the premises and shut

them down for no apparent reason (IPI 2003

[2001 review]).

From 1999 until 2002 media conditions dete-

riorated further. Complicating matters was the

civil unrest that the government faced for much


of 2002. The official reaction was that news

media increasingly felt the heavy hand of the

government, mostly through the means of law-

suits and libel suits. However, often and under

mysterious conditions, reporters are found bea-

ten up or accused of taking bribes or the like (IPI

2003 [2000 review]).

Because of these activities, the independent

media has become aware of what not to write or

what to say. This has restricted their effective-

ness and effectively has limited the ability to

carry out successful investigative reporting. As

a result, the ambiance of self-censorship is now

the rule. Major media and ‘friendly’ media are

owned or controlled by the government via

family links or similar means (IPI 2003 [2002

review]).

As dire as the above conditions appear, by

comparison to its neighbors, the journalist in the

Kyrgyz Republic enjoys a greater amount of

freedom. However, it would be an illusion to

consider the Kyrgyz journalist to be able to

exercise his/her craft with the kind of flexibility

of their Western colleagues. Thus the indirect

threat of government suppression means that

stories on public corruption or public miscon-

duct, though not uncommon, may not reach a

mass audience. Complicating matters is that

news content in the news outlets that dare to

be oppositional tends to be heavily partisan,

according to Sivashova (2002, pp. 5�6), or what

the Western press would regard as advocacy-

style journalism.

A further complication is that the news media

occupy niches reaching specialty audiences in

either Russian or Kyrgyz. A 2002 report notes

that the Kyrgyz Republic has about 900 news-

papers and radio and television outlets offering

a mix of news and entertainment (Buldakova,

2002, p. 11). Newspapers that feature Western-

defined ‘‘news’’ include Vecherny Bishkek , Res

Publica , Slovo Krygyzstana , Kyrgyz Tuusu , Agym

and the dormant Moya Stolitsa . Res Publica , like

Moya Stolitsa , is an oppositional paper but

without economic analysis. Agym was critical

of government for its first year, but toned down

coverage in 2003, avoiding reporting on corrup-

tion or touching the president or his family.

Other newspapers feature entertainment or

specialize in crime stories. Buldakova (2002,

pp. 11�2) also notes that newspapers are less

competitive than television or radio stations.

Television and radio tend toward entertainment,

but stations such as Radio Liberty have featured

political oppositional news shows and the

expected fair share of purported government

harassment.

One newspaper that has avoided the repor-

torial weaknesses that have afflicted other news

organizations is the now out-of-business Moya

Stolitsa. The thing that has separated Moya

Stolitsa from some of the other news outlets in

the Kyrgyz Republic is a fairly high level of

professionalism. The lack of accuracy in some

other news outlets results in part from a lack of

training, but Radio Liberty’s Moldokasymov

had praise for Moya Stolitsa ’s reporting: ‘‘Very

good sources, very detailed.’’ Moldokasymov

noted that Moya Stolitsa was reporting on the

real sources of corruption at the highest levels of

government. This makes the government’s case

against the newspaper weaker, and more

broadly its suppression of journalistic freedom

more disturbing.

A Case with Reverberations

Alexander Kim sits for his interview in a small

office as though he still were editing Moya

Stolitsa [My Capital ], a newspaper that he and

others claim the government obliquely targeted

and forced to shut down. He is an older,

dignified man with a clear sense of what he

wants journalism to be, i.e., a Western-style

independent press that may freely fault both

government and major institutions within the

republic.

Kim was interviewed in late June 2003. On

May 23 of that year Moya Stolitsa , a newspaper

of about 17,000 circulation, ceased publication. It

was forced out of business by a libel suit, which

Kim said was the result of indirect government

pressure to silence the independent press.

Although the newspaper had been the target

of several lawsuits in its year and an half of

printing, the case that broke it was a defamation

suit by Prime Minister Nikolai Tanaev. Tanaev

claimed the newspaper had insulted his honor

and dignity. Moya Stolitsa had been particularly

hard on the nation’s economic structure that has


strong ties to the political elite. Kim noted that

most of the nation’s economic resources that

have been developed are centered in the Bish-

kek metropolitan area and are controlled or

influenced by the president’s family. Therefore,

he said, criticizing the economy is tantamount to

criticizing the president, a holdover from the

Soviet Union. ‘‘All high level positions,’’ he

noted in the kind of statement that drew the

government’s ire, ‘‘are bought and sold for

money, and top officials get their money back

by charging people below.’’

On June 27, shortly after the interview, Kim

published the first issue of MSN , described by

sources as Moya Stolitsa ’s alter ego. The new

newspaper moved to a less expensive office, but

it has remained faithful to the same policy,

format and design and published three times a

week with 5000 copies on Tuesdays and Thurs-

days and 42,000 copies on Fridays.

Four years earlier, in 1999, Kim experienced

the heavy hand of government at another news-

paper, Vecherny Bishkek [Evening Bishkek ], where

he was chief editor. Kim said that President

Akaev’s son-in-law was behind a takeover of

that paper by an American-registered corpora-

tion in an attempt to prevent critical news

coverage. Kim added that he and other key

editors left Vecherny Bishkek shortly after the

takeover and later formed Moya Stolitsa. How-

ever, Kim remains outspoken and said he

looks forward to the newspaper coming back.

Citing government corruption, Kim charges,

‘‘We have become a criminal state with a nice

appearance abroad, where Kyrgyzstan is con-

sidered progressive.’’

Kim’s situation and the fate of Moya Stolitsa is

a metaphor for the marginal nature of the

Kyrgyz Republic’s independent press and to

an extent for the status of the republic in the

world community. Indeed Kim’s case*/and

similar cases of government harassment of the

nation’s independent press*/has become some-

thing of a cause celebre in the international press

and human rights circles. To whit:

. In a January 30, 2003, letter to President

Akaev, the New York based-Human Rights

Watch (HRW.org), protested the beating three

days earlier of Aleksandra Chernik, a Moya

Stolitsa journalist, whose mother is the poli-

tical editor known for her investigations into

political corruption including Akaev’s family.

The organization cited the newspaper staff’s

contention that the beating by unknown

assailants was an attempt to intimidate the

paper because of reporting critical to govern-

ment officials. Later, in a June 30 letter to the

General Affairs Council of the European

Union, the organization criticized the target-

ing of media outlets through defamation suits.

It cited the closing of Moya Stolitsa and the

similar closing of the independent Kyrgyz

language newspaper Kyrgyz Ordo on April 23.

The small circulation newspaper had pub-

lished a story about a tax official who plagiar-

ized a Ph.D. dissertation. Human Rights

Watch also said human rights conditions

have worsened overall since parliamentary

and presidential elections in 2000.

. The International Press Institute, in its 2002

World Press Freedom Review (IPI, 2003) noted

the plight of Moya Stolitsa and predicted its

closure if not by libel suits then by its printing

house, Uchkun, which like all printing facil-

ities in the country, are state owned. The

report also noted that Akaev’s son-in-law,

Adil Toigonbaev, and his associates ‘‘control

various enterprises, including a television and

print media empire,’’ a charge that Kim raised

several times during his June 2003 interview.

According to the previous year’s World Press

Freedom Review (IPI, 2003 [2001 review]),

suppression of the independent press, usually

in the form of libel suits, under the Akaev

government began in earnest prior to presi-

dential elections in October 2000. With the

shutting down of Moya Stolitsa , that suppres-

sion reached a new plateau.

. Following the Moya Stolitsa ’s closing in 2003,

Reporters Without Borders (2003) condemned

the ‘‘. . . relentless harassment of the indepen-

dent daily . . . by means of libel suits by

government officials . . .’’ The condemnation,

posted on the organization’s website on June

13 and quoting its secretary-general, Robert

Menard, added, ‘‘The authorities wanted to

gag this newspaper because it was in the habit

of denouncing cases of corruption implicating

the president’s associates.’’


. On May 3, 2002, the international press

watchdog group Committee to Protect Jour-

nalists named the Kyrgyz Republic as one of

the 10 worst places to be a journalists, along

with nations such as Afghanistan, Cuba and

Iran. It noted that the government ‘‘used the

threat of international terrorism as an excuse

to curb political dissent and suppress the

independent and opposition media,’’ and

cited the frequent use of libel suits against

media organizations. In fact, in late 2002 on

Radio Liberty Kim debated a government

official Moya Stolitsa had accused of corrup-

tion. Pressure on Moya Stolitsa mounted after

that.

A year after Moya Stolitsa ’s closing little had

changed in the Republic’s journalistic landscape,

although it should be noted that on November

14, 2003, a new independent printing press

operated by Freedom House, funded by the US -

government, opened in Bishkek. As of this

writing, several papers, including MSN , are

being printed in color at the facility.

Sources in Bishkek note that despite the

opening provided by the new press, significant

because the press itself is owned by the govern-

ment or its associates, there have been setbacks.

Primary among them is the case of Pyramida

TV’s broadcasting ‘‘problem,’’ which began

on March 17, 2004, as a technical issue but then

turned political when the station, after the

technical problem was resolved in three days,

was not permitted to broadcast for a month, a

move that may be interpreted as a message by

the government.

Ideological News Schemas

The way news organizations function in the

Kyrgyz Republic was established shortly after

the fall of the Soviet. Although the Kyrgyz news

media may not be as tightly controlled as its

Central Asian neighbors, news organizations

have yet to fully engage the Western-style free

press model. Although the Kim case is evidence

that Kyrgyz journalists have experimented with

a free press, the government’s success at sup-

pressing news directly and indirectly suggests

the lingering impact of a Soviet-era news model,

or news schema.

The term schema is used in two senses. The

first is adopted from Strauss (1992), who defines

the term as a motivational framework, a pack-

age of information or knowledge about phe-

nomena that inform shared activity. The second

sense derives from Sewell (1992), who uses the

term cultural schema to refer to an abstract

cultural domain where paradigms are formu-

lated, established and contradict other schemas.

This cultural domain acts as a template which

informs and is informed by social structures.

Giddens (1979, 1984, 1992, [1976]) contends that

social structures are generated by and are

reciprocally influenced by cultural schema,

that is, the realm of values, beliefs and goals.

Giddens’ point is critical, for he suggests that a

cultural schema may be altered and transformed

by human activity. In this sense, we use the term

‘‘ideological schema’’ in reference to an ideolo-

gical template or grid that informs the rules that

frame a sociocultural system. Such grids link

discreet ideological elements into a whole, a

template upon which reporters act and news is

constructed. Journalistic ideological schemas,

therefore, are conceptual portraits of journalists,

complete with a patterned set of values and

beliefs upon which the newsperson acts.

As concepts of news have diffused through-

out the world in the 20th century, two distinct

ideological schemas have emerged: the propa-

gandistic schema and the free press schema , both

of which may be divided into subschemas

(Manzella, 2000).

The Propagandistic Schema

This is based on the notion that the press is

simply an organ of a political party or a nation

state. The news content*/not just the editorial

opinion*/of the medium is dictated by a

political party or the central authority. This

cultural schema roughly parallels that of Siebert

et al. (1963) and consists of two variations, or

subschemas:

1. Totalitarian subschema . This implies direct

control of news content by a nation state.

Journalists who practice journalism within


this subschematic frame may view them-

selves as part of a system for maintaining

social order. The Soviet-era press func-

tioned as such.

2. Public relations subschema . This implies that

the news content is controlled by a poli-

tical party or public interest group. Lines

blur between this form of journalism and

organizational newsletters. The ‘‘yellow’’

journalists of the 19th century in the

United States fell into this category, as

do some modern news organizations

such as the Washington Times and Rupert

Murdoch’s enterprises.

Free Press or Western Schema

Based on the idea of a free press, that is, free of

overt political control, the Western schema of

news assumes a free market place of news

production and consumption. This term is

similar to what Siebert et al. (1963) have called

the Libertarian press, which characterizes media

in the United States and Great Britain. However,

not all American or European news organiza-

tions fall within the Western schema, and not all

‘‘free’’ media organizations within the schema

are independent of party or other ideological

affiliations. Yet the free press schema of news is

fast manifesting itself as a primary global

culture of newspeople. As such, it is infused

by five subschemas, each with distinct ideolo-

gical components (Manzella, 2000, pp. 314�5).

They are:

1. The watchdog subschema . This has been a

primary ideological thrust of the US press

throughout the 19th and 20th centuries,

although somewhat less evident in the

Western European press. It suggests that

the object of the press is to be society’s

watchdog. Implied in the watchdog sub-

schema is the notion that authority is not

to be trusted and that government is

inherently corruptible.

2. Watchdog inversion subschema . On the other

hand, newspeople tend to be drawn to

centers of power and to the powerful even

as they strive to ‘‘take them down.’’ To

an extent, one’s status as a journalist is

determined in part by whom one can ‘‘get

to’’ for an interview or ‘‘bring down’’ in a

story.2

3. The mirror subschema . This originated in the

Western notion that the press should be an

objective observer of society and a mirror

or reflection of reality. This has further

roots in the early 20th-century professio-

nalization of the news business in Europe

and the United States.3 The mirror schema

also implies a reflection of the public will,

or at least a perception of the public will as

expressed by the dominant elite. As pre-

viously mentioned, Radio Liberty employs

‘‘mirror’’ techniques, such as its on-air

debates between government officials and

opposition leaders. Such bifurcations of

political realms, however, have limitations.

As Tannen (1998, p. 288) observes, limiting

debate to two sides limits range, filtering

out shades of gray, but the technique does

allow the media to claim objectivity

because ‘‘both sides of the story were

presented.’’ The idea of an ideological

continuum is thus antithetical to ‘‘objec-

tive,’’ and thus fair and balanced news.

4. The ritual subschema. This implies belief in

the ritualistic power of writing, or the

word, to affect positive social change.

This means that journalists act upon the

notion that the processes of newsgathering

and the act of writing are instruments of

ritualistic power. This is found primarily

in news organizations that specialize in

‘‘literary’’ journalism, in which the power

of the language plays as much a role in the

story’s impact as the content.

5. The egalitarian subschema . Western, particu-

larly US journalists, allied with the alter-

native or liberal press, often view the press

as an instrument of democracy, a class

leveler and a route to power especially for

the lower socio-economic levels.

A Transitional Schema

Since 2003, the press as a whole in the Kyrgyz

Republic falls uneasily between the propagan-

distic schema and the free press schema, thus

reflecting a liminal nature. This might be called


a transitional schema of news. In this schema,

journalists who publish newspapers such as

Moya Stolitsa , and thus adopt the free press

schema, find themselves under considerable

pressure and somewhat isolated. Their plight

tends to attract more attention in the interna-

tional press community than within the nation.

But the trappings of a free press exist at least in

some outward appearances. In effect the press

in such political states are betwixt and between.

One way of framing the transitional ideologi-

cal schema with its betwixt and between nature

is through the notion of rites of passage (Turner,

1969, 1974; van Gennep, 1909). As described by

van Gennep, rites of passage occur in all

societies as processes through which indivi-

duals, and by extensions, groups of cultured

connected individuals, move from one stage

of life to another, usually from childhood to

adulthood.

Although the free press to some may not be

analogous to adulthood, at least we might

suggest that a passage of some sort is taking

place in Central Asia, as a whole, the passage

from the old Soviet system to various other

sociopolitical systems. Likewise, the press of the

Kyrgyz Republic is clearly transitioning in the

sense that the free press ideological schema is

present if the reality is somewhat different. But

the outcome of that transition remains unclear,

an ephemera.

In fleshing out the notion of rites of passage,

van Gennep identified three stages, separation ,

transition , and reaggregation , through which

participants must pass. The salient point is

that all societies share these kinds of rituals,

the tripartite nature of which seems to be a

cultural universal. But anthropologist Turner

(1974, pp. 13�4) suggests something even more

may be at work. He notes that van Gennep’s

tripartite template for ritual movement in space-

time may be applied to extra-ritualistic pro-

cesses as well. One may observe such movement

processes in many aspects of sociocultural

change.

For example, the news media of the Kyrgyz

Republic clearly separated from its past with the

dissolution of the Soviet Union, but has yet to

reaggregate fully into the current social system

and has yet to become fully a member of the

culture of the Western press. It exists in what

Turner called a liminal state, one in which

Turner says is ‘‘betwixt and between successive

lodgments in jural political systems.’’ In such a

state between ‘‘ordered worlds almost anything

can happen . . .’’ including a ‘‘potentially unlim-

ited series of alternative social arrangements’’

(Turner, 1974, pp. 13�4).

Trapped as it is within the second stage of a

rite of passage, the Kyrgyz Republic media’s

liminality is manifested by the lack of a unified

notion, or definition, of what news is, or at least

what it should be. This contrasts with the press

in nations such as Indonesia and South Africa,

both of which emerged from repressive and

hegemonic political systems in the past decade

but whose liminal phrase was by comparison

truncated. For example, until the end of the

Suharto regime, Indonesia had restrictions on

the press not unlike those in the Kyrgyz

Republic today. Under Suharto, the press was

free to publish a variety of stories as long as no

criticisms were leveled against the president,

his family and the military (Manzella, 2000,

pp. 309�10).

As in Indonesia, there is an unspoken dictum

that the Kyrgyz press should not criticize the

president or his family. Complicating this is the

fact that most of the nation’s economic resources

are centered in and around Bishkek and are

controlled or influenced by the president’s

family. Therefore, Kim and other journalists

say, criticizing the economy is tantamount to

criticizing the president, a holdover from the

Soviet Union.

Parallels with Indonesia are limited, however.

With the fall of Suharto, Indonesian journalists

readily adopted the free press schema. This was

especially true in the major cities, such as

Jakarta, which had decades of exposure to the

Western press, so much so that journalistic

training centers used Western journalism texts.

Therefore, unlike the Kyrgyz Republic, the

ideological resources to establish a free press

were in place long before Suharto’s regime

collapsed (Manzella, 2000, p. 316). Much the

same can be said of South Africa, in which the

English Press had strong ties to the British press

and its traditions during the apartheid era. This

allowed for experience in oppositional reporting


during the repressive apartheid government,

and it gave the English Press the resources to

readily adopt the free press schema upon apart-

heid’s collapse.

No such ideological resources existed in the

newly independent Kyrgyz Republic during the

Soviet era. After the Soviet collapse, therefore,

the press has had to adapt to a rather steep

learning curve. Gradually, with assistance both

external and internal, the marginalized press is

gaining the ideological resources to get through

the transitional phase, although material re-

sources are limited.

For example, organizations such as the Osh

Media Resource Center (OMRC) hold the po-

tential to unify the media ideologically and to

facilitate a transition to what Turner (1969,

passim ) would call a reaggregation stage in

which the press is fully integrated into the

sociopolitical system. Founded in 1996, the

center is a joint project of UNESCO and the US

Information Service. Its purpose, according to

staff members, is to support a free press and

unite the Kyrgyz Republic’s media. It offers

training and some material resources at its Osh

headquarters. The media also gets assistance

from non-profits such as the Switzerland-based

Cimera, which has been active in providing

material and ideological aid to OMRC and

media and media education institutions

throughout Central Asia.

Conclusion

The transformation of the Kyrgyz news media

into a free press or Western schema is inhibited

by the lack of a communitarian response. In its

current conditions, mired in the transition phase

of a rite of passage, the press is betwixt and

between worlds, but able to fully unify because

of the critical sociopolitical divisions within the

state.

Nonetheless, the transition stage of the Kyr-

gyz media’s rite of passage does permit experi-

mentation and a loose sense of investigating

paths to be followed. The process of proper

journalistic behavior cannot be reached without

this transition period, which can best be labeled

as a period of adjustment, a time of learning and

obtaining information for a functioning modus

operandi . However, the strong and persistent

paternalistic tradition makes the process of

change that much more difficult (Splichal,

1994, passim ).

To complete the transition phase and fully

emerge as a free press, the media need both

material and ideological resources upon which

to draw. As Bailey (1960, 1969) noted, bridging

opposing schemas requires drawing resources

from one social system to affect another. Ideo-

logical resources in the Kyrgyz Republic are

limited in that lack of formal journalistic train-

ing is endemic. The existence of organizations

such as OMRC is a step in that direction, but it is

doubtful such organizations can exist on their

own, i.e., without strong support from the

international community. Full transition to the

free press schema may require drawing upon

ideological and material resources from within.

Material resources mean that the press must be

economically self-sustaining. As such it must

draw upon the development of an economically

empowered middle class, or an alternative

economic structure to that of the present, in

which control of major economic institutions

remains in the hands of a ruling elite. The fact

the government controls the means of news

production, the actual printing presses, is a

signifier of a system that extends little self-

determination to the press.

In some ways the fate of the press in the

Kyrgyz Republic offers a warning to countries

such as the United States, in which increasing

conglomeratization is leaving media organiza-

tions in the hands of corporate elites with strong

ties to the political system. In other words, the

free press schema, which some media profes-

sionals appear willing to adopt or at least learn,

needs an economic structure upon which it can

draw resources, i.e., an economic system de-

tached from the dominant political party.

Addendum

Since this article was written, seismic change

has shaken the Kyrgyz Republic and the center

of the storm was editor Alexander Kim and his

new version of Moya Stolitsa .

On April 4, 2005 Askar Akayev resigned as

president following explosive demonstrations


against his regime. Critics saw Akayev’s admin-

istration as increasingly authoritarian, and

charges of corruption in a resurgent press

eventually led to a revolt against Akayev’s

decade-old hypothetical democracy.

In the weeks leading up to Akayev’s resigna-

tion, protestors took to the streets of the south-

ern cities of Osh and Jalal-Abad. Shortly

thereafter, demonstrations spread to the capital

city of Bishkek. Observers in Bishkek said in the

beginning the demonstrators were peaceful

following the model of Poland during the

Solidarity movement, but looting of markets

and clothing stores became commonplace be-

cause police failed to secure the streets.

During the protests, observers noted, anti-

Akayev leaflets were distributed, and Bishkek

residents cheered the demonstrators from their

apartments. Members of the Social Democratic

Party joined demonstrators at Alatoo Square.

They chanted, ‘‘Down with Akayev!’’ and

waved posters saying: ‘‘Down with Akayev

the thief!’’, ‘‘Akayev leave!’’ ‘‘The daughter, the

son and the son-in-law, your best times have

passed!’’ Eventually, protestors stormed the

nation’s White House and took over the build-

ing. City Hall, too, was taken over with mini-

mum incident. Akayev asked and obtained

political asylum in Russia. Just before that Prime

Minister Tanaev resigned.

Observers in Bishkek denied Western rumors

that the revolt was the work of Islamic militants

and said it was about the fraudulent elections

and corruption. They added that the people of

this multiethnic country simply reached their

boiling point. The parliamentary elections initi-

ally took place on February 27 and the runoff

election on March 13. Both elections were

marred by fraudulent activities, according to

Organization for Security and Co-operation in

Europe (The Economist, 2005 ).

Although the street protests that brought

down the government were similar in style to

those that swept aside leaders in the former

Soviet Republics of Georgia and Ukraine, the

future of the political process in Kyrgyzstan

remains uncertain because the new leadership

has not yet exhibited cohesiveness of the oppo-

sition in the other republics. New presidential

elections were scheduled for July 10, 2005.

The political upheaval profoundly affected

the news media and vice versa . For the first

time since the collapse of the Soviet Union in

1991, there are no overt or covert restraints on

the news media, and the members of the

Akayev opposition, who have assumed power,

appear to be open for peaceful dialogue. More

importantly, Kyrgyzstan’s press profoundly af-

fected the political situation. In fact, sources in

Bishkek credit a resurrected Moya Stolitsa , now

called MSN , for fanning the fires of dissent that

drove out Akayev.

Kim’s MSN (Moya Stolitsa-Novosti or My

Capital News ) first emerged in 2003 shortly after

Moya Stolitsa was closed. MSN has been using

the presses of the US government-financed

Freedom House to publish and has continued

Moya Stolitsa ’s tradition of publishing scorching

material on Akayev, including photos of the

president’s luxurious new home. At one point,

the Akayev administration cut off electricity to

the newspaper’s offices, but the sources said

pressure from foreign governments forced the

administration to relent and the newspaper

pressed on. (Note: In February, the government

also closed down Radio Free Europe/Radio

Liberty just ahead of parliamentary elections.)

The New York Times reported that MSN was

distributed by Akayev’s opposition and aided

protestors by publishing information on when

and where to gather (Smith, 2005).

David Mikosz, chief of Party IFES Democracy

at Large (formerly International Foundation for

Election Systems) noted that in the post-Akayev

era the press has already demonstrated more

‘‘openness’’ in its news reports. Other sources

note the overall feeling in the country is that

people are satisfied with the emerging open

press.

Despite the new openness, it is likely the

nation’s news media will remain in a transi-

tional state in the short term. But the end of the

Akayev regime and the re-emergence of Kim’s

newspaper as a major, transformative force

means that the last stage of the news media’s

rite of passage to a Western free press schema

may be in sight. The real hurdle, however, may

not so much be the political structure as it is the

economic system, which will continue to have

structural problems as the country attempts to


develop and as a new government emerges.

Corruption also remains a problem. Meanwhile,

the media may show restraint in the short term

and adopt a wait-and-see attitude toward the

new leadership that emerges after July 10.

Regional differences also must be taken into

account, since the large Uzbek minority in the

south differs in their interpretation of how the

Akayev government ruled the country. The

media also may limit its dissemination of

regional events because of the strong hold

leaders of neighboring countries have on their

own people and the potential actions that they

may take that could have a negative effect on the

Kyrgyz Republic. For example, Kazakhstan

closed its border for a week with the Kyrgyz

Republic. Even such short-term events may

have an economic impact to say nothing of the

symbolic significance of such actions.

Acknowledgements

Dr. Yacher was a Fulbright scholar at the Kyrgyz

State National University during the spring

2003 semester and both authors wish to

acknowledge this invaluable contribution to-

wards the conduct and completion of this

research.

Notes

1 This and other interviews of media were conducted by both authors in situ . Field studies in the Kyrgyz Republic covered a

period roughly from January to July 2003 and May and June 2004.2 For example, the need to be called upon during a press conference by a public official often means that reporters soften

questions in the fear that asking a harder question will mean that they will not be recognized by the public official at the next

press conference. The watchdog subschema tends to break down in times of national stress. In the Iraq war of 2003, for

example, American media tended to tone down anti-war coverage and lean toward a more propagandistic schema of news

coverage. Thus the watchdog subschema was replaced by its inversion, which might be called the ‘‘pet dog’’ subschema,

unless it is institutionalized, thus slipping permanently into propaganda.3 Indeed, for much of the 20th century, objectivity was a core component of Western journalistic ideology and identity.

Nevertheless, newspapers that embrace this subschema tend to eschew overt advocacy, except on editorial pages. This has

been true to an extent in Western Europe and elsewhere. The Mirror subschema also implies acquiescence to the interests of

the audience. Thus if the audience prefers one ‘‘kind’’ of news over another, news owners and managers can freely engage in

the fiction that the newspaper is mirroring reality because it is simply reflecting what’s ‘‘out there’’ inasmuch as public

opinion, itself shaped in part by media, is interpreted as a form of reality.

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Documents

The Kyrgyz Republic's Liminal Media: assessing a journalistic rite of passage