The Clash of Great Powers and Revolution in the Baltic Sea

Aappo Kähönen

THE CLASH OF GREAT POWERS AND

REVOLUTION IN THE BALTIC SEA?

Finland in the Soviet foreign policy, 1922–1925

The Soviet party leadership claimed repeatedly after the mid-1920s that the Soviet Unionwas under an acute threat of intervention. The interpretation was based on different viewsregarding the development of socialism in the USSR. The role of Finland in the Sovietpolicy towards other border-states offers a case for observing the relation of ideology andpractice in Soviet foreign policy, especially in the Baltic Sea context in 1925. The maininterests for the Soviets were plans for military alliances and spheres of influence andintelligence. Contrary to the ideological worldview, the Peoples’ Commissariat for ForeignAffairs (NKID) did not see the western great powers, Great Britain and France, as beingbehind the Baltic alliance plan. Instead, the alliance attempt was primarily seen as anindependent Polish initiative, especially lacking British support. The Soviet foreignadministration was able to evaluate the grounds for eventual Finnish non-allianceaccurately, despite Baltic sympathies and the lack of an active Scandinavian orientation.The results suggest the NKID observed international relations from the traditional view-point of Soviet state interests, and on the basis of quite accurate information, not reflectingthe needs of ideological interpretation or domestic power struggles.

Keywords Soviet Union, Baltic Sea, Finland, foreign policy

In a larger context, the evaluations of the Soviet Union’s Peoples’ Commissariat ofForeign Affairs (NKID) on the Baltic Sea alliance and Finland in 1922 and 1925 aresignificant as examples of a Soviet interpretation of the character of internationalrelations. As previous foreign political consensus broke down in the USSR betweenLenin’s death in 1924 and the 1927 war scare of British attack, this regional evaluationwill be compared with the main interpretations within the Communist Party of theSoviet Union (CPSU) and with the general view of the Soviet foreign administration.This article claims that the study of Soviet policy towards Finland in the 1920s willoffer new insights and a more nuanced understanding about these themes.

In previous research, the basic contradiction in Soviet foreign policy from therevolution until the collapse of the Soviet Union has often been observed to bebetween ideology and ‘realpolitik’, or principles and practice. However, this holdstrue on foreign policy in general. Regarding Soviet foreign policy, this question has

Scandinavian Journal of History, 2015Vol. 40, No. 5, 632–652, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03468755.2015.1085435

© 2015 the Historical Associations of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden

been posed, for example, by Margot Light, when Soviet policy has been studied on thebases of its own statements, or, for example, by Jonathan Haslam, when it has beenrelated to foreign sources as well. Though Haslam underlines more the pragmatism ofSoviet foreign policy, based on taking advantage of the frictions between the capitalistgreat powers, earlier he saw this ‘undifferentiated approach’ being based on ‘Marxisttheory reinforced by traditional Leninist practice’. More recently his answer has beenthat the Soviet policy was realist in means, though utopian in ends.

The viewpoint of Geoffrey Roberts combines these approaches by taking security,power, ideology, and (interest group) politics as concepts for analysing Soviet foreignpolicy. For him the most central concepts were more or less reactive securityconsiderations and revolutionary, anti-status quo ideology, defining policy objectivesand filtering perceptions of the policy makers. This synthetizing approach, presentedby Roberts, is taken as a starting point for this article, though the focus here is moreon the side of the formulations used in everyday practice of Soviet foreign policy.

Regarding both the Soviet and western objectives in the years closely following theFirst World War, the question has been how commitment to bolshevist revolution orto its destruction changed to ‘co-habitation’.1 Regionally, the generally accepted viewof the previous research on the Baltic Sea in the 1920s usually presents the SovietUnion opposing all alliances by arguing that they were hostile tools of a western greatpower or powers, especially Great Britain.2

The practical questions this article addresses are as follows. How was theideological interpretation of international relations reflected in the Soviet border-state policy, especially in the Baltic Sea region? Did it strengthen threat scenariosbased on Anglo-French influence and diminish cooperation with Germany? How wasthe role of Finland evaluated during the attempts to revive the border-state allianceduring 1925? Soviet policy towards Finland is observed here as a case of Soviet border-state relations, and how these relations reflect a larger change in Soviet foreign policyin 1922–1925, both in the means and in application of the ideological framework.

Previous research has characterized Soviet foreign policy as being based on limitedcooperation or coexistence with the capitalist states since 1921, after victory in thecivil war and the stalemate of the Polish war.3 Significant change from coexistence andthe New Economic Policy (NEP) to expectations of western great powers’ hostilityand even actual aggression took place from the turn of 1924–1925.4

As the controversies in the Soviet–western relations were often ideological, basedon legitimation of the political systems, the interest group approach is found as a usefulmeans for analysing these relations, as interest groups competing for political poweraim to have influence on both domestic and foreign policies. The approach will makethe emergence of Soviet–German cooperation and Soviet–British relations, as well asSoviet evaluations of the Finnish political field, more understandable. An interest groupapproach also allows the opening of the seemingly monolithic façade of policyformulation in a one-party state like the Soviet Union.5

Georgii Chicherin had been the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairsfrom January 1918 as Trotsky’s deputy, and from May 1918 as actual Commissar untilhis death in 1930. He was well suited to the task on the basis of his former experiencein the Imperial Russian foreign ministry, as well as his aristocratic background.However, this and his Menshevik party background made him rather dependent onLenin’s support. The NKID, like other Commissariats, was directed by a collegium,

FINLAND IN THE SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, 1922–1925 633

which included most important assistants, usually the chiefs of departments. Inprinciple, the collegium was an advisory body, which the commissar could bypass indecision-making. In practice some of its members, like Maxim Litvinov, who joined inthe summer of 1919, could hold a higher position in the party. He became Chicherin’sdeputy. However, rivalry between the two had begun much earlier, during their exilebefore the revolution.6

The image the NKID formed on Finnish policies in the 1920s was based on theSoviet Helsinki mission’s information from closed sessions of the Finnish government,as well as on discussions between the Estonian foreign ministry and military leadership.Also, contacts with Finnish MP’s were activated, either for receiving information orfor distributing Soviet views. These sources were then completed by exchanginginformation with the Germans.

The turning points of Soviet foreign policy, 1920–1924In order to understand the role of the border-states – Finland, Estonia, Latvia,Lithuania, Poland, and Romania – in the Soviet foreign policy, it is necessary to locatethem in the larger context of Soviet foreign relations, which were defined both byforeign and domestic factors. The main issues of conflict between the Soviet govern-ment and the bourgeois, parliamentary governments of western and central Europewere the legitimacy of political systems, loans/investment, and reparations. Conflictsover these themes, or attempts to solve them, either by force or diplomatically,structured their relations in a significant way in the 1920s. Reparations and loans werecrucial also in the relations between the western powers and Germany.7

Regarding legitimacy, the first significant redefinition in the Soviet–western greatpower relations took place when the Bolshevik victory in the Russian civil war becameevident, from early 1920. This was based on a surprising stalemate: the Bolsheviks hadwon in Russia, contrary to the expectations of the western great powers supporting theWhites, but also, contrary to the expectations of the Bolsheviks, the World Revolutionhad not spread globally.8 In such a situation, ideology needed to be reinterpreted.Central and western Europe was clearly not yet ripe for revolution and capitalismseemed stabile, at least for a couple of years. This underlined war-weary SovietRussia’s need for recovery and rebuilding, encouraging those, like Lenin, AlekseyRykov, Leonid Krasin, and Grigori Sokolnikov, favouring ‘cohabitation’, moderationin relations with capitalist countries, to create bases for recovery through NEP andmonopolized foreign trade with Great Britain and Germany. Economic concessionswere expected to buy off the capitalists from aggression and even cause them tocompete with each other on the Russian market. This interpretation generally helduntil 1925.

The most noteworthy of the European great powers, Great Britain, was preparedto end the intervention and naval blockade of Russia, unlike France, when the Whitedefeat became inevitable from early 1920. According to the British, integrationthrough trade would allow more influence on the Soviet government in the newsituation than use or threat of force. This was based on the interpretation of thesignificance of the Russian market, firstly on the British, but also on general Europeaneconomic recovery after the First World War. However, trade and legitimacy wereconnected in the Soviet–British, as well as Soviet–German, trade negotiations: the

634 SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF HISTORY

bourgeois governments demanded the end of Soviet propaganda directed against themand the Soviets demanded the end of support to White Russian emigrant organizationsas well as diplomatic recognition. In Soviet–British relations, these issues remainedproblematic throughout the 1920s, also in the wider context of the British Empire.9

Soviet–German relations, after the retreat of German forces from Russia during1919, had a different basis when compared with Soviet relations with the winners ofthe First World War. Despite similar and quite open conflict over legitimacy, bothSoviet Russia and Weimar Germany had a shared interest in anti-Versailles foreignpolicy, either as a means for revolution or recovery of great power status. Both alsorecognized the economic potential in their relations from the pre-war basis. On theother hand, the Soviet interest in European revolution was the strongest in Germanybetween the years 1921–1923 and a couple of attempts were encouraged. Despite theinstability of the relations, the Soviet–German treaty on political and military-indus-trial cooperation was reached in Rapallo in 1922, during the Genoa conference. Insteadof a British-sponsored ‘European deal’, linking Russian markets, west Europeaninvestment, and German war reparations, Soviet–German special relations emerged.These relations became the cornerstone of Soviet foreign policy for the 1920s, as itallowed them both to break their isolation and prevent the potential unity of capitalistgreat powers.10 This cornerstone could, however, be challenged by agreement on theGerman war reparations and their payments with the US-financed Dawes Plan, and bygeneral détente in western Europe. In September 1924, the British Labour Party PrimeMinister, Ramsay Macdonald, proposed, with acceptance of the French, the invitationof Germany to the League of Nations. In September 1925, mutual guarantees onFrench, Belgian, and German western borders were agreed on in Locarno, with thesupport of Great Britain and Italy.11

The Soviet visions of international relations, 1924–1927The power-struggle after Lenin’s death was also a struggle in the manner of buildingsocialism and developing the Soviet Union. The socialist ideology was reinterpreted sothat the survival and success of socialism in the Soviet Union did not require the rapidspreading of revolution abroad. This interpretation, originally presented by NikolayBukharin, was made more well-known by Stalin as he took the opposing position inrelation to Trotsky’s view on permanent revolution, but implicitly also against Lenin’sview on world revolution.12 Although ‘socialism in one country’ did not mean givingup on revolutionary internationalism and eventual struggle between capitalism andcommunism, it gave moderate bases for foreign relations and diminished the role ofthe Comintern.

Both foreign political successes and threats offered grounds for different inter-pretations. During 1924, the majority of the CPSU Central Committee held anoptimistic view on international relations. This was based on the fact that a numberof important countries recognized the Soviet Union diplomatically, and that economicagreements on trade and investments seemed to be progressing. Thus, both socialismand capitalism seemed to have stabilized, allowing time for the construction ofsocialism and industrialization, before the eventual victory of communism.13

Stalin and, initially, also Bukharin’s view on the ‘epoch of World revolution’ as alengthy process came close to this, especially as the upsurge of revolution was seen to


have ended in 1923 after the failure of the German revolution. However, Stalin andBukharin expected that the German war reparations payments would soon revolutio-nize the country again, and that the Dawes Plan as the latest attempt to organize thepayments would fail. Both Stalin and Bukharin were concerned by the breakup ofSoviet–British political and economic relations because of ‘the Zinoviev letter scandal’in late 1924 and by the stabilizing influence of the Dawes Plan for Germany.

Despite public moderation, personally, Stalin denied the existence of a longrecovery period. He stated, first privately, in January 1925 that a radical change inthe international situation had begun and the danger of intervention again was becom-ing real. During the year, he, on three separate occasions, claimed that the interna-tional situation was reminiscent of the outbreak of ‘the great imperialist war’ of 1914.In May 1925, he observed that the stabilization of capitalism, on the bases of DawesPlan and the Locarno détente, might lead to a united front against the Soviet Union.The Third Soviet Congress in May moved towards his lines, as it gave declarations onthe preparations of capitalist states for new wars and hostile encirclement of theUSSR. The 14th Party Congress in December 1925 observed the strengthening ofAnglo-American hegemony, increasing the danger of war. The importance of strength-ening Soviet defensive capabilities, the army, the navy, and the air force, wasunderlined.14

In addition to these two CPSU views on international relations, there was the viewof the Soviet foreign administration, which was concerned with the practice ofinternational relations. Unlike the party interpretations, it operated on a shorterterm, with more moderate aims. In the mid-1920s these included protecting the tieswith Germany, despite its western détente, settling disputes with France, and reopen-ing negotiations with Great Britain about debts and loans. Chicherin’s report to the14th Party Congress on international relations is especially interesting when comparedto the views presented by Stalin throughout the same year. According to Chicherin,the Locarno treaty gave the Soviet Union no reason to panic, though he criticized itspacifist hypocrisy and proposed the creation of their own diplomatic system to counterit. With the exception of Great Britain, major great powers from France to Japan wereseen to be convinced about the stability of the USSR. Chicherin specifically noted thatEngland did not consider military intervention in the Soviet Union. Instead it aimed atsoftening the Soviet attitude, making it repay former tsarist debts, and forcing theSoviet Union to give up its policy in the East. This referred to the growing sphere ofinfluence conflict between Great Britain and the Soviet Union in China. Comintern-based policy there aimed at controlling both nationalist and communist movements,and turning them against the British influence in China. This report of Chicherin wasclassified as secret until 1991.15

When relating these three major Soviet interpretations on international relationswith the domestic development of the Soviet Union in the latter half of the 1920s, it isclear that Stalin’s alarmist interpretation offered arguments for the quick realization ofindustrialization. This took the form of the subsequent five-year plans, from 1928onwards. However, the loan negotiations, especially with Great Britain, had failed as aconsequence of mutual ideological and political conflicts, the British Zinoviev letterscandal, and Comintern-influenced China policy. Consequently, quick industrializationnow required the forced collectivization of the agriculture, as that was the only way toproduce the needed investment from the domestic market in a short time. Obviously,


the combined scenarios of foreign threat and speeded industrialization also allowed thepresentation of the party opposition, beginning with Trotsky, both as supporters of theforeign enemies and opponents of socialist development in the USSR.

Soviet border-state policy and attempts for the Baltic allianceSoviet policy towards the border-states, all of which, with the exclusion of Romania,had been parts of the former Russian Empire, was also directly based on the outcomeof the Russian civil war. After the stabilization of independence in this area underbourgeois governments, partly with German or British support, the Soviet aim was toneutralize these countries as White supply bases during 1919, and then to establishtrade links through them. Despite a clear legitimacy conflict between the nationalismof the new nation-states and Bolshevism, and varying trade interests, they succeeded in1920 with Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, but failed with Poland andRomania.16

During 1920, the centrality of the Soviet–Polish and Soviet–German relations tothe area was made evident. Poland initiated a major attack on Soviet Russia in May1920, aiming at re-establishing 1772 borders, incorporating Belo-Russia, Ukraine, andLithuania. Soviet foreign policy was consequently re-evaluated on the basis of amilitary and ideological offensive, as the Soviet counter attack advanced from Kievto Warsaw and German frontiers. The Soviet leadership was prepared to spreadrevolution with armed forces, to create a Soviet Poland, and initiated contact withGermany on a partial division of Poland. As the Polish–Soviet war ended, after asuccessful Polish counter offensive, in mutual exhaustion in the treaty of Riga in March1921, this effectively terminated the first objective, but created more lasting bases forthe second. The result meant that Poland had a continuous need to strengthen itsposition in relation to both Soviet Russia and Germany. Therefore it was in the Polishinterest to participate in the French alliance policy, directed firstly against Germany,but also against Soviet Russia, and to conclude a military alliance with Romania, whichhad annexed the province of Bessarabia from Soviet Russia. The creation of a militaryalliance with the remaining border-states would have further strengthened Poland’sposition. Conversely, Soviet Russia, Germany, and Lithuania, from which Poland hadannexed the city of Vilnius, had a shared anti-Polish interest.17

The context for the second attempt for a border-state alliance was created both bythe changing international and Soviet domestic political situations in 1924–1925. In thesphere of international relations, German–western détente was finally advancingduring 1924. Regarding Soviet domestic politics, there was an interregnum during1923–1927, after Lenin’s serious strokes and subsequent death in January 1924, andbefore the rise of Stalin as the strongest party leader.18

Growing equality in Germany’s position in Europe, especially in relation to GreatBritain and France, diminished, but did not end, the significance of the Soviet–Germanspecial relationship for Germany. This was acknowledged by the Soviet foreignpolitical leadership, and initiatives aiming at continuing the relationship were made.Instead, Poland’s position weakened more clearly, as its alliance with France lost someof its significance as a consequence of the Franco-German détente. This increasedPoland’s need to strengthen its position by a renewed attempt to create a militaryalliance with the border-states in 1925. The first attempt for a military alliance had


already been made in March 1922, but common interest among the border-states washard to find. Finland had first agreed, with qualifications, on defensive militarycooperation with Poland, but disengaged in May, after the parliament had refused toratify the agreement and the government had collapsed.19

The Soviet comments related to the failure of the 1922 alliance plans offer animportant starting point for the Soviet evaluations regarding Finnish foreign policy andthe second attempt for a border-state alliance in 1925. The central themes in theobservations of the NKID Baltic department and Soviet representative in Finland in1922 were the development of Finnish–Polish relations, promoting their own con-ference initiative as a counter measure to border-state conferences, and comparingFinnish policy with the Baltic States, mostly with Estonia and Latvia. The Sovietrepresentative in Finland, Aleksander Tshernyikh, was asked in early June 1922 topresent his propositions for the NKID on ‘how to take advantage on the prevailingmood in Finland’. This was connected, according to the head of the Baltic departmentand member of the NKID collegium Jakov Ganetsky, to ‘the tensions in the [Finnish]relations with Poland, which has influence also on the Baltic States, [and] is veryadvantageous for us. Consequences of these tensions should bring Finland a little closerto us’. The Baltic department praised Tshernyikh for achieving the ratification of aborder treaty with Finland: ‘Without a doubt it is a great plus for you. We need to useit, especially for increasing tensions between Finland and Poland’. Small concessions orrewards in the visa regime or in founding a consulate in Petrograd could be offered inorder to encourage the Finns to move in the right direction.20

The Soviets were preparing a disarmament conference in Moscow for July 1922,as they demobilized the Red Army, and as a means to gain the initiative from Poland inthe relations with the other border-states. Although the conference was realized onlyin December, and the results remained more propagandist than practical, the prepara-tions bring out the general views of the NKID on the Baltic states. It was expected thatthe initiative, ‘which in fact should be delightful to our [Baltic] neighbours, causes asurprise and a fright, and they will try to postpone their answer’. However, the Sovietrepresentatives were ordered to press for an answer.21 As a tactic for gaining theinitiative this had not quite worked out, since the border-states held a pre-conferenceamong themselves.

The Soviet view on their own as well as the border-states’ objectives becameclearer in November. The NKID believed it had a relatively good idea about the verylimited disarmament propositions that the border-states were prepared to make. Thesewould be countered with a far-reaching Soviet proposal, which ‘will make animpression in the whole of Europe’. ‘The Polish machinations’ were seen to threatenthis objective, not only from Warsaw but also from Estonia. In contrast, the border-states were not a unified bloc, as distrust between Poland and the Baltic states wasunderlined. This was connected to the Polish objective to move closer to Romania, andto avoid discussion on its conflict with Lithuania in the conference. The other Balticcountries, especially Latvia, were expected to be concerned, on the one hand, about‘imperialistic means’ and the Polish annexation of Vilnius from Lithuania, and, on theother hand, not being ultimately able to count on Polish loyalty in case of an alliance.22

The objective of making a virtue out of necessity seemed to work from the Sovietviewpoint, when the disarmament conference was finally opened on 2 December1922. The border-states were seen to be ‘seriously concerned’ on the far-reaching


Soviet disarmament proposal. They were trying to agree on closed sessions and willingto limit common declarations on future disarmament to only one. However, theSoviets were prepared to strike decisively for peace, and at least the Baltic departmentof the NKID was optimistic. ‘Within an hour a bomb, which without doubt, will haveinfluence on the whole world, will explode in the conference: Our delegation willmake a declaration, which announces on our decision of cutting our army even with200,000 men’.23

The NKID indeed had grounds for its opinion that it was well informed about itscounter-parties’ views on the disarmament conference. Tshernyikh had informed thedeputy foreign commissar, Maxim Litvinov, on the views of the Finnish government aweek before the conference. The Russian representative referred to a closed session ofthe Finnish parliamentary commission for foreign affairs, during which Prime MinisterJuho Vennola (Progress Party) had presented the Finnish aims. The government ‘wasvery sceptical about reaching any useful results in the conference’. This was becausethe position taken by the League of Nations on disarmament limited Finnish optionsvis-à-vis Soviet Russia, and because the Finnish delegation would not discuss abolishingthe civil guard, a large paramilitary organization guaranteeing the White victory of1918 in the Finnish civil war. However, the prime minister ‘further mentionedrelations with other border-states, and observed that the government proposes closegeneral co-operation in defence policy with Estonia and Latvia. Regarding Poland, thegovernment does not consider a connection with Poland desirable, as Poland hasrecognized the Bessarabian question as potential casus belli in relation to Russia’.Bessarabia was, according to the prime minister, distant for Finns and the Poles weretaking great risks. At the end of the report, Tsheryikh did not fail to underline thesignificance of the Finnish views on Poland and Romania: ‘It could be said that thePolish conduct on the Bessarabian question did some services for us’.24

‘Alliance alert’ of 1925: role of Finland in the Soviet border-statepolicyAgainst this background it could hardly come as a surprise that the renewed Polishactivity at the turn of 1924–1925 for increasing military cooperation between theSoviet Union’s western neighbours caused certain alarm in the Soviet foreign admin-istration, the NKID. However, it is the evaluations of this activity, and the Finnish roleregarding it, as well as the conclusions drawn, that are of considerable interest. This isespecially so when the differences between evaluations of the Soviet foreign adminis-tration and the party are compared.

From an ideological viewpoint, the party line was connected with the interpreta-tion of the temporary stabilization of capitalism and building of socialism in onecountry, which required rapid industrialization in the USSR. The stabilization phase,which followed as revolution did not spread permanently in eastern Europe orGermany, would now enable the rivalling capitalist great powers to ally against theSoviet Union, which would be vulnerable before industrialization had taken place. Thisinterpretation, especially favoured by Stalin, reached its peak in the war scare of 1927.The fall of the British Labour government in late 1924 and developing German–western détente during 1925 seemed to lend credibility to this scenario.25


When reporting at the beginning of January 1925 on the meeting of the border-states’ foreign ministers’ conference in Helsinki,26 the Soviet mission in Helsinkimentioned the concerning information, ‘which has lately reached Moscow on theHelsinki conference supposedly preparing a military-political Baltic bloc’. Already atthe beginning of the report it had been brought up that according to availableinformation these views were completely exaggerated and did not correspond withreality. To support his argument, the Soviet representative Tshernyikh referred to hisdiscussions with the German representative, Count Chekh, who had just returnedfrom Berlin. Characterizing the Finnish general opinion, the German representativesaw it moving from the side of Germany towards England and France. Support for thePolish orientation could be found ‘in the Progress party, among the young officials ofthe Ministry for Foreign affairs (type Holsti), and maybe, the president [Ståhlberg]’.However, he was quite convinced that in the Finnish parliament there would be thesame kind of majority against the Polish orientation as had been against the Warsawtreaty in 1922. The German representative also calmed his Soviet colleague aboutpossible Finnish–Estonian military cooperation. This was on the basis that ‘one of hisinterlocutors (a significant person), had noted that “Estonia could be invaded in half anhour, in maximum two hours”, willing to say that an ally would not have time to help,and Finland would remain, consequently, alone against the enemy’.

According to the German representative, Poland, Latvia, and Estonia had closecoordination between each other and were, unsuccessfully, trying to entice Finland tojoin the planned Polish–Baltic bloc. Regarding the formation of the alliance on ‘someother basis’, Count Chekh thought the English Conservative government valued itstrade interests much higher with the USSR than with the Baltic States. Therefore theGerman representative was strongly convinced that Great Britain would not supportthe formation of an aggressive bloc against the USSR in the Baltic Sea. As a friendlyreminder, he observed, though, ‘if, for example, the Soviet Union should occupyEstonia or Latvia, then England might actively meddle in the affairs of the Baltic shorestates [pribaltiskii strany]’. There was, indeed, a British military commission in Finland,advising the Finns on the organization of the army, but on defensive grounds. TheBritish had been invited, as the Finnish nationalistic officers had been against invitingofficers from Sweden, the former mother country before Russia.

Both the Soviet and German representatives agreed that remaining neutral wouldbe the best policy for Finland. In relation to this, Count Chekh noted, as well, ‘thatduring the past two years distrust and hostility towards the USSR has diminished in theFinnish political circles, where the fear of Russia had reached atavistic levels’.Tshernyikh ended his report by observing how Chekh’s information correspondedwith his own regarding the Baltic alliance, ‘especially as he has close relations to theGerman-friendly circles of Finland’.27

Before mid-January 1925, the Soviet mission in Helsinki and the Soviet foreignadministration were beginning to form a quite calm preliminary view on the Finnishpolicy regarding the Baltic alliance. This impression was based on the effectivegathering of information, both through official and unofficial channels. The Sovietmission in Helsinki was, firstly, reasonably well connected, not only to the extremeLeft, and, secondly, information was combined within the Baltic Department and theNKID collegium as well as exchanged with Germany. Though the Soviet–GermanRapallo relation was, at its best, more of a temporary business partnership than any


kind of lasting alliance, information on the border-states between the two countriesseemed to be shared on a routine basis, up to a point.

The German ambassador and the Soviet mission exchanged information a weekafter their first discussion about the views of the Finnish foreign minister, HjalmarProcopé, of the Swedish People’s Party (SPP, conservative-liberal), as well as those ofthe National Coalition Party (NCP, conservative). Count Chekh claimed that theFinnish foreign minister did not believe that Russia threatened Finnish independence.After this, the head of the Soviet mission, Tshernyikh, was most interested to hearabout the ‘correlation of forces’ in the National Coalition Party, which the Germanrepresentative characterized interestingly in the following way: ‘A couple of persons,not even a group, who are motivated by old fears in relation to Russia, mix upentering this kind of [Polish-dominated Baltic] alliance to a certain kind of [national]defence’. As Tshernyikh enquired whether the negative attitude of the majority in thecoalition reflected their German sympathies, Chekh mostly denied this. Instead, heobserved that ‘there were, even among the Coalitionists, some thinking heads thatwere, with thousands of arguments, against the alliance’. This was mostly on thegrounds of the worsening economic situation in Finland, in Chekh’s opinion.28

Within this context, it becomes understandable that before mid-January 1925 theSoviet mission in Helsinki could quite astutely evaluate the Finnish parliamentaryparties’ opinions regarding the Baltic alliance, which did not correspond directlywith the division between the Left and Right. The Baltic alliance was opposed bythe Finnish Socialist Workers’ Party (FSWP, the legal arm of the communists), theSocial Democratic Party of Finland (SDP), and the Swedish People’s Party. Theseparties had already been observed to hold a majority of a couple of votes in parliament.Clearly in favour of the alliance were the Progress Party (liberals) and the AgrarianLeague. The National Coalition Party was observed to be, interestingly, divided on thematter, but was for the most against. On the whole, it was clear that the majority ofmembers of parliament would oppose an alliance agreement. This did not mean thatthere would not have been interest in alliance politics in Finland. However,Tshernyikh’s analysis made it very clear that party divisions in the question weresuch that they ‘paralyse almost every attempt to give these aims a practical form anddirection’.

As the National Coalition Party was a kind of unstable factor in the ranks of anti-alliance parties, it received, with the Social Democrats, the most attention. Motives forthe prevailing negative attitude of the coalition were observed to be the following: fearof ‘great politics’, German-mindedness, the treaty of Riga, Bessarabia, Lithuania, andundesirability of certain countries as allies. The wavering of the Coalition Party in thealliance question was connected, ‘unlike with the Swedish [People’s Party] or the socialdemocrats’, to the Karelian question, as a considerable part of the party was seen to bebased on activism, the radical wing of the Finnish independence movement. On thesegrounds, the party was seen to aim at the strengthening of the Finnish-speakingnational element in Finland and therefore unwilling to orient towards Sweden. ‘Acertain element in the Coalition party’ was especially hurt by the feeling of nationalweakness, and looked for possibilities for the strengthening of the country. For them,‘the question on the alliance was immediately connected to the activation of Finnishpolicy towards the USSR’, of which some spoke openly, others ‘under the flag of puredefence’.


The Progress Party and the Agrarians were identified as the true champions of thealliance. Their fear of Russia was seen to be the decisive cause: ‘They are ready toenter to any political combination, as long as they can support Finnish independencewith whatever bayonets’. However, these two parties were seen to have neither thenumbers nor the influence to solve the issue. According to Tshernyikh, these divisionscould be explained by the division between Finnish- and Swedish-speaking national-isms, and the relation, not only to the USSR, but also to Germany, Sweden, and GreatBritain.

This information was related to the role of other great powers and regionalcircumstances. Tshernyikh underlined: ‘I have not been able to observe traces of anykind of English work on behalf of the Baltic alliance. Especially, all the sourcesinvalidate the version of English influence’. Regarding the Baltic region-states,Tsernyikh considered Poland and Estonia as the most resolute supporters of thealliance. The alliance project was seen as a Polish attempt to strengthen its positionin relation to the USSR. The position of Latvia remained problematic; it was believedto vacillate between alliance and non-alliance.29

This quite relaxed Soviet attitude was supported by the observations on thefinishing protocol of the border-states’ foreign ministers’ conference in Helsinki. Asthe immediate creation of the Baltic alliance did not succeed, it was transformed to anearlier idea of an alliance based on the Geneva protocol of the League of Nations. TheGeneva protocol was understood ‘to legalise regional military-defensive treaties andgive the guarantees of the League of Nations [for them]’. Despite the Soviet reserva-tions towards the League of Nations as an organization of the winners of the FirstWorld War, these principal guarantees were seen as formalities instead of signifyingany practical consequences.30

The Baltic department of the Soviet foreign administration evidently appreciatedthe observations of the Helsinki mission. Viktor Kopp, the chief of the Baltic depart-ment after Ganetsky from 1923, especially mentioned to Tshernyikh that ‘yourinformation is in complete accordance with those conclusions I have reached myself,when analysing information not only from the Finnish, but also from the Latvian, theLithuanian and the Warsaw lines’. Kopp confirmed this view two weeks later, despitereceiving some contrasting information from Poland on the progress in the allianceissue. Kopp repeats his agreement with the evaluations of the Helsinki mission andexplains the Polish ‘rumours’ as attempts to save their face after the failure to receivepractical results. The failure was, in fact, seen to diminish Polish prestige and influence‘in the northern Baltic countries’. These consequences were hoped to trouble theirFrench allies, too.31

The Soviet information channelsEven though the border-states’ Helsinki conference was over, without any tangibleresults, the alliance alert had not passed. The Soviets were informed in early February1925 about a potential continuation: the conference of the border-states’ general staffswere to be held, in Riga in March. Even though it was presumed that the participationof Finland in such cooperation would be on limited grounds only, it did not diminishthe need to ensure this by close observation. At this point the information-gatheringnetwork of the Soviet foreign administration was put to good use.


When informing in early February about the possible conference of the generalstaffs, the Helsinki mission also noted its lack of information regarding cooperation inthe anti-communist struggle. However, regarding mutual aid between the border-states in the case of a communist rebellion, Tshernyikh had information on the Finnishgovernment’s policy, which had been formed ‘already during the days of the Tallinnrebellion’, referring to the attempted communist coup in Estonia in December 1924.According to Tshernyikh: ‘In its closed meeting the Finnish government recognisedformal intervention [in Estonia] as impractical. However, voluntary help (civil guards)was recognised as completely desirable and the opinion was expressed on the desir-ability of this kind of voluntary activity and government support for it’. The Finnishgovernment was still expected to follow this policy.32

Regarding the actual alliance formation, the Soviets needed as acute and accurateinformation as possible on the policy of its supporters among the border-states.Significant success would seem to have been achieved in the case of Estonia. TheHelsinki mission reported in mid-February 1925 to the Baltic department on the NKIDthat, ‘according to the information received’, a Polish general would have visitedTallinn three weeks earlier in order to prepare a separate military treaty betweenPoland and Estonia. According to the Soviet source, before the following visit of theEstonian foreign minister, Karl Pusta, to Warsaw, a meeting had been held betweenPusta and the Estonian military leadership. Interestingly, the Estonian foreign ministerand the military would have had conflicting views on the desirability of the alliancewith Poland. Pusta was for the alliance with Poland and thought that ‘one should notcount on the Finnish participation in such an alliance’. Part of the unnamed militaryleadership had some doubts. These in the military leadership ‘underlined the limitedsignificance of a military alliance to be concluded with Poland’. This was because:

[O]n the grounds of geographic and other reasons, Poland could not give real help.A necessary condition for an alliance with Poland should be that Finland alsoparticipates, as it were possible to expect real help from there. Pusta argued forthe alliance with Poland on the basis of its political significance, safeguardingEstonia from aggression. In relation to Finland, he underlined the necessity toinclude it in the alliance in the nearest future.33

The Soviet source on the meeting thought it ended with Pusta’s viewpoint. Tshernyikhobserved in his report that it should be important to check the information ‘from theother side’, probably meaning the Polish rather than the Finnish side. The position ofLatvia was still unclear, but it had significance for Estonia. Even though Tsernyikhadmitted he ‘did not have the Estonian-Latvian military agreement at hand’, he was ofthe opinion that without Latvian acceptance Estonia could not conduct military treatieswith other states.34

When the Riga meeting of the border-states’ general staffs took place in March,the state secretary of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Pontus Artti, veryformally stated that the meeting addressed disarmament and Finland was not officiallyparticipating in it or sending any representation to it from Helsinki. While it was truethat Finland only had an observer in the conference, not participating in its decisions onalliance plans, the conference was concerned with the exchange of military informationalthough only disarmament was mentioned on the public agenda. In March 1925, the


Soviets had good reason to doubt this polished version on the basis of the telegrams ofthe Finnish mission in Paris that they had received. The Finnish representative in Paris,Carl Enckell, had agreed, in French according to the Soviets, on the non-public agendaof the Riga conference with the Polish foreign minister, Alexandre Skryzinski, and theEstonian foreign minister, Pusta. The impression could not have been very reassuringfrom the Soviet viewpoint, considering the earlier reports on the Polish and Estonianactivities in the alliance issue.35

Earlier in March, the Soviet mission had contacted some Finnish MPs fromdifferent parties on the alliance question, so as to receive information on foreignpolitical decision-making and to influence public opinion. In the first week of March,Tsernyikh had mostly discussed the Finnish government coalition and the presentgovernment crisis, but also views regarding the Baltic alliance, with a comrade,Kulmala, representative of the Socialist Workers’ and Smallholders’ ParliamentaryFraction (1924–1930). However, in his report, Tshernyikh thought Kulmala’s viewson the alliance and the Riga conference were exaggerated and mistaken, and agreedmore with the views of the Finnish foreign minister, Procopé, at this point. Hisinformation on the foreign minister’s views was probably based on seven (!) foreignminister’s memoranda, translated accurately from Finnish to Russian, including theclassification ‘top secret’. These were attached in the report.36 In order to confirm theinformation on the Riga conference, the Finnish government crisis, and rumours of theretired commander-in-chief of the Finnish Whites, C. G. Mannerheim’s, return to anofficial position, Tsernyikh exchanged information with the chargé d’affaires of theGerman embassy, Felkers.37

At the turn of March and April, Tsernyikh widened his contacts with the FinnishMPs also to the Social Democrats and the Swedish People’s Party. He talked to ArtturiAalto, who was characterized as ‘the leader of the social democratic centre’. Aalto wasbriefed on the inconsistencies of the official Finnish line regarding the Riga conference.This apparently made an impression, as ‘Aalto got worried and said he would take allthe necessary measures, in order for the question to be deal with not only in thenewspapers, but also in the parliament’.38 A week later, at the beginning of April,Tshernyikh discussed this with Georg Schauman, who was characterized as belongingto the ‘Left’ wing of the SPP and an expert on foreign policy. On these bases, ‘he mostclearly brings out his antipathy towards [part of] the Swedish party’s Baltic orientationand Karelia activism’. This made him, according to Tshernyikh’s evaluation, ‘a suitableperson for influencing the responsible [SPP] party circles’. Schauman also held a speechon the Riga conference in the parliament, demanding more information from thegovernment. As an interesting detail, it was mentioned that Schauman had been achildhood friend of Mannerheim. This probably did not decrease his significance as acontact. In comparison, the social-democratic MP, Aalto, proved to be at first a littledisappointing as a contact. After his second discussion on the same day as withSchauman, Tshernyikh observed that Procopé had dealt ‘directly and easily’ with thesocial democrats, not even bothering to present any information for them on the Rigaconference. So a new briefing round was needed, and ‘this time Aalto wrote factscarefully up, and said he will present them on the parliamentary commission forforeign affairs. If decisions on some steps are taken, then Aalto will send the news tome’.39


Yet on the same day a consultation with the German embassy was in order. TheGerman chargé d’affaires, Felkers, sounded somewhat more concerned than the Soviets,as he believed the preparation of a military-defensive alliance was on the agenda of theRiga conference. His sources from the Finnish ministry for foreign affairs, the Balticreferent Talaskivi, as well as from the Finnish general staff circles and from theEstonian embassy, ‘bring out the same idea’. Especially interesting from the Sovietpoint of view were Felkers’ observations of 10 Polish officers in Estonia, and the‘division of the Baltic Sea shore countries [pribaltiski strany] to French and Britishspheres of influences (Finland to the English, southern Baltic countries – French)’.Regarding the acquiring of information in general, Felkers was, coincidentally, inter-ested ‘whether we would happen to have a common primary source in Berlinregarding Estonia, to which I [Tsernyikh] answered convincingly negatively’.40

The end game of the Riga conferenceThe decisive formulation of the Soviet foreign administration’s quite moderate inter-pretation on the Riga conference of the border-states, and the role of Finland there,took place during April 1925. However, the Soviet mission in Helsinki continued tofollow related information at least until June, filling in some details.

The general impression of the Baltic department of NKID was, after noting theattempts of the border-states to deny the conference or hide its agenda, that ‘neitherthis [Riga] conference had a decisive role [in forming the Baltic alliance], and noconventions were signed, and that Finland was a mere observer in this issue’. TheHelsinki mission was advised to base its views on an earlier letter of the deputycommissar of foreign affairs, Maxim Litvinov. However, it was reminded that con-trasting information on the Riga conference was offered ‘by our neighbours’, andespecially Poland claimed that a military convention would have been signed. Frenchparticipation in the conference was expected, though it was thought unlikely that thesewould have been officers.41

This kind of contradiction required checking and, happily, it was, once again, theGerman ‘associates’ of the USSR who could fill the information gaps. In late April,Tsernyikh referred to the ‘following confidential information from the Germanembassy’. The unnamed Germans of the Helsinki embassy could confirm that theFinnish delegate had not participated in the last sessions of the Riga conference and, asan attempt to create a military alliance, it had ended in failure. The main causes,according to the German embassy, were the differences between the border-states and‘the concern [negative attitude] expressed by the USSR’. The Soviet attitude wouldhave had influence, especially on Latvia, although the clear lack of British interest inthe Polish-dominated Baltic alliance had made an impression as well.

However, on the basis of their discussions with the representatives of the border-states, the Soviets were informed by the Germans that the border-states were:

[E]xtremely upset with Finland, blaming it for exposing the conference to us [theUSSR], sending us information which allowed us to crush the campaign. With this“treason”, the Finns destroyed the conference. According to the representatives [ofthe border-states] the Finns did this on purpose, to whitewash themselves in the


eyes of the USSR. They still think all the Soviet information on the Rigaconference comes from Helsinki – the Finnish Government.

This information must have been as useful as it was amusing from the Soviet viewpointwhen evaluating the Finnish role. In addition to these ‘treats’, the Germans had somemore information on Finnish foreign and defence policy. The Germans denied, on thebasis of their information, that the Finnish general staff would have visited Poland. Theyhad also discussed alliance policy with the resigning Finnish foreign minister, Procopé, andevaluated his policy. Procopé would have claimed to the Germans that Finland, from thebeginning, had not had any intention to participate in the Riga conference. Because of this,the Finnish government had not even sent an observer from Helsinki, but instead theFinnish military attaché in Riga had been acting as the observer. Further on, Procopé hadstated that, as a foreign minister, his policy was not to conduct any military treaties,morally obligating Finland in the future. The Germans were of the opinion that Procopéhad changed, apparently to his advantage, after becoming the foreign minister: he hadbecome less Polish-friendly and more careful in general.

On the new Finnish government, the Germans briefly noted that the presentforeign minister, Karl Idman (non-party), did not conduct an independent policy. Hewas not, as was thought, influenced by MP Nestor Setälä (Progress), who received thecritical characterization of being ‘too theoretic’, ‘a narrow Finnish nationalist’, and‘horrified of the Swedes [shvedofob]’. Instead, the foreign minister was expected to beunder the influence of Prime Minister Antti Tulenheimo (NCP) or President LauriRelander. However, the report ended with a German inquiry. Regarding the Soviet–German relations, the Germans ‘were especially interested, if we were conductingnegotiations on a guarantee agreement with Poland’. 42 This observation was related tothe larger European context. As the German détente with the western powers wasprogressing, the Soviets were countering it with a potential warming of relations withPoland. The German inquiry made it clear that the message had not been missed onthe German side.

After this briefing, the Soviet foreign administration could take quite a relaxedattitude to the Baltic alliance in general, and the role of Finland in particular. Theinformation from the Germans confirmed earlier Soviet interpretations, and invalidatedsome contrasting information which could most often be tracked to Poland. On thefollowing day, the Soviets had also received the Finnish government’s original answer,written in English, to the invitation of the Riga conference, in which the Finnishgovernment had declined to send a representative. It came out that the originalinvitation to the Riga conference had been presented by Latvia, and had includedonly Poland, Estonia, and Finland. The participation of Romania was not mentioned inthe Finnish answer. According to the Soviets, the Finnish representative in Riga, andformer foreign minister, Rudolf Holsti, had personally extended the invitation toRomania.43 All in all, this confirmed the information the Germans had on Procopé’spolicy. Not all the disinformation was Polish responsibility though, as Tsernyikhreferred to in the ongoing lengthy disagreement within the NKID. According tohim, the Soviet Warsaw mission and its chief, Petr Voikov, had a tendency toexaggerate the significance of Polish information, even though all sources of theHelsinki mission invalidated them.44


In the end, the Soviets managed rather accurately to confirm the hidden agenda ofthe Riga conference on 22 April 1925, which was referred to in a later report in June.The information had been received from ‘our usually enlightened informer’. Accordingto this source, an agreement on the coordination of military intelligence was concludedin Riga, and Finland also participated in it. However, ‘the Polish proposition oforganising it through the second department of the Polish general staff’s central officewas declined’. Confidence towards Poland seemed less than complete among the otherparticipants. It also came out that the Finnish mission in Warsaw was clearly lessinformed on the matter than the Soviets, as they had sent a telegraph enquiry to theFinnish ministry for foreign affairs, which had ended in Russian hands. In the telegraph‘much is talked about the [Riga] conference, but nothing is known’. All in all, thisfurther confirmed the Soviet evaluations on the Finnish role. Finland had beenexpected to be interested in the exchange of military information, but had neverthelessstayed out of alliance negotiations.45

The decisive moment in defining the Soviet foreign administration’s generalinterpretation on the development of the Baltic alliance in 1925 had taken place duringthe first week of April. Then the deputy commissar for foreign affairs, Litvinov, hadwritten to Tsernyikh on his views on the situation in the Baltic Sea, and how it hadbeen presented in the Soviet government’s organ, Izvestija. The letter is of considerableinterest as it, in very clear words, of course within the NKID only, criticizes theforeign political interpretation of the official newspaper. Litvinov began with the directcriticism of Juri Steklov’s article, ‘Whose Hands’, which observed the foreign politicalconnections between the Baltic countries and western great powers. Litvinov agreedwith Tsernyikh that Steklov’s views ‘appeared completely incomprehensible, not justfor you, but other representatives of missions as well, who are familiar with thesituation, and for the [NKID] collegium itself’. In contrast to Steklov, he was not soconvinced that France should be seen leading ‘the intrigues of the Baltic Sea shorecountries [pribaltiskii strany]’, even if there has been evidence of this earlier. This wasbecause:

We [the Soviets], unfortunately, have a tendency, regarding international ques-tions, to think too simply and primitively, aiming to operate through formulasabout masters and lackeys, which are fit for agitation, not for serious analyses ofthe international situation. Poland is independent enough to create, even withoutforeign help, complicated plots against us in the Baltic shore countries. These plotsare possible also without construction help, but if it nevertheless is given, it doesnot come from England, but from France.

Finally, Litvinov defines Steklov’s article as an error, for two reasons. It not only givesthe wrong picture to the Soviet public, but it also discredits the professionalism of theNKID abroad. Therefore it ‘blows wind to the Polish sails’ and questions thecredibility of the NKID policy.46

It might be difficult to find a clearer, or better, definition from the Soviet foreignadministration on how they understood the difference between Soviet ideologicalpresentations and foreign political analyses.


Relation of ideology and practiceRegarding the discussion of previous research on the relation of ideology and pragma-tism in Soviet foreign policy, it is most interesting to note how small a role ideologicalcharacterizations has had in these sources from the People’s Commissariat of ForeignAffairs. It almost seems that the memoranda could have been written in any greatpower, basing argumentation on the Russian geopolitical position. Directly, ideologywas referred to only when the correspondence routinely ended, before the signature,‘with communist greetings’. On the other hand, though the Commissariat gatheredand analysed information quite pragmatically, the Soviet foreign policy-making in theCentral Committee and Politburo was often related to ideological goals and struggles,both home and abroad. On the level of political decision-making, the ideologicalstruggles tended to steer the interpretation of the gathered information. CertainlyStalin proved to be capable of using these to his advantage.47

The NKID interpretation of the regional Baltic development in 1922 and 1925 isobserved through the roles of information exchange, the Baltic region countries, andthe western great powers, France and Great Britain. Firstly, the received reliableinformation played a crucial role as a precondition for the Soviet foreign policyformulation regarding the area. It enabled the quite realistic and moderate evaluationof the Finnish policy towards the Baltic alliance. The Soviet mission in Helsinki had atits disposal accurate and timely information on the Finnish party political field ingeneral and on the views of the parties towards foreign relations and alliances inparticular. The head of the Soviet mission, Aleksander Tshernyikh, also seemed quitecapable of understanding the basics of a parliamentary political system. In addition, hewas well aware of the strains between Finnish-speaking and Swedish-speaking nation-alists, and how this could reflect on foreign political orientations, towards the Balticregion or Scandinavia.

In addition to Soviet contacts with Finnish MPs, through whom the documentsfrom the parliamentary commission of foreign relations were probably acquired, attimes the Soviets received more confidential information from the actual governmentsessions. This would have meant contacts at least in the prime minister’s office. TheSoviet exchange of information with the Germans on Finland and Estonia was alsosignificant. It was fruitful for both, as their contacts in the region covered differentkinds of interest groups, usually from the opposing ends of the political spectrum.The German sources among the National Coalition Party, the army, and ministry forforeign affairs enabled the Soviets to crosscheck the validity of Finnish officialstatements. The Soviet sources among the Estonians would appear to be considerablybetter placed than in Finland, as they were able to report directly on negotiationsbetween the foreign minister and the military command. However, from the view-point of evaluating the credibility of Finnish official foreign policy, these differentsources confirmed the Finnish non-participation in the Baltic alliance plans. TheSoviets understood, however, that this did not mean a lack of sympathy, as such, incooperation, especially with Estonia. On the basis of this information, the SovietUnion could adopt a low-key policy in relation to Finland, as its objectives at themoment were best served actually just keeping Finland in the direction in which itwas already going.

Secondly, the evaluations of the Soviet mission in Helsinki, as well as the Balticdepartment of the NKID in Moscow, show that keeping Finland apart from Poland was


in the continued interest of Soviet foreign policy. Finland was understood to be abourgeois, anti-communist country, being interested in support against Soviet Russia.However, this search for support was not unconditional, as the Finnish governmentfound Poland too risky and volatile as an ally, something which delighted the Sovietobservers. This was clearly spelled out in the Finnish government’s characterization ofthe Polish–Romanian alliance ‘tying’ Finland to Bessarabia, which formed an openborder conflict between Romania and Soviet Russia. Conversely, Latvia’s policy wascharacterized by the Soviets as more unstable than prudent in relation to alliances. In1922, Poland and Estonia belonged to another category altogether, as the most activecountries regarding the forming of an alliance. Though Finland obviously had lessweight than Poland, it was a potential lynch pin in a Baltic alliance. It became clear thatFinnish participation in the alliance would have significantly strengthened the argumentin Estonia to ally with Poland. Finnish participation could also have increased interestfor the alliance in faltering Latvia. Consequently, at least in the case of the Balticalliance, Finland was observed in the Baltic context instead of the Nordic; moreimportant than the three Baltic countries, but less significant than Poland.

Thirdly, the role of the western great powers, or the lack thereof, is one of themost interesting aspects of these Soviet materials. Tshernyikh made clear in earlyJanuary 1925 that signs of British influence had been expected, and carefully lookedfor, but nothing substantial had been detected. The German view, despite observingchanges in the Finnish public opinion towards the entente and mentioning the Britishmilitary commission, generally confirmed the very limited interests of Great Britain inthe Baltic Sea at the time. French influence, or background support for the Balticalliance, was expected on the basis of the French–Polish alliance, but only in relationto the Riga conference were there actual claims of French presence. Great Britain waspresented as mostly lacking interest in the Baltic alliance, at least under the presentPolish-dominated combination. French support, on the other hand, seemed more likethe passive observation of regional activity than determined support. Despite thestrains of the Locarno détente in Soviet–German relations, cooperation between thetwo worked well in relation to the small border-states, at least in the area ofinformation exchange.

In addition to this general impression, Litvinov’s letter to Tshernyikh underlinesclearly Poland’s role as the regional power most interested in the Baltic alliance.Keeping in mind Poland’s weakened position, this was not very surprising. Therefore,from the Soviet foreign administration’s viewpoint, the second attempt to create aBaltic alliance in 1925 was hardly a sign of new general intervention against the SovietUnion. However, this is exactly what Stalin’s interpretation of international relationsduring 1925 claimed was taking place.

Finally, the evaluations of the Soviet mission in Helsinki and the Baltic departmentfit well within the NKID’s moderate and rather nuanced interpretation of internationalrelations. At the time, in the mid-1920s, it formed its views quite independently in theprevailing international situation, on the grounds of available information. This clearlycontrasts with Stalin’s alarmist views in 1925 on the possible second intervention ofthe capitalist powers against the Soviet Union. Therefore, it was obvious for the NKIDthat western great powers were not clashing with revolution or the Soviet Union in theBaltic Sea. Another question would be if there was much interest for this kind ofinformation in the party leadership.


Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 Light, The Soviet Theory, 1–5; Haslam, The Soviet Union, 2; Haslam, Russia’s ColdWar, 1; Roberts, The Soviet Union, 4–8, 11–12; Debo, Survival and Consolidation, 5.

2 Kirby, The Baltic World, 286–9. Despite the generally valid view of the British andGerman policies of the 1920s, the presentation of Soviet policy follows thisformula.

3 Debo, Survival and Consolidation, 408–9.4 Jacobson, When the Soviet Union Entered, 142, 173.5 Gill, ‘The Soviet Mechanisms of Power’, 19–26.6 O’Connor, Diplomacy and Revolution, 48–9, 56–7.7 Marks, The Illusion of Peace, 44; Jacobson, When the Soviet Union Entered, 81–2.8 Debo, Survival and Consolidation, 406–7.9 Jacobson, When the Soviet Union Entered, 23–4; Debo, Survival and Consolidation,

413; Marks, The Illusion of Peace, 50.10 Jacobson, When the Soviet Union Entered, 93; Marks, The Illusion of Peace, 51–2.11 Jacobson, When the Soviet Union Entered, 137.12 Ibid., 141.13 Ibid., 173.14 Stalin, Sotsinenia, in January on the actuality of new intervention and the strength

of the Red Army, 12–14; in March on the stabilization of capitalism, especially inGermany on the bases of the Dawes Plan, and concentration of counter revolutionaround Anglo-American capital, 52–6; in December on the treaty of Locarno as aplan for new war, on the international relations reminiscent of 1914 before thewar, and on the division of the world to two camps, 276–82. See also Jacobson,When the Soviet Union Entered, 141–7.

15 Jacobson, When the Soviet Union Entered, 175–6.16 Debo, Survival and Consolidation, 133–46, 203–12.17 On the background and conduct of the Polish–Soviet war of 1920, and of the

Soviet–German contacts related to it, Debo, Survival and Consolidation, 204–47.18 Jacobson, When the Soviet Union Entered, 136–7.19 Korhonen, Naapurit vastoin tahtoaan, 68–72, 107.20 Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), fond 04

Secretariate of Georgii Chicherin, opis 41, papka 251, portsija 53423:Correspondence between the NKID and the Helsinki mission, Ganetsky toTshernyikh, 3 June 1922 and 10 June 1922.

21 AVP RF, 04/251/53423, Ganetsky–Tshernyikh, 26 June and 15 July 1922.22 AVP RF, 04/41/251/53423,Ganetsky–Tshernyikh, 25 November 1922.23 AVP RF 04 /41/ 251/53423, Ganetsky–Tshernyikh, 2 December 1922.24 AVP RF, 04/41/251/53425: Finland and the Karelian adventure, Tshernyikh to

Litvinov, 2 November 1922.25 Jacobson, When the Soviet Union Entered, 141–51.26 Korhonen, Naapurit vastoin tahtoaan, 108.27 AVP RF, 04/41/255/53480: Conference of the Baltic States in Helsinki and Riga

in 1925, Tsernyikh–Kopp, 2 January 1925.


28 AVP RF, 04/41/255/ 53480, 8–11, Tsernyikh–Kopp, 10 January 1925 no 2.29 AVP RF, 04/41/255/53480, 12–20, Tsernyikh–Kopp, 10 January 1925 no 3.30 AVP RF, 04/41/255/53480, 45, Tsernyikh–Kopp, 31 January 1925 top secret.

The protocol of the Helsinki conference had been received through ‘neighbourline’, which could mean other missions or intelligence.

31 AVP RF, 04/41/255/53480, 34, 51, Kopp–Tshernyikh, 13 January and 3February 1925 secret.

32 AVP RF, 04/41/255/53480, 52–54, Tsernyikh–Kopp, 7 February 1925, andKorhonen, Naapurit vastoin tahtoaan 111.

33 AVP RF, 04/41/255/53480,Tsernyikh–Kopp, 14 February 1925 no. 30.34 Ibid.35 AVP RF, 04/41/255/53480, Tsernyikh–Kopp, 28 March 1925 no. 68, and later

Tsernyikh–Aralov, 18 April 1925 no. 84, on the actual agenda, Korhonen on theRiga conference, 110.

36 AVP RF, 04/41/255/53480, Tsernyikh–Kopp, 7 March 1925 no. 48, 59–62.37 AVP RF, 04/41/255/53480, Tshernyikh–Aralov, late March or early April 1925

no 72, after the date 26 March 1925, mentioned in the text. Aralov became thechief of the NKID Baltic department after Kopp.

38 AVP RF, 04/41/255/53480, Tserrnyikh–Kopp, 28 March 1925 no. 68.39 AVP RF, 04/41/255/53480, Tshernyikh–Aralov, 4 April 1925 no. 74, and 4

April 1925 no. 75.40 AVP RF, 04/41/255/53480, Tsernyikh–Aralov, 4 April 1925 no. 77.41 AVP RF, 04/41/255/53480, Aralov–Tshernykh, 14 April 1925 and Tshernykh–

Aralov, 18 April 1925 no. 84.42 AVP RF, 04/41/255/53480, Tshernyikh–Aralov, 24 April 1925 no. 3/c top

secret.43 AVP RF, 04/41/255/53480, Tshernyikh–Aralov, 25 April 1925 no. 13/ top

secret.44 AVP RF, 04/41/255/53480, Tshernyikh–Aralov, 2 May 1925, no. 19/c top

secret.45 AVP RF, 04/41/255/53480, Tshernyikh–Aralov, 24 June1925, no. 6/c top

secret.46 AVP RF, 04/41/255/53477: Correspondence of the NKID with missions in 1925,

Litvinov–Tshernyikh, 4 April 1925 no. 0257 secret, 28–30.47 On the character of the Politburo discussions, see Gregory and Nainmark, The Lost

Politburo Transcripts; Davies and Harris, Stalin.

References

ArchivesArchive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (Arkhiv Vneshneij Politiki Rossiskoi

Federatsii, AVP RF), Moscow.

BibliographyDavis, Sarah, and James Harris, eds. Stalin. A New History. New York: Cambridge

University Press, 2005.Debo, Richard K. Survival and Consolidation: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1918–1921.

Montreal: McGill–Queens University Press, 1992.


Gil, Graeme. ‘The Soviet Mechanisms of Power and the Fall of the Soviet Union’. InMechanisms of Power in the Soviet Union, ed. Niels Erik Rosenfeldt, Bent Jensen, andEriki Kulavig, 19–26. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000.

Gregory, Paul R., and Norman Nainmark, eds. The Lost Politburo Transcripts: From CollectiveRule to Stalin’s Dictatorship. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008.

Haslam, Jonathan. The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe,1933–39. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984.

Haslam, Jonathan. Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of theWall. London: Yale University Press, 2011.

Jacobson, Jon. When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics. Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1994.

Kirby, David. The Baltic World 1772–1993: Europe’s Northern Periphery in an Age ofChange. London: Longman, 1999.

Korhonen, Keijo. Naapurit vastoin tahtoaan: Suomi neuvostodiplomatiassa Tartosta talvisotaan.Vol. 1, 1920–1932 [Neighbours against Their Will: Finland in the Soviet Diplomacyfrom Tarttu to Winter War]. Lahti: Tammi, 1966.

Light, Margot. The Soviet Theory of International Relations. Brighton: Weatsheaf, 1988.Marks, Sally. The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe, 1918–1933.

Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.O’Connor, Timothy Edward. Diplomacy and Revolution: G. V. Chicherin and Soviet Affairs,

1919–1930. Ames: Iowa University Press, 1988.Roberts, Geoffrey. The Soviet Union in the World Politics. London: Routledge, 1999.Stalin, Iosif. Sotsinenia. Vol. 7, 1925. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoje izdatel’stvo polititsheskoi

litaratury, 1947.

Aappo Kähönen is a docent in political history in Helsinki University. He has studiedthe Soviet viewpoint in the Cold War, on the basis of interdependence between domesticand foreign politics. He has published on Soviet foreign policy, the role of ideology, andeconomic reforms in Finnish, English, and Swedish. Address: Helsinki University -Political and Economic Research, PL 54 Snellmaninkatu 14 A 00014 Helsingin yliopistoHelsinki, Finland. [email: [email protected]]


mailto:[email protected]

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The Clash of Great Powers and Revolution in the Baltic Sea