The Economic Impact of Paternity Leave

TheEconomicImpactofPaternityLeave SaiMingLiew

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SchoolofEconomics

L13500EconomicsDissertation2016

TheEconomicImpactofPaternityLeave

Student:SaiMingLiew


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Abstract

Thispaperconsidershowpaternityleavelegislationafterthebirthofchildrenaffects

labour market outcomes for men and women, focusing on the gender gaps in these

outcomes, across countries. Such family policies are granted for various lengths of time,

have differing wage replacement rates and are typically in addition to maternity and

parental leave.Asoutlined inaUSDepartmentofLabourpolicybrief,paternity leavehas

been found to increase father engagement, result in better health and development

outcomesforchildren, improveequalityathome,andimproveemploymentandwagesof

mothers.Thisstudylooksattheconsequencesofpaternity leaveonthegenderwagegap

and on female,male and gender differences in prime-age (25-54 years old) employment

ratesandaverageweeklyworkinghours. Ittakesanunconventionalmacro-levelapproach

byusingdatafrom30OECDcountriesfrom2000to2013andusingamodelproposedby

Thévenon&Solaz (2013).Thestudyhasshownthatpaternity leave legislationhas largely

insignificant impacts on employment rates and average weekly working hours, with the

exception of the presence of paternity leave raising the male employment rate by

approximately4%onaverage.However,thestudydoesfindthatonaverage,eachweekof

legislated paternity leavewidens the genderwage gap. Longer durations of entitlements

comparedtoshorteronesarenotfoundtohaveanysignificantimpact.Theseresultsdonot

conform to what theory would suggest. The study provides a foundation for future

investigationtounderstandtheeffectsofpaternityleavepolicyonlabourmarketoutcomes

whichcanhelpgovernments shape theirown familypoliciesas they seekmoreequitable

societies.


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Contents

Abstract........................................................................................................2

Introduction..................................................................................................4

LiteratureReview..........................................................................................6

DataCollectionandEmpiricalSetting..........................................................11

Results........................................................................................................32

Discussion...................................................................................................43

Conclusion...................................................................................................48

References..................................................................................................50

Appendix.....................................................................................................52


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Introduction

Aprominentglobaleconomicthemeofthe21stcenturyisthepathtowardsgender

equality. Much of the focus has been on discrimination faced by females in the labour

market,whether it iswagesoropportunitiesforemployment.McKinseyrecentlyreported

annualglobalGDPcould riseby$28 trillion,or26%, if labourparticipation ratesbetween

genderswereequal(Woetzeletal.,2015).Aninterestingandkeyissuerelatedtothisisthe

significanceofpaternityleave.

In 1994, just 28% of 141 countries investigated had paternity leave provisions

(InternationalLabourOffice,2014).In2013,47%of167countrieshadlegislationproviding

paternity leave, signalling the ever-growing recognition for the need of fathers at home.

While the US has not legislated paternity leave, a policy brief by the US Department of

Labouroutlinesseveralkeybenefits.Benefits includeincreasedfatherengagement,better

health and development outcomes for children, equality at home, and improvements in

employmentandwagesofmothers.Personalperceptionsand traditional viewsofgender

roles,andalackofgovernmentandworkplacepolicieshinderthepathtowardsequality.In

a 2012 survey, almost half of workers who required leave did not take it for economic

reasons.Anothersurveyofhighlyeducatedprofessional fathers found that they took less

than was available due to workplace pressures. The policy brief suggests supportive

paternityleavepoliciesandeducationregardingitsbenefitscanincreaseaccessanduptake.


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Perceptionsof parental relationships are shifting away fromneotraditional gender

roles toones thatareegalitarian.A reportby theFamilies andWork Institute found that

both genders were less likely in 2008 to conform to traditional gender roles of male

breadwinners and female caregivers compared to 1977 (Galinsky et al., 2011).Under the

title, “The Economic Impact of Paternity Leave”, the claims in the aforementioned policy

brief are tested by studying the effects of paternity leave on several household variables

across the globe, with a particular focus on the effect on earnings, working hours and

employmentofmenandwomen. Legislationcanonlygo so far inbringingaboutchange.

Employersandparentsmustbewillingtoembracechangetoo.Understandingtheeffectsof

varying structures of paternity leave policies can assist governments and corporations in

encouragingitsuptake.Progressiveculturalnormsandtheeradicationofthestigmaaround

ahealthywork-lifebalancecanhelpputprinciplesintopractice.


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LiteratureReview

Of particular interest will be the effect of legislation of paternity leave on

subsequentearningsofmothers.Johansson(2010)investigatedtheeffectofbothownand

spousal parental leave on subsequent earnings in Sweden. An explanation for the

unexplainedearningsgapistheunequalshareofhousework,caregivingandparentalleave

usage (Lundberg & Pollak, 2007; Datta Gupta et al., 2008). The future division of intra-

household labourandchildcarehasbeen ignored inpreviousstudiesandcouldbecaused

by specialisation in caregivingoremployment. Theeffectsof spousalparental leavewere

alsopreviouslyignored.

Johansson(2010)usescrosssectionalandfixedeffectsmodels,aswellastwopolicy

reformsoftheparentalleavesysteminSweden.Thereformsreservedoneandtwomonths

ofpostnatalleaveforeachspouse.Theeffectofreformexposurewasestimatedusingboth

difference-in-differences and triple differences models. Panel data sourced from register

information encompassing the entire Swedish population highlights the strength of the

analysis. Under the fixed effects model, controlling for unobserved time-constant

heterogeneity,ownleavewasfoundtohaveanegativeeffectonownfutureearnings,likely

duetothelossinhumancapital(Mincer&Polachek,1974).Spousalleavetoohasaneffect,

but only for women. Each month of paternity leave taken has a net positive effect on

mothers’earnings.Johansson(2010)postulatesthatincreasedpaternityleaveuptakecould

improvemen’schildcare-relatedskills,resultinginamoreevendivisionofemploymentand

caregivingbetweenmenandwomen.Themodelcouldbeimprovedby includingthenon-


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linear rate of return on paternity leave for labour market outcomes for mothers, which

couldprovidemoreinformationforpolicystructure.

NepomnyaschyandWaldfogel(2007)mayhaveexplainedthisnet-positiveeffecton

women’s earnings. Using a recent and nationally representative sample from the US,

Nepomnyaschy and Waldfogel (2007) sought to understand the determinants of the

likelihood and duration of parental leave-taking. The links between early childcare

involvementduringparentalleaveandlaterinvolvementinchildcarehadnotbeenstudied

andweresubsequentlyexamined.Aself-administeredquestionnairewasusedtoexamine

the involvement of fathers in childcare. Questions concerned fathers’ frequency of

diapering, feeding, dressing and bathing of their nine-month-old children.Nepomnyaschy

andWaldfogel (2007) estimatedordinary least squares regressionsusing results from the

questionnaire.

They found that most fathers take some parental leave but duration varies

significantly. Additionally, fathers who take longer leave are more involved in caregiving

ninemonthsaftertheirchild’sbirth.Heterogeneouseffectssuchasanaffinityforpaternal

caregiving may have distorted the results and so were controlled using proxies. This

supports Johansson's (2010) conclusion that paternity leave encourages more equitable

division of caregiving, allowing mothers to re-enter the labour force with minimal

disruption.

Barteletal. (2015) focusedon the less-studiedeffectsofpoliciespromotingwork-

family balance on men and joint leave-taking decisions in dual-earner households. They


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analysed howAmerican fathers responded to the introduction of the nation’s first large-

scalepaid familypolicy inCalifornia (CA-PFL),andhowparents indual-earnerhouseholds

share leave-taking responsibilities. Using difference-in-differences and triple differences

methods,theyaimedtoidentifythecausaleffectsofCA-PFLonpaternityleave-taking.The

triple differences specification compared employed fathers of infants under one year in

California to employed fathers of children aged one to three, relative to corresponding

fathersofthesameagechildreninotherstates,beforeandaftertheintroductionofCA-PFL.

Underthetripledifferencesmodel,CA-PFLwasestimatedtoraisetheuptakeofpaternity

leaveby0.9percentagepoints,a46%increasefrombefore.However,equaltreatmentdoes

not imply equal use. Bartel et al. (2015) found that under CA-PFL, mothers made most

parental leaveclaims.The55%wagereplacementrate(withaceilingof$1,104perweek)

while on leave (amaximum of sixweeks) could have amore detrimental effect formen

given their higher average earnings compared to women. The potential unintended

consequence of this could be specialisation.While paternity leavewas driven entirely by

fathersof first-bornchildren, itwasnot thecase forsubsequentchildren.Stemmingfrom

Johansson's(2010)findingsthatwagesfallafterleave-taking,thepotentiallossesoffathers’

incomeassociatedwithleave-takingforsubsequentchildrencouldbetoogreattobear.

Contrarily, Matzner-Heruti (1998) found Israeli paternity leave policy to be

ineffective. She discovered that few fathers took paternity leave and those that did

specialised inemploymentwhiletheirspousesbecameprimarycaregivers,someengaging

inpart-timework.Shearguedthatculturalsupportalongsidelegislationwouldbekeytothe

policy’ssuccess.


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In Israel,onlypaternity leaveisdependentuponsomecriteriatobefulfilledbyhis

spouse. Having dissimilar systems for mothers and fathers may promote neotraditional

gender roles. Stigma may play a part too. Separate analysis from Coltrane et al. (2013)

revealed that, similar to thatofwomen,menwho choose flexibleworkpathsexperience

lowerlong-termearnings,suggestingthat“theflexibilitystigmaisrelativelygenderneutral”.

Equally,RudmanandMescher(2013)foundthatmaleworkerswhorequestedfamilyleave

wereperceivedtobepoorworkersandbelieve“theconceptofwork-lifebalanceisstrongly

gendered”. It appeared that there were higher expectations of men to uphold the

characteristicsofan“idealworker”.

Matzner-Heruti (1998) proposed a supplementary policy, the “Reduced Schedule

Provision”,totackle lowmaleengagement.Thepolicywouldrequireemployerstoreduce

men’s working hours, whose working hours exceeded 40 hours, for the first six months

following their child’s birth.While this policymay notwork in all sectors andwould still

promotegenderroles,shearguesthatimprovedintegrationbetweenworkandfamilycould

changeculturalnormsinthelong-term.

Dahletal.(2014)establishedthatco-workersandbrothersweremorelikelytotake

paternity leave if a peer father became eligible for paternity leave and discovered a

snowballeffectwitheachsubsequentbirth. Improvements in informationaboutemployer

reactions and costs and benefits were the likely cause. Acknowledging the presence of

workplacestigmaisanotherfindingfromBarteletal.(2015)thatbothmenandwomenin

occupations with a high share of female workers were more likely to take leave. While


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paternity leavepolicies are important, educationanda shift in attitudes couldencourage

uptakeofpaternityleave.

Relatingmore closely to this study, Thévenon& Solaz (2013) analysed the labour

market effects of parental leave policies in OECD countries. The authors examined “the

long-runconsequencesofextendedpaid leaveon female,maleandgenderdifferences in

prime-age (25-54) employment rates, average working hours, and earnings in 30 OECD

countries from 1970 to 2010”. They used fixed effectsmodels to estimate the impact of

changes in leave duration on labour market outcomes for men and women separately,

before estimating the effect on the gender gaps.While the paper does not explore the

significanceofpaternityleaveonlabourmarketoutcomes,itdoesprovideaframeworkfor

which it is possible to build upon for the purpose of this examination. Results from this

paper present an opportunity for comparison and evaluation. While most studies have

employed amicroeconomic approach, this cross-countrymodel accounts for unobserved

heterogeneity across countries and could indicate how successful different governments

maybe inusingpaternity leavepolicies, likely inconjunctionwithmaternityandparental

leavepolicies,inachievingtheirfamilypolicyandlabourmarketobjectives.


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DataCollectionandEmpiricalSetting

IntroductiontoparentalleavepoliciesintheOECD

TheOECD has identified four general types of parental leave policies. The following four

policy definitions are included for clarity and have been taken from the OECD family

database:

Maternity leave is defined as employment-protected leave of absence for employed

womenataroundthetimeofchildbirth.Thismayincludeadoptioninsomecountries.The

International LabourOrganisation convention onmaternity leave stipulates the period of

leavetobeatleast14weeks.However,thestructuresofmaternityleavemayvary.Inmost

countries,mothersmaycombinepre-withpost-birthleavewhileinsomecountries,ashort

periodofpre-birthleaveiscompulsoryalongwithasixtotenweekleaveperiodfollowing

thebirthoftheirchild.Furthermore,somecountriesseparateregulationformaternityleave

withstipulationsinsteadintegratedintotheparentalleavescheme.

Paternityleaveisdefinedasemployment-protectedleaveofabsenceforemployedfathers

atorwithinthefirstfewmonthsafterchildbirth.Unlikematernityleave,paternityleaveis

notstipulatedbyinternationalconvention.Ingeneral,periodsofpaternityleavearemuch

shorterthanformaternityleave.

Parentalleaveisdefinedasemployment-protectedleaveofabsenceforemployedparents.

Itisoftensupplementarytoparent-specificleaveperiods,andcommonlyfollowstheperiod


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ofmaternity leave. Entitlement to the parental leave period is often individual (i.e. each

parent has their own entitlement) while entitlement to public income support is often

family-based, so that only one parent can claim such income support at any one time

(except for a short period after childbirth). Some countries structure their parental leave

policysuchthatthereisasharablefamilyentitlementbutwithcertainperiodsreservedfor

usebyindividualparents,whileinothers,‘bonus’paidweeksareofferedifbothparentsuse

a certain portion of the family entitlement. This implies that a certain proportion of the

parental leave is effectively ‘reserved’ for fathers, assuming that the family wishes to

maximisethetotallengthofleaveonoffer.

Homecare leave (orchildcareorchild raising leave) isdefinedasemployment-protected

leavesofabsencethattypicallyallowsatleastoneparenttoremainathometoprovidecare

untilthechildistwoorthreeyearsofage.Outofthefourdifferenttypesofparentalleave,

homecare leave isthe leastcommonand isonlyoffered inaminorityofOECDcountries.

Theyarealsooftenunpaidbutifpaid,onlyatalowflat-rate.

Datacollection

This analysis relies on The Organisation of Economic Co-operation and

Development’s(OECD)databaseforaggregatedatafor30outof34members1acrossatime

period of 14 years from 2000 to 2013 due to its credibility and depth. TheOECD Family

Databasecomplementsthisdatawithinformationonthenumberoflegislatedpaidweeks

ofpaternityleave,thekeyexplanatoryvariableinquestion.SectionAintheappendixshows1ExcludesChile,Estonia,IsraelandSloveniaduetoanabsenceinpaternityleavedata.


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the trends in thedurationof legislatedpaidweeksofpaternity leave forall30countries.

Due to the commonly shorter duration of paternity leave compared to maternity leave,

fathers typicallycontinue to receive fullwagepayments.SectionB in theappendixshows

the averagepayment rate for fathers inOECD countries in 2015. TheOECDnotes that in

somecountries,“fatherspecific leaveentitlementsarepartof theparental leavescheme,

rather than a separate right”. For this study, the data on paternity leave refers to

“entitlements to paternity leave, 'father quotas' or periods of parental leave that can be

usedonlybythefatherandcannotbetransferredtothemother,andanyweeksofsharable

leavethatmustbetakenbythefatherinorderforthefamilytoqualifyfor'bonus'weeksof

parental leave”. Figure 1 shows how the average duration of paternity leave for the 30

countrieshasevolvedfrom2000to2013.

Figure1.Averagedurationofpaternityleave(weeks)in30OECDcountriesfrom2000to2013

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Paternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

Averagepaternityleavefor30OECDcountries


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Over the14-yearperiod for the30countries, theaveragepaternity leaveduration

more thandoubled from justunder fourweeksofpaternity leave in2000 toalmostnine

weeks in 2013. There were a total of 30 changes (27 increases and 3 decreases) in the

duration of legislated paternity leave. Therewere 7 changes (6 increases, 1 decrease) in

2002,thehighestforasingleyear.Denmarkreducedthepaternityleaveentitlementfrom

17weeksin2001tojust2weeksin2002.Austriahalvedthepaternityleavedurationto13

weeks in 2008 and thenby a further 4.3weeks in 2010. Thebiggest changes came from

SouthKorea(+52weeks,2008)andJapan(+52weeks,2010).However,somecountrieshad

notenactedpaidpaternityleavepoliciesby2013,includingCanada,CzechRepublic,Ireland,

NewZealand,SlovakRepublic,Switzerland,Turkey,andmostnotably,theUnitedStates.

Dependentvariable

To study the impact of paternity leave on the three labourmarket outcomes, the

OECD database provides time-series data across 30 countries on paternity leave

entitlements.Whilepaternity leavemaybe legislated tocloseemploymentgapsbetween

menandwomenortoacknowledgeafather’srole inthecareofhischild, legislationonly

provides themeans for fathers tograsp theopportunity.Theenacted lawscannotcoerce

fatherstoutilisepaternityleave.Theextentofpaternityleaveuptake,eitherinrelativeor

absolute terms,wouldhave likelybeenanadditional significantmeasureof theeffectsof

paternityleaveonthethreelabourmarketoutcomes.Further,itwouldbeadvantageousto

include information on wage replacement rates providing further guidance on paternity

leave policy structure. However, there is no available cross-country time-series data and

therefore are not considered. As a result, the impact of changes in legislation may be


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overestimated. Nevertheless, variations of paternity leave legislation as explanatory

variablesshouldpresentsome insight into the impact legislationcanhave in termsof the

acknowledgement of the importance of paternity leave. Figures 2, 3 and 4 compare the

differencesinthedurationofpaternityleaveentitlementsandthegendergapsinthethree

labourmarketvariablesacrossvariouscountrieswithintheOECDin20132.

2OnlyOECDcountrieswithdatafortheinterestedvariablesareincluded.


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Figure2.Durationofpaternityleave(weeks)andthegenderwagegap(%)in2013

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Paternity

leave(w

eeks)/Gen

derw

agegap(%

)

Paternityleavedurationandthegenderwagegap

Paternityleave(weeks) Genderwagegap(%)


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Figure3.Durationofpaternityleave(weeks)andthemale-to-femaledifferencesinemployment-to-populationratios(%)in2013

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Paternity

leave(w

eeks)/Employmen

t-to-po

pulatio

nratio

(%)

Paternityleavedurationandthemale-to-femaledifferencesinemployment-to-populationratios

Paternityleave(weeks) Employment-to-populationratio(%)


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Figure4.Durationofpaternityleave(weeks)andthemale-to-femaledifferencesinaverageweeklyworkinghoursin2013

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Paterin

tyleave(w

eeks)/Averageweeklyw

orkinghou

rs

Paternityleavedurationandthemale-to-femaledifferencesinaverageweeklyworkinghours

Paternityleave(weeks) Averageweeklyworkinghours


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Inallthreecross-sectionalcharts,therelationshipbetweenthedurationoflegislated

paternityleaveandthegendergapsinthelabourmarketvariableisunclear.Theorycould

suggestanegativerelationshipbetweenanyofthese labourmarketvariablesaspaternity

leaveentitlementscouldallowmotherstoresumeworkshortlyafterchildbirthreducingany

human capital loss as a result of the absence, for example. A smaller human capital loss

couldresultinasmallerpaycuttherebyreducingtheincentivetostayathomeorswitching

topart-timeworkafterthematernityleaveperiodhasbeencompleted.Thiswouldimprove

femaleearnings,employmentratesandaverageworkinghours.

Independentvariables

The independent variables are the gender wage gap (presented in percentage

points)andthenaturallogsofmale,femaleandgender-differencesofprime-age(aged25-

54)employment-to-populationratiosandaverageweeklyworkinghours.

Genderwagegap

Duetotheabsenceofsex-specificaverageearningsdata,onlythegenderwagegap

for full-time employees is used. The gender wage gap is unadjusted and defined as the

differencebetweenmaleandfemalemedianwagesdividedbythemalemedianwages.For

the17OECDcountries3withafullsetofdata,theaveragegenderwagegapwas20.01%in

2000 which declined to 15.81% in 2012, as shown in figure 5. In this case, the negative

3The17countriesareAustralia,Austria,Belgium,Canada,CzechRepublic,Finland,France,Germany,Hungary,Japan,Korea,NewZealand,Norway,Poland,Sweden,UnitedKingdomandtheUnitedStates.


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relationship between the trends in paternity leave duration and the gender wage gap is

clearerastheymoveinoppositedirectionsovertime.

Figure5.Thegenderwagegap(%)andaveragepaternityleaveduration(weeks)for17OECD

countriesovertheyears2000to2012

Employment-to-populationratio

The age band chosen for this variablewas between 25 and 54 years old as those

outside this range of prime-age workers are likely to be affected by other factors. The

averageageofwomenatbirth (shown in appendix sectionC) grew from27.4 in1970 to

30.3yearsold in2014fortheOECD-26,suggestingparental leavepolicieswouldhavethe

greatestimpactonindividualsinthisageband.Underthereasonableassumptionthatmen

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

0

5

10

15

20

25

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Paternity

leave(w

eeks)

Gend

erwagegap(%

)

Year

Genderwagegap(%)

Genderwagegap(%) Paternityleave(weeks)


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andwomenareofasimilarageatchildbirth,individualsoutsidethisagebandareunlikely

tobedirectlyaffectedbypaternityleavepolicies.Figure6showsthetrendsinemployment-

to-populationratios,measuredinpercentagepoints,formenandwomeninOECDcountries

from2000 to20134.Theemploymentgapbetweenmenandwomenhas closedover the

specifiedtimeperiodfrom20.68%in2000to13.56%in2013,asshowninfigure7.

Figure6.Theaverageemployment-to-populationratio(%)formenandwomeninOECDcountries

overtheyears2000to2013

4ExcludesChile,Estonia,IsraelandSloveniaduetoabsenceinpaternityleavedata.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Employmen

t-to-po

pulatio

nratio

(%)

Year

Averageemployment-to-populationratios

Male Female


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Figure7.Themale-to-femaledifferenceintheaverageemployment-to-populationratio(%)inOECD

countriesovertheyears2000to2013

Fromfigure7,thedownwardtrendofthemale-to-femaledifferenceintheaverage

employment-to-population ratio over the 14-year time period compared to the rising

durationofpaternityleaveisashypothesised.

Averageweeklyworkinghours

Averageweeklyworkinghoursareshownasaverageusualweeklyhoursworkedon

the main job in the OECD’s labour force statistics. Those with an employment status of

‘dependent employment’ were chosen. This would exclude thosewho are self-employed

whohavemore freedomwith regards to decision-making. Similar to the employment-to-

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0

5

10

15

20

25

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Paternity

leave(w

eeks)

Employmen

t-to-po

pulatio

nratio

(%)

Year

Male-to-femaledifferenceinaverageemployment-to-populationratios

Male-to-femaledifference(%) Paternityleave(weeks)


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population ratio variable, men and women between the ages of 25 to 54 years old are

considered.Figure8showsthetrendsinaverageweeklyworkinghoursformenandwomen

in OECD countries from 2002 to 20135. Average weekly working hours have remained

relatively stagnant withmales working 6.53 hours longer than females in 2000 and 5.90

hourslongerin2013,asshowninfigure9.

Figure8.TheaverageweeklyworkinghoursformenandwomeninOECDcountriesovertheyears

2000to2013

5ExcludesChile,Estonia,Israel,Slovenia,Canada,Japan,KoreaandTurkeyduetoabsenceinatleastoneofthepaternityleaveandtheaverageworkinghoursvariable.

05

1015202530354045

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Hoursp

erweek

Year

Cross-countryaverageofaverageweeklyworkinghours

Male Female


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Figure9.Themale-to-femaledifferenceinthecross-countryaverageofaverageweeklyworking

hoursformenandwomeninOECDcountriesovertheyears2000to2013

Fromfigure9,thetrendsobservedbetweentheaveragemale-to-femaledifference

in average weekly working hours and the average duration of paternity leave is as

hypothesised. Figure 9 shows that the 2013 gap in average weekly working hours has

dropped from the levels in 2002, a positive outcome. However, the difference is just 38

minutesofworkperweek,aninsignificantdifferencecomparedtoroughly35to40hoursof

work per week. A potential explanation for the average female weekly working hours

remainingstagnantcouldbethatmorepart-timeandfull-timeworkersareparticipatingin

thelabourmarket,suggestedbytheincreasingemployment-to-populationratioinfigure6.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5.4

5.6

5.8

6

6.2

6.4

6.6

6.8

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Paternity

leave(w

eeks)

Hoursp

erweek

Year

Male-to-femaledifferenceinthecross-countryaverageofaverageweeklyworkinghours

Averageworkinghours Paternityleave(weeks)


25

Summary

Figure10 shows thecomparisonbetweenpercentagechanges in thegenderwage

gap,theemployment-to-populationratiogapandthegapinaverageweeklyworkinghours

forcountrieswithandwithoutpaternity leavefrom2002to2012.Only4countries inthis

samplehadnotenactedpaternityleaveby2013.

Figure10.Comparisonbetweenpercentagechangesinthegenderwagegap,theemployment-to-

populationratiogapandthegapinaverageweeklyworkinghoursforcountrieswithandwithout

paternityleavefrom2002to2012for14OECDcountries6

6Only 14 countries with full set of data included. 4 countries with no paternity leave: Australia, CzechRepublic, New Zealand, and United States. 10 countries with at least 1 week of paternity leave: Austria,Belgium,Finland,France,Germany,Hungary,Norway,Poland,Sweden,andUnitedKingdom.

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Percen

tagech

ange(%

)

Year

Percentagechangeindependentandindependentvariables

Genderwagegap(0weeks) Genderwagegap(>0weeks)

Gendergapinemploymentrates(0weeks) Gendergapinemploymentrates(>0weeks)

Gendergapinaverageweeklyworkinghours(0weeks) Gendergapinaverageweeklyworkinghours(>0weeks)

Paternityleave(weeks)


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From figure10, given the rise in the averagedurationof paternity leave from the

year2002to2012,thedownwardtrendsinthegapsinthethreelabourmarketoutcomes

for those that have enacted paternity leave are as theory would suggest. Furthermore,

though these trendsareobserved incountries thathavenotenactedpaternity leave, the

trends in those that have legislation are considerably steeper. Econometric analysis is

requiredtodeterminethedegreeofcausalityandimpactofpaternityleave.

Table1presentssummarystatisticsforthevariablesofinterestintheeconometric

analysis. Themean for paternity leave entitlements is approximately eight times smaller

than that of maternity and parental leave, suggesting that most countries in the OECD

conform to traditional gender roles where mothers are the primary caregivers.

Furthermore,thedisparitybetweenchildbirthleavepoliciesispronouncedwhenobserving

therangeofdurationsinpaternity,maternityandparentalleave.

Table1.Summarystatistics

Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max

Paternityleave(weeks) 424 5.86 10.29 0.00 52.60

Maternityandparentalleave(weeks) 424 47.43 42.18 0.00 164.00

Genderwagegap(%) 351 16.72 7.57 0.38 41.65

Maleemployment-to-populationratio(%) 476 86.35 4.51 70.44 95.29

Femaleemployment-to-populationratio(%) 476 69.60 11.46 24.43 86.16

Maleaverageweeklyworkinghours 408 41.38 3.00 36.55 53.39

Femaleaverageweeklyworkinghours 408 35.17 3.75 25.33 45.93


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Empiricalsetting

This paper uses an empirical model constructed similar to that in Thévenon and

Solaz’s (2013) study. For the dependent variables of average weekly working hours and

employment-to-populationratio,theeffectsofpaternityleavearemeasuredintwostages.

First,thedependentvariablesare logarithmicallytransformedwithnatural logarithmsand

regressedupon.Second,thedifferencesbetweenthelogarithmicallytransformedvariables

formenaresubtractedfromthatofwomenbeforebeingregressedupon.Thegenderwage

gapdoesnotrequirelogarithmictransformationpriortoregression.

Testforheteroskedasticity

Given the panel data set, a potential issue in the regression model is

heteroskedasticity.Under heteroskedasticity,while the estimates from the regression are

unbiasedandconsistent, thestandarderrorsarebiased.Thiswouldresult inabias inthe

test statistics and confidence intervals.While Thévenonand Solaz (2013)donotmention

the use of any tests for heteroskedasticity, they present robust standard errors in their

regressions.ThisstudyincludesaformoftheWhitetesttotestforheteroskedasticitydue

to the non-linearity of the proposed model. The White test tests whether the residual

variances in a regression rely on the values of the independent variables. Generally, the

Whitetesttakesthelistofregressorsandadjuststhemwithsquaresandcrossproductsof

eachofthesevariables.Thetestthenrunsanauxiliaryregressionofthesquarederrorterm

on the regressors, their squares and the cross products, while removing any duplicate

elements.As thereare several regressors, thealternativeWhite test isused. In this case,


28

only the fitted values of the original regression and their squares are used. An F-test is

conductedtodetermine joint-significanceofthecoefficientsofthefittedvalues. Thenull

hypothesis states that thevariancesof the residualsareconstantandare independentof

the values of the independent variables. The alternative hypothesis states that the

estimated variances are a multiplicative function of one or more variables, suggesting

heteroskedasticityispresent.A5%confidenceintervalofstatisticalsignificancewaschosen.

Robuststandarderrorswillbeincludedinthemodelstoaccountforanyheteroskedasticity.

Testforfixedorrandomeffectsestimator

Astheremaybesomeunobservedheterogeneityinthemodels,ThévenonandSolaz

(2013)usedfixedeffectsestimatorsintheirregressionsbutdonotstatetheuseofanytests

forthisdetermination.Thisanalysistakesthe initialstepofconductingteststodetermine

whetherarandomorfixedeffectsestimatorwouldbesuitablefortheregressionanalyses.

The estimator is used to control for any unobservable country-specific factors. Given the

possible heteroskedasticity, an appropriate test would be the Sargan-Hansen test, as

proposed by Wooldridge (2002). The test is similar to the Hausman test but is

heteroskedastic-robust. In the case of homoskedastic errors, the reported test statistic is

equivalenttotheusualHausmanfixedvs.randomeffectstest.TheSargan-Hansentestisa

suitable test as the test of fixed or random effects can also be seen as a test of

overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis states that the individual effects are not

correlatedwithanyoftheindependentvariables.Thealternativehypothesisstatesthatthe

individual effects are correlatedwith any of the independent variables. If the alternative

hypothesis isrejected,arandomeffectsestimator isappropriate.Therejectionofthenull


29

hypothesiswouldmean that the randomeffectsestimator isnotconsistentand the fixed

effects estimator should be used. A 5% confidence interval of statistical significancewas

chosen.

Whileseveralnestedmodelsaretested,theextendedempiricalmodelproposedis:

!"#$ = &'" + )*"+,-./,0/#$ + &*"+,-./,0/#$ + &1"+,-./,0/#$1 + )1"2,-+,3./,0/#$

+ &4"2,-+,3./,0/#$ + &5"6/,3 + 7"# + 8"#$

where,

• !"#$isthelabourmarketoutcome(employment-to-populationratio/averageweekly

working hours) measured in natural logs for each sex9(where:indicates female

and2male)incountry;inyear-,orthegenderwagegapmeasuredincountry;in

year-;

• &'" isaconstantforeachsex9;

• +,-./,0/#$is the durationof paid paternity leave inweeks for country;in year-.

Dummycoefficient)*" = 1ifpaternityleaveispresent;

• 2,-+,3./,0/#$isthedurationofmaternityandparentalleaveinweeksforcountry

; in year- . Dummy coefficient)1" = 1if paid maternity and parental leave is

present;

• 6/,3isthetimetrend;

• 7"# isthefixed/randomeffectestimatorforsex7#;

• 8"#$isanidiosyncraticrandomerrortermforsex9incountry;inyear-.


30

Thecoefficientsonthepaternityleavevariables()*,&*, &1)provideunbiasedestimates

of the effects of paternity leave if the error term and the paternity leave variables are

uncorrelated. If the time-varying country effects are correlated with the duration of

paternityleavelegislation,theremaybesomebiasintheestimation.Apossiblesolutionto

this problem is to estimate the impactof paternity leavedurationon the female-to-male

differenceinlabourmarketoutcomesasproposedbyThévenonandSolaz(2013):

!?#$ − !A#$ = &'? − &'A + )*? − )*A +,-./,0/#$ + &*? − &*A +,-./,0/#$

+ &1? − &1A +,-./,0/#$1 + )1? − )1A 2,-+,3./,0/#$ + (&4?

− &4A)2,-+,3./,0/#$ + (&5? − &5A)6/,3 + (7?# − 7A#) + (8?#$ − 8A#$)

orequivalently,

∆!#$ = &' + )*+,-./,0/#$ + &*+,-./,0/#$ + &1+,-./,0/#$1 + )12,-+,3./,0/#$

+ &42,-+,3./,0/#$ + &56/,3 + 7# + 8#$

In thisspecification,)*,&*, &1measuretheeffectsofpaternity leaveonchanges in

the gender gap of the labour market outcomes. This specification only applies to the

dependentvariablesemployment-to-populationratiosandaverageweeklyworkinghours.

The coefficient on the paternity leave dummy variable ()*) is expected to be

negative.Thiswouldhappeninthecasewheregovernmentswhichhaveenactedpaternity

leave legislationare likelytohavesocietiesorpolicyobjectivesthatvaluegenderequality

andarealsolikelytohavesmallerlabourmarketgapsbetweengenders.Thecoefficientof


31

the linear paternity leave variable (&*) is also hypothesised to be negative. Eachweekof

paternity leave would result in losses in human capital for men, similar to the effect of

maternityleaveonwomen.Atthesametime,thisallowsmotherstoreturntoworksooner,

reducingtheirhumancapital lossandtherebyclosingthelabourmarketgap.Theaddition

ofthesquaredpaternityleavevariableisincludedtoaccountforanynon-lineareffects.The

coefficientonthesquaredvariable(&1)ishypothesisedtobepositive.Increasingdurations

of paternity leavemayhave little effectwhen theduration is long in the casewhere the

significanceofhumancapitallossislow.

Maternityandparental leavevariablesareaddedtoactascontrolvariables in the

regressions.Whileparentalleavecanbesharedbetweenmothersandfathers,mostofthe

uptakeisfrommothers.Thismayresultinsomebiasbutthebiasislikelytobesmallgiven

the lowmaleuptake inmostcountries (Ruhm,1998).Furthermore,dueto the infrequent

nature of policy amendments regarding paternity leave, time trends are included in the

regressiontoaccountforexogenoustrendsinlabourmarketoutcomes.


32

Results

Tables 2-8 present the results from the regressions conducted to investigate the

impactofpaternity leave legislationonthethree labourmarketoutcomesof interest.For

each dependent variable, one complete and five nested models containing variations of

independent variables are presented for the purpose of comparison. In eachmodel, the

variable‘year’isanindexnumberfortheselectedtimeperiodstartingfromtheyear2000

(i.e. 2000=1, 2001=2, etc.). Thevariables ‘paternity leave’and ‘maternityandparental

leave’ are durations of entitlements measured in weeks. Each table presents the results

from the statistical tests for heteroskedasticity and fixed vs. random effects. As

heteroskedasticity ispresent(rejectionofthenullhypothesisoftheWhitetestwithfitted

values) in the majority of regressions, robust standard errors have been included in all

regressions for heteroskedastic-robustness. In cases where theWhite test does not find

heteroskedasticity, the robust standarderrorsactasaconservativemeasure.P-values for

theSargan-Hansentestsandtheresultingestimatorshavealsobeenincluded.


33

Table2.Effectofpaternityleaveonthegenderwagegap

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Dependentvariable:Genderwagegap(%)

Constant 19.584*** 18.960*** 19.245*** 19.170*** 17.707*** 17.389***

(1.233) (0.473) (1.382) (1.406) (0.984) (1.015)

Year -0.294*** -0.339*** -0.300*** -0.303*** -0.333*** -0.351***

(0.059) (0.056) (0.063) (0.062) (0.065) (0.063)

Paternityleave(dummy) -1.368 - -1.696 -1.893* -1.615 -1.491

(0.834)

(1.087) (1.082) (1.078) (1.071)

Paternityleave - 0.068 0.018 0.084 0.143*** 0.130**

(0.104) (0.024) (0.068) (0.050) (0.054)

Paternityleavesquared - -0.002 - -0.001 -0.003** -0.002**

(0.002)

(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)

Maternityandparental - - - - 2.007** 1.940*

leave(dummy)

(0.967) (0.974)

Maternityandparental - - - - - 0.012

leave

(0.008)

Whitetest(fitted) 0.0229** 2.70E-04*** 0.0017*** 2.00E-04*** 3.90E-05*** 3.80E-05***

Sargan-Hansentest 0.2038 0.0000*** 0.0776* 0.6362 0.0000*** 0.0000***

Randomorfixedeffects RE FE RE RE FE FE

R-squared 0.320 0.312 0.325 0.328 0.344 0.395

N 351 322 322 322 322 318

Robuststandarderrorsinbrackets.***,**and*:significantatthe1%,5%and10%levels,respectively.

FEstandsforfixedeffects,REforrandomeffects.


34

Table 2 presents the results obtained for the estimationof the effect of paternity

leaveonthegenderwagegap.Anegativecoefficientonanyoftheindependentvariables

wouldbeviewedasaprogressivesteptowardsequalityas itwouldrepresentaclosurein

thegenderwagegap.

The largest effect of paternity leaveon the genderwagegap is noticeable for the

coefficientofthedummyvariablewhichshowsthat,onaverage,thepresenceofpaternity

leave reduces the gender wage gap by 1.893 percentage points. This is shown to be

statisticallysignificantatthe10%levelinmodel4.Thehumancapitaleffectsareanunlikely

explanationgiven that in this regression, it is thepresenceofpaternity leave, rather than

theduration,thathasthebiggestimpact.Itislikelythatthepaternityleavepolicyhasbeen

enactedalongsideothergenderequality-promotingpolicies.Furthermore,models5and6

present better statistically significant results showing that, on average, each week of

paternity leaveresults ina0.143and0.13percentagepointwideningofthegenderwage

gaprespectively,contradictingthehypothesis.Interestingly,thepresenceofmaternityand

parentalleaveseemstonegatethepositiveimpactofpaternityleave,significantatthe5%

and10%levelsinmodels5and6.


35

Table3.Effectofpaternityleaveonnaturallogoffemaleemployment-to-populationratio

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Dependentvariable:naturallogoffemaleemployment-to-populationratio

Constant 4.170*** 4.173*** 4.163*** 4.165*** 4.176*** 4.181***

(0.039) (0.011) (0.042) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)

Year 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005***

(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)

Paternityleave(dummy) 0.018 - 0.025 0.024 0.024 0.030**

(0.011)

(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013)

Paternityleave - -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003

(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)

Paternityleavesquared - 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 0.000

(0.000)

(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)

Maternityandparental - - - - -0.013 -0.007

leave(dummy)

(0.011) (0.010)


leave

(0.000)

Whitetest(fitted) 9.70E-08*** 0.0256** 5.20E-06*** 1.20E-05*** 8.80E-09*** 1.10E-16***

Sargan-Hansentest 0.0782* 0.0004*** 0.1858 0.0026*** 0.0034*** 0.0332***

Randomorfixedeffects RE FE RE FE FE FE

R-squared 0.301 0.308 0.309 0.316 0.318 0.316

N 476 424 424 424 424 410




36

Table4.Effectofpaternityleaveonnaturallogofmaleemployment-to-populationratio

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Dependentvariable:naturallogofmaleemployment-to-populationratio

Constant 4.462*** 4.482*** 4.466*** 4.468*** 4.451*** 4.450***

(0.012) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)

Year -0.002** -0.002** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***

(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)

Paternityleave(dummy) 0.020* - 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.040***

(0.010)

(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)

Paternityleave - -0.001 -0.001* -0.002 -0.002 -0.002

(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)


(0.000)

(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)

Maternityandparental - - - - 0.020* 0.021*

leave(dummy)

(0.010) (0.011)

Maternityandparental - - - - - -0.000

leave

(0.000)

Whitetest(fitted) 0.1828 0.0029*** 0.006*** 0.0038*** 5.20E-04*** 0.002***

Sargan-Hansentest 0.2033 0.0001*** 0.0004*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***

Randomorfixedeffects RE FE FE FE FE FE

R-squared 0.086 0.110 0.158 0.162 0.169 0.179

N 476 424 424 424 424 410




37

Table5.Effectofpaternityleaveonfemale-to-maledifferenceinnaturallogofemployment-to-

populationratio

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Dependentvariable:female-to-maledifferenceinnaturallogofemployment-to-populationratio

Constant -0.290*** -0.309*** -0.307*** -0.304*** -0.275*** -0.269***

(0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)

Year 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009***

(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)

Paternityleave(dummy) -0.007 - -0.016 -0.015 -0.015 -0.010

(0.013)

(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)

Paternityleave - -0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001

(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)


(0.000)

(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)

Maternityandparental - - - - -0.033** -0.028**

leave(dummy)

(0.013) (0.012)


leave

(0.000)

Whitetest(fitted) 2.30E-09*** 0.0083*** 5.70E-07*** 9.40E-07*** 1.10E-10*** 3.00E-18***

Sargan-Hansentest 0.0332** 0.0001*** 0.0423** 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0005***

Randomorfixedeffects FE FE FE FE FE FE

R-squared 0.429 0.477 0.478 0.479 0.486 0.487

N 476 424 424 424 424 410




38

Tables3, 4 and5present the resultsobtained for theestimationsof theeffectof

paternity leaveon the female,maleandgenderdifferences inemployment-to-population

ratios respectively. Positive coefficients on the explanatory variables would indicate

progressionintheemploymentratesformenandwomen(tables3and4)andareduction

in the gap in employment rates (table 5). As the dependent variable uses natural logs,

coefficientsshouldbemultipliedby100togiveitsimpactintermsofpercentage.

Tables 3 and 5 present largely insignificant results with regards to the impact of

paternityleaveontheemployment-to-populationratio.Theexceptiontothisismodel6in

table 3 which shows that, on average, the presence of paternity leave raises female

employmentratesby3%,statisticallysignificantatthe5%level.Fromtable4,thepresence

ofpaternityleaveisfoundtohaveastatisticallysignificantimpactinfiveregressions(fourat

the1%level)onthemaleemployment-to-populationratio.Thegreatestimpactisobserved

inmodel 6 which shows that, on average, the presence of paternity leave improves the

employment-to-populationratioby4%,statistically significantat the1% level.Apotential

justificationfortheresult formaleandfemaleemploymentrateswouldbethatcountries

thathavehigheremploymentratesare likelytobericherandsocanaffordto implement

somelevelofpaternityleavepolicy.


39

Table6.Effectofpaternityleaveonnaturallogoffemaleaverageworkinghours

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Dependentvariable:naturallogoffemaleaverageworkinghours

Constant 3.547*** 3.534*** 3.529*** 3.530*** 3.520*** 3.515***

(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)

Year -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001

(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)

Paternityleave(dummy) 0.016 - 0.012 0.014 0.014 0.012

(0.011)

(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)

Paternityleave - 0.001 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.001

(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)

Paternityleavesquared - -0.000 - 0.000 0.000 -0.000

(0.000)

(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)

Maternityandparental - - - - 0.011** 0.009

leave(dummy)

(0.004) (0.006)


leave

(0.000)

Whitetest(fitted) 0.6996 9.60E-06*** 3.60E-06*** 6.10E-05*** 3.10E-06*** 0.0075***

Sargan-Hansentest 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0002***


R-squared 0.025 0.034 0.049 0.050 0.057 0.060

N 408 358 358 358 358 358




40

Table7.Effectofpaternityleaveonnaturallogofmaleaverageworkinghours

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Dependentvariable:naturallogofmaleaverageworkinghours

Constant 3.727*** 3.730*** 3.722*** 3.722*** 3.719*** 3.713***

(0.007) (0.017) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)

Year -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***

(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)

Paternityleave(dummy) 0.014 - 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.008

(0.012)

(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016)

Paternityleave - 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.003

(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)

Paternityleavesquared - -0.000 - -0.000 -0.000 -0.000

(0.000)

(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)

Maternityandparental - - - - 0.003 0.000

leave(dummy)

(0.004) (0.006)


leave

(0.000)

Whitetest(fitted) 0.0352** 0.2104 0.0807* 0.1467 0.0253** 0.0029***

Sargan-Hansentest 0.0000*** 0.1238 0.001*** 0.0028*** 0.0001*** 0.0001***

Randomorfixedeffects FE RE FE FE FE FE

R-squared 0.138 0.113 0.117 0.121 0.121 0.126

N 408 358 358 358 358 358




41

Table8.Effectofpaternityleaveonfemale-to-maledifferenceinnaturallogofaverageworking

hours

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Dependentvariable:female-to-maledifferenceinnaturallogofaverageworkinghours

Constant -0.180*** -0.191*** -0.193*** -0.192*** -0.199*** -0.198***

(0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.013)

Year 0.002** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002**

(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)

Paternityleave(dummy) 0.002 - -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.004

(0.009)

(0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)

Paternityleave - -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001

(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)


(0.000)

(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)

Maternityandparental - - - - 0.008 0.009

leave(dummy)

(0.005) (0.009)

Maternityandparental - - - - - -0.000

leave

(0.000)

Whitetest(fitted) 0.2961 0.0014*** 0.0017*** 0.0367** 0.1235 7.70E-04***

Sargan-Hansentest 0.0231** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***


R-squared 0.166 0.201 0.187 0.202 0.207 0.207

N 408 358 358 358 358 358




42

Tables6, 7 and8present the resultsobtained for theestimationsof theeffectof

paternity leave on the female, male and gender differences in average working hours

respectively. Positive coefficients on the explanatory variables would indicate

improvements in theaverageweeklyworkinghours formenandwomen (tables6and7)

and a reduction in the gap in averageweeklyworking hours (table 8). As the dependent

variable uses natural logs, coefficients should be multiplied by 100 to give its impact in

termsofpercentage.

Theimpactofpaternityleaveontheaverageweeklyworkinghoursfromthethree

groups of regressions is largely insignificant. However, model 3 in table 6 finds that, on

average,eachweekofpaternity leave increases femaleaverageweeklyworkinghoursby

0.1%,statisticallysignificantatthe1%level.However, this improvementofapproximately

20minutesperweekistrivialwhencomparedtothe35.17hoursfemalesworkonaverage

inOECDcountries.

Overall, the effect of the duration of paternity leave is largely insignificant with

respect to the male, female and gender gaps in average weekly working hours and the

employment-to-populationratiovariables.Thedurationofpaternityleaveisfoundtohave

astatisticallysignificantalbeitsmallwideningeffectonthegenderwagegap.Thesquared

paternity leavevariable, includedtotesttheeffectsof longerdurationsofpaternity leave

comparedtoshorterones, is foundtobeapproximatelyzeroandstatistically insignificant

across almost all regressions. This is likely due to the low dispersion in paternity leave

durationswithinthedataset.


43

Discussion

Themajorityof theresults fromtheregressionswerestatistically insignificant.The

striking result is the effect of paternity leave on the gender wage gap. In the twomost

expandedregressions,eachweekofpaternityleaveisfoundtowidenthegenderwagegap.

Thislabourmarketvariableisthemostcriticaloutofthethreeduetoitsnature.

Asstated,thegenderwagegapvariableusedinthisinvestigationisunadjusted.The

unadjusted genderwage gap does not take into account the number of averageworking

hours or the occupation that an individual is in. Thismeans that anywage gap between

individuals of opposite gender who are essentially indistinguishable in their wage-

determiningcharacteristicsislikelytobeoverestimated.Somemayarguethatthisvariable

does not measure the true wage discrimination females face in the labour market.

Nevertheless, the objective of this paper is to determine the impact paternity leave can

haveonthegendergapsinthelabourmarket.Inadditiontodirectwagediscrimination,the

unadjustedgenderwagegapencompassesanynon-wagediscriminationfacedinthelabour

market and in society, clarifying why it can be considered themost critical variable. For

example,afemaleindividualmaynotearnhigherwagesduetoherinabilitytoparticipatein

aprofessionofchoiceasaresultofdiscriminationfromemployersornegativeassociations

withparticipatinginajobthatistypicallymale-dominated.Furthermore,traditionalsocietal

and familial perceptions of gender-specific aspirations may condition or pressure both

genderstopursuewhatothersdeemfitting.


44

Duetotheabsenceofgender-specificdata,itisnotpossibletodeducewhetherthe

gendergapwidenswitheachweekofpaternity leaveasa resultof femalewages falling,

male wages rising, or a combination of both outcomes. Taking the more statistically

significant result, implementing the average duration of paternity leave of approximately

nineweekswidens the genderwage gap by 1.26 percentage points. This contradicts the

theory that a significant duration of paternity leave would represent an opportunity for

morebalancedsharingofchildcareandotherhouseholdresponsibilitiesbetweenparents.

More equality in the home could encourage mothers to return to work sooner after

childbirthwhilealsoencouragingthemtoengageinlongerworkinghoursandhigherpaying

occupations than in the case with significantly imbalanced household and child caring

responsibilities.Furthermore,motherswhoreturntoworkquickerloselesshumancapital,

adeterminantofwages,andthussufferasmallerwageloss.Conversely,morebalancingof

non-employment responsibilities and longer absences from work can have the opposite

effectonmen.Combined,theseconsequenceswouldresultinaclosureofthegenderwage

gap.Possibleexplanationsforthisobservedresultandsolutionsarediscussed.

The contradictory result may be due to a misguiding variable. Paternity leave

entitlements may reflect societal behaviours or the government’s objectives for family

policybutpaternity leaveuptake,measuredeitherabsolutelyor relative to the legislated

duration, is likely to be a better direct contributor to closing the gender gaps in labour

marketoutcomes,aspreviouslyhighlighted.Acomparisonof leaveentitlementsdoesnot

capture theeffectof cross-country variationsbetween takeup rates. Japan, for example,

offers the second-most generous father-specific leave entitlement in the OECD, yet only

approximately 2% of employed fathers take advantage of the leave (Nakazato and


45

Nishimura,2015). This is likelydue to the invisiblebarriersof societalnormsandculture.

The intergenerational conflict of work-life flexibility and gender roles will take time to

erode.

Giventhenatureofthestudy,i.e.oneongovernmentpolicy,changesinlegislation

maytaketimetorevealitsfulleffects.Becausetheconceptofpaternityleaveisrathernew

(18 out of 30 countries in the OECD had no paternity leave in 2000 but this fell to 8

countriesby2013), uptakeof paternity leavemaybe low in early yearsof adoption.The

labour market may not respond instantaneously to a change in paternity leave policy.

Labourmarketoutcomesformenandwomenmayonlybeaffectedafteranumberofyears.

Lagged values of paternity leave entitlements would be an appropriate addition to the

estimation.ThévenonandSolaz(2013)notedintheirpaperthat“adividepersistsbetween

countriesthatfirstpromotedrightstoparentalleaveinthelate1960sandearly1970s–and

whichstillgrantlongperiodsofpaidleave–andthosethatintroducedsuchrightsfromthe

1980sonwards”,suggestingthatthe14-yeartimeperiodmaynotbe longenoughforthis

investigation. Longer cross-country time-series data may find significant results for the

economicimpactofpaternityleave,potentiallycausedbythesnowballeffectsuggestedby

Dahletal.(2014).

UsingthedataforJapanandKoreaasexamples,theresultsforthegenderwagegap

variablemayalsobeskewed.Suchradicalpaternityleavepolicies(52weeksenactedfrom

zero in 2010 and 2008 respectively) have been enacted to combat the extremely high

genderwagegaps,andpotentiallyotherlargelabourmarketgendergaps.Usingdatafrom

theOECD and proprietary analysis, a report by PwC noted Japan and Korea’s GDP levels


46

couldpotentiallygrowby11%and13%respectivelyshouldtheirfemaleemploymentrates

match that of Sweden’s, highlighting the importance of closing these gaps. The slow

adoptionratesupportstheinclusionoflongertime-seriesdataandlaggedvaluesinfuture

investigations.

Future investigations could also focus on the relative values of gender-specific

parentalleave.Followingatwo-weekperiodofabsenceformothers7,anyadditionalleave

couldbecomparedtothatoffathersasaproxyforhowgovernmentsandbusinessesview

genderroles inparenting.Thisvariablecouldalsoprovidesome indicationabouthowthe

gendergapsinpolicyaffectthegendergapsinthelabourmarket.

Bytakingacross-countryapproachtotheinvestigation,thediversityandcomplexity

among parental leave systems are not considered. In some countries, state and local

governments provide alternative leave and financial entitlements, such as the

aforementioned CA-PFL. Moreover, by using the macro-level approach and a model

proposedbyThévenonandSolaz (2013), the independentvariables in theregressionsare

ratherdifferenttothosethattaketheconventionalmicro-levelapproach.Forexample,the

regressions do not include any other variables that would typically be a determinant of

wages, such as the level of education. This underspecification would result in omitted

variable bias, resulting in biased coefficients and variances. Ultimately, any hypothesis

testingwouldbeinvalidated.Futureinvestigationsshouldincludeanymacro-levelvariables

that influence the outcomes any of the three labour market variables alongside any

paternityleavevariables.

7MandatorymaternityleaveistwoweeksintheUK,assuminglyforpost-childbirthrecovery.


47

It iswidelyknownthat theNordiccountrieshavesomeof the lowestgendergaps

andsomeofthemostgenerousfamilypolicies.Aproblemfacedinthispaperisdetermining

thedirectionofcausality.Theself-reinforcingcircleofalackoffamily-friendlypoliciesand

largegendergapsinthelabourmarketcouldbehypothesised.Policiesthatdonotpromote

gender equality tend to lead to traditional outcomes for men and women. Conversely,

countrieswithtraditionalfamilyperceptionsmaynotunderstandthenegativeimplications

ofgender inequality inthelabourmarketorhavemyopicviewsofthecostsof legislation,

and so do not enact such policies. Political or ideological stances may explain why, for

example,theUS,despiteDepartmentofLaboursupport,hasnotenactedmaternityleave,

let alone paternity leave. Moreover, the case for a self-reinforcing circle between the

genderwagegapand theuptakeofpaternity leavecanalsobeargued.A smallergender

wage gap would mean a lower cost to families if fathers, typically higher earners, take

unpaidorfractionallypaidpaternityleave.Breakingthiscyclecouldresultinimprovements

in gender-balanced household responsibilities in the future, further contributing to the

closure inthegendergaps inthelabourmarketandpotentiallypaternity leaveuptakefor

future children. These cycles would suggest that a change in mindset is necessary. The

existence of these perceptions were highlighted in a recent survey conducted by the

International Social Survey Programme (shown in appendix section D). The survey asked

respondentstoconsiderafull-timeemployedcouple,both insimilarworksituations,who

haveanewbornchild.Withbothparentseligibleforleave,thesurveyaskedhowthepaid

leaveshouldbedivided.63%ofrespondentsfeltthatthemothershouldtakemost, ifnot

all, of the leave available. This figure may be higher in practice. Changing mindsets of

societies, governments and businesses is needed to break these cycles and progress

towardsequality.


48

Conclusion

Theobjectiveofthisdissertationwastodeterminetheeconomicimpactofpaternity

leave legislation. The examination of the impact of father-specific leave entitlements on

three labour market variables stems from the claims made about improvements in

employmentandwagesofwomenmadebytheUSDepartmentofLabourinapolicybrief

on paternity leave. This study builds upon the existing literature, forwhichmost authors

take a micro-level approach, by taking a macro-level approach, looking at the OECD

countriesinparticular.Themostrecentstudythatcloselymatchesthisdissertationisthat

by Thévenon and Solaz (2013). Thévenon and Solaz (2013) looked at the labour market

effectsofmaternityandparentalleavepoliciesinOECDcountries.Thisdissertationtakesan

unprecedentedanglebylookingattheeffectsoffather-specificleaveinstead.

The majority of results deem paternity leave to have an insignificant impact on

employmentrates.Thiscontrasts theresultsobtainedbyRuhm(1998)andThévenonand

Solaz(2013)whichfoundthatshortperiodsofmaternityandparentalleavehaveapositive

effectonemploymentratesofwomenandhavecontributedtothereductioninthegender

employment gap. Surprisingly, thepresenceof paternity leaveentitlementswas found to

have a positive impact on the male employment-to-population ratio, increasing it by

approximately3.9%onaverage.ThévenonandSolaz(2013)alsofoundthatbothshortand

longperiodsofpaidleavecontributedtogenderpaygaps.Theresultissimilartothatofthis

paper which found in two regressions that, on average, each week of paternity leave


49

contributedtothegenderpaygapbyapproximately0.14percentagepoints.WhiletheUS

policy brief has advocated for paternity leave in closing the gender gaps in the labour

market,thisanalysishasshownthatwhilepaternityleavemaybesuccessfulinonecountry

(suchasSweden,thecountryofinvestigationreferencedinthepolicybrief),itmaynotbe

successfulinothers.

Following this analysis, future investigation into the economic impact of paternity

leave couldexploreuptakeof theseentitlements rather than,or alongside, the legislated

durations. Government spending on father-specific leave could be used as a proxy for

uptake, though this is not likely to be available given its specificity. Significant positive

resultspotentiallyprovide the foundation forgovernments toexplorehowparental leave

policies shouldbe structured toencourageuptake.Toaccount for countryheterogeneity,

futureinvestigationsmayalsoprovidetheframeworkforfamilypolicystructurebytesting

the effects of paternity leave on labourmarket variables and then comparing the results

amongstgroupsofcountries,categorisedbyincomelevelsforexample.Governmentscould

self-categoriseandunderstandthepotentialeffectivenessofdifferentpaternityleavepolicy

structures,giventheirdemographics.


50

References

Bartel,A.etal.,2015.PaidfamilyLeave,Fathers’Leave-Taking,andLeave-SharinginDual-

EarnerHouseholds.NBERWorkingPaper,1,pp.1–41.

Coltrane,S.etal.,2013.FathersandtheFlexibilityStigma.JournalofSocialIssues,69(2),

pp.279–302.

Dahl,G.B.,Løken,K.V.&Mogstad,M.,2014.Peereffectsinprogramparticipation.

AmericanEconomicReview,104(7),pp.2049–2074.

DattaGupta,N.,Smith,N.&Verner,M.,2008.PerspectiveArticle:TheimpactofNordic

countries’familyfriendlypoliciesonemployment,wages,andchildren.Reviewof

EconomicsoftheHousehold,6(1),pp.65–89.

Galinsky,E.,Aumann,K.&Bond,J.T.,2011.2008NationalStudyoftheChangingWorkforce,

InternationalLabourOffice,2014.Maternityandpaternityatwork:Lawandpracticeacross

theworld,Geneva.

Johansson,E.-A.,2010.Theeffectofownandspousalparentalleaveonearnings.IFAU-

InstituteforLabourMarketPolicyEvaluation.

Lundberg,S.&Pollak,R.A.,2007.TheAmericanFamilyandFamilyEconomics.National

BureauofEconomicResearch,53,p.160.

Matzner-Heruti,I.,1998.Allyouneedisleave?Rethinkingtheconceptofpaternityleave.

CardozoJournalofLaw&Gender,21(475),pp.475–498.

Mincer,J.&Polachek,S.,1974.FamilyInvestmentsinHumanCapital:EarningsofWomen.

JournalofPoliticalEconomy,82(2).

Nakazato,H.andNishimura,J.,2015.‘Japancountrynote’,in:P.Moss(ed.)


51

International Review of Leave Policies and Research 2014. Available at:

http://www.leavenetwork.org/lp_and_r_reports/

Nepomnyaschy,L.&Waldfogel,J.,2007.PaternityLeaveandFathers’InvolvementWith

TheirYoungChildren.Community,Work&Family,10(4),pp.427–453.

PwC,InternationalWomen’sDay.WomeninWorkIndex.March,2016.

Rudman,L.A.&Mescher,K.,2013.PenalizingMenWhoRequestaFamilyLeave:IsFlexibility

StigmaaFemininityStigma?,pp.1–33.

Thévenon,O.&Solaz,A.,2013.LabourMarketEffectsofParentalLeavePoliciesinOECD

Countries.(141).

Woetzel,J.etal.,2015.ThePowerofParity:HowAdvancingWomen'sEqualityCanAdd$12

trilliontoGlobalGrowth.McKinseyGlobalInstitute.September,2015.

Wooldridge,J.M.,2010.Econometricanalysisofcrosssectionandpaneldata.MITpress.

US Department of Labour,Why Parental Leave For Fathers Is So Important ForWorking

Families.DepartmentofLabourPolicyBrief.


52

AppendixSectionA:Trendsindurationofpaternityleave

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Paternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

Australia

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Paternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

Austria

0

5

10

15

20

25

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013Pa

ternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

Belgium

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013Pa

ternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

Canada

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013Pa

ternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

CzechRepublic

0

5

10

15

20

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013Pa

ternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

Denmark


53

0

2

4

6

8

10

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Paternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

Finland

00.51

1.52

2.5

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Paternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

France

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Paternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

Greece

00.20.40.60.81

1.2

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013Pa

ternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

Hungary

02468101214

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013Pa

ternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

Iceland

0

2

4

6

8

10

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013Paternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

Germany


54

00.20.40.60.81

1.2

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013Pa

ternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

Mexico

0102030405060

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013Pa

ternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

Korea

0102030405060

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013Pa

ternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

Japan

051015202530

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013Pa

ternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

Luxembourg

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Paternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

Ireland

17.217.2517.317.3517.417.4517.517.55

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013Pa

ternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

Italy


55

0

5

10

15

20

25

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013Pa

ternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

Portugal

00.050.10.150.20.250.30.35

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Paternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

Netherlands

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.52000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013Pa

ternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

Poland

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013Pa

ternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

NewZealand

02468101214

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013Pa

ternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

Norway

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013Pa

ternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

SlovakRepublic


56

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.52000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013Pa

ternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

Spain

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Paternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

Turkey

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Paternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

Sweden

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013Pa

ternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

UnitedKingdom

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013Pa

ternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

UnitedStates

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013Pa

ternity

leave(w

eeks)

Year

Switzerland


57

SectionB:Averagepaymentratesforfathers

SummaryofpaidleaveentitlementsforfathersPaidpaternityleaveandpaidparentalandhomecareleavereserved(oreffectivelyreserved)aforfathers,inweeks,2015b

Paidpaternityleave Paidparentalandhomecareleavereserved

forfathersaTotalpaidleavereservedforfathers

Length,inweeks

Averagepaymentratec(%)

Full-rateequivalent,inweeks

Length,inweeks



Length,inweeks



(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)=(1)+(4) (8) (9)Australia 2.0 42.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 42.0 0.8Austria (c) 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.7 80.0 6.9 8.7 80.0 6.9Belgium 2.0 72.8 1.5 17.3 20.3 3.5 19.3 25.8 5.0Canada 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Chile (c) 1.0 100.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 100.0 1.0CzechRepublic 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Denmark 2.0 54.1 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 54.1 1.1Estonia 2.0 100.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 100.0 2.0Finland 3.0 75.0 2.3 6.0 68.6 4.1 9.0 70.7 6.4France (c) 2.0 93.5 1.9 26.0 14.6 3.8 28.0 20.2 5.7Germany (c) 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.7 65.0 5.7 8.7 65.0 5.7Greece 0.4 100.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 100.0 0.4Hungary 1.0 100.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 100.0 1.0Iceland 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.0 63.8 8.3 13.0 63.8 8.3Ireland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Israel

0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Italy 0.2 100.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 100.0 0.2Japan 0.0 0.0 0.0 52.0 58.4 30.4 52.0 58.4 30.4Korea 0.6 100.0 0.6 52.0 29.9 15.5 52.6 30.7 16.1Luxembourg 0.4 100.0 0.4 26.0 38.8 10.1 26.4 39.8 10.5Mexico 1.0 100.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 100.0 1.0Netherlands 0.4 100.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 100.0 0.4NewZealand 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Norway 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 98.7 9.9 10.0 98.7 9.9Poland 2.0 100.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 100.0 2.0Portugal 4.0 100.0 4.0 17.3 43.6 7.5 21.3 54.2 11.5SlovakRepublic 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Slovenia 2.1 90.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 90.0 1.9Spain 2.1 100.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 100.0 2.1Sweden 1.4 63.4 0.9 8.6 77.6 6.7 10.0 75.6 7.6Switzerland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Turkey 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0UnitedKingdom 2.0 20.6 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 20.6 0.4UnitedStates 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0OECDaverage 0.9 - - 7.2 - - 8.2 - -

a)Informationreferstoentitlementstopaternityleave,'fatherquotas'orperiodsofparentalleavethatcanbeusedonlybythefatherandcannotbetransferredtothemother,andanyweeksofsharableleavethatmustbetakenbythefatherinorderforthefamilytoqualifyfor'bonus'weeksofparentalleave.b)ThetablereferstopaidleaveentitlementsinplaceasofApril2015.SeeTablesPF2.1.C,PF2.1.D,PF2.1.EandPF2.1.Ffordetailsonbenefitpaymentrulesandconditions.c)The"averagepaymentrate"referstheproportionofpreviousearningsreplacedbythebenefitoverthelengthofthepaidleaveentitlementforapersonearning100%ofaveragenational(2014)earnings.Ifthiscoversmorethanoneperiodofleaveattwodifferentpaymentratesthenaweightedaverageiscalculatedbasedonthelengthofeachperiod.Inmostcountriesbenefitsarecalculatedonthebasisofgrossearnings,withthe"paymentrates"shownreflectingtheproportionofgrossearningsreplacedbythebenefit.InAustria,Chile,andGermanybenefitsarecalculatedbasedonpreviousnet(postincometaxandsocialsecuritycontribution)earnings,whileinFrancebenefitsarecalculatedbasedonpost-social-security-contributionearnings.Paymentratesforthesecountriesreflecttheproportionoftheappropriatenetearningsreplacedbythebenefit.Additionally,insomecountriesmaternityandparentalbenefitsmaybesubjecttotaxationandmaycounttowardstheincomebaseforsocialsecuritycontributions.Asaresult,theamountsactualamountsreceivedbytheindividualonleavemaydifferfromthoseshowninthetable.

Source:OECDFamilyDatabase


58

SectionC:Meanageofwomenatbirth

Meanageofwomenatbirth,1970,1995and2014a

a)Data forCanadaandMexico refer to2011, forChile to2012, and forAustralia, Israel, Japan,Korea,NewZealand, the

UnitedStates,theRussianFederationandCostaRicareferto2013

b)Thestatisticaldata for Israelaresuppliedbyandunder the responsibilityof the relevant Israeliauthorities.Theuseof

suchdatabytheOECDiswithoutprejudicetothestatusoftheGolanHeights,EastJerusalemandIsraelisettlementsinthe

WestBankunderthetermsofinternationallaw.

c)FootnotebyTurkey:The information inthisdocumentwithreferenceto«Cyprus»relatestothesouthernpartof the

Island.ThereisnosingleauthorityrepresentingbothTurkishandGreekCypriotpeopleontheIsland.Turkeyrecognizesthe

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is foundwithin the context of United

Nations,Turkeyshallpreserveitspositionconcerningthe“Cyprusissue”;

d)FootnotebyalltheEuropeanUnionMemberStatesoftheOECDandtheEuropeanCommission:TheRepublicofCyprusis

recognizedbyallmembersoftheUnitedNationswiththeexceptionofTurkey.Theinformationinthisdocumentrelatesto

theareaundertheeffectivecontroloftheGovernmentoftheRepublicofCyprus.



59

SectionD:Parentalleaveuptake

Usersofpaidparentalleave

Recipients/usersofpublicly-administeredparentalleavebenefitsorpublicly-administeredpaidparentalleavea,bygender,2013b

a)Data refer to recipients/users of publicly-administeredparental leavebenefits or publicly-administeredpaid parental leave, anddonot includeusers ofmaternityorpaternityleaveunlessthecountryinquestiondoesnotmakeadistinctionbetweenthedifferentleaves(e.g.Iceland,Portugal).DataforBelgiumandKorea refer to users of statutory paid parental leave (or equivalent). For Korea, data cover private sector employees only.Data forAustralia, Austria,Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,Germany, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg,Norway, Poland and Sweden refer to recipients of statutoryparental leave benefits (or equivalent). For Australia, data refer to recipients of 'Parental Leave Pay' only. For Austria, data refer to recipients of'Kinderbetreuungsgeld'(childcareallowance).ForDenmark,datarefertorecipientsofbenefitsforthe32week'commonleave'periodonly.ForFinland,datarefertothemaleshareofrecipientsoftheparentalallowanceonly,anddonotincluderecipientsofthepaternityallowance(eitherthatavailableduringoraftertheparental leaveperiod).ForFrance,datarefertorecipientsofCLCA(Complémentdelibrechoixd’activité).ForGermany,datarefertorecipientsof'Elterngeld' (parental allowance) for those with children born in the given year. For Iceland, data refer to recipients of any benefits in relation tomaternity/paternity (i.e.benefitspaidduringeitherthemotheror father-quotaorduringthesharableperiodofparental leave).ForPortugal,datarefertorecipientsofbenefitsfor 'InitialParentalLeave'only. Inallcasesdatareferonlytothoseusingstatutoryschemesanddonot includeindividual'susingonlyemployer-providedparentalleaveorparentalleavepay.

b)DataforAustraliareferto2012-13,forBelgiumto2012,forFranceto2011,andforKoreaandPolandto2014

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

Users/recipientsper100livebirths

PanelA.Recipients/usersofpublicly-administeredparentalleavebenefitsorpublicly-administeredpaidparentalleaveaper100livebirths

Men Women

0102030405060708090

100

Share of users/recipients (%)

Panel B. Gender distribution of recipients/users of publicly-administered parental leave benefits or publicly-administered paid parental leavea

Men Women


60

Attitudestowardsthegenderdistributionofleave-taking

Distributionofresponsestothequestion"Consideracouplewhobothworkfull-timeandnowhaveanewbornchild.Bothareinasimilarworksituationandareeligibleforpaidleave.Howshouldthispaidleaveperiodbedividedbetween

themotherandthefather?",2012

Distributionofresponse

Theleaveshouldbe

usedentirelybythemother

Theleaveshouldbe

usedmostlybythemother

Theleaveshouldbesplitevenlybetween

themotherandfather

Theleaveshouldbe

usedmostlybythefather

Theleaveshouldbe

usedentirelybythefather Undecided Noanswer

Bulgaria 0.60 0.28 0.07 0.05 SlovakRepublic 0.64 0.20 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.06 Turkey 0.59 0.25 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01CzechRepublic 0.64 0.19 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00Latvia 0.56 0.24 0.13 0.00 0.07 Slovenia 0.38 0.39 0.14 0.06 0.04Japan 0.19 0.57 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.01Lithuania 0.46 0.30 0.09 0.00 0.15 Croatia 0.48 0.26 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00Chile 0.30 0.43 0.23 0.00 0.03 0.01Austria 0.35 0.36 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.09 Israel 0.49 0.19 0.18 0.01 0.14 0.00Korea 0.18 0.50 0.32 0.00 Mexico 0.47 0.15 0.31 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.02Spain 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.02Poland 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.01Ireland 0.15 0.43 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.01UnitedKingdom 0.16 0.42 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.13Australia 0.16 0.41 0.25 0.00 0.13 0.05Switzerland 0.18 0.38 0.35 0.01 0.02 0.05UnitedStates 0.28 0.26 0.30 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.06Canada 0.18 0.35 0.20 0.00 0.15 0.12Norway 0.04 0.48 0.39 0.00 0.07 0.02Finland 0.03 0.46 0.39 0.00 0.09 0.03Iceland 0.03 0.45 0.45 0.00 0.02 0.05Denmark 0.05 0.43 0.41 0.01 0.00 0.10 EastGermany 0.13 0.34 0.40 0.01 0.10 0.02France 0.13 0.32 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.03WestGermany 0.14 0.29 0.43 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.04Sweden 0.01 0.25 0.61 0.00 0.11 0.02Note:distributionofresponsesamongthosewhobelievethatpaidleaveshouldbeavailable


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