srmootae STUDIESONCOPULAR SENTENCES, CLEFTS

AND PSEUDO-CLEFTSFacultatis Litterarum et PhilosophiaeLovaniensis

Renaat DECLERCK

Leuven University Press MForis Publications Holland/USA ll(

SERIES C LINGUISTICAVOL. 5

SYMBOLAE. series C LlNGUISTICA. a collection of studies editcd bythe department of Linguistics of thc Faculty of Philosophy and Letters at

thc 'Katholieke Universiteit Leuven' (Louvain, Belgium).

CJP KONINKLIJKE BIBLIOTHEEK ALBERT I, BRUSSEL

No part of this baak may be reproduced in any form;by print; photoprint, microfilm or any other means without wntten

petmission from the publisher.

D/1988/1869/24

© 1988 by Leuven University Press/Presses Universitaires de Louvain/Universitaire Pers Leuven

Krakenstraat 3, B-3000 Leuven-Louvain (Belgium)

ISBN 90 6186 289 2 (Leuven University Press)ISBN 90 6765 1249 (Foris Publications Holland/USA)

PREFACEThis is a baak on copular sentences in which ample attention is devoted to

so-called cleft and pseudo-cleft sentences. (I myself will speak of i/-defts andWH-clefts and use the label cleft as a cover-term for both.) It is not a baak that iswritten within a theoretical framework, or which is meant to adduce evidenceeither for or against one of the current linguistictheories. In this respect the hook isatheoretical. What it does aim to do is go into the (primarily semantic andpragmatic) characteristics of copular sentences, derive some generalizations fromthem, point out a number of restrictionsand propose an explanation for them. If thebaak succeeds in achieving this aim, it presents a great number of linguistic datawhich will have to be accommodated by any linguistic theory that aims to achieveexplanatory adequacy.

The baak is divided into six chapters, The first (which takes up nearly half thevolume of the work) deals with the different semantic types of copular sentencesthat appear to exist in English, viz, specificational sentences, predicational ones,what I will call 'descriptionally-identifyingsentences', identity statements, defini­tions, etc. In this chapter I deal with the typical characteristics of each of thesesentence types, thus laying the foundations for die other chapters, in which a coupleof phenomena are investigated that are closely connected with the differentproperties of the various sentence types,

Chapter 2 deals with a very concrete point of English grammar, viz. the use of ftis... versus that ofHe/she is... in sentences like lt is thepostman, He ismy neighbout;11is John; She is my friend, etc. Chapter 3 investigates the possibility that theremight be exceptions to the widespread belief that it-clefts are by definitionspecificational(identifying).Chapter 4 examines a number of restrictionson the useof it-clefts(e.g. the restrietion00 highlightingpredicate nominals which entails thata sentence like 71ftis a teacher that John is is of very questionable acceptability).Chapter 5 investigatesthe useof it-cleftsand WH-elefts in discourse.Here a numberof semantico-pragmatic subtypes of elefts are identified, and the factors areexamined which may induce a speaker to prefer a particular type of eleft to anotherin particular contexts. Chapter 6, finally,examines tbe role played by word order inthe semantic interpretation of copular sentences,more specificallythe way in whichword order may determine the possibility of interpreting the sentence in aspecificationalway.

Chapters 2 to 5 are based on work which has already been published. They arerevised versions of the following articles:- 'It is Mr Y' or 'He is Mr Y'? Lingua 59 (1983), 209-246.

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- Prcdicauonal clefts. Lingua 61 (1983),9-45.- Some rcstrictions on clefts that highlight predicate nominais, Journalof

Linguistics 20 (1984), 131-154.- Tbc pragrnaticsof it-cleftsand WH-c1efts.Lingua 64 (1984),251-289.Tbe above mentionedjoumals retain the copyright on these articles.

29 September J986

VI

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACEV

TABLE OF CONTENTS Vll

CHAPTER 1. TYPES OF COPULAR SENTENCES 11. Introduetion 12. Specificational sentences 53. Predicational sentences 554. Further differences between specificational

and predicational sentences 755. Descriptionally-identifying sentences 956. Identity statements 1107. Definitions 1148. Other types 117

CRAPTER 2. 'IT IS MR Y' OR 'HE IS MR V'? 119

CHAPTER 3. PREDICATIONAL IT-CLEFTS 148

CHAPTER 4. SOME RESTRICTIONS ON IT-CLEFTS THATHIGHLIGHT PREDICATE NOMINALS 182

1. Introduetion 1822. Restrietions 1833. Conclusion 207

CHAPTER 5. THE USE OF IT-CLEFTS AND WH-CLEFTSIN DISCOURSE 208

1. Introduetion 2082. Pragmatic subtypes of (specificational) WH-defts

and ft-defts 2093. The use of clefts in discourse 2244. Special types 2395. Conclusion 241

CHAPTER 6. SPECIFICATIONAL INTERPRETATION ANDWORD ORDER 242

REFERENCES 251

CHAPTER 1. TYPES OF COPULARSENTENCES

1. INTRODUCTION

It is well-known that sentences with be can express a variety of meanings,depending on the particular kind of be that is being used. In this study 1 willdisregard the use of be as a lexical verb (as in God is or Undoubtedly there is a God,where be is said to have an 'existential' meaning) and as an auxiliary of voice (e.g.The problem is being solved), aspect (e.g. They are walking) or modality (e.g.Hewas to leave at once). What Iwill he concerned with is the copula be, and even thenIwill restrietmyselfto the care of its uses,for Iwil! not consider sentenceslike It is 5o'clock, The meeting is in the adjacent room or The explosion was at 8: 00 p.m.,though all of thesewould seem to be examples of be as a copula in the wide senseofthe term (cf Kahn 1973: 22). Tbe type of construction that I wish to investigate isbasically that of the farm 'NP be NP', although 1 will also consider otherconstructions (e.g. 'NP be adjective', eleft and pseudo-eleft sentences, and evennoncopular structures) as long as these can have the same semantic or pragmaticmeaning as one of the types of structure of the farm 'NP be NP'.

Many linguists hold that sentences of the farm 'NP be NP' faUapart into twosemantic types, which are aften referred to as 'predicational' and 'specificational'.'.Others hold that other types should be distinguished besides these. In tbis hook Iwill defend the latter position, but the bulk of the book will be concerned with thedistinetion between specificational and predicational sentences.?Tbe terrns specificational and predicational appear to have been launched by

Akmajian in his 1970 Ph.D. dissertation (which was published as late as 1979).

I. An examplc of thisposition isBlom& Daalder (1977: 65), who claim explicitlythat every copularsentence is eithcr specificational or predicational, though thcy allow for tbc fact that thesecatcgoriesmay be further subdividcd.

2. Among tbc copular ('predicative') uses of 10 be logicians usually distinguish: (a) the identificationof one entity with another (a = b) (e.g. The murderer is that man over there); (b) class-membcrship(e.g.Bill is a teacher (= Bill is a member of the class of people characterized as teachers»; and (c)class-inclusion(e.g. Whales are mammals (= Tbe mcmbers of the class of beings characterized aswhales are included among the members of the c1assof beings characterized as mammalsj). Asnoted by Lyons (1968: 389), "though logically important, this distinetion between c1ass­membership and class-inclusion does not appear to be of any syntactie significanee in mostlanguages." The notions of class-membershipand class-inclusionmay thercfore be collapsed intoone linguisticcategory,viz. the one we will callpredicational, whilc the notion of identification ofone entity with another seems to correspond to Durnotion of specificational.

Tbere are other terms for the same concepts (see below), but the terrnsspecificational and predicational are (in my opinion) the most suitable, becausethey are quite in keeping with the definitions of the concepts in question. Aspecifieational sentence is one whose semantic function is to specify a value for avariable. Tbus, the sentence The one who sto/e the money is Fred is specifieationalbecause it specifies a value (Fred) for the variabie 'the X who stole the money'. Apredieational sentence, in contrast, does not specify a value for a variable. Rather, itjust predieates a property of the subject NP. For example, the sentence Bil! is a goodstudent (when used without contrastive accent on any of the constituents) justpredieates of Bill the characteristic of being a good student. Tbere is na sense that avalue is being specified for a variabie.

As noted above, the linguistic literature contains a variety of terms to denote thiscontrast. Specifieational sentences have sometimes been called identifying (see e.g.Dik 1980a, Gundel 1977b) or identlficational (e.g. Kuno & Wongkhomthong1981, Quirk et al. 1985). Tbese terms are in keeping with the fact thatspecifieational sentences like It is John who is the murderer indeed identify a personor entity, but they are inaccurate because (as we will see) not all identifyingsentences are specifieational. (For example, in

(1) Mike? Who's Mike? - He's our neighbours' son.

the reply sentence is identifying but not specifieational - cf. below). In some casesthe choice of the term identifying or identificaüonal seems to be motivated, not bythe fact that specifieational sentences reveal the identity of someone or something,but by the observation that they represent two entities as being identieal. Thus, Dik(1980a: 32) defines an 'identifying' sentence as one "in which a relation of identityis established between two entities", i.e, "in which it is expressed that the referents oftwo definite terms do, in fact, coincide in the same entity." Tbe same view alsounderlies the use of the terms equative (e.g. Halliday 1970b, Huddleston 1971,Kahn 1973) and equational (e.g. Harries-De1isle 1978, Bolinger 1972a): aspecifieational sentence is held to have "two functions, resembling the two terrns ofan equation, where the one serves to identify the other, as in x = 2" (Halliday1970b: 155). However, I do not think that specifieational sentences express "theidentification of one term by another" (Huddleston 1971: 134) or the idea that"what is referred to as NPl is the same as what has been referred to as NPt (Kuno1970: 351). Sentences that express this kind of relation are identity statements (e.g.The Moming Star is the Evening Star, Dr. Jekyll isMr. Hyde), and, as we wiIl seebelow, identity statements difIer in many respects from specificational sentences.Although the claim that specifieational sentences (for example, c1efts or pseudo­c1efts) express "a relationship of identity, a kind of 'equals' sign" (Halliday 1982:68) is widespread in the linguistic literature (see also Van Dijk 1977: 121,Harries-Delisle 1978: 422, Atlas & Levinson 1981: 53, Kuno &Wongkhomthong1981: 76, etc.), and although there is a long philosophieal tradition of treating

specificational sentences like The number of planets is nine as the expression ofsome kind of identity, specificational sentences cannot actuaIly be analysed in thisway. They are identifying in the sense that they reveal the identity of some entity butnot in the sense that they state a relation of identity between two entities. Only acouple of linguists (e.g. Higgins 1976: 11, 133, Ba1l1977: 67) have stressed thisdifIerence between specifieational sentences and identity statements. For example,BaIl (1977: 67) states explictly that, if we use the notation 'x = y' for specifieationalsentences, "tbis is read 'assign the value y to x' and not 'x equals y'. In the farmer, thevariabie x is treated in effect as non-referential, in the latter it is not."

In sum, terrns such as identifying, identificational; equative and equational areeither imprecise or misleading when applied to specifieational sentences. Incontrast, the term specificaiional expresses precisely what such sentences do, viz.specify a value for a variable,

For the sake of completeness I should also mention the term extensive, which isused by Halliday (1967, 1968). Halliday's distinction between 'intensive' and'extensive' be appears to concur with our distinction between predieational andspecifieational sentences. However, these terms have not become widespread in thelinguistic literature and I will not make use of them in this work.

Tbe array of terms that have been used for what we call predicational is evenlarger. Tbe fact that predieational sentences predieate some property (characteristic,attribute, quality) of the referent of the subject NP has engendered the use of suchterms as aaributive (Gunde! 1977b, Lyons 1968: 389, Halliday 1970a), property­assigning (Dik 1980a), qualifying (Mathesius 1975), characterizational (Kuno &Wongkhomthong 1981, Quirk et al. 1985) and ascriptive (Kahn 1973: 469-473).Erades (1949) speaks of classifying sentences, because assigning a property to anentity boils down to saying that the entity belongs to tbe class of entities sharing thatproperty. Harries-Delisle (1978) uses the term non-equational, to set off suchsentences from 'equational' (specifieational) ones. And, as noted above, Halliday(1967, 1968) introduces the term intensive. Although most of these terrns wouldseem to be fairly satisfactory, 1 still prefer the term predicational because this is theterm that is normaUy contrasted with the term specificational. And, indeed, themost important characteristic of a predieational sentence is not that it assigns aproperty, but that it does so in a non-specifieational way. As we wi11 see, apseudo-cleft like What John is is tall is specifieational in spite of tbe fact that itaseribes a property to the referent of tbe subject NP. A predieational sentence is thusone which merely predicates a property of the referent of the subject, i.e. one which .does not specify the property in question as the value of some variable, Tbe termpredicational seems to be better-suited tban the other terrns to capture tbismeaning.

Before we start investigating the different sentence types, two further remarksshould be made. First, it should be noted that the distinction between specifieationaland predieational sentences is relevant not only to copular sentences but also toother structures expressing a relationship that is basically the same as that expressed

3

between the subject and the subject complement of beo 1 am referring here tostructures with as (e.g. I consider John as my rolemodel. lam speaking toyou as afriend) and structures with an object complement (e.g. I made John my assistant;They called Edna a good student). Noun phrases that are used as objectcomplement or which follow as are also to be analysed as either specificational orpredicational.

The second remark we have to make concerns our use of the terms'specificational sentence', 'predicational sentence', etc. This use is somewhat~leading, in that it suggests that we are dealing with sentence types that have quitedifferent syntactic and semantic characteristics. Although this is true to a certainextent, the distinction we will make is essentially of a semantic nature and is notnecessarily reflected in the syntactic properties of the sentences in question. That is,although there are some syntactic characteristics that are typical of predicational orspecificational sentences only, it is possible for one and the same sentence to yieldboth a predicational and a specificational interpretation. As we wi11see below,pseudo-clefts are often ambiguous between a predicational and a specificationalreading. (For example, the sentence What happened was a catastrophe can beinterpreted both as 'What happened was disastrous' and as 'The followinghappened: a catastrophe'.) A term like 'predicational sentence' is therefore asomewhat inaccurate abbreviation of 'sentence that yields a predicational interpre­tation'.

Let us now have a closer look at the different sentence types. Since apredicational sentence is to a large extent defined on the basis of the negativeproperty of not being a specificational sentence, it seems logical that we shouldexamine the specificational type fust.

2. SPECIFICATIONAL SENTENCES

Consider the following sentences :

(1)(a) The bank robber is John Thomas.(b) The only people that can help you are the Prime Minister

and the Queen herself.

These sentences clearly come up to the definition of specificational sentences : (1,a)specifies the value 'John Thomas' for the variabIe 'the X who is the bank robber',and (l,b) similarly specifies the two values ('the Prime Minister' and 'the Queenherself') that satisfy the variabie 'the only X-es that can help you'. Specificationalsentences like these have the following characteristics:

2.1. As pointed out by Higgins (1976), specifying values for a variabie is verysimilar to enumerating the items 00 a list. Thus, we could say that (l,b) enumeratesthe two items that figure on the list whose heading is 'people that can help you'. Thesame is true of (l,a), but the list in question here has only one item on it.

2.2. It follows that (l,b) can be paraphrased as 'The list of people thatcan help youcontains only two people: the Prime Minister and the Queen herself', Moregenerally, any specificational sentcnce expresses something like 'Thc followingvalues satisfy thc variable: value., value., etc.'. A paraphrase ofthis form is thereforcalways available, and, moreover, every specificational sentence can be read with a'colon intonation' (i.e. with a slight pause after be) as long as the constituentindicating the variabie precedes the one denoting the value. Thus, (La) can beparaphrased as 'The following person is the bank robber: John Thomas', and thesentence can be pronounced with the colon intonation: 'The bank robber is: JohnThomas'.

Apart from the fact that specificational sentences can be paraphrased in terms ofthe structure 'x be: y', it should be noted that this structure may be used as asyntactic device for explicitly creating a specificational interpretation. A very clearexample of this is to be found in Dutch, where the constituent to be interpretedspecificationally can be moved towards the end, where it is typically preceded by aslight pause creating a colon interpretation. The following examples are from Blom& Daalder (1977: 106):

(3)(a) Belde ineens aan: de pianostemmer.'Suddenly rang: the piano tuner'

[b] Hij zal altijd blijven: trouw aan zijn principes.'He will always remain: loyal to nis principles'

Although this kind of 'postpositioning' does not seem to be a recognizedtransformation in English, similar examples can be found, provided the specifica-tional constituent is relatively long or complex: .

(4)(a) Dead were Mrs. Claudia Ann Plumley, 24 years aid, ofGobles, Mich.; her children, Virginia, 4, Melissa, 2, Howard, 11/2 and Sarah Jane Saye, 5, also of Gobles. (l1ensky 1981 :138)

(b) Needed will be an adjustment of academie calendars andschedules, effective combination of classroom requirementswith independent study, and Jiberal recognition of Ihe maturestudents' practical experience. (ibid.)

Examples like these would seem to be instances of Complex NP Shift. Vet theyviolate the ruie that Complex NP Shift does not operate on subject NPs (cf.Postal1974: 83). Whether the shift in question is Complex NP Shift or not, the result atany rate is that the sentence can only be interpreted specificationally,whereas thesouree sentences ('x, y and z were dead', 'x, y and z will be needed') can also beinterpreted as predicational.Apart from examples like (4,a-b), English also uses the colon intonation in

sentences of the type which Ross (1969) has called instaaces of 'equativedeletion':

(5) Bill is what you think him 10 be: a bore.

2.3. Specifyinga value (or values) for a variable (or enumerating the itemson a list)isverysimilar to providing an answer to a question.The reason is that in a questionthat has narrow scope the WH-word functionsas a variabie for which a value mustbe specified.It follows that specificationalsentenceswill often be used in answer toexplicitWH-questions, or, if this is not the case, imply such a question. Thus, thesentence The bank robber is John Thomas is naturally feItto provide an answer tothe question Who is {he bank robber?

A consequence of this is that specificational sentences have exactly the samepresuppositionsas question-answer pairs:

(6)(a) What did you gel? - A book.(b) 1I was a book thaI I got.(c) Whal I got was a book.

Not only the question in (6,a) but also the specificationalsentences (6,b) and (6,c)presuppose that there was sernething that I got. (That is, all three of them carry apresupposition of existence.)Becauseof this, some people (e.g.Grimes 1975: 341,Faraci 1971) have argued that the Wll-clause of a WH-cleft (which is a typical

6

specificationalstructure)! should be analysed as a dependent question c!ause ratherthan as a free relative.

Conversely,others (e.g.Harries-Delisle 1978: 479, Takizala 1972) have claimedthat WH-questions and their answers are in fact underlying eleft sentences. (As wewill see, cleft sentences are the most typical instances of specificational sentences).Although I doubt that the mere fact that it-clefts and WH-clefts ~hare the s~mepresuppositionsas question-answerpairs is a suflïcientbasis for making such claims,the great similarity of the three structures is certainly worth emphasizing.

It also needs stressing that there is na such similarity where predicationalsentences are concerned. I disagree with Lyons (1977: 598) where he writes that"every statement can be seen as providing an answer to either an explicitor implicitquestion", Although it is true that a suitable question could be thought of for anystatement, predicational statements are not feit to be answers to implic~tqu~tion~.The predicational sentence John is walking in the garden becomes specificational ifit is felt to answer the questioriWhat is John doing ? In that case what represents avariabie and walking in the garden is thc value that is assignedto it, Similarly,Johnis a good student, which is normally feit to be predicational, is used specificationallyif it answers the (explicit or implicit) question What is John?

The semantic similarity between specificational sentences and question-answerpairs is also reflectedin syntactic facts.One example of how the two pattern alike iêtheir behaviour in conneetion with referring pronouns. Compare:

(7)(a) What did John, sell? - Hisj house.(b) 'What did hei sell? - John's. house.

(8)(a) What John, sold was his, house.(b) *What hei sold was John's. house.

(9)(a) It was hls, house that Jonn, sold,(b) *It was John's. house that hei sold.

Not surprisingly,listsbehave in the same way (cf. Higgins 1976: 218-219):

(10)(a) John, sold the following: his, house.(b) 'Hej sold the following: John's. house.

The fact that specificational sentences are feIt to be answers to WH-questionsaccounts for the fact that, syntactically,they can be of two different types. The firsttype requires that the specificationalsentence should be used in answer to an overtWH-question. In that case the specificational sentence may be a repetition of thequestion, but then in the form of a statement and with a specificationalcan~tituent(representing a value) in the place of the variable (WH-word) of the question:

3. Frorn now an I will be usingthe term 'i/-eleft'for what is traditionally called a 'cleft sentence' and'Wlf-cleft' for what is often referred la as a 'pseudo-cleft'. The term 'cleft' will be used as acover-term for bath of these.

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II IJ IVVIIU openeu tne ooor v] - Jonn opened the door.

Varian.ts of this type are (a) the construction in which the 'old' material (opened thedoor) IS replaced by a pro-form (John did), and (b) the construction in which theold. informati~n is deleted altogether (Ieaving only John as answer). The threevanants have lil common that the specificational sentence specifies a value for avariabie without containing a formulation of the variable itself.

Th.e second type is that in which the value and the variabie are both expressedand linked to each other by means of beo Typical examples of this are it-clefts andWH-clefts:

(12)(a) lt was John who opened Ihe door.(b) The one who opened Ihe door was John.

Noneleft sentences can also be of this type, but then only if the subject NP is of theappropriate kind. Compare :

(13)(a) The reason why they have failed is that they havent workedhard enough.

(b) The problem is how to collect all that money.[c] The murderer is Jack Smith.(d) "John's ability is 10swim.(e) 'My anger was that Bil! had lied.

Higgins (1976: 92-93) points out that the predicate complement in such aspecificational sentence "in some way gives the content or constitution of what isreferred to by the subject NP". This is not the case in (13,d) and (13,e): "Swimmingdoes not constitute John's inability - John may have an inability with respect toswimming, but swimming in na sense makes up his inability." Similarly, "the factthat Bill had lied does not constitute my anger, but is rather the stimulus or target ofmy anger. Inability and anger refer to characteristics that simply are not constitutedby some other thing." Another way of formulating this restrietion is to say that thesubject NP must be paraphrasable as 'the X that is...' in the way suggested by Bach(1968). Thus, the murdereris equivalent to 'the X who is the murderer' (or: 'the onewho committed the murder'); the problem in (13,b) is equivalent to 'the X that isthe problem' (or: 'what is problematic'), etc. There are no such paraphrases fornouns like ability or anger. Nominalizations that are based on this type of copularparaphrase are possible for (he murderet; {heproblem, etc. but not for John Jo abilityor my anger:

(14)(a) (The one) who is the murderer (is insane).(b) (1'11teil you) what is the problem.(c) '(1'11 teil you) what is John's ability.(d) '(1'11 lell you) what is my anger.

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And of course it is related to tlns tnat we ask quesuons llli.t: \.l.J,a-U), uuc HU.0)"""questions as (15,c-d):

(15)(a) Who is Ihe murderer?(b) What is Ihe problem? .(c) ·What is John's ability?(c) 'Wh al is your anger?

All this makes clear that in specificational sentences like (13,a-c) (i.e. specificationalsentences of the 'second type' that are no clefts) the subject NP must contain thevariabie for which a value is specified.

In sum, specificational sentences may be of two types. In the first type, thespecificational sentence is used in answer to an overt question and contains only themate rial necessary for specifying a value for the variabIe in the question. In thesecond type, the sentence consists of two constituents, one representing tbe variable,the other the value, and the copula be is used to conneet them to each otber. The factthat the variabie is mentioned exp1icitly means that we na langer need the precedingdiscourse to interpret such sentences. Because of this, specificational sentences ofthis second type (including it-defts and WH-defts) can in principle be used out ofcontext (i.e. out of the blue, or discourse-initially) (cf. chapter 5). This possibility isrestricted, though, since it appears to be a natural fact that we do not start tellingsomeone the answer to a question unless we assume that he is actually thinking ofthat question. This means that the use of any specificational sentence normallyrequires that the variabIe be in the hearer's consciousness. Still, there may beexceptions to this rule, in which case the specificational sentcnce convcysinformation that is entirely new This special use of specificational senten ces wil! bediscussed in detail in chapter 5.

There is a final remark to be made about these two types of specificationalsentences. Higgins (1976) argues that the subject of a specificational sentence is notreferential but 'superscriptional', i.e. it resembles the heading of a list. We are now ina position to remark that this is not true of all specificational sentences. In order tobe 'superscriptional' the subject NP must represent the variable. In manyspecificational sentences the subject NP does not do this, for several reasons. One isthat, as we will see below, specificational sentences are 'reversible', so that thevariable NP can turn up as subject as wel! as as predicate nomina!. In the latter casethe subject is not superscriptional:

(16)(a) The murderer is JOHN.(b) JOHN is the murderer.

A second reason is that in most specificational sentences of the first type thevariable is represented not by an NP but by another constituent. Whereas in (17,a)the content of the variable is still described by an NP (the murderer), it is describedby the VP (committed the murder) in (17,b) (where John is the value specified for

9

2.4. We have already noted that it-e!efts are typieally specifieationaI. In fact, theclaim that they are 50 by dcfinition has often been made in the linguistic literature(see e.g. Akmajian 1979: 163, Clark & Haviland 1977: 11, Gundel 1976: 4,1977b: 547, Haji~ova & Sgall 1975: 5, Halliday 1967; 236, Harries-Delisle 1978:422, Huddleston 1971: 246ft; Kuno 1976: 443, Van Dijk 1977: 121, Visser 1970:40). Although 1wiII point out in chapter 3 that there are exceptions to this rule,' Ithink that the claim is basieally correct. There is na doubt that the vast majority ofit-cleft sentences are specifieationaI. Moreover, the opposite claim is even moretrue: if a sentence is specifieational, it ean always yield an ft-deft paraphrase (unIessthe it-c1eft forrnation is blocked for a particular structuraI reason - see chapter 4).This provides us with an excellent tooi for establishing whether a sentence has aspecificational meaning or not: if it has one, it-c1eftingshould be eapable ofbringingit to the fore.

The same is true of Wli-cleft sentences. Although not al! sentences that have theform of a WH-deft are specificational (cf. section 3.7. below), it must in principlebe possible for any specificational sentence to be paraphrased by a WH-eleft. (Theonly exceptions are the cases in which no Wll-cleft can be formed for lack of anappropriate relative construction to describe the contents of the variabie. Thus, wecan say 1t was reluctanüy that he did it, but there is no suitable expression tolexicalize the variabie X in the WH-deft 'The X that he did it was reluctantly'.Phrases like the way in whicn he did it or how he did it are not quite what we needhere.) .

2.6. In WH-question - answer pairs the contents of the variabie for w~ch ~heanswer specifies a value must be described in the question. Thus, a que~tlOn likeWho committed the murder? asks for a specification of a value for the vanable 'theX who committed the murder'. Here the contents of the variabie ('(who)committed the murder') is described in the question itself It follows that, when thequestion is answered by a sentence like JOHN committed th~ crime only. theconstituent representing the value is new information. The remainder tcommiuedthe crime) is information that is 'old' or 'known', or 'shared by the speaker andhearer'.' Since the specifieational act is always. si~lar to giving ~n ans~er to aWH-question, the same is true whenever a specificational sentence IS used. In any

'the X who committed the murder'). There is therefore no superscriptional subjectNP (in fact no superscriptional NP at all) in (17,b):

(17J(a) (Who's the murderer? -) The murderer is JOHN.(b) (Who committed Ihe murder? -) JOHN committed the

murder.

(18)A. Who broke the window?B. lt was Tom who did it.

Speaker A knows that there is someone who broke the windo~. (i.~. thepresupposition of existence is satisfied) but he ~oes. not know who it IS, i.e, hecannot identify the window-breaker, he cannot plek him out from .the set of peoplethat he is acquainted with. The information provided by speaker B IS n:eant to ~akethis identification possible. Speaker B specifies a value for the vanable, ~mg adescription (in this case a proper name) which should enable speaker A. to plek ?utthe person in question from a set. Of course, speaker B may be wrong m ass~mmgthat the description that he uses will have this effect. In that case speaker A will aska further question : Who's Tom?, and speaker B will have to look for anoth~rdescription (viz. a description that really means something to A), and only then willA be able to identify the person who broke the window. .. .

Another case in which a specifieational sentence fails to provide really l~entIfYl~ginformation is when the value specified for the variabie has the form of an indefiniteNP (e.g. 1twas a boy who broke the window).The answer provided by such a c1eftisa 'reticent' or 'evasive' answer, reflecting that the speaker does not really ha~e thefull identifying information himself or that he does not wish to reveal ~1Iof 1.t.

This does not alter the fact, though, that a specifieational sentence IS basicallymeant to give identifying information. This is a point to which we will returnbelow.

2.5. Specificational sentences provide identifying information. (This does ootmean, however, that idenrifying sentences are necessarily specifieational - seebelow). The purpose of a specificational sentence is to make it possible for thespeaker to piek out the referentes) from a set. For example:

5. According to Dyhr (1978: 157), it is already the case in the WH-question itself that everyconstituent except the question word is old information. This claim seems 10 be generally correct -for example, I am not likely to ask you Who's the murderer? ifI do not ~ume that a murder wascommitted - but there may weil be exceptions 10 it. For example, rhetoncal quesuons (e.g. Whoshall say that he is wrong1) do not seem to contain old information. ~Dother kind of ex~ption willbe pointed out in chapter 5. (We will observe there that cleft questions can more easily be useddiscourse-initially than cleft statements. When a sentence is used discourse-initially, everythmg ISncw information.)

6. This is actually an overstatement. Sec below.

4. In chapter 3 I will point out sorne exceptional types of it-clefts that are partly or even wholly,predicational, For example, (i.a-b) have a predicational meaning which is paraphrasable as(ii.a-b):

(i)(a) Was il an INTERESTING meeting that you wsnt to last night?(b) 1Iwas certainly na IOIOT who wrole this,

(ii)(a) Was the meeting that you went to last night inleresting?(b) The one who wrote this was certainJy na idiot

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specilïcational sentence the value part represents 'new' information while thevariabie part expresses 'old' information. In tbe terminology of Cbomsky (1971):the value part is tbe 'focus' and the variabie part is tbe 'presupposition' of thesentence. Thus, in The bank robber is JOHN THOMAS, John Thomas is the focusand:the bank robber is the presupposition. It follows that the nuclear accent of thesentence falls on John -Thomas. The possibility of deleting elements from aspccificational sentence confirms this organization: because it is oId information,the variabie part may be deleted under the identity condition (as in (Who's the bankrobber?) - (lt's) Jolzn), but the value part, which is new, can never be omitted.

There are a couple of things tbat should be noted here. First, when we say thatthe value (focus) is new, this does not mean that it must be newly introduced in thediscourse. The constituent in question may well be old in the sense that it has beenrnentioned in the preceding context, but it is new in the sense that it is newinformation that it is this .constituent that is the value satisfying the variable,?Second, when we have a copular structure it seems natural to think of ascribing thelabels value and variabiesst focus and presupposition to these parts of the sentencethat followand preeede be, respectively. However, examples may bc found in whichthc variabie or prcsupposition is defined by constituents both to the right and to theleft of beo Consider, for example:

(19)(a) 1I was the student in the green hal thai came in first.(b) The personwho came in firstwas the student in the green

hal.

These sentences may be used in answer to different questions:

(20){a) Who came in first?(b) Which studentcame in firsl?(c) The student in which hal came in first?

When we use (19,a-b) in answer to (20,a), the focus (value) is the student in thegreen hal; when we use them to answer (20,b), the focus is in the green hat; whenwe use them to answer (20,c), the focus is green. (See Chomsky (1971: 202) andJackendoff (1972: 233) for similar examples.)

It follows that it is nol always correct to use the termfoeus or foeal constituent torefer to the constituent preceding the WH-clause of an it-cleft or to refer to that partof a WH-cleft that is not the WH-c1ause. In many cases the focus (value, newinformation) is only part of this constituent. Although the termfoeus is often used to

7. This point has oftcn been made in thc linguistic litorature. For example, Hutchins (1975: liS)notes that thc focal element can be said to be 'new' only in the sense that its exact relationship toether clements was prcviously unknown to thc hcarer. Harries-Delisle (1978: 422) dcfines newinformation as "tcxtually and situationally nonderivable information" rather than "factually newinformation".

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. !refer to the relevant constituent as a whole (see e.g. Akmajian 1979, Higgins 1976:8), it seems better to use another term in this sense. The term that will be used in thisbook is clefted constituentê The term focus or focal element will be reserved forwhat is actually the new information, i.e. the value specified for the variabie in thespecificational sentence. To refer to that part of an U-deft or WH-eleft that is not thec1efted constituent I will use the term WH-clause. Again, this is technically morecorrect than speaking of the·p~esuppositioll or out-offocus constituent (Schachter1973).

Now that we have defined tbe relevant terminology precisely we can examinefurther what it means to say that a specificational sentence typically consists of afocus (new information), which is the value part, and a presupposition (oldinformation), which is the variab1e part. The following remarks can be made:

A. It follows from thc above observations that in a eleft construction the focus musteither be the c1efted constituent or be contained in it, This, at least, is the case inclefts of the canonical type (e.g. It was John who did ft or The one who did it wasJohn), which is the only type of clefts taken into account in nearly every treatmentof clefts in the linguistic literature. However, I will point out in chapter 5 that thereare exceptions to the general rule. One special type is tbat in which the whole eleft isfocus, i.e. in which the information given in tbe WH-dause is also new. Theexistence of such cleftswas first signalled by Erades (1962), and later on by Prince(1978). They are discussed in detail in chapter 5. Another exceptional type is that inwhich two specjficational acts are performed simultaneously. In that ca~e. there aretwo value parts (foei), and since only one of them can occupy the positron of ~hcc1efted constituent, the other has to appear in the WH-elause. The followmgsentence is an example of this:

(21) (Why dld you hit Mary? - I beg your pardonI) It was SHEwho hit ME!

There are still other types of special clefts, but it would be premature to deal withthem here. They will be discussed in due course in chapter 5.

B. As has often been noted," what is the focus of a specificational sentence in thesen se that it expresses the new information (value) is also intonationally the focus,since it receives the nuelear accent of the specificational sentence (or at least of theinformation unit (tone unit) in which it oecurs, for a sentence may consist of more

8. Tbis is in kecping with Jackendoff (1972: 233), who spcaks of the 'clefted phrasc'. Rochernont(1986: 129) also adopts this convention.

9_ Sec e.g. Chomsky 1971, Elffers 1979: 103, Postal 1971: 234, Bolinger 1972c: 633, Schermer­Vermeer 1979: 193, Davison 1984.

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10. This rule has often been formulatcd. Sec e.g. Halliday (1967: 82), Chomsky & Halle (1968: 90)(the well-known "Nuclear Stress Rule"), Huddleston (1971: 136), Bolinger (1972c: 644),Crystal (1975: 23), Buysschaert (1982: 125-126). Rochemont (1986) examines how the ruleshould be precisely formulated. He argues against Chomsky & Halle's Nuclear Stress Rule (whichsays that nuclear stress must be assigned to the rightmost lexical category in S) and againstJackendoff's (1972) reformulation (according to which the nuclear accent is assigncd to therightmost lexical catcgory in a [+ focus] constituent in S). He argues that "accenting is neither anecessary nor a sufficient condition for interpretation as focus" (p.25) and therefore proposes thefollowing rule: "If a constituent is specificd [+ focus] in S-structure, then an accent is assignedrightmost in the [+ focus] constituent. If there is no overtly marked [+ focus] constituent, then anaccent is assigncd rightmost in S."

11. The fact that the focus of a specificational sentence must be intonationally prominent coneurswith the fact that, when an item has both a stressed and an unstressed form, only the stressed formcan oecur in the focus.Thus, the pronoun it,whicb is known to be the "stress-rcduced" anaphoricferm of that (Kuroda 1968: 250-251), cannot he substituted for that in ft is that that I don'tunderstand. In languages like Dutch, German or Danish, where the third person reflexivepronoun bas a stresscd and an unstressed variant, only the stressed variant can occur in focusposition. The following example is from Dutch:

(i) Het is zichzelf ('zich dat hij gekwetst heeft.'It is himself that he has injured'

12. The relation between the notion of old information and that of logical or pragmatiepresupposition has been recognized for some time. What is presupposed is considered to be partof the speaker's and hearer's 'shared knowledge', (Sec e.g. Karttunen 1973, Kempson 1975,Stalnaker 1977, 1978, Gazdar 1979a,b, Wilson & Sperber 1979.)

ft was John who was here expresses the presupposition that someone was here in the sensethat truth of the presupposition is a prerequisite for the utterance to have a truth value.

According to our definition, the claim that the sentence It was John who was herecarries the presupposition 'someone was here' means no more than that the v~riable'the X who was here' is present in the minds ofthe speaker and the hearer. This doesnot mean the same thing as saying that the proposition Someone washere must be

than one inforrnation unit, as is usually the case e.g. when the sentence is aWH-cleft.) In other words, the 'focus of information' (i.e. the position of the nuclearaccent) "indicates where the new information lies. The rule is that in any unitmarked as new,the nucleusassumes(subject to stressrules) final position" (Quirk ctal. 1972: 940).10Thus, in It was the student in the red hat who came in first thenuclear accent wil! fall on hat if the new information (focus, value) is either thestudent in the red hat or in the red hat. If the new information isjust red, it is thisitem that receives the nuclear accent.'!

presupposed in It wasJohn who committed the murder is that 'th~re is some X whocommitted the murder', However, Seuren (1985: 295) objects to the term'presupposition of existence'. He points out that in

C. The variabIe part of a specificationalsentence is the 'presupposition', not only inthe sense that it represents old information, but also in the sense that it refers tosomething that is logicallypresupposed.P The sentence It wasJohn who committedthe murder logicallypresupposes that someone committed the murder. Even if thespecificational sentence does not contain a formulation of the variabIe (as in (Whocommitted the murder Z) - It wasJohn) the presupposition remains present. And ofcourse, as can be expected of logical presuppositions, it remains intact when thespecificational sentence is put in the negative (It was not John who commiued themurder).

The presupposition in question is normal!y referred to as a presupposition ofexistencebecause it can be expressed in the form of an existentialsentence.What is

(22)(a) It is the Abominable Snowman that Mrs Prendergast is tryingto shoot.

(b) What Mrs Prendergast is trying to shoot is the AbominableSnowman.

"what is presupposed is not the existenceof what Mrs Prendergast is trying to shoot,but that there is something that Mrs Prendergast is trying to shoot, or, in otherwords, that it is true that Mrs Prendergast has gone out with the idea of shootingsomething. This, of course, may be true even if what she intends to shoot does notactually exist." Correct as this remark may be, I do not think that it must lead us toconclude thatpresupposition of existence is an infelicitousterm. Since the essenceofa specificational sentence is that it specifies a value for a variable, what ispresupposed is the existenceof the variabie (in this case 'the X that Mrs. Prendergastis trying to shoot') in some worId, which is not necessarily the a.ct~alone. The factthat what Mrs. Prendergast is trying to shoot does not actually exist IIIthe real worlddoes not alter the fact that the variabie 'what Mrs. Prendergast is trying to shoot' ispresent (i.e. exists) in the minds of the speaker and the hearer. If we takepresupposition of existence to mean na more than this, the term presents noproblem at allo

The above observations hold good not only for statements but also for questions.The sentence Is John the murderer? presupposes that, at least in the mind of theperson asking the question, there is someone who is the murderer. This observationruns counter to Donnellan's (1966: 284) claim that in the sentence Is de Gaulle theking of France? "there seems to be no presupposition or implicati~n th~t some~neis the king of France". I claim that, if the sentence is interpreted specificationally(i.e,with the nuclear 'accent on de Gaulle), the speaker asking the question doespresuppose that there issorneonewho is the king of France. If this were not the case,the variabIe 'the X who is the king of France' would not exist and the sentencecould not be specificational at all.

The way in which we have defined the existential presupposition that is attachedto specificational sentences differs from the way in which it is defined by variouslinguists, Chomsky (1972: 100)writes:

14 15

true for the it~eleftto have a truth value. Examples can be found of specificationalsentences ~hlch ar~ perfectly. felicitous in spite of the fact that tbey occur in aco?te~t which explicitly questions or denies the truth of the presupposition. Tbispoint IS also made by Gundel (1985: 101).lt can be illustratedwith examples likethe following:

(26)[a) !JOHN did not murder Smith: Smith was not murdered at all.(b) 'The one who murdered Smith was not John: Smith was not

murdered at all,

(23)(a) l'm still not convineed that anyone called. but I know it wasn'tmy mottier (who.called). (Here the speaker obviously doesnot believe In the truth of the proposition Someone ca/led.)(example from Gunde11985: lOl)

(b) You say that some.on~ in this room loves Mary. Weil maybe~o.,But It certainly rsn t Fred (who loves Mary), ano it clearlyisn t John. And ... Therefore, no one in this room loves Mary.(example trom Keenan 1971: 52)

The fact tbat the presupposition of existence attached to the variable of aspecificational sentence cannot be eliminated by making the sentence negativefollows automatically from the nature of the presupposition.We bave defined thepresupposition in question as meaning that a specificationalsentence requires thevariabIe to be explicitly or implicitly present in the preceding discourse or in thesentence itself.Clearly,if there is no variable, no act of specificationcan take place.In consequence it is logicallyimpossible that a (negative) specificationalsentencecould serve to cancel the presupposition tbat the variabie exists.A specificationalsentenceby its very nature requires that the variable must exist.

It should be noted, fmally,that the claim that (27) (as well as its negative andinterrogative counterparts) logicallypresupposes 'John ate something' is explicitlyrejected by Delahunty (1981: 389ff). According to Delahunty, the sentenceIt should also be noted that the presupposition of existence attached to the

vari~bleof a specificationalsentence differsfrom the presupposition of existencethat IS attached to definiteNPs, in that it cannot be cancelledby the use of not for'radical negation' in the sentence.» For example, the sentence It was JOHN~ONES whomurdered~mith involvesat least two presuppositions:the presupposi­non that John Jones existsand the presuppositionthat someone murdered Smith.The former can be cancelled by radical negation,sincewe can say

(24) It was not .John Jones who murdered Smith: John Jonesdoesn't exist.

But we c:a.nnotus~ not in the specificational sentence to reject the secondpresupposiuonof existence.Instead of (25,a) we will normally use (25,b):

(27) It was an apple that John ate.

entails 'John ate something' but does not logically presuppose it. Tbe evidenceadduced in support of this claim hingeson the followingsentence:

(25)(a) 'It was not John who murdered Smith: Smith was not mur­dered at all.

(b) John did NOT murder Smith: Smith was not murdered at all.

The firs~sentenceof (25,b) is predicational,whereas that of (25,a) is specificational.In.fact,it appears th~tnegativespecificationalsentencesof whatever type are neversuitable for cancellmg the presupposition of existence that is attached to thevariabIe.The followingare no better than (25,a):14

(28) It it wasn't an apple that John ate, then John ate nothing.

According to Delahunty,(28) is an impeccable sentence,although it would have tobe an impossibleirnplicationif the cleftlogicallypresupposed 'John ate something'.My answer to this is simply that (28) is not an acceptable sentence if the cleft isinterpreted specificationally.As we will see in chapter 5, i/-c1eftshave developed asecondary use in which a constituent iseleftedfor emphasis rather than because it isthe value specified for a variable. Such it-defts (which are exceptional) are nolonger truly specificational. I maintain that sentence (28) could only be judgedacceptable if the it-eleft is interpreted this way. If we substitute a (trulyspecificational)WH-eleft for the Ït-c1eftin (28), the result is obviously unaccept­able:

13. Seuren (1985: 238) distinguishes between 'minimal negation', which is the normal negationunder which presupposltJODSare prescrved, and 'radical negatian', which serves precisely tocancel a pr~upposltlon. For.ex.ample,the sequcnceFather Christmas did not speak to you, jorFatherClmst~ does=.extst lS acceptableonly ifnot isintcrpretedas a radicalnegator rejectingthe presupposiuon of existence that is normally attached ta the definite description FatherChristmas.

14. Seur.en(l985:. 296) notes that what he caUsthe 'cleft presuppositian' cannot be eliminated by(radical) negauon,whereasother presuppositionscan, Howcver,the phenomcnon holels not onlyIor u-cleft sentencesbut for any type of specificationalsentence.

(29) !If what John ate was not an apple, then John ate nothing.

Delahunty (1981: 391) alsomakes the same claim (that specificationalsentencesdo not carry a presuppositionof existence) in conneetion with noneleft sentences.He argues tbat John ate an APPLE does not logically presuppose 'John atesomething', since the followingis not inconsistent:"

15. Delahunty actually gives the sentcnce Ij JOHN did not eat an apple then nobody did, but tbis isobviously amistakc, for this sentence could only be used as evidence in conneetion with thcpresupposition 'Someone ate an apple'.

16 17

(30) II John did not eat an APPLE, then he ate nothing.

However, it appears again to be the case that the conditional clause is notinterpreted specificationally. This is clear from the fact that an apple is notinterpreted contrastiveIy, which it would bave to be if it were the focus of aspecificational sentence (CL section 2.8. below).

D. A natural consequence of the fact that the variabIe part of a specificationalsentence is presupposed is that specificational sentences cannot normally be used'out of the bIue' or discourse-initially. A sentence like It was John who murderedSr:zith can only be appropriately used if tbe hearer can be assumed to be acquaintedwith the fact that someone murdered Smith. This means that the existence of thevariabie 'the X who murdered Smith' must belong to the information shared by thespeaker and the hearer: it must be old (known) information. In fact, therequirement is even stronger than this: for a felicitous use of the sentence thisinformation must not only be 'known' but also 'given', i.e. it must be informationwhich "the coöperative speaker can assume to be appropriately in the hearer'sconsciousness at the time of hearing the utterance" (Prince 1978: 888).16 Thereason for this is obvious: if we teIl someone the answer to a question withoutintroducing or rcpeating the question first, this means we assume the question to bepart of the listener's short memory storage. If we know that the question links upwith information that is shared by the hearer, but which is not part of what he iscurrently concerned with, then we will first activate th is information so that it isbrougbt back into the hearer's consciousness. In that case we will not teIl the hearerwithout further ado It was John who murdered Smith but we will fust reintroducethe topic of Smith's murder, as in

(31) Hello, Tom. Do you remember that ehap that was killed in thepark last year? Smith his name was. Weil, 1'11 teil yousomething. ft was John who murdered Smith.

In sum, the fact that specificational sentences specify a value for a presupposedvariabIe entails that they naturally require that the variabie should not only be

16. The term 'given' is sometimes .uscd in this sense (e.g. Chafe 1974, 1976; Halliday 1967), butsometimes in the scnse of 'old', 'known' (i.e. information that is assumed 10 be in the hearer'sgeneral knowledgc-store but not necessarilyin bis current consciousncss(e.g.Haviland & Clark1974, Clark & Haviland 1977).

18

known information but should actually be in tbe hearer's consciousness at the timeof utterance. This conclusion is an important one and will be further examined inchapter 5. The possible exceptions to the rule wilI also be gone into there.

E. The above conclusion does not mean that tbe presupposition of a specificationalsentence must oecur verbatim in the preceding context. Though this may be thecase, it more often happens that the presupposition is old information only in thesense that it links up witb what has already been said. Sometimes the bearer musteven build one or more inferential 'bridges' (see Haviland & Clark 1974, Clark &Haviland 1977) to understand bow the presupposition is connected with the 'given'information. Consider, for example, the following:

(32)A. John seems to be moody?B. Yes. I think it's his stomach again.

This scrap of discourse is perfectIy coherent, yet one bas to build a bridge in order tounderstand it. Tbe step skipped over by speaker Bis: 'If John is moody, there mustbe something the matter with him.' This proposition ('Tb ere is something the matterwith John') then serves as the presupposition for B's specificational sentence.

F. ICthe presupposition of a specificational sentence is expressed in the form of anNp, this NP is usually definite (cf Clark & Haviland 1977: 13). This follows fromthe fact that the presupposition represents old (even given) information: it iswell-known that indefinite NPs are used to introduce new information, whereasdefinite NPs refer to what is old (i.e. already mentioned or inferrable from thecontext). Still, examples may be found of specificational sentences whose variabieNP is indefinite:

(33)(a) (Most wars in history have had economie eauses.) Anexample of this is World War 11.

(b) A question which has apparently never been asked is whatis the use ol it all.

(c) One thing that I don't understand is why this suggestion hasnot been made earl ier.

(d) (Some parents don't like their chlldren to go out.) - Someonewho certainly doesn't like that is my father.

The use of indefinite NPs in specificational sentences such as these can be explainedfrom th ree observations. One is that the indefinite NPs invariably involve modifiersexpressing old information (as in (33,a) and (33,d» or at least expressinginformation that is linked up with the preceding context. Sentences like (33,a-d)require a context; they will not be used out of the blue. They therefore satisfy thegeneral condition that the variabie should link up with what is in the mind of thehearer. The second observation is that the subject NPs of (33,a-d) cannot be madedefinite without a drastic change of meaning:

19

(34)(a] The example of this is World War 11.(b) The question which has apparently never been asked is

what is Ihe use of it al!.(c] The thing that I don't understand is why this suggestion has

not been made earlier.(d] The one who certainly doesrit like that is my father.

Since definite NPs implicate 'indusiveness' (i.e. the idea that al! the items in tbe setsatisfying tbe referring description are being referred to),'? a singular definite NPsugges~ that there is only one referent satisfying the referring description (cfHawkins 1978). If ~hesp~ker do~ not want to convey this aspect of meaning, hecannot but us~ ~n m~efintte NP instead. This is elearly the case, for example in(33,a), where it is ObVIOUStbat there exists more than one 'example of this', The useo~ the indefinite varia bIe NPs in (33,a-d) is therefore motivated by the semanticdifference between these NPs and tbe corresponding definites.

The third observation that helps to explain the acceptability of sentences sucb as~33,a-d) ~ that the variabie NP is special in that it is not wholly oid (or inferrable)information, In fact, the noun head itself is not given in or inferrable from thecontext.. For ex~mple, in ~33,a), where the variabie NP is an example of this, it is?nly this that links up with tbe preceding context. The noun head itself is newl~form~tion: Similarly, in (33,d) the context creates the idea of parents who do notltk~ their chrl~ren. t~ go out, but the idea of someone in particular is not suggested.This observ~tlOn is unportant, for it is precisely because of this that the oppositionbetw~n an indefinite noun head and a definite one becomes possible. If the nounhead .Itself were part of the presupposed (old) information, it would have to bedefinite. Thus, if the context creates the idea of a particular 'someone' thespecificational sentence specifying the identity of the person in question cannotitsslfinvolve someone as head of the variabie NP:

(35]A. Someone doesrit like you to go out.8. I know. 'Someone who doesn't like me to go out is my father.

In this sequence there is semantic contradiction between A (which refers to onepe~so~) and B, w~e~e th~ us~ of someone suggests that there are other peoplesatJ~fymg ~hedescription given In the rest of the variabie NP. The possibility of usingan mdefimte NP thus crucially requires that the noun head of the NP should not bepart of what is presupposed (old) information.

17. Hawkins (1978) claims that inclusivenessisan inherent part ofthe meaning of thc definite article.Declerc~ (1987b), on the ether hand, argues that inclusivenessis no more than an implicature, i.e.that the Id~ of 'refe.rcnceto all' is only suggestedas long as there is no indication to the contrary.Thus, the Wicketswill be mtcrpreted as 'all the wickets' in (i), but not so in (ii) where the contextexcludes this interpretation : '

li) IIwas John who brought in Ihe wickets after the game.1") The one who broughl in Ihe wickets after Ihe game leftone on the pitch.

20

The above observations account for the fact that the specificational sentences(33,a-d) cannot be replaced by their U-deft counterparts:

(36)(a) (Most wars in history have had economie causes.] *11 isWorld War 11mat is an example of Ihis.

(b] *11 is what is Ihe use of it all that is a question that hasapparently never been asked.

(c] "11 is why this suggestion hasn't been made earlier that isone thing that 1don't undersland.

(d) (Some parents don't like their children to go out.) - "lt is myfather who is someone who certainly doesn't like that.

Whereas the noun heads of the variabie NPs are not part of the oid information in(33,a-d), they are represented as such in (36,a-d). Sentence (36,a) presupposes thatthere is 'an example of this' and identifies the example in question. This means that(36,a) specifies a value for the variabie 'the X that is an example of this'. However,there is nothing in the preceding context creating a variabie of this kind. Thesentence preceding the Ît-deft in (33,a) may create the idea of possible examples,bUI it does not establish a particular example, nor does it allow any inference thatthere exists only one example. (In fact, it does just the opposite: the use of mostasserts that there exist several examples.) The it-eleft in (36,a) (which presupposesthe definite variabie 'the X that is an example') therefore does not link up with thepreceding senten ce. The scrap of discourse in (36,a) (and the other examples of(36» is discontinuous (incoherent), and therefore unacceptable. (As a matter offact, it-clefts like (36,a) are unacceptable even in isolation because there iscontradiction between the use of the indefinite NP (an example, a question, etc.) inthe WH-c1ause and the fact that they specify only one value for the variabie. Thefact that only one value is mentioned means that only one value satisfies thevariabie, but, if so, the relevant NP in the variabie should be definite, not indefinite(since indefinite NPs suggest 'excl usiveness'). 18Thus, the use of an example in (36,a)suggests that other examples exist, but the i/-c1eft actually specifies only one. Theresult is th at the sentence is vcry odd even when used in isolation.)

The above observations reveal an interesting difference between clefts andnoneleft specificational sentences. In a eleft the WH-clause always represents thevariabie as definite. In a noncleft the variabie may be indefinite. It may sometimeseven be indefmite when it represents old information, as in

(37]A. Gan you give me anexample of what we call a super power?B. An example of a superpower is the Soviet Union.

18. By exclusiveness is meant the idea that there are other entities satisfying the referring descriptionbesides the one actually refcrred to. For example, the usc of an tnhabitant of that house in asentence like An inhabitant of that house came /0 see me yesterday suggests that tbc house inquestion is inhabited by more than one person (otherwise we would have to use the inhabitant ofthat house). According 10 Hawkins (1878), exclusivencss is an inherent part of the rneaning ofindefinitc rcference, Howevcr, Declerck (1987a) shows that it is no more tban an implicaturc.

21

~ _ •••• _ ol •••• ",,,\-U"".J1L"-' LJ..1 .u Ul,;\,.;du.::,t tlle expressesinclusiveness (and bence, in tbe singular, uniqueness), wbereas a does not (cf.above): the shift to the would in fact be a correction of the idea (conveyed by asuperpower) that there are several superpowers. Because of tbis, (37,B) cannot bec1efted,since the variabie part of a cleft is definite,not indefinite:'?

(38) B. 'lt is the Soviet Unionthat is an example of a superpower.

(Note that this sentence is odd even in isolation because the inclusivenessunderstanding that followsfrom the definitenessof the WH-c1auseclasheswith thesense of exclusiveness (i.e. the idea that there are other entities satisfying thereferring description) suggestedby the indefinitenessof an example.)

In sum, the variabie NP of a specificationalsentence is normally definite, butexceptions remain possible. In fact, we have pointed out two types of exceptions:sentences like (33,a-d), in which the head noun of the variabieNP is not part of theold information, and sentences like (37,B). In both casesan indefiniteNP is used inorder to convey an 'exclusive' interpretation. Such an interpretation is the oppositeof the 'inclusive' interpretation conveyed by definiteNPs.

2.7. In section 2.3. we spoke about specificationalsentences 'of the first type', inwhich the variabie part is not expressed in the sentence again. Sentences like these(e.g.JOBN commiued (hemurder) are mostly noncopular.What we have observedin section 2.6. concerning 'focus' and 'presupposition' is, of course, also in keepingwith the conelusion that specificationalsentencesneed not be copular.Noncopularsentences mayalso involve a focus and a presupposition of the kind we havedefined for specificationalsentences.Thus, the noncopular sentences in (39,b) haveexactly the same specificationalmeaning as the copular ones in (39,a):

(39)(a) Who's theone who robbedthe bank? - The one whorobbed the bank is John Thomas.

(b) Who robbed the bank? - John Thomas did.

Whether or not a noncopular sentence (e.g. John THOMAS robbed the bank)will be interpreted specificationallydependson two factors,viz. the context and theintonation pattern of the sentence. The context can make clear that specificationalinformation is requested; the intonation pattern revealswhich part of the sentence isnew information. If the sentenceJohn Thomas robbedthe bank is pronounced withthe nuclear accent on John Thomas, we wil! infer that it is presupposed that

19. That the WH-clauseof an iI·cleftfunctions like a definiteNP isalso pointed out by Dik (1980a:36), Brömser(1984: 329), Gundel (1985: 97) and Wirth (1978). (Wirth even arguesthat the it ofan U-deft is derived from the: in her opinion, it is "the syntactic variant of the" (p.70).)

22

someoue robeed me bank anu mat trus someone IS now xienuneu as oeing JoonThomas. If the sentence is pronounced with the nuclear accent on the bank, onlythis constituent can be interpreted as a specificational focus (i.e. as the valuespecifiedfor the variabie 'the X that John Thomas robbed').

Tbc two factors inviting a specificational interpretation (viz. the contex.tand theintonation pattern) may often suffice on their own, but in some cases they mustco-operate. The nuclear accent entails a specificational focus interpretation of therelevant constituent only if the constituent in question wil! not receive the nuelearaccent under neutral sentence intonation. As noted above, the neutral position ofthe nuclear accent is,generallyspeaking, on the last open-classitem or proper namein the elause.This means that, when the nuelear accent falls on the finalNP of thesentence, as in John gave Mary a BOOK, it is not clear whether or not that NP is tobe interpreted as the focusof a specificationalsentence.In that case only the contextcan guide us to the correct interpretation." There isgenerally no problem when thenuclear accent fallson the subjectNP (as in JOHN committed the murder), althougheven then a predicational reading is not always excluded. Thus, the sentence YourMOTHER iscomingcan be used in answer to both (40,a) and (40,b). In the formercase the sentence is predicational, in the second it is specificational,"

(40)(a) What's al! this fuss about?(b) Who's coming?

So, in many cases contex.tualand intonational factors will have to co-operate inorder to bring out a specificationalreading.

The fact that copular specificational sentences likc elefts have "non-clcftcongeners" with which they are "truth-conditionally identical" (~ela'bunty 198.1:384)22,23has led to the interesting use of a blended construcuon lil colloquialEnglish:

I

20. Chomsky (1972: 89, footnote 21) notes that in such a case the element "that would serve asintonation center under normal intonation" may reeerve "an extra heavy stress and extradominant pitch". But he remarks that even then the interpretation of such sentences is"obscured", i.e. that it is hard to interpret them if they are isolatcd sentences.

21. In the sequence What's all thisfuss about? - Your MOTHER is coming the nuclear accent onmother in the second sentence runs counter to the general rule that tbc nuclear accent falls on thelast open-class item in the information unit conveying new inform~tion.(In this ~e the wholesentence conveys new information and forms a single tone umt.) Sentences like these arediscussedby Bolinger(1985: 121). Equally exceptional are sentences likeJ ran into Jo.HN thismorning which can be used discourse-initially (i.e. as scenesetters). They exemphfy whatReehement (1986: 52-56) calls 'presentational focus' (as opposed to'contrastive focus').

22. This claim is rejected by Seuren (1985: 300):«The cleft presuppositionmakes for certain truth-conditional differenceswith respect to'straight' sentences.For example, if in a situation where nobody laughed (88a) is uttered itwillsimplybe (minimally)falseand its negation (89a) will he true, but if (88b) is uttered itwill be (radically) falseand its negation will still fail to he true: ./ ..

23

(41)(a) Whal Bill wants is Bil! wants a BIKE.(b) Whal l'rn trying 10do is l'rn trying to HELP you.

Seur~n (1985: 297) notes that this construction is "extrernely common in spokenEnghsh of all sociolinguisticlevels".

2.8: Affirmative specificationalsentences always convey a contrastive meaning.>This follows from the act of specificationitself.The fact that a particular value isassignedto the variabIeautomatically creates a contrast with aUthe other potentialvalues that have not been selected. This implication of contrast wiU becomest~ongeracco~dingas the set of potential candidates is smaller and strongest whenthis s.etcontains ~nly two members. Thus, when only Fred and Tom are possiblecandidates for being elected chairman, the sentenceFRED has been elected willautomatically be strongly contrastive (i.e. imply 'not Tom').

In negative specificational sentences the strength of the implication of contrastdepends on whether or not the negation belongs to the presupposition. If it does(e.g. if .we interpr~t JOHN ~idn" do it as 'It was John who didn't do it'),contrastivenessagam clearly anses because a candidate is selected.However if nothas wide scope (e.g. if we interpret JOHN didn't do it as 'It was not John who did

22. ../ .. (68)a. Harry laughed.b. Ths one who laughed was Harry.

(89)a. Harry didn't laugh.b. The one who laughed was not Harry.

This shows that it is mistaken to say that whatevcr differencc there is between(pseudo)cleft and 'straight' sentences is merely pragmatic and not truth-conditional.»

In my opinion, this~nelusion is unwarranted because the only possible interpretation ofHarrylaughed in the snuauon outlined here is predicationa1.There are two possibleways in which thissenterree may be used. One is that the statement Nobody laughed has actually been made bysomconc: In that case lIarry lnu~hed (with the nuclear accent on Harry, for that is the only newinformation) IS meant to contradiet this statement. Since the context contains no presuppositionthat sorneone laughed, the sentence is not specificational. (Rather than presupposing thatsorneone l~ughed the sentcnce actual1ymakes an assertion to this effect.)The second possibility isthat the POlOtof someone laughing or not laughinghas not been verbally made in the context. In~hatcase the whole sentenceHarry laughed conveys new information (so that the nuclear accentIS on laughedy; and this sentence is obviously not specificational either, So, the observation thatl!arry laughed an~ Th~ one who laughed WlL5 Harry are truth-conditionally different in theillustrativecontext IS quite correct, only it does not warrant the conclusion that cleftsdo not havethe sam~ truth conditions as the corresponding 'straight' specificational sentences, for Harrylaughed IS not uscd specificationally in the example.

23. This identity of truth conditions ~as even led Lakoff (1965) and Postal (1971) to argue thatnoncIeft specificationalsentences likeJOHN bought a chair are derived from their correspondingeleft counterparts.

24. This point has aften been made in the linguistic literature. It ismade in conneetion with cleftsbye.g. G~ndcl (197~b: SS?), Harrics-Delisle (1978), Laeven (1983: 140), Lipka (1982: 164). n ismade 10 conneenon with bath cleft and nonelelt specificational sentences by Chafe (1976:33-37), Kuno (1972: 269)..

24

Ü'),25 no sueh clcar contrastive implication need be present, because no selection ismade: instead of assigninga value to the variabie, the eleft rejects a candidate as thecorrect value for the variabIe. Since na selection is made from a set of candidates,the only contrast that is implied is that between John and 'someone else'. If this'someone else' is not thought of as being one of a restricted set of candidates (as inWe don', know who is the murderer; but it certainly isn 't TOM) the senseof contrastisnot very strong. It ismuch strongerwhen the set is restricted (as in We don'! knowwhich ofthem is the murderet; but it certainly isn't TOM).

So, contrastiveness is automaticaUy implied whenever the act of specificationtakes place. This is the case in affirmativespecificationalstatements and in negativeones in which not belongs to the presupposition. If not has wide scope (i.e. if a valueis not assigned to the variabie but rejected), contrastiveness is still present in the(weaker) sense that it is understood that, if this value does not satisfy the variabIe,there must be some other value that does. However, in interrogative specificationalsentences (e.g. Who (is it who) is the murderer?) the situation is different.Here thequestion of which value satisfiesthe variabIe is asked but not answered. That is, noact of specification takes place. Consequently, na value is selected from a set ofpossible candidates, hence no sense of contrastiveness is created.>

The fact that (declarative) specificational sentences are inherently contrastivemeans that there is normally a kind of 'exclusivenessunderstanding' attached tothem. The sentence ft is JOHN who lovesMary presupposes not only that there issomeone who lovesMary but also that there is at least one person who does notlove Mary. Whereas the presence of the presupposition of existence has beenpointed out by innumerable Iinguists,the point about the exclusivenessunderstand­ing has not so aften been made. (Notabie exceptions are Dyhr (1978: 150ff),Moreau (1976: 25-26).) Still,exelusivenessis clearly present: like contrastiveness,itis an automatic consequence of the act of specification.(That this is so is elear fromthe fact that exclusivenessis as absent as contrastiveness in interrogative specifica­tional sentences.)

Contrastiveness is one of the differencesthat distinguishbetween specificationalsentencesand predicational ones. A sentence like John opened THE DOOR can beinterpreted specificationallyor predicationally.(The nuclear accent does not enforce

25. These two interpretations are connected with two different intonation patterns. See Akmajian(1979: 239ff), who speaks of a 'conclusive' and a 'contradictive' intonafion pattern, respect.ively

26. Because 110 act of specificatien takes place in questions, one could object 10 our speaking of'interrogative specificational sentences'. However, I think this term can he maintained to refer tosentences that ask for specificaticnal information. This is a slight extcnsion of the meaning of'specificational' but it seems warranted by the fact that questions like these share most of thecharacterlstics of (truly) specificational statements. (For example, they can he elefted: Who (WlL5it who) closed the door .'1).

25

a specification~ interpretation bere because it fallson tbe last open-classitem in these?tence.) I c1~lmtba~tbe specificationalinterpretation is inextricably connectedWltb,a contrastive readingof the door,Tbis doesnot mean that, on the predicationalreading, the door is not contrastiveat alloBolinger(1965a: 106) notes:

In a broad s,enseevery sernantic peak is contrastive. Clearly in Let's have a picnic, comingas a suggestion out?f ~he,blue, there is no specific contrast with dinner party, but there is acontrast between picnicking and anything else the group rnight do, As the alternatives arenarrowed down, we get closer to what we think of as contrastive accent.

,I would ~y that, tbough contrast is always present - anything we say contrastswith anything else we could bave said - contrastiveness is not actually in thespeaker's,mi~d when h~ us~ a predicational sentence, The speaker uttering Letshave a ptcntc as a predicational sentence is not actually thinking of the contrastbetween a picnic and somethingelse, i.e. he is not suggestingthe picnic as one ofseveral altematives.The fact tbat contrastiveness is automatically present wben a sentence is

specificational is already c1earfrom the fact that the sentence has an existentialpresupposition. The presupposition 'There is an X that Jobn opened' which thesentenceJohn opened the D?C!R b,ason the specificationalinterpretation alreadysuggestscontrasnveness, for it implies tbat, in order to identify X, one value willbave t~.be selected from tbe set of possiblecandidates.Tbis brings us back to theconclusion arrived at before, viz, tbat the most important factor determining:-vbetbera noncleft sentence is to be interpreted specificationallyor predicationallyIS the absenceor presenceof the existentialpresuppositionin the context.The senseof contrast is already activated by this presupposition, The place of the nuclearaccent is then no more tban an ancillary factor wbich is not always conclusivebyitself.If we combine the observation that the focus of a specificational sentence is

contrastivewith the observationthat the focusnecessarilyconveysnew informationand therefore carries tbe nuclear accentof tbe tone unit, we come to the conclusionthat the focusof a specificationalsentencealwaysbears 'contrastiveaccent'P?In factit is tempting to hypothesize that contrastive accent is nothing more than thephenom,enon t~at tbe nuclear accent is placed on an item tbat is semantica1lycontrastrve.This would mean that it is not correct to say tbat contrastive accent

27. S?rI_lcpeople speak of 'contrastive stress', but I wil! follow Bolinger (1965a, 1972c) in making adistinction between 'stress' and 'accent', Bolinger uses the term stress cxclusive1yin the sense of'word stress': "the stressedsyllable of a word is the one where the accent falls if there is an accentwhich is to say that 'it is the syllable with the potential for accent" (Bolinger 1965a: 107), H~speaks of contrastive stress ifthcre is "a shift in stress" (pp.116-117), that is, if the word stressdoesnet Iall on the part of the word wherc it usually falls if the word receivesthe nuclear accent. This ise.g. the case in These goods are not EXponed but Itdponed. Stress is thus to be distinguished fromaccent, which is a question not only of stress but also of pitch, "Stress belongs to the lexicon,Accent belongs to the utterance." (Bolinger 1972c: 644 ),

entails a contrastive interpretation. Ratber, wbat bappens is tbat a semanticallycontrastive item attracts the nuclear accent of the information unit. Moreover, wemigbt go one step further and assume tbat an item can be semantically contrastiveonly if it is the focus of a specificationalinterpretation, Tbe conclusion would thenbe that contrastiveaccent can be defined simplyas nuclear accent 00 tbe focusof aspecificationalsentence,

Although 1have not studied contrastive accent in great detail, I do believe tbatthis hypothesis is correct. As far as I can see, placing the nuclear accent on aconstituentwhicb would not receivetbat accent under neutral sentenceintonationëdoes not create a contrastive interpretation if tbat constituent is not tbe focus of aspecificationalsentence.This seems clear from examples like the following (whichare all predicational):

(42) (a) NEVERwilll do itl(b) That WAS a serious mistake.(c) That was REALLYa serious mistake.(d) SOMEBODYmust be responslble.

(43) Why are you so sulky? - Your MOTHER is coming,(44) (Thatman is mad. - I don't aqree.)He is NOT rnad.

In (42,a-d) the nuclear accent is placed on an item other than the final one in orderto put special 'emotive emphasis' on tbis constituent. As noted by Quirk et al.(1972: 969), this kind of emphasisdoes not result in a contrastive interpretation ofthe item in question. In (43) the nuclear accent isagain not placed on the focal item.This is apparently because the speaker considersyour mother to he the semanticpeak of the sentence (cf.Bolinger1985: 121).Again, thismarked choice of nuclearaccent does not lead to a contrastive interpretation, In sentence (44) the nuclearaccent ison not.Now,not isoftenconsideredto have agreat potential for expressingcontrast, 80 that some people (e.g. Higgins 1976) distinguisb between a 'straight'negation and a 'contrastive' negation.However, it apears again to be the case tbatnot suggests a contrast ('not A but B') only when it bears on the focus of aspecificationalsentence (e.g.What I need isNOT a new car). Tbis is not the case in(44) and there is consequentlyno idea of contrast. (Compare (44) with I wouldn'tknow what John is, but he isNOT mad, which is specificationaland where not maddoes imply a contrast witb what Jobn really is.)The claim that the accent isnot contrastive in sentenceslike (42)-(44) is perhaps

not quite accurate. In (44), which is used to contradiet tbe previous sentence, thereis, of course, an implication of yes/no contrast. The same thing is possible insentenceswith emotive emphasis:

28, Tbe concept 'neutral sentence intonation' may not be as straightforward as is suggested here (andnearly everywhere in the linguistic literature). See Schmerling (1974) for a discussion,

(b) Why cidn't you loek the door? - Bul I DID loek itl(c) Look lor your keys. - I AM looking lor Ihem.

In sentences like these, where the nuclear accent is on the operator, some sort ofcontrast is implied, but it is only a contrast between positive and negative meaning.There is no 'selective contrast', as with specificational sentences, but only a 'yes/riocontrast'. Tbe function of putting a strong accent on the operator is to emphasize thetruth of the statement. This typically happens when the opposite claim has beenmade, as in (45,a-c), or when the speaker assumes that the hearer is implicitlymaking this claim, as in

(46) I'm selling my old Volkswagento buy a Mereedes.I CANafford to buy a Mereedes,you know.

In order to maintain our hypothesis we must therefore eliminare yes/no contrastfrom tbe formulation. The claim is then that a constituent that receives strong accentexpresses selective contrast only if it is interpreted as the focus of a specificationalsentence. This means that placing the nuc1ear accent on a constituent that shouldnot normally receive it is a sign that the constituent in question is to be interpretedspecificationally - an interpretation whieh is then automatically contrastive andexc1usive, because the specificational act is by definition an act of selecting (andhence exc1uding).

2.9. Specificational sentences have an 'exhaustiveness' understanding:" they implythat the focus represents an exhaustive list of the values satisfying the variabie. Forexample, when the speaker utters (47,a) or (47,b), the hearer has a right to concludethat only two people insulted Mary. If more (or fewer) people actually did SO, thespeaker would be deceiving hirn:"

(47l(a) JOHN and BILL insulled Mary.(b) II was JOHN and BILLwho insultedMary.

It is not difficult to show that this exhaustiveness understanding is not a logicalpresupposition (like the presupposition of existence). Since an answer to a questionis only appropriate if the two share the same presuppositions (cf. Chornsky 1971:202), the exhaustiveness understanding would have to be shared by the question ifexhaustiveness were a logical presupposition. However, this is obviously not the

29. I will point out below that this is actually true of affirmative specificational sentences only.

30. It goes without saying that the exhaustivenessunderstanding must be understood with respect to arestricted universe of discourse (cf. Halvorsen 1978: 15). The sentences (47,a-b) do not say thatapart from John and Bill nobody ever insulted Mary.

28

answered by any one of the following sentences :

(48)(a) (Itwas) John.(b) (11was) John and Mary.(c) (lt was) John, Mary and Betty.

Each of these sentences has an exhaustiveness understanding. They suggest,respectively, that one, two and three persons left the room. Evidently, none of theseunderstandings can be shared by the question, otherwise only one of these answerswould be an appropriate reply. The conclusion must be that exhaustiveness is notlogically presupposed by specificational sentences.

On the other hand, exhaustiveness is not an entailment either." As pointed out byDelahunty (1981: 409), if the entailed sentence is false, then the entailing sentencemust (by definition) also be false. Hence, if exhaustiveness were entailed, thefollowing syllogism ought to succeed, whereas in [act it does not :32

Premise 1. If it was John who left the room, then only one person left theroom.

Premise 2. Mary also leftthe room.Conclusion. It was not John who left the room.

Another argument proving that

(49) It was JOHN who left the room.

does not logically entail

(50) Only one persen left the room.

is the following. If(50) were a logical entailment of (49), then (49) could not be trueif (50) were false. That is, if (50) were false, then the negation of (49), vÏZ.

(51) It was not John who left the room.

would have to be true. Now, if it turns out to be the case that (50) is false (becauseseveral people actually left the room), it does not automatically follow that (51)must be true. There is no reason to rule out the possibility that John was among thepeople who left the room. In a situation like this we cannot reaUy say that (49) is

3l. This runs counter to Atlas & Levinson's (1981 : 29-30) claim that "It was John that Mary kissed(...) cntailsMary kissed (exactly) one persen",

32. Still, I will point out below that there are exceptional cases in which exhaustiveness is entailed,viz. those cases in which the variabic is overtly expressed in the form of a singular definite NP.

29

false. Rather we wil! be inclined to say that (49), aIthough technieally true, isdeeeiving because it suggests (without asserting) that (50) is true. That is, (49) is notas inforrnative as it should be, and therefore violates one of Griee's (1975) principlesof conversation.

The above arguments, which show that exhaustiveness is neither presupposed,asserted nor entailed by (49), thus naturally lead us to the conclusion that theexhaustiveness understanding observed in (49) is an implicature. And, indeed, it isnot hard to see how exhaustiveness follows from the very act of specifieation if thespeaker is taken to abide by the conversational Maxims described by Griee (1975).The Maxim of Quality prescribes that the speaker should specify the correctvalue(s) for the variable; the Maxim of Quantity ('Make your contribution asinformative as required') prescribes that the speaker should give the complete(exhaustive) list of the values that satisfy the variabie. If tbe speaker is taken to beco-operative (i.e. abiding by the Maxims) the listener has a right to conclude thatthere are no values satisfying the variable apart from those listed in the focus of thespecifieational sentenee. This is why a sentenee like The one who wentout wasJohnimplicates the truth of the statement Only oneperson went out.

It is clear, then, that exhaustiveness follows directly from the act of specifieationitself. Exhaustiveness is nothing else than 'exhaustive listing'." It follows that there isno such implieature in predieational sentences. Compare:

(52)(a) (Who called you up a minute ago? -) BETIY called me up.(b) (Did anything interestinghappenwhile Iwas out? -) BETIY

called me up. (She said thaL)

In spite ofthe identieal intonation pattern, (52,a) is specifieational, whereas (52,b) isnot. While (52,a) implieates that nobody else called up the speaker, (52,b) does not.(Perhaps the speaker reeeived several phone calls, but Betty's is the only one shefinds worth mentioning.) HaUiday (1967: 225) notes that "the London brewer'sslogan We want Watney's,which envisaged the possibility that we might want otherthings as weU, was very early replaced by the identifying form What we want isWatney's." This is not surprising: the WH-deft is specificational and henceimplieates 'we do not want anything else', while We want Watney's ean beinterpreted predieationally. 34

33. 'Exhaustive listing' is actually thc term used by Kuno (1972). (H should be noted, however, thatKuno considers the exhaustive listing interpretation as a reading different from the contrastiveone: on p.269 he states that John kissed Mar)! but Bill did not and John (and only John) kissedMary are different interpretations of the sentenceJohn kissed Mary. It is clear that in our theorythese are not different interpretations: theyjust represent different aspects of the specificationalmeaning of the sentenee.)

34. Although there is no implicature of exhaustiveness in the scnse of 'exhaustive Iisting' inpredicationalsentences,predicational sentencesmay often implicate somethingverysimilar,for adifferentreason.Alias& Levinson(1981 : 46) note that when a speaker asserts(i.a) he implicates~~: ~

30

The eondusion that specifieational sentences have an exhaustiveness implieaturecalls for several interesting remarks :

A. It is clear from the mechanism engendering the implieature that the implieatureean only arise if the variable is uniquely defined. Now, this is usually the case sineethe variabie part of a specifieational sentence is usually a definite NP (cf. above)and, as is well-known, a definite NP always "conveys the speaker's understandingthat there is some referent that is to be identified uniquely in the eontextualknowledge shared by speaker and hearer" (Leech 1983: 90). As we have seen(section 2.6), the WH-clause of a WH-deft or it-deft always functions like adefinite nominal, and in noncleft specificational sentences the variabie part isusually also definitebut occasional examples ean be found in which it is not:

(53)(a) An exampleof this kind of war is WorldWar IJ.(b) Typical instaneesof this are Julius Caesar and Napoleon.(c) Something that Idon't understand is how the thief managed

to get in.

When the variable NP is indefinite, there is na uniqueness understanding. Sentences(53,a-c) leave open the possibility (and even suggest) that there are other examples,and other things that I do not understand. (We have spoken of an 'exc1usive'meaning: indefinite reference implicates that the reference is to only a subset of theset of items satisfying the referring description, i.e. that at least one item is ex1udedfrom the reference.) (When the indefinite NP involves another ar other asdeterminer the existence of other objects satisfying the description is evenasserted.)

It follows that (53,a-c) do not implicate the truth of (54,a-c):

(54)(a) WorldWar II is the only example of this kind of war.(b) Julius Caesar and Napoleonare the only typical instaneesof

this.(c) The only thing that Idon't understand is how the thief

managed to get in.

34. ../ ..(i)(a) RusselI wrote Princij:JiaMathematica.(b) Only RusselI wrote Principia Mathematica.

Sentcnce (i,a) can be interpreted specificationaUy(with contrastive accent on e.g. Russell) orpredicationaHy.H is true that even'on the latter interpretation (i,a) seems to implicate (i,b). Thiscan again be traeed back to the Maxim of Quantity. When we say that X wrote a book, weimplicate that X wrote the book completely.Otherwise (because of the Maxim of Quantity) wcwould say somethinglikeX helped 10 writethe baak or X wrotepart ofthe baak. Of course, if it isunderstood that X wroteCl the book completely,it fellows that X must be the only writer of thcbook. In (i.a) the implicature (i,b) thus arisesfrom the mere forrnulationof the VP.Howcver, inmost predicational sentencesthe VP does not triggersuch an implicature. For example, Socrateswas mortal does not implicate Only Socrates was mortal because be morlal is not a VP thatimplicatcs'completeness' the way write a book does.

:il

._ , .. ) •.•. ; _d .•.U..lO •......."Uv'" ..1...'\;) "".lV '-'J.Io.tJ..L.'-'u., UCi'-'<llU)Ç l.lt~

corresponding it-clefts do irnplicate the truth of (54,a-c):

(55)(a) ?It is World War 11Ihat is a typical instanee of this kind of war.(b) ?The ones that are typical instanees of Ihis are Julius Caesar

and Napoleon. '(c) ??It is how the thief managed to gel in thaI is something that I

don't undersland.

These sentences do irnplicate (54,a-c) because their WH-clauses are definite. (Thefact that sueh sentenees are rather unacceptable has already been pointed out andexplained in section 2.6.).

B. In some cases.the variabie is expressed in the farm of a singular definite NP:

(56)(a) The one who murdered Smith is JOHN.(b) The murderer is JOHN.

In that case the exbaustiveness understanding (Th ere is only one person who is themurderer') is of course not only implicated: it is entailed by the singularity and thedefiniteness of the variable NP. It follows that it does not make sense to add only tothe focus. Compare

(57)(a) The one who murdered Smith is my neighbour.(b) The one who murdered Smith is only my neighbour.

The .firs~sentence can be read specificationally (with my neighbour as focus) orpredicationally The former interpretation irnplicates 'only my neighbour', so thatth~ add!tion of only would be quite redundant on this reading. It follows that (57,b)will be interpreted difIerently (i.e. predicationally): it will be understood as meaningthat Smith's murderer is not someone with whom I have close relations. That is,(57,b) stresses that the murdcrer is not my son, or my brother, etc. but only myneighbour. .

C. Since t.he exba~tiven.ess understanding arises from the fact that a co-operativesp~ker usmg a s~eclficahonal sentence must give the fulllist of values satisfying thevan~ble, ~here will be na exhaustiveness implied (or rather irnplicated) in negativespecificational sentences, uniess the negation farms part of the presupposition. Thusthere is no exhaustiveness in (58,a), nor in in (58,b) if it is interpreted as (58,a):because no real act of specification takes place:

(58)(a) lt was not John who klssedMary.(b) JOHN did not kiss Mary.

What is expressed in (58,a) is merely that John is not the value (or one of tbevalues) satisfying the variabie. (That is, Jobn does not figure on the list of people

32

WIlO KJ.:)::it:U lYlary.) i ne seruence uoes nOL specuy wuicu vaiue \.ur sec 01 val Ut:.»)actually does satisfy the variabie, hence there is no sense of exhaustive listing, sincethere is no listing at all.

D. It is not easy to say whether exhaustiveness is a conventional implicature or justa conversational one. As is well-known, conversational implicatures are cancelable,whereas conventional ones are not because they are part of the meaning of theexpression. Now, as far as the exhaustiveness implicature is concerned we note thatthe use of a specificational sentence in a context which cancels tbe implicature issametimes acceptable, but sometimes not. Tbat is, the implicature appears to becancellabIe by some contexts but not by others. The following paragraphs providesome examples.

A clear illustration of how the implicature can be cancelled is provided bysentences like the following, in wbich the focus is preceded by an adverb that is a'particularizer', i.e. one of the focusing adjuncts that "restrict the application of thecommunication particularly or mainly to the part focused" (Quirk et al. 1972:431):

(59)(a) 1Iwas not only JOHN who kissed Mary.BILLand FRED didso too.

(b) It is mainly TOURISTS thaI come here.(c) Itwas especially the CHILDRENthat were afraid of her.(d) It is primarily the WORKERS that are dissalisfied with the

government's policy.

In (59,a) the implicature ('Only one person kissed Mary') is explicitly denied by theuse of not only. In (59,b-d) the particularizers tmainli: especially primarily) cancelthe implicature because each of them implies that it picks out only a subset of the setof entities referred to by the NP that follows it.

On tbe other hand, focusing adjuncts that are 'additives' do not cancel theimplicature. The sentences

(60)(a) Itwas also JOHN who ran away.(b) The one who ran away was also JOHN.

cannot be interpreted as saying that John was not the only one who ran away. If tbesentences are not unacceptable it is because another interpretation is available, viz.the reading on which John is taken to be tbe value not only of this variabie but alsoof another one (or other ones). That is, (60,a-b) are interpreted something like(61,a) (which is equivalent to (61,b»:

33

~-" '1'_'1 ,\ ,,""" .•.• "",n VI"} ,.H,-,I10I ".IV U••••.•" \UoIII.J I J •••H,~LH ,,'U.;) ul';:'V ..JUII.I

who ran away.(b) John was nol only Ihe one who did X (and Y) but he was also

the one who ran away.35

With an additive like even there is na specificational interpretation besides the onecancèlling the implicature, and because this does Dot appear to be permissibie thesentence is unacceptable:

(62) °lt was even John who ran away.

As pointed out by Dilion (1977; 9), Even John ran away "presurnes someone elseran away". This presumption runs counter to the implicature 'Only one person ranaway' bul is not capable of cancelling it, The sentence is therefore unacceptable."(The fact that the noneleft Even John ran away is not out is because this sentence,unlike the cleft, can he interpreted predicationally. On that reading there is noexhaustiveoess implicature, hence no semantic contradiction leading to unaccepta­bility.)

Sentences in which the specificational statement is followed by an additioncancclling thc exhaustiveness implicature do not appear to be acceptable:

(63)(a) °They were the ones who ran away, like us.(b) °11was they who ran away, among others.(c) 1"lt was Bill who ran away, but not just him. John and Mary

also ran away.

Atlas & Levinson (1981: 25) point out that sequences like the following are allright:

(64) 1Iwasn't John that Mary kissed - it was Mart and Riek.

Howevcr, this cannot be taken as an cxample of implicaturc cancelling, since (as wehave scen sub C.) there is no listing and hence no exhaustiveness implicature innegative clefts likc 1t wasn't John that Mary kissed.

Thc following sentences do not tcach us anything either about the possibility ofcancelling the exhaustiveness implicature:

(65)(a) Was it Bill and Fred who kissed Mary? - No, it was only Bili.(b) Was it Bill who ran away? - No, il was John and Mary.

35. Higgins(1976: 206) overlooks the possibilityof intcrpreting (60,a-b) as (6 1,a-b) when he makesthc claim that Wll-clefts cannot he interpreted specificational1yif alm is added to the copula.

36. The unacccptability ol seotenceslike (62) is also ooted by Gundel (1977a: 127). Surprisingly,thesentcnce II was even John who prolesled figures as an cxample that is oot starred (i.e. judgcdacceptable) in Quirk cl aL (1972: 438) and Quirk el aL (1985: 611).

lil ,oJ,a-o) we exnausuveucss ulluer:;t.allulUg HUl.!lI..;<UCUuy wu •.•~U>,,'uu uy "l'WI~~1A is denied by what is said by speaker B.37 However, this kind of 'correction' isalways possible, even with presuppositions (which are by definition not cancel­able):

(66) 11was John who closed the door. - No, he didn't. The doorwas closed all the time.

The only kind of cancelling that is relevant to the present discussion is that in whichone and the same speaker first implicates something and then rejects it. This is notpossible with presuppositions (witness (67,a» but is generally possible withconversational implicatures (CL (67,b), where the implicature 'John is no longer amember of the club' is cancelled by and he still is) :38

(67)(a) Ilt was John who locked the door, though the door was neveropened.

(b) John used to be a member of the club, and he still is.

The exhaustiveness implicature cannot be cancelled in this way:

. (68) 'It was Betty who came in last, although it was Mary too.

In fact, the only way in which the implicature can be cancelled appears to be by theuse of not only or chiefly, mainly, primarily, etc. (as in (59,b-d». This suggests thatthe implicature, although it arises from conversational principles, must beconventionalized to a (fairly high) degree.

I[i

37. Halvorsen (1978: 16) claims that qucstioned i/-defls do not implicate exhaustivc listing:«Qucstioned cleûs also have a focus constituent. It isJohn in the question Was it John thatMary kissed? But this question does not conventionally implicate that the list containingthe single name John is an exhaustive listing of the persons Mary kissed. If it had been SO,

the question would have been pointless.»I think this statement is not correct. What is implicated by the question is that (in the opinion ofthe speaker) there is only one person who kissedMary. The point of the question is whether it iscorrect to say that this person is John. There is no way in which the implicature makes thcqucstion pointlcss. (The problcm noted by Halvorsen ariscs only when the implicature is taken tobe Gilly John kissed Mary rather than Only one person kissed Mary. The element John is ofcourse the point of the question, However, it is clear from what we have argued that theimplicature in thc sentence under consideration is Only one person kissed Mary.)

38. That used to eonversationally implicatcs that thc habit referred to isa 'discontinued' one is pointedout by Comrie (1976, 1985).

E. The claim that (apart from the exceptions pointed out above) specificationalsentences have an exhaustiveness understanding expressabie in terms of only mightlead one to wonder why only is often used overtly before the focus of aspecificational sentence:

(69)(a) It was John that kissedMary.(b) Itwas only John that kissed Mary.

We may wonder if the use of only in (69,b) is not redundant. Could we simplysubstitute (69,a) for (69,b), or is there asemantic difference between them? Theanswer is that there is indeed a difference. Sentence (69,a) presupposes that some X(singular or plural) kissed Mary, asserts that X is John and implicates that only Johnis X (i.e. that no one else kissed Mary). Sentence (69,b), on the other hand,presupposes that John kissed Mary and asserts that no one else did (cf. Seuren1985: 304). This means that (69,a) and (69,b) have different presuppositions andmake different assertions. They are therefore likely to be used in different contexts.In answer to Who kissed Mary? we will normally use (69,a), not (69,b). Sentence(69,b), but not (69,a), will be appropriately used in answer to a question like Whoe/se kissedMary? The two sentences thus have different semantic properties, whichaccounts for the fact that they occur side by side. Only is not used redundantly in(69,b).

2.10. As noted above, a specificational statement provides an answer to an (eitherovert or implied) WH-question. Questions introduced by a WH-word (which, howwhy, etc.) always ask for specificational information, and may therefore always bec1efted themselves. For example, both the question and the answer in (70,a)) arespecificational, so that they are semantically equivalent to the e1eft sentences in(70,b):

(70Ha) Where did he go? - Hewent to Paris.(b) Where is it that he went? -11 is to Paris that he went.

There are, however, a couple of exceptions to the rule that WH-questions alwaysask for specificational inforrnation. The first concerns sentences that answerquestions with who. These may, but need not, be specificational. Consider:

(71) Who's the chairman? - That man over there. - Who is he? -He's the mayor of this town.

The question Who's the chairman? asks for specificational information. It maytherefore be replaced by Who is ft who is {hechairman? The question Who is he?,00 the other hand, is not equivalent to *Who is ft who is he? This sentence does not

36

ask for specificational information, but for what we will call 'descriptionally­identifying' information (cf. section 5). That is, Who is he? is interpreted somethinglike 'Can you tell me something more about him 7'.

This means that a question of the type 'Who is NP?' may be either a request tospecify a value for the variabie represented by who or an invitation to furnish furtherinformation about the referent of the NP. A suitable answer will be specificational inthe former case and 'descriptionally-identifying' in the latter (cf. section 5). In theformer case, but not in the latter, who is similar in use to which (one) in that itimplies that someone bas to be picked out from a set. In fact, the difference betweenWhich (one) is the chairman? and Who's the chairman? (on the specificationalinterpretation) is that which (one) implies tbat the value to be assigned to thevariabie is to be found in a restricted set of entities known to the speaker and thehearer, whereas who does not imply this. (This is why we can say Which of them isthe chairman? but not *Who of them is the chairman?).

A second exception to the generalization that WH-questions ask for specifica­tional information concerns questions introduced by whai. Apart from asking thehearer to specify a value for the variabie (as in (72,a», a what-question mayalso askfor a definition (as in (72,b»:

(72)(a) What was the cause of the accident?(b) What is a ouija board?

Altbough both questions could be answered by a copular sentence with deictic thatas subject, it is clear that there are fundamental differences hetween them. Providinga definition is not the same as specifying a value for a variable. To give a couple ofillustrations only (for 'definitional' sentences will be dealt with more extensively insection 7): (n,a) can be it-clefted, whereas (72,b) cannot:

(73)[a) What was it that was the cause of the accident?(b) 'What is it that is a ouija board?

In (72,a) whicb will he substituted for what if it is understood that the value is to beselected from a restricted set of candidates that is known to the speaker andhearer:

(74) Which (of these factors) was the cause of the accident?

There is no similar use of which in (72,b). That is, the sentence Which is a ouijaboard? is perfectly grammatical, but it asks for specificational information and notfor a definition.

These and other pieces of evidence (see section 7) make clear that what-questionsasking for definitions must be considered as constituting an exception to the rulethat WH-questions ask for specificational information.

37

The same conclusion might seem to hold for what-questions that ask forpredicational information:

(75)(a) What;s he? - He is a teacher.(b) What is he like? - He's a nice fellow.

However, the issue is not as simple as it may look. It is certainly true that, if we areconfronted with a predicational sentence and we are asked to reconstruct thequestion to which thissentence could be an appropriate reply,we will come up witha question of the type' What zsNl'?' or 'What isNP like1.39 However, this is not thesame thing as saying that we use a predicational sentence when we answer one ofthese.questions. A predicational NP (i.e. an NP denoting a property, profession,function, role, capacity,etc.) can be focalizedjust like any other NP (although thereare restrictionson this,which we will discussin chapter 4). In that case it is obviousthat the predicational NP is the focus of a specificationalconstruction :

(76)(a) He is a BAKER, not a BUTCHER!(b) It is a BAKER that he is, not a BUTCHER!(c) 1'11teil you what I think he is. He's a THIEF.

Since a predicational NP can thus be the focusof a specificationalsentence there isno a priori reason why we should not look upon the answers of What is X? andWhat is'X like? as specificational.And, indeed,we notice that an answer likeHe isa TEA CHER can be paraphrased as 'He is the following: a teacher',

However,we have seen that the speaker uttering a sentence of the type 'A is thefollowing: B' must make sure that B is an exbaustivelist of all the values satisfyingthe variabIe 'the X that A is'. And here a problem does arise. Most predicationalideas are not such that a statement of the kindA isX implicates 'hence X is not YZ, etc.'. Whereas in the specificational sentence The murderer is John'the focus i~interpreted as contrastive and exhaustive (because the murderer can only be oneperson to the exclusion of all others), the sentence John is a good student does notexclude that John may have other properties as weil. The property 'good student'does not exclude (and hence does not contrast with) other properties, such as thoseindicated by expressions like small, ugly. with brown hait; young, etc. For thisreason, a good student does not represent an exhaustive listingof the properties thatJohn has. This means that, even when used in answer to What is John like?, thesentence John is' a good student would seem to lack some of the salientcharacteristics of specificational sentences, viz, exhaustive listing and contrastive­ness.

39. What is he? is usually interp:eted as inquiring about such things as someone's profession, or hisfunction, or class-membership, Whal is he like ? is the usual question if the speaker expects thehearcr to IISSlgnn property or characteristic to tbc referent of the subject NP.

38

On the other hand, these characteristics need not be totally absent. A goodstudent stillcontrasts with a badstudent, and when the sentence is used in a situationin which students are being evaluated, John is' a good student does indicateexhaustivelyhow John is to be characterized in terrns of 'studenthood'. The contextcan thus narrow down the (otherwise almost infinite) set of properties from whichone is selected as the value for the variabIe. This narrowing down can even bemaximal, as in

(77) If there is one thing that he is not, it ;s intelligent.

Here the first clause states explicitly that only one property is in question.When the predicational NP denotes a profession, function or role rather than a

property, the sentence also more easily suggestsa contrast. Since most people haveonly one profession, the sentence John is a teacher readily suggests 'That's the(only) thing that he is'. In a context in which it is being discussedwhich member ofthe board has which function, the sentence John is' the treasurer automaticallysuggests 'not the president, nor the vice-president, etc.'.

The conclusion, I think, must be that when a sentence like John is a teacher orJohn is silly is used in answer to the question What is'John ? or What is John like ?,it is a specificational sentence with a predicational focus. Because of the specialcharacteristics of predicational elements some of the typical characteristics ofspecificational sentences (viz. contrast and exhaustiveness) may be more or lessobscured, and this in its turn may render it difficult to cleft the sentence (since cleftsrepresent a more emphatic kind of specificationalconstruction). However, this is noreason for abandoning the conclusion that such sentences specify a value for the(predicational) variabie in the question and are therefore basically specificational.

Returning now to the basic claim of this section, we can conclude thatWH-questions generally ask for specificational information in the sense that theyask the hearer to specifya value for the variabIe represented by the question-word,i.e. ask him to use a specificational sentence as reply. (The only exceptions are thatquestions with who may, in some contexts, be answered by means of a'descriptionally-identifying' sentence and that questions with what may ask for adefinition.j'? This conclusion is in keeping with Rochemont's (1986: 19)observation that "wh phrases function naturally as foei" (cf. also Danes 1967,Horvath 1981) and that a "wb phrase may be informally viewed as a kind ofvacuous operator, binding an open position in a proposition for which the speakerintends the audience to provide an appropriate value • the focus, or newinformation" (ibid.),

40. The use of who asking for descriptionally-identifying information will be discussed in section 5 ofthis chapter. The use of what in questions asking for a definition wil! be treated in section 6. Theproblems in conneetion with specifieational sentences with a predicational focus wil! beexarnincd in more detail in chapter 3.

~.! 1. ujJc,\.-lUwllUual :,tllLt:uws oi tne torrn 'NP! be NP2' are 'reversible'.That is, thetwo NPsmaybe permuted (so as to yield'NP2 beNPl') without any semantic effect.This means that either the variabie NP or the focus can occur as superficialsubject." For example:

(78)(a) (Who is it who is the bank robber? -) The bank robber isJohn Thomas.

(b) (Who is it who is Ihe bank robber? -) John Thomas is Ihebank robber.

(79)(a) What we need is love.(b) Love is what we need.

In WH-clefts, this reversibilityleads to clear ambiguity:

(80)(a) What I told him was what she wanted 10 know.(b) What she wanted 10 know was what I told him.

Both these sentences (which come from Huddleston (1971: 135» allow the twointerpretations paraphrasable as 'It was wbat she wanted to know that I told him'and 'It was what I told him that she wanted to know'. That is, both the precopularconstituent and the postcopular one can be interpreted as either the variabie part orthe value of the specificational structure. (At least, this double possibility existswhen the sentences are written. In speech, the intonation pattern will make clearwhich of the constituents is to be interpreted as the focus (value).)The possibility of permuting the two NPs is of course related to tbe fact that

specificational sentences "have as their most characteristic function that ofidentifyingan entity referred to by means of one expressionwith an entity referredto by anotber expression" (Kahn 1973: 473). Since the referents of the twoexpressionsare identifiedwith each other, it doesnot reallymatter whicb expressionis placed first.On the other band, there may be independent reasons for putting ornot putting one of tbe expressionsin a particular position, and it is therefore natura!that we should have to mention a number of exceptions to the reversibilityrule.First, specificationa! sentences of the form 'It is + NP' (e.g. It is John) are notreversibie (*John is it). This is because (as we will see.below) such sentences are

41. In discussingthe ruleof reversibilityIwiJlconcentrateonspecificationalstructuresofthe type'NPbe NP' becausethere are too many factorsdisturbingreversibility whenoneof theconstituentsdoesnothavethe formofanNP.Forexample,when the valueisaprepositionalphrase,it will notnormaIly take the subject position for the simple reasonthat the subjectof a sentencemustnormallyhavethe form of anNP:(i)(a) The usual method of sotvinq this problern is by firing the coach.(b) ??Byfiring the coach is the usual method of solving this problem.

(Thai sentenceslike In the woods is where I found iJ seemallright isdueto the faet(pointedoutbelow) thal WH-c1auseswith where, when, hOIll why and who are not normally processedassuperficialsubjectof a specificationalsentence,)

40

reduced it-clefts and it-cleftsdo not allow the permutation in question. Secondly,, . .when the subject NP is deictic that (with reference to a person), the permutation IS

not aUowed either. Thus, we can use (81,a-c), but not (81,d) in answer to thequestion Who's the chairman?:

(81)(a) The chairman is THAT MAN OVER THERE.(b) THAT MAN OVER TH ERE is the chairman.(c) THAT's the chairman.(d) *The chairman is THAT.

Thirdly, anaphoric demonstratives cannot be processed as subject complements(predicate nominals):

(82)(a) She said that I was a creep and THIS/THAT was what mademe sado

(b) "She said that I was a creep and what made me sad wasTHIS/THAT.

(83)(a) (A couple of strangers were there too.) I think THOSE/THESE were the murderers.

(b) (A couple of strangers were there too.) *1think the murdererswere THOSE/THESE.

Cases like tbese will be discussedin chapter 5 (section 3.3.2). An explanation oftherestrietion will be proposed there.

A fourth exception concerns WH-c1efts.As noted by Quirk et al. (1972: 955),WH-clauses that are introduced by who, where or when will not normally occur asthe superficial subject of a WH-deft:

(84)(a) The police chlel was who I meant.(b) ??Who I meant was the pollee chief.

(85)(a) Here is where the accident took place.(b) ??Where the accident took place is here.

(86)(a) (In) Autumn is when the countryside is most beautiful.(b) ??When the countryside is most beautiful is in Autumn.

In fact the restrietion also holds for how and why:,

(87)(a) Lack of money is why he did it.(b) ??Why he did it is lack of money.

(88)(a) With a gentie touch is how it should be done.(b) ??How it should be done is with a gentle touch.

Tbe fifth exception concerns specificational sentences in which the variable NP isindefinite,while the presupposed variabie as a whole is definite:

(89) (One of your men is a traitor. - Who (is it who) is a traitor? -)BILL is a traitor.

41

In the last sentence of (89) a traitor is an indefinite NP representing the variable, butthe presupposed variabie as a whole is definite ('the one who is a traitor'), as it alsois in the corresponding ft-deft or WH-deft. This sentence is not reversible:

(90) *A traitor is BILL.

There is no reversibility either if the definite artiele is dropped from a definitevariabie NP (as is sometimes possible, ct section 3.5). Compare:

(91)(a) BILL is the captain of the team.(b) The captain of the team is BILL.(c) BILL is captain of the team.(d) 'Captain of the team is BILL.

This is a restrietion that is hard to account for. There is no a priori reason why itshould be impossible for an indefinite variabIe NP to become the subject of aspecificational sentence, as the following is grammatical :

(92) An exampleof this was Hitier's attitudetowards the Jews.

The only difference between (92) on the one hand and (90) and (91,d) on the otheris that the presupposed variabie is definite in the latter (viz. 'the X who is a traitor'and 'the X who is captain of the team') but not in (92): here the variabIe is 'an Xwhich is an examp!e of this'). The restrietion thus appears to be that a definitevariabie cannot be represented by a nondefinite subject Np' though it can berepresented by a nondefinite predicate nominal, I have no explanation of this, apartfrom the suggestion that the restrietion might be connected with the fact that thesubject NP expresses the theme (topic) of the sentence (in the sense of: what thesentence is about) and that a nondefinite NP is not a suitable means of informing thehearer that the sentence is going to he about a definite variabie.

A sixth exception follows simply from the well-known rule that English preferssentences with a short subject NP and a relatively long VP to sentences in which theVP is much shorter than the subject. Thus, although both (93,a) and (93,b) are fine,(94,b) is much less acceptable than (94,a) because the nominal that is now thesubject is much longer than the subject complement NP:

(93)(a) Our strategy is: DENlAL.(b) DENlAL is our strategy.

(94)(a) Our strategy is to deny every charge that is made against us.(b) ?Todeny every charge that is made againstus is our

strategy

A final set of exceptions follow from the rule of 'topic continuity' (Givón 1983).I~in a particular discourse, we have the choice between two variants of asentence,

42

we will preferably select the one whose topic (theme)" is the same as in thepreceding discourse. Thus, (95,a) is more coherent (and thus 'better') as a stretch ofdiscourse than (95,b):

(95)(a) What's the problem? - The problem is that I have nainfluentialfriends.

(b) What's the problem? - That I have na influential friends isthe problem.

The principle of topic continuity (which will be more extensively dealt wit~ inchapter 5) accounts for the fact (observed by Hetzron (1970: 908» that (97,a) IS a"natural sequel" to (96,a), but not to (96,b), whereas one would expect (97,b) tofollow (96,b) rather than (96,a):

(96)(a) The institutehas a director appointed by the board oftrustees.

(b) The council elects one of its members as president. .(97)(a) The director of the institute is the presidentof the.co~ncii.

(b) The presidentof the council is the director of the institute.

The sentence topic of (97,a) (the director of the institute) is already mentioned in(96,a), but not in (96,b). Hence there is topic continuity if (97,a) follows. (96,a), n~tif it follows (96,b). Conversely, topic continuity wil! be p~eserved If (96,b) .IS

followed by (97,b). The topic of the latter sentence (the president of the council)does not link up with anything in (96,a), but it does link up with (96,b).

Hetzron (1970: 908) concludes from these facts that (97,a) "is not the sa~e as"(97,b). Ithink this conclusion is not warranted. The facts observ~ do not pomt to adifference in the semantic contents of the two sentences. They just show that theprinciple of topic continuity helps to determine the pragmatic use of su~h sentenc~.Putting (97,a) after (96,b) or (97,b) after (96,a) does not result m semannccontradiction or in some other violation of semantic restrietions. It just makes forstretches of discourse that are not optimal in that they are not as coherent as theycould have been.

In sum, there are at least seven types of exceptions to the rule that specificationalcopular sentences (involving NPs as subject and as subject comple~ent). ~rereversible. (The last of these is less stringent, as it is a question of pragmatic felicityrather than of grammaticality or semantic acceptability.) The fac~ that, apart fro~these exceptions, specificational sentences of this type ~re rev~rslble may. m~ke ltdifficult to establish which of the two NPs is the underlymg subject and which IS thepredicate nominal.? Still, there are some indications that it is the focus (value) NP

42. I'm using 'topic' or 'theme' here in the sense of'what the sentence is about' (nol in thc sense of'oldinformation'). As is well-known, the topic is very aften the subject.

43. Blom & Daalder (1977) devote a lot of attention 10 this problem, yet the conclusions thcy comeup with seem to me 10 be patcntly wrong.

'''~, '''> u,,_ uuu"'H.Yltl~ ~UUJtl,.;lut tue sentence:

A. Consider the following question-answer pairs:

(98)(a) Who's Ihe Ihief? - BILL is Ihe Ihief.(b) Who's Ihe Ihief? - The Ihief is BILL.

IC we ~u~e that it is the s~ntenee BILL is the thief that reflects the (underlying)order subject + verb + ~redlcate nominai', we must assume that Who is the thief?reflects the s.ame order (i.e, that who is the subject): if is the thief is the predicate inthe answer, u must also be the predicate in the question.

One ~ight object t~ this, saying that the word order Who's the thief?is the resuItof applying WH-frontmg to The thief is who? If this is correct, who is the predicatenominal 10 the question and Bil! is consequently the predicate nominal in theanswer. However, this objection appears untenable when we consider sentences likethe following:

(99) A. One of them is a thief.B. Which one is a/ths thief?A. Bil! is a/the Ihief.B. Thera thief is BiIJ.

In the questi?n Which ?ne is a thief? the order of the constituents must be subject +verb + predlca~e nominal: no WH-fronting can have applied, sinee we cannotaccept a question of the form *A thief is whicb one? This situation remainsunchanged when v:e substitute the thief for a thief. (This substitution is possiblebecause the precedmg context bas established that one (and only one) particularpers~n from ~ group ~ a thief; we can therefore refer to that person as the thief) InWhich on~ IS the {hief? the NP which one is therefore the subject, and in thecorrespondmg answer BILL is the thiefthe subject is Bill, This is confirmed by thefact ~hat BILL is the 'hief aIternates with BILL is a thief, in which a thief cannotpossibly be the subject.

B. Hi~ns (1976: I.40ff) points out a couple of tests that can help to make cIearwhat IS the underlymg constituent order of the copular sentences. One of them is?as~ on the.observation that subject-auxiliary inversion does not take plaee inindirect questrons, Because of this, indirect questions ofthe form 'WH-word +NP +be'can be traeed back to (direct) questions ofthe form 'WH-word + he +NP'. Thus,from the order of the constituents in (lOO,a-b) we learn that the corresponding

44

direct question has the (underlying) order of (lOl,a) and not of (lOl,b):44

(100Ha) I asked him which one was the/a thief.(b) *1asked him which one the/a Ihief was.

(101Ha) Which one is a/the thief?(b) *The/a thief is which one?

C. Another test that we can use consists in inserting a modal auxiliary in thequestion. If in the question Which one (is it who) is a thief? the NP whichone is thesubject (as we are arguing), insertion of an auxiliary like can wil! yield

(102)(a) Which one can be a thief?(b) Which one can it be who is a thief?

If the underlying subject were a thief, the resulting sentences would have to be

(103)(a] *Which one can a thief be?(b] *Which one can il be who a thief is?

Since (103,a-b) are plainly ungrammatical, we can conclude that a thief is not thesubject.

D. Similar results are obtained when we embed the question under a verb ofpropositional attitude:

(104)(a) Which one do you think is a thief?(b) 'Which one do you Ihink a thief is?

44. One might wonder whether the fact that subject-auxiliary inversion does operate on directquestions could provide us with another test. However, this does not appear to be the case,because subject-auxiliaryinversionapplies to superficialrather than to underlying subjects (cf. thegrammaticality of Is John hard laplease? where John is superficialsubject and underlying directobject). This rneans that, sinceboth NPs can in principle become superficialsubject, both shouldbe capable of participating in subject-auxiliary inversion. This does appear to he the case,although (for various pragmatic reasons) one alternative generally seems to be better than theother. Compare:

(i)(a) Who is the murderer? - John.(b) Is JOHN the murderer?(c) ?Is the murderer JOHN?

(ii)(a) Whal he gave me was a BOOK.(b) ?Was a BOOK what he gave you?(c) Was what he gave you a BOOK?

45

In sum, there appears to be ample evidence that in specificationalsentences it isthe NP representingthe focus that is the (underlying)subject.4S,46This means thatthe unmarked word order in the surface structure must be taken to be the one inwhich the focusNP fillsthe subjectposition.Specificationalsentencesin which it isthe ~aria?le NP that fills the position of the superficial subject are 'inverted'specificationalsentences.This conclusionisparticularlyrelevant to the treatment ofWH-clefts, since the term 'inverted pseudo-cleft'has actually been used with twodifferent meanings in the linguistic literature. For Prince (1978) an invertedpseudo-cleftis ~n~i.nwhich theWH-clausedoes not occur as subject; for Quirk etal. (1972: 954) it isjust the other way round: theWH-cleft iscalled 'inverted' whenthe WH-clause is .processedas the subject of the sentence. If the terminology isbase~~n the ~.uestlOnofwhichconstituentis subjectin the underlyingstructure, thedefinition of inverted WH-cleft' must be as in Quirk et a1.47This conclusion isconfirmed by the restrictionson reversibilitythat we have noted above. Most ofth~e restrictions co~cem the impossibility for an NP which (in our theory) issubject c.OI~ple~entin underlyingstructure to occur as superficialsubject.That is,the restnetion IS always that what we consider to be the noninverted structure ispossible,whereas the inverted one is not. There are no caseswhere the restrietionworks the other way round. This is strong evidence in favour of Quirk et al.'s(1972) definition of inverted specificationalsentences.(As regards WH-clefts wewill therefore consider as inverted that version in which the WH-clause occupiesthe subject position in the surface structure.)

I would like to note, finally, that the question of which element of aspecificational copular sentence is the underlying subject and which is the

45. This conclusion is in koeping with Givón's (1973: (19) claim that it is a universal restrietion 00

predicate nomina!s that they must be lessgeneral than their subjeets. As we wil! argue in seetion2.12., the variabie NP of a specificational sentence is 'attributive' (in the sense of Donnellan(1966», whereas the value NP may be referential or attributive. Since "the referential is lessgeneral than the attributive" (Givón 1973: 118), the restrietion coneurs with the claim that it isthe value NP that is the underlying subject.

46. Rensky (1981: 140) reaches tbe same conclusion, but 00 a rather dubious basis. Concerning thesentence

(i) Man's most obvious sign ol age is the dry, wrinkled, Ilaccid skin that marks hislate years. (Huddleston 1971 : 133-134)

he notes that while (i) "is contextually freely reversibie, a substitution of represent for be confirmsthe obvious assumption that the more specificskin is the subject and the more general sign (...) thecomplement". However, tbe conclusion would be just the otber way round if we substitutedconsist in for beo This shows that no conclusions are 10 be drawn from this kind ofparaphrasi ng.

47. Huddlestoo (1971: 136) takes another criterion, viz. the accentuatioo pattern: "Since the norrna!position for the nuclear stress in clauses in general is (other things being equal) at the end of theclausen and since the nuclear accent of a specificationa! seotence falls on the focus (value), heassumes that the variable-as-subject version is "basic" and the focus-as-subject type "marked",

46

underlying subject complement is not just a theoretical issue w.ithout pr~cticalimplications.The answer to this question is directly relevant to the mterpre~t1~nofany specificationalsentence.For example, we have already noted the ambiguity ofsentenceslike What I told him was what she wanted to know and What she wantedto know was what I told him.Concerningthis,Huddleston (1971 : 136) notes: "Thisambiguity can be accounted for by postulating two different functionsor case~,a~'identifier' and an 'identified', such that in the first interpretation what I told him IS

the identifier what she wanted to know the identifiedand vice versa for the secondinterpretation. (We would expect identifierand identifiedto be special instancesofmore general deep structure cases,but I shall not consider this qu~tion her~.)" Inmy opinion, the functions 'identifier' and 'identified' correlate directly with thefunctions 'subject' and 'subject complement' in the underlying structure of thespecificational copular sentence. In other words, the i~entified.is th.econstituentinvolvingthe variable, the identifier is the value, and (.ma specificationalcop~larsentence) these functions correspond with the functions of underlymg subjectcomplement and subject, respectively.

2.12. The NP representing the variabie of a specificationalsentence is a 'referring'NP only in a weak senseof the term. Although the descriptiongivenin the NP (e.g.the bank robber has a particular referent, it does not by itselfenable the hearer toidentify this referent (i.e. to piek him out from a set). Thus, in

(i OSlA. Who is the bank robber?B. The bank robber is JOHN THOMAS.

speaker A uses the description the bank robber to refer to someone who is n~tidentifiablefor him from the mere use of the description. In fact, the purpose of bissentence is preciselyto inquire into the identity of the person in question.

It is clear that the description the bank robber in (105,A) satisfies therequirementsofwhat Donnellan (1966) has caUedthe 'attribu:ive' use of a definiteNP: {he bank robber is a definite description whose referent IS not known to thespeaker(so that the speaker cannot 'identify' him in the senseof 'pi~khim out') .andwhich is essenrialto the speaker (rather than just being one of vanous descripuonsthat could be used)because it is the only description that he can produce to.refer ~othe person in question. These requirements would not seem to be satisfied lil(105,B),as speakerB obviouslyknows the identity of the refer~ntand can.producealternative descriptions.However, the use of the bank robber in (105,B) 15 just auecho of its use in (105,A) - we must keep in mind that the variable of aspecificationalsentence is always presupposed - and it therefore seernsreasonableto say that {hebank robber is alsoused attributivel~by s~eaker~. The ~urpo~eof aspecificationalsentence with a definite NP as vanable IS precisely to ldentIfy thereferent of an NP whose use has remained attributive for the hearer.

'[he claim that thc variabic NP of a specificational sentence is attributive is notnew. lt has ~~ mad~ ~y e.g ..Fodor (1976: 203) and Elffers (1979: 109).48 On theether hand, rt IS explicitly rejected by Higgins (1976) (who calls the relevant NP'superscriptional' because it resembles the heading of a list.):

Clearly ~he~upersc~plional and the attributive noun phrases differ in semantic function;~he auributive reading of a noun phrase is aften used precisely when one is unable to stateIN ~/ly more exact way who or whatfits a eertm'ndescription: One is, as it were, a symptomof ignorance, (he other 0/ kIlowIedge,

True as ~h~ cernment may be, I do not think it is an argument against the view thatsupcrscr,lpllo~al NPs are uscd attributivcly, for we can arguc (as I have done inconneetion with (105,B» that the attributive NP in the specificational sentence is anecho of the prcceding context. In a specificational sentence the speaker identifies thereferent of an NP which up to that point has been attributive for the hearer

Higgi?s ~1976: 170-171) also offers two more specific objections to the vi~w thatsupcrscriptional NPs are used attributively The first is that there exist NPs whichcan only be uscd supcrscriptionally, that is, which cannot be used attributively inany other context. An example of this is what he wants 10 marry in (106,a), which,as appcars from the ungrammaticality of (l06,b), cannot be used as subject of aprcdicational sentence:

(10S)(a)What he wants 10 marry is an actress.[b) 'What he wants 10 marry is blonde and wealthy,

However, why ~hould the fact that phrases like what he wants to marry can only beuscd as the vanable part of a spccificational sentence enforce the conclusion thatsuch an NP is not attributive? In my opinion, the only conclusion that we can drawfrom, the un~ram~at,icality of (106,b) is that an NP like what he wants 10 marry isheavily restncted In lts use. (This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the NPcannot even occur in spccificational sentences that are interrogative: 'Who is whathe wants 10 marry 7).

~iggins' second argument is that "if one collapses the superscriptional and theattnbutivc readings", one cannot account for alI the possible interpretations ofsentences like the following:

48. ElITe~(1979: ,1?9) even claims that thc attributive character of the superficialsubject NP is asUm~lcnlcondition for lhe sentcnce to bc specificational. However, this is plainly inCOITlXt,sinceprcdicational sentences and identity statements with an attributive NP as subject are impecc­able:(i)(a) Smith's murderor must be insane. (on Ihe reading: 'Whoever il is Ihal murdered

Smilh must be insane')(b) Tha leader of the party always IS Ihe Prime Minister, (is = 'is thesarnepersenas')

(Mor,cover,th~ alt~butivc NP in the spcciïicational scntcnce need not bc lhe supcrficial subjectNp' since specificational sentences are rcversible.)

48

(107) The winner of the election might have been the loser.

Among the many readings of this sentence we note the following two:

(108)(a) The winner of the election might have been the following: theloser. (= specificational)

(b) The winner of the election might have been the same personas the loser.(= identity statement)

Higgins points out that the winner of the election is superscriptional in (108,a) andmay be attributive in (108,b). Ris argument now is that the two readings could nolonger be distinguished if we collapsed the superscriptional and the attributivereadings. However, it should be pointed out here that what we argue is no morethan that superscriptional NPs are used attributively. We do not 'collapse' the twomeanings, i.e. we do not identify them with one another. We just say that one of theuses of attributive NPs is as superscriptional NPs in specificational sentences.Besides, one of the premisses of Higgins' argument is that the ambiguity of (107)depends on an ambiguity in the subject NP: it is assumed that (107) is readspecificationally if and only if the subject NP is read superscriptionally. However,there is no evidence that the interpretation of the sentence works like this ratherthan the other way round (i.e. there is no rcason why we should not adopt the viewthat the subject NP is interpreted as superscriptional because the sentence is readspecificationally). In this conneetion we can point out that the readings (108,a) and(108,b) can be brought out by the intonation of the sentence, without the subjectNP playing any decisive part in this: reading (108,a) is produced when we putcontrastive accent on loser and have a slight pause ('colon intonation') before thisNP; reading (108,b) is produced when wc put the nuclear accent on been, Theclaim that the two readings can no longer be distinguished if we assume that thesubject NP is attributive on both interpretations is thus clearly not warranted.

In sum, it can be argued that attributive NPs can be used both in specificationalsentences (in which case the NP can be called the 'superscriptional NP' or 'variabIeNP') and in other types of sentences (e.g. predicational sentences, identitystatements, etc.).

I hasten to add that this does not mean that a superscriptional NP has to bedefinite (although it usually is). As noted above, examples like the following arespecificational:

(109) An example of Ihis is Ihe decline of civilization in the westernworld.

There are two avenues open to us here. We can simply assume that superscriptionalNPs are attributive only if they are definite - since Donellan has made thedistinction only for definite NPs - or we may assume that indefinite NPs can also beused in two different ways, resembling the referential/attributive contrast. Thelatter assumption is in fact not uncommon in the linguistic literature. Many linguists

4Q

have argucd for some kind of referentiallattributive distinction in conneetion withindefinite NPs. For example, quite a few have c1aimed that the well-knownspccific/nonspecific contrast is no other than Donnellan's distinction applied toind:finite NPs (see ~.g. Heringer 1969: 94, Palacas 1977: 202, Taglicht 1972: 12,Klem 1980: 153, Rivero 1975: 39). Tbe fact that specificational sentences with anindefinite varia?le NP such as (109) are grammatical (though rare - cf. Higgins1976: 196, Quirk et al 1985: 742) therefore presents no real problem for the claimthat superscriptional NPs are attributive.

Tbc conclusion that the variable NP of a specificational sentence is attributiveautomatically explains why 'strongly referring' NPs like anaphoric pronouns,proper names and demonstrativc pronouns (or NPs with a demonstrativedete~min~r) cannot be used superscriptionally" Sentences like thc following are notspecificational (but, as we will see in section 5, descriptionally-identifying):

(110Ha) Who's that man? - Thai man is Ihe Prime Minister.(b) (Thera'sa mansmokinga pipa in the corner.)Who is he? -

He's Ihe PrimeMinister.(e) (Yousay you gave it to John.)Who's John? - He's a son of

my neighbours'.

It may bc noted, finally, that, as far as the focus (value) NP is concerned,Donncllan's referential/attributive distinction is not criterial at alloIn thc example

(111Ha) Who a.r~you lookingfor? - I'm looking for tha man drinkinga martini,

(b) Who is il that you are lookingfor? -It's the man drinking amartini that l'rn lookingfor.

the f<><:us.NP the man drinking a martini may be both referential and attributive,(That IS, the speaker may know who it is that is drinking a martini and use thedescription the man drinking a martini as one of various possiblemeans to refer to~hatperson; or he may not know which person fits the descriptionand use the latterIn the sense of 'whoever it is that is drinking a martini")

49. Ho~ever, cxccptions are possiblc where proper names are conccmed. There are some cases inwhich proper names are not uscd in a strongly rcferring way, i.e. are not suffieient to piek out thercfere~t from a group. For exarnple, even if I know who John is (so that the mere use of the nameJohn IS normally sufficicnt la identify the referent), there may be oircumstances in which thename John does net sufflce 10 piek out John from a set, e.g. when John belongs 10 a group ofpcop~etha.tare masked.In that case we can ask the question Which one is John? and reccivc the(spccificational) rcply John is {he one witn {he red mask (or 1/ is the one with the red mask that isJohn). For further examples and discussion, sec Chaptcr 2.

2.13. Specificational sentences are the only type of copular sentences tnat snow'connectedncss'. This means that elements from both the focus and the presupposi­tion participate in the application of certain rules, An example of such a rule isreflexivization,which may involve elements from both constituents, even if thesebelong to different superficial clauses." For example: 51

(112)(a) What Johnj did was wash himselfj/*himj/*herselfj•(b) What John,wants Maryj to do is wash him/*himself1/herselfj•(e) John's. greatesttreasure is a book about himselfrhimj.

The fact that there is connectedncss in specificational sentences but not in othercopular sentences accounts for the differencc between (I 13,a) (which is specifica­tional) and (113,b) (which is predicational):

(113)(a) The job Fred has aeeepted is to write a baak aboul himself.(b) The job Fred has aceepted is a souree of agony for him.

Apart from reflexivization, thc following examples of connectedness offerthcmselves:

A.What is perhaps the most basic kind of connectedncss is that, because it specifiesa value for a variable, the focal item must be of the appropriate semantic class, i.e.the class represented by the variabie (cf. Akmajian 1979: 19).52This explainsobservations like the following:

(114)(a) What he wrotewas a BOOK.(b) 'Whal he wrote was an APPLE.63

B. A negative or near-negative element in the variabie part of a specificationalsentence can trigger the use of a 'negative polarity item' (nonassertive word orphrase) in the focus:

50. Because reflexivization is claimed la be a clause-internal rule, the fact that the two clauses of e.g. aWH-deft are involved in thc opcration has aften been considered as evidence for deriving suchspecificational structures from an underlying simple sentence (sec e.g. Akmajian 1979).

51. The faets about reflexivization referred to here have aften been noted in thc linguistic Jiterature.

52. To put it in words that have to do with the list analogy: "a weU-formed list contains items thatconform to the heading at the top of the list, and therefore a well-formed list will only consist ofsemantic predicates if tbc heading states that such are being listed" (Higgins 1976: 95).

53. These selectional restrictions are obviously the same as in noneleft sentenccs. In the olderIiterature this was aften taken as evidcncc that elefts are transformationally derived from sirnplesentences (see e.g. Lees 1963).

51

(115)(a) What I have never noticed is any signs of dissatisfaction.(b] 1I is rarely that we need do thaI.(c) It is seldorn that we receive any help.[d] What John hasn't done is leaveyeU'a/ready.(Halvorsen

1978: 6)(e) What John doesn't want is everto be left alone. (ibid.)(ij Whal he omitteddoing was telling anybodylhal he would

leave.

There is na such connectedness in predicational sentences:

(116)(a) What he omitteddoing was as interesling10 some of us aswhat he did do.

(b) Whal you never rmtleedwas noliced by some of us.(c) What John hasn't done is a/readya subject of conlroversy.

C. A reciprocal pronoun in the focuscan refer to NPs occurring in the variabie part.Compare the specificationalsentence (117,a) with the predicational (117,b):

(117)(a) Whal Ihe two of Ihemdid was kiss each olher.(b) 'Whal Ihey did was surprisingto each other.

D. Quantifier shift can move a quantifier from the variabie part into the focus:

(118) What the litttebastardsdid was all gel in Ihe tub at Ihe sametime. (Hankamer1974: 223)

There is na sueh possibilityin predicational sentences:

(119)(a) What all the little bastarosdid was sursprising10 us.(b) 'What the little bastardsdid was all surprising to us.

E.When the presuppositionpart of the specificationalstructure is a finiteclauseandthe focus is a nonfinite clause, bath clauseshave to share the same (progressiveornonprogressive)aspect:«

(120)(a) What he did was work in the garden.(b) Whal he was doing was working in Ihe garden.(c) 'What he did was working in Ihe garden.[d) 'Whal he was doing was work in Ihe garden.

54. The present participlc working in (120,b) and (120,c) is an obligatory reduction of be workingand therefore has progressive meaning (cf. Declerck 1981b).

52

Predicational sentences again do not share this farm of connectedness. Thefollowing predicational examples are grammatical although one clause is progress­ive whereas the other is not :55

(121)(a) What John does for a living has been causing some bitter­ness lately

(b) What John has been doing has caused a great deal ofbitterness.

F.This matching of the two verb farms in specificationalsentences is also possiblewhere perfect aspect is concemedr=

(122) What he's done is spoilt the whole thing. (Quirk et al. 1972:955)

However, the perfect aspect of the focal clause is more aften neutralized:

(123) What he's done is spoll the whole thing.

G. When the focusof an U-eleftis an NP functioning as the object of a preposition,the preposition may occur either in the elefted constituent or in the variabie part(WH-clause) :

1124)(a) 1I is 10 John that I was lalking.(b) lt is John thai I was lalking 10.

H. Ir the verb of a WH-c1auseof a eleft is an intensional verb, the focus is ineludedin its scope, even when the focus precedes the WH-clause:

(125)(a) 1I is a Swedish girl ïhat I want 10 marry(b) Whal I wanilo marry is a Swedish girl.

In these sentences the possibilityof interpreting a Swedish girl as a nonspecificNP(which has no referent in the world of discourse) is created by the presence of wantin the WH-clause. Sentences like these should be compared with

(126) The one I want to marry is a nice person.

55. Notice that this is not due to some restrietion on the formation of progressive verb forms, sincebath do and cause readily yield progressive forms.

56. Once again we may note the similarity between specificational sentences and question-answerpairs:

li) What has he done? - Spoiled the whole thing.

53

"'h •••., !-,1"UIUlllUil~llOlerpretat~on,a nice person is a property NP (predicationalNP), not a nouspeciûcone.57ThISmeans that the predicationalNP is not within thescope of the intensionalverb in the subjectclause.

In sum, examplesof various kindsshow that there is connectednessbetween thetwo parts of a specificational sentence, whereas there is none between thecomparable parts of predicational sentences.

57. The claim (?at a property NP is a nonspecific NP is false,though it has occasionally been made in(he linguistic literature. A nonspecific NP is 'weakly referring' h i h, ttrib . 'd fi . ,muc In t e same way as an;.,2 utlVCbe mrte NP (cf. ~ection 2.12). A property Np' in contrast, is not referring at all. Theirterenee etween the two IS stressed e.g. by Kuno (1970).

54

3. PREDICATIONAL SENTENCES

Section 2 was concerned with the definition of specificationalsentencesand anexamination of their salient characteristics.In this section I will concentrate on thesecond major group of copular sentences, which, following Higgins (1976),Akmajian (1979) and many others, I will call 'predicational'. Predicationalsentences derive their name from the fact that instead of specifyinga value for avariabie (i.e. identifyinga referent) they merely predicate something of the referentof the subjectNP.In most casesthis 'something' isa characteristic,a role, a function,or an indication of classmembership. For example:

(1)(a) John is a teacher. (= John teaches)(b) Mary is a prettygir!.(c) John is the cleverest student of them all.

Becausemany predicational sentencesascribe a characteristic to the referent ofthe subject NP - perhaps even all predicational sentencescan be said to have thisfunction if the term 'characteristic' is used in a very broad sense -58 some linguistsrefer to them as 'characterizational'sentences(e.g.Kuno&Wongkhomthong 1981,Quirk et al. 1985). I myself will sometimes use the term 'property NP' (next to'predicationaJNP') to refer to the predicate nomina! of such sentences.

Predicational sentenceshave the following characteristics:

3.1. A predicational sentence is not felt to answer a question asking forspecificational(identifying) information. This statement should not be misunder­stood. It does not mean (as has sometimesbeen said) that a predicational sentenceanswers a question for predicational (characterizational) information, Rather itmeans that a predicational sentence is not felt to answer a question at alloAs wehave seen in section2.10, if a sentenceis felt to be an answer to a WH-question, thismeans that it specifiesa value for the variable represented by the WH-word. Inother words, a WH-question always asks for a specificational reply, even if thevariabIeand the value in question are predicational in the sense that they denote aproperty.Consider,for example, the fol1owing:

(2) John is a good student.

58. Even locative expressions are sometimes analysed as eharacteristics. For example, Dik (1980b)treats (is) in the garden in John is in the garden as a property. Bali (1977; 60) states that allpredicational sentences mean that a property is added to the list of properties that hold of thereferent of the subject NP.

! IJl;' ;,~lIL~IJLI.:, WlIH.:n asenbes a property to John, is predicational when used out ofcontext. But when it serves as a reply to a question specifieally asking for aspecifieationalanswer (e.g. What is John (like)? or What is ii that John is?) it isused specifieationally.In that case a good student is the value specified for tbevariabie 'what John is' and the sentence is interpreted as 'John is tbe following: agood student'. The fact that both the variabieand the value denote a property doesnot alter this. In other words, a question like What is John (like)? asks forpredieational information, but this predicational information is to be given in thefarm of a specificational reply.

3.2. As has aften been noted (seee.g.Kuno 1970), an NP denoting a property hasno referentin the universeof discourse.Not only does it fail to be 'strongly referring'(like e.g. anaphoric pronouns), but it is not even 'weakly referring' (like e.g.attributive definite NPs, or nonspecific indefinites,or generic NPs) and thereforefails to establishwhat Karttunen (1968) calls a 'discourse referent'. Even when anNP is only weakly referring, it can nonetheless trigger the use of areferringexpressionin the following discourse:

(3)(a) I need a doctor. He must be no older than sixty(b) Smith's murderer (whoev€r he may bel must be insane. He

has literally torn Smith to pieces.(c) The whale is a mammal. Itdoes not lay eggs.

Property NPs, by contrast, do not refer at alloFor that reasou thcy cannot evenestablishdiscourse referents.That is, in a sentencelike (4,a) the NP a good man justdenotes a property; it does not refer to anybody having this property. If we add to(4,a) or (4,b) a sentence startingwith he, we refer to John, not to a good man or theacme of courtesy. This is clear from examples like (4,c), where the property is notascribed to a particular referent and the use of areferring expressionsuch as he inthe context that follows is consequently impossible:59

59. Cf. Vendier(1971: 131), who notes that sequenceslike the following are "discontinuous":(i)(a) He is a teacher. The teacher is lazy.(b) Joe became a saJesman. The sales man is weil paid.

Kuno (1970: 356-357) discussesa similar cxamplc:(ii) My brother is a doctor. Icannot trust him/'lhe doctor/mat doctor,

Kuno points out that the doctor is unacceptable in the secend clause because a doctor in the firstclause "does not establish, linguistically,tbe presence of a doctor in the present universe ofdiscourse"; him is acceptable, but is anaphoric, not with the preceding a doctor, but with mybrother,which isa referentialNP; that that doctor is acceptable is explained from the fact that NPswith that (e.g. that bastard, that man, etc.) can function like pronouns. (In my opinion, the reasenfor this is that the anaphoric power of theseNPsresidesentirely in that.The added noun does notparticipate in the referring function of the NP; its function is rather to predicate an additionalproperty of the referent. Thus, that bastard is equivalent to 'he, who is a basterd,' - cf.Declerck1979.)

56

(4)(a)(b)(c)

John is a good man.John is the acme of courtesy. .. •Being a good man is the highest of human destinles. ( Hehas therefore been rewarded.)

McCawley (1981: 124) points out that in

(5) Carter is a politician. l'm glad t'm not him.

him can only have tbe subjeet, not tbe predicate NP,as antecedent. Ifwe want to kera pronoun that does have the predicateNP as anteced~ntwe use that (or thewea .erform it). In that case tbe pronoun refers to the de~otatlOnof tbe a~tecede~tN: (l.e.to the property itself),not to any individual having the property m question:

(6)(a) Carter is a politician. I'm glad l'rn not that. .(b) He is a rich man, though he does not look It.

It follows that the question-word who cannot be used in a WH~question.askingfor a property-ascribingreply.A question with who alwaysasks for mfo.rmatlOnth~tshould enable the hearer to identifya referent. Ifwe ar~mter.ested,not 10 som~one~identity,but in his relevant properties we ask a question with what, what.Iikc, 0

how:60

(7)( ) What is John? - He is a doctor.(~) What is John like? - He is a very nice young fellow.(c) How are you? - I'm fine, thank you.(d) What,'Who did she becorne ?"

The nonreferentiality of property NPs is also appa~ent from the use of rClati~epronouns. In a nonrestrictive relative clause the relative pr~no~n r:cann~t ( ~used as subject complement (i.e. as predicational NP). Whicn 1S used mstea c .Kuno 1970):

(8)(a) He is a good student, which you are not. . . ,(b) At that time he still was the chairman, whJch he now isn t any

langer.

... . Th . th peaker asks for informalion60. Questions with which ask for identiîying I~(orfmalion.t ;~S~nti~ySiSusually a person or object,

which should enable him la piek out an enuty rom a se . . ... .but it may also be a property.The following sentences illustrate these two posslbihlles.

(il\~l ~:~: ~III~~~~;:~~:~~~St::~~~d~~:d:rer ISinsane, Ihe others that he is quileresponsible. Whlch IS he then . . .

. h b . ecessarilyproperty-ascnbmg. See also61. Higgins (1976: 154) notes that a sentertee Wit ecome ISnsection 4.7.

57

I"'AS appears trom these examples, the antecedent of predicational which may be a(definite or indefinite) property NP.It mayalso be a nonspecificindefiniteNP:

(9) I need a psychiatrist,which you are not.

A predicational nonrestrictiverelative clause cannot depend on an antecedent tbatis referential,attributive (in Donnellan's sense) or specificindefinite:

(10Ha) 'I saw the murderer,which you are not.(b) *1 sawa (certain)murderer,which you are not.

Higgins (1976: 158) also notes that we use what, not who, to introduce a freerelative denoting a property:

(11)(a) John wants to becomewhat his fatherwas.(b) John is what his fatherwanted to become.

It automatically followsthat a Wll-cleft highlightinga property cannot involve (theone) who in the WH-c1ause.We use what instead:

(12) What I'd like to be is chairman of the club.

(Note that a Wll-cleft with what cannot be used to specifythe identityof the personreferred to in the WH-clause:

(13)(a) 'What is the murderer is JOHN.(b) The one who is the murderer is JOHN.)62

Who ean be used in restrictive relative c1ausesthat form part of the propertyNP:

(14) John is a studentwho works a lot.But if the relative pronoun itself functions as a property Np' we have to use thatinstead of who :63

62. What is possible is sentences like(i)(a) What l'd liketo marry is a Swedish gir!.(b) What I need is a doctor.

but these are clearly of a different type, since their WH-clausesare not copular. Note that suchsentencesalways require the focus to be a nonspecificindefinite:(iiJ(a)What I need is a friend.(b) 'What I need is your Iriend.

63. Vendier (1971: 131) and Emonds (1976: 141) note that sentences like the following areungrammatical:(i)(a) 'I spoke to the teacher that he is.(b) 'There is a salesman that Joe became.

The reason that theseare ungrammaticalis that it is not possiblefor a relativepronoun denotingaproperty (i.e. a nonreferential relativepronoun) to follow a referentialantecedent.

58

(15) 1 am not the man that I used to beo

(The use of who would imply that Ihave changed my identity - cf Higgins 1976:160). That also has to be used instead of who in exelamations like tbe following:

(16) Fooi that I was!

The fact that property NPs are nonreferentia1 of course means that stronglyreferring NPs (e.g. personal pronouns, demonstratives, anaphoric NPs, propernames) cannot be used as property NPsf>4,65As noted by Quirk et al (1985: 742),"noun phrases used as characterization attributes are normally indefinite." Still,detlnite NPs are not altogether exc1uded.Various writers (e.g. Halliday 1967:68-71, Kuno 1970: 349-350, 358-359, Fodor 1976: 202-215, Higgins 1976: 155ft)have stressed that definite NPs may sometimes be used predicationally. Thefollowing sentences (which are to be read with neutra1 sentence intonation)illustrate this:66

(17)(a) Is John Mary's husband?(b) I dreamt thaI I became the king of France.(c) I am not the king of France.

Examples like these provide further proof that property NPs do not refer.As iswell-known, definite referring NPs (whether referential or attributive) carry a

64. There are a couple of exceptionsto this. As noted above, that and ii can refer back to a propertyexpression, In exampleslike (i.a-b) the proper name (typically preceded by the indefmitearticle)is also used predicationally:(i)(a) Idoubt ijthis paintingis a Picasso.(b) The boy is every inch a Ewing,justlike his father.

65. Nominal c1ausescannot function as property NPs. A copular sentencecannot be predicational ifthe postcopular NP is a gerund c1ause,an infinitiveclause, a tlrat-clauseor a dependent question.The followingsentences are all specificational:(i)(al What I hate doing is writingreports.(b) What I liketo do is (to)walkon my own.(c) Our advice is that he should leave.(d) The question is whether the olhers wil!be there too.(e) What Idon't understand is how the burglar got in.

Nominal relativec1auses(headlcssrelatives)form the only exception: they can sometimesbe usedpredicationaUy:

(ii) This theatre is no longer what iIwas when we firstwent to it.66. lt hardly needssaying that the above statement that definiteproperty NPs are not referential does

not mean that they are attributive in the sense of DonneUan (1966). Blom & Daalder (1977:101-102) therefore make amistake when they reject Akmajian's (1979: 178) claim that thepostcopular NP in a predicational sentence is nonreferentia1on the basis of the observation thatthe sentence The leader of theparty is the PrimeMinister may bc specificationalin spiteof the factthat the Prime Minister can be interprcted attributive!y.(As we have observed in section 2.12,attributive NPs are 'weakly referring',while property NPs do not refer at all.)

presupposinon ot existence.v but the predicate NPs in (l7,a-c) do not. It followsthat thc question of whether a sentence like

(18) The one who gol killed was not my sister.

is true on a predicational or specificational reading partly depends on whetber ornot Ihave a sister. IfI have one, thc sentence may be true irrespective of whether it isinterpreted predicationally or specificationally; if I bave no sister, (18) can only betrue on the predicational interpretation (see also Gundel (1977: 544».

1t is perhaps worth noting that definite property NPs normally require that thesubject NP should refer to tbe wbole set of entities characterized by tbe property inquestion (cf. Declerck 1986). Tbus, John and Mary are the culprits implies thatthere are no more (and no fewer) than two culprits. Tbe difference between Thechairman is a linguistand The chainnan is the linguist is that, unlike the former, thelatter represents the property in question as typical of the chairman only. (Sinceanybody knows that there exist plenty of linguists, this is of course only possible ifthe property in question has been restrictively defined in the context, i.e. if thelinguist stands for 'the linguist who ...'. In that case the restrictive information ismore likely to occur overtly, as in

(19) The chairman is the linguisl who founded case grammar.)

However, there are exceptions to this rule. In John is my friend tbe (formallydefinite) NP myfriend does not imply that the property ofbeing my friend is typicalof John only: myfriend can be read as 'a friend of mine'. (This is an interesting caseof an NP that is definite in form but indefinite in meaning - see Declerck (1986) fora discussion.)

3.3. Since a property NP is quite nonreferential, whereas a predicational sentencedoes prcdicate something of a referent, the subject NP of a predicational sentencemust be at least weakly referring: it must be capable of referring to an entityindependently of what is predicated of that entity in the rest of the sentence. In fact,we ascertain that the subject NP of a predicational sentence may be eitherreferential or attributive (in the sense of Donnellan). Donnellan's own example

67. Gundel (1985: 100-102) rejects this claim on the basis of examples Iikeli) 1II pullthis handle, the explosion is inhibited.

However, although it is truc that thcre exists no referent for the explosion in the actual world, Ithink there does existone in the mind of the speaker.(Moreover, if one remarks that the explosiondoes not take place, this means that the possibility of an explosion has been discussed or isotherwise present in the mcmory of the speaker and/or hearer.) The claim that definite NPspresuppose cxistencedoes not rnean that their referentsmust exist in the actual world (cf also ouruse of the Abominable Snowmall, the Loch Ness Monster, etc.)

60

Smitb s murderer is insane, in which the subject NP may be referential orattributive, can be interpreted as predicational on both readings."

For some reason, the subject of a predicational copular sentence is not normallyindefinite, unless it is interpreted generically (which is another instanee of 'weak'reference) :

(20) A horse is a rather slow means of conveyance.

Sentences like (21), in which a generic interpretation is excluded, are odd, even in asuitable context:

(21) (Nobody is eight feet tall.) - ??A man I met last year waseight feel lall.

A sentence like this wiU normally be reworded as Imet a man lastyear who waseight feet ta/l or something of the kind.69

The fact that a predicational sentence is unlikely to have an indefinite subject(unless it is generic) can be explained from the following observations:a. When tbe subject NP represents old information (as is usually the case in a

predicational sentence, since it is usually the property that is the newinformation), the subject must be definite. (Indefinite NPs imply tbat the referentis not identifiable in the linguistic or situational context and therefore typicallyrepresent new information - cf. Chafe 1970: 214, Leech 1983: 90-93).

b. If the subject does refer to an entity that has not been referred to yet (in thepreceding discourse) or is not identifiable from the situation or context, thespeaker normally introduces that entity linguistically before ascribing a propertyto it. A typical example of tbis is the use of an existential ('presentational')sentence. Compare:

(22)(a) (I went 10London.) ?A man I met there looked exactiy Iikeme.

(b) I went 10 London and met a man there who looked exactlylike me.

(c) I wenl to London. There was a man there who looked exactlylike me.

68. I thoroughly disagrec with EllIers (1979': 109-111) where she claims that a copular sentence isautomatically specificational if the firstNP is attributive and predicational if that NP is referential,(A vcry clear cxample of a predicational sentence with an attributivc subject NP is I've beeninformed that the mal! drinking 'he martini has important newsfor me. So I mustfind out who heis. Similarly: Whoever it is that ki/led Smith.must be insane.)

Higgins (1976: 166) also claims that the subject of a prcdicational sentcncc is always"referential", but he uses the term as a synonym of 'referring' and not in the sense of Donnellan(1966). Au attributive phrase like whoever killed Smith is 'referential' in his terminology.

69. Closs Traugott (1972: 41) makes a comparable statement: "FOT reasons not yet entirely clear,certain adjectival verbs like be tall; be loyal must have definite subjects. I cannot say •A man istall; 'Aman is loyal in the same sense as I can say A man came in."

!I,!

61

Sentences (22,b) and (22 c) in which th [J • •better than the c1umsy(22~) in whi h this :erent IS fust mtroduced, are much

" IC IS not the case.

3.4.. Beeauset?e s~bject of a predieational sentence is a referringNP.whereas thpredicate nominal is not, predieational sentencesare not reversible: ' e

(23)(a) John is a teacher.(b) "A teacher is John.

Compare also:

(24)(a) What .I'mdoing is amusingmyself.(b) Amusl~g mysel~is what I'm doing.

(25)(a) What Im dOlngIS amusingme.(b) "Amusing me is what I'm doing.

As is clear from the fact that they show connectedness(the fare specifieational(cf.section2.13) while(25 a) whi h h use 0 myself), (24,a-~)predieational. '" c S ows no connectedness,ISA couple of things are worth noting here:

A. What we eaII reversibilitymeans that the order 'NP b NP" h .'NP be NP' Th' h I e 2 IS C anged mto.2 . . I' IS penomenon should not be confused with ' re osin ' .

topicalization, focus-movement or Yiddish-movement)70 P . p. p g (as in:~~~~~t (;.h~h is not the subject) into initial position,'but r~~~l:~t :~~~ t~~

~ , ': IC consequently remams before the verb. In contrast when a co 1~entence.IS rbeverSed'both the subjectand the predieate nominal a;e moved st~h:~eremams etween the two NPs So (26 a bl provid 'whereas (27 b) ill .. ' , - provi e an example of reversing,a- ustrate preposmg: '

(26)(a) TOM is Ihe murderer.(specificational)(b) The murderer is TOM.

(27)(a) He is a teacher. (predicalional)(b) A teacher he is.

(27,a) does not allow the NPs to change places:

(28) "A teacher is he.

70. These three types of . .are' preposmg operauons are distinguished by Prince (1981 1985)' E 1. , ,xamp es(i)!~l MaryJohn saw yesterday. (topicalization)(c) ~~:~ ~~~~~:: ~~g:;Iggl~ey named it.(focus-movement)

movement) 9 they should buy,thelr house is so dirty.(Yiddish-

62

On the other hand, (26,a-b) do not allow preposing of the predieate nominal:

(29)(a) *The murderer TOM is.(b) "TOM the murderer is.

The difference between preposing and reversing is particularly c1ear when thecopular sentence is embedded under a raising verb. In that case reversing is stillpossible,whereas preposing ean no longer take place:

(30)(a) I believe the murderer to beTOM.(b) I believe TOM 10 be the murderer.(reversing)

(31)(a) I believe him to be a teacher.(b) *1 believe a teacher him to beo(preposing)

B. In a couple of cases preposing of a predieational element is accompanied bysubject-verbinversion,so that the resuIt is the same as when reversinghas applied.One such case is when the preposed element is an obligatory place adverbial:

(32)(a) The knife is on the table.(b) 'On Ihe table the knife is.(c) On the table is the knife.

That we do not have reversingherebut rather preposingplus inversionis clear fromthe fact that what we observe in (32,a-c) is in no way different from what weobserve in conneetion with the noncopular (33,a-c):

(33)[a) A man stood on the hilI.(b) "On the hili a man stood.(Cl On the hili stood a man.

The differencebetween reversingand preposing with inversion is also revealed inthe interrogative.Compare:

(34)(a) The murderer is JOHN.(b) JOHN is the murderer.(c) Is JOHN Ihe murderer?(d) ?Isthe murderer JOHN?71

(35)(al The knife is on the table.(b) On the table is the knife.(c) "Is on the lable the knife?(d) Is the knife on the table?

71. Theacceptability ofthis sentence is doubtful (which is in keepingwith our claim (made in sectien2.11) that the (underlying) subject in (34,a-b) is John; not (he murderer.) On the other hand, thefollowing is not too bad:

(il Is the one who murdered Fred thaI man over there?(In 50 far as this sentence is acceptable, it would seem to indicate that subject-verb inversion canalso operate on a superficial subject which is not a subject in undcrlying structurc.)

63

Moreover, (35,a) and (35,b) do not have quite the same meaning, as appears fromthe fact that they imply different questions: whereas (35,a) can answer the questionWhere is (he knife?, (35,b) isonly a suitablereplyto What is there on (he table? (cfBolinger1972a: 100).

A second case where preposingof a predicational element triggerssubject-verbinversionis when the property expressionimpliescomparison:"

(36)(a) More interestingis the second illustration.(b) Jus! as surprisingwas the defeatof the Dodgers.(c) Equally importantis looking after the animals.

Once again we can show that what is happening here is preposingwith inversionrather than reversing:

(37)(a) We believethe second illustrationto be more interesting.(b) 'We believemore interestingto be the second illustration.

(38)(a) Is the second illustrationmore interesting?(b) *Is more interestingthe second illustration?

In sum, predicationalcopular sentencesmay allow the property expressionto bepreposed,but they do not normally allow the subject and the predicate nominal tobe permuted." The reason is that, unlike preposing, reversingproduces the effectthat the NP that is moved into subject position is actually interpreted as tbe(superficial)subjectof the sentence.(This followsfrom the fact tbat the other NP ismoved into a positionwhere it can be interpretedas predicate nominal. This is notthe casewben an elementispreposed,becausethe subjectNP ofthe sentenceis thenleft in subject position). Now, the subject of a copular sentence is also usually the

72. The reason why predicational elements implying comparison can easilybe preposed is obvious:such elements are explicitly linked up with the preceding discourse and are thereforc eminentlysuited to becornc the topic of their sentence. (cf. Butters 1977: 68)

73. I still add the mitigating term normally because a couple of linguists claim that reversedpredicational sentencescan he found in a particular styleof English,Kahn (1973: 472) writes that"Intelligent is John is of course acceptable; but it is stylisticallyrestricted,and it is associated witha very particular intonation pattcrn." Rensky (1981: 140) points out that sentences like Aremarkable bird is the pelican can be found in poetry. In everyday English, however, sentenceslike these wilt surely be judged unacceptable.It should also he notcd that in somecases reversinga prcdicational scntcnceyieldsaresuit that is

perfcctly gramrnatical and acceptable, but which does not have the same rneaning. Forexample:(i)(a) Someone who has a bad conscience is someone who does not sleep weil.(b) Someone who does not sleep weilis sorneone who has a bad conscience.

In this case too we can uphold the claim that predicational sentences are not reversibie, fOTwehave seen that revcrsinga specificational sentence has no sernantic impact.

64

topic of the sentence (in the sense of the 'theme', 'what the sentence is a?out'), an~,as noted by Guéron (1984: 153), a topic NP "must be referential, that IS

interpretable as denoting an individual wbose existence in the world of thediscourse is independent of the truth value of the sentential predicate." Using theterminology introduced above, this means that the subject must be a 'referring'expression. This requirement presents no problem for reversing a specificationalsentence,since the variabieNP is 'weakly referring' (attributive),whereas the focusis either strongly or weakly referring (cf. section 2.12). Property NPs, by contrast,are not referringat all. This explainswhy they cannot be processedas subjects.

3.5. Because predicational NPs do not refer but rather denote a property, theybehave as adjectivals ratber tban as nominals. That is, tbey have at least thefollowing typically adjectival characteristics:

A. Predicational NPs may indicate a property that is gradable and therefore enterinto grading constructionswhere referringNPs are totally excluded:

(39)(a) John is a better teacher than you.(b) He is more of a hero than Kelly.(c) What intelligentchildren they are!(dj What a disgrace it was!(e) Why are you such a snob?(fJ He is such a baby.(gJ He is diplomatenough to settle sueh quarrels.(hJ That was quite a success.(i) The performancewas rather a disappointment.

B. PredicationalNPs are the onlyNPs that can be preposedby certain stylisticrulesthat only apply to adjectivals:

(40)(a) King of the country as he is, he should teil us what to do.(b) Good studentthat I arn, I never get drunk on Mondays.

(Delahunty1981: 50)(c) Genius though she was, she was quite unassuming. (Quirk

et al. 1985: 1097)

It is worth noting that such preposed predicational NPs are used without ~bedefiniteor indefinitearticle.The reason is presumably that the absenceof the artieleis a signal tbat the NP in question is predicational rather tban referring and musttherefore not be interpreted as the subject (topic) of the sentence.

C. Even when they are not preposed, predicational NPs can sometimes be usedwitbout the definite article:

(41Ha) Bil!is now cook. (Gruber 1976: 142)(b) Tom is captain of the cricket team. (Fodor 1976: 118)(c) That woman is Mayor of Cambridge. (Higgins 1976: 149)

(42)(a) They elected him President of the U.S.(b) He hopes to be crowned king.

The omission of the definite artiele is obligatory in sentences like (42,a-b).Otherwise it is only possible when the predicational NP expresses a role, function orprofession, Thus, the sentence Bil! is ugliest man on campus is "only appropriate ifthere was a competition resulting in the selection of Bill as the ugliest man oncampus, that is, if the NP describes a position or status" (Fodor 1976: 208).Moreover, Gruber (1976: 142) notes that "the the which may be omitted singlesout the individual as unique in the identified class". This probably explains what isnoted by Bald (1972: 99), viz. that we can say He was leader/king but not *He wasbusinessman/philosopher.

Unlike the definite article, the indefinite artiele is not normally deleted from a(nonpreposed) predicational NP in English. (However, deletion is very common inother languages. Compare Englisb He is a baker witb Dutch Hij is bakker orFrench nest boulanger.) We can therefore subscribe to Kahn's (1973: 472) claimthat the occurrence of the indefinite artiele in the English sentence John is a writer"is a purely automatic consequence of the fact tbat the subject-NP is singular andwriter is a countable noun. Tbe complement in tbe ascriptive sentence is not,therefore, the NP-expression a writer but the N-expression writer."

D. As we have seen, predicational NPs have their own question words (e.g. what(...like), but not who) and relative pronouns (e.g. which, not who, in nonrestrictiveclauses). Moreover, they aJso have special anaphoric pronouns (e.g. that; it). In fact,the pronouns that can refer to a predicational NP are exactly the same as are used torefer back to adjectivaI ideas. Compare:

(43)(a) Nick is tall, and 1'11 never be that. (Thompson 1971 : 93)(b) They all say Bil!is a fooi, and that he is.

(44)(a) Billis intelligent, although he doesn't look it.(b) Mary is a fooi, although she doesn't look it.

(45)(a) Petrol was expensive in Europe betore it became so in theU.S.

(b) Neither of these places is an island, but that they were onceso appears trom geological evidence. (Scheurweghs 1959:137)

E. Only predicational NPs can he preceded by no (cf. Kruisinga 1920: 112):

(46) He is no hero.

(See aJso section 4.2.B.)

66

F. Predicational NPs and adjectives may often alternate:

(47)(a) He is rich/a rich man.(b) Most of the tourists were Swedish/Swedes.(c) He is (an) American.

Kruisinga (1920: 112) also mentions examples like the following:

(48)(a) Al!these roses are dwarf.(b) His talk was and remained only church.

In some cases the predicational NP can aJso be conjoined with an adjective:

(49) In 1961 she was still young and an innocent child. (Kirkpa­trick & Uszkoreit 1982: 128)

(As is well-known, constituents can only be conjoined with each other if theybelong to the same syntactic or semantic category.)

G. Tbe property expressed by a predicational NP is o~ten actually a bundle .ofproperties. For example, Bill is a tyran_tsuggests tha.t am has vanous propertl~typical of a tyrant (i.e. he is undemocranc, cruel, volatile, ruthless, etc.). In ~ eertamsensc, a property can be seen as a bundie of semantic features, one ~f w~llch veryoften is the feature 'sclf-controllable' (cf. Kuno 1970: 352-353). Predicahonal NPswhich have this feature in their property set can be used in copular sentences thatare in the imperative or progrcssive form, and in examplcs likc (52,a-b):

(50)(a) Be a good girl.(b) Be a hero.(c) Don't be a fooI.

(51)(a) He's being a fooI.(b) She's being a good girl.

(52)(a) Iwarned him not to be a fooI.(b) She asked me not to be a hypocrite.

Similar examples are ungrammatical when the NP in question is a referring

one:"

74. Examples similar to (53,a-e) may sometimes be acceptable if be is interpreted as 'play the part of,'pretend to be':

[i) Today my son is being Napoleon.However, this sentence is pred.icationalrather than specificational. (This appears e.g. from ~e factthat it cannot be reversed: Today Napoleon is being my uncle does not mean the same thing as(i)).

67

(53)(a) "Be Tom.(b) "Be that man over there.(ej 'l'm being Tom.(dj "She's being her mother.(e) "I warned him not to be that man over Ihere.

3.6. When we speak of a predicational NP we usually refer to an NP that is used assubject complement (predicate nominai). However, predicational NPs can alsooccur in noncopular structures. The most obvious examples are NPs that functionas object complements or follow the 'prepositional copula' as:75

(54)(a) I eonsider John (as) my friend.(b) I Ihoughl Bill a good linguist.(c) As chairman of Ihe society he should be able to help us,

(In examples like these the relevant NP cannot be specificational:

(55) "I Ihöught Peter John.)

A predicational relation is also expressed when we use an ofPP after words likefunction, capecity etc.:

(56) In his function of chairman he knows a lot of influentialpeople.

'Absolute' c1auses introduced by with can also be predicational (not specifica­tional):

(57)(a) With her husband an invalid, it must be difficult tor her tomake ends meet.

(b) With John (as) our leader, nothing ean happen 10 us.

In all the above examples the constructions involving the predicational NP arenot copular, but tbey are still clearly related to copular sentences. However, thereare numerous predicational sentences which neither contain nor imply the presenceof beo For example, the noncopular sentences in (58,a) convey exactly the samepredicational information as the copularones in (58,b):

(58)(a) What does he do? - He teaches at the loeal girls' school.(b) What is he? - He is a teacher at the local girls' school.

75. l borrow the term 'prepositional copula' from Emoncls(1982).

rn

As noted above, it depends on the context and on the intonation pattem wbethera noncopular sentence will be interpreted as specificational or as predicational. Tbecontext can make clear tbat specificational information is requested; in that case theintonation pattern of the sentence will reveal which constituent is to be interpretedas focus. If the context does not create the idea of a variabie that is to be specifiedand if the sentence bas a neutral intonation pattern (rather than an intonation withcontrastive accent on a particular constituent), the sentence will be interpreted aspredicational. Tbus, a sentence like John robbed a bank can be interpreted in. twoways. It will be interpreted as specificational u: for example, the nuclear accent IS onJohn and the context somehow makes mention of or implies the idea of someonerobbing a bank. It will be interpreted as predicational if the intonation pattern isneutral (i.e. witb tbe nuclear accent on bank) and there is no variabie like 'tbe Xwho robbed a bank', 'the X that John did to a bank' or 'the X that John robbed'suggested by the context. (This is the case, for example, in

(59) (Do you know why John is so rich? Weil, I will teil you.) Johnrobbed a bank.)

3.7. Whereas it-clefts are always specificational," WH-clefts may be specifica­tional or predicational. Compare:

(60)(a) What I gave her tor her birthday was not expensive, (predica­tional)

(b) What I gave her for her birthday was a ring. (specificational)(c) What I gave her for her birthday was an expensive piece of

jewelry. (predicational or speeifieational)

A similar example of an ambiguous WH-deft is sentence (61) (whicb I borrowfrom Clifton (1969)):

(61) What I don't eat is food for the dog.

This sentence yields the specificational reading 'The following I don't eat: food forthe dog'. In this sense it is equivalent to the ft-deft (62,a), and may be reversed so asto become (62,b):

(62)(a) It is food tor the dog that I don't eat.(b) Food for the dog is what I don't eat.

However, (61) also yields a predicational reading: 'Whatever I do not eat is used asfood for the dog'. On this reading the sentence does not identify the referent ofthe

76. A5 noted before, there are actually a couplc of exceptions to this rule. See chapter 3.

hO

SUDJt!Cl Nt' but merely says somethingmore about it. Neither the i/-eleft(62,a) northe (62,b) version of the WH-deft can have this interpretation.

There are a couple of remarks that should be made in conneetion with thisarnbiguity:

A. The fact that WH-constructions like (61) are ambiguous has created someconfusion as to the use of the term 'pseudo-cleft' (Wll-cleft). Since i/-defts do notshow this ambiguity and since it has often been c1aimed that there is sometransformational relationship between it-c1efts and Wll-clefts, most linguistsdealingwith WH-c1eftshave c1aimedthat a sentencelike(61) isa WH-eleftonly onthe specificationalreading. They uphold the view that it--cleftsand WH-elefts areboth instancesof specificationalconstructions.At least one linguïst(Higgins1976)does not share this view.For Higgins,a WH-eleft need not be specificationalbydefinition, and Higgins consequently speaks of 'specificational Wll-clefts' and'predicational WH-elefts'. In my opinion, this position bas at least the advantagethat there is a complete terrninology.Those wbo hold that Wll-clefts must bespecificationaldo not appear to have a suitable term for the predicational type ofWH-construction. (As a matter of fact, the latter is mostly disregarded.)

The issue is further complicated by the fact (apparently overlooked in thelinguistic literature) that WH-sentences similar to either (62,b) or its reversedversion (61) may still have other meanings besides a specificational and/orpredicational one. In section2.10we pointed out that what-questions may ask for adefinition. The definition in question can be given in the farm of a WH­construction similar to (62,b):

(63) What is a pyramid? - A pyramid is what the Egyptiansbuiltto bury their pharaos in.

If we extend Higgins' terminology,we can speak here of a 'definitionalWH-eleft'.And we still have another meaning in

(64)(a) What I did WASwhat you told me to do.(b) The one who is drinking the martini IS Mr.Brown.

Sentences like these are interpreted as identity statements. They express that thereferentsof the two NPs are the same (is = 'is the same as', 'is identicalwith')." Aswe will show in section 6, identity statements are neither specificational,predicational nor definitional. We may therefore refer to (64,a-b) as 'identityWH-elefts'.

77. This interpretation of course requires a suitable context. For example:(i)A. We must try and find the man drinking the martini as soon as possible.B. No. we must lirst try and find the man who calls himself Mr. Brown.A. But that's the same thing. The ona who is drinking the martini IS (the one who

caUshimselDMr.Brown.

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Since sentencesof the farm of (61) can have all thesemeanings, it seemsbest touse the term 'WH-eleft' as a mere indication of the outward form of suchsentences." To indicate the meaning of a particular WH-cleft we can then add oneof the modifiers 'specifieational','predieational', 'definitional' or 'identity'. 1proposeto adhere to this convention in the presentbook. However,sincethe vastmajority ofWH-defts are specifieational,and since 1will not often be concerned with one ofthe other three semantic types, I will often use the term 'WH-eleft' where I reallymean 'specificational Wll-cleft'. This will only happen in contexts where noconfusion can arise.

B. For some speakers the Wll-clause of a predicational Wll-cleft ean undergoextraposition:

(65)(a) What Henry sells is expensive.(b) It is expensivewhat Henry sells.

Such a construction is formally very similar to an it-eleft.79 However, it is notspecificational.(Seuren (1985), who elaims that sentences like these are gramma-tical, stressesthis point.)C. There isat leastone case inwhich the farm of the postcopular item (i.e. the focusor predicational element, according as the Wfl-cleft is specifieational or pred~ca­tional) makes clear whether the interpretation must be specificationalor predica-tional. Consider the following:

(66) How did he speak to you? - Flatteringly.

Corresponding to this question-answer pair we have the Wll-cleft'?

(67) The way he spoke to me was flatteringly.

78. The term 'WH-eleCt' wilt not, however, cover WH-sentences whose WH-elause is an indirectquestion rather than a free relative (e.g. Whal happened afterwards is a complete mystery).

79. The similarity is the greater because certain diaJectsof English, notably lrish and Scottish dialects,allow the use of what instead of thai in it-clefts.The following examples are frorn Delahunty(1981: 270):(i)(al 1Iwas a lalling tree what him him.(bi 1Iwas the accident whal upsel him.

80. Some people might object to my calling (67) a WH-deft because its 'WH-clause' does not beginwith a true WH-word. However, I consider it an accidental gap in the potentialities of how thatthe WH-cleft How he spoke to me wasflatteringly is unacceptable. The fact that we normally usethe way instead of how is no reason [or claiming that the structure is not a WH-deft. (There ,isasimilar problem in conneetion with who, which must normally he replaced by the one who In aWH-e1eft.)

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This WH-eleft can only be specificational. (This is of course in keeping with the factthat there is connectedness between the adverbial WH-element and the adverbialfocus.) The corresponding predicational WH -eleft makes use of flattering instead offlaueringly :

(68) The way he spoke to me was flattering.

Bolinger (19na: 98-100) gives various examples illustrating this difference:

(69)[a) The way he playedthe music was hopelessly.(specifica­tional)

(b) The way he playedthe music was hopeless.(predicational)(70)[a) The way he behaved towards her was offensively.[specifica­

tional)(b) The way he behaved towards her was offensive.(predica­

tional)

These examples can be compared with

(71) The way she looks is frightful.

where the two meanings are no longer signalled by words from different parts ofspeech because look is a copula and we therefore have to use an adjective, not anadverb of manner, on the specificational reading too.

D. The specificational reading of a WH-eleft is no longer available if we substitutewhatever for what, or whoever for the one who, etc.:

(72)[a) The one who did that was astranger.(b) Whoever did that was astranger.

Whereas (n,a) is ambiguous between a specificational and a predicational reading,(n,b) can only be predicational. The reason is that the use of whoever implies thatthe speaker does not know the identity of the person in question. Using whoever in aspecificational sentence in which that identity is revealed therefore makes forsemantic contradiction. (I will not go into the question of whether what is violatedhere is a presupposition, an entailment or an implicature.) The same kind ofexplanation accounts for the following:

(73) (a) What he told themwas a secret. (specificationalor predi­cational)(b) Whateverhe told themwas a secret. (predicationalonly)

(74) ·Whoeverdid it was John.

(In (74) whoever enforces a predicational reading, but John cannot be used as apredicational NP.)

E. As noted by Kaisse (1979: 708-709), auxiliary reduction is not possible inspecificational WH-clefts, although it is possible in predicational constructions :

What I eat's important to me. (predicational)What he sald's not significant. (predicational)·What I want's an avacado. (specificational).What I wonder's whether we'lI find a solution to this pro-blem. (speciticational)

Sentences like (72,a) or (73,a) are disambiguated by tbe possibility of applyingauxiliary reduction:

(75)(a)(b)(c)(d)

(76)(a) What she is telling him is a military secret. (ambiguous)(b) What she's telling him's a military secret. [predicational only)

F. It is possible to combine a predicational WH-cleft and a specificational eleft inone complex sentence:

(77) Whatever it was that he got trom her was expensive.

This sentence combines tbe predicational WH-deft What he got from her wasexpensive with the idea that the identity of the object in question is unknown (asexpressed in What (ever) was it that he got from her?) Such sentences alwaysrequire the use of whatever (rather tban what):

(78) ·What it was that he got trom her was expensive.

(I cannot say wh ether the obligatory use of whatever is due to the fact that thisconstruction needs stressing that the identity of tbe referent is unknown or to thefact that the construction must be distinguisbed from a similar type of construction,in which what(not whatever) is used, but then as a question word (introducing adependent question), not as a free relative:

(79) What it was that he got from her is stiUa mystery.)

Another type of complex sentence involving both predicational be andspecificational be is the following:

(80) Mary is what I wiUnever be: attractive.

Here part of the sentence corresponds to a specificational WH-deft identifying aproperty:

(81) What I will never be is: attractive.

The (predicational) head clause then aseribes this property to Mary.

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\.J. r\ 111JC11nurc lil couuecuou WHO me ooservauon mat Wtl-cletts may haved~ffe~entmeanings is that the number of ambiguous WH-clefts is actually not veryhigh m everyday language. The reason is that selectional restrictions usually rule outall but one of the theoretically possible interpretations. Thus, (82,a) and (82,b) canonly be read as specificational and predicational, respectiveIy:

(82)(a) What John is is angry with his father.(b) What John is is lucralive.

Tbe possible interpretations are determined by the selectional restrictions. One cansay of someone that he is angry with someone, not that he is lucrative. Conversely,one can say ofsomething (e.g. whatJobn is, i.e. tbe profession he exercises) that it islucrative, not that it is angry.

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4. FURTHER DIFFERENCES BETWEENSPECIFICATIONAL AND PREDICATIONALSENTENCES.

4.L Specificational and predicational sentences behave differently in various typesof conjoined structures:

A. When the predicate nomina! consists of two predicational elements conjoinedby and, the sentence will express that both descriptions are simultaneouslyapplicable to the referent of the subject NP:

(1Ha) Lisa is a clever girl and a hard worker.(b) What Lisa is is a clever girl and a hard worker.

If the two conjoined elements are specificational, the interpretation will be quitedifferent. Since specification is tantamount to listing, the sentence will beunderstood as asserting that two values satisfy the variabie. Thus, the specificationalreading of

(2) What I need is a car and a boat.

is that I need two things, viz. a car and a boat. On the predicational interpretationthe sentence means that I need an object that is simultaneously a car and a baat, i.e.a kind of amphibian.t'é-

B. It follows that a predicational NP cannot be conjoined with a specificational Np,except zeugmatically (HaUiday 1967: 71):83

(3)(a) "The murderer is Bill and very clever.(b) 'Mary is the blonde one and also rathersmalI.

81. The noncleft1need a car and a boat does not yield this reading. lts only possible intcrprctation isspecificational.

82. Higgins (1976: 7) notes that, on the predicational reading, the sentence Whal .wesaw in the pa,:kwas a man and a woman means that the entity referred to by the WH-clause IS a hermaphrcdite(i.e. has the propcrty of being both a man and a woman).

83. As noted above, specificational NPs can be conjoined with other specificational NPs, andpredicational NPs can be conjoined with ether predicationa1NPs. In the former case the onlyrequirement is that no selectional restrictions should bc violated (e.g: 11drank tea and a~apple);in the latter case the predicational elements must not belong to quite different semantic classes(e.g. IBilI is disappointed and ra/her smallfor his age) (cf Bald 1972: 40).

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C. oecause a specuicauonal sentence gives an exhaustive hst of the elementssatisfying the variable, the copula be cannot he repeated before each of the elementslisted in the focus. Thus, we can use (4,a), but not (4,b), as a specificationalsentence:

(4)(a) Whatl saw was a man and a horse.(b) What 1saw was a man and was a horse.

Sentence (4,b) is, however, perfectly grammatical on the predicational reading(asserting that what I saw was at the same time a man and a horse). Halvorsen(1978: 11) observes the same thing in conneetion with VPs:

(5)(a) !What John is doing is buying tickets and is selling cars.(b) What John is doing is buying tickets and selling cars.(c) What John is doing is dangerous and is damaging to his

health.

The repetition of is entails that (S,a) and (5,c) cannot be interpreted specifica­tionally. Sentence (S,c) is interpreted predicationally, but (S,a), which yields nomeaningful predicational interpretation either, is unacceptable. Sentence (5,b), inwhich is is not repeated, is impeccable as a specificational sentence.

D. We have already noted that WH-clefts may be either specificational orpredicational. Now, when two such sentences are co-ordinated, they must both beeither specificational or predicational:

(6)(a) What John is is dissatisfied/angry with Bill. (specificational)(b) What Fred is is rewarding/worth while. (predicational)(c) What John is is angry and what Fred is is dissatisfied.

(specificational + specificational)(d) What John is is rewarding and what Fred is is worth while.

(predicational + predicationaJ)(e) ·What John is is dissatisfied and what Fred is is worth while.

(specificational + predicational)

E. Gapping can occur in (6,d), but oot in (6,c):

(7)(a) What John is is rewarding and what Fred is worth while.(predicational + predicational)

(b) ·What John is is angry and what Fred is dissatisfied. (specifi­cational + specificational)

This means that, unlike predicational be, specificational be cannot be deleted.

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A. When not is added to a specificational sentence, it always expresses that theelement in focus position is not the correct value (i.e, the value satisfying thevariable):

(8) 1Iis not John who is Ihe bank robber.

In (8) the negation merely denies that John is 'the X who is the b~nk robbe~'; theexistence of the variabie itself is not denied." Tbis means that the interpretanen of(8) is something like 'I believe that (there is) som~one (who) robbed the bank, butthat person is not John'. Since it follows from this that som~ne else.mus~ ~e thebank robber not is automatically taken to express contrashve negatlOn: tt IS notJohn who... automatically suggests: but... Another consequence of this is that,. inspecificational sentences, no difference is feit to exist between sentence negation(widc scope) and focus negation (narrow scope). Since

(9) 1Iis not true Ihal il is John who is Ihe bank robber.

entails

(10) Hence it must be someone else who is Ihe bank robber.

there is no semantic difference between (9) and (11):

(11) 1Iis [not John] who is Ihe bank robber (bul someone else).

The negation of a specificational sentence is therefore naturally felt to be constituentnegation of the focus.

B. In predicational sentences, not is not felt to be contrastive. Under n~utralsentence intonation, the sentence John is not angry is an example of ."or~maryneutral sentence-negation" (Pinkham & Hankamer 1975: 436), which IS notpossible in specificational sentences.P

84. This is, of course, because the variabie is presupposed.85. In Dutch, the negator niet ('not') normally precedes the focus of a specifi~tional sentence but

usuallyfollows the property NP in a predicational s~ntence.Hence th~Englishsent~n~ The onewho did il is nol my friend (which can be read predicauonally or speclficanonally) IS likely 10 bedisambiguated by the posiLionof niet:

(i)(a) Degene die het gedaan heeft is niet mijn vriendin.'The one who did it is nol my fnend'

(b) Degene die het gedaan heeft is mijn vriendin niet.'The one who did it is my !riend not'

The normal readings of (i.a) and (i,b) are specificationa]and predicational, respectively.

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It is related to this tbat negators other than not (e.g.na, or incorporated negatorslike un-, im-, etc.) can occur in predicational sentences,but not in specificationalones:

(12)(aJ He is no hero.(bJ The idea is impossibleto realize.(c) Bill is dissatisfied.(dj The suggestion is quite unfounded.

Negators of this kind cannot be substituted for not in specificational sentences,because they cannot be used for contrastive negation:86

(13](aJ What we need is not a HERO.(b) 'What we need is no HERO.

The differencebetween the contrastivenegation of a specificationalsentence andthe 'straigbt' or 'neutral' negation of a predicational sentence is also apparent fromthe fact that the latter, but not the former, triggers the use of nonassertive items('negative polarity items') in its scope. Compare:

(14](aJ 1 think John has alreadyfinished.(bJ I cont think John has finishedyet.(cJ I think JOHN has alreadyfinished, not TOM.(dj *1don't think JOHN has finished ye~ but TOM.(e) I dont think JOHN has alreadyfinished, but TOM.

In the predicational sentence (14,b) the addition of not to the subclause entails theuse of the nonassertive itemyet.87If we similarlyadd not to the subclause of (14,c),thisdoes not result in the useofye!: as shown by the ungrammaticalityof(14,d) andtbe grammaticality of (14,e), we must continue to usea/ready. The reason is that in(14,c) (and hence also in (14,d) and (14,e)) already belongs to the presupposition('tbe X who bas already finished'),and tbat the presupposition isnot affectedby thecontrastive negation in (l4,d-e). What isnegated in (14,d-e) is the assertion that theX who has already finishedisJohn. This negation thereforecannot triggerthe useofyet in the presupposition. (For the use ofyet to be possible the presupposition itselfwould have to be negative (independentlyof the contrastive sentence negation), as

86. These negators can he used for contradicting a statement (e.g.He is a hero! -[ disagree.He isNOhero!) but this is not the same thing as contrastive negation (as in He is nol a HERO but aCOWARD).

87. Although nol occurs in tbe head clausc, its scope is the subclausc, not the head clausc. This isbccause nol has been raised ('transferred') from the subclause into the head clause.

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in I (don 't) think that JOHN hasfinished yet, where the presupposition is 'someonebas not finished yet'.)88

4.3. The scope differences observed in conneetion with negation also app~ar i~interrogative sentences. In a specificational question the point of the ques~lO~ISalways whether the value expressedby the focal item is the correct value satisfyingthe variabie:

(15J Is JOHN the murderer?

This kind of questioning is again felt to be contrastive (= 'Is it John or someoneelse?') and therefore to have narrow scope. In predicational interrogative sentencesthe question is felt to have wide scope: Is John a murderer? is equivalent to 'Is it thecase that John is a murderer?'.

4.4. There are a couple of observations to be made in conneetion with concord(subject-verbagreement). In specificationalsentences the nUI~berof the copula canapparently be determined by that of either tbe superficialsubject NP or the vanableNP. If the two coincide there is of course no problem:

(16)(a) The aim of our policy is/-are improved relationswith theSoviet Union.

(b) What the book does not offer is/'are any solutions to theproblems that are noted.

When the subject NP expressesthe value and isplural in form (whereas the variabieNP is singular in form), both a singular and a plural copula may oftenbe found, butthe singular is normaUypreferred:

(17) Improved relationswith the Soviet Union is/?are the aim ofour policy.

When the subject NP does coincide with the variabIe NP but is a ~H-cla~se(which does not signal number by itself),we still usuallyfind is,but are 15 not quiteimpossible:89

88. In a sirnple sentence, where there 'isonly one 'locus' for thc negation, there cannot sirnultaneouslyhe a negation in the presupposition and a contrastive negation. For tb~t r~on tbe ~enten~JOHN hasn'tfinished yet can only he understood as 'The one who hasn t finished yet IS ~o~n .Thc idea 'The one who hasn't finished yet is not John' cannot he expressed by a simplcsentence.

89. Gundel (1977b: 547) adduces examples similar to (Iê.a-b) but notes th~t these sentences "are n~tequally acccptabic for all speakers. In most cases, agreement with thc left-hend NP 15

preferred."

79

(18)(a) What we can't have here is/ ?are theft and robbery.(b) What I need is/??are more books. .

When tf!:~vanable NP occurs as predicate nominal, the number of the verb canmore easily depend on that of the value NP:

(19)(a) Theft and robbery is/are whatl despise most.(b) More books is/?are whatl need.

In predicational sentences the situation is different. Here the number of thecopula normally depends on that of the subject:

(20) Good books are/Is a rarity these days.

However, it is the predicate nominal that dictates the concord in sentences like

(21) What you have bought are fake jewels.

(Using is would enforce a specificational interpretation.) The reason why we useare IS that :"H-cIauses .like what_Youhave bought may have singular or pluralreference. ~mce the predicate no~mal (which is singular or plural according to thereference) .IS the only other NP In the sentence, it is this NP that distinguishesbctw.een ~mgular. and p1ural. Thus, we have to use are and a plural predicatenom~al .If there.IS plural reference (as in (21» and is and a singular predicatenominal if there ISsingular reference (as in (22»:

(22) What you have bought is a fake jewel.

When the predicational element is not an Np, the sentence cannot make Iwhether the reference is singular or plural, and in that case is is used irrespectiveofthe number of referents:

(23) What you have bought is fake.

The above observations account for the fact that the number of the copula mayr~veal whether a WH-eleft is to be interpreted specificationally or predica­tIonally:

(24)(a) What you have bought is fake jewels. (specificational)(b) What you have bouqht are. fake jewels. (predicational)

(25)(a) What she wants IS expensivs things. (specificational)(b) What she wants are expensive things. (predicational)

~5. No ll~ complicated than the question of number is the question of the tense ofe ~pu a. n predlcationa! sentences the copula may be in any tense d di

the time that the rtv i (or waswi , epen mg onprope y IS or was, WIn be, etc.) an attribute of the referent of the

subject NP. Thus, John is my friend expresses a present property of John, whereasJohn was my friend expresses a past one. This simple system is slightly complicatedby the fact that some properties may be considered as permanent. Thus, it wouldseem that attributes like being a thief or being a murderer are commonly consideredas permanent (as is clear from tbe saying Once a knave, always a knaveï and thatsentences like John was a murderer tberefore make sense only if the referent of thesubject NP is no langer alive. Still, sentences like the foliowing seem all right:

(26) Good books are/'is a rarity these days

The reason why such sentences are possible is that the use of the tenses rnay bedetermined not only by the 'deictic centre' of the speaker making the utterance (i,e,the present hic et nunc of the speaker) but also by some other deictic centre chosenby the speaker. In (26) the speaker is thinking of the time when he didn't trust Johnand he takes this time as point of reference (deictic centre) for the tenses in bissentence (i.e. he uses the past tense to represent the situations referred to assimultaneous with that past point of reference.) (For more details about thepossibility of selecting a 'secondary' deictic centre see Declerck 1987c.)In sum, in predicational sentences the tense of the copula depends on the

relationsbip between thetime at which the property is true of the referent and thecbosen deictic centre (which is usually the moment of speech).. In specificational sentences the tense of the copula may be determined by twodifferent and independent systems:

A. The first system is similar to that observed in conneetion with predicationalsentences. That is, the tense depends on tbe relation between the chosen deicticcentre and the time irnplied by tbe variabie NP. This system is clearest when thevariabie is expressed in the farm of a clause, since the time implied by the variabIethen appears from the tense of the WH-ciause:

(27)(a) The one who murdered Smith was John.tb) It had been John who had been the first to leave.[cl The one who will win will be one of us.

In each of these sentences the tense of the WH-ciause representing the variabie isdetermined by the usual rules governing the use of the tenses. The tense in questionis then also selected for the copula. The WH-clause and the copula tbus show thesame tense. This is logical, since the function of the copular clause is merely to filI inthe contents of the variabie NP. This means that the WH-clause and the copularclause cannot refer to different times.

Two things should be noted here. First, the system is exactly the same when thevariabIe NP contains na WH-c1ause. In that case the variable NP still implies aparticular time reference and is still paraphrasablc in terms of a WH-clausc. The

81

tense ot be again depends on this time reference (which is reflected in the tense ofthe paraphrase), For example, in the pattern Smith's murderer + be + John, be willbecome was, will be, etc. according as Smith's murderer is read as 'the one whomurdered Smith', or 'the one who will murder Smith', etc. The second remark isthat, when the variabie is expressed in the farm of a WH-clause, the rule that thetense of the copula must agree with that of the WH-clause is aften obscured by thefact that 'tense simplifieation' is then aften possible and sometimes even more or lessobligatory'" Compare :

(28)(a) The one who hadmurderedSmilh was/rnad been John.(b) John had been Ihe one who murdereo/rhad murdered

Smith.(c) John was/rhad been Ihe one who had murderedSmith.

(29)(a) The one who will win is/??will be Fred.(b) Fred will be Ihe one who wins/?will win.

(30)(a) ??Itwil! be Fredwho wil! win.(b) 1Iis Fred who will win.(c) 1Iwil! be Fred whowins.

Even when the variabie is not a WH-clause, tense simplifieation may occur in thecopula if the relevant tense is already present in the preceding discourse:

(31) Smilh had been kil!ed,and Ihe murdererwas/thad beenJohn.

In sum, in this first system the tense of the copula ean in principle be any of thetenses that ean be accounted for in terms of reference points and temporal relations,but because of the rule of tense simplifieation the copula is in most cases eitheris/are or was/were.91 (Perhaps it is worth stressing that tense simplifieation does nottake place in predicational sentences, for the obvious reason that it would changethe time when the property is said to hold of the referent. There is a clear differenceof meaning between the following Ca)and (b) sentences:

(32)(a) The one who wil! win wil! be happy.(b) The one who will win is happy.

(33)(a) The one who had won had been happy.(b) The one who had wonwas happy.)

B. The second tense system which the speaker using a specificational sentence eanchoose is that in which the tense of the copula is neutralized. In this system, thecopula is always in the present tense:

90. This is basically the sarne kind of tense simplificationas is observed in conditional c1ausesandadverbial time clauses. (See Comrie 19&5.)

91. Higgins'(1976: 199) claim that the tenseof the copula in a (specificational)WH-c!eftcan only bea present or past tense is therefore an overstatement.

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(34)(a) It is John w~o killed Smith.(b) The culpnt ISyou. .(c) The reason he did it is that he IS.a ~oward.(d) What he would not say is when ItWIl!happen.

. . " ible in specifieational sentences (butThe reason that 'tense n~utralizatlon ~ pOS~1 el~elationshi is by nature timelessnot in predieational ones) ISt~at the ;~;~l~~;lo;:at 1975: 39~. That is, if X is the(cf. Bolinger 1972a: 1.01, GlVón 1 .. r'time it remains so for ever, unless thecorrect value for a vanable Y at a partIcula d d Smith in 1982 he will be

. If J hn is the man who mur ere 'vanable changes. 0 B dB 11is the winner ofthe Grand National in 1982, he~mith's murde~er for e;~~ne~ ~f t~e Grand National in any other year. That. is, theISnot necessarily the d N' 1" a variabie that is satisfied by differentvariabie 'the winner ~fthe Gran atlonhat ISlthough (35 a) expresses a timelessvalues at different tunes, It fellows t a, a ,relation, (3S,b) does net:

. I' arY(35)(a) X is the winner of the Grand Nat~onaIn ye(b) X is the winner of tne Grand Natlonal

utral ization cau take place in sentences of the type (35,a), but not inHence, tense nethose of the type (35,b):

(36)(a) BiJlwas/is the winner of tne Grand ~ational of 1982.(b) BiJlwas the winner of the Grand NatlOnal.

. . d k 1 ce in (36 b) the reference will automatieally beIf tense neutrahzatIon oes ta e p a. "taken to be to the lates.t Grand ~atlOnal. e neutralization can take place only if

The above cbservanons explam why tens f ifi ti is still felt to bethere is 'present relevance', i.e. if the p~t act 0 S?~c ica Ionrelevant. The following sentences further illustrate this:

(37)(a) It was/is John who murderedSmith.(b) It was/??is John that 1needed/feared most.

h urdered Smith continues to be thought of as 'theAs explained above, the one w ith'. B t h t I needed most or feared most at some= w~o is the mur~erer ~~;~yl~O'b~ ;a~ relevant to the present. Hence thetime lil the past 15 un 1 S' i1 xamples are'implausibility of tense neutralization in (37 ,b). irn ar e .

I' d) wasJ??iswhy sne was(38)(a) That (= what 1have just exp ame ..angry. )' I?? what they were(b) That (= what you see over there IS . rwaslooking for.

h ker i ointing at the sense of presentIn (38,b), ,:here that indicateshwhat t ~ ~~~ n~u~~ized pres~nt becomes almostrelevanee IS so great that t e use 0

obligatory.Apa~ from the above restriction, there are sorne other factors that may help to

deterrnine whether or not the use of a neutralized present is acceptable Foexample, when not only the variabie but also the value is a clause in a non-presenttense, the copula linking the two clauses cannot be in the present tense:

(39HaJWhal he said wasf?ïs that he was ill.(bJ What.sheaskedwasris whelher Ihere would be any time tor

quesnons,

(It should be noted that the tense of the postcopular form is determined by that ofthe Wh-c1a~e (by the 'sequence of tenses' rule). The occurrence of is between thetwo c1ausesISapparently feIt to disturb this system.)When only one of the NPs is a clause, tense neutralization is easier when the

clause follows be than when it precedes the copula:

(40)(aJ 1Iis/was Tom who killed Fred.(bJ Tom is/was Ihe one who ki/ledFred.(c) The one who killed Fredwasf?is Tom.(dj Tomwas/is Smilh's murderer.(eJ Smith's murdererwas/?is Tom.

In some cas~ there are elements in the context that entail that is is interpreted,not as a neutralized tense, but as referring to present time:

(41Ha) 1Iwas, in my opinion,John who murderedSmith.(b) 1IIS, In my apinion,John who murderedSmith.

The additi.onof in my opinion entails that (41,a-b) may be interpreted in differentways, While (41,b) suggeststhat the speaker now thinks that John murdered Srnith(41,a) ma~ be ~e.d to suggest that the speaker thought so at the time but has nowchanged hIS.0pIOlon.On this interpretation the act of specification is explicitlyconnec~ed.Wlt~~hepast (rather than being interpreted as tirneless), so that tenseneutralizanon ISImpossible.Anot~er factor that can more ~r less rule out the use of a neutralized present has

to do with ~hether or not there ISa referent that is no longer alive. If there is thepast tense WIl!normally be used: '

(42J The manwho founded this church was/ ?'is Henry VIII.

But this factor may be overruled by that of present relevance:

(43) SHAKESPEAREis the aulhor of HamIet.

An~the: restrietion is to be observed in specificationalWH-c1eftswhose focus isa predicational element. Compare:

(44)(a) Whal John was wasl'is happy.(b) Itwas/is happy Ihat John was.92

(45)(a) What he wanled 10 become wasris a teacher.(b) 1Iwas/is a teacher thaI he wanted 10 become.

I have no explanation for the unacceptability of is in the WH-c1efts.(That is is notruled out in the (b) sentencesmust again have to do with the fact that it precedes theWH-clause.) .

To sum up this section: in predicational sentences the tense is determined by thetime when the property is felt to hold of the referent of the subject NP; inspecificational sentences it either depends on the tense (or time) of the variabie NP(though tense simplification may blur this tense harmony) or it is neutralized.

In the wake of this discussionof tense we can say something about the auxiliaryused /0. Higgins(1976: 151) claims that used to be can replace was in predicationalsentences, but nor in specificational ones. This appears to be correct for sentenceslike

(46) The murdererof Tom wasl'used to be John.

but not for examples like the following:

(47)(a) The colour that she prelerred used to be blue.(b) The one who did most ol Ihe work used to be John.

Sentences like these show that used 10be can occur in specificationalsentences if thevariabie NP is such that differentvalues can be assigned to it at different times, as in(47,a-b), nut not if only one value can be assigned to it at any time, (as in (46». Inother words, the reason that used la be is out in (46) is that the meaning of used la(which is 'discontinued habit' - cf.Cornrie 1976) is incompatible with the timelessnature of the specificational relation. However, (47,a-b) show that not allspecificational sentences express such a timeless relation, so that the (im)possibilityof using used la be is not a reliable test for establishing whether a sentence ispredicational or specificational.

4.6. Indefinite pronouns and determiners can occur freely in predicationalsentences, but some of them are excluded from the focus position of specificationalsentences.This is a restrietionwhich has been noted for it-clefts,93but actually holdsfor all types of specificational sentences.We can distinguish the following cases:

92. This type of sentence bas a low degree of acceptability, for reasons that have notbing 10 do witbtbe choice of tense. See chapter 4 for a full discussion,

93. Gundel (1977a: 127) notes Ibis for many and lew; Lees (1963: 2) notcs it for no, every andneither;Schachter (1973: 28-29) mentions the restrietion in conneetion witb somebody, anybody,everyone and nothing; Seuren (1985: 297) notes it in conneetion with many.few and most.

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A. The focus cannot be one of the negative pronouns nothing. nobody no one (nornot + anything/anybodylanyone):

(48)(a) 'Whal happenedwas NOTHING.(b) *11was NOONE who came in.(c) (I know the ring was found.)"lt was found by NOBODY(d) *11was NOT ANYTHINGthat he lold me. .

(Not.e that (48,a) and, to a minor extent, (48,c) are acceptable on a predicationalreading.) ~be reason why (48,a-d) are unacceptable as specificational sentences israther Ob~IOUS:they make an assertion that is incompatible with the presuppositionof the vanable. For example, (48,b) presupposes that someone came in and assertsthat no one came in. This semantic contradiction of course renders the sentenceunacceptable.

What is possible, though, is that a sentence with nothing, etc. is used 10 contradietthe presupposition:

(49)(a) Whal happened? - NOTHINGhappened.(b) Who was it who called up? - NOONEcalled up.

As noted before, clefts cannot be used in this way:

(50)(a) What happened? - 'What happenedwas NOTHING.(b) Who was it who called up? - 'rt was NOONEwho called up.

B. U~iversal determiners tevery, any, alt, etc.) and universal pronouns teverybody,anything, al/, etc.) do not normally occur in focus position:

(51)(aJ *11was every/any mistakethat we corrected.(b) 'What we saw was every1hing/anything.(c) *Itwas anything that we got trom them. .(dj *Whal I want is all.

Sent~nces like these are unacceptable because the universal quantifiers are whatColh.nson .(1937: 25) calls 'exhaustive indicaters'. That is, they refer to a set in itstotal~ty, without exduding any item or subset of it. This is incompatible with therequirement that the focus of a specificational sentence should be exdusive andcontrastive, i.e. that there should be a contrast between the candidate(s) selected asvaIu~ a?d the ?ther .cand~date(s) in the set satisfying the referring description.

It 18 10 k~e?mg with. this that the use of a universal determiner does not produceunacceptability when it does not rule out a contrastive interpretation :

(52)(a) What we want to save is all Ihe buildingsthat were builtbetween 1800 and 1850.

(b) Whal John steppee on was every bee in Ihe hive. (Halvorsen1978: 82)

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In (52,a) the buildingsthat were built between 1800 and 1850 contrasts with all thebuildings that were built at some other time; in (52,b) every bee in the hive cancontrast with all the bees outside the hive.

Specificational sentences with every, etc. in the focus can also be used tocontradiet an assertion, presupposition, or implication. (We have noted the samething in conneetion with nothing. nobody, etc.)

(53) Which of themwas here? - EVERYONE of Ihem was here!

Again, deft sentences cannot be used in this way:

(54) Which of Ihem was here? - '11was EVERYONE of them thatwas here!

C. Although indefinite determiners like some, several; a lew, a couple of can occurin the focus of a specificational sentence, it has been c1aimed that indefinitedeterminers like much; few many, most are exc1uded there. Thus, Gundel (1977a:127) notes that (55,a-b) are ungrammatical:

(55)(a) 'It was lew people that voted tor George.(b) 'It was many blackbirds that were in the pie.

Seuren (1985: 297) gives the following example:

(56) Whal Henry sold was a postcare/a lew postcardsf'fewpostcards/'rnany postcardsz'rnostpostcards.

He also notes that the use of the indefinites in (56) is exactly the same as in thequestion-answer pair (57,a) and as in (57,b):

(57)(a) What did Henry sell? - A postcard/a few poslcards/*fewpostcards/*many postcards/*most postcards.

(b) Henry sold a POSTCARD/a tew POSTCARDS/*fewPOSTCARDS/*many POSTCARDSl*most POSTCARDS.

The possibility of using a focus NP with a, some, a lew, a couple of a Uittecan beexplained from the fact that the answer to a WH-question may be 'evasive' or'reticent', i.e. it may be information which is not fully identifying but which at leastlifts a tip of the veil. The same is possible in specificational sentences. Sentenceslike

(58)(a) Whal Henry sold was a POSTCARo/somePOSTCAROS.(b) The one who did it was a MAN.

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specify a value whicb is perhaps not as identifying as it could have been - this isespecially elear in (58,b! - but which is nonetbeless offered as if it were identifying.It should be noted that in sueh sentences the nuclear accent is entirely on the nounhead. The determiner (a, some, etc.) is not heavily accented at allo

In my opinion, determiners like afew, man] much can be used similarly, but it isvery difficult to find contexts in which they seem good, because they have asemantic import that determiners like a, afew, some, several, etc. do not have. In~enten~ such ~ (58,.a-b) th~ latter determiners have no clear lexical meaning. A isjust the indefinite artiele which for syntactic reasons is required before a singularcount noun, a little and some can be used in an article-like function before massnouns, and the other determiners (a couple of; a few, several) (and also some) areused as the plural counterparts of a. None of these determiners has a particularsemantic import, and this is in keeping with the fact that they are very weaklyaccented. By contrast, the determinersfew, man] much and most do add an aspectof meaning since they not only refer to an indefinite quantity but also specify thatthis quantity is a smal! or large one. As aresuit the use of such a determiner in thefocus NP of a specificational sentence will require that the determiner participates inthe contrastive meaning of this focus. That is, if the focus is e.g.few postcards (as in(56)-(.57), there must not only be a contrast between postcards and something (oranything) else but also between the idea of 'few' and its opposite. This is not the casein the examples (56)-(57), where the use of few, many and mast is consequentlyunacceptable, but the requirement is satisfied in the following examples:

(59)(a) Henry didn't sell much.- That's not true. He sold tewpostcards,but he sold plentyot pencils.

(b) The children have eatena lot. - Not really.They have eatenmany apples but they havent eatenmuch bread.

(c) Let's buy a lot ot cheap inslruments.- No. I think that whatwe should buy is not a lot ot cheap instruments,but a coupleof really good ones. .

In. some cas~, however, viz. when the specificational sentence serves to explicitlyreject a particular value, the quantifier need not be contrastive:

(60) We need a lot of moneyto do all this. - Weil, I think it is a lolof courage and a lot of enthusiasm, ralher than a lot ofmoney, thai we need 10realize this project. If everybodywillco-operate and do his utrnost,we will not necessarily need alot of money.

In cases like this the determiner is again unaccented, whereas it is not in (59,a-c).The above observations make elear that determiners like few, many, etc. are not

necessarily unacceptable in the focus of a specificational sentence. Under particularconditions they may be perfectly all right.

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D. When (a) lew, (a) little, much, etc. are used as pronouns rather than asdeterminers, they are not acceptable in the focus of a eleft:

(61)(a) "What I need is much/a litlle/a lot.(b) *Uis many/a tew/tew that know that.

Noneleft sentences like

(62)(a) They spend LlTTLE.(b) They eat A LOT.

are grammatical, but I do not think they are specificational. They do not teU uswhat is spent or eaten, but rather how much. And for some reason the variabie of aspecificational sentence cannot merely indicate quantity:

(63)(a) *How much we need is SIXTEEN.tb) *It is SIXTEENthat we need.(c) *We need SIXTEEN.

These can be compared with

(64)(a) What we need is SIXTEENPOUNDS.(b) It is SIXTEENPOUNDSthat we need.{cl We need SIXTEENPOUNDS.

Sentences like these show that the focus of a specificational sentencc can be an NPwith a quantifier as determiner, but it cannot be an unmodified quantifierpronoun." This means that it is not possible for the focus to indicate no more thanquantity. That is, the value specified for a variable like 'the X that I need' mustnecessarily indicate what it is that I need, and may in addition say how much of thatis necessary. But indicating quantity without indicating the substance that it appliesto is not possible.

E. The Iinal set of indefinite words that we must consider consists of the pronounssome, somebody, something and someone. None of these can occur as the focal itemof a specificational sentence:

(65)(a) "It was SOMEBODY/SOMEONE that came in.(b) ·We bought SOME.(c) ·Whal I need is SOMETHING.

94. A senterreelike What we need is THOSE THREE is all right because it is also acceptable whenthree is dclcted. Equally acceptable are sentences in which the quantifier is accompanied by arestrictive relative clause or prepositional phrase: What I need is (he three (that are) ill (hecupboard. not the three (that are) in the drawer; What I need is three of thesepencils.

RO

The reason tor the unacceptability of such sentences is obvious: the focal item istotally uninformative. What is asserted is exactly the same thing as is alreadypresupposed. Thus, (65,a) both presupposes and asserts that someone came in. Itgoes without saying that such sentences violate Grice's Maxim of Quantity and aretherefore pragmatically unacceptable.

4.7. When the linking verb of a copular sentence is not be, the postcopular elementis always predicational. This bas often been noted in conneetion with become (seee.g. Geacb 1968: 35, Fodor 1976: 119-120,209, Higgins 1976: 150-151) but isactually true of virtually any verb that can occur in copular function. (Turn into isthe only exception tbat Iam aware of - see below (esp. footnote 95).) Thus, everyone of the following sentences has a predicational NP after the copula:

(66)(a) At first he had na job but later he became a teacher.(b) Atoms for peace could turn killer. (Bald 1972: 95)(c) The man proved a coward.(d) We want to keep friends.(e) She seems a courageous woman.

It follows that elements that cannot be used predicationally cannot follow thesecopulas:

(67)(a) 'After the kiss the trog became Prince Edward.95(b) 'The shadow proved Bill,

According to Higgins (who deals with WH-defts only) a WH-eleft alsoautomatically becomes predicational if we add to it a verb or adjective thatproduces raising (e.g. tend to, begin 10,seem 10,sure 10,unlikely (0),a modal verb, ora sentential adverb (Higgins 1976: 195,204-205,226). The following examples areadduced to illustrate this:

(68)(a) Betsy believes that what Bifl is is tafl. (specificational)(b) !What Bill is is believed by Betsy to be tafl. (nonsensical

predicational reading only)(69)(a) What John is tends to be boring. (predicational only)

(b) What he is pointing at seems to be a kangaroo. (id.)(70)(a) !What John is may be rich. (nonsensical predicational read­

ing only)(b) 'What he doesn't know is possibly that anyone tried to bribe

them.

On the other hand, Halvorsen (1978: 34) argues that the following WH-elefts (inwhich raising has applied) are fine on a specificational reading:

95. This sentence is al! right if we use turned into instead of became:ril After the kiss the (rog turned into Prince Edward.

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(71)(a) What John wants seems to be never to be left alone.(b) We believe what John wants to be never to be left alone.

However this may be, noneleft specificational sentences certainly do not becomepredicational when we add a sentential adverb or moelal verb:

(72)(a) The murderer could be JOHN.(b) What they need is perhaps a HAMMER.

These sentences are specificational, and they would not seem to be unacceptable.The acceptability is, however; more doubtful when raising has applied :

(73)(a) ?The murderer is unlikely to be JOHN.(b) ?The murderer seems to be JOHN,

On the whole, sentences in which be combines with some other verb or adverb areharder to judge than sentences in which another copula is used. In the latte~ case thepostcopular NP is elearly predicational; in the former type of sentence this mayormay not be the case, and judgements are often hard to make.

4.8. According to several linguists a predicational sentence typically denotesc1ass-indusion, i.e. "expresses the relation of c1ass membership" (Halli~y 1970:154). Thus, Jespersen (1962: 176) elaims that "He is arascal means 'he IS one ofthe elass of rascals'" (see also Jespersen 1961: 390). Gunde! (1977a: 130) argucsthat She was my friend means that "the NP she is asserted to have been ineludedamong a set of friends"; and according to Halliday (1970: 154) Margueri~eis ap0e_tcan be paraphrased as 'Marguerite belongs to thè elass of poets'. Accordmg:o ~hlSclaim the subject and the predicate nominal show a different degree of specificity:the predicate nominal is more general than the subject NP. In the opinion of ~~om &Daalder (1977), this claim even represents the essence of the definition of'predicational sentence' : a sentence is predicational if it classifies ~he referen~ o~ thesubject NP in a larger category, indicated by the predicate no~nal. That IS, lil apredicational sentence the subject is a 'hyponym' of what is denoted ~y th~predicate nominal (which is the 'hyperonym' or'superordinate')." Thus, m HlS

mistake was understandable, the NP his mistake is the hyponym and understa~d­able is the superordinate. This means that his ":istake represents a mor~ Specl~Cconcept, whose meaning is incIuded in the meamng of the larger concept (what is)understandable' .

96, The terrns 'hyponym' and 'superordinate' were introduced by Lyons (1963: 68-71; 1968:453-460; 1977: 291-301). According to Lyons, a word is a 'hyponym' of another if the conceptdenoted by the farmer is included in the concept denoted by the latter (the 'supero~~inate')..Forexample, tulip is a hyponym ofjlower. Blom& Daalder (1977) extend these definitions a little:they apply the terms not only to words but to linguistic expressionsin genera] (p.70).

91

In my opinion, this thcory raises insurmountable problems. I agree thatpredi~tion~l sentences wi!h an indefinite NP as subject complement often expressclass-inclusion (e.g. John IS an American), but there are subtypes of predicationalsentences where no idea of class-inclusion (or class-membership) appears to bepresent:

a. We hav~ already noted that definite NPs can sometimes be used predicationally(cf secnon 3.2.). In that case the predicational sentence does not expressc1ass-inclusion:

(74)(a) Bill is Ihe acme of courtesy.(b) Reagan is (the)Presidentof the U.SA(c) John is the best musician in town.

b. Even when the subject complement is an indefinite Np, it does not always denotea larger class in which the referent of the subject is included:

[75J BiUis someone who is wise enough to know that his marri­age to Marywould be in danger if he went about withanother girl.

The (rather complex) subject complement here does not imply (or implicate)'exc1usiveness', i.e. does not suggest that the description (someone who is wiseenough 10.•. ) is applicable to other people besides Bill.97

Tbere are similar problems in conneetion with anotber claim made by Blom &Daalder. (197?), viz. that the essence of a specificational sentence is just the reverseof what IS (claimed to be) expressed in a predicational sentence. According to Blom& Daalder, a specificational sentence by definition has a subject acting as'superordinate' (more genera! concept or class), whereas the subject complementfunctions as 'hyponym'.Thus, they claim that in

(76) His mistakewas that he let himself be easily intimidated.

his mistake is the superordinate and the that-clause is the hyponym. However, thistheory again raises serious questions. It is not clear to me in what sense hts mistakein (76) is more genera! than the thal-clausespecified as value. As stressed by Higgins(1976), the essence of the specificational relation expressed in a sentence like (76) isthat the contents of a concept (in this case his mistakes are specified. But thisnaturally means that the NP denoting the concept and tbe NP specifying its contents

97. As n?tcd before, Hawkins (1978) claims that exclusivenessis an inherent part ofthe meaniog ofthe indefinite article, but Declerck (1987a) argues that exclusiveness is no more thanconversationally implicated by the uscofa(n), and cao thereforehe cancelled by thc context or bythe mcaning of the rest of the sentencc.

cannot differ in generality or specificity" Moreover, the claim that, in aspecificational sentence, the subject is the superordinate and the subject comple­ment the hyponym, wbereas it is the other way round in a predicational sentence,leads to the conclusion that a specificational sen ten ce must automatically becomepredicational when it is reversed (i.e. when the subject becomes subject comple­ment and vice versa). Tbis runs counter to everything we have argued in section2.11.

In sum, it does not appear to be possible to define predicational andspecificational sentences on the basis of a hyponymy relation or in terrns of greateror smaller specificity or generality of the NPs. The only claims that seem warrantedare the following:

a. Predicational copular sentences with an indefinite subject complement mostlyexpress class membership (in which case the concept denoted by the subjectcomplement is more general than that denoted by the subject).

b. Specificational sentences do not express a hyponymy relation. There is nodifference in generality between the variabIe NP and tbe value Np'99

4.9. In section 3.2. we saw that a predicational NP is always non-referring,irrcspcctive of whcthcr it is definite or indefinite. Howevcr, I may drawattention 10an exceptional type of Np, which is at the same time referring and prcdicational,Consider:

(77)[a) Let's ask John tor adviee. - By God, nol I won't have thatidiot meddling in my affairs.

(bJ Have you heard of Bill? The idiot has divorced his wife.

98. Halliday (1967, 1968) argues that the two NPs of a specificatiooal copular sentence have thesame dcgrce of specificity,and that this is precisely the reason why such sentences are reversiblc.Blom & Daalder's theory is also incompatible with Givóo's (1973: 119) claim that it is auniversal restrietion that "a predicate may never he less general than its subject".

99. It is worth noting, though, that the variabIeNP may include an expression that is a superordinatewith respect to the value Np,but not vice versa:(i)(a) The flowers they gave me were TULIPS.(b) 'The tulips they gave me were FLOWERS.

Sentence (i,b) is unacceptable because it failsto give any identifyioginformation : sinceflower isasuperordinate of tulip, what is specified as value is information which is alrcady present in thcvariabie 'the tulips they gave me'. (That is, we here encounter thc same problem as we met inconneetion with •It was somebody who came in, which is also unacceptablc becausc what isasserted is alrcady presupposed.)

91

In t~ese examples the N: that/the idiot is used both to refer to someone and topredicate a.prop~~y of hlm.1OO The NP is therefore paraphrasable as 'He (or: that?ne), w~o IS an idiot', However, the fact that the NP thus contains predicationalinformation does not mean that it can be used as a predicational NP. This isprevenred by t?e f~ct that the NP is also referring. Thus, the following aremterpreted speclficatIonally,not predicationally:

(78)fa) The one who did it is the/that idiot.(b) The murderer is the/that idiot.

100. Declerck (19~9) points out tha~in some cases the property is not simply assigned to the referentbut also f~~tl~ns as an evaluation of the assertion that ismade in conneetion with that referent,Th~, the id_'OtIn (77,~) says ?ot only that Bill is an idiot, but also (and perhaps even primarily)tha~I~was 1~lotlCof him to divorce his wife. (This double claim is the samc as ismade inBill isan idiot to divorce his wife. Sec Declerck (1979) for an analysis of such sentences.)

5. DESCRIPTIONALLY-IDENTIFYINGSENTENCES

Although the vast majority of copular sentences are either specificational orpredicational, there are someminor sentence typeswhieh do not fit in either of thesecategorics.One such sentence type is that which Higgins(1976) caUs'identification­al'. It is exemplifiedby sentences like the following:

l1}(a) Who's that man? - That man Is John's brother.(b) Mike? Who's Mike? - Mike is my brother.

Higgins calls such sentences 'identificational' because they clearly ask for, orprovide, identifying information. However, wc have observed that spccificationalsentenees (like Who's the bank robber? - It's John Thomas) are also concernedwith identifying information and I therefore think that using the term'identificational' for nonspecificational sentences such as (l,a-b) is somewhatmisleading. Because of that, I will use a different term, viz. 'deseriptionally­identifying',which corresponds exaetly with the function that such sentences have.The followingparagraphs should make this dear.

Unlike specificationalsentences,sentences like (La-b) are not meant to specifyavalue for a variabie.Rather, the specificationseemsto have happened in advance, sothat the subject NPs are now fully referential: descriptions like that man and Mikeare normally sufficient to piek out a person from a group. In other words,identificationhas already happened in the sense that a value has been specifiedfor avariabie. However, identificationmay require more than this. The assignment of avalue to the variabie will result in full identificationonly if the deseription (whieh isspeeifiedas value) can be associatedby the hearer with a particular entity,i.e, if thedescription belongs to the "backing of descriptions"IOIthat the hearer has of theentity referred to. Thus, descriptions like that man or Mike will not lead to fulIidentification if the hearer knows no further deseriptions of tbe person referred to,i.e. if he does not reeognize the description in question as typical of a particularperson he knows. Thus, on being told The murderer is that man over there, thehearer can piek out tbe person in question from a group that isbeing shown to him

101. The term 'backing of descriptions' is borrowed from Strawson (1959: 20), who claims that "it isno good using a name for a particular uniess one knows who or what is referred 10 by the use ofthe name. A name is worthless without a backing of descriptions which can be produced 00

demand to explain the application", (The resulting theory, viz. that the reference of a name isnecessarily determined by some cluster of descriptions is criticized by Kripkc (1972) andDonncllan (1972). This criticism,however, is immaterial to the use l will be making ofthe term'backing of descriptions'.)

95

but he may unable to recognize the person as somebody he knows, i.e. ofwhom hehas a 'backing of descriptions'. In that case the specificational sentence fails to createfull identification and the hearer is likely to ask Who is that man?, thus asking for a'descriptionally-identifying' sentence like That man is John 's brother. In thissentence the speaker does not specifya value for a variabIe but adds a description(John's brother)as further identifyinginformation. If thisdescriptionbelongs to thebacking of descriptions which the hearer has of a particular person, fulleridentificationwill have been achieved.The above observations lead to thc followinggeneralizations:

A. There is 'fulI' identification only if two requirements are simultaneouslysatisficd: (a) the relevantentity can be 'indicated' (in the senseof 'picked out from aset') by a deictic expressionlike that one, the girl over there, the man in the middle,etc.; and (b) we can give the name of the entity in question or a description whichdistinguishesit from all other entities.

B. This means that identifying information is eithcr a deictic expression (whatCollinson(1937) callsan 'indicater') or a name or what I will call a 'description'J'?A description is an expressiondescribinga property and is therefore the only one ofthese three types of NP that can also be used predicationally'P

C. AH three types of identifyingNPs can occur as the value of a specificationalsentence:

(2)(a) Who did that? - It was that man over there.(b) Who did that? - Itwas John.(c) Who did that? - 1\was a friend of mine.

D. Since full identification means that the referent can be bath 'indicated' andnamed or described, the use of any one of these three expressions does notnecessarilylead to full identification.When the identifyingexpression used is anindicater, the hearer is enabled to piek out the referent from a set, but it is possible

102. I am not using the term 'description' here in the way the term 'referring descriplion' is used in thephilosophical literature, Dcictic expressions and proper names are normally also treated asrelerring expressions there.

103. A proper name is not a description in this sense.As pointed out by Christopbersen (1939: 59),"proper names differ hom appellatives in having no conccptual content. They merely indicatean object without implying a description of it. (...) Proper names are like the numbers assignedtoconvicts; no maller how mucb alike are two convicts, they are never givcn the same number.The number only identifies, but does not describe thc person to whom it belongs, and tbcfunction of a proper name is cxactly similar."

that the entity in question does not mean anything to him (i.e. he does not 'know'the referent, he can provide neither his name nor any description applying to him),Conversely, when the identifying expression is a 'non-indicater' (i.e. a name ordescription), the hearer may still be unable to 'indicate' the referent. In both casesthe hearer will have to ask for the missing identifying information. For example:

I"II~

IIu

I~,,I,,

(3)A. Who won the first prize?B. John did.A. Who's John?B. John is thatman over there.

In this example speaker A first provides a non-indicater (John) as identifyinginformation.When this appears not to be sufficientlyidentifyingfor B,A bas to addan indicater (that man over there). In the following cxample the two picccs ofidentifying information are given in the reverse order:

(4)A. Who won the first prize?B. That man over there.A. Who is he?B. He is the son of Judge Harris.

E. Whichever type of expression is provided first, the first answer to a questionasking for identifyinginformation is normally specificational.This is clearly the casein the above two examples,where the first answer of Bcan each timebe replaced byan it-cleftsentence (viz. ft is that man over there (who won thefirstprize) and ft isJohn (who won thefirst prize).

F. The nature of the second answer of B (i.e. the sentence givingthe supplementaryidentifying information) depends on which information is being provided. In (3),B's second answer can again be interpreted specificationally(and can therefore bereplaced by the it-eleftft is that man over there who is (called! ~ohn. In.(4), ~n .theother hand, B's second answer is not specificationalbut descnpuonaIlY-ldentlfymg.For that reason it cannot be replaced by an it-cleft(*1tis the son of Judge Harris thatis that man over there).The reason for this differencebetween (3) and (4) is that asentence can only be descriptionally-identifying if the identifying NP is adescription, not if it is an indicater or a proper name. B's second sentence istherefore descriptionally-identifyingin (4), but not in (3), and neither in (5):

(5jA. Who won the first prize?B. That man over there.A. Who's that man?B. Why,don't you recognize him? tt'e Jahn!A. John? Who's John?B. Don't teil me you don't know who John is. He is the fellow

who sat besideyou at the annual dinner party af the club.

B's first and second replies are specificational; the third is descriptionally­identifying.

G. Examples like these show clearly that, if the hearer has neither of the twoelements of full identification, we can use a specificational sentence, but not adescriptionally-identifying one, to give him one of these elements. Adescriptionally-identifying sentence can only be used to pro vide the second element(with the addit~on~l condition that the element in question must be a description,not a name or indicater), In a sense, a descriptionally-identifying sentence is thus asccondary type of identifying sentence. It wil! be recurred to only if the specificationof a value for the variabIe has failed to be fully identifying. This does not mean thatthe act of specification must have been overtly expressed in the farm of aspecificational sentence preceding the descriptionally-identifying one. The mere useof an indicater pr proper name in the preceding context is sufficient because theseimply that the variabie has been assigned a value. For example: '

(6)A. John may be coming tonight.B. John? Who's John?

A's sentence need not be specificational(i.e. it need not be pronounced with thenuclear accent on John). But even if it is predicational, it asserts that someone maybe coming tonight and identifiesthat someone as John. Although the sentence (onthis predicational interpretation) does not serve to specifya value for a presupposedvariable,100.h is ~l~r t~at this s_pecificationis implicitlymade. B's question asking~orf~rt~er identifyinginformation can therefore be answered by a descriptionally­identifyingsentence (e.g.John is my uncle).

H. The three kinds of identifyingexpressions(viz. indicaters (deictic expressions),names and descriptions) correspond with three levels of identification, Whensomeone is said to know the identity of some entity,this means that he can refer tothat entity by usingan indicater,a name or/and a description.Tbe entity in questionis then 'identifiable by indication', 'identifiable by naming' or/and 'identifiable bydescribing'. Although any of these three possibilitiescan be realized on its own(without either of the others being realized), there does appear to be some kind ofgradation. If one can provide (or understand, i.e,recognize)descriptionsapplying tothe entity,then one usuallyalso knows its name. And if one knows its name, one isusually also able to 'indicate' it, i.e. piek it out froma set. If one can only indicate theentity (without knowing its name or any descriptionapplying to it), the knowledgethat one has of the entity's identity is still very 'elementary'. That knowledge is

104. This is precisely the diffcrence hetween the predicational use and the specificational one: theformer assem, whereas the Jatter prcsupposes, that somcone may he eoming tonight.

richer if it also includesthe name,but ismaxima! only ifone is also familiarwith thcdescriptions (at least the most relevant ones) applying to the entity.

What hasjust been referred to as 'knowledge ofthe identity of an entity' is called'acquaintance' by Higgins(1976). The way in whieh this term is defined is quite inkeepingwith our above remark in conneetion with 'degrees of knowledge' : we saythat a person is 'acquainted' with some entity if he is at least capable of using anindicater (deietie expression) to refer to that entity,i.e. to piek it out from a set:

The use of a Deietie phrase implies that the user has the object referred to before him insome very direct sense. I will say that if one is in a position to say thisx or IJwI x, then oneis Acquainted with the x, or that one has Acquaintance with it. This (...) notion ofAcquaintance (...) does not presuppose any knowledge about the object but merely a hieet nune confrontation (...). I shall say that a proper name is used with Acquaintance if oneknows who or what bears the name to an extent that would allow one to use the name asan alternative to a Deictie phrase accompanied by a pointing gesture if the bearer of thename was present and one was in a position to recognize him, her, or it. (Higgins 1976:137)

The preceding pages have given a definition of deseriptionally-identifyingsentences and have made clear what is the relationship of such sentences tospeeificational sentences, whieh are also identifying. (In what follows I willsometimes use the term specificationally-identifying instead of specificational whenthe sentences in question are compared with descriptionally-identifyingsentences.)We are now in a position to go somewhat more fully into the eharaeteristics ofdescriptional1y-identifyingsentences.Especially the way in whieh they differ fromspecificationally-identifyingsentences is worth examining.

5.1. Deseriptionally-identifyingsentences laek the most salient eharaeteristics ofspecificational sentences. This is immediately clear when we consider a simplecxample like the following:

(7)A. Who's that fellow?B. He's a friend of mine.

Sentenec (7,B) lacks the following properties that are typical of specificationalsentences:

a. It is not paraphrasable as The following person is thatfellow: afriend of mine.

b. It cannot be replaced by an it-deft (witness the ungrammaticality of "I! is afriend of mine who is that fellow).

C. It cannot be used in answer to an interrogative eleft. The question Who is it whois that man ? (which is not a very acceptab!e sentence) will not be answered by adescriptionally-identifying sentence like He is a friend of mine but rather by aspecificationally-identifying one like ft is afriend of mine. (See Chapter 2 for adetailed discussion of the difference between ft is a friend of mine and He is afriend of mine.)

5.2. Descriptionally-identifying sentences do not normally answer questions thatuse which or which one instead of who. The reason is that whicn (one) is typicallyused for picking out an entity from a set and is therefore normally used in questionsasking for specificationally-identifying information.l'"

5.3. Bath specificationaIly-identifying sentences and descriptionaIly-identifyingones can answer questions of the (superficial) form 'Who is NP?'. Apart from thefact that c1efting is only possible in the farmer case, the two sentence types differ inthat the underlying order of the constituents in the question is different. Whe haveseen that in a specificational question of the type 'Who is NP?' the NP is thepredicate nomina! and who the underlying subject. In descriptionaIly-identifyingsentences it is the other way round: who is the predicate nomina! and the NP is theunderlying subject. This is c1ear from various observations (see also Higgins1976):

d. Sentence (7,B) is not feIt to specify a value for a presupposed variable. Thetypical aspects of meaning following from the act of specification (viz.contrastiveness and exhaustiveness) are therefore absent. The description afriend of mine is not feIt to contrast with a11the other possible descriptions, anddoes not exelude any one of these. Rather, the description is just one of thedescriptions that are applicable to the person in question, and it is perfectlypossible to add others:

(8) (Who's that man?) - He is a relativa of John's and a friend ofmine.

A. As pointed out in section 2.11, indirect questions of the form 'Wh + NP + be'correspond to direct questions of the underlying form 'NP + be + wh', whereasindirect questions of the farm' Wh + be + NP' correspond to direct questions of theunderlying form 'Wh + be+ NP'. Consider now what happens when we use (12) inindirect speech, as in (13):

As we have seen, similar sentences are unacceptable if they are specifica-tiona!: .

(9) (Who is Smith's murderer?) - '11 is a relative of John's and afriend of mine. (12)A. Who's the new president?

B. That man over there (is the new president). (specificational)A. Who is he/that man?B. He is the son of the farmer president. (descriplionally­

identifying)(13)[a) The girl asked us who was the new president.

(b) We told her thai il was the man standing in the corner of theroom.

(c) She then asked us who he/thai man was.(d) We replied that he was the son of the farmer president.

The indirect questions (13,a) and (13,c) reveal the different underlying order of theconstituents in the specificational question and in the descriptionally-identifyingone. (It should be noted that (13,c) could not be reworded as "She then asked uswho was he/that man. 106 As for (13,a), ifwe change it into The girl asked us who thenew president was, the result is not ungrammatical, but it is not the correct indirect

e. Sentence (7,B) is not reversible:

(10) (Who's that man?) - 'A friend of mine is he/him/that man.

Although it is true that next to (11 ,a) there is the possibility of saying (I1,b), wecannot conc1ude that (11 .a) is reversible.

(11Ha) (Who's Bill Smith?) - Bi" Smith is a friend of mine.(b) (Who's Bill Smith?) - A FRIEND OF MINE is Bi" Smith.

Whereas (11,a) is descriptionally-identifying, (11,b) is specificational. That is,the question Who 's Bil! Smith ? in (l1,b) is interpreted as 'Who is it that is(called) Bill Smith?', and (lI,b) (or its inverted equivalent Bill smitn is aFRIEND OFMINE) is a (rather reticent) specificational answer to this question.In (11.a), on the other hand, the question is interpreted as 'TeU me somethingmore about that fellow caUed Bil! Smith', and the answer is descriptionally­identifying. The difference between these two answers is brought out further bythe fact that, if we use a pronoun instead of repeating the name Bil! Smith, wewill substitute He is a friend of mine for (11,a) and ft is a friend of mine for(11,b), but not vice versa: (See also Chapter 2.)

105. I know of only two exceptions to this rule. One is pointed out by Higgins (1976: 163), whonotes that the following is grammatical and must be 'identificational' (= descriptionally­identifying) because of the use of that as subject:

(i) (Do you know which member that is?) - Yes. That's the member for !he ChilternHundreds.

The second exception wiUbe pointed out in section 3 of Chapter 2.

106. A similar cxamplc isI'd like to know who that is, for which wccannot substitutc'l'd likc 10 knowwho is that.

100 101

~ersi~n .of the f~st question in (12): the new sentence reports a descriptionally­lden.tify~g qu~tlOn and cannot be appropriately answered by the first reply of (12)(which IS specificationally-identifying).What is revealed by the word order in indirect questionsis in fact already clear

from the word order in direct questions:

(21Ha) Which one do you think is the thief? (specificational)(b) 'Which one do you think the thief is? (id.)

(22)(a) A. Mike? Who's Mike? (descriplionally-identifying)B. Weil, who do you think he is? (id.)

(b) A. Mike? Who's Mike? (id.)B.'Well, who do you think is he/him? (id.)

(23)(a) Who do you think you are? (descriptionally-identifying)(b) ·Who do you Ihink is you? (id.)

D. A sentence like Who are you? can only be descriptionally-identifying:it is aclear example of a sentence that does not ask for specification of a variabie butrather for an identifyingdescription.The fact that we say Who are you? and not*Who is you? confirms our claim that it is you, not who, that is the underlyingsubject. The same is clear from the fact that someone coming to after a period ofunconsciousnesscan say Whoam I?, but not Who is me? In this case the speaker isclearly asking for an identifyingdescription. He is not asking the hearer who (i.e.which person) it is that is using the pronoun I to refer to himselfIn the above example (viz.the useof Who am I? rather than *Who is me ?) there

are two indications that it island not who that is the subject: the verb agreeswith I,and we use I rather than me (which is the usual farm of the pronoun in subjectcomplement position). The latter phenomenon can also be observed in

(14)(a) Who's Ihat man? Is he/that man a friend of yours?(b) Who's that man? 'Is a friend of yours he/him/lhat man?

(As pointed out in footnote 44, this test is unreliable in connection withspe~ificational sentences because subject-verb inversion applies to superficialsubject NPs, and in specificationalsentences (wbicb are reversible)both NPs canoccur in subject position. This problem does not arise in conneetion withdescriptionally-identifyingsentences.Since these are not reversible the NP that issubject in the surface structure is also the underlyingsubject.) ,

B. ~he c~aimthat the underlying word order is 'Wh be NP' if tbe question isspe~l?catJOnaland :NP b~wh' if it is descriptionally-identifyingis confirmedby thepostnon of the NP if we msert a modal auxiliary into the question. Compare:

(15)(a) Which one is Ihe thief? (specificational)(b) Which one could be Ihe Ihief? (id.)(c) 'Which one could Ihe Ihief be? (id.)

(16)(a) Which one is il who is Ihe Ihief? (id.)(b) Which one could it be who is Ihe Ihief? (id.)(c) 'Which one coulc it be who the Ihief is? (id.)

(17)(a) Mike? Who'sMike? (descriplionally-idenlifying)(b) Mike? Who could Mike be? (id.)(c) 'Mike? Who could be Mike? (id.)

The above examples are direct questions.The followinginvolve indirect questionswith the modal auxiliary added to be:

(24)(a) Mike? Who's heFhim?(b) Beaumont and Fletcher? Who are Iheyrthem?

Since a pronoun used as predicate nominal usually appears in the object form (e.g,It's him; That's her, etc.), the obligatory USeof the subject form confirms that thepersonal pronoun is the subject.

5.4. The subject of a descriptionally-identifyingsentence is either a deictic NPreferring to an entity in the immediate situation (as in (25,a») or what we havecalled a 'non-indicater' (i.e. a proper name or description) which is referential forthe speaker but attributive for the hearer (cf (25,b»).(18)(a) I arn al a loss 10know which of Ihem may be the thief.

(specificalional)(b) '1 am at a loss to know which of them Ihe thief may beo(id.)

(19)(a) I am at a loss to know what thls may beo(descriptionally­identifying)

(b) *1 arn al a loss 10know what may be this. (id.)(20) ...a lady whose face seemed tamillar to me, but who she

could be I had not the slightest idea. (Kruisinga & Erades1953: 449)

C. Tbe same results are obtained when the question is embbeded under a verb ofpropositional attitude:

(25)(a) Who's that (man)? - That (man) is John Thomas.(b) Who's John Thomas? - John Thomas is a friend of mine.

5.5. Higgins (1976: 147) notes that a typical kind of 'identificational'(descriptionally-identifying)sentence is that introduced by a deictic pronoun:

(26) This/lhat is Michael Vork.

This use of thislthat with human reference (which Higgins (1976: 147) calls'common gender use') is possible only in identifying sentences. In the followingexample, which is predicational, {halcannot have human reference:

10?103

(27) That is tall.

Com~~n gen~er that ean be found in both specifieationally-identifying anddcscnptlOnallY-ldentifyingsentences :

However, the use of this/that does not always mean that elementary identifica­tion has taken place. In some cases the use of a demonstrative (rather than it)appears to have some other origin:

(28)(a) Who's Ihe murderer? - THAT's the murderer.(b) Who's thaI? - That's MICHAEL VORK.

Th,e ~ifferen~ be~w.eenspecificationally-identifying sentences like (28)(a) anddescnptlonal~y-ldentlfYI~g ones like (28,b) is clear from several indications. In~28,a) t~a' lS contrasuve and heavily accented, while the murderer is oldIllformatlO~. We here have the typical features of a specificational sentence. In(28,b) that IS~eakly accented and conveys old information. The new information isthe name, which therefore receives the nuclear accent, but which is not contrastive.The sentence. h~ the typieal meaning of a descriptionally-identifying statement.

However, tt IS not always that easy to judge whether a sentence with commongend:r that as subject is specificationaIly-identifying or descriptionally-identifying.Considcr:

(31Ha) I hope you're feeling belter today? - How's thaI? - I heardyou were sick, - Oh, that was last week that I was sick.

(b) What difference does a little dispute make now and then? -OK but this was with his boss that he was ha ving theargument,

In these two examples (which I borrow from Bolinger (1972a: 107» thedemonstrative pronoun does not refer to an entity in the immediate situation.Rather, its use seems to be the result of adding to it the tempora! deixis that isrealized in the WH -clause. That is, it is replaced by that in (31 ,a) to create the ideaof temporal distance, while this was in (31,b) is equivalent to this time it was.

In sum, it appears to be warranted to analyse sentences like (29,a-b) and (31,a-b)as it-cIefts of a special type, but the use of this/that in some cases entails that theconstruction also has the basic properties of descriptionally-identifying sentences.

(29)(a) Look! lsnt that John who's walking over Ihere?(b) Is that a gun that he is pointing at us?

Sentences like these ,have very seldom been considered in the linguistic literature.Those who have pointed out their existence (Bolinger 1972a: 107, Jenkins 1975Bali. 197?) have treated them as representing a special type of it-cIeft, i.e. ~specificat~o~al sentences. This analysis seems correct, for the most essentialcharactensttcs of it-clefts are realized: the sentences fill in a value for a variabie andthe foca! items (John and a gun) are strongly accented and contrastive. On the otherhand, sen~ences such. as (29,a-b) differ from it-clefts (and from specifieationalsente~ces in g~neral) III that th~ variab!e (WH-clause) need not be presupposed(old) mform~t~on. A sentence like (29,a) ean easily be used out of the blue. Thereason for this lSto be found in the use of deictic that, which creates for the sentencean anchoring-point in the immediate situation.

5.6. If we disregard the this/that-clefts referred to in the preceding section, theover-al! conclusion from section 5 must be that there are numerous differencesbetween specificational (specificationally-identifying) sentences anddescriptionally-identifying ones. This means that the question Who is X? isambiguous between the readings 'Who is it who is X?' and 'Tell me somethingmore about X'. Since the difference has to do with a different function (subject orpredicate nominal) of the nominal constituents, Ieven think it is warranted to speakof syntactic homonymy.

It follows that (if we disregard the minor sentence types still to be discussed)copular sentences fall apart into two major classes: those that give identifyinginformation and those that do not. The latter, which just predicate a characteristic ofthe referent of the subject NP, are predicational. The former are eitherspecificationally-identifying or descriptionally-identifying. The sentence is specifica­tional if the speaker specifies a value for a variabIe. This means that, prior to the useof the identifying sentence, the hearer knows that a particular description (e.g. 'theX who did Y' applies to a particular individual or set but does not know whichindividu al or set it is. The specificational sentence is meant to furnish him thisinformation. Conversely, if the relevant individual or set is identifiable to the hearerin the sense that he can piek it out (i.e. there is hic et nunc acquaintance with it), adescriptionally-identifying sentence may be required for the hearer to link up thereferent in question with an individual or set that he knows in the sense that he has a'backing of descriptions' of it.

What is interesting about (29,a-b) is that they also have the most essentialcharacteristics of descriptional!y-identifying sentences. If we leave out the WH­clauses they are definitely descriptionally-identifying:

(30)(a) Look! Isn't that John?(b) Is that a gun?

!he r,easo~ is,t?at the use.of deictic.lhatmeans that what we have called 'elementary~dentIficatton ISautomatically realized: the person or object in question is identifiedIn the.se.nsethat he, she or it ean he picked out. What the sentence does is provide adescription (gun) or proper name (John) as further identifying information.

5.7. In the preceding sections we have concentrated on the differences betweendescriptionally-identifying sentences and specificational ones and have disregarded

104 105

predieational sentences altogether. However, it may be interesting to draw the latterinto the picture as weU, for we may wonder whether the three major classes(specifieational, predieational, descriptionally-identifying) are not related in anotherway. Instead of first distinguishing between identifying sentences and predieationalones and then further subclassifying the former, we could perhaps argue that theprimary distinction is that between specifieational and predieational sentences, andthat the latter fall apart into identifying predieational sentences (i.e. thedescriptionally-identifying ones) and nonidentifying predieational sentences. Such aclassifieation would imply that descriptionaUy-identifying sentences share the basiccharacteristics of (nonidentifying) predieational sentences. Actually, there issomething to be said for this point of view. If the differences between specifieationalsentences and descriptionally-identifying ones are numerous, both semantieally andsyntactieally, those between descriptionally-identifying sentences and (nonidentify­ing) predieational ones are more restricted. The two sentence types have at least thefollowing characteristics in common:

an attributive definite Np, a generic definite NP or an indefinite one).

f. Unlike specifieational sentences and like (nonidentifying) predicational ones,descriptionally-identifying sentences carry no exhaustiveness implicature. In

(32) John? Who's John? - He's my friend.

there is no sense that the NP my friend is the only description that could be usedin the slot after He's. This description is just one of the several that could be used.As we have seen, it is only in specifieational sentences that an exhaustivenessunderstanding arises.

a. Neither of them is reversible. This c1earlydistinguishes them from specificationalsentences.

In sum, descriptionally-identifying sentences have a lot of characteristics incommon with (nonidentifying) predicational sentences, so that it rnight seemjustified to claim that both belong to the same class of predicational sentences.However, this claim is dubious, because the differences still outwéigh thesimilarities :a. In conneetion with persons, descriptionally-identifying sentences are felt to

answer the question 'Who is NP?', whereas (nonidentifying) predicationalsentences answer the question 'What is NP?' or 'What is NP like?'. (Thisdifference is not devastating to the claim, though, since it just shows that theformer sentences are identifying and tbat the latter are not.)

b. Descriptionally-identifying sentences answer questions of the underlying form'NP is who?', and (nonidentifying) predicational sentences answer questions ofthe underlying form 'NP is what?'.Specificational sentences, on tbe other hand,answer questions of a different underlyiog order: 'Who/what is NP?'. b. Although the description given in the predicate nominalof a descriptionally­

identifying sentence (e.g. my friend) cao mostly also be used as the predicatenominalof a predicational sentence, there are occasional instances where this isnot the case. For example:

c. The questions 'NP is who?' and 'NP is what?' are both questions asking fordescriptive information. The question 'Who/what is NP?', by contrast, is arequest to fill in a referring expression.

d. Descriptionally-identifying sentences and (nonidentifying) predicational sen­tences have the same intonation pattern. If there is no material following thepredicate norninal, neutral sentence intonation puts the nuclear accent on thepredicate nomina! (i.e. on the descriptive information). Thus, the sentence Johnis my friend (with the nuclear accent onfriend) is either predieationa! or (whenused in a suitabIe context, e.g. in answer to John? Who's John 7) descriptionally­identifying. The same sentence can also be used specificationally (i.e. in answerto Who is it who is your friend 7), but then the intonation pattern is entirelydifferent (viz. with the nuclear accent on John).

(33) Bill? Who's Bill? - He's that man over there.

The description that man over there is a strongly referring expression, whichtherefore cannot occur as the postcopular NP of a (nonidentifying) predieationalsentence. (As we have seen, a predicational NP (property NP) is alwaysnonreferring.) The fact that the postcopuIar NP of a descriptionally-identifyingsentence may be strongly referring follows precisely from tbe fact that it isidentifying information that is given. On the other hand, an identifyingdescription need not be referring. It can also be a property Np, as in

e. As we have seen, the NP that represents oId information in (nonidentifying)predicational sentences and in descriptionally-identifying ones (i,e. the NP that issubject in the question 'NP is who/what1)may be either attributive or referentialin Donnellan's sense. However, in specificational sentences the relevant NPcannot be referential: we have seen that it ean only be a weakly referring NP (i.e.

(34) Mary? Who's Mary? - Oh, she's a friend of mine.

In this case the speaker dodges giving precise identifying information. Theanswer is ratber evasive.

106107

c. Wbcreas tbc property of a predicational sentence can beturned into the focus ofI spccificational ~nstructio? (e.g. by clefting the sentence), this is not possiblewhcre tbe predicate nommal of a descriptionally-identifying sentence isconcemcd:

(where the singularity of the thing implies that I saw only one object) isunacceptable on a specificational reading.) Similarly, in the predicationalsentence John is a good boy and an excellent student the two conjoined NPs referto different properties of the same subject. When we apply this test todescriptionally-identifying sentences we ascertain that they behave rather likepredicational sentences :(35)(a) John is a teacher. (predicational)

(b) ?Jtis a TEACHER that John is.lo7(c) What John is is a TEACHER.

(36)(a) John? Who's John? - He is a teacher at our school.(descriptionally-identifying)

(b) John? Who's John? - ït is a teacher at our school that he is.(c) John? Who's John? - 'Whatlwho he is is a teacher at our

school.

(39) Who's that? - That's my neighbour and best friend John.

The conjunction of two postcopular NPs in (39) does not entail multiplereference. On the other hand, the following is out:

(40) (Who's that?) - "That's my friend and a good man.

The reason why the conjunction produces unacceptability here is that, unlike myfriend, the NP a good man does not provide identifying information. For thatreason it can only occur in predicational sentences, not in descriptionally-identifying ones.

Tbe :~on w~y t~e .answers in (36,b-c) are unacceptable is simply thatdescriptionally-identifyîng sentences presuppose that specification of the referentbas alrea~y ha~pened. As we have seen, descriptionally-identifying sentences areus.edprecisely in cases wbere specification ofthe referent has taken place but hasfailed to have the expected result of making the referent identifiable for thehearer.

The above observations lead to the conclusion that the set of NPs that can besubject complement in predicational sentences overlaps only partly with the set ofNPs that can be subject complement in descriptionally-identifying sentences. Theoverlap concerns sueh NPs as myfriend, which can be used either as mere propertyNPs or as identifying descriptions. Demonstrative NPs and proper names can onlyhave the latter function and cannot, therefore, be used in predicational sentences.NPs like a good man can be used as property NPs but not as identifying oncs and aretherefore excluded from descriptionally-identifying sentences.

It follows that, in spite of the fact that there are various similarities betweendescriptionally-identifying sentences and predicational ones, it would be incorrectto treat deseriptionally-identifying sentences as a subc1ass of the larger class ofpredicational sentenccs. Descriptionally-identifying sentences with a deictie NP orproper name as predieare nominal are not predicational: such NPs cannot be usedas property NPs. We will therefore have to go on distinguishing betweendescriptionally-identifying sentences and predicational sentences. IC we wish tomake a generalization over two of the three classes, we must take together theidentifying ones (specificationally-identifying and descriptionally-identifying) andset them off from the class of predicational sentences, which are not identifying.

d. We hav~ obser~ed (cf section 3.5) that the definite artiele may sometimes bedeleted !TI definite property NPs that refer to a rank, function or position:

(37) That man is (the) president of the club.

This omission of the artiele appears to be impossible in descriptionally­identifying sentences :

(38) Who's that? - "Ihat's president of the club.

This means th~t the de1etion of (he is possible only in (true) predicational~enten~, not m sentences where the property NP is meant to be identifyinginformation,

e. In section. 4.1 w~ sa~ that the conjunction of postcopular NPs entails multiplereference in specificational sentences, but not in predicational ones. For exampleon the predicational reading the sentence What we saw was a car and a boa;impli~ ~hat we saw one ?bject that was simultaneously a caf and a boat (i.e. anamphibian); on the specificational reading it asserts that we saw two differentobjects. (For th at reason a sentence like The thing that I saw was a car and a boat

107. As noted bef?~e,there is a restrietion OD the use of it-cleftsthat highlighta property Np, so thatthe acceptability of sentenceslike (3S,b) is rather low. See chapter 4.

Ino 109

6. IOENTITY STATEMENTS

(2)(a) The following person killed Smith: the man who robbed thebank.

(b) It is the man who robbed the bank who (is the man who)killed Smith.

(c) The man who kilied Smith is the same person as the manwho robbed the bank.

There is a clear semantic difference between the specificational reading paraphrasedin (2,a-b) and the identity reading paraphrased in (2,c). This se~anti~ differen~ isreflected in tbe intonation pattern that (l,c) receives: on the specificational readingthe nuclear accent is contained in the focus (lhe man who robbed (he bank); on theidentity interpretation it is on the copula. In my opinion, the differen~ between thetwo readings is so obvious that it is unnecessary to adduce further evidence for thedistinction. Like Higgins (1976), 1will benceforth treat identity statements as a typeof copular sentence that should not be confused with the specifi~tional type. .

An attempt at eliminating identity statements in another way IS to be found 111

Blom & Daalder (1977). Blom & Daalder claim that a11copular sentences areeither specificational or predicational. Seeing that identity statements are c1early notspecificational, they therefore claim that they are predicationaI. Thus, thc sentcn~The Morning Star IS the Evening Star is treated as a predicational sentence III

which a characteristic is predicated of the Moming Star, viz. the characteristic of'being the Evening Star'. The fact that we can also say The Evening Star IS theMorning Star (since identity statements are evidently reversible: a = b can also bcexpressed as b = a) is not felt to be a problem for th~ir theory. This se.ntence, theyclaim, is also a predicational sentence, which aseribes to thc Evemn~ ~tar t?eproperty of 'being the Morning Star'. In my ~pinion, such an analy~IS IS quitecounterintuitive. I discern na difference of meanmg between TheMorning Star ISthe Evening Star and The Evening Star IS the Morning Star. Moreover, there isplenty of evidence that this type of sentence is different. f~om .predicationalsentences. To sum up the most important arguments only: (a) lil identity statementsthe postcopular NP is always areferring NP,112whereas the property NP of apredicational sentence is by definition nonrefcrring; (b~in ~n identity statement thenuclear accent is typically on the copula, whereas predicational sentences show theneutral intonation pattern (with the nuclear accent on the last open classconstituent); (c) in an identity statement the copula can be paraphrased as is t~esame as or is identical with.Sueh a paraphrase would lead to nonsensical results lilmost predicational sentences (e.g. She is a beauty); (d) unlike predi:ation~lsentences, identity statements obviously do not evoke questions of the typ~ what IS

NP?' or 'what isNP like't', No doubt many other differences could be pointed out,

Apart from the three major types referred to above, there are a eouple of minortypes of the form 'NP be NP'. Sentences like the following iIlustrate such a type:

(1)(a) The Morning Star is the Evening Star.(b) Dr. Jekyll is Mr. Hyde.(c) The man who killed Smith is the man who robbed the bank.

Sentences like these yield a reading which eau be paraphrased as 'NPI is the same(person/objeaj as NP{ Following Higgins (1976) and many others, I will refcr tothern as 'identity statements'.

In treatments of copular sentences identity statements are not often considered toform a c1ass of their own. In many cases they are conflated with specificationalsentences. This is in keeping with the fact that specificational sentences are aftenclaimed (especially in the philosophicalliterature )108to express sameness or identity.A sentence Iike ft is John who is the (hief is then held to express that the pcrsonreferred to by John is 'the same as' (or: is 'identical with') the person referred to bythe thiepffl However, although this is logically entailed by the sentence, it is not acorrect characterization of the specificationaI act that is performed in such asentence.!» In my opinion, sentences like (l,a-c) are ambiguous between aspecificational reading and an identity reading. Thus, sentence (l,c) can beinterpreted either as (2,a-b) or as (2,C):111

108. Of course, even in the philosophicalliteralure exccptions can be found. For example, Linsky(1963: 80) writes:

Some of the statements which have been counted as identitiescannot be interpreted as such.Suppose I explain 10my confused son, "Charles de Gaulle isNOT the king of France", Thatthisstatement is not an identity can he shown as follows.From a =b, it follows that b =a, butfrom "Charles de Gaulle is NOT the king of France" it does not follow that "The IcingofFrance is NOT Charles de Gaulle", Tbc first of these statements is true while the secend isneithcr true nor false.

109. This opinion is widespread among linguiststoa. See e.g. Kuno 1970: 351, VanDijk 1977: 121Har~es-Delisle 1978: 422, Atlas & Levinson 1981:, Kuno & Wongkhomthong 1981: 76:~a1h:wy 1982: 68. Someone making the erroneous claim in the other direction (i.e. treatingidentity statements as specificational sentences) is EIffers(1979: 102). According to her, TheMorning Star is the Evening Star is an "identifying" sentence.

110. Higgins (1976: 133) stresses that "the Specificational reading of a copular sentence is not theexpressionof some kind of identity". He rightlypoints out that tbe mucb discussedexample Thenumber of planets is nine is not an identity statement but a specificational sectenee.

111. The specificationalreading pointed out bere is the one on which the man who robbed the bank isthe focus NP. However, since specificational sentences are reversible, there is also thespecilicational reading on which the man who killed Smith is the focus. Let us disregard thisinterpretatïon in the discussion.

112. Wiggins (1965: 42) defines an identity statement as follows: .For a sentence 10 expressan identity 'is' or '=' must stand between two nou~-phrases which,if they are distinct, are serving independent1yof one another 10 make genume references.

110111

I;

b~ltJI think ~hepoint is t?Oo~vious to devote further attention and space to. In fact I:1th~~~tOo:rther mlo Id~ntl.ty.statements at aHbecause they are not really releva~tof WH J f the book. Still, It.1Sworth noting that sentences of the superficiaI farmtures: -c ets are sometlmes identity statements rather than specificationaJ struc-

(3) What we call the MorningStar ISwhat they call the E .Star. venmg

ii;ceb wc )dOnot treat Wli-clefts as being by definition specificational (ct: section. a ove , we can refer to such sentences as 'identity WH-clefts' ( di ti fspecif ti IWH . . as IS met rom

Cl ica iona -clefts, predlcatlOnal WH-defts t), e c..

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7. DEFINITIONS

To the four sentence types discussed so far, a fifth should perhaps be added. It isthe type of copular sentence that is used to give definitions:

(1Ha) A motor car is a vehicle that has four wheels and is pro­pelled by an internal combustion engine.

(b) A pyramid is what the Egyptiansbuilt to bury their pharaos in.

This type of sentence seems to have escaped the notice of nearly everyone dealingwith the specificational/predicational distinction in the linguistic literature. Yetsentences like these again do not fit into the predicational/specificational dicho­tomy. Ta begin with, it is clear that they are not specificational:

a. They do not have the intonation pattern typical of specificational sentences (i.e.with contrastive accent on the constituent that is to be interpreted as focus).

b. They are not reversible. (That is to say, switching the places of the subject NPand the predicate nominal in (l,a) or (l,b) results in a sentence that is notungrammatical, but which na longer counts as an example of a definition.)

c. Although a paraphrase in terms of 'NP I is the following: NP 2' seems possible, navaluc is spccificd lar a variabie. Thc structure

(2) A motor car is the following: a four-wheeledvehicle with aninternal combustionengine.

does not give an exhaustive enumeration of the items on the list whose heading is'the X that is a motor car'.

d. It-c1efting is not possible. The sentence

(3) ?It is a four-wheeledvehicle with an internalcombustionengine that is a motor car.

can only be interpreted specificationally. (This reading would only make sense ifthe speaker were presented a number of alternative definitions of the term motorcar and had to select the correct one, i.e. the correct value for the variabie 'whatmotor car means'. In that case the 'definitional' NP would be turned into thefocus of a specificational construction in the same way as a predicational NP canbeoHowever, it is doubtful whether this type of sentence is quite acceptable.)

Could we say that a definitional copular sentence is predicational? Such an

113

interpretation would be in keeping witb tbe intonation pattem of the sentence, witbtbe fact tbat tbe structure is not reversible, and with tbe fact that definitions answertbe question 'What is NP?'. On tbe other band, defmitional sentences differ frompredicational ones in that the information given by tbe predicate nominal is meantto make the hearer understand the contents of a concept or tbe use of a term. Thismay happen by relating the term in question to another one, which is expected to bebetter known (e.g.An oculist is an eye-doctor)or by sumrning up the cbaracteristicsthat are considered to be tbe most typical (essential) properties ofthe prototype. In a'normal' predicational sentence the predicate nominal is not feIt to have thisfunction. Even wben a number of characteristics are summed up, as in John is astupid; haughty and disagreeableperson, there is no idea that a definition is beinggiven. In fact, for a copular sentence to be interpretable as a definition it is necessarythat the subject NP should not be interpreted as referring. This means that it cannotbe a proper name. If it is a defmite description (e.g. theAbominable Snowman), tbisdescription is not used as a referring NP.Hence tbc diffcrence between Who is theAbominable Snowman? (which uses the description as a referring NP and asks foridentifying inforrnation) and What is theAbominable Snowman? (where the NP isnot referring and it is the denotation of the term, not its reference, tbat is inquestion). Only the latter question, which asks for the meaning of the term, can beanswered by some kind of defmition.

AB appears from (l,b), a definitional sentence may be a WH-cleft, but thennecessarily one with the WH-dause in postcopular position. This is unlike what wehave observed in conneetion with predicational WH-clefts, whose WH-dausenecessarily precedes the copula. Compare:

(4)(a) A racket is what you use to play tennis. (definitional)tb) What I use to play tennis is rather expensive. (predicational)

The conclusion would seem to be tbat definitional sentences like (1,a-b) do not fitinto any of the categories of copular sentences discussed in the previous sections.The issue is furthermore complicated by the fact that sentences such as these do notrepresent tbe only possible type of sentence giving a defmition. A request for adefinition can also be satisfied by ostensive exemplification:

(5)(a) (What is a pyramid?) - What you see over there is apyramid.

(b) (What does to bug someone mean?) - Bugging someone iswhat you're doing to me just now!

Sentences such as these are no defmitions in the technical sense of the word, buttbey do count as valid answers to questions asking for definitions. The canonicaltype of definitions (exemplified by (1 .a-b) consists of the name of the object to bedefined followed by be and a list of the most salient characteristics of theprototypical object (cf. Lander 1977). Sentences like (5,a-b), in contrast, give no

114

more than an example of the object in question. APpare~tlih~h:e:~~~ :~:~that the example in question is identifiabie to the hea_rer10 disti h thbackin of descriptions of it and that the hearer will he able to istmguis hereleva! descriptions (viz, those that are typical of the prototype) from t e

co~t~gen: ones~oestablish whicb type(s) of copular sentences (5,a-b) belang to. A_st 15 nIo easy (5 a) can be oonsidered as predicational: it states that what ~

far as can see" . . S (5 b) on the other hand, 15b d bas the property of being a pyrarrud. entence , , .o ser~e il t (1 a b) However it differs from these in that it does not really give avery Slm ar 0 , - . ,

definition. h h re is no d~ubt a lot more to be said about definitions, I wi1~O?t

ex::~~~~e :u~ject any further here. Definitional sente: :~~~:eb~~:a~o~~t~h~

the rest.of thdisb~Okt'o: !~:tOt~eypr:~n~!~~~seesfi:~~nto the three major types ofthey exist an pom .'copular sentences dealt with m sectlOns 2 to 5.

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8. OTHER TYPES?

There are still a couple of copular sentence types left that cannot be simplyanalysed as specificationaI, predicational, descriptionally-identifying, identity state­ments or definitional. A first such type is illustrated by the following examples:

(1Ha) To see her is 10 love her. (Kahn 1973: 27)[b) Ta be a member of the Space Club is 10 be one of the most

privileged citizens of the world. (Esser 1984: 116)(c) Ta be human is 10 err. (Quirk et al. 1985: 1063)(dj Ta look back 10 the past is surely 10.look away from your

responsibilily for the future. (Bald 1972: 66)(e) Ta remain in a favourable state is in general 10 be inactive.

(Huddleslon 1971 : 139)(fj (If eleft sentences ean be generaled by the base rules of a

transformational grammar, Ihen they must be so generated.)Ta generale Ihem otherwise is 10 render the grammar redun­dant.

(2)(aJ Virtue is happiness.(b) Demoeraey is chaos.

The sentences (La-f), whose two NPs are each time infinitive clauses, can all beparaphrased in terrns of (3):

(3) If elause 1 is true, Ihen clause 2 is Irue.

Sentence (2,a) can he paraphrased similarly if we look upon its NPs asnorninalizations of infinitive clauses. (That is, if (2,a) is considered equivalent to Tobe virtuous is to be happy.) Sentence (2,b) yields a paraphrase very sirnilar to (3),viz. 'If there is democracy, tbere is chaos'.

At fust sight these sentences look very similar to identity statements. However,they do not really express an identity. For example, if democracy and chaos wereidentical, i.e. denoted the same concept, it would be possible to substitute one forthe other in most contexts. However, this is clearly not possible. lt is in keeping withtbis that these sentences are not reversible, They would be if tbey were identitystatements.

Can we look upon them as predicational? Clearly not. Although we might findDemocracy is chaotic a reasonable paraphrase of (2,b), (2,a) certainly does notmean the same thing as Virtue is happy. The infinitive clauses in (1) do not functionas property NPs either. In fact, we pointed out in section 3.2 (more specifically, infootnote 5) that nominal c1auses cannot be used as predicational NPs.

The question whether (l,a-t) and (2,a-b) could be specificational ordescriptionally-identifying need hardly be asked: it is clear that none of thesesentences identifies some unknown (or insufficiently known) entity. And interpret-

116

in them as definitions does not make any sense enner.. .gw thus faced with a special type of copular sentence. Since the m~Dlng of

such sentences is paraphrasable in terms of 'if...then ...', we might refer to this type asthe 'inferential' type. . . f .ck

There is another type that is worth mentioning, although it 15 less 0 a mavenand can probably even be treated as specificational:

(4)(a) It was not that he was not hungry. It was merely that he didn'ldare to ask for food. . .

(b) lI's not that I don't like him. [On the contrary, I hke hirn verymuch.)

Delahunty (1981: 180) considers such sentences as it-clefts that have no overtWH-clause (representing the variable). This analysis is pr~umably correct!" Thedeleted WH-clauses are easily recoverable and mostly indicate th~ r~ason or causeof something that is clear from the context. A nice example of this 15 (5):

(5) It may have been that the porter at Vork railway station wasirritated by Sunday duty, or it may have bee.n that t~e outwardsigns of weallh in his client were not conspieuous , whateverthe cause, he spoke rudely 10 her. (Kruisinga 1932a: 503)

The following example (and the comment in brackets) is from Curme (1931a:

187):

(6\ The queer part of it was that Miss Waters didn'~ seem t~ bereally mean. It (= the eause of her t~ouble-makmg\ was justthat she couldn't mind her own bUSiness.

113. It-defts with a tllal-clause as focus and an overt WH-clause are not very. accep:~:: Still,Dclahunty (1981: 82) notes the following example from a navel by Sornerville & .

(i) 1wonder i1it was that they hadn't room enough lor them up in the house thatthey put them out here in the woods?

117

CHAPTER 2. 'IT IS MR Y' OR'HE IS MR V'?

1. The problem I will attempt to solve in this chapter is that of finding themechanism that underlies the selection of it versus he!she/they as the subject ofsentences like (l,a-d):

(1Ha) There's a policeman al the door. - Who is it/he?(b) Last night a man was arrested by the London police and

charged with the murder of Annie Jones. ft was/He is MrJames $mith, of $weetham Street,Bexton.

(c) I know the man in the photograph. It/*he is John!(d) Who is Mr Aronov? - Herit is a Russian.

The problem considered here is by no means an unfamiliar one. It has beentreated by quite a number of grammatical handbooks and there is at least one artic1ethat is entirely devoted to it, viz. Erades (1949). Vet the solutions that have beenproposed do not appear to be fuUy satisfactory. They usually involve one of thefollowing claims, which (as Ihope to show) are either fallacious or insufficient tosolve the it/he-problem.

1.1. According to some grammars (e.g. Sack 1954: 111, de Vocht 1947: 149,Close 1975: 6), it is used instead of he/she/they if the gender and number of thesubject cannot be gathered from the preceding context. This explanation may seemall right for sentences like

(2) Who's at the door? - n's thepostman.

but is clearly inadequate in other cases:a. It does not explain the possibility of using it in (l,a-c), where the preceding

context does specify the gender and number of the referent (a man!polieeman).

b. It fails to account for the difference between (3,a) and (3,b), where the genderand number of the referents are not specified:

(3)(a) There's someone at the door. - lU*he is a polieeman.(b) Thore's someone al Ihe door. - He/*it wants 10 see you.

C. The rule cannot be extended to cases where the preceding context does notcreate a personal referent (i.e. where it does not appear to refer to a person at all),as 10

119

I"" VVlldl::i UldIIlUlse'( - Illever mind.lt's only the children.

1.2. Some grammars (e.g. Deutschbein 1959: 208) state that it is used when thereference is to an "unknown or unmentioned person". In doing so they avoidproblem (a), but do not escape the problems (b) and (c).

1.3. According to Curme (1931 a: 7), it is "used as subject to point to a person orthing that is first presented in only dim outlines by the situation, but is often lateridentified by a predicate noun: 'I1's John' ... (uttered by someone upon hearingapproaching footsteps)", This explanation may cover the cases of problem (c) butcertainly does not solve problem (b). It also meets with the problem that exampleslike (5,a-b) show that one and the same noun phrase (that man) can be used both as'identifier' (as in (5,a» and as 'identified' (as in (5,b». How is it possible for thesame NP to present a person "in dim outlines" in one context and to "identify" himin another?

(5){a) Someone shouted something. r Ihink it was that man overthere.

(b) Who's that man over lhere? - Why, don't you recognizehim? lt's John!

1.4. Some other gram mars (e.g. Zandvoort 1964: 166) state that when u is used,"both pronoun and verb refer 10an image seen, a sound heard, a smell perceived, inshort some sensory perception", This rule avoids the above three problems (a)-(c),but fails to explain the use of ii in cases like (l,b) or (6), where no sensoryperception appears 10 be involved:

(6) (talking of an engagemen~ But who is it? Is it lhe young manthat she used 10go out wilh last summer?

1.5. According to Jespersen (1958: 149), senlences with it is are reduced it-cleftsand he/she/they are used only "when there is no cleft sentence (i.e. when nocontinuation with a relative clause could be thought of)", as in

(7) Who are those girls? - They are my sister's friends.

A similar view is defended by Poutsma (1916: 732), who states that "itmay beunderstood as the representative of a substantive clause (...), which, although notactually expressed, is more or less distinctly implied in the context".

However, although many it-sentences may indeed be considered reduced it-defts(cf below), there are other cases which do not yield to such an analysis. Thus, (8)resembles (7) in that "no continuation with a relative clause could be thought of",but we aU the same have to use it:

(8) Who's that (girl)? - n's Mary.

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Conversely, there are cases in which the continuation with a relative clause ispossible but where he can be used next to (although not always interchangeablywith) it:

(9) Who's the girl that is walking there? - Itlshe is my sister.

The rule thus wrongly predicts that it and helshelthey are mutually exdusive and istherefore incapable of explaining the difference between the use of it and that ofhelshelthey in sentences like (9).

1.6. Scheurweghs (1959: 182) claims that it-sentences are used "when there is norefcrencc at all to a particular word mcntioned bcfore: thcy express who it is thatdoes something, that is heard or seen, that is talked about". For example:

(10) I have to go to a funeral in Golders Green. - "Is it a triend?",Sylvia asked.

It is dear, however, that this mie covers only part ofthe cases, since sentences with itoften do refer to a person that has been mentioned before (cf. examples like (8) and(9».

1.7. According to Kruisinga (1932a: 99-101), it is used in sentences that serve toidentify a person mentioned befare and helshe in sentences that serve to describethe referent. In other words, il answers the question 'Who is it?', and helsheanswers the question 'What is he/she?'. This rule is inadequate in at least tworespects. First, it does not account for the use of it in sentences that do not refer to a"person spoken of before" (as in (4), (6), (10». Secondly, next to the questions'Who is it?' and 'What is helshe?' we can also ask the question 'Who is helshe?'and the corresponding answer will make use of helshe, in spite of the fact that itappears to provide identifying information. The possibility of using helshe inidentifying sentences is stressed by Erades (1949), who gives numerous exampleslike the following:

(11) An unusual feature of the investiture was the appearance ofa lady to receive the VC. She was Mrs Green, widawafCaptain Jahn Les/ie Green, la wham the award af the Vc.was natified on August 5.

Kruisinga's own comment on this sentence is that "we should expect it' (p.102) andthat the use of she is "a trick of refinement" (p.1 03) often used by journalists.

1.8. What seems to me to be the best and fullest treatment of the itlhe-problem is tobe found in Erades (1949) and in Kruisinga & Erades (1953: 59-61,444-445,452-454). In these works a distinction is made between three types of sentences:

121

a. "roentuymg sentences" answer the question 'Who is it?' and therefore have it assubject. They serve to identify a person (or persons) either as "thc source, causeor origin of some sensory perception" (K & E 1953: 59) or as "the subject orobject of an activity, or as the cause of some occurrence, mentioned before" (K &E 1953: 453). Sentences such as (4) and (10) are good examples of these twopossibilities,

b. "Specifying sentences" answer the question 'Who is hel she?' or 'Who are they?'and therefore begin with helshelthey. Their function is to specify a personmentioned befare by giving his name, "either in the shape of a class-noun or of a .personal proper name" (K & E 1953: 60). Sentence (11) can serve as anillustration.

c. "Classifying sen tences" answer the question 'What is helshe?' or 'What arethey?'. They begin with hel 'she/they and have the function of "attributing somequality (rank, age, occupation, degree of relationship, nationality, religious orpolitical persuasion, etc.) to persons mentioned before (K & E 1953: 61). Thefollowing is an example:

(12) Fortunately,Dr.Seatonarrived promptly.He was a bluft,hearty middle-aged man.

Although this threefold distinction is no doubt more illuminating than any other1 have reviewed, it still has a number of weak points:

A. The definition of 'specifying sentences' appears unsatisfactory. For one thing,sentences giving the name of a person wilt use it much more often tban helshelthey(ft is even virtually obligatory wben the proper name is just somebody's first name(e.g. Johnîy. For another, tbe "class-noun" can hardly be said to function as a namein sentences like

(13) Robert?Who's Robert? - He is a Frenchman, for al/I know.

Moreover, aFrenchman indicates a nationality and sbould therefore be 'classifying'.Still, the sentence here answers the question Who is Robert?, not What isRobert?

B. There are some problems in conneetion with 'identifying sentences' too:a. The statement that it-sentences can identify a person as "the cause of some

occurrence, mentioned before" is inaccurate in that the occurrence of wbich theperson is identified as the cause need certainly not have been mentioned before.For example, on coming home and finding my wife in tears I may ask What's thematter? and then make a guess: Is it the children?Has something happened tothem?

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b. Both in Erades (1949) and Kruisinga & Erades (1953) the it of identifyingsentences is claimcd to be an anaphoric pronoun relerring to thc scnsoryperception that is identified:

They (i.e. identifying sentenccs) attribute a sensory perception to some souree, causc,origin, or 'object' (in the philosophical sense of the term). This explains why thereferring pronoun should invariably be neuter and the verb singular: both refer to aneuter and hence singular idea, viz, sornething seen, heard, feit, etc. (K & E 1953:·451)

However, this claim raises several problems. Ta begin with, it overlooks suehit-sentences as (6) and (10) in whieh there is no reference to a sensory perceptionat aU. Secondly, the claim runs counter to the observation that we have to usewhoever rather than whaieverin sentences like (14). If it were a neuter pronoun,whatever should be possible.

(14) Who's at the door? - Whoever rwnaiever it is, it is not John.

Thirdly, there are cases in which plural they has to be used in spite of the fact thatthe reference is to a sensory perception. For example, on seeing one person enterthe room you can ask your hearer Who is it?, but on seeing several personscoming in you can only ask him Who are they? Yet, in both cases there is asensory pereeption of exactly the same kind.

c, There are sentences that are clearly 'identifying' but where he can or should beused:

I

f.

1\

I:I

(15) Who's the murderer? - Do you see that man over there? Heis the murderer.

d. The distinetion between identifying, classifying and specifying sentences doesnot enable us to explain the selection of it or he in cases like the following:

(16) (a) Who's that man? - It/he is my brather.(b) Who's that? - Jtrhe is John.(c) Who's thatman? - Itrhe is John.(d) Who are those people? - They are ("ft is) the Johnsons.The new general,he/it is a friend of the President.That fat old humbugwe met last week has just been electedchairman of the club. - Is he/*it the one with the funnymoustache?

(17)(18)

In sum none of the treatments of the itlhe-problem appears to provide a fully,satisfactory solution.

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2. The direction in which we should look for a solution to the problem is indicatedby two things that are particularly dear when we have a look at the examples. Thefirst is that the use of it in statements about persons is restricted in that it canexc1usively he found as subject of be:

(19) There's a man in the kitchen.- Who is it?What does herit want?Howdid herit get in?

The second observation is tbat the it-sentence invariably contains a noun phrase(possibly a pronoun) as predicate nominal. Apparently, it cannot be used when tbepostcopular elements is an adjective, adverb or prepositional phrase:

(20) There's someoneat the door.-Who is it?What is he/"it like?How tall is herit?Where is he/"it now?

These two observations make dear that only sentences of the farm 'NP be NP' arerelevant to the discussion of the itlhe-problem. And since it-sentences appear to besemantically different from he-sentences, it seerns reasonable to assume tbat at leastpart of the solution to tbe problem is to be found in the distinction between differenttypes of'NP be NP' sentences which we bave made in chapter 1. As a matter offact,Iwill argue that, apart from a number of special cases (to be discussed below), theuse of it versus helshelthey can be accounted for by tbe following two hypotheses:(a) lt-sentences are specificational, wbereas helshelthey-sentences are eitherdescriptionally-identifying or predicational; (b) Such it-sentences are reducedÏ1-c1efts.

These two hypotheses are not unrelated: as pointed out in chapter 1, it-clefts arethe most typical instances of specificational sentences. Even when the nondeftcounterpart of the it-deft is a predicational sentence, the cleft specifies a value forthe variabie :

(21) lt is Johnwho is a teacher.

In this example the is in the relative dause is predicational, but the head dause (andtherefore the sentence as a whole) is specificational. It is because it-c1efts arespecificational that they always imply tbat one candidate (or group of candidates) ispicked out from a set. Thus, what distinguishes (21) from the simplex John is ateacher is that only tbe it-cleft presupposes the existence of a set of candidates (i.e. aset of people who might he teachers) from whicb John is picked out as the one whois a teacher and which must therefore contain at least one otber person besides

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John. As we have seen, tbis 'picking out' function is precisely wbat distinguishesspecificational sentences from the other copular sentence types.

A natural consequence of the observation that i/-c1eftsare always specificational'is tbat the first bypothesis in fact follows from tbe second: if it-sentences are reducedit-clefts, they will naturally be specificational.

As a first approximation to proving tbese hypotheses, let us consider thefollowing examples:

(22)(a) (Who is your Iriend?) - lt is the son ol the Prime Minister.(b) (Who is your Iriend?) - He is the son of the Prime Minister.

Tbere is a clear difference of meaning between (22,a) and (22,b). In (22,a) thequestion Who is your friend? is interpreted as a request to reveal the identity of aperson who bas apparently been referred to as myfriend. The reply is meant toenable the bearer to piek out the person in question from a number of people thatare known to him. In other words, the ÏI-sentence specifies a value (the son of thePrime Minister) for a variabie ('tbe one who is my friend') and is thereforespecificational (specificationally-identifying). Sentence (22,b), on the other hand,requires a different setting. It suggests that some identification of the friend inquestion bas already taken place (e.g. the friend is in the same room as the hearerand bas been pointed out to him), but that the bearer does not recognize the personin question as someone he knows. The question Who is your friend? is thenequivalent, not to 'Tell me who is your friend', but to 'Tell me sometbing moreabout your friend'. lt is a request for a further description or further descriptionswhich must enable the hearer to relate the friend to someone of whom he bas afuller 'backing of descriptions? or at least to build up a backing of descriptions inconneetion with the friend birnself so that fuller identification becomes possible(rather than being restricted to the hic et nunc possibility of picking out the friendfrom the set of people in tbe room). In otber words, (22,b) is a descriptionally­identifying sentence.

There are various differences between (22,a) and (22,b) that confirm theseconclusions :

a. In (22,b) the NPs your friend and he are 'strongly referring' (cf. chapter 1,sections 2.12 and 5): the use of your friend implies that the person asking thequestion bas been able to piek out the person from the group ofbystanders. Even

l. As pointed out in chapter I (scction 2.4), there are a couple of exceptional types of i/-clefls thatshould be considered as prcdicational. I will discuss them in detail in chapter 3. None of them,however, is relevant to the it/he-problem that we are dealing with here.

2. Jam using the term 'backing of dcscriptions' here 35 explaincd in chapter I,scetion 5 (see espcciallyfootnote 101).

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if the question receives no answer, there will have been some 'elementary'identification in the sense that the description your friend has been related to aparticular person. In (22,a) this is not the case. The NP your friend is here only'weakly referring' (i.e. there is a referent but his identity is unknown) and only ifthe question is answered with an appropriate specificationally-identifyingsentence will it be possible to conneet the description your friend with aspecificperson.

b. Only in (22,a) is it possible to substitute Which (one) isyour friend? for Who isyour friend? This is consistent with the claim that only (22,a) is aspecificationally-identifying sentence, since we have seen that questions of thefarm' Which (one) is NP?, typically ask for a specificational answer.

c. The string underlying the question Who isyour friend? has the underlying wordorder 'who is your friend?' in (22,a) and 'your friend is who?' in (22,b). Thisbecomes clear when we replace the question with an expression involving anindirect question, as in

(23)(a) I am asking you who is your friend.(b) I am asking you who your friend is.

The it-sentence of (22,a) can only be used as a reply to (23,a),3 whereas thehe-sentence of (22,b) can only be used as a reply to (23,b). This is consistent withthe hypothesis that the former is specificationally-identifying whereas the latter isdescriptionally-identifying (cf. chapter 1, sections 2.11 and 5).

d. For some reason the addition of a superlative to an NP renders it hard for the NPto be interpreted as strongly referring. Thus, in Who isyour bestfriend? the NPyour best friend wil! not normally be taken to be strongly referring and thesentence wil! therefore invite a specificationally-identifying answer rather than adescriptionally-identifying one. It is therefore consistent with our hypothesis thatthe he-sentence of (22,b) is not aplausible answer to this question, whereas theil-sentence of (22,a) is.

e. The claim that it-sentences like (22,a) are specificational is further corroboratedby the fact that they may show connectedness:

(24) Who's your best friend? - My best friend is not a person. Jt isa boak aboutmyse/fl'me.

3. It appears that for some speakers (23,b) can also he used as an alternative 10 (23,a). I~ t~at case(23,b) is ambiguous hetween a specificationally-identifyingreading and a descriptionally­identifyingone. In the formercaseonly the it-sentenceof (22,a) is a suitable reply.In the latter caseonly the he-sentenceof (22,b) is appropriate.

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As noted in chapter 1 (section 2.13), connectedness is typieal of specificationalsentenccs. The connectedness shown in (24) is the same as found in thcspecificationally-identifying sentence

(25) My best friend is a book about myselWme.

f. It has already been noted that it-c1efts are always specificational (see, however,footnote 1). A similar claim can be made in conneetion with it-cleft questions:questions of the farm Who is it who... ? always ask for a specificationally­identifying answer. It is therefore in keeping with our hypothesis that Who is itwho isyour friend? ean be substituted for Who isyour friend? if an ïz-sentencefollows, as in (22,a), but not if a he-sentence follows, as in (22,b). Our secondhypothesis, viz. that the relevant Ïl-sentences are reduced it-defts, al~o bccomesplausible now: since /t is the son of the PrimeMinister is an appropnate answerto Who is your friend? only if the latter is interpreted as Who is it who is yourfriend?, it seerns natural to look upon the it-reply in (22,a) as a reduction of It isthe son of thePrime Minister who is my friend.

IIIIII\..,,.I',

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3. Tbc abovc obscrvations make clear, I tbink, that it-sentences like (22,a) arespccificationally-identifying, while he-sentences like (22,b) are descriptionally­idcntifying. Before adducing further evidence I will consider one more illustration,which wil! also be useful in setting the stage for the notes on sentences involvingproper names that wil! be given below.

Consider the following sentence:

(26) Who is Jack Smith?

Sentcnce (26) can be a question asking for either specificationa! or descriptionally­idcntifying information. In the latter case it means that the value 'Jack Smith' hasbeen specified for a variable, but that the speaker of (26) has no backing ofdescriptions for this name (i.e. the name Jack Smith does not mean anything tohim). In tbat case sentence (26) asks, not for specificationally-identifying informa­tien (so that the speaker can piek out Jack Smith from a set of people), but fordescriptionally-identifying information, i.e. for a description or set of descriptionsapplying to Jack Smith. Any description concerning Jack Smith, e.g. (27,a) or(27,b), will be a suitable answer to this question.

(27)(a) He is a neighbour of mine.(b) He lives next door to me.

Sentence (26) can also be used as a question asking for specificationaUy­identifying information. In that case a suitable paraphrase is (28,a), not (28,b):

(28)(a) 1 am asking you who (it is thaI) is Jack Smith.(b) 1 am asking you who ("it is that) Jack Smith is.

and if the speaker seeks to piek out Jack Smith from a specific set of people, whick(one) will normally be used instead of who:

(29) Which (ene) is Jack Smith?

A sentence like this can be used in a variety of situations. It is possible that thespeaker has just heard the name Jack Smith and, having no backing of descriptionsfor it, does not know which person is to be associated with this name. Or thespeaker does have a backing of descriptions for the name (i.e. he knows who JackSmith is) but, owing to circurnstances (e.g. aU thc people present are masked, or thespeaker has left his spectacles at home), he is unable to piek out Jack Smith from agroup. The third possibility is that the speaker has a backing of descriptions for theperson who is called Jack Smith (i.e. he knows the person) but the name JackSmith is not part of them (i.e. he does not know that the person he knows is called

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Jack Smith). On hearing the name Jack Smith he is therefore incapable ofassociating the name with a particular person. These three possibilities have incommon that the speaker who asks (29) seeks to relate the name Jack Smith to aparticular person. That is, he is asking for specificationally-identifying inforrnation,and an appropriate answer will be something like (30), not (27,a) or (27,b):

(30) It is that man over there.

However, there is still another situation in which the sentence Which is JackSmith? can be used. Suppose Jack Smith is an actor who belongs to a company thatis playing Hamiet. In that case it is possible that, thinking of the characters in theplay, 1ask the question Which is Jack Smith?, meaning 'Which of the characters isplayed by Jack Smith T: An appropriate answer to this question may be somethinglike (31,a) or (31,b), but not (31,c):

(31Ha) Jack Smilh is Guildenslern.(b) He is Guildenslern.(c) 1I is Guildenstern.

The reason why (31,c) is not a suitable reply is that my question here does not askfor specificationally-identifying information: the reply shou!d not enable me to piekout Jack Smith from the group of actors - obviously, this is something I am alreadycapable of doing - but it should add a description ('the one who acts the part of X')to the backing of descriptions I bave of Jack Smith. Since the description inquestion is to come from a restricted set (viz. the set of descriptions of the type 'theone who acts the part of X', where X can only have as many values as there arecharacters in the play), my question can involve which instead of who - a possibilitywhich, as we have seen, is otherwise restricted to questions inviting aspecificationally-identifying answer. But (31,a) is c1early not specificational here.This is also obvious from the fact that (31 .a) is not reversible: in answer to thequestion Which (character) is (played by) Jack Smith? we can say (31,a), butnot

(32) Guildenstern is Jack Smith.

The latter sentence would be used in a different context. For example, when Iseethe actors acting and cannot recognize Jack Smith (though 1know he is one ofthem) I can ask Which (one) is Jack Smith î,meaning 'Which of these people isJack Smith?', In this case I wish to piek out Jack Smith from the group, and theanswer will be the (now specificationally-identifying) sentence (32), or its reverse(31,a), or the equally specificational (31,c). The difference between this use ofsentences like (31,a) and the descriptionally-identifying use outlined above isespecially clear when we have a question with you instead of a proper name. In thefirst context, when I wish to know which part you are acting, tbe question will be

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(33,a), where the use of are makes c1ear that you is the underlying subject; in thesecond context, when I wish to piek you out from a group of actors (e.g. in aphotograph), the question will be (33,b), where the use of ismakes clear that whichis the underlying subject:

(33){a) Which are you?(b) Which is you? .

In the farmer case the reply win be descriptionally-identifying (e.g. IamHamIet); inthe latter it win be specificationally-identifying (e.g. Hamiet is me, which isreversible to I am Hamleîy:

Examples like these make clear that, contrary to what is aften assumed, propernames need not always be strongly referring (like anaphoric or demonstrativepronouns): in sentences like (31,a) they mayalso be used as a description attributedto a strongly referring subject in a descriptionally-identifying sentence.

Cases like the one outlined above, in which a proper name is equivalent to thedescription 'the person who acts the part of X' are not the only ones in which propernames are used in this way. Another case is provided by examples like the following(which I borrow from Kruisinga (1932a: 103»:

(34)(a) I met today astrange, battered figure of a man - Ihe firstnewspaper man 50 far as I am aware 10 be wounded in thewar. He was Mr. DonaId C. Thompson, one of the 'cameramen' of the 'New York World'.

(b) An unusual feature of the investiture was the appearance ofa lady to receive the VC. She was Mrs. Green, widowofCaptain John Leslie Green, to whom the award of the v.c.was notified on August 5.

In sentences like these the proper names are not strongly referring: they do notsuffice to piek out a person from a set. Rather, it is clear that the proper names donot mean anything to the speaker (i.e. they are not automatically associated by thespeaker with aspecific person) but are presented as descriptions (equivalent to'someone called X' or 'a certain Mr/Mrs/Miss X') which are added to the backingof descriptions that the speaker and hearer have of the person in question. Thisbacking is still very limited, but as a result of the information given in the first part of(34,a) and (34,b) it contains at least one definite description ('the first man to bewounded in the war', 'the lady who received the V.C.'), so that it is possible for thespeaker to refer to that person by means of a strongly referring NP like he ar she. In

4. Thc rcversedversionI am Hamietwill generallybe preferrcdtoHamlel is me bccausethe pronounrelerringto the speaker is a 'preferred therne', i.e, it ismore Iikelyto be processedas the theme oftbesentence (which in this case is the subject) than an NP referring to some other cntity (cf. KUllO1976)

]30

II:I

I'

I111i

Ii,,

other worels : a proper name can be used as an additional description given in thepredicate complement of a descriptionally-identifying sentence, provided it does notpresuppose what Fodor (1976) calls 'acquaintance', i.e. provided the speaker andhearer do not know in advance of a particular person that he has that name." In thatcase the name can be added as a description to the backing of descriptions whichthe speaker and hearer already have of a certain person, i.e. after 'elementary'identification (specification of a value (e.g. 'the fust man to be wounded ...') for thevariable) has already taken place,?

In sum, the distinction between It isMr Yand He is Mr Y is basically that thefarmer is specificationally-identifying (i.e. answers the question 'Who (is ii who) isNP?'), wbereas the latter is descriptionally-identifying (i.e. answers the question'NP is who?').

5. Accordingto Fodor (1976: lOS),a proper name like John is usedwith 'acquaintance' ifthe speakercan answer the question Who is John? correctly with a sentence of the form 'John is + definiteNP'.

6. A fineexampleof this is to be found in the followingpassagefromAnthony Powcll'snevel At LadyMolly's. (The setting is as follows.A new guestarrivesat LadyMolly's and she does not kuow whohe is. The narrator, however, recognizeshim as a former school mate of his, and says:)

(a) I knowhim.(b) Who is he?(c) He is called KennelhWidmerpool.Iwas at school withhimas a matter of lact.

He is in Ihe City.(d) Iknowhis name ol course. Andthat he is in Ihe City.Bulwhal is he like?

As is clear from the use of he and him, elernentary identification has taken place right from thebeginning: everybodyknows whichguest isbeing referred to. ButLadyMolly wants to have fulleridentification, So she utters (b) to ask for a description (or descriptions) which can enhance her'acquaintance' with the guest.The narrator then gives three descriptions,one of which consistsofthe name of the person. However, two of these descriptions already belong 10 the backing ofdescriptions that Lady Molly has of the person in question, and anyhow they are not the kind ofdescriptionsthat she is interestedin. They do not enable her to place the guest sociallyand morallyin her world. So shc asks for more (and othcr) descriptions,using the qucstion What is he /ike?,which is basicallyequivalent to Who is he?

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4. Apart from the evidence advanced in the previous sections, there are quite anumber of observations that support the hypothesesthat have been put forward. Inthis sectien I propose to go into some of them.

4.1. The claim that it-sentencesare reduced it-clefts is borne out by the fact thatthey share the same restrietions.For example:

(35)(a) Who's Ihe bank robber? - '11is even Smilh.(b) 'It is even Smilh who is Ihe bank robber.

Certain indefinite nonspecificNPs are equally unacceptable in bath constructions(cf.chapter 1, section 4.6):

(36)(a) Who were Ihe firsl guesls 10arrive? - 1Iwas our/'rnany,'*fewl*no neighbours.

(b) 1Iwas ourl*manyl'few/*no neighbours Ihal were the firstguesls 10arrive.

~.2. !h.e ~nclusion that sentencesof the typeHe isMr Yare not specificationally­identifyingIS supported by the fact that they do not allow the predicate nominal tobecome the focus of an it-cleftconstruction:

(37) Who's that man? - He is Mr Green.°11is Mr Green that is that man?

In general, predicate nominals of descriptionally-identifyingsentences cannot behighlightedin an it-cleft:

(38) Jack? Who's Jack? - He is a friend of mine."11is a friend of mine that he is.

The same test confirms another conclusion we have arrived at, viz. that the~entence!ack Smith is Guilden:tern is descriptionally-identifyingwhen meaningJack Smith acts the part of Gwldenstern' and specificationally-identifyingwhen itm~ns 'The following person is Jack Smith: the one acting the part ofGuildenstern'. Only on the latter interpretation is it possible to substitute ft isGuildenstem thai is Jack Smith for Jack Smith is Guildenstem,

7. In spite of the un~rammaticalityof thîs it-clcftsentence,IJ'sMr Green is an acceptable answer.Thisdoes not contradl~t the theo~ argued here, for it will he pointed out below (section 5.2) that incases like this the rr-sentenceIS not a reduced it-cleft.Rather, it is the stress-reducedfarm of that andechoes (he demonstrative determiner in the quesuon,

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4.3. As pointed out by Halliday (1967: 237), it is characteristicof it-cleftsentencesthat an auxiliary from the souree sentencecan sometimesbe put in the head clauseas weil as in the WH-clause:

(39)(a) 1Iwas going to have been John who was given the prize.(b) 1Iwas John who was going 10have been given Ihe prize.

(40)(a) It wil! be John who comes in first.(b) It is John who wil! come in first.

The same vaciI1ationseems to be possible in it-sentences:

(41) (Who's going to be Ihe next chairman?) - 1Iis (going 10belJohn Robinson.

This possibilitysupports the hypothesis that (41) is a reduced it-cleft.

4.4. There is a clear semantic differencebetween (specificational)it-sentencesandthe corresponding (descriptionally-identifying)he-sentences. Consider the follow­ing examples:

(42)(a) (You know that someone was arrested last nighl?) Weil, it'sJohn!

(b) (Yesterday a man was arrested and charged with severalserious crimes.) He is Mr John Roberts, of High Streel,London.

Sentence (42,b) assignsto the referentof the subject NP a descriptionwhich is nottemporally or spatially restricted,i.e.which is applicable to that person at any timeand at any place. Sentence (42,a), in contrast, does not reveal the (permanent)identity of a person. Rather it reveals the identity of a participant in a particular(non-permanent) situation. Whereas (42,b) assigns an 'inalienable' (permanent)description (viz. a proper name) to a person, (42,a) assigns an 'accidental' (i.e.temporallyand spatiallyrestricted)description(viz.'who was arrested last night') toa person who is already known by name. In this respect (42,a) is exactly like the(fuII)it-cleft (43), and this of coursesupports the bypothesisthat (42,a) is actually areduced version of (43):

(43) 1Iis John who was arrested last night.

4.5. As pointed out by Poutsma (1916: 733-734), we wiU not normally use(descriptionally-identifying)he-sentencesin wbich he refers back to an indefinitepronoun. lt-sentenceswill normally be used instead:

(44) He caught sight of somebody on Ihe pavement (...). For Ihemoment Mrs Altham could nol see who itl"he was.

Jt should he noted that this is not due to some absolute prohibition for he to refer tosomeone, since we can have

(45) There was someone at the door. 1wondered whathe wanted.

Howevcr, the restrietion observed by Poutsma is in keeping with the hypotheses Ihave been arguing, as the copular sentence in (44) cannot be deseriptionally­idcntifying: a deseription like somebody is not sufficient to piek out a person from aset (i.e. it does not really specify a value for a variablej,« so that na 'elementary'identification is achieved in the first half of (44). In other words, an indefinitepronoun can hardly be used as a strongly referring Np' so that it cannot furnish thesubject of a descriptionally-identifying sentence. Rather, because somebody gives naidentifying information whatever, the copular sentenee that follows it mustnecessarily be specificationally-identifying.

4.6. The theory argued here also accounts for the fact that some proper names wil!only be found in it-sentences, while others ean also occur in he-sentences:

(46)(a) (The pollee have arrested a suspect.) - 1know. It/*he isSmith/John.

(b) (The police have arrested a suspect.) He is Mr W Smith,aged 46, of Walbey Street, Harrow.

As we have seen, proper names can occur in the predieate complement ofdescriptionally-identifying sentences if they just specify thc name of someone whohas already been identified in an 'elementary' way. This is the case in (46,a). (Thereason why, in spite of the proper name being used as a mere label, it is not excludedin (46,b) is that it is possible to use the form of a specificationally-identifyingsentence to give information which pretends to be specificational but is not really 80(cf. chapter 1,section 2.5). Thus, to the question Who's the murderer?one may givewhat Higgins (1976: 153) calls "a somewhat re ticent answer (of a kind dear tosmall children)" such as

(47) The murderer is (a) Mr W Smith, of Walbey Street, Harrow.

This reply is reticent in so far as it pretends to be specificationally-identifying,whereas in actual fact it is not likely to help the hearer to piek out the murderer froma given set of people.)

Consider now (46,a). The proper nam es here cannot be used as mere labels (as in(46,b» because they presuppose 'acquaintance' in the sense of Fodor (1976) (cf.

8. In chapter 1 (section 4.6.F) wc noted that iI-c1efts whose focus is a pronoun Iike somelsomebodylsomeollelsomet}ling are unacceptable (e.g. *It was somebody who was on the pavement).

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footnote 5). That is, the very use of proper names like John a~d Smith implies thatthe speaker has a particular person in mind: there ar~ sp~cific persons who areknown to him as 'John' and 'Smith' and who are fully identifiable by the mere useof these names. In consequence, such names are not likely to be used in thepredieate complement of a descriptionally-identifying sentence ~ut will naturally betaken to represent specificational information.vw The same 1S true of personalpronouns like me, him, her, etc. These too cannot be used as mere labels that arestuck to a person who has already been identified. Rather, they can only beinterpreted as specifying a value for a variabie. For example:

~11

t~I:

rrII

III

(48) (Who's that boy in the photograph?) - Why don't you ree-ognize him? Itl*he is melJohn!

Even though the use of that boy implies that the va~able .ha.sa~eady be~n ~ven avalue it is possible to add further specificationally-identifying information lil thefarm 'of me/John because these represent more strongly identifying information.Whereas the use of that boy merely enables the hearer to piek out the personreferred to from a particular set (hence at a particu!ar pla~ and time), the ~~ of meor John enables him to piek him out from any set, immediately and unconditionally(i.e. at any place and time). .. ..

It should be notcd that still other NPs can sometimes be used m a similar way,provided they also unequivocally refer to a specific and known person. Forexample:

(49)(a) (Who's that boy?) - Why, don't you recognize him? ft/he ismyson!

(b) (Who's that man?) -ltlhe is the Prime Minister.

9. This concurs with Searle's (1971: 215-217) statement that proper namcs are not "uscd to dcscri.beor specify eharacteristies of objects": "Unlike definite descriptions they do not In general speclfyany characteristics at all of thc objects to which they ref~r. 'Scott' ref~r~ to the same ,obJect as does'the author of Waverley' but 'Seott' specifies none of lts characteristics, whereas the author ofWaverley' refers only in virtue of the fact that it does specify a characteristic". .However Searle wrongly treats all proper names alike. As we have seen, some proper names (V1Z.

those that are used without 'acquaintancc') may specify a 'characteristic' (i.e. a description), as in(46,b).

10. The observation that proper names in he-sentences do not irnply acquaintance, w~~reas those ini/-sen tences do, explains the use of he and il in the following example from Kruisinga (1932a:103):

(i) Suddenly there came the man. Some say he was Mr E.V.Lucas, ~n authorwhom we Irusl il ;5 na dlscounesy to call celebrated. Others say /1was Mr GrantRichards Ihe well-known publisher.

As is clear from 'the different nature of the appositions (the definite the we!l-know~lpublisherversus the indefinito an au/hor whom...) and from the fact th at only Mr Lucas s name IS prcccdcdby initiaIs, the speaker expects the reader to be familiar with Mr Grant Richards, but he does notexpect him to be acquainted with Mr Lucas.

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Sentences likc these show that NPs like my son and the Prime Minister can be usedas additional descriptions in descriptionally-identifying he-sentences, but can alsoconvey specificationally-identifying information in the same way as personalpronouns and proper names.

It should be pointed out, fmally, that, although proper names that presupposeacquaintance in Fodor's (1976) sense are normally used in specificationally­idcntifying sentences only, there may be exceptional cases in which they are useddifferently.Tbe following sentence (which is used for a different purpose by Fodor(1976: 143» is a case in point:

I'

I(50) Charley believes Ihal Tom is not Tom. Silly old Charley. Of

course he is Tom.

In this sentence the speaker states that the name Tom, which in bis opinion is adescription that applies to a particular person X, is wrongly rejected by Charley as adescription for X: according to Charley the man referred to as Tom by the speaker isnot called Tom. Sentence (50) is therefore paraphrasable as either (51,a) or(51,b):

(51Ha) Charley believes that the man Ihall call Tom is not calledTom. Silly old Charley. Of course he is called Tom.

(b) Charley believes thaI the man I call Tom is not the man whois called Tom. Silly aid Charley. Of course he is Ihe man whois cal led Tom.

In both these paraphrases he refers to the man that I cal! Tom. The sentence Ofcourse he is Tom is therefore equivalent to either (52,a) or (52,b):

(52)(a) Of course Ihe man I call Tom is called Tom.(b) Of course Ihe man I call Tom is the man who is called Tom.

These paraphrases make dear that the sentence is not specificationally-identifying:it does not specify a value (Tom) for a variabie. Rather, this specification has alreadytaken place: the speaker has no doubt that the person in question is the uniqueperson that is generally referred to as Tom (i.e. represents the unique variabie thathas the value 'Tom'). On the interpretation (52,a), He is Tom is a predicationalsentence; on the interpretation (52,b) it is an identity statement (i.e. the speakerasserts that the man he caUs Tom is the same person as the man who is generallyknown under the name of Tom). As we will see below (section 6.3), identitystatements whose NPs have a human referent can also make use of he, but not ofit.

4.7. There is a restrietion on the use of it in specificationally-identifying sentenceswhich apparently has to do with the number of the NP in the presupposedWH-clause:

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Ii

rI·

tf,IJ,

I

(53)(a) (Who's the murderer?) - It's a friend of mine ..(b) (Who are the murderers?) - *It is friends of mine.

They are friends of mine.

This restrietion is in keeping with my analyses, since Ihave argued that it-sentencesare reduced it-e1efts and that the questions of the form 'Who is NP?' that theyanswer must therefore be interchangeable with 'Who is u who is NP?'. We nownotice that this kind of reformulation is possible only in (53,a):

(54)(a) Who is it who is the murderer?(b) 'Who is it who are the murderers?

The ungrammaticality of (54,b) is due to a conflict betw~en t~o re~uirements: o~the one hand there is the requirement that ii should combme with a smgular verb (ltare is always ungrammatical); on the other hand, a question beginning with whowin require a plural verb if who is assumed to refer to n:'0re than one person (e.g. wecannot say Who has done this? if we assume that it has been don~ by severalpeople). In other words, the use of a plural NP like the murderers re~u~es tha~ whoshould be followed by a plural verb, whereas the use of it makes this impossible.

The impossibility of substituting (54,b) for the question in (53,b) ex~lu~es anyreply in the form of a reduced it-e1eft. Instead, we have to use a descriptionally­identifying sentence with they. This requirement will, how~ver, .lead to anotherconflict when the predicate nominal in the reply is an exprcss~on like the~ ?r Johnand Mary which cannot be used as predicate nominal in a descnptlOnally­identifying sentence but rcquires the usc of an it-senten~e. In that case the la~~c~requirement prevails and it is used, even though a question of the type Who Ij uwho...? is exduded:

r

tI\

II1

I

II)

(55) (Who ("is lt who) are the leaders here? - It is/*they arethem/John and Mary.

4.8. The hypothesis that it-sentences are reduced it-defts is further corroborated bysentences like the following:

(56) A whisper went round: "The Queen!" and Queen MaryherseJf it was. (Scheurweghs 1959: 116)

It was pointed out in chapter 1(section 3.4) that preposing th~ predi~te n?minal isnormally possible in predicational sentences, but not III specificational or

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descriptionally-identifying ones: II (As a matter of fact, some people have argued that (59,a) is denved trom (ou.a)rather than from (59,b) - see e.g. Gundel1977b, Harries-Delisle 1978: 422, Givón1979: 246.) It follows that, if independent it~sentences are reduced it-c1efts,as 1haveargued, we should expect the use of it versus he in independent c1auses to be thesame as the use of it versus he in dislocated structures. This expectation is actuallyborne out, as appears from the following examples:

(57)(a) (You must r= speak ill of John.) A true gentleman he is, I amsure. (predicaüonal]

(b) (Who's the murderer?) - "That gentleman over there themurderer is. (specificational)

(c) (Who's that man?) - -A friend of mine that man is.(descri ptionally-identifying)

The possibility of preposing Queen Mary herself in (56) (which is specificational)would therefore seem inexplicable, if it were not for the fact that we treat suchit-sentences as reduced it-clefts. In it~c1eftsthe postcopular NP can, indeed, easily bepreposed:

(61Ha) (Who's the murderer?) - Itrhe is John/me.(b) The murderer, iWhe is John/me.

(62)(a) (Who's Jack Smith?) - Herit is a friend of mine.(b) Jack Smith, he/wit is a triend of mine.

(63)(a) IWshe was Alice, the one who just had Ihe baby. (Gundel1977b: 555)

(b) Who was it Nixon chose? -11was Agnew, the one Nixonchose. (Bolinger 1972a: 112)

We should also notice the difference between (64,a) and (64,b):(58) Queen Mary herself it was who came to welcome us.

4.9 '. In section. 2.7 of chapter 1 we noted that it-c1eft sentences are semanticallyequivalent to Simplex sentences tbat are specificational. Thus, there is no semanticdifference between (59,a) and (59,b): (64)(a) The murderer, who is it?

(b) The murderer, who is he?

Whereas (64,a) clearly asks for specificationally~identifying information (whichshould enable the hearer to piek out the murderer from a set), (64,b) requires adescriptionally~identifying reply: it implies that some elementary identification hasalready taken place and asks for further descriptions (i.e. the speaker would like toknow more about the murderer).

(59)(a) It is Smith who is the murderer.(b) SMITH is the murderer.

Som.e linguists have ~ven argued that (59,a) is actually derived from (59,b) by aclefting eperatton which extracts the focus from the simplex sentence and turns thepresupp~sition into a WH~cIau:'e. (Although this operation is now usually rejectedbecause It appears to be syntactically unrnotivated, IwiII continue 10 speak of (59,a)as the 'c1efte_dversion: of~59,b). In doing so I do not make any claim concerning thetransforrnational derivation of it-clefts.) If it is correct that it-clefts are somehowderived by a transformation moving (extracting) the clefted constituent, then whathap pens in it-defts is very similar to wh at happens in dislocated structures like thefollowing:

(60J(a) lt's Jack Smith, the (one who is the) murderer.(b) The (one who is the) murderer, it's Jack Smith.

11. In chapt~r [ (scction 3.4.A) I stressedthat preposingthe predicate nominal is not the sarne thingas r~~ersmgtbc copu!ar sentence, Preposingmovesan element (otber than the subject) into initialpostnon (e.g. for topicalization),but does not affecttbe subject Np,whicb conscquentlyremainsbefo~e thc verb. In contrast, when a sentence is reversed, both the subject and the predicatenominal are moved, 50 that be remains between the two NPs. Specificationalsentencesdo notallow tbe predieare nominal to be preposed, but they are reversiblc.Predicational sentences incontrast, are not reversible,but they permit preposingof tbe postcopular NP. '

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5: The theory I have developed thus far stiIl raises a couple of questions, but Ithink they can be given a satisfactory answer:

5.1. A first problem concerns sentences of the following type:

(65}(a) (Who's Ihat?) - Itrhe is the son of the Prime Minister.(b) (Who ean this be?) -It/'he is ColonelBrandon. [Poutsrna

1916:734)

These sentences are c1early descriptionally-identifying: the use of that and this in thequestions implies that elementary identification has already taken place (i.e. theperson has been picked out from a group), so that the subject NPs of (65,a-b) arestrongly referring and the sentences serve to give an additional description whichmust render full identification possible (since the man referred to by this or thatappears to be otherwise unknown to the person asking Who's that? or Who can thisbel). That (65,a-b) are not specificationally-identifying is furthermore clear fromthe fact that completion with WH-c1auses is impossible (which means that (65,a-b)are no reduced it-c1efts):

(66)(a) *11 is the son of the Prime Minister who is thaI.(b) *11 is Colone! Brandon who ean be this.

However, in spite of the fact that (65,a-b) are descriptionally-identifying, we have touse it instead of he. (Poutsma (1916: 4) also notes this explicitly in conneetion with(65,b): "When a person is indicated by a demonstrative pronoun, he/she/theycannot be used.") Tbe solution to this problem appears to be that deictic that andthis, if used with reference to persons, ean only be referred to by anothernonpersonal deictic form, i.e. by thatlthis itself (whieb could, indeed, be substitutedfor it in (65,a-b» or by it, which is known to be the "stress-reduced" (Kuroda 1968:250-251) anaphoric form of the pronouns that and this (cf. sentences like

(67)(a) ThaI man is Ihe son of Ihe Prime Minister, lsn't he!*it?(b) That/this is the son of the Prime Minister, isn't itl*he/'that/

"this?

See also Higgins 1976: 179-180.) This is in keeping with the fact that he is actuallyonly ungrammatical in (65,a-b) if it is an anapborie pronoun (referring baek tothatlthis), not if it is used deictieally (i.e. in a nonanaphoric, demonstrative way),l2

12. Polloek(1983: 105) also notes that, although we normally have to say That's Paul rather than*He is Paul, there is nothing wrong withHE is Paul (in which the pronoun is pronounced withcontrastiveaccent).

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,.I'1\;rI

ti1Ilii:

Tbe it of (65,a-b) is thus not the it of a (reduced) it-cleft and does not present anyreal problem for our analysis. . ,

It should be noted that the possibility of using it as a weak form of thallthlS lil

deseriptionally-identifying sentences may be taken to be the origin of quite anumber of it-sentences. For example:

(68) The clatter of Penny Pitches' heavy shoes eame eehoingdown the passage. "Is it your son 7' broke in Mr, Geard, bulthe priest shook his nead. (Kruisinga & Erades 1953: 453)

Compare also the following sentences :I·liI'""1ï

(69)(a) (Here is the girl that asked lor you.) She seems to be a friendof yours. " .

(b) (Here is the girl that asked for you.) Why! ft sa fnend of mme!

In (9,a) she is merely anaphorie; in (69,b) it is deictic (i.e. a weak demonstrat­

ive).

5,2, Whereas descriptionally-identifying sentences need to have thatlthis or it ~subject if the referent is the pronoun that or this, they mayuse both ,an an~phonesubject (helshe) or a deietie one (thatlthislit) if the referent IS an NP mvolvmg thator this as a determiner:

(70) Who is Ihat boy? - He/that/it is a ecusin of mine.

The claim that this it not that of a reduced it-deft is borne out by severalobservatioDS. First, the fuU U-deft is ungrammatical:

(71) *It is a eousin of mine who is tnat boy.

Secondly, the claim that it is a stress-redeeed that is confirmed by the ?bservationthat it is excluded whenever that is excluded, e.g. when the antecedent involves theplural determiner those:

(72) Who are those people? - They are friends of mine."That is/are friends of mine.'It is/are friends of mine.

Tbe possibility of using it also accords with that of using that in sentences like thefollowing:

(73)(a) (Do you see that boy?) Thatlit/he is the murderer.(b) (Do you see that boy?) Hel"that/*it is said to be the mur-

derer.

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.' .J • ..), r~IJ 1I11<:Ic.')llllgprooiern ior tne reduced ir-cleft hypothesis is raised by sentenceslikc thc following:

(74)(a) (Who was at the door this morning?) - Nobody.[b] (Who was al the door this morning?) - Oh, it was nobody.

There is a difference of meaning between (74,a) and (74,b): the former denies thatanybody was at the door, the latter presupposes that somebody was at the door butasserts that the cal! was unimportant. In our analysis, (74,b) should be a reducedit-c1eft, but the full cleft appears to be unacceptable:

(75) *Jtwas nobody that was at the door this morning,

As explained in chapter I (section 4.6.A), the unacceptability of i/-e1eftslike (75)results from semantic contradiction; on the one hand, a eleft of the form 'It was Xthat was at the door' necessarily carries the presupposition that somcone was at thedoor; on the other hand, filling in nobody for X entails the assertion that nobodywas at the door.

~till, there are a couple of indications that (74,b) must be a reduced it-e1eft.First,unlike (74,a), (74,b) carries the presupposition that someone came to the door.Treating (74,b) as a reduced it-e1eft accounts for this. Secondly, (74,b) provides adescription which is not generally applicable to the person referred to, but whichapplies to him only in so far as he is a participant in the event. Thus, unlike asentence like

(76) That man is (a merel nobody

~74,b) does not assert that the man who was at the door is somebody unimportant:it merely asserts that the man in question was a participant in an unimportant event.In section 4.4 we have observed that restrictions like this are typical of (reduced andfull) Ït-c1efts.

I w~1Itherefore assume that (74,b) is a reduced it-c!eft and that nobody is areduction of something like 'nobody of importance'. This is in keeping with the factthat the full it-c!eft which on this hypothesis is the putative souree of (74,b) is nolonger unacceptable:

(77) 1Iwas nobody of importanee that was al the door Ihismorning,

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6. There are a couple of remarks that still need to be made in order to avoidmisunderstandings in conneetion with the previous sections.

6.1. The statement that he cannot be used in specificationally-identifying sentcnc~should be interpreted as meaning that it is not possible to substitute he for it msentences like

(78) (Who's the murderer?) - ItI*he is that old man thaI lives nearthe river.

In sentences such as this it is the predicate nominal, not the subject, that is the'identifier' NP. However, if it is the subject NP that is the identifier, he can be used(with demonstrative force), whereas it cannot:

(79) (who's Ihe murderer?) - HE/"it is the murderer!

Sentence (79) is equivalent to (80,a) and reversibie to (80,b):

(80)(a) It is HIM (that is the murderer).(b) The murderer is HIM.

6 2. It should also be pointed out that for the use of a reduced it-c!eft it is notnecessary that the deleted WH-elause should be recoverable from the linguisticcontext (i.e. should be identical with a phrase or clause that has been used before).In many cases it is the extralinguistic context or situation that makes clear how thereduced ft-c!eft should be completed. For example:

(81)(a) Felix passed them, and turned 10 look. Yes, it was the~ (thatwere walking there; or: that he had passed, etc.]. (KrUlsmga& Erades 1953: 59)

(b) (talking about an engagement:) Who is it (that she gotengaged tol ? ,

(c) (on seeing people coming in:) Why, it's you (who are commgto see me)! What good news have you got to teil me?

6.3. Up to now identity statements have not been dealt with in this ch~pter '. Itshould be clear, however, that only he-sentences can be interpreted as identitystatements (if there is a human referent). For example:

(82) 1Iis Mr Hyde who has commitled those murders. But onecould also say it is Dr Jekyll, for he/'it IS Mr Hyoe.

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7. Summarizing the previous sections, we can say that the following principleshave been established so far: (a) he can be used as the subject of sentences that are~ithe~ descriptionally-identifying, predicational," or identity statements, and as theidentifier NP in specificationally-identifying sentences; (b) it-sentences are eitherspecificationally-identifying sentences answering the question 'Who (is it who) isNP?' or descriptionally-identifying sentences in which it is the stress-reduced formof that/this.

There is, however, one more type of it-sentence to be considered, It is illustratedby sentences like the following:

(63)(a} {What's that noise?} - Oh, it's only the children.(b) (We heard a sound of tootsteps in the hall.] It was John and

Mary.

Sentences like these should be linked up with sentences like the following, in whichthe postcopular NP is followed by a relative or participial clause:

(64}(a) (What's that noise?) - Oh, it's only the children playing atRed Indians.

(b) (We heard a sound of footsteps in the halL) lt was John andMary coming home.

(c) (What's the problem?) - It's that damned neighbour of yourswho refuses to accept my offer!

~have pointed out elsewhere (Declerck 1981a) that sentences like these are peculiarm that the relative or participial c1auses do not really modify their NP heads, i.e.they are neither restrictive nor nonrestrictive in the traditional sense of the word. Ihave adduced ample evidence that c1auses Iike these (which I have called'pseudo-modifiers') differ from normal restrictive and nonrestrictive relative c1ausesboth semantically and syntactically. Ihave also shown that the sentences containingthem are no it-c1efts.(Ten arguments have been adduced to this effect. Among themare the observations that, unlike it-clefts, it-sentences Iike (84,a-c) do not alternatewith WH-c1efts, do not allow tense neutralization, cannot involve that (instead ofwho) after a proper name, cannot be conjoined without omission of it is, allow

13. Thc lauer possibilüy has been somewhat neglected in the previous sections (which bave beenmainly conccrned with he/il-scntences artswering the question 'Who is NP?'), but it is clear thatpredicationaJ sentences (answering the question 'Whal isNP'I') cannot make use of it if there is ahuman referent. The following sentences illustrate this:

(i) What is John? - He/"it is a teacher.(ii) John Roberts is always eating candy. Hel'it is the (attest boy I know.

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passivization without semantic impact, and do not aUow deletion of the r~lativepronoun that.) It follows that, if the it-sentences of. (83,a-b) can be .conslderedreduced sentences of the type (84,a-c), they are certamly not reduced u-defts. ?nthe other hand, they are not instances of descriptionally-identifying se~tenc<: usmga deictic it either, since sentences like (84,a-c) are clearly specJfïcatlOnal1~­identifying. They fully satisfy the definition of specificational sentences (VlZ.

sentences in which "the predicate complement says what constitutes or makes upthe object referred to by the subject noun phrase" (Higgins 1976: 93» and allowthe kind of paraphrase that is typical of specificational sentences:

(85)(a) The noise you hear is the following: the children are playingat Red lndians. .

(b) The sound of footsteps that we heard was (caused by) thefollowing: John and Mary we re coming home.

(c) Tne problem is the following: that damned neighbour ofyours refuses to accept my offer.

As is suggested by these paraphrases, a sentence like (84,a) .appears to ~ave asunderlying structure something like (86,a), although its superficial structure IS of theform of (86,b) :

(66)(a) NP[NP[thenoise]NP s[you hearlslNP be s[the children beplaying at Red Indiansls . .

(b) NP[NP[thenOiselNPs [you nearl SlNP IS NP[NP[thechlldren]NPs[(who are) playing at Red IndianslslNP

In Declerck (1981a) 1have provided further evidenc~ for stru~tu:es li~e .these andargued for a movement transformation ('pseudo-modlfier creanon ).denving (86,b)from (86,a). However this may be, it is clear that it-senten~es like (~4,a-c) ar.edifferent from the types that we have discussed in the previous secnons. Theirrelevant features are that they are specificational and that their subject it is not thedummy it of an it-eleft. Rather, it mostly refers (anaphorically or deictically) to a(noun phrase referring to a) sensory perception (e.g. a noise) ~r to an 'operator'noun (Plötz 1972: 37) like problem, thing, reason, cause, quesuon, etc. Sente~cessuch as (83,a-b) can be regarded as reduced versions of such pseudo-modlfierconstructions. Thus, (83,a) expresses that the noise that is heard is caused by thechildren doing something, but what that something is is not expressed: the VP(which would normally appear as a pseudo-n:odifier) ~sleft unexpressed. There areat least three good arguments that support this reduction theory:

a. If we do not assume there to be a VP in the underlying structure of (83,a), thissentence must be the pronominalized version of

(87) 'That noise is only the children.

145

However, (87) is unacceptable because it violates the requirement that "the nounphrases in a specifieational statement (...) must be non-distinct with respect to allthose semantic features which play a role in selectional restrictions" (Akmajian1979: 35). (That is, the unacceptability of (87) is of the same nature as tbat of

(88J *The man over there is the woman I know.)

If (87) does not seem totally unacceptable in informal English, it is beeause tbesame sentence could be used as a reduced pseudo-modifier construction.

b. Perhaps the strongest evidence that the children is not anormal predieatenominal in (83,a) is that the sentence (altbough specifieational) is notreversibie :

(89) "The children are/is only itlthat noise.

If (83,a) were a simplex specifieational sentence it would have to be reversible to(89) (cf. cbapter 1, seetion 2.11). But if the sentence is a reduced pseudo­modifier construction (i.e. if the children is wh at remains of the NP after deletionof the pseudo-modifier), the ungrammatieality of (89) becomes explieable, sincethere appear to be scvere restrietions on the reversibility of sentences whosepredieate nominal involves a pseudo-modifier, Compare:

(90)(a) That noise is the children playing at Red Indians.(b) *The children playing at Red Indians is/are that noise.

c. Another pieee of evidence is provided by sentences like

(91) (What's that noise?) - Never mind. What you hear is only thechildren.

As pointed out by Halliday (1967: 234) and Kuno (1970: 50), it is not normallypossible to use what as subject of a speeifieational WH-cleft whose focus is ahuman NP with speeifie reference:

(92)(a) What she needs is a daughter/*her. (Halliday 1967: 234)(b) ·What I love Is that girl.(c) *What I heard singing yesterday was the children.

The grammatieality of (91) is therefore only explieable on a reduced pseudo­modifier construction analysis (according to which the referent of what is aclause in underlying strueture).

146

8. CONCLUSION

Copular sentenees involving a predieate nominal with a human referent c_anha.vca pronominal subject whieh is either ii or a regular persona! pronoun (ag~ec1l1gwiththe predieate nominal in gender and number) sueh as he/she/they: In this ~hapter Ihave argued that the foUowing principles govern the selection of ü versushe/she/they:

a. He/she/they must be used in predieational sentenees.b. He/she/they are the normal forms in deseriptionally-identifying sentences, but it

ean be used there as the stress-redueed form of this/that.e. Deietie he/she/they ean be used in specifieationally-identifying sentences only if

they represent the identifier NP (as in (79».d. Otherwise it has to be used in speeifieationally-identifying sentences. It-sentences

like these ean be of two types: those that answer the question Who is it who...?are reduced it-clefts; those in which it refers anaphorieally or deietieally ~o asensory perception or to a noun like problem are reduced pseudo-mcdifierconstructions.

e. Only he/she/they-sentences ean be interpreted as identity statements.

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11

Ii

CHAPTER 3. PREDICATIONALIT-CLEFTS

1. In chapter 1 (section 3.7) we noted that a WH-deft like

(1) What the jewel thief did not steal was worthless jewelry.

is ambiguous between a specificational and a predicational interpretation, On thespecificational reading the sentence is equivalent to (2,a), on the predicationalreading it can be paraphrased by (2,b):

(2)(a) It was worthless jewelry that the jewel thief did not steal.(b) Such jewelry as was not taken away by the jewel thief was

worthless.

ft-defts, by contrast, cannot normally be interpreted predicationally: they areinherently specificational.' Thus, sentence (3), which is tbc U-deft corresponding to(1), cannot possibly have tbc predicational reading that (1) can bave:

(3) The jewel thief did not steal the following: worthless jewelry.

Similarly, the specificational WH-deft (4,a) bas an it-deft counterpart (4,b), butthere are no it-deft sentences corresponding to the predicational (S,a) and (6,a):

(4)(a) What I read was a boak.(b) It was a book that I read.

(5)(a) What I read was interesting.(b) *It was interesting that I read.

(6)(a) What is happening is a blow to every one of us.(b) *It is a blow to every ane of us that is happening.

In chapter 1 it was also stressed that the statement that it-defts are alwaysspecificational should not be misunderstood as meaning that they cannot involveany predicational information whatever. As is clear from a sentence like

(7) What John is is ambitious.

1. The observation that it-clefts are always speciûcational bas been made by a large nurnber ofIinguists. See e.g. Akmajian 1979: 163, Clark & Haviland 1977: 11, Dik 1980a: 41, Gunde!1977b: 547, Hajicova & Sgall 1975: 5, Halliday 1967: 68, 236, Harries-Delisle 1978: 422,Huddlcslon 1971: 246, Jacobsson 1971: 322, Kuno 1976: 443, VanDijk 1977: 121, Visser 1970:40, Delahunty 1981: 74.

149

oom ine vanacre ot the Wh-cieft (what John is) and the value assigned to it(ambitiousi may be predicational, but even then the structure as a whole isspecificational, precisely because it specifies a value for a variabie. The same is trueof Ît-defts like the following:ê

(8)(a) It is ambitious that John is, not haughty.(b) I can find no trace ot his having exercised any protession

betore 1980. I wonder what it was that he used to be then.

Again these sentences are specificational, although bath the variabie and the valueassigned to it are predicational. So, what seems to be impossible in U-defts is notth at the variabie and the value are predicational, but that the structure as a whole ispredicational. As illustrated by (5,b) and (6,b), it is irnpossible to interpret the headclause (i.e. it is + the focal item) as giving predicational information about somereferent (identified by the WH-dause). It-defts can apparently only be interpretedas specifying a value for a variabie.

However, in this chapter Iaim to show that this rule is not as strict as it is widelyassumed to be (cf. footnote 1), and that there do appear to be types of i/-c1efts thatare in a certain sense predicational, After having coosidered what is ostensibly suchao exception in section 2, 1 wil! drawattention to some types of i/-defts that arepartly, and sometimes even purely, predicational.

2. Exarnplesof it-clcfts with a predicational variabie and valuc are more difficult to come by becausethere are severc restrictionson the occurrencc of predicate nominals in thefocal (value) position ofit-clcfts, Sec chaptcr 4 for a detailcd treatment.

150

I

II

II,

2. What, at first sight, would seem to be the c1earest case of predicational it-c1eftsis to be observed in proverbial sentences like the following. (The examples comefrom Jespersen (1961: 89), who includes them in his discussion of it-c1efts):

(9)(a) It is a poor heart that never rejoices.(b) It is an ill bird that louis its own nest.(c) tt is a long lane that has no turning.(d) It is a wise child that knows his own father.

Other, somewhat less proverbial, examples are:

(10Ha) It is a good divine that followes his owne instructions.(Jespersen 1961 : 89) .

(b) It would be a brave man who tried to stand up aqamst MrDavidson. (ibid.)

(c) It'II be a lucky man who marries her, won't it? (Kruisinga &Erades 1953: 145)

(d) It would be an inhuman boy who kept a diary withoutconfiding to it some disparaging references to the masters.(Kruisinga 1932b: 504)

(e) It would be a bold minister who would embark on suchfundamental changes.

It needs little arguiog that sentences like these are predicational: (9,a) is clearlyequivalent to

(11) A heart that never rejoices is a poor heart.

and does not specify a value for a variable.'

3. Delahunty (1981: 32) and Bali (1977: 58) propose (i) as a paraphrase for (9,a):

(i) The heart that never rejoices is a poor heart.Sincc both the heart in (i) and a heart in (11) are to be interpreted generically,there hardly seems tobe any difference between these two paraphrases. However, I will point out bclow that (9,a) canalso be paraphrased in terms of a conditional scntence ('If a heart never rejoices, it is a poor heart')and this kind of paraphrase is also applicable to (11), but not to (i).Jespersen himself proposes the following paraphrase:

(ii) The heart that never rejoices is poor.Delahunty (1981: 32-33) remarks that (ii) is "minimally but critically distinct" from (i), as "thereseems to be an ambiguity about this paraphrase that is not available in the original" (= our (ll)),"nor in the paraphrase structure given in" (i). Another problem Ior (ii) is that, like (i) and unlike(11), it does not aliow thc conditional paraphrasc referred to abovc.

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How can this type of "proverbial it-cieft" (Prince 1978: 905) be accounted for?As far as Ican see, there is some evidence that such sentences are not it-elefts at al!but belong to a different type of sentence:

It goes without saying that the WH-dause of a specificational eleft cannot be ~ivena similar conditional interpretation, but the sentènces of the type under considera­tion can: (l6,a) is interpretable as (16,b) and hence as (16,c). The WH-dause of(l6,a) is therefore a genuine relative clause,A. A first piece of cvidence is that, unlike true it-clefts, sentences like (9,a-d) and

(lO,a-e) cannot be "uncleft" (Bali 1977: 58). Compare:(16)(a) It is a happy mother who has such children.

(b) A mother who has such children is a happy mother.(c] If a mother has such children, she is a happy mother.

b. In hypothetical constructions, true relative clauses follow the system of verbforms used in conditional clauses, whereas the WH-dauses of it-defts normallyfollow the system of verb forms used in head clauses:

(12)(a) It was JOHN who did it.(b) JOHN did it.

(13)(a) It's a POOR HEART that never rejoices.(b) A POOR HEART never rejoices,

(14)(a) lt's a LONG LANE that has no lurning.(b) A LONG LANE has no turn ing.

Whereas (12,b) is equivalent to (l2,a) (cf chapter 1, section 2.7), the (b) sentencesof (13)-(14) do not have the same meaning as their (a) counterparts.

(17)(a) lf a man dlcn't/'wouldn't have any friends, he wouldn't behappy?

(b) A man who didn't/*wouldn't have any friends wouldn't behappy.

(c) If John were Ihe one 10 decide, it wouldn't be a book thatwould bef?was given to Mary.

(d) If I were the one to decide, it would be a more interestingsubject that we would bel*were discussing tonight.

By this test, the WH-clauses ofhypothetical sentences ofthe type (16,a) qualify asgenuine relative clauses, and not as WH-clauses of it-clefts:

B. It is well-known that the Wll-clause of an it-cleft does not behave like a genuinerestrictive relative clause in several respects.' However, there is plenty of evidencethat the WH-cIauses of sentences like (9)-(10) are true relative clauses:

a. As is well-known, restrictive relative clauses yield a conditional interpretation ifthe antecedent NP does not have a specific referent. For example, (15,a) can beinterpreted as (15,b):

(15)(a) A man who has no money may feel obliged to steal.(b) Jfa man has na money he may feel obliged to steal.

(18)(a] lf those slanes were real diamonds, it would be a happymolher who possessed/Yîwould possess them.

(b) It wauld be a happy mother who had/??would have suchchildren as you have just described.

(c) It would be a bold prophet who predicted/r twould predict Ihefuture of Ihis company.

This concIusion is corroborated by the fact that the auxiliary should, which can beused to express improbability in conditional clauses (cf.( 19,a» and conditio~alrelative clauses (cf. (19,b», can also be found in the WH-clauses ofsentences like(16,a):

4. For exarnple: (a) The Wrl-clause ofan ir-eleCtcan follow a uniquely referring 'antecedent' such asa pcrsonal pronoun Cl, me) or a proper name not preceded by an article, whereas a restrictiverelative clause cannot,

(b) The WH-clause of au il-e1eft may sometimes be delered in subject position (e.g. lt was Johnsaw il firstï, whereas a subject relative pronoun can otherwise never be omitted (except inthere-constructions).

(c) Rclative clause reduction is impossible in il-clefts. Compare JOBN was the man working in thegarden with "It was JOBN working in tlie garden(d) As pointed out by Kuno (1970), a relative clause depending on a predicational humanantecedent has to be introduced by which, not that or who (e.g. Bilt is the president of the club,whieh/'thal/'who John has in [act always wanled 10 bel. However, a predicational human'antecedent' can be followed by that in an it-cleft (e.g. It is the president of the club thai he hosalways wanted 10 bel.(e) Truc relative clauses can aften alternate with infinitival e1auses (e.g. Be was the third man whowasarrested/to be arrestedj. In the corresponding it-cleft an infinitival clause cannot be substitutcdfor the WH-e1ause: 11 is the third man that fired the shots/t'tofire the shots.(f) A relative clause dcpending on an antecedent containing such must be introduced by as (e.g.This is such a doll as/îthat I'd like 10 have). The corresponding it-eleft cannot involve as: 11 is sucha dalltlwll"as I'd like la have.

(19)(a)(b)(c)

If someone should come, teil him l'm away.A person who should say that would be a rash person.It would be a rash person who should say Ihat a ha~d voiceis universally characteristic of the North or West. (Klrchner1970: 295)

5. The would form in the if-elause is to be interprered here as a conditional form (with hypotheticalmeaning), No volitional interpretation is intended.

152153

C. A~ pouueu out oy Kuuo (1YIU) and Higgins (1976: 160), the relative pronounwho cannot be used predieationally in a relative structure with a full lexicalantecedent. Instead we use that in restrictive relative clauses and which innonrestricti ve ones:

(20)(a) He is not the man that/twho he used to beo(b) He is a reliable man, which/*who you are not.

The same restrietion applies to it-clefts:

(21) It is a teacher that/'who 1 want to become, not a baker!

It-defts moreover show a sirnilar restrietion if the WH-word is not usedpredicationally itself but has as 'antecedent' a cIefted constituent with a predica­tional focus: in that case that is preferred to who:

(22J(a) 1 thought it was a RELIABLE man thatl(who) had been giventhe job.

(b) It is only a DEVOTED wife that/(who) makes her husbandhappy.

(c) It is only RELIABLE people that/(who) should be hired for thisjob.

These sentences are of a type that will be discussed in section 3. They are basieallyspecifieational it-clefts, but they turn out to give only predicational informationbeeause the adjective in the clefted constituent is the only 'new' element (i.e. thehead noun belongs to the information that is 'given' or 'known' - cf. chapter I,section 2.6). In that case most speakers feel there to be a preferenee for that (whiIcwho is preferred if the predieational adjectives are dropped).

Consider now sentences of the type (16,a). Here too the structure is feIt to bepredicational because it is the adjective (e.g. happy in ft is a happy mother who hassuch childreny that conveys the new information in the focal NP. Nevertheless, thereis no preferenee for using that rather than who, although (22,a-c) make clear thatÎt-clefts do show such a preferenee if the Wll-clause depends on a cleftedconstituent in which the new information is entirely predicational. This confirmsthat sentences like (l6,a) are distinct from it-defts. (It also suggests that a happymother is not actually the antecedent of who has such children, which is in keepingwith the possible analyses that will be pointed out below.)

The above pieces of evidence make clear that predicational sentences like (l6,a)are not really i/-defts but represent a type of sentence that is homophonous withit-defts. They differ from the latter in that they cannot be 'uncleft' and in that theyinvolvc a truc restrictive relative clause, As far as Iean sec, there are three possibleanalyses that ean account for these facts, and all three of them have actually beenproposed in the linguistic literature. The first, which is asserted but not argued in

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Kirchner (1970: 295), treats the it of such sentences as a 'determinative pronoun'followed by a restrictive relative clause that has undergone so-called extraposition­from-Nlë Additional evidence for this analysis is to be found in the fact that insentences of this type that are less proverbial than (9,a-d) or (16,a) the pronoun itean be replaced with the more regular detcrminative pronouns helshe:

(23)(a) ...and the best that we find in these travels is an honestfriend. He is a fortunate voyager who finds many. (Kruisinga1932b: 505)

(b) lt/he would be a rash prophet who should attempt to fore-tellthe future fate of shall and will in American speech. (Galinsky1952: 277)

The second analysis that is in keeping with the observation that sentences of thistype involve truc restrictive relative clauses is advocated by Poutsma (1928: 992)and Jacobsson (1971: 321). According to them, (24,a) is derived from (24,b):

(24)(a) It is a happy mother who has such children.(b) *It is a happy mother, a mother who has such children.

This analysis also concurs with the observation that helshe ean often be substitutedfor it, as helshe are in fact the regular pronouns in cases of right disloeation such as(22,b). It follows, however, that the analysis does not account for the possibility ofusing it - a weakness that it shares with the first analysis, which does not explain thispossibility either, since the normal determinative pronouns with human referenceare he, she or they.

The third analysis, which is proposed by Ball (1977: 11), derives (24,a) from(25,a) via (25,b) (which is the result of applying extraposition-from-Nl' to(25,a»:

(25)(a) The mother who has such children is a happy mother.(b) 'The mother is a happy mother who has such children.

This analysis again has the advantage of treating the WH-clause as a true relativeclause. However, BalI herself admits that it encounters the problem that it violatesthe well-known constraints on backward anaphora. Another problem is that, likethe other two analyses, it fails to account for the possibility of using it:pronorninalization of the mother should result in the use of she, not it.1

I~. 6. A determinative pronoun is a pronoun that is restrictivelymodified by a relative clause, participial

clause, prepositional phrase or adverbial adjunct (sec e.g. Scheurweghs 1959: 133). Thus, thesubject pronoun is used determinativelyin Those who are here know about this or They laugh bestwho laugh lust.

7. Baliherselffailsto recognizethis problernbecause she illustratesher analysiswith the exarnple ft isa poor heart that never rejoices. (Of course it is thc cxpected pronoun herc since (he heart isneuter.)

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! wui uot aucrnpt lO argue in favour of one of these three analyses, but Iwouldlike to add some comment on the faet that none of them can apparently account forthe use of it. In present-day English it cannot normally have a human referent if it isused as a determinative pronoun, as tbe pronoun left behind in a dislocatedstrueture, or as a cataphorie pronoun. However, we should keep in mind that thetype of sentence under consideration is essentially proverbia! and, like mostproverbs, reminiscent of an older stage of the English language. A closer look at thatolder stage reveals tbe following faets:

a. As noted by Poutsma (1928: 730), we do "find instances of it used as a kind ofdeterminative" in the writings of Sbakespeare:

(26)(a) For that's it that always makes a good voyage ot nothing.(b) It holds current that I told you of.

Note that in (26,b) the relative clause has undergone extraposition-from-Nf

b. Visser (1970: 41) notes that Hit was formerly also used as formal subject ofclassifying to be, wh ere nowadays he, she, that would be preferred" (Visser'sterm classifying coneurs with our predicational.):

(27)(a) Hit is an biscop.(b) 'T is a good boy', said his master.

e. Visser (1970: 50) and Curme (1931b: 188) also point out that in former timesthe it of specificational it-clefts eould be replaeed with a pronoun agreeing withthe gender and number of.the focal NP. Thus, "in the 16tb, 17th, 18th and 19tycenturies 'they are my brothers who ...' was occasionally used by tbe side of 'it isor it were my brothcrs who ...'" (Visser 1070: 50):

(28)(a) They are our own sell-chosen employments (...) which hinderprayer.

(b) ...she was a stranger with whom you were talking. (Visser1970:41) (dated 1875)

Taking these elements together, we see that (a) in older English it could be used asa determinative pronoun funetioning as the head of an NP from which the relativeclause could be extraposed; (b) it could replace helshe in predicational sentences ;and (c) it is and he/she is were apparently interchangeable anyhow, not only inpredicational sentences but even in specificational it-clefts.8 It follows that the facttbat ii can be used in sentences like (9)-(10), where contemporary English should

8. For the rules goveming the use of iI is versushe/she is in contemporary Eng!ish, see chapter 2.

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I normally require helshe, is no real counterevidence to the possible analyses po~~t~dut above as long as we keep in mind that this type of sentence IS essen la y

o , f ., t fan older stage of the language,?proverbial, and tbere ore rennmscen 0 . lik (9)-(10)

Tbe ener al conclusion from this section, then, IS that sentences e .represe~t a type of their own, different from ge~uine it-cl~fts, ~nd therefore provideno exception to the mie that it-clefts are essentIally speclficatlOnal.

II'ii1I1~

. f the anal ses in question also figureamong those9. What is not 50 easy 10 accept ISthat the firs~two 0 I Its Th: analysis in terms of a determinative

that have been argued to hold for .gen~medt~c~ai!iday (1968) and Hudd!eston (1971: 325) topronoun and extraposillon-from-NP IS cl~lme ,y ed to su ort this claim. Bo!inger(1972b:hold for it-c1eftsin general. bu~na real eVlden.~I::~~~WH-c1~~seof any i/-c1eftis an "adjective31) makes much the same ~lalmwhen asd1serll"ts f nction" The same arialysis is also argued inclause", i.e. "one that modifles it regar ess 0 I U .

Wirth (1978). .' .' ri ht-dis!ocated structure as underlying form) isThe secend analysis (VIZ. the one mvolvmg arri!_Delis!e (1978: 422) and Givón (1979: 246).

applied to (true) i/-cleftsby Gunde! (1977~), Ha I diff ences between i/-defts and sentences IikeHowever, given the fact that there are fun am~~ ~ e~ldbe applicable to both of them.(9)-( 10), is is rather unlikely that lhe same an ySIS5 0

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3.. If we discard such sentences as (9)-(10) we still have not producedevidence that ~here exist i/-deft sentences that could be called predicatio:~i.~owcv~r, such II-defts do appear to exist, and the following sentences provide someillustrations:

I (29)(a) w~s it an interesting meeting you went to last night?(b) ~sn ~ ~e~ devoted,rat~ersimple-mindedyoung womanwho

IS wntmg.of that Ihere IS no doubt at all. (Kruisinga 1932b'504) .

(c) An excellent chapter in Vol. V is Mr Tod's on Ihe economicbackground ..ft wa~aluminous cboice whichput him incharge of this sectien.tor he has Ihe tirst Iwo qualificationsfor the task ... (Kruisinga 1932b: 505)

(d) Assuredly il was a daring thing whieh she meanl to do(Poutsma 1916: 990) .

(e) ':s~it a glorious bonfire it was you made! (Quirk et al. 1972:

Sentences like these should be distinguished from sentences like Wh t Th' .bi . . . a JO n IS ISam ~tlOU:, In w~lch, as we have seen, a predicational value is specified for apredicational v~nable. In (29,a-e) the variabie is not predieational yet the value (i ethe. focal NP) IS. In fact, .the speaker does not seem 10 be specif~ing a value for' ~variable at all: the vanable ~P (which is in large part represented by theWH~clause) se~ms to be referentlal rather than 'superscriptional' (i.e. resembling the

(h;admg of a hst - cf. chapter 1, section 2.1). Thus, the correct paraphrases of9,a-e) would seem to be, not (30,a-e), but (31,a-e):

(30)((~))Did you go to the following last night: an interesting meeting?~he follo~lng person is writing: a very devoted, ratherslmple-rninded young woman.

(e) The. following put him in charge of this seetion: aluminousoholee.

(dj She meant to do the following: a daring Ihing.(e) You made the. followinq: (what) a glorious bonfire!

(31)(a) Was Ihe meetmg that you went 10 last night interesting?(b) The young woman who is writing is very devoted and rather

sirnpte-rrunded(e) The. ehoiee that put him in charge of this seetion was a

hrminous one.(d) What sh~ meant to do was (a) daring (thing).(e) How glorlaus the bonfire was thaI you made!

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Sentences like (31 .a-e) are predieational without doubt, yet they represent thecorrect meanings of (29,a-e),10 which are U-deft sentences and should therefore bespecifieational. When we examine the syntactic behaviour of the latter sentences wenotice that they show characteristics of both predieational and specificationalsentences. In the remainder of this section I will point out some twentycharacteristics that they share with predicational sentences. In section 4 I willsubsequently go into the characteristics that they share with purely specifieationalsentences.

3.1. Perhaps the simplest proof that sentences like (29,a-e) are (to a certain extent)predieational is that they ean be used in answer to a question that is explicitly askingfor a predieational answer:

(32)A. The car you saw in front of the house, was it a red one or agreen one?

B. II was a GREEN car that I saw in front of the house.

Notice that in (32,B) all the information except green is oId. The new information isentirely predicational.

Similarly:

(33)A. You're a lucky man. You're rich, you have a good job and anamiable wife ...

B. lt's certainly not a GOOD lob that I have! (or: lt's certainly notan AMIABLE wife that I have!)

In (33,B) (which is a eIeft of the 'correcting' type - see chapter 1 (section 2.6.A) andchapter 5 (section 4», it is not the entire clefted constituent but only thepredicationaI element in it (viz. the adjective good/amiable) that is negated, i.e. that,together with not, constitutes the new information.

10. The observation that the sentencetype illustratedby (29,a-e) conveyspredicational information isa1somade by Kruisinga(1932b: 504). Kruisingauses (29,b-c) as illustrations and comments thatthese sentences represent "what may be called the descriptive type. What is formally the mainclause might be a nominal predicate in the usual sentence type".

Since publishing the artiele that serves as the basis for this chapter (viz.Predicational de/Is inLingua 61 (1983): 9-45) I have found that the point I am making in conneetion with (29,a-e) isalso made by BaU(1977). Bali a1sonotes that although Uithas been claimed that all ïr-cleftsarespecificational",sentences like (i.a-c) "are predicational it-defts: the subjects are referential, andthe focus is read as predieated of the subject in each". Thus, (i,a) "cannot be read as specifyingwhat you're wearing,but instead is interpreted as a comment on a partieular property of the dressthat you're wearing."(i)(a) Gee, it'sa nicedressyou'rewearing.(b) Itsure is a fastear youdrive.(ellt's a sublledislinclionyou'remaking.

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.J •••• UI vU,,!Jll;j 1 ~~I;CUOIl4..t.JJ) we saw that the negator no camlot be used tonegate the focus of a specificational sentence. Thus, we cannot substitute no for nota in the following:

asemantic relation which in some sense implies uniqueness, and there ean be nomodification of degree. Thus, one ean say that someone is very fat, or somewhattall or that someone is taller than someone else. However, one cannot say thatJones is somewhat the man who robbed the bank, or that he is mor~ the.man. whorobbed the bank than he is the man who lives on the corner. Jones elthe~ IS or. IS notthe man who robbed the bank, and there ean be no sense of modification ofdegree." .' . .

This difference between predicational and specificational sentences provides uswith a strong argument for saying that sentences like (29,a-e) are predicational, forthe predicate nominal allows comparison and modifieation of degree:

(34)(a) What we need is not a teacher.(b) It is not a teacher that we need.

On the other hand, no ean occur in some predicational NPs, viz. in those thatexpress a property in the strict sense of the term. Thus, we can use John isno teacherto express that John does not have the qualities of a teacher, or we ean say Mary isno hero, etc.

Consider now the following sentences, which are acceptable if the negation isinterpreted as bearing on the adjective in the clefted constituent:

(29)(e) What a glorious bonfire it was you made! .(38)(a) Itwas such an important meeting that he went to last niqht

that he is extremely happy now that he did not miss it.(b) How interesting a subject is it that they are discussing?[cl [The subject matter of the latest debat~s was not particularly

interesting.) It is a rather more mterestmg topte, however, thatwe are going to discuss tonight. .

(d) Are you really saying that it is a SEDER player than Kevinthat you are looking for?

3.4. The difference that we assume there to be between 'predicational it-clefts'.like(29,a-e) and specificational it-clefts is borne out by the fact that a ~left from eithcrclass ean be conjoined with a cleft from the same class, but not with one from theother class:

(35)(a) Itwas no MEANgathering of souls that Mrs Brockett's dingygas illuminated. (Kruisinga 1932b: 504)

(b) It's no RELlABLEman that you have hired, but a craok!(c) Itwas no INTERESTINGmeeting that I went to.

The possibility of using no in such sentences confirms that the information given isreally predieational. On the other hand, the choice of no seems less natural to manypeople than the use of not a, and in some sentences it yields a somewhatquestionable result:

(36) ?It certainly was no BEAUTIFULgirlwho asked me to marryher. (39)(a) Itwas a BOOK that John gave me and a BIKEthat Mary

gave me. (spee. + spec.)(b) It is an IMPORTANTmeeting that I'm going to and an

INTERESTING subject that they're discussing. (pred. + pred.)(c) ??It is an IMPORTANTmeeting that l'rn going to and JOHN

who is presiding at it. (pred. + spec.)(d) ??It is JOHN who is going to lead the debate and an

INTERESTING subject that is going to be discussed. (spee. +pred.)

As pointed out in section 4.l.B of chapter 1, predicational and sp~cificationalelements cannot be coordinated, except zeugmatieally (see also Halliday (1967:71):

This is in keeping with what will become clear throughout sections 3 and 4, viz. thatsentences like (29,a-e) are really border-line cases: although the information theyconvey is predieational, they are formally it-cleft sentences, and it-clefts areessentially specificational in nature. Because of this we wil! see that sentences like(29,a-e) share characteristics and restrictions ofboth specificational and predicatio­nal sentences at the same time.

3.3. In section 3.5.A. of chapter 1 it was pointed out that predicational NPs mayindicate a property that is gradable and may therefore enter into gradingconstructions such as

(37)(a) He is more of a hero than Kelly[b) What a disgrace itwas!(c) He is su eh a baby.(d) How intelligent is he?

Grading constructions of this kind are incompatible with a specificationalinterpretation. As pointed out by Akmajian (1979: 164), "predication is asemanticrelation which admits comparison and modification of degree, while specification is

[40)(a) •John is the tall one and also fat. .(b) *John is both the bank robber and very charminq.

3.5. Higgins (1976: 194) notes that (41,a) is ambig~ous between a speci~eat~onaland a predicational reading, but that (41,b) yields only the predicationalinterpretation :

160161

(41Ha) Where John is going to is a nice place.(b) Where John is going is a nice place.

Both sentences can be reformulated as Ît-clefts:

(42)(a) It is a nice place where/that John is going to.(b) 1Iis a nice place where John is go ing.

Sentence (42,a) is again ambiguous, while (42,b) yields only the predicationalinterpretation. As a matter of fact, (42,b) is a sentence of the type (29,a-e) andtherefore confirms the existence of predicational Ît-clefts.

3.6. In a copular sentence in which to be is preceded by seem, the copula can neverbe deleted on a specificational reading:

(43)(a) The murderer seems 10be Jack Jones.(b) "Ihe murderer seems Jack Jones.

(44)(a) It seems to be a book that is missing.(b) "lt seems a baak that is missing.

There appear to be some restrictions on deleting to be from predicational sentencesas well,!' but there are no exceptions to the rule that only a predicational reading ispossible if to be is actually deleted. Thus, WH-c1efts like (45,a-b) are not ambiguousbetween a predicational and a specificational reading but can only be interpretedpredicationally:

(45)(a) What you are working on seems an interesting subject.(b) Whal he suggested seemed a difficull thing to do.

The above observations provide a further argument for the claim that it-clefts maybe prcdicational, since it-clefts such as the following appear to be acceptable:

(46)(a) It seemed an interesling subject that he was working on.(b) Jt seemed a difficult thing to do that they required of him.

3.7. In section 4.7. of chapter 1 we saw that the verb become cannot be used as tbecopula of a specificational sentence because it "behaves rather like an inchoative tothe verb be in its Predicational meaning" (Higgins 1976: 150-151). Thus, sentenceslike (47,a-b) are ungrammatical, and the same is true of specificationaI Ît-cleftsinvolving become, such as (47,c):

11. For example, /0 be appcars 10 be more casily dispensable in (i.a-b) than in (ii.a-b):(i)(a) Thai seems [to bel a difticult thing to do.(b) She always seems (to bel sado

lii)(a) He seems (to bel an important man.(b) Bill seems (to bel a close friend of John's.

162

tI;~.

II~.

I

(47)(a) *John's friend became that girl.(b) *The man who robbed the bank became you.(e) *11has become John who is our worst enemy.

However, it does appear to be possible to find become in sentences like (29,a-e):

(48)(a) A eouple of weeks ago it seemed clear which eandidaledeserved voting for, but now many people think that it nesbecome a difficult choice Ihey have 10make.

(b) After Ihe recent troubles it has become an extremely impor­tant issue that the minisiers will discuss next week.

(c) In the meantime it has become somelhing different that thechildren would like 10have.

This is another piece of evidence that sentences like (29,a-e) are predicationalU-defts.

3.8. Another argument, similar to the previous one, concerns tbe pos~ibili~y ofadding adverbials like na longer or not ... any more to the copula. In specificationalsentences this can be done only if the variabie is such that different values can beassigned to it at different times, as in (49,a-b). Otberwise the result is unaccepta-bie:

(49)(a) The president is no longer John.(b) lt is no langer John who is the president.

(50)(a) *The murderer of Smith is no long er John. .(b) *11is no long er John who (is the man who) murdered Srnith,(c) *It is no longer an ice cream that 1have given 10Mary. It has

melled.

In predicational sentences the adverbial will be possible as long as the propertyreferred to is temporary:

(51)(a) John is na langer ill.(b) 'This oirels is no longer round.

Consider now:

(52)(a) It is no longer an INTERESTING subject tnat they arediscussing.

(b) It is not a HAPPY woman any more that is speaking here.

If the adverbials do not cause the sentences to be unacceptable here it is not becausethe variables are such that different values can be assigned to them. The sentencesmust therefore be predicational.

3.9. As noted in chapter 1 (section 4.5.), the tense of the copula in a specificationalsentence may either depend on the variable part or be a neutralized presenttense:12

(53)(a) The one who murdered Smith was/is John.tb) It was/is John who murdered Smith.

In predicational sentences, however, the tense can never be neutralized. Thus in

(54) The man who murdered Smith was crue!.

is cannot be substituted for was without semantic import. The reason is that inpredicational sentences the tense of the copula expresses the time at which theproperty is applicable to the referent of the subject NP (see also section 3.10).

Consider now:

[55)(a) It is/would be a book that John would give 10me if he hadhis way.

(b) It would be/'is a more interesling Subject that we would bediscussing if John had his way.

In (55,a) neutralization of the tense is possible because the it-deft is specificational.In (55,b), on the other hand, is cannot be used, which is another indication that (atleast in certain respects) this type of ft-deft is not specificational but predicatio­nal.13

3.10. If tense neutralization does not occur in predicational sentences, we noted inchapter 1 (section 4.5) that there is another type of variation that is possible there.Consider the following:

(56)(a) The man who told you that is dangerous.(b) The man who told you that was dangerous.(c) The man who told you that has always been dangerous.[dj The man who told you that will be dangerous (it you betray

him).

The variation observed here has nothing to do with the phenomenon of tenseneutralization: (56,a) is not equivalent to either (56,b), (56,c) or (56,d). Rather, the

12. This does not mean that both tensesare always equally appropriate. Sec chapter 1 (section 4.5)for some discussion.

13. As could he expected, predicational sentences of the type It is a happy mother who has suchchildren bchave like (55,b):

(ij 1Iwould be/"is a bold prophel who predicted the future of shall and wil/ inArnerican English.

variatien is a natural consequence of the predicational nature of these sentences : theproperty assigned to the referent of the subject NP may be a property which theperson in qurestion has (now), had (at some time in the past), has had (for sometime) or will have (at some time in the future). Specificational sentences can showthis kind of variation only if the variable is such that different values can be specifiedfor it at different times (cf. section 3.8):

(57) JOHN is/was/bas been/will be the chairman of the commit­tee.

Otherwise only a present tense form of the copula is possible. Thus, sentences like(58,a-b) are ungrammatical, while (58,c) cannot mean that the person whomurdered Smith is 'that man over there' now but possibly was not him at some timein the past. (That is, is is a neutralized tense form in (58,c).)

(58)[a) "The one who murdered Smith has always been that manover there.

[b) *The one who murdered Smith wil! be that man over there.(c) The one who murdered Smith is that man over there.

As could be expected, specificational it-clefts behave in exactly the same way:

(59) It isl*has always been/'wilt be that man over there whomurdered Smith.

On the other hand, ifwe examine predicational U-clefts like (29,a-e), we notice thata variation of the kind observed in (56,a-d) is possible:

(60)[a) It was/is an INTERESTING subject that they were discus­sing.

[b] It was/is a WISE man who said mat(c) It is/was/wil! (prove tol be/has al ready proved to be a

FAR-REACHING decision that was made yesterday.

The tense variation here is not of the type observed in (57): it is not the case thatdifferent values are assigned to one and the same variable. Rather, the variation is asin (56,a-d). The fact that such a variation is possible (at least to a certain degree)"confirms that the focal item of such sentences is predicationaL On the other hand,the fact that the possibility of variation may well be more restricted here than it is innonclefts like (56,a-d) (cf. footnote 14) confirms that it-defts are not a naturalmeans of conveying predicational information.

14. In some cases the result is not so acceptable:(ij It was/?is/?will prove 10 be an IMPORTANT person that you threw out just now.

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3.1 1. As pointed out by Higgins (1976: 207), "the copula in a Specificationalpseudo-cleft .sentence cannot have a 'straight' negation of the predicate but at bestonly some kind of contradiction negation". Thus a sentence like '

(66)(a) 'It wasn't things that he told me.(b) 'It wasn't people that told me that.

(67)(a) It wasn't INTERESTING things that he told me.(b) It wasn't IMPORTANT people that told me that.

Specificational it-clefts like (66,a-b) are unacceptable because NPs like things andpeople are too vague to specify a variabie or to carry an exhaustiveness implicature.On the other hand, it-clefts like (67,a-b) are fine because they are primarilypredicational (i.e. the focal item is not the entire c1efted constituent but only theadjective in it).

(61) What you need is not a doctor.

is acceptable ?nly if some cont~uation with but is explicitly or implicitly present.As ~e noted 111 chapter 1 (section 4.2), the same is true of specificational it-cleftsand 111 fact of any kind of specificational sentence: '

(62J(a) It is not John who murdered Smith.(b] Smith's murderer is not John.

~dd.ing not to a specificational sentence inevitably means that a partieular elementIS reJ~te_d as value for the variabIe and hence that some other value must be chosen.Pre~lcatlOnal sentences do not imply this kind of contrast and can therefore have a'straight' (or 'neutral') negation:

3.14. Specificational sentences not only have an exhaustiveness implicature butalso imply contrastiveness (cf. chapter 1, section 2.8). This naturally follows fromthe act of specification itself, since specifying a value for a variabie necessarilymeans that other potential values are rejected. Tbe value that is chosen isautomatically felt to contrast with the values that are rejected, and this sense ofcontrastiveness will become stronger according as the set of potential values is morerestricted. Thus, if only three people (say John, Bill and Ted) could have killedSmith, the sentence It's John who killed Smith automatically implies 'not Bill orTed'.

In predicational sentences there is na sueh implication of contrastiveness. In

(63) The meeting was not inleresting.

Whe~ we examine the negation in sentences like (29,a-e) we find that it is a straightnegation, and hence that the it-defts in question must be predicational:

(64J(a) 1I was not an IMPORTANT decision that was made yester-day.

(b) It.wasn't an INTERESTING subject that they were discus­sIng.

(68) What he said was interesting.

interesting may be contrasted with 'not interesting', in the sense that any termimplies the negation of its antonym, but there is no contrast with other adjcctivcsthat might have been chosen. When we consider predicational it-clefts like

3.12. The predicational nature of such sentences is also apparent from the fact thatthey.lack the exhaustiveness implicature which is typical of speeificational i/-cleftsand 111 fact of specificational sentences in general (cf. chapter 1, section 2.9). Unlike(65,a), (65,~) does not suggest that the adressee went to only one place last night.And .there IS. no se~e of exhaustiveness attached to the adjective either: if themeetuig ':"~ mteresting there is nothing to suggest that it could not have had othercharaeterlShcs (e.g. pleasant, long, etc.) as weil.

(69) 1I was an INTERESTING thing that he told us.

we find that thcy are just like (68) in that they lack the explicit sense ofcontrastiveness that is attaehed to specificational sentences. This is another way,then, in which such it-clefts as (29,a-e) and (69) behave like predicationalstructures.

(65)(a) Was it a meeting that you went 10last night?(b) Was II an INTERESTING meeting that you went to last night?

3.13 .. T~e obs.ervatio~ t.hat no exhaustiveness implicature follows from the use ofpredlcatJonalll-clefts IS 10 keeping with the fact that, unlike specificational it-clefts~such ~ (66,a-b)), predicational i/-defts (like (67,a-b» can have a nonspecificindefinite plural NP as clefted constituent:

3.15. lt is weU known that the it of an Ît-cleft can never be followed by a pluralfarm of beo On the other hand, plural predicate nominals in predicational sentencesappear to require a plural copula (cf. chapter 1, section 4.4). Thus, a sentence like

(70) What he wanled 10 give me was interesting books.

will normally be interpreted specificationally only. For a predicational interpreta-

166 167

uon a scntcncc hkc Ol) wil! bc required :15

(71) The books Ihal he wan led 10 give me were inleresting(books).

It fellows that it-clcfts should normally be harder to interpret as predicational iftheir prcdicate norninal is in the plural - an expectation which is actually borne outby thc fact that a sentencc such as (n,b) is much Iess acceptable on a predicationalreading than (72,a). Instead, speakers will normally recur to a construction in whichlVere is possiblc, such as (n,c):16

(72)(a) 1Iwas an INTERESTING meeting Ihat John organized.(b) ?It was always INTERESTING meetings that John organized.(c) They were always INTERESTING meelings thai John orga­

nized.

It is also interesting to notice that it is becomes much more acceptable if the plu ralpredicate nominal is such that a specificational reading is exc1uded (e.g. if it contains110 (cf. sectien 3.2)):

(73) It was no INTERESTING meetings that John organized.

3.16. In chaptcr 1 (scction 4.5) wc noted that copular sentences involving used 10be arc usually predicational. Sentence (74,a) is an example. Used to be can occur inspecificational sentences if the variable is such that different values can be assignedto it at different times, as in (74,b-c), but not if only one value can be assigned to it atany time, as in (74,d):

(74)(a) John used 10 be a good tootbalt player when he was young.(b) The colour that she preferred used to be blue.(e) The one who did most of Ihe work used 10 be John.(dj Tha murderer of Tom was/'useo 10 be John.

IS. In Dutch there are two altematives for a sentence like(70). The first,which is thc exact equivalentof (70) and yiclds only the specilicational interpretation is

(i) Wal hij mij wilde geven was: interessanle BOEKEN.'Whal he wanted 10give me was: inleresling books'

The second, which can only be interprered predicationally,is(ii) Wal hij mij wilde geven waren INTERESSANTE boeken.

'Whal he wanled 10give me ware interesting books'

16. Thc observation that clefts of the form 'it is + plural NP + WH-clause' are normally onlyinterprered specificationally and that we normally use they are instcad of it is 10 render thepredicaticnal reading is also made by Bali (1977: 62). Her cxamples are:

(i)(a) They are/?II is SERIOUS charges you're making.(b) They are/?It is ROYAL horses you are ealching. Lel Ihem go.(e) They were{11t was ENGUSH hands thaI dragged him up 10Iha Iree of shame.

168

Consider now:

(75)(a) 1Iused to be a RELIABLE man that worked for John.(b) It used to be a really GOOO painter who painted their

portralts.

Sentences likc these are grammatica!, even if it is assumed that only one valueshould be assigned to the variabie (i.e. if only onc man has ever worked for Johnand if thc portraits referred to wcre all painted by one and the same painter), Itfollows th at (75,a-b) must be taken to be predicational sentences - a conclusion thatis confirmcd by the fact that thcy are paraphrasable by (76,a) and (76,b),respectivel y.

(76)(a) The man that worked for them used to be reliable.(b) The one who painted their portrails used 10 be a really good

painter.

3.17. It goes without saying that a question of the type' What kind of NP is NPT ispredicational (i.e. asks for predicational information) and cannot, therefore, besuitably answered by a specificational sentence:

(77)(aj (What kind of person is John?j - 1think he is a thiel(predicational)

(b) (What kind of person is John?) - 'I think the thief is him.(speeificational)

It follows that both it-clefts in the question-answer pair (78) are predicational:\I

I(78) Whal kind of person is it that you're looking for? - It is a FAT

man that we're looking for.

3.18. In chapter 1 (section 4.1) the following clear difference between specificatic­nal and predicational sentences was pointed out: if tbc predicate nominal consists oftwo conjoined NPs, it will be specificational if there are two referents andpredicational if there is only one. For example:

(79)(a) What I need is a ear and a driver, (specificational: tworelerents)

(b) Thai man is a thief and a murderer. (predieational: onereferent)

(c) What we need is a fast player and a good defender, (eitherspecificalianal (two referents) or predieational (one referent))

Consider now Ît-clefts such as the following:

169

(80)(a) It is a fast player and a good defender that the club needs.(b) It was a good worker, and a fast one, that did this job.(c) It is a thief, and a murderer too, that is being chased by the

police.(d) lt was an interesting meeting, and a very pleasant one, that I

went to last night.

In each of these sentences the predicate nominal can easily be interpreted as havinga single referent. On this interpretation the it-cJefts are therefore predicational, notspecificational.

3.19. In a specificational Ît-eleft like

(81) It is an escaped convict who committed this murder.

the indefinite focal NP has specific reference. For that reason an can be replaced bysome or (though somewhat clumsily) by a certain or a particular (cf. Heringer1969). In a predicational it-cleft the situation is different. Although the eleft as awhole still implies a specific referent, the focal NP itself no longer functions as aspecific NP. That is, the predicational it-cleft

(82) Was it an INTERESTING meeting that you went to last night?

which yields the predicational interpretation 'Was the meeting you went to lastnight interesting?', will no longer yield this reading if the focal NP is explieitlymarked as specific, e.g. through the substitution of some or a particular for an:

(83) Was it some/a partienlar interesting meeting that you went 10last night?

Sentcnce (83) only yields the speeificational interpretation (and is thereforeawkward if strong accent is put on interestingi. Whereas a natural reply 10 (82)would be a predicational sentence sueh as Yes, the meeting was interesting, onlyspeeificational sentences like (84,a-b) are suitable answers to (83):

(84){a) No, it was a party thatl went to last night.(b) Yes, it was a meeting that I went to, but I did not find it

interesling.

The fact that the focal NP in (82) does not behave like a specific NP is in keepingwith its predicational nature: as pointed out by Kuno (1970), an NP cannot be usedas a 'specific' NP and as a 'qualitative' (prcdicational) NP at the same time.

3.20. Infinitival clauses that involve a copula and depend on a verb like considerwill beha ve differently according as they are predicational or specificational. If they

170

I' are predicational, to be can easily be deleted. I~they are. specificational, to be ean bedeleted only if the value NP precedes the variable NP.

(85)(a) I consider John (~obel his best friend. (either predicational orspecificational wlth John as focus) . . .

(b) I consider his best friend to be JO~N. (SpeClflcatJonal)(c) *1consider his best friend JOHN. (Id.)

If the infinitive clause is it-c1efted, only the specificational reading is retained, but tobe cannot be deleted at all:

(86)(a) I consider it to be JOHN ~h~ is nis b~st triend.(b) *1consider it JOHN who IS hlS best triend.

The same is true in the passive:

(87)(a) It is considered to be JOHN ~ho is his b~st friend.(b) *It is considered JOHN who IS hls best triend.

However, predicational it-clefts like (82) allow deletion of to be:

(88)(a) I cansider it (to bel an INTERESTING subject that they arediscussing tonight.

(b) 1tis considered (to bel an INTERESTING subject that theyare discussing tonight.

Th" ther piece of evidence for the claim that it-clefts like (8~) arepr~i~ti~~~l. (On the other hand, the essentially specificational nature of ll-cleftsreveals itself in the faet that sentences similar to (88,a-b) are not always equally

acceptable:

(89)(a) ?I consider it an IMPORTANT man that is speaking tonight.(b) "lt is considered an IMPORTANT man that IS speakinq

tonight.)

171

4. In the previous section I have pointed out twenty characteristics that sentenceslike (29,a-e) or (82) share with predicational sentences. Some of these characteris­tics apply without apparent restrictions, others apply as it were only reluctantly. Inthis section Iwill point out a couple of characteristics of predicational sentences thatare not shared by sentences like (29,a-e). In these respects (and in others - cf. below)such sentences behave like specificational structures.

4.1. With few exceprions (to be dealt with below), predicational Ü-defts requirethat the predicational element be a modifier rather than the noun head of the NPthat is the c1efted constituent. Thus, in (82) interesting is the only predicationalelement. The reason why such a cleft is feIt to be predicational is that only thepredicational element represents new information: all the rest is presupposed. Thus,(82) implies that the speaker knows that the hearer went to a meeting last night andmerely wants to know whether that meeting was interesting. Jf the noun headmeeting were not presupposed (i.e, if the speaker knew no more than that the hearerwent somewhere last night) (82) would be pronounced with contrastive accent onmeeting and would be unambiguously specificational. It follows that it-defts like(82) in fact require a specificational noun head representing old information. If weleave out the predicational modifier, what remains must be a good specificationalft-eleft (except when the noun head is a vague or indefinite plurallike things orpeople - cf. section 3.13). Thus, if we leave out interesting from (82) we get animpeccable specificational it-cleft:

(90) Was it a MEETING Ihal you went 10 last night?

4.2. There is other evidence that in it-clefts such as (26,a-e) or (82) it is not thec1efted constituent as a whole that is predicational. As we saw in chapter 1 (section2.13), specificational sentences can show 'connecteclness' whereas predicationalsentences cannot. That is, only in specificational sentences is it possible for certaindausc-internal rules (e.g. reflexivization) to hold between the subject NP of thematrix and a constituent of the postcopular clause or phrase. For example, there isconncctedness in (91,a-b), which are specificational, but not in (92,a-b), which arepredicational:

(93)(a) I1was a description of himselfjl"himj th~t John, v-.:rote. .(b) I1was an EXCELLENT description of hlmselfj'"hlmj that John,

wrote.

Sentence (93,a) illustrates that .th~ it-~eft ~~ ~~~l~:~:~:~i~~~ t~~~~::~~Even in (93,b), where excellent 18 t e 0 y pi nnectednessis therefore predicational in the sense defin~ ab~ve~~h~~: ~~~c~~~ 17 This is inbetween the noun head o~ the cle:ede :~~tu:~ ~at in predicational it-c1eftslikekeeping with the observation v:e .av . ,. P a whole stands in athese only the adjective is predicational, while the c1efted N asspecificational relationship to the Wll-clause,

43 This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that an it-~lelftifofhthetyt'PeecLle'ftWedasNa;. . . lastni ht i grammatica teen lfinteresting meeting t~at I wentto ast ~g lISftUlld NP as a whole functions as the

is predicational, as m (94), where t e ce epredicate nominalof the predicational WH-clause:

(94) "Was it an interesting meeting that the meeting that you went10 last night was?

Notice that the corresponding noncleft predicational sentence is fine:

(95) Was the meeting that you went to last night an interestingmeeting?

dtb n occur freely in predicational:~:~e~~:~c~~nis3~~~~~e ~~s:;~~~!~~~~ se~~e:~ only if.the variabie NP is suchthat different values can be assigned to 11 at different times.

(96)(a) John used to be reliable. (predicationa!l. .(b) "The murderer used to be John. (speclflcatlonal). h(c) The JACKSONSus~d to be the ones who were qiven t e

best jobs. [speciricational)

ld ith d to verbs like begin, continue andThe same situation aPtear~°frhol :lpr:~fc~tional sentences (as is illustrated bycease These too can e us ee y if diff t alues ean be(97,a~c» but can only occur in specificational sentences 1 I eren vassigned to the variabie (cf. (98,a-c»:

(91Ha) The ioo Fredj has accepted is 10 write a book about himselfj.(bJ What John, wrote was an excellent description of himselfj.

(92)(a) The job Fredl has accepted is a SOureeof agony lor hirn,(b) Whal John, wrote was an excellent description of himj.

Consider now: 17. One of rny infor~lanls fatund ~~~h:t;rup~r;~~th~::I~;~~~ei~;~i~'a~~:rS~~;~~~~~~~'t~acceptable to a re evan nurn .(partly) predicational nature of such ïr-clefts.

172173

(97)(a) John .has begun 10 be harder 10 eonvinee lalel.(b) He slill conlmues 10 be a reliab/e servanI Y(e) Mary has eeased to be an attractivs wornan

(98)(a) The co'our that she prefers has eeased 10 be blu(b) The one who do t e.(e) 'Th es most 0 the work eontinues 10be John

e murderer of Tom continues to be John. .

In conneetion witb used to we noticed that tb' Tpredicational ft-defts: IS aUXIiary can be found in

(99) It used to be a RELIABlE man that worked tor John.

However, verbs like begin, cd'in this way: ease an contmue are much more reluctant to be used

(100)(a)~~hCn~nlinues10 oe an UNRELIABLE servanI that works for

(b) ?/t hasn't yet ceased to be an ATTRACTIVEmarried to. woman that l'rn

Sentences like these are b tt h 'they are much worse th:n e;:e a~Jlurely specifi~tional it-clefts ~ike(101 ,a-b) butnonclefts (1 02,a-b): ( Y grammatIca!) correspondmg predicational

(101)(a)(b)

(102)(a)

:I~~onli~ues 10 be John who is Ihe murderer of Fredasn t yet ceased 10 be Mary that t'm married to .

b/~e(::Z:~~,thal works tor John continues 10be (a~) unrelia-

(b) The w?man l'rn married to hasn't yel ceased 10 be (an)anracuvs (woman).

The relative unacceptability f(100 b)' .sentences are partly specifica~ional i:-nat~r:~erefore eVldence for the fact that these

~,5. As is well-known, the sentence I want .mterpretatioll on which a doctor is a . 10. marry a doctor yields anthe universe of discourse of the s nOkllspeoclficN_P,i.e. d?es not have a referent inc Il pea er. n this readîng the t10 owed by (l03,a) but not by (103 b) b' sen ence can bethe use of he presupposes the existen'ce' fecause ~finthe latter, but not in the former,

o a speel c doctor:

(103)(a) He must be genUe and good-Iooking.(b) He IS genUe and good-Iooking.

A similar restriction can be observed when the . .nominal in a predicationaI sentence F ~onspeelfïc NP IS used as predicateon a specificational reading the pr~d' ~rt~xamlp~, ~Ithough. (104,a) is grammatical

, ica iona reading tequires must be:

174

(104)(a) What I'd like 10 read is a really interesling nevel (specificatio­nal)

(b) What l'd like to read must be/'is (a) really inleresting (no­vel).18(predicational)

A nonspecific NP in a predicational sentence thus req uires must be (or some similarmodal phrase) instead of is. However, when we consider predicational it-clefts witha nonspecific NP as clefted constituent, we find not only that is is possible, but alsothat must be cannot even be used:

(105) 11is/*must be a really INTERESTING novel that I would like10 read.

Even though (105) ean be paraphrased as (106) (in which must be has to be usedinstead of is on the nonspecific interpretation), is wil! be the normal form in (105).This is another way, then, in which predicational it-defts like (lOS) qualify asspecifieational structures.

(106) The navel that I wauld like to read must be/*is really interes-ting.

4.6. Another piece of evidence confirming that even predicational it-c1efts areessentially specificational is that the WH-clause of a predicational it-c1eftcan hardlybe omitted.!? Compare:

(107)A. 1 am meeting a man tonight.B. (a) Is it John thaI you are meeting lonight?

(b) Is il John?(c) Is it a YQUNG man that you are meeting lonight?(d) ??Is it a YOUNG man?

Sentence (107 ,B,c) shows that a full it-cleft can be used to convey predicationalinformation (the idea 'Is the man a young one?'), but (107,B,d) makes cIear thatreducing such an i/-eleft leads to a hardly acceptable result. The reason is that it isdifficult to interpret a copular sentence that conveys predicational information as(part of) an ft-cleft if there is 00 overt WH-clausc to enforce this interpretation.It-defts are, indeed, essentially spècificational, For this reason the speaker whoembarks on a predicational sentence in the form of au it-cIeft will find it necessary toadd the WH-clause as an explicit indication that the sentence he is constructing isreal!y an Ît-eleft. Otherwise he wil! prefer an unambiguously predieationalconstruction such as Is he young ?

18. Of course, is is acceptable if there is reference 10 a specific navel, but here we are consideringnonspecificNPs only.

19. There are sorne restrictions on the possibility of reducing it-defts (cf chapter 4), but these do nolaffect the particular exampies given here.

175

-r, I. !ue uuar naiure ot predicauonal i/-c1eftsalso reveals itself when the word alsois added to the copula of the matrix. In chapter 1 (section 2.9.D) we saw that if thisis done in a (purely) specificational it-cleft, the implication is that the value shouldbe assigned not only to some variabie not expressed in the sentence but also to thevariabIe that is expressed there. Thus,

(i 08) 1I is also a meeting thai I am going to.

is to be interpreted as 'Not only variabie X (e.g. 'What you are going to') is ameeting; what Iarn going to is also a meeting'." By contrast, if also is added to apredicational sentence there are two possibilities, according as also is related to theprcdicational element or to the subject NP. In the former case the implication is thatnot only some property not referred to in the sentence but also the property referredto there is predicated of the subject NP. Thus,

(109) The meeting that l'rn going to is also important.

can be interpreted as 'The meeting that I'm going to is not only X (e.g. pleasant) butalso important'. The alternative interpretation is that the property is predicated notonly of some entity not referred to in the sentence but also of tbe referent of thesubject NP of the sentence. On this reading (109) means 'Not only X (e.g. themeeting that you're going to) but also the meeting that I'm going to is irnportant'.Tbe predicational Ît-cleft

(110) It is also an important meeting that I am going 10.

yields only the latter interpretation (and wil! tberefore normally be pronouncedwith stress on I, which is the contrastive element in the description of the referent).This means that a/so cannot bear on the predicational element (important),whereasin a predicational sentence like (109) it can. On the other hand, (110) also differsfrom the specificational it-cleft (108), since the noun head (meeting) of the cleftedNP is not specified as value for a variabie but is part of the NP ('the meeting that I'rngoing to') of whose referent the property important is predicated. However, (108)and (IlO) do resembie each other in another respect: in both cases also bears onwhat is the subject NP in the semantic representation (viz, 'what I am going to' and'the meeting I am going 10'). The conclusion, then, is that, although (IlO) ispredicational in meaning, it has the form of a specificational structure and this

20. Compare:ril I admitthal it's John who drinks most ol Ihe whisky, but it is also John who pays

lor itlwhere the interpretation is somethinglike: 'I admitthat John is tbc value of the variabIe"the Xwho drinks most of the whisky", but he is also the value of the variabIe "the X who pays forif'.'

176

results in certain restrictions which are shared, not with predieational sentences, butwith specificational ones."

4.8. A final piece of evidence confirming the. fun~mentally. speci~cational n~tu~~of predicational it-c1eftsconcerns their behaviour III conneetion with pronomm'~lzation. In predicational sentences pronominalization appears to be P0S:Sl eirrespective of whether the coreferential NP precedes or follows the pronoun.

(111)(a) John's, son is hi~i best friend.(b) Hls, son ISJohn Sibest fnend. .

(112)la) What Johni knew was a souree of agony tor hlrn,(b) What hei knew was a souree of agony for John,

In specificational sentences, by contrast, there are several restrictions ..One of the:is that, if the value NP precedes the variabie Np, the.latter ean con~m a pronou f)that is coreferential with (part of) the value NP only if that pronoun IS not (part 0

the subject of the WH-clause:

(113)(a)(b)

(114)la)(b)

(115)la)(b)

*It was John's. dog that hei beat.It was John's, dog that worried hirn,*John's, dog was what hei beat.Jonn's 'd09 was what worried nim,*lt wasl Jonn, whom hls, dog bit.It was John, who beat hisi dog.

When we examine predicational Ïl-clefts we find that, un~ike pr~di~tionalh ' (111 a-b) and (112 a-b) they show eertam restricuons onsentences suc as, , , . ti

pronominalization. More specifically, they are subject to exactly the same restnc Ionas is i1lustrated in (113)-( 115) :

(116)(a) *It was something useful for John, that hei bought.(b) It was something useful for John, that I gave nim, .(c) It was something useful tor Jonn, that I boughl tor nirn, .

(117)(a) It was somelhing important tor John'~i future that I told him,(b) *It was something important tor John Sifuture that hel was

told by her.

21. The condusion that even predicational U-defls are essentially .specificational suggests th~trammatical slructurescontinue to impose their essentialcharactenstlcseven when they contarnrexicalmaterial that is normally incompatible with them. ~s a matter of factothis phenomeno~(sometimescalled 'shifting')has beennoted in conneenon with ether grammatlca\ structures.It sdescribed in detail in Talrny (1978) and Talmy (1985).

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5. In the previous two sections we have examined the characteristics of suchit-clefts as (29,a-e). This examination has led to the following eonclusions.

5.1. In sentences sueh as (29,a-e) the new information is entirely predicational. Toconvey predicational information can therefore be eonsidered to be the solefunction of this sentence type.

5.2. Not any predicational sentence can be reformulated in the form of such asentence. The reason is that in an it-c1eft like (29,a-e) the c1efted NP isspeeificational as a whole, although it eontains predicational information about thenoun head.lt-clefts in which the entire clefted NP is predicational will not normallybe found. (See, however, below.)

5.3. As a result of combining a predicational meaning with a speeificationalstrueture, it-clefts like (29,a-e) have some eharaeteristics in common with bothpredicational sentences and speeificational it-clefts, but also differ from both ofthese in several ways.

5.4. The predicational meaning of sueh i/-clefts follows (more or less aecidentally)from the fact that the NP specified as value for the variabie represents oldinformation except for the adjective modifying the noun head.v We eould thereforemaintain that sueh predicational it-clefts are still specificational in strueture, if itwere not for the fact that the construction has given rise to a eouple of types wherethe speeificational nature can no longer be upheld. An example of this is the typementioned above in which be is replaced by become (cf seetion 3.7.):

(48)(b) After the recent troubles it has become an extremely IMPOR­TANT issue that the ministers wil! discuss next week.

As in (29,a-e), the noun head (issue) is not part of the predicational newinformation. In other words, the logical subject of become (i.e. that whieh has eomeinto being) is signalled excJusively by the adjective: it is not the case that somethinghas become an issue now but rather that the issue (which is old information) has

22. Thc rcasonwhy this construction is used is probably that "Englishprefersqualification realizedbya combination of a noun with an adjective 10 qualification expressed by an adjective alone"(Mathesius 1975: 114). Thus, "in English wc can (...) say His career was ShOH,bUI a moreidiomatic marmerof expressionwould be His career was a ShOHone" (ib.). Similarly,Mrs. SmiJhwas a clever woman is "more idiomatic English" (ib.) thanMrs. Smith was clever.

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become important now. However, the faet that become j~used ~nste~dof be mak~ itimpossible to maintain that the c1efted NP as a whole IS specl~cat~onal (cf. s~ct!On3.7). Here we are eonfronted with an example of~ow t~e predicational meamng ofthe sentenee has overruled the essentially specificational nature of t?e 1l~c1efteonstruetion: what should be considered as the value part of a specificationalstructure is at the same time marked as a predicational NP by the use of become.

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6. There are other cases of it-c1eftsthat can hardly be recognized as specificationalany more. Up to now we have only considered cases in which the predicationalelement is tbe modifier in the clefted NP and we have observed tbat tbe noun headitself cannot normally be predicational." Thus, as we have pointed out, tbesentence

(2)(a) II was worthless jewelry that Ihe jewel thief did not steal.

ean on!y be interpreted specificationally, althougb the corresponding WH-cleft canbe predicational as weil.

There are, however, exceptional cases of predicational it-clefts in which the headnoun of the foca! NP is itself predicational. The following sentence is anexample:

(118) II is such an idiol who says mat Ihat you should nol pay anyattenlion to him.

As pointed out in section 3.3, the fact that tbe focal NP involves a degree modifiermarks it unambiguously as a predicational NP.What is important, however, is thattbe predicational element here is no longer a modifier but the noun head itself. Thewhole clefted NP is exclusively predicational, which means that we have a type ofi/-cleft here that is no longer specificational at allo

The same conclusion should be drawn in conneetion with i/-clefts like thefollowing:

(119](a) It certainly was no idiot who planned this.(b) II was no fooi who wrote this.(c) II certainly was no beauty who asked me to marry her.

In each of these sentences the clefted NP consists of only a noun and the modi fierno. The fact that no is used marks the noun unequivocally as a predicationalelement (cf sectien 3.2). Moreover, tbe figurative sense in which beauty bas to beinterpreted in (119,c) renders a specificational reading impossible.

Tbe following is still another type of i/-cleft that appears to be purelypredicational, albeit for a different reason, As noted in cbapter 1 (section 2.6), thevariabie part of a specificational e1eft is presupposed and cannot, therefore, benegated. That is, it is not possible to use an NP with zero reference (e.g. nobody,

23. Rcmember that wc are nOLdealing with i/-defts Iikeft is a goodteacherthat f wantto be,which isa purely specificaticnat i/-c1eftin which a predicational value is assigned 10 a predicationalvariabie. In such i/-defts the focus NP as a whole can of course be predicational.

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nothing. etc.) as the NP representing the value tbat is assigned to the variabie. Forexample, tbe U-defts

(120](a) "lt was nobody who came in.(b) "Ihe one who came in was nobody:

are unacceptable because of the semantic clash between what is presupposed (viz.that someone came in) and wbat is asserted (viz. that nobody came 10). Thefollowing it-defts are unacceptable for the same reason:

(121 )(a) *11 was nol anything that he told me.(b) "lt was nothing that he told me.

On the otber band, we have seen that sentences like (122) are also unacceptable asit-clefts, because they assert the same tbing as is already presupposed:

(122) "It was something that he told me.

Consider now:

(123)(a) It was nobody ot importance that came in.(b) It was nothing new Ihat he told me.(c) lt was somelhing new that he told me.

In it-defts like these it is exclusively the predicational element (of importance, new)that renders the sentence acceptable. The meaning of the cleft as a whole is alsopurely predicational:

(124)(a) The person who came in was not anybody of importance.(b) What he told me was not (anything) new.(c) What he told me was (something) new.

The definition of specificational sentences is no longer applicable to (123,a-c).These it-clefts do not specify a value for a variabie, but predicate something of thatvariable, while the variabie itself is left unspecified. In other words, the clefted NPsin (123,a-c) do not contain any specificational information whatever. They arepurely predicational.

The same is true of sentences like the following:

(125)(a) lt's really SOMETHING that he has discovered!(b) It was really SOMEONE who made that speech!

Here something and someone mean something like 'something/someone ofimportance' and contain exclusively predicational information. The fact that tbeydo not specify a value for a variabie is clear from the fact that the sentences become

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unacceptable as it-clefts if the predicational idea 'of real importance' is no longerexpressed:

(126)(a) "lt is something that he has discovered.(b) *It is someone who made that speech.

We may conclude, then, that apart from purely specificational it-clefts andi/-clefts that are specificational and predicational at the same time, it is possible tofind it-clefts that are exclusively predicational. A condition for the use of theseit-c1efts,and also for the use of it-defts of the mixed type, appears to be that theit-eleft (or the context in which it is used) makes clear that a predicationalinterpretation is the only possible one. The reason is that the unmarkedinterpretation of an it-cleft is naturally the specificational reading. Predicationali/-elefts of the mixed type (e.g. It was an interesting meeting that1went ta) requirethat the clefted NP contain an adjective and that this is the only new informationgiven in the sentence. Purely predicational i/-clefts like (48,b), (118)-(119),(123,a-c) and (125,a-b) are possible only because a specificational interpretation isexplicitly excluded by the lexica! material of the head clause, viz. by the use ofbecome instead of be, or by the presence of such (a) or na in the c1eftedNp, or by theuse of a figurative noun head like beauty in (119,c), or by the use of an indefinitenoun head like na/hing or something which cannot otherwise be the focus of aniJ-eleft.24

24. We may add to this the remark that in some cases there seerns to be no sernantic differencebetween the predicational reading and the specificationalone. For example, an it-cleft like

(i) It is the truth that Mary is telling you.can bc given both a spccificational paraphrase and a predicational one:(ii)(al What Mary is telling you is (the following): the truth.

(b) What Mary is telling you is true.b.utit is questionable whcther there is any real scmantic differencebetween these two readings,smcc even on the spccificational interpretation no precise value is specified for the variabie: onncither of the readings do we know cxactly what Mary is telling the hearer. For this reason itseems impossible to teil whether the meaning of (i) is prcdicational or specificational,or both,

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I1

I CHAPTER 4. SOME RESTRICTIONSON IT-CLEFfS THAT HIGHLIGHT

PREDICATE NOMINALS.

1. INTRODUCTION

It is well-known that an it-cl~ft whose clefted constituent functions as subjectcomplement (predicate nominal) in the WH-dause is often unacceptable, or at leastquestionable:

(1Ha) 'It's a genius that he is. (Leech & Svartvik 1975: 181](b) *It's a conductor that John is. (StockweIl et al. 1977: 107](c) *ll's the footbal! coach that John is. (Emonds 1976: 140)(d) *ll's easy to please that John is. (Gunde I 1977b: 554)(e) *It is quite happy that Bil! is. (Mieszek 1979: 121)(f) *It is tal! that John is. (Akmajian 1979: 166](g) ?It is clever that John is. (Delahunty 1981: 162)(h) *It was nice that she seemed. (Bolinger 1972b: 28)1

In this chapter I will investigate different types of Ët-c1eftshighlighting predicatenorninals. I will point out five different restrictions that may lead to partial orcomplete unacceptability and dcvelop a theory that can account for them. In thistheory the notions 'predicational' and 'specificational' will again play an importantrole because the it-c1eftconstruction is essentially a specificational type of sentence.(The exceptional cases of predicational and semi-predicational it-clefts discussed inchapter 3 will not prove relevant to the restrictions that are now going to bediscussed. )

~

I,IIiIt

I. Dyhr (1978: 115) and Gross (1977: 42) make the same observation in conneetion with Germanand French, respectively.

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2. RESTRICTIONS

2.1. Any specificational sentence specifies a value for a variable. Using Halliday's(1967) terminology, we can say that the value is the 'identifier' and the variabIe the'identified'. In the information structurc the idcntified represents known informa­tion and the identifier represents information that is new. It follows that in an it-deftsentence, where the focus presents new information and the WH-dause informa­~iont.hat is known (presupposed) (or represented as such - see chapter 5),2 only theidentifier can Iill the focus position. This is a restrietion that was already pointed outby Halliday (1967: 238-239). For example:

(2)(a) Who's the murderer? - JOHN is the murderer.It's JOHN who is the murderer."lt's the MURDERER who is John.

(b) Who's John? - The MURDERER is John.lt's the MURDERER who is John."lt is JOHN who is the murderer.

2.2. There are some rather intricate restrictions on it-defts whose defted consti­tuent conveys only predicational inforrnation.ê It should be noted that theserestrictions need not follow from the specificational nature of i/-defts per se, as it isdear from specificational WH-defts like (3,a-b) that there is nothing to prevent thevalue of a specificational sentence from being prcdicational, as long as the variabIcis predicational as wellr'

2. Of course, thc focus of an {t-eleft necd not be 'new' in the sense of 'not mentioned' bcfore but it isalways new in the sense that thc factthat the focal item is thc value to be assigned to the variable isprescnted as new information (cf. chapter l, section 2.6).

3. Some people, e.g. Lees (1963: 280) and Emonds (1976: 140), simply assert that "predicativenorninatives and predicative adjectives do not appear in focus position in thc eleft construction"(Emonds 1976: 140). However, we wi11 see that the situation is much more complicated thanth is.

4. It is quite impossible for a predicational element to become the value of a spccificational sentence ifthe variabIe is not prcdicational as weil. Compare:

(i)(a) What hit John was heavy.(b) ït was heavy that hit John.

Sentencc (i,b) is ungrammatical bccause thc variablc ('the X that hit John') contains nopredicational constituent. If we add such a constituent the result is much better (though it still needsa suitable context to be judged quite acceptable - cf below) :

(ii) It was heavy that what hit John was.(Here the variabIe is 'the X that what hit John was', in which X is predicational.)

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(3)(a) What John is is proud.(b) What John has always been is arespectabie citizen.

Still, tbe i/-defts corresponding to (3,a-b) are hardly acceptable.v

(4)(a) ??It is proud that John is.(b) ??It is a respectable citizen that John has always been.

As far as I can see, the following are the principles determining the possibility ofusing ir-defts that specify a predicational value for a variabIe:

A. As pointed out in chapter 1 (section 2.1), the variabie of a specificationalsentence is always 'superscriptional', i.e. it functions like the heading of a list. Nowthe heading of a list is necessarily a nominal, For example, as the heading of a listenumerating entities that are green we can imagine phrases Iike 'objects that aregreen' or 'what is green', but not simply 'green'. A superscriptional element mustalways take the form of an Np' even if the vaIue specified for it is an adjectival. InWH-defts this requirement presents no problem, as the variable is alwaysforrnulated in the form of a "nominal relative dause" (Quirk el al 1972 : 732), asshown by (3,a-b). In it-clcfts, however, the situation is different. Here theWH-dause is not a nominal dause, and therefore does not express the variabie NPcompletely. Rather, the variabie can be formulated in the form of a noun headfollowed by a rclative cIause (i.e. 'the/an X whc/which/that...'), in which X is anoun like person, thing, time,place, etc. In the it-cIeft itself only part of this variabie(viz. the Wll-clause) is explicitly expressed, but the variable as a whole ispresupposed. Thus, the speaker using the it-e1eft ft is John who killed Billpresupposes that someone killed Bill, and it is the variable 'the person who killedBilt' that is actually given a value. So, the requirement that the superscriptionalelement should be a nominal is fulfilled in it-clefts, not through the presence of anominal in the sentence itself, but through the presupposition of a nominal asvariable.?

5. ft-defts likc these are hardly acceptable when used in isolation, but we wiU sec below that they maybe quite acceptable wh en uscd in a suitable context.

6. The restrictions in question do not appear to hold for Irish English. Jespersen (1958: 149) notesthat "the Irish make an excessive use of cleft sentences" and gives scvcral exarnples (by Irishauthors) of sentences similar to (4,a-b), e.g. ft is angry that he ww; It'sproud andpleased I am la secyou home again, It's an angel you are la forgive me.

7. This accords with the fol1owing remark by Bolingcr (1972a: 112):What is special about deft sentences is not their deep structure - which is simply that ofadjective clause embeddings - but the nominalizations th at they represent. The adverbialnouns are particularizations for placc, time, manner, etc. The adverbial pronouns, whichinclude this and that as weIl as it, are generalized nominalizations of anything that can berestrictively focused on; they cover the sarne ground as the adverbial nouns and rnuchmore.

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Thcre is a second requirement that a superscriptional element must satisfy. Notonly does it need to be a nominal, it needs to be a nominal with a specific referent.As pointed out in chapter 1 (section 2.6.F), the superscriptional NP of aspecificational sentence is usually definite, Although exceptions of the type (S,a) canbe found (see the relevant section in chapter 1for some discussion), it-clefts with anindefinite superscriptional NP are usually unacceptable, as appears from (S,b):

(5)(a) An example of Ihis is world war 11.(b) 'A man I met yesterday was Jack Jones.s

It follows from this that the value assigned to the variabIe will always be feIt to be'exclusive' (cf. section 2.8 of chapter 1): if the variabIe has aspecific entity or set asreferent, only one entity or set can be assigned to it as value. All other potentialcandidates are then automatically exc1uded. (Hence the exhaustiveness implicaturewhich we have discussed in chapter 1, section 2.9.)9

The above two requirements, viz. that in a specificational sentence the variabIemust be a nomina! and have aspecific referent,'? entail that it-clefts with apredicational element as clefted constituent will be acceptable on certain conditionsonly. Since predicational elements are basically adjectival (cf chapter 1, section3.5), they do not by thernselves suggest any nomina! idea with a specific referent. Infact, predicational elements are not feit to be exclusive at aIl: in Mary ispretty theuse of pretty does not exclude that other characteristics could be predicated of Mary

8. It was pointcd out to me that (S,b) becomes much better if was is replaced with turned out /0be:

(i) ?A man Imet yesterday turned out to be Jack Jones.I have no explanation for this. (lt is also remarkable that (ii) is again unacceptable, exeept if amurderer is read as 'one of the murderers':

(ii) 'Amurderer turned out to be Jack Jones.)9. The claim that the variabIeNP of an it-cleftmust have specificreferenceis inherent in some of the

analyses that have been proposed for it-clefts,e.g. in the analysis (argued by, amongst ethers,Bolinger(l972b» that treats the WH-clauseof an it-cleftas an adjectiveclausemodifying it, andwhieh thercfore considers it a true pronoun with specificreference.

[0. Our claim that specificationalsentencesare subject 10 these two requirementsaccords with whatClark & Haviland (1977: 4) write about what they call the 'antecedent', i.e, the piece of giveninformation: "Formally, tt consistsof a node in the listener'smcmory structure characterizedas anominalthat has associatedwith it one or more propositions in whieh tbc norninal serves as anargument." For exarnple, in It wasPercival whopiqued the professor, "the antecedent is the nodein the listener's mcmory corresponding to 'the one who piqued the professor"'.

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II

as well.!' For a predicational element to have an exclusive meaning it is ne~arythat this exclusive sense is brought about by the cont~x~. For example, in ~d'scussion about what is Mary's most typical charactenstlc I ca~ say Mary IS

;RETTY, implying that this and no other cha~acteristi~ is ~ost typical of Mary Itfollows that for an adequate use of an U-deft with a pre~lcatlOnal clefte? ~nstltuentit wil! be necessary that the nominal idea with the specific referent wh~ch IS.nee~edas variabIe be brought up by the context. Thus, in the context of the dIscUSSIonjustreferred to, an it-deft will be possible:

(6) It's pretty Ihat Mary is, more than anything else.

Similarly, although (7,a) is unacceptable (if used out .of context), (7,b) is finebecause the nominal idea ('the thing that he is not') IS created by the contextpreceding the it-cleft:

(7Ha) *11is intelligent/a good cilizen thal.he is no~.(b) If there is one thing that he is net, It IS Intelligeni/a good

citizen.

Another example is provided by (8,b), which is much better than ~8,a! beca~se theaddition of want to implies that the speaker is thinking of something 111 partlcular:

(8Ha) ??It is a teacher that 1am.(b] It is a teacher that 1want 10 beo

In (8,b) the variabie can easily be con~ived as 'th~t wh,ich I w~nt to be: bu~ it i.~more difficult to conceive (or contcxtualizc) thc vanablc that ,:"llIc~I al~ winch IS

required for (8,a).12This is clear from sentences like the following, 111 which the useof these two variables as specific nominals is tested:

I:r

\:'I

11. This coneurs with Bolinger's (1972b: 28) claim that t~e elements that ca~ be ~ocalizcdin a2i/-cleftare those of which it is true that "their preseneem the sentenee partlculanzes the event .Bolingeralso points out that such elementscan be identifiedthrough the fact that they produce a'sc arate event' when used in a conjoined structure. Thus, (i.a) can be it-clefted becausc twodifferentevents are relerred to, whereas(i.b) cannot be il-clefted becausethe two adverbs refer 10the same act of speaking:(i)(a) He workedyesterday.Todaytoo.(b) He spoke happily.Feelinglytoa.

(ii)(a) Itwas yesterday thaI he worked.(b) "Itwas happilythat he spoke.

12. This obscrvation accords with the followingstatement by Akmajian (1.979: 159): "1 leave as ~~open questionwhether adjectivescan appear in focusposuien. Whde (I) seemsunacceptable, (u)seems to be beller:

(i) It's tallthat John is. ..(ii) tt's idiotiethat John always manages to beo ./ ..

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(9)(a) Is there something that you want to be? - Yes. I want to be ateacher.

(b) Is there something that you want to be? - Yes. It is a teacherthat I want to beo

(10)(a) 'Is there something that you are? - Yes. I am a teacher.(b) 'Is there something that you are? - Yes. "lt is a teacher that I

am.(11)(a) I'd like to talk to you about something that I want to beo

(b) 'l'd like to talk to you about something that lam.(12)(a) There is something that I want to beoIt/that something is: a

teacher.(b) *There is something that lam. It/that something is: a teacher.

So, one of the conditions for the use of Ît-c1efts with predicational c1eftedconstituents appears to be that a variabie should be available in the form of anominallike 'the thing that...'. Whether such a superscriptional NP is possible canbe tested, not only by means of existential sentences such as (9)-(10) and (12,a-b),but also by examining the possibilities of pronominalization: if a predicationalsentence suggests aspecific nominal like 'something' or 'one thing' (which canbecome the variabIe 'the thing that...' of an it-cleft), the predicational element can bereferred to by the pro-form that; otherwise, we wil! have to use so (which is theusual pronoun substituting for adjectivals) or, if the predicational element is an Np,one.Thus, (13, A) does not by itself suggest 'There is something that she is', and thepronoun in (l3,B) is therefore so rather than that:

(13)A. She is beautiful.B. Yes. She has always been so/*?that.

Similarly, (l4,A) does not automatically suggest 'There is something that she is', andthat is again unacceptable as a pro-form:

(14)A. She is a teacher.8. Yes. She has been one/*?that for 25 years.

On the other hand, (15,A) (through the use of want 10) does suggest 'There issomething that she wants to become', and consequently that can be used in(15,B):

12 ../ ..

In my opinion, (i) is lcssacceptable than (li) because the presupposition that John is somethingrequires a very spccifictype of context, whereas the presupposition in (ii) (namely,that there issernethingthat John alwuysmanagcs to be) does not. And this is itsclfthe resultofthe fact that in'John always manages to be X' the predicationalelement X has an exclusive(specific)meaning,whereas it lacks such a rneaning in 'John is X'. The same explanation also accounts for[iii)(a) ??It was never truly ambitious that he was.

[bi It was never Iruly ambitious that I expected him 10beo[Bolinger 1972a: 113)

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(15)A. She wants to become a teacher.B. Yes. She has always wanted to be that.

Another possible test consists in building specificational sentences like thefollowing:

(16)(a) "Tbe (only) thing that she is is an American.(b) *?The (only) thing that she is is a teacher.(c) The (only) thing that she wants to be is a teacher.

Sentences like these make clear that this restrietion on it-clefts specifying apredicational value is in fact part of a more general restrietion on specificationalsentences involving a predicational value: such specificational sentences will onlybe acceptable if the nominal idea that is to become the superscriptional NP issuggestcd by the context, because the predicational element will not normally do soby itself. As a further illustration of this, consider the following sentences :

(17)(a) 77ft was not happy that sbe was when she heard Ihe news.(b) I don't know what she was when she heard the news, but I

can assure you that it was not happy.

The Ït-cleft of (17,a), which is hardly acceptable in isolation, becomes fullyacceptable in (17,b) because the preceding context now provides the nominal('what she was') which is needed as the variabIe to which the predicational value isassigned. Similarly:

(18)(a) ??It is not a teacher/idiot that John is.(b) I don't know for certain what John is>but it is certainly not a

teacher/idiot

Consider also (19)-(21). Whereas the (a) sentences are unacceptable in isolation,the (b) sentences are much better because they all presuppose aspecific variabIe.Thus, (19,b) presupposes the idea 'there is something that he is', since the sentenceexplicitly identifies this 'something' as the property 'important', while asking aquestion about the degree to which the statement 'he is important' is true.

(19)(a) ??Is it an important man that he is?(b) How important a man is it that he is?

(20)(a) ??Is it pretty that she looks?(b) How pretty is it that she looks?

(21)(a) ??Is it weil thaI he plays?(b) How weil is it that he plays?

The observation that the superscriptional element (variabie) of a specificationalsentence should be a nominal can also account for other restrictions on it-clefts andon specificational sentences in genera!. For example, the specificational sentences(22,a) and (23,a) are ungrammatical for lack of an appropriate nominal as variabie

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(as appears from the corresponding (b) sentences), whereas similar sentences suchas (24,a) and (25,a) are al! right because there is a nominal idea available asvariabic:

(22)(a) *11was whereas John was a Londoner that she was aParisian.

(b) *The? that she was a Parisian was whereas John was aLondoner.

(23)(a) *It was although it was raining that he went out.(b) *The? Ihat he went out was allhough it was raining.

(24)(a) It was in spite of the rain that he went out.(b) ?The thing in spite of which he went out was Ihe rain.

(25)(a) It was because he came that Jwas angry,(b) ?Ihe thing because of which I was angry was Ihat he carne.

The reason Ihat I was angry was that he came,

The sarne principle accounts for the fact that, although predicational sentencesli~e She looked nice or They painted the fence black can be it-clefted (that is, It was~lce that she l~oked and It was black that they painted the fence may be acceptableI,nan app~opnate con.tex:), other predicational sentences appear unable to yield anu-cleft (with the predicational element as clefted constituent) at all:

(26)(a) He drove us all insane.(b) *11was insane that he drove us all.

(27)(a) He scorched himself black.(b) *11was black that he scorched himself.

(28)(aJ He dug himself deep.(b) *Uwas deep that he dug himself.

While it is possible to conceive of variables like 'how she looked' or 'the colour thatthey painted the fence', there is na possibility of deriving an appropriate variabIefrom the (a) sentences of (26)-(27):

(29) *The ? that he drove us aJl was'What scorched himself*How dug himself

insane.blackdeep

Simi~arly, predicational sentences whose predicational information is not thecxpression .of ~ role, of class membership, or of a property Iike good., silly: etc. wil!always resist lt-cleftmg b~cause they fail to suggest an appropriate variabIe. Thus,~30,b) ~nd (3I,b! are quite unacceptable because (30,a) and (31,a) do not imply,There .15 somethmg.lhat your ~ucsti~n/this problem is'. ThaI is, it appears simplyimpossible to conceive of a variable like 'What your question is' and to assign to itthe value 'one that I cannot solve',

190

(30)(a) Your question is one that I cannot solve.(b) *It is one that I cannot solve that your question is,

(31)(aJ This problem is something that I don't understand,(b) "lt is something that I don't understand that this problern is,

Closing off this section, we can conclude that it-clefts (and other specificationalstructures) that specify a predicational value for a predicational variabie require thatthe variabIe should be given or presupposed in the form of a nomina! with aspecificreferent. Since a predicational focus does not normally suggest aspecific nominal byitself, it-clefts ofthis type will be hardly acceptable when used in isolation but are a11right in a context where the specific nomina! is presupposed.P

There are two further pieces of evidence confirming this conclusion, The first isthat iJ-defts whose predicational focus is a question word like whicb or whai arealways fully acceptable:

(32)(a) Some teil me that John is generous, some that he is stingy.Which is it that he is, then ?

(b) Nobody will lell me which it is that John is: a teacher, aphysician or an engineer,

(c) I can find no trace of his having exercised any professionbefare 1980. I wonder what it was that he used to be then.

In sentences like these, whicn and what are predicational. That such sentences areacceptable is predicted by our theory, since a question of the form What/whicb is iithat he is? (in which whdt/which are predicational) necessarily presupposes 'Thereis something that he is'. (In fact, the noncleft What/which is he? alreadypresupposes this.)"

The other additional piece of evidence for our theory is that it-defts (involving a

13. For the sake of eompleteness it should be noted that these claims do not hold for i/-defts sueh asthc following:

(i) II was as ehairman of the board that John had 10deal wilh such problems.As we have seen, as is a 'prepositional copula', and the c1efted NP chairman of the board ispredicational. However, this type of i/-eleft differs from the one we have been discussing in thatthe clefted NP does not specify a value for a variable expressed in the WH -clause, That is, there isno variabie 'what John was' exprcssed by the WH-c1ause and specified by the clcfted constituent.(The relevant predicational copula (as) is not part of the WH-c1ause but rather of the cleftcdconstituent.) Examples like (i) are thercfore not subject to the restrietion that we have noted(which has to do with the probability of variables of the kind 'what John is').

14. It is interesting to note that the question What is X like?, whieh also asks for predicationalinformation, does not imply that there is one specifie quality to be assigned to X (i.e, does notpresuppose 'There is something that X is') but inquires into X's qualities in a very general way.That is, the adjectival what...like lacks tbe exclusive sense that the nominals what and whichappear to have. It is therefore in keeping with our theory that the it-elert What is it thatX is like? isacceptable only in a suitable context, i.e. in a context implying the presupposition 'There issomething that X is like'.

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predicational c1efted constituent) that are hardly acceptable in isolatio bh b ·C h .. n ecome~uc ett~r ~ t e predicational focal item is given extra contrastive emphasis (ein contradicting statements) : .g.

(33)(a) *?]t is a teacher that he is.(b) 1I is a TEACHER that he is, not a BUTCHER!

The reason is t~at this ~xtra contrastive emphasis assigns astrong exclusive meaningto the element m question. For example, the predicational element pretty in Mary ispretty ~oes not have ~~ exelusive sense, and therefore does not imply 'There issernething th~t Mary IS, unIess pretty receives contrastive emphasis. In the lattercase t~e m~nmg ofthe.sente~ce ~ something like 'It is X (viz. pretty) that Mary is,not Y , .WhiChautomat~cal~y Imphes 'Th~re is something that Mary is'. Similarly,(33,b) ~ of the f~rm It IS X that he IS, not V', which presupposes 'There issomethmg that he IS'.

The same effect can also be achieved by the presence of an emphatic(contradicting) negation in the focus:

(34) It is NOT courageous that he is.

Senten~e (~4) presupposes 'There is something that he is' and states that thissome~hlllg ISnot 'courageous' but something else. If this 'something else' is explicitlymentioned, not need not even be stressed:

(35)(a) lt.is not really foolish that he looks. Rather, it is helpless.(b) It snot haughty that she is, lt's jus! proud.

The observation that a predicational sentence implies the idea 'Th .hi h . , ere IS~omet mg t at X IS more easily if the predicational element is feIt to be contrastiveIS also confirmed by the fact that it is virtually impossible for a sentence such as(36,a) to be it-elefted:

(36)(a) Malhematics is a Subject.(b) *It is a subject that mathematics is.

Sin<: there see~s to be no predicational element that elearly contrasts with a==,(~6,a) will not b~ felt to presuppose 'There is something that mathematicsIS: n?T ISIt easy to co.nce~veof a context suggesting this idea. This means that even~Ithlll the set of predicational ele.ments, some wil! more easily be highlighted in anU-eleft than others '.Those .that will most readily appear in focal position are thosethat can most easily be mterpreted as having an exelusive (contrastive) sense,

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namely those that indicate elass membership (e.g. He is a teachery? and those thathave apolar opposite (e.g. He is happy/unhappy).

B. As has been pointed out by many linguists," the elefted constituent of an it-cIeftis generally also the 'theme' of the sentence (i.e. what the sentence is about).'? Itfollows that predicational elements are not very suitable to become the cleftedconstituent of an it-eleft, for two reasons. First, predicational elements, even if theyare NPs, do not have referents (cf. chapter 1, section 3.2), whereas it is natural for atheme to have a referent," since the function of the theme is to indicate what thesentence is about (see e.g. Gundel 1977a: 97-98, Guéron 1984: 153, Davison

15. The strengest excJusive scnse appcars to bc attached to predicational elements that specify a roleor function. If there is no indication to the contrary, a sentence like John is a teacherwiU normallybe felt 10 have an exclusive meaning, i.e. we will not assume that John exercises other professionsas weil. It is for this reason that the sentence What is John.?will normally be interpreted asinquiring into John's profession (role, function) rather than into other properties that he mayhave. (In the latter case What is John like? will he the normal qucstion.) This follows from thefact that whai implies somcthing specific (exclusive)while whaL..like does not.It is also in keepingwith the fact that the VP be something can actually be used in the sense of 'belang to a profession',as in (i.B):

(i)A. I don't believe he has any diploma.B. I think he does. l'rn sure l've heard that he is something. lsn't it a civil engineer

that he is?

16. See e.g. Allerton 1978: 164, Chomsky 1965: 221, Dekeyser et al 1979: 11, Giv6n 1979: 217,Grimes 1975: 341, Gross 1977: 40, Halliday 1967: 236-238, 1970a: 357,1982: 62ft; Hutchins1975: 115, Kuno 1976, Leech & Svartvik 1975: 180, Poutsma 1928: 140, Quirk et 01.1972:951.

17. This view is not shared by these linguists who sirnply equate 'theme' with 'old! given'inforrnation, bccausc in an U-elert it is normally the WH-clause that presents known informat ion(see, however, chapter 5). However, lagree with Halliday (1970b, 1982) that a distinction shouldbe made between the thematic structure of a sentence and its 'information structure' and that,even if the focal item presents new information, it can be thematic. This distinction runs parallelto the distinction (made for example by Barry (1975: 1), Bates (1976: 171), Keenan & Schieffelin(1976: 381), Van Dijk (1977), Levy (1982), Davison (1984» between the 'discourse topic' or'context-dependent topic' and the 'topic of the sentence'. Consider, for example, the followingillustration from Keenart & Schieffclm (1976: 381):

lilA. What's the matter?B. My father, he's bugging me again.

K & S comment: "Here the left-dislocated NP is part of the new information provided about thediscourse topic proposition 'something is the matter'. The NP 'my father' is the 'center ofattention' ( ...) of the sentence in which it is couched. It is not the 'center of attention' of thediscourse in which the sentence is couched." (their emphasis)

18. This is true at least for a 'cognitivc' (Halliday 1967) or 'topica!' (Halliday 1982: 86) therne, i.e. fora theme (or for that part of a theme) that functions as subject, complement or circumstantialadjunct.

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1984: 803-804).19 Using an it-cleftwith a predicational focus is therefore a markedchoke. Secondly, because the clefted item of an it-eleft is normally thematic andtherefore referring, a c1efted item wil! not be given a predicational interpretationuniess a referring interpretation is ruled out. Thus, on hearing the beginning of anit-eleft like ft is a teacher that... the hearer will automatically interpret a teacher asreferring (i.e. as a specific or nonspecific NP),20 not as predicational (i.e. not as aproperty NP). If the full it-cleft then turns out to be such that only a predicationalinterpretation is possible (e.g. 11ft is a teacher that he is), the hearer has to correcthis initial interpretation. Because of this, a 'co-operative' speaker" will not normallyuse such an U-cleft with a predicational focus, uniess it is clear from the precedingcontext or from the focal element itself (cf. below) that the predicationalinterpretation is intended. Thus, in a discussion about whether John is a teacher aplumber or a veterinary surgeon, we can easily say ft is a teacher that he is becauseit is then clear from the context that it is a predicational value that should beassigned to the variable.F

There are various pieces of evidence that corroborate the above principles:

a. The claim that the clefted constituent of an it-deft is normally thematic accordswith the principle (argued by e.g. Halliday (1967, 1982) and Kuno (1975» thatthe (cognitive) theme of a statement is the first NP of the sentence or the initial'scene-setting' adverbia!. The claim that predicational elements will not bethematic is in keeping with Halliday's (1970a: 357) statement that "the functionof theme can be regarded (...) as the deictic element in the structure of the clause,in that it defines the speaker's angle on the content": since predicational elementsrepresent adjectival idcas, and therefore have no referents, they certainly have nodeictic force.

19. Davison (1984) exarnincs a number of marked constructions in which an NP is interpreted astopic because it is placed in a salient position. She concludes th at there is "a scale of NP types -ranging from those which make 'good topics', in the way that they point to a referent, to thosewhose rcfcrential properties make thern very poor topics". The NPs that are highest on the scaleare those that we have called 'strongly referring' (i.e. proper names, definite descriptions that areused referentially, specific indcfinites). Lower 00 the scale are 'weakly referring' NPs such asnonspecific indefinites, attributive definite descriptions and generic NPs. NPs that are hardlyrcferential at all (e.g. idiom chunks, any-generic NPs and 'end of scale' superlatives like theslightest noise, the smal/est vibrationï are lowest on the scale (i.e. make very poor topics).

20. To he quite correct, the intcrpretation that will automatically suggest itse1f will he eitherreferentlal or gcneric. The point, ho wever, is that it wil! not he predicational.

21. Sec Grice (1975) for a definition of the concept 'co-operative speaker'.

22. It follows that it-clcfts Iike these requirc that thc presupposcd part (variable) should represcntinformation that is not only 'known' but also 'given' (i.e. actually in the hearer's consciousness althc moment of speaking). This runs counter to Prince's (1978) claim that the information in thepresupposed pari of an ïr-cleftalways has to he known (or represented as such) but need not begiven. (See chaptcr 5 Ior a more general discussion of this claim.)

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I Tbe validity of the above two elaims appears to be confirrned by the fact that,unlike specificational sentences, predicational sentences are not reversibie (cf.chapter 1, section 3.4):

(37)(a) *A philosopher is John.(b) *Silly is John.

In (37,a-b) the predicational element (which is not fit to be processed as theme)is put in initial position and should therefore be interpreted as theme.

It follows that there is a striking parallelism between it-c1efts and simplexsentences. Because in both types of sentences the first NP position is thematic, thenominal elements that cannot be highlighted in it-clefts (uniess they areexceptionally stressed) will be the same as cannot occur in thematic position inthe corresponding noncleft. Compare:

(3BHa)(b)

(39Ha)

(b)(40)(a)

(b)(41Ha)

(b)

It was JOHN who dld it.JOHN did it.lt was JOHN'S hat that we found in the room.lt was JOHN whose hat we found in the room.JOH N'S hat we found in the room."It is a GOOD MAN that he is.•A GOOD MAN he is."It is a TEACHER that lam.•A TEACHER I am.23

b. It accords with the above observations that predicational information that doesinvolve a deictic (referring) element (which is rather exceptional) can moreeasily be thematic and hence become the elefted constituent of an it-cleft:

(42)(a) tt's like this that he has always been.(b) lt's like your father that you should try to beo(e) I've always been an HONEST politieian and it is that that I

want to remain.

I'II

tI\,

I,.j,i!

c. The full grammaticality of sentences like (42,c) also confirms the principle thatan it-cleft with a predicational NP as focus requires that a nonpredicationalinterpretation of the NP should be exc1uded by the context. In (42,c) there are atleast two indications that tha:must be predicational. First, that refers back to thepredicational NP an honest politician. Second, although that can refer to a

23. (41 ,a-b) are unacceptable in isolation but not if the preced.ing context has brought up the idea'There is sernething that I am'. In that case a teacher can more easily be thematic because itpursues the thematic line ofthe preceding context. It should also be noted that (40,b) and (41,b)are more acceptable if they are intended to be the result of a 'preposing' operation (cf section3.4.A of chapter 1).

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person when used in subject position, it cannot do so when used as the focus ofan U-e1eft. (Compare That's my friend with "It's that who's my friend.) Anonpredicational interpretation is therefore exc1uded.Another example illustrating this point is:

(43) A. Why won't you pay attention 10 what I say? You slmplydon't want to become a good businessman.

8. No.tt's only the kind of busisnessman that you want me tobe that Irefuse to become. Iwant to be an HONESTbusinessman.

The it-c1eft in (43,B) is unproblematic because the focus is unambiguouslypredicational. This is because the relative clause here helps to specify theproperty referred to in the entire predicational NP and because the antecedent ofthe relative clause must be predicational if the relative pronoun is predicational.(That the antecedent and the relative pronoun must belong to the same semanticclass is a general requirement of relative clauses, as has been observed by(amongst others) Emonds (1976: 141) and Higgins (1976: 159).) In the ft-eleftof (43,B) a nonpredicational interpretation of the focus is thus exeluded, not onlyby the context, but also by an indication in the NP itself. The latter possibilitymayalso observed in (44,b), which should be contrasted with (44,a). Tbe lattersentence shows that predicational NPs mayor may not involve the definitearticle. However, in the corresponding Ît-cJeft the use of the definite artiele isquestionable.ë which is in keeping with our observation that a predicationalinterpretation of the focal item will be diffucult as long as a refercntial reading ispossible as wen.

(44)(a) He wants to be (Ihe) president of Ihe club.(b) It is (?the) president of Ihe club thai he wants 10 beo

Another example of this tendency for the predicational NP to be formallyrecognizable as exclusively predicational when used in thematic position is to befound in sentences like the following:

24. In Dutch the situation is even clearer, as the definite artiele is quitc unacceptable in cases like(44,b):(44)(a') Hij wil (de) voorzitter van de club zijn.

(b'] Het is ('de) voorzitter van de club dat hij wil zijn.

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(45)(a) You are an idiot.'You are idiot.

(b) Look what you've done! Idiot that you are!'An idiot that you are!

(46)(a) Michael is a faal.*Michael is fooI.

(b) MIchaei, faal as/that he was, completely ruined the dinner.[Ouirk et al. 1972: 750)

Notice that an idiot/afool will again be substituted for idiot/fool if the thematicNP to which it belongs is otherwise marked as predicational, e.g. through thepresence of what, as in What an idiotyou are!.

d. The claim that a predicational clefted NP is acceptable if it cannot bemisinterpreted as referring is in keeping with the fact that WH-defts withpredicational foei present no problem: unlike its it-cleft counterpart, a sentencelike What John is is a teacher is quite acceptable. The reason is that the focalitem (the value) will not be interpreted otherwise than predicationall~ be~usethe variabie is expressed first, and this variabie is unambiguously predicational,(Not only is the question word predicational in function in the nominal relativeclause, it is also formally marked as such through the choice of what rather thanwho.)i

I

rI

III,.I,III:tIf

Concluding this section, we can say (a) that it-clefts with a predicational cleftedconstituent wil! always bc a markcd choice becausc prcdicational clements arereluctant to be used in thematic position, and (b) that such Ït-clefts will be evenmore problematic if the clefted NP is such that it can be mistaken for a referring(and therefore nonpredicational) NP.

C. In addition to the restrictions noted above we should also point out that, forsome reason, a predicational element can more easily be focalized in an i/-cleft if ~hecopula in the WH-dause is a verb other than beo Tbus, although the followmgsentences may al! be more or less acceptable in an appropriate context, the (b)sentences seem a little less good than their (a) counterparts:

(47)(a) How happy it is that she looks!(b) How happy It is that she is!

(48)(a) How good a player is It th at you flnd him?(b) How good a player Is it that he is?

(49)(a) It was white that the wall had been painted.(b) It was white that the wall was.

I would hazard the following explanation for this slight difference in acceptabi­lity. As we have seen, every one of these (b) sentences implies the idea 'There issomething that X is/was'. If the 'sornething' in question is to be predicational (i.e. a

197

property), this very idea is somewhat unnatural, because properties are notmutually exclusive: if X bas property A, tbere is no reason why it sbould not baveother properties as weil. For tbis reason, i/-c1efts implying this idea will need asuitable context, i.e. a context that makes clear that only one property is presently inquestion.

When other linking verbs are used, the idea 'There is something that...' is not sounnatural. Unlike he, linking verbs like look.find; grow, etc. express a predicationalrelation that is more readily linked up with specific circumstances or with aspecifictime. The property that is assigned to the referent of thesubject NP is therefore moreeasily feit to be exclusive: it is the particular property that the referent has or had inspecific circumstances. It follows that the variables that are presupposed in the (a)sentences of (47)-(49) (namely 'how she looks, 'how you find him' and 'the colourthat the wall had been painted') are more naturally conceivable than the variablesthat are presupposed in the (b) sentences ('what she is', 'what he is' and 'the colourthat the wall was'). In other words, the (a) sentences are slightly more acceptablethan the (b) sentences because they more easily suggest a specific setting and hence aspecific variable.

The above explanation is corroborated by the fact that the (b) sentences becomemore acceptable if he is accompanied by an adverbial that creates a specific settingor otherwise particularizes the event:"

(50)(a) How happy it was that she was in those days!(b) How happy it is that she looks in that lovely hat and pink

dress!(c) How good a player is it that he is now?(dj It was while that the wall had been in the good olc days.

D. In conclusion, it-clefts with predicational c1efted constituents will be subject toat least the following restrictions :a. The variabie must be formulated, or be capable of being formulated, as a

nominal tbat has a specific referent.b. If the c1eftedconstituent is an Np' it must be dear from the NP itself or from the

context that this NP should be interpreted as predicational and not asreferential.

25. Bolinger (1972b: 28) claims th at elemcnts can be Iocalized in an it-den only if"their presence inthe sentence particularizes the event". Iwould agree that sentences referring to a partienlar eventcan more easily be it-clefted (because the specific variabIe is more easily conceived of) but I donot think that it is thc focal element itself that must particularize the event, For cxample, (i,b) isrnuch more acceptable than (i,a) because of the particularizing information, but a teacher is notparticularizing itself:lilla) 111twas a teacher that I was.(b) It was a teacher thai I wanted to become in those days.

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c. Since the focus of an it-eleft is normally thematic, and since a predicationalelement is not normally capable of being thema tic, Ï{-c1eftswith a predicationalelefted constituent will always be marked anyhow.

d. It-defts with a predicational defted constituent wi1lbe somewhat lcss acceptableif their Wh-clause involves an unmodified form of he than when it involves amodified form or another linking verb.

2.3. There is a third restrietion on it-clefts hightlighting predicate nominais, whichis apparently linked up with the specificational nature of it-clefts, since it is to beobserved in specificational sentences in genera!. In informal terms, the restrietion isthat the copula of a specificational sentence must always occur between the subjectNP and the predicate nominal, except in cases of inversion. For example, though(5l,a) is reversible to (5l,b), no related construction in which he does not appearbetween the two NPs wil! be grammatical :

(51)(a) The murderer is your brother.(b) Your brother is the murderer.(c) "rour brother the murderer is.(d) *The murderer your brather is.

The restrietion can also be observed in specificational relative dauses: altbough(52,a) is reversible to (52,b), and altbough bath NPs can become the head of are1ative clause, only those relative clauses win be grammatical in which he occursbetween the relative pronoun and the other Np:26

(52)(a) The murderer has turned out to be John. He was arrestedlast night.

(bJ John hes turned out to be the murderer. He was arrested lastnight.

(c) The murderer, who has turned out 10 be John, was arrestedlast night.

(d) *The murderer, who John has tumeä out to be, was arrestedlast night.

(e) John, who has turned out to be the murderer, was arrestedlast night.

(t) *John, who the mumeter nes turned out 10 be, was arrestedlast night.

26. Notice, incidentally, that this restrietion explains the ungrammaticality of Kuno's (1970: 351)cxample (i), which I do not think is accounted for by the principles that he argues himself:

(i) 'Mr Jones, who my piano teacher happens 10be, has been arrested by policefor drunken driving.

If the relativc clause is to be interpretcd specificationally, our eenstraint rcquires that happens tobe should occur bel ween the NPs who and mypiano teacher. This word order is also obligatory ifthe relative clause is 10 be predicational, because in that case who must be the subject NP and mypiano teacher the predicational NP (sincc who refers to Mr. Jones, which cannot normally bepredicational).

III,I!

I:I:I:

I:I

Ir

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As could be expected, the same restnetion will also be observed whenspecificational sentences are it-clefted :27

(53)A. Who is the bank robber?B. John is Ihe bank robber.

II is John who is Ihe bank robber.The bank robber is John.'It is John who Ihe bank robber is.

(54)A. Which one is John?B. The bank robber is John.

It is Ihe bank robber who is John.John is Ihe bank robber.*11is Ihe bank robber who John is.

How can this restrietion be accounted for? It is doubtful that there should be anyindependently motivated mie prohibiting the copula of a specificational sentence tooccur in any position other than in between two NPs. Such a rule seemsquestionable (a) because of its ad hoc character (e.g. it does not hold forpredicational copular sentences - cl footnote 27), (b) because it fails to explain whybe can preeede the two NPs in case of inversion (e.g. Is John the murderer ?), and (c)because it is a language-specific rule: though it reflects the facts of English, the rule isnot applicable e.g. to Dutch. In Dutch, the copula is found between the two NPs insimple specificational sentences, but necessarily fol!ows the two NPs in specificatio­nal subclauses (e.g. relative clauses or the WH-cIauses of it-clefts):

(55)(a) De leider is Jan.'The leader is John'

(b) Jan is de leider.'John is the leader'

(c) 'Jan de leider is.'John Ihe leader is'

(d) 'De leider Jan is.'The leader John is'

(56)(a) Jan, die de leider is, is mijn vriend.'John, who Ihe leader is, is my friend'

(b) 'Jan, die is de leider, is mijn vriend.'John, who is Ihe leader, is my friend'

(57)(a) Hel is Jan die de leider is.'11is John who the leader is'

(b) 'Hel is Jan die is de leider.'lt is John who is Ihe leader'

27. Lees (1963: 380) had al ready noted exarnples like (53)-(54), but his conclusion was that "the~redicale noun in a copula sentence is not amenable to the cleft-sentence operation", However itIS clear that this conclusi~n is false, since the restrietion observed holds only for specificationalsentenccs. When predicational sentences are clefted (which, as we have seen, is possible, althoughthcre are a number of restrictions), the prcdicate nominal can become the focal item and be neednol occur bet ween the two NPs (e.g. Wlurlis it thatyou wallt10 become? - It is a teacher that Iwant 10 become).

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AU this suggests that tbe restrietion observed is not an independent one but followsfrom another, more fundamental principle. As far as I can see, this is the principle(argued in section 2.l.B) that the initial NP of a specificational copular sentence isalways interpreted as the theme and therefore as the syntactic subject of the clause."Since specificational copular sentences are reversible, this means that whichevcr NPcomes first in sucb a sentence is interpreted as both theme and syntactic subject(irrespective of whether it is the variabie NP or the value NP)29 and tbat the otherNP will automatically be interpreted as predicate nominal and fil! the position afterbe. In other words, the reason why "The leaderJohn is is ungrammatical is that it isimpossible to interpret the leader as predicate nominal and John as subject if theleader is put in initial (i.e. subject) position. If the leader fills this position, it must beinterpreted as subject, and then John has to be interpreted as predicate nominal andfollow be, as in The leader is John.

As far as I can see, the above explanation naturally accounts for the different factsthat we have noticed, as weIl as for others:

A. It explains why specificational be is not found between the two NPs in cases ofinversion (e.g. Is John the leader.7). Since the point of the explanation is that inspecificational copular sentences the first NP will be interpreted as subject andtbe second as predicate nominal, it is natura! that the first NP should follow bein those cases in which a subject NP normally follows tbe copula, i.e. in cases ofinversion.

B. Our explanation accounts for the fact that the restrietion observed (namely theobligatory occurrence of be between the two NPs) does not hold forpredicational sentences. Since predicational NPs are nonreferring by nature,they are not suitable to be interpreted as tbeme and subject of the sentence. (Aswe bave seen, this is the reasen why predicational sentences are not reversible.)It follows that, even if the predicational NP is used in initial position (as in suchformal sentences as A thief he is, and a murderer), it is the other (i.e. thereferring) NP that is interpreted as subject. The latter NP will therefore alsopreeede the copula.

28. As pointed out by Halliday (1982: 72), Quirk el al. (1972: 945) and many others, it is thc subjectthat is the unmarked theme in a declarativc sentence.

29. This is especially clear in an example likc the following:(ilA. lpointing at a pholograph:) Which is you?

B. This one is me.I am lhis one.

The use of is ralher than are in (i,A) makes clear that whicn is the subject and you the predicatenorninal, Accordingly, in This one isme, the phrase this one is the subject and me is the predicatenomina!. But when the sentence is reversed, I becomes the syntactic subject. This is clcar bothfrom the use of I (rather than me) and from the use of am (rather than is).

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C. The explanation holds not only for simple sentences but also for relative elausesand the WH-clauses of Ïl-elefts. If clauses of this type are copular andspecificational, the first NP (i.e. the relative pronoun or the NP containing therelative dcterminer) will always be interpreted as the subject Np' while the otherNP will be interpreted as (and take the position of) the predicate nominal (e.g. Itis John who is the leader or John, who is the leader, is a friend of mine).Although the specificational sentence John is the leader alternates with Theleader is John (in which the leader is subject), there is no it-eleft *1( is John whothe leader is (in which the leaderwould still be the subject and who would haveto be interpreted as predicate nominal). Rather, who, which is the first NP in thespecificational WH-elause, can only function as subject, so that the only possiblci/-cleft is 1t is John who is the leader.»

On the other hand, if the WH-clause is predicational, only the referential NPcan become subject. This accounts for the fact that we can say You need adoctor, which 1am not, but not *You need a doctor, which is not me, and forexamples like 1t is a teacher that1want to be or 1am not the man that1used tobeo

D. Our theory predicts that the restrietion on the position of be will apply only tosuch i/-cIefts as have an NP as focus: ifthe cIefted constituent is an adjective oradverbial, the WH-word must also function as an adjectival or adverbial andcannot, therefore, be interpreted as the subject of the Wh-clause. This predictionis quite correct, as appears from the following examples:

(58)(a) 1I is happy that she is, nol unhappy!(b) "It is happy that is she/her, not unhappy!

(S9)(a) It was in the kitchen that he was.(b) *It was in the kilchen that was he.

E. Our theory is in keeping with the fact that, in Dutch, the restrietion on thcposition of the copula in specificational copular sentences holds only forindependent c1auses and not for relative clauses or the WH-c1auses of it-defts(CL (55)-(57)). The reason is that, unlike English, Dutch has a rule that requiresa different word order irrhead clauses and subclauses. If we assume, with Koster(1975), that Dutch is an SOV language, the rule can be formulated as follows(cf. Declerck 1982: 170):

30. This point is especially c1ear from examples like the following, in which the verb form and theform of the pronouns reveal which clement functions as subject:

(iIA. (pointingat a photograph:) Whichone is you?B. The tallone is me.

I am the tall one.n's the tall one who is me.'lI's the tall one who lam.

202

In clauses that do not begin with an overt complementizer,the operator (i.e. the verb form that is marked for tense,number and person) must be moved to the position followingthe subject.

This rule (which in this formulation is called 'Verb Second')" shifts the verb tothe position after the subject in (55,a-b), but does not does not have this effect in(56)-(57), because relative c1auses and the WH-clauses of it-clefts involve anovert complementizer (viz. the WH-word). The fact that Verb Second basapplied in the derivation of both De leider is Jan and Jan is de leider confirrnsthat in both cases it is the initial NP (i.e. the NP after which is is put) that is felt tobe the syntactie subject, as is cIaimed in tbe theory that we have argued.

(60)

E Our theory also accounts for the difference in acceptability between (61 .a-b) and(62,a-b):

(61Ha) What John has always been is talt tor his age.(b) What Mary wants to be is a teacher.

(62Ha) "?What his aim is is to enrich himself at your expense.(b) "?What his car's worst defect is is its steering.

Higgins (1976: 162) notes that, unlike (61,a-b), (62,a-b) are "relatively bad",whatever the context in which they are used. In my opinion this unacceptabilitycan be traeed back to the constraint that we are discussing: (62,a-b) areunacceptable because the copula does not occur between the superscriptionalNP and the value NP. If we put it in that position, the sentences become quiteacceptable:

(63Ha) What is his aim is to enrich himself at our expense.(b) What is his car's worst defect is its steering.

The fact that (61,a-b) are not unacceptable (although the copula again fails tooccur between what and the second NP) is automatically explained from tbe factthat the constraint holds only for specificational clauses. In (61 ,a-b) theWH-clauses are not specificational but predicational (witness the use of whatinstead of (the one) who.)

G. Our theory also aecords with the observation that the restrietion does not holdfor descriptionally-identifying c1auses:32I

tt

II

31. The rule exists indcpendently of the SOV hypotbesis, but must be formulated differently if thishypothesis is rejectcd. In an SVO framcwork it is known as 'Verb Final',

32. The term 'descriptionally-identifying' is introduced in chapter 1 (section 5). Sec also chapter 2.

(64)(a) Mike? I wonder who thatcan beo(b) *Mike? I wonder who can be that

As we have seen, descriptionally-identifying clauses are not reversible. Thismeans that only one constituent can act as syntactic subject, and that constituentis that, not who. Thai must therefore occur in subject position, i.e. before thecopula, whereas the subject complement who enels up at the beginning of theclause as a result of WH-movement.

In sum, the restrietion noted and explained in section 2.3 is that specificationalsentences (at least in English) require the copula to occur between the subject NPand the predicate nominal, the reason being that the interpretation of the NPs assubject or predicate nominal depenels entirely on their position with respect to thecopula." .

2.4. Another restrietion on i/-c1efts focalizing predicate nominals is that thecorresponding noncleft must not be descriptionally-identifying:

(65)(a) Who is that (man)? - He/That man is my brother.(b) 'Who is it who is that (man)? - *It is my brotherwho is that

(man).(·...who that (man)is)(66)(a) Mike?Who's Mike? - He/Mike is my neighbour.

(b) 'Mike? Who is it who is Mike? - 'It is my neighbourwho isMike.

1t should be noted that Who is it who is Mike? is acceptable as a specificationalsentence (meaning 'Which person isMike?') but not as a descriptionally-identifyingone (i.e. as a question asking for a description of Mike). Similarly, It ismy neighbourwho is Mike is impeccable as a specificational reply but unacceptable as adescriptionally-identifying one (see also chapter 2).

The reason why descriptionally-identifying sentences cannot be it-elefted is to befound in the specificational nature of it-clefts. Whereas an it-cleft specifies a valuefor a variable, a descriptionally-identifying sentence assigns a description to an(already partly identified) referent. These are two entirely different functions.Moreover, because au it-cleft serves to identify a variabie, the NP representing thelatter must not be identifying (specifying) itself and must not have a referent that hasalready been identified. It-clefts such as those in (65)-(66) violate this requirement,since the NPs that should function as variables imply that some sort of identificationhas already taken place. For the same reasons the corresponding specificational

33. As far as I know, this constraint has not been formulated before in the linguistic hterature. Vet, thedata relating to it have sometimes been noted. For example, Higgins (1976: 163) notes that thesentence

(i) ?Please teil me which man the Speaker of the House is.is "strange on its Specificational reading" and that "it would be more norrnal to say":

(ii) Please teil me which man is the Speaker of the House.

204

WH-clefts are also ungrammatical :34

(67)(a) 'Who/whatlthe one who that is is my brother.(b) 'Who/what/the one who Mike is is my neighbour.35

2.5. There is one more restrietion that 1would like to drawattention to, although ithas a wider scope than the previous ones, since it holeIs not only for it-cleftshighlighting predicate nominals but for it-clefts in general. However, the principlesthat can account for it are the same as have been established in the previous sections,and Itherefore deern it useful to include it in this chapter. The restrietion in questionconcerns the possibility of deleting the WH-elause of the i/-cleft. In some casesdeletion appears to present no problem at aU, in other cases it yields anunacceptable result:

(68)A. Someonefeil olf the roof of the school.8. Was it a pupil (whofeil olf the roof)?

(69)A. One of the pupils ran away.B. Was it a friend of yours (who ran away)?

(70)A. I'd like an ice cream,please.B. Is it a big one that you'd like?

'Is it a big one?(71)A. I need three peopleto help me.

B. Is it adults that you need?'Is it adults?

The rationale of this appears to be the following. As pointed out above, an i/-eleftalways presupposes a variab1e in the form of a nominal with specific reference."This nominal has the form of a noun head (which is not overtly expressed in theit-cleft) followed by a restrictive relative elause ('the X who/that...'). Deletion ofthis WH-clause from the it-eleft is possible only if the specificity of the variabie NP

34. Bolinger (1972a: 102) accepts examples like tbe following:(i) (What's that?) - Weil, what that is is a cap.

This would seem 10 be a counterexample to the claim that dcscriptionally-identifying sentencescannot yield a WH-cleft. However, it seems to me that the (relative) acceptability of this Wh-cleftis entirely due 10 the question-answer situation, which facilitates the use of what that is as subjectNP: th is NP is c1early a reiteration of the question. Note that the corresponding i/-deft (in whichthere is na what and hence no possibility of reiteration) is quite unacccptablc:

(iil (What's thai?) - 'Well, it's a cap that that is.

35. The sentence The one who isMike ismy neighbour ismoreacceptable than (67,b), but only on aninterpretation on which neither the varia bie nor the value is descriptionally-identifying. Thesentence could be used, for example, to express that the actor who plays the part of Mike in a playis my neighbour. In this sense il is a specificational sentence, which is therefore reversible to Myneighbour is (he olie who isMike (in which is means 'plays the part of) (see chapter 2).

36. Except, as will now becomc dear, when it is used in an opaque context (see below).

III 205

is established by the context; if the relative clause is the only indication that thevariabie is specific, it cannot be deleted. Thus, tbe relative clauses can be deleted in(68,B) and (69,B) because tbe specificity oftbe variabie is establisbed by the specificNPs someone and one of thepupils in tbe precedingcontext,but (70,B)and (71,B)cannot be reduced because here the noun bead of tbe variabIe is establisbedby anonspecificNP (an ice cream;threepeople). In otber words,a reduced i/-cleftlikeIsit a big one? in (70,B) is unacceptablein this particular stretchof discoursebecauseit prcsupposesaspecific variabie (i.e, it presupposesthe existeneeof some specificiee cream) while there is no indication in tbe discourseof what tbe referent of thisNP could be. It should be noted that the problemdoes not arisewhen not only thequestion (A) but also the reply (B) is embedded in an opaque context:

(72)A. I'd like an lee eream, please.8. Must it be a big one?

In an opaque context the variabieNP is no longer specificand does not, therefore,requirea specifyingrelativeclauseor the preseneeof a specificNP in the preeedingcontext. (Becauseof its specifyingmeaning,a WI-I-clausecannot evenbe added anymore.)The followingexample further ilIustratesthese principles:

(73)A. I'm looking tor someone who can help me.8. Is it a pupil (that you are looking tor)?

Must it be a pupil ('thai you are looking tor)?

Sentenee (73,A) is ambiguous between aspecific and a nonspecificreading of theNP someone who can help me. On the former interpretation the speaker hassomeone specificin mind and says that he is looking for him (or her). In this caseonly Is it a pupil (that you are looking for)? is an appropriate reply. On thenonspecific interpretation (73,A) means tbat tbe speaker is looking for someonewho can help him without baving any particular person in mind. In this case onlyMust it be a pupil? is acceptable as a reply.

In sum, redueed it-defts whose focal item is a specific NP (i.e. an NP thatpresupposes a referent in tbe world of discourse) require tbat there should be aspecificNP introducing that referent in tbe preceding context. Unredueed it-cleftsdo not require this becausespecificationthenbappens through the presenee of tbeWH-c1ause.Redueed it-cleftswitb a nonspecific focal NP do not require thiseitber.

lt is worth noting that the above theory confirrnsone of the conclusionsthat wehave already arrived at. In section 2.2.B we observed that the cIeftedNP of anit-cleft will always be interpreted as referring (and thematic) if no predicationalinterpretation is enforeedby the context.This is in keepingwith the conclusionwehavejust reached, namely that the variabIeNP of an i/-cleft(and hence also the NPrepresenting the value, i.e. the cIeftedNP) will be interpreted as specific (benee

referring)unless a nonspecificinterpretation is enforced by the context.This leads to the conclusion that tbere is a eertain hierarcby in the way focalNPs

are interpreted: if aspecific interpretation is possible, the focal item will notnormally be interpreted as nonspecificor predicational; if aspecific interpretation isexcluded, the nonspecificinterpretation (on which the NP is only referringwithinthe world created by the opaque context) will be preferred; a predicationalinterpretation (on which the NP is not referringat aU)wi11be selected only if thcother two are explicitly excluded. (It goes without saying that this accords withwhat we observedin chapter 1,viz.that nonspecificNPs are only 'weakly referring'and that predicational NPs are not referringat all.)

3. CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have pointed out and attempted to expl.ain the followingrestrictionson U-cleftswith a predicate nominal as c1eftedconstituent:

3.1. The cleftedNP must be the 'identifier' and cannot be the 'identified'.

3.2. !t-clefts with predicational foei are subject to the following restrictions: .a. The variabie must be (or must be capable of being) formulated as a nominal

with a specificreferent.b. It must be c1earfrom the context or from the c1eftedNP itself that the latter

should he interpreted as predicational.c. Even those it-eleftsthat come up to theserequirementswillbe marked because a

predicational NP cannot normally be thematic. . .d. An it-eleftwith a predicational focus wiUbe less acceptable if the VP of lts

WH-elause consistsofjust a farm of be than ifthe VP involvesother elementsaswell, or consistsof a different verb farm.

3.3. In an U-eleft(and in fact in any specificationaltype of sentence) the copu~amust always be put between the subjectNP and the predicate nominal, except mcasesof inversion.

3.4. The predicate nominalof a descriptionally-identifyingsentence cannot beprocessedas the focus of an it-c1eft.

3.5. The WH-clause of an it-cleft can be deleted only if the specificity of thevariabieNP is establishedby the context.

CHAPTER 5. THE USE OF IT-CLEFTSAND WH-CLEFTS IN DISCOURSE

1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I will be concerned with the principles,that govern the use ofi/-eleftsand WH-elefts in discourse, i.e.with what we could call the 'pragmatics' ofelefts.In doing so I wil! start from a discussionof Prince (1978), which is the mostdetailed treatment of the subject in the recent linguisticliterature. 1will adopt someof the principlesargued there but reject others and build on this criticism to makealternative proposals. The condusion will be that both it-eleftsand WH-defts fallapart into three major subtypes and that, altbough it-cleftsand WH-eleftsbasicaUyhave the same meaning and function, there are numerous pragmatic factors thatmay induce the speaker to prefer one type of eleft to another in a particularcontext.I

It should be noted that this condusion in fact holds only for specificationalclefts,Since we will be concerned with a comparison of it-c1eftsand WH-defts indiscourseand since it-defts are essentiallyspecificational- the (semi)predicationaltypes discussedin chapter 3 are exceptionaland will be disregardedhere - we willnot be concerned with WH-defts that are not specificational (i.e. the types ofWH-defts that we have ealled predieational,definitionalor identitystatements - cfchapter 1,section 3.7). Prince (1978), which servesas our starting-point, also dealswith specificationalcleftsonly.On the other hand, Prince considersonly WH-cleftswhose WH-elause precedes the copula. (As noted in chaptcr 1 (section 2.11),Prince calls such WH-defts 'noninverted' but we actually consider them to be the'inverted' type. In order to avoid any misunderstanding I will use the label'Wll-clause-initial WH-elefts' in this chapter.) However, since both WH-clause­initial and Wll-clause-final WH-clefts can be used specificationally,I will includebath in the discussion.

I. This conclusion exposesthe simplicityof a claim which is not unfamiliar in the linguistic literature,viz, the claim that iI-"clcftsand WH-clefts "are synouymous, share the same presuppositions, answerthe same questions, and in general they can be used interchangeably" (Akrnajian 1979: 149). (ForAkmajian this putative interchangeability is even sufficient ground for claiming that it-defls arelransformationally derived from WH-clefts by some sort of extraposition rulc.)

209

2. PRAGMATIC SUBTYPES OF(SPECIFICATIONAL) WH-CLEFTS ANDIT-CLEFfS

In the linguistic literature clefts? are traditionally treated as a unitary class ofconstructions. They are considered to be structures consisting of a 'focus' whichrepresents new information and is heavily accented and contrastive, and a .WH-clause which represents 'presupposed' or 'old' information. (In our termino­logy, the focus represents the value and the WH-clause the variabIe to which it isassigned.) The sentences of (l,B) are typical examples of such clefts:

(1)A. Who broke Ihe window?B. (a) II was John who did it.

(b) The one who did it was John.(c) John was the one who did it.

As far as Iknow, only two people have challenged this unitary treatment of clefts.In one of his 'Points of Modern English Syntax' in English Studies, Erades (1962)draws attention to the sentence

(2) II was in 1886 that (...) Lewin published the first systematicstudy of Ihe cactus.

Erades points out that (2) differs frorn i/-clefts like (l,B,a) in that the focus is notcontrastive, the that-dause does not convey old information, and that is notdeletabie (as it is in 'normal' it-defts: It wasJohn (that) saw itfirst). Erades thereforeconcludes that (2) is not really an it-cleft but "a different type of sentence"(p.138).

More recently, examples like (2) have been discussed by Prince (1978). Princeadduces a nurnber of similar examples (drawn from a corpus) and concludes thatit-clefts (but not WH-clefts) should be divided into two subclasses: next to'stressed-focus it-c1efts' like (2,B,a) she also distinguishes 'informative­presupposition it-clefts'. The latter are it-clefts such as (2) whose focus is notcontrastively accented and whose WH-clause represents information which is notpresupposed but entirely new. The following sentences further illustrate the type:

2. As above, I will be using'cleft' as a cover-term for it-cleftsand Wll-cleüs.

210

(3)(a) It is with great pride that I accept this nomination.(b) It was also during these centuries that a vast internal mig ra­

tion (...) trom the south northwards taak place ... (Prince 1978:898)

(e) The leaders of the militant homophile movement in Americagenerally have been young people. It was they who foughtbaek during a violent police raid on a Greenwieh Village barin 1969... (Prince 1978: 898)

Prince points out that it-clefts like these differ from 'normal' (i.e, 'stressed-focus')it-defts in several respects: (a) the focal item is not as heavily accented; (b) theWH-c1ause conveys information which is not presupposed (known) to the hearer,but which is represented as if it were known; (c) for that reason, the WH-clause isnormally (vs. weakly) accented; (d) the foca! item is generally short and anaphoric,and is usually an NP or a "thematic scene-setting adverbial"; (e) the WH-word isnot deletabIe.

It goes without saying that splitting up the class of it-c1efts into two subclasseswith characteristics of their own is a major step forward. The question then iswhether this distinction can also be made for WH-clefts. Prince (1978) answers thisquestion negatively. According to her, WH-defts show a characteristic which isincompatible with the idea of an 'informative presupposition', viz. the characteristicthat (for an adequate use of a WH-cleft in discourse) the WH-clause must represent'given' information, i.e. information which "the coperative speaker can assume tobe appropriately in the hearer's consciousness at the time of hearing the utterance"(p.888). If this claim is correct, there cannot be any 'informative-presuppositionWll-clefts', since an 'informative presupposition' by definition represents informa­tion that is quite new.

However, is the claim made by Prince really correct? Is it true that WH-cleftsmust always involve a WH-clause that represents 'given' information? When weexamine Prince's evidence we ascertain that her claim is based on two observa­tions :

A. Prince's first piece of evidence is that, unlike it-c1efts,WH-c1efts cannot functionas discourse openers. Thus, she points out that none of the following is acceptablewhen used out of the blue:

(4)(a) Im 'HiJ What my name is is Ellen.(b) tUt *Hi! What I've heard about is your work.(e) tut 'HiJ What you used to do was go to school with my

brother.

According to Prince, the reason for this unacceptability is that, although thematerial in the WH-clause can still be considered as 'known' in the sense that it can

') 1 1

be inferred via 'bridges',' it is not 'given', i.e. it cannot be assumed to be in thehearer's consciousness. Thus, in (4,a), "the hearer, seeing that I am a person, couldinfer that I have a name" but "it would be highly presumptuous (though possiblycorrect) for me, tbe speaker, to assume that my hearer is actually thinking that Ihave a name" (p.888).

It-defts, on the other hand, can be found as discourse openers. Prince's examplesincIude the following, in which the it-deft is the first sentence of a piece of writtendiscourse:

(5)(a) Itlt ft was just about 50 years ago that Henry Ford gave usthe week-end. On September 25, 1926, (...) he decided toestablish a 40-hour week ...

(b) ## It is through the writings of Basil Bernstein that manysocial scientists have become aware of the scientific poten­tial of sociolinguistics ...

Such examples show that "the information represented in it-cleft that-dauses doesnot have to be assumed to be in the bearer's mind" (p.894). This conclusion isfurther illustrated with examples like the following (p.894):

(6)(a) II I see a train crossing, I keep going. It's a game you'repfaying. (...)

(b) I've been bit once by a German shepherd. It was really scary.ft was an outside meter the woman had. I read the gas meterand was walking back out...

In (6,a) the speaker (who is describing bis job) clearly does not presume t~at thehearer is thinking that one is playing sometbing; nor does the speaker relating thedogbite incident in (6,b) assume that the hearer is thinking that a particular womanexisted and that she had sometbing. If he used WH-clefts instead of it-clefts, thespeaker would make these assumptions.

However, I do not think that the above argument is a valid one. In my opinion, itfails in two wa ys :a. Examples like (5)-(6) lead Prince to conc1ude that "it-defts make no assump­

tions about the hearer's thoughts" (p.895). However, this generalization is dearlyinadequate. To see this, it suffices to substitute it-defts for the WH-defts in(4,a-c) :

(7)(a) Itlt 'Hi! It's Ellen that my name is.(b) #It "Hi! lt's your work that I've heard about.(c) tttt 'Hi! It's go to school with your brother that you used to do.

3. The term '(inferential) bridge' is due to Clark & Haviland (1977: 6).

Obviously, these it-defts are no more acceptable as discourse openers than theWH-cIefts of (4,a-c), the reason apparently being the same, viz. that the clcftscannot be used out of the blue because they require the presupposed part to be inthe hearer's consciousness.

b. It is not correct that WH-clefts can never be used as discourse openers. This isdear from examples like (8,a-b), where a WH-eleft is used as the openingsentence of a speech:"

(8)(a) What I have often asked myself is how other linguists man­age to keep abreast with the rapid deve/opments in thedifferent fields of linguistics while still finding time to go onwriting artic/es themselves. One colleague who has proved10 be able to do this and who I have the honour to introduceto you tonight is Mr...

(b) My dear triends, what we have a/ways wanted to know, butwhat the government has never wanted to teil us, is whatexactly happens at secret conferences fike the one you havebeen reading about in the papers this week. There is oneman, however, who has been present at such conferenceshimself and who is willing to break silence. His name isRobert Fox, and he is the man that we have invited as guestspeaker tor tonight.

1

It would seem, then, that we arc faced with a rather odd situation: both it-c1cfL<;and WH-clefts are sometimes acceptable as discourse openers but sometimesunacceptable. However, there is a very simple explanation for this: the it-clefts thatare used discourse-initially (as in (5,a-b) are of the 'inforrnative-presupposition'type, while those that are unacceptable as discourse openers (as in (7,a-c») are'stressed-focus' ft-defts. And exactly the same thing is true of WH-defts: as shownin (4,a-c), stressed-focus WH-c1efts cannot be used discourse-initially, but there arealso WH-defts that can be found as discourse openers (as in (8,a-b», and these are

4. Prince recognizes that WH-c1eftscan occur discourse-initially,but she claims that this is possibleonly if the information given in the WH-clause is 'given', i.e. "coperatively assumable" as being inthe hearer's consciousness.However, I do not think that one can claim that this is the fact in (8,a-b)without stretchingthe mcaning of'given' 10 a point that the term isvirtuallyempty ofmeaning (andis certainly no longer distinguishable from 'known'),

c1early of the informative-presupposition type.'

B. The second piece of evidence adduced by Prince in support of the claim thatthere are it-clefts but no WH-clefts that have an informative presuppositionconcerns the followingexamples:

(9)(a) It's sort of an arbitrary line that you're drawing.(b) 'What you're drawing is sort of an arbitrary line.

(10)(a) lt's obvious that I'm a woman and enjoy being a woman. I'mnot overly provocative either. /t's the thin, good-nigger finethat I ha ve to toe.

(b) 'What I have to toe is the thin, good-nigger line.

According to Prince, cases like these, in which the focusNP is extracted from anidiom, confirm that "it-cleftsmake no assumptions about the hearer's thoughts"

5. This condusion rcfutes not only Prince (1978) bul also Gundel (1985: 98), who makes the exactlyopposite claim, viz. that WH-clefts, bul nol it-c1efts can be uscd diseourse-initially. Gundel adduecsthe following examples as evidence for her claim:

(i)(a) Can I help you? - Yes, what /'m looking lor is a printer.(b) Can I help you? - ?Yes, U's a printer thaI /'m Jookmglor.

lii) (at tbe beginning of a leeture:)la) What I would like to talk about today is conversational implicature.Ib) 'lt's conversational implicature that I would Iike to talk about today.

(iii)(a) At first meeting, people are always telling Judy Goldsmith that she doesn't lo<;>kthe type. What they seem 10 expeet Irom the president of the.Nstione' Orgamza­tion tor Wamenis someone stick, sophisticated,perhaps a bit strldent.

(b) (...) ?It's someone slick, sophisticated, perhaps a bit strident that they seem 10expecl from the president of the National Orqanization for Women.

In sectien 3.3. I will show that there are various pragmatic principles whieh may entail that onctype of cleft is more felicitous than another in particular contcxts. The relative unacceptabilityofthe it-clefts in the abovc examples is due to sueh principles, and therelore cannot sustarn the claimthat il-defts cannot be used discourse-initially. The principle that is at work in (i) and (ii) is that aconstituent that is a 'continuous topic' (i.e. a topic which links up with the preceding context) willprefcrably be placed at the beginning of the sentence (cf. section 3.3.1.). In (i) it is e1early wllat I'mlookingfor that links up best with the preceding sentence Can I helpyou? (which is a question thatis typically asked when sorneonc seems to be looking for something). For th is reason thcWH-dause-initial WH-eleft (i.a) is a better choice than the it-e1eft (i,b) or the WH-e1ause-finalWH-eleft A printer is what Fm looking for. In (ii) there is no context in the sense of precedingdiseourse, but there is a situational context: the speaker isjust starting his lecture and is announcingits topic. It goes without saying that the constituent th at links up best with this is the WH-c1ausewhat/that I would like to talk about today, not the constituent çonverstuional implicature. It isthcrefore predictable that the only suitable type of cleft in this situation is the one in which theWH-clause is processed first (i.c. not an it-c1eCtor WH-elause-final WH-eleft).In cxample (iii), finally, the relative unacceptability of thc it-eleft is due to the fact that the deftedconstituent someone slick, sophisticated, perhaps a bil strident is nol a referring NP but aprcdicational one. (This also appcars from the use of what rather than lire one who in theWH-clausc.) As wc saw in chapter 4, i/-deflS with predicational foei are relatively unacceptable,exccpt if the variabie is established by the preceding context. This is not the case in (iii,b).

214

(p.895), whereasWH-clefts do. In my opinion, however, the ungrammaticality ofthe WH-c1eftsin (9)-(10) can simply be traeed to the fact that there are severerestrictions on operations that break up idioms. As noted by Schachter (1973:31-32), idioms may allow extraction of an NP for relativization, but otheroperations that break up the idiom are not normally possible:

(11)(a) She's keeping caretul track of her expenses.(b) The careful track she's keeping of her expenses pleases me.(c) *The careful track pleases me.(d) 'Careful track is being kept of her expenses.(e) 'What she's keeping is careful track of her expenses.

We can conclude, then, that neitherof Prince's arguments against the existenceofinformative-presuppositionWH-clefts is valid, On the contrary, the discussionofthe first argument has made clear that the existence of such WH-clefts must berecognized: it has been shown that WH-cleftsmay sometimesbe found as discourseopeners, as in (8,a-b). It goes without saying that the WH-c1auseof a cleft (of anytype) that is used discourse-initially cannot present 'given' information (i.e.information that the hearer is assumed to be thinking about) and must thcrefore beinformative.

There are other pieces of evidence that confirm this conclusion:

A. When we examinePrince's examplesof informative-presuppositionit-clefts,wenotice that many of them can easilybe replaced by WH-clefts:

(12)(a) But why is the topic so important? Apparent/y, it is the topicthat enables the listener to compute the intended ante­cedents of each sentence in the paragraph. (p.902)

(b) But why is the topic so important? Apparently, the topic iswhat enables the fistener to compute tne intended ante­cedents of each sentence in the paragraph.

(13)(a) However, it turns out that there is rather interesting indepen­dent evidence tor this rule and ii is to that evidence met wemust now turn. (p.902)

(b) However, it turns out that there is rather interesting indepen­dent evidence tor this rule and that evidence is what we mustnow turn to.

(14)(a) It is tor this reason that Halle's argument against autorio­mous phonemics is of such importanee. (p.900)

(b) This is why Halle's argument against autonomous phone­mies is of such importanee.

In these examples both the it-cleftsand the (WH-clause-fmal) Wll-clefts that wehave added as possible alternatives are of the informative-presupposition type.Examples with Wli-clause-initial WH-cleftsare aIso easily found:

(~\J

(14) A. Those apples are good, aren't they?B. So they are! What keeps me trom eating al/ ot them is thaf

mottiet wil/ be furious if I don't leave any tor the others.A. I hear you've got a job at Johnson's. A nice place that is. I

suppose you're happy now?B. Weil, I don't know. Whaf I'd rea/ly like to do is run a

business of my own. But I can't do that because I've nomoney to start one.

B. That informative-presupposition Wll-clefts are not at all exceptional is .furthermore clear from the fact that they are sametimes more natural than theirit-deft counterparts:

(15)

A. l'rn afraid we'll have to give up the plan.B. (a) That's what I thought toa.

(b) ?It is that that 1thought toa.A. The machine appears to be badly damaged.B. (a) That's what I was afraid of, yes.

(b) ?It's ths: that I was afraid of, yes.

C. The conclusions arrived at in this section so far are further borne out by the factthat the basic properties which Prince aseribes to WH-defts and i/-deftsrespectively are in fact properties of the larger elass of structures to which bathbelong, viz. specifieational structures.

Thus, the requirement that the presupposed part of a (stressed-focus) WH-eleftshould represent material that is given (i.e. that may be assumed to be in the hearer'sconsciousness at the time of speaking) is in fact typical, not ofWH-elefts only, but ofspecificational sentences in general. Since specificational s.ente~ces specify a val~efor a variable, the normal (unmarked) use of any specificational sentence WIl!require that the variabIe be given when the value is specified. Thus, the sentences(17 a-e) wil! all be equally acceptable or unacceptable as discourse openersaccording as the speaker ean or cannot assume that the variabie (fhe X whomurdered Smith') is in the hearer's consciousness:

(16)

(17)

(17)(a) Hi! The one who murdered Smith is JOHN.(b) Hi! JOHN is the one who murdered Smith.(c) Hi! It is JOHN who murdered Smith.(d) Hi! The murderer of Smith is JOHN.(e) Hi! JOHN is Smith's murderer.

These sentences are all specifieational, and they all require the variabie to be 'given'in exactly the same way.6

The same is true of the property which in Prince's theory is typical of

6. It should be pointed out that this conclusion actually holds for declarative specificational sentencesonly. Interrogativc stresscd-focus clefts (which form a category that is disregarded b_YPrince(1978» do not require the WH-clause to represent 'given' information. Thus, whereas (i.a-b) arevery odd as discourse openers, the corresponding questions (ii,a-b) seemall right: ./..

..",r.

informative-presupposition it-defts, viz. that the part corresponding to the variabierepresents new information as if it were known. In my opinion, any kind ofspecifieational sentence will evince this property if the variabie to which the value isassigned is unknown to the hearer at the time of the utterance. For example:

(18)A. But why is everybody so interested in uranium?B. (a) Because uranium is what you need to produce atamic

power.(b) 8ecause it is uranium that you need ta produce atomic

power.(c) Because uranium is the tissionable material used in

producing atomic power.

6. ../..

(i)(a) 'Hi! Itwas about JOHN that your brother spoke to Mary(b) 'Hi! JOHN was Ihe one that your brolher spoke 10 MarYabout.

(ii)(a) Hl! Was It about JOHN that your brother spoke 10Mary?(b) Hl! Was JOHN Ihe one that your brolher spoke to Mary about?

Sim.ilarly, there seems 10 be nothing wrong with examples likc (iii,a-b):(111)(a)Good morningl Was it your radio that p/ayed so /oudly last night? It kept me

trom sleeprng untll after midnighl.(b) G?Od morning, sir. Is Ihis what your son ordered by telephone last night? My

. . wlfe was not qu.ts sure she had underslood him correctly.It IS clear that In examples like these the speaker need not assume that the contents of theW~-c1ause are in the hearer's consciousness at the time of utterance. In (iii,a) the speaker may~eahze the hearer was probably never conscious of his being too noisy, and (iii,b) can easily be saidif the speaker suspeers lha t the .hcarer does not know that his son ordered something by telephone.In that case the speaker consciously inforrns the hearer of this [act (possibly to spite (he hearer'sson), which means that (he contcnts of the WH-c1ause are actually new (rather than known)intonnution and are therefore certainly not given,

The r~ason why interrogative clefts do not require the presupposed part 10 be given, whereasdecla~atl~e defts of the stressed-Iocus type do, eppears to be the following. Like otherspeciflcattooat =r=de:ls specify a val~e. for a variabie. As we saw in chapter 1 (section 2.3),this IS a process that IS similar to providing an answer to a question. For this reason a(stressed-focus) cleft like (i,a) could easily be paraphrased as: 'Youwant to know about whom yourbrother spoke to Mary? WeU, the answer is: John'. Now, it is a natural tact in the use of questionsand answers that we will not=a stretch of discourse by telling someone the answer to a questionthat we assume he IS not thinking about, If the speaker tells someone the answer to a question in th isway (for example, by telling hirn which value is to be assigned (0 a particular variabie), it meansthat the speaker presupposes that the question (variable) is at thatmoment 'given' in the mind ofthehearer,

In in~errogati~e clefts the situation is different. Here the speaker asks the hearer which answer(v.aluc) IS (0 begiven to a question.(variable), and this, of course, is something that he can easiiy doWithout assummg that (he hearer IS actually thinking of that question.

'"I,,,,,

In each of these specifieational sentences,7 the part correspondin~ to .the. variabiecontains information which cannot be taken to be what the heare: IS thinking aboutat the time of the utterance, since it provides tbe answer to a question that the hearerhasjust asked. This part of tbe sentence is ~h~ entirely new,b~t.beeause the ~peakerchooses to use a specifieational sentence, it 15 represented as if 11were a v.ana~le towhich a value has to be assigned. And since in the unmarked use of spwficatlOnalsentences the variabie is not new but known to the hearer, this has as a ~es~lt thatinformation that is unknown to the hearer is actually represented as if it wereknown.' . f . .

The reason why Prince wrongly concludes that representing new 10 o:matlOn asknown is characteristic of (informative-presupposition) it-cl~fts only 15 that shecontrasts her examples of it-clefts exclusively with nonspeclfieatlûnal senten~.Thus, in connection with (19,a) she noted: "Were the first sentence not elefted,.l.C.Fifty years ago, H.E gave ..., it would seem as though the ~e~spap~r h~d justdiscovered (or were pretending to have discovered) the information 10 thethat-elause; the it-c1eft,in contrast, serves 10mark it as a known fact, un.known onlyto the readership" (p.898). She adds that "the same is truc of' other informative-presupposition it-c1efts,such as (19,b).

(19)(a) It was just about 50 years ago that Henry Ford gave us theweek-end. (..·l . .

(b) The leaders of the homophile movement In Amenca gene-rally have been young people. ft was the!, who fought b?ckduring a violent police raid on a Greenwlch Village bar In1969, (...)

Example (19,a) is deceiving in that only a nonsp~cificational structure ean besubstituted for the it-eleft in a natural way. However, 10 (19,b) we can try out more

alternatives :

(20)(a) It was they who fought back ...(b) They we re the ones who fought back ...(c) They fought back ...

Like the it-cleft in (19,a), the WH-eleft in (l9,b) (at least 011 the. specificationalreading) also appears to represent the fight as if it were old information. In contrast,

7. Scntcncc (18,B,c)is ambiguous bctween a spccificationaland a predicational reading.To.get anunambiguouslyspecificationalinterpretationwewould have to reversethe order of the subjectNPand tne prcdicate nominal, but this is somewhat difficult to do because It runs counter to the'principleof themc continuity' that we wil!discussin sectien 3.3.1.It ~n be done, howe~er,if thespeakeruscs a special intonation pattcrn which puts surpnscd emphaslson the IinalNP. I

(ij Because the fissionablemalerialused In producinçatormcpower IS ...uranium.

(20,c), which is not specifieational, definitely does not have this effect." The rcasonis that this effect follows from phrasing the new information in the form of avariable, i.e. from the use of a specifieational sentence. The observation that thevariable part of such a sentence is always (represented as) known concurs with thefact (noted in ch~pter 1, section 2.6.F) that, with very few exceptions, the NPexpressmg the vanable in a specifieational structure (e.g. the variabie 'the ones whofought back' in (20,a-c)) is always defmite. It is well-known that the the use of adefinite ~P im~lies that the speaker assumes the hearer to he ahle to identify who orwbat he 15 talking of. The use of a specifieational sentence with a definite NP asvariabie (presupposition) therefore naturally entails that the latter part is represen­ted as known to the hearer.?

In sum, the following tbings have become dear now:a. It i~not only ~H-clefts that involve a 'given' variabie. The presence of a 'given'

vanable IS typical of the unmarked use of any specificational sentence.Pb. It is not ?nly it-c1eftsth~t may have an informative presupposition. The presence

of a vanable representmg new information as if it were known is typical of amarked use of specifieational sentences in general."

c. It follows that the distinction between 'stressed-focus' c1efts and 'informative­presupposition' clefts can he made for WH-defts as weIl as for it-clefts.

However, this still is not the end ofthe story. When we scrutinize the examples of'inforrnative-presupposition' clefts given here and in Prince (1978) we notice thatthey actually faIl apart in two groups. The following examples (which are repcatedhere for convenience) should make this clear:

(21Ha) H~wever, it tur~s out that there is interesting independentevidence for this rule and it is to that evidence thaf we mustnow turn.

8. Sentence (20,c) can be interpreted as specificational,though, provided there is contrastive accenton they. In that case (20,c) also representsthe fight as information that is known to the hearer.

9. ~s a rna.tterof fact t~~ explanation also accounts for the fact that c1eftscan be used with anmform~tlvepr~upposltlon: for (as has often been observed)"the relativeclausein the it-cleftisa150a definite refernngexpression"(GundelI985: 97).

10. This conclusion accords with Rochernont's (1986' 132) claim th t h .'. . a aprase can rCCClvec~~trastlvefocuson~~Ir ~,herest of.the sentence is :directlyc-construable', i.e, if either it "has adiscourseantecedent or the attentionof the participantshas been directed towards the intend ctreferent (...) m the physical environment of the discoursc". e

11. Nonclef~specificationalsentencesof the type The problem is that.: or The question is wl tiare particularlyapt to have an informativevariabie part. For example: ze Ier...

(I) We certainlyhope to hav,,:the bridgefinishedbefore next week. The problem isthat the weather forecast IS none toa qooä.

(b) However, it turns out that there is interesting independentevidence for this rule and that evidence is what we must nowturn to.

(22)(a) But why is everybody so interested in uranium? - Because itis uranium thaf you need to produce atomic power.

(b) But why is everybody so interested in uranium? - Becauseuranium is what you need to produce atomic power.

(23)(a) My dear friends, what we have a/ways wanted to know, butwhat tne government has never wanted to teil us, is whatexactly happens at secret conferences /ike tne one you havebeen reading about in the papers this week. There is oneman, however, ...

(b) It was just about 50 years ago that Henry Ford gave us theweek-end. (...)

(24)(a) Those apples are good, aren't they? - So they are! Whatkeeps me trom eating all ot them is thaf mother wou/d befurious it I/eft none tor the otnere.

(b) It is through tne wrilings of Basil Bernstein that many socialscientists have become aware of the scientific potential ofsociolinguistics. (.,,)

There is a clear difference between tbe examples in (21)-(22) and those in(23)-(24), The former elearly satisfy all the requirements imposed on 'informative­presupposition' clefts by Prince (1978), but the latter satisfy only some of them.More specifically, the former involve a focus NP that is unaccented and "short andanapboric" (Prince 1978: 899), but the latter do not. In (23)-(24) the focus isrelatively accented and long, and it does not link up with the preceding discourse inany way. A further difference, which is related to this, is that (23)-(24) can easily beused discourse-initially, whereas this does not seem to be possible for (21 )-(22), Thismeans that, rather than distinguish two types of it-clefts and WH-defts (viz,'stressed-focus' ones and 'informative-presupposition' ones), we should actuallydistinguish three, And in doing so we win have to coin new terms, since exampleslike (23)-(24) appear to involve both a (relatively) accented focus and aninformative presupposition. I therefore suggest the foUowing subclassification.

A. Contrastive c1efts

These are the clefts that we have so far labelled 'stressed-focus clefts' and whichare exernplified by (I.Ba-c). They have the following characteristics:a, The WH-clause gives information that is not new but 'given' (in the above

defined sense of 'co-operatively assumable to be in tbe hearer's consciousness atthe time of utterance'). (In the terminology of Givón (1983): the WH-clausepursues the thematic line of the stretch of discourse in which it is couched; thevariabic is therefore a 'continuous topic")

b. The focus NP mayor may not occur in the preceding context. In ether words, itmay be a 'continuous topic' (as in (25,a)) or a 'discontinuous' one (as in

(2S,b)):

"

I

\I

(25)(a) I asked ~er what was Ihe matter with John and she answe­red that It was he who had been the victim of the robbe

(b) No~ody kno~s who killed Ihe old man. The police seem~obelieve that It was a tramp who did it.

Irrespectiv~ of ;V,hethert~e focus NP is a continuo us or discontinuous to ic itrepresents new information in the sense that the NP h t b p. 'as value for the variabie in the preceding context (That~ ~~ . yet e~~ spCCl~edthat the NP is identified as an argument NP of I ~~ IS ne; in ormfatlonWH-elause.) e pre icate 0 the

c. The focus NP is heavily accented whereas the WH- I 'd. Because it is heavily accented, the focus NP is stronglyCC~~t~~t~:a~z ~~~~te~,

~hapter 1~section 2.8), specificational sentences naturally invit~ a contras~' in~nterpretatlOn of the value Np, and this is especially the case if the NP 0 olveIS strong~y.accented and if the variabie part is given.) in question

e. Because It IS heavily accentcd th f NP' I', " h . ' e ocus IS ikely to be an 'important topic'i.e. a rat er persistent topic in terms of the succeedi dis '(Giv6n 1983' 9) Th ' . mg course context"

edi ,. us, in (2S,a), John may easily continue to be a topic in the~~~ mg sentences. (For example, the next sentence could easily begin with

f. Because at least one of its constituents (the WH cia )' , .t . I" . - use IS a contmuous topic acon rastive c en will not be found at the bezi f .'our above discussion of (4,a-c) and (7,a-c»)~nmng 0 a stretch of discourse (cf

g. If the contrastive eleft is a WH-eleft it may be inverted 'one: ' a nomn verte one or an inverted

(26)(a) Who broke that window? - John was the one who did it.(b) Wh at do you need? - What I need is a sheet of paper and a

pencit.

~This d~es not mean',of course, that the two constructions are always uall!:::::r~a~. "t ;e wil!~ belowpragmatic factors(havingto dowith~. th~on fOtht e c efitedconstituent or the choice of tbe sentence topic) may render

e 0 em pre erabIe to the other

B. Unaccented-anaphoric-focus c1efts

TThheseWarHec1leftslike (21)-(2~) which exhibit the following characteristics:a, e -c ause represents inform t' hi h . ', a Ion w IC IS new (but represented if it

were old), It IS thereforc a discontinuous topic. as 1 1

b. The fOCfusNP is an.aphoric and therefore by definition a continuous topic (iterrns 0 the preceding context). In

c. The focus NP is not heavily accented.P This is in keeping not only with the factthat this NP is anaphoric but also with the observation that this type of eleft doesnot invite a contrastive interpretation. The WH-elause is normally (vs. weakly)accented.

d. The focus NP is not likely to be a persistent topic. For example, in (27) the topicthese centuries is a "fast-decaying" topic (Givón 1983: 25) which is not repeatedin the elauses following tbe eleft:

It was also during these centuries that a vast internal migra­tion (...) from the south northwards took place, a process noless momentous than the Amhara expansion southwardsduring the last part of the 19th century. (...) (Prince 1978: 898)

The reason why the focus NP is not likely to be a persistent topic is that it isweakly accented and gives old information, whereas the WH-elause that fellowsis more heavily accented and represents new information. (As pointed outbelow: in WH-elefts of this type the WH-elause norrnally follows the copula inorder 'to conform to this pattern.) Naturally, it is the new and more emphatictopic expressed in the second constituent that has the greater potential for beingcontinued in the succeeding discourse.

e. Because the focus is anaphorie and thus continuous, this type of eleft cannot beused as a discourse opener. It needs a preceding context containing theantecedent of the anaphor.

f. If the clef" is a WH-eleft, the WH-elause normally fellows the copula. (As wewin see in section 3.3.2., a short and anaphoric focus win normally be processedbefore the WH-elause.) For example:

(27)

(28)A. Why do you like Paris so much?B. (a) Because that's where I met my future wife.

(br Because where I met my future wife is thaL

C. Discontinuous clefts

These are clefts of the type exemplified by (23)-(24), which have the followingcharacteristics :a. The WH-elause represents information which is new, but which is no longer

elearly represented as if it were known. The latter fact can be explained asfollows. We have seen that, in the unmarked use of specificational sentences, the

12. This is the only type of cleft in which i! can be found as the destressed form of that:(i)(a) (Do you like il ?)- lI's whall have always wanted.(b) n's what he said, son.

value part represents old information. It follows that, if a specificational sentenceis used with a value part that is new, the effect is that the new information isrepresented as if it we re known. This marked use of a specificational sentence iswhat we actually ob~erve in unaccented-anaphoric-focus elefts. However, (andnow I am anncrpating section 3.3.3) discontinuous clefts are often used toemphasize rather than identify, in which case there is hardly anything left of their~pecificational meaning. In such cases the implication of representing newinformation as if it were old is naturally as weakly present as the specificationalmeaning on which it depends.

b. The focus NP also represents information that is new in every sense of the word.Not only the variabie but also the value is thus a discontinuous topic.

c. Because of this both constituents are at least normally accented.d. Anot~er cons:que?ce of th: fact that both the focus and the WH-elause give

new information IS that this type of eleft can easily be used as a discourseopener.

e. As we have seen, specificational WH-elefts may generally be either noninvertedor ~nverted. Unaceented-anaphoric-focus WH-elefts represent an exception, asthw WH-elause must normally follow the copula. The reason for this is that inan English eleft it is natural to process a short and anaphoric focus before theWH-elause (cf. section 3.3.2). In discontinuous elefts, the focus is not anaphoric,and the shorter constituent may be either the WH-elause or the focal element. Indiscontinuous clefts the WH-clause can therefore either follow the copula (as in(29» or preeede it (as in (23,a» (although, as we will see, pragmatic factors canentail that one of the alternatives is preferabie or even obligatory in a particularcontext). .

(29) Good morning, sir. /s this what your son ordered by te/ep­hone Jastnight? My wife was not sure she had understoodhim correctly

f. Because both constituents of a discontinuous eleft give new information and maybeo process~ as first or second constituent, both may easily continue to be thepnmary topic of tbe following discourse.P Discontinuous elefts therefore differfrom ~accent~d-anapho~ic-focus elefts in that the focus NP bas a greaterpot~nt1al for being a persistent topic. This is the case, e.g. in (23,b), where thetopic 50 years ago is pursued in the following sentence:

13. Our conclusions in conn~ction w.ith th~ likelihoed ofthe focus being a persistent topic in OUT threetypes of clefts are quue In koeping with the general conclusions which Engelkamp & Zi e(1983) reach on the basis.of experiments, Their findings are that inforrnation following an i~:e~~s~etter processed when 11 relates to the new information than when it relates to the old, and thatit is consequently the new rather than the old information of the cleft that is likely to become thesubject of the following sentence.

(23)(b) Jt was just about 50 years ago ths: Henry Ford gave us theweekend. On September 25, 1926, (...) he decided to esta­blish a 40-hour week, giving his employees two days ofinstead of one. (Prince 1978: 898)

In sum, the main conelusion from section 2 (which has been concerned with thedifferent types of clefts and their characteristics) is that both U-defts and WH-deftsfaIl apart into three major subtypes: 'contrastive clefts', 'unaccented-anaphoric­focus elefts' and 'discontinuous elefts'. The main difference between the three types,whose characteristics are summarized in table 1, is that contrastive elefts involve an'old' variabie part and a (possibly continuous) focus representing new information,whereas unaccented-anaphoric-focus c1efts involve a 'new' variabIe part and aweakly accented continuous focus, and discontinuous clefts involve a variabie and afocus which are both discontinuous. What the three types have in common is thatthey are all specificational and because of this put emphasis on the value constituent(which can therefore rightIy be called the 'focus' of the cleft). As we will argue insection 3.2.1, emphasis is one ofthe natural consequences ofusing a specificationalconstruction (which use may therefore be triggered by the need for emphasis). Insection 3.3.3 we will show that in discontinuous clefts the specificational meaningmay be weaker, but the emphasizing function remains.

Table 1

contrastive clefts unaccented-anaphoric- discontinuous cleftsfocus clefts

The focus is new; the The focus is old; the Bolh the focus and theclause is aid inlorma- WH-clause is new but WH-clause are newtion represented as old

Focus heavily accen- Focus weakly accen- Focus and WH-clauseted; WH-clause wea- ted; WH-clause nor- at least normally ac-kly accented mally accented cented

Focus strongly con- Focus not strongly Focus not stronglytrastive contrastive contrastive

Focus likely 10 be a Focus not likely 10 be a Either the focus or thepersistent topic persistent topic WH-clause can be a

persistent topic

Cannot be used as a Cannot be used as a Can be used as a dis-discourse opener discourse opener course opener

WH-clefts can have WH-clefts are always WH-clefts can have ini-initialol final WH- WH-c1ause-linal tial or linal WH-clauseclause

3. THE USE OF CLEFTS IN DISCOURSE

This section will be concerned with the question of whether there is a differenceof meaning and/ or use between the different types of sentences that the speaker hasat his disposal when he wants to code specificational information (these differenttypes being a noncleft sentence, an it-eleft, a Wlî-clause-initial WH-deft or aWH-clause-final WH-deft). '

3.1. Prince (1978) makes some specific claims about the use of clefts in discourse(i.e. about what we might caU the 'pragmatics' of it-defts and Wll-clefts),According to her, it-defts and Wlf-clefts are not interchangeable but rather "dodifferent kinds of work and mean different things, at least some of the time" (p.883).This daim is based on the assumption that WH-clefts always require that thematerial inside the WH-clause should be 'given', whereas ft-defts mayalso have an'informative presupposition'. However, we have shown that this assumption is false:WH-defts mayalso be 'informative-presupposition' clefts. There is therefore nabasis left for c1aiming that the two constructions have a different meaning orfunction.

Still, it is clear that WH-clefts and it-c1eftsare not always interchangeable andthat there may be contexts in which one of the constructions seems preferable to theother (cf. the examples in (16) above). The factors determining this preferenee areprobably numerous and poorly understood, but I will make some suggestionsbelow, pointing out what I think to be the most important of them.

3.2. Let us first of all tackle the question of why the speaker/writer may prefer touse a de ft rather than a nonc1eft sentence.

3.2.1. A first factor evidently is that it makes a difference whether information is oris not presented in the form of a specificational sentence. Consider, for example, thefollowing sentences :

(30}(a) John has murdered Fred.(b) John is the murderer ol Fred.(c) John is the one who murdered Fred.(d) The murderer of Fred is John.(e) The one who murdered Fred is John.(I) lt is John who murdered Fred.

The last three of these sentences can only be interpreted specificationally, i.e. asanswering the question Who has murdered Fred? The first three sentences, incontrast, can be interpreted either specificationally or predicationally. (In the lattercase they can be used e.g. in answer to the question Why hasJohn been arrested?)

If these three sentences are not used in a disambiguating context, only theaccentuation pattern can make dear which interpretation is meant. Thus, since in aspecificational sentence the value normaUy presents new information, and since thesubject of a sentence is usually the primary topic (cf. Givón 1983) and henceexpresses old (continuous) information, special emphasis on the subject wil! beneeded to mark it as new information and, by doing 50, make the specificationalreading predominant. It follows that when no accentuation is available (e.g. in awritten text) and when the context does not exclusively caU for a specificationalreading, only (30,d-f) will be used if the specificational reading is intende1It is thensufficient that a nominalization like the murderer is not available for thespeaker/writer to be obliged to use an it-cleft or a WH-c1ause-initial WH-cleft:

(31)(a) It was Fred who was seen stealing the apples.(b) The one who was seen stealing the apples was Fred.(c) *The seen stealing the apples (one) was Fred.

So, the use of a (particular type of) cleft can be induced by the speaker / writcr's wishto produce an unambiguously specificational sentence. In written texts such deftsfulfil the function that is mostly fulfilled by accentuation in spoken language. Thisexplains why elefts are much more frequent in written language than in speech.

The above observations naturally lead us to the question why a speaker mayprefer to use a specificational sentence rather than a predicational one. The answerto this question is that using the farmer type of structure enables the speaker toconvey additional information along with the message. Consider, for example,(30,a). On the predicational reading this sentence conveys a single piece ofinformation (viz. that it is a 'property' of John that he is Fred's murderer). However,on the specificational reading (i.e. with the nuelear accent on John) the informationconveyed is more complex: it may be represented as involving two pieces ofinforrnation, viz. 'X has murdered Fred' and 'X is John' (cf. Akmajian 1979). Asnoted in chapter 1, we automatically get the following aspects of meaning alongwith this:

a. an implication of contrast: The fact that a particular value is assigned to thevariabie automaticaUy creates a contrast with all the other potential values thathave not been selected. This implication of contrast is stronger according as theset of potential candidates is smaller (and is thus strongest when there are nomore than two candidates).

It has sometimes been elaimed (see e.g. Brame 1978: 51, Harries-Delisle1978: 421) that it is the function of elefts to express contrast, but this is true onlyif taken in a nonexdusive sense: in any specificational structure the valueselected implies a contrast with the possible alternatives that have not been

chosen.vb. emphasis:Aiong with contrastiveness, the particular choice of value also entails

a certain emphasis on the value constituent. This is a natura! consequence of tbespecificational meaning and, like contrastiveness, is not typical of clefts only.

c. an implicature of exhaustiveness: It is inherent in the use of a specificationalsentence that the (co-operative) speaker win specify the variabie correctly. Thismeans, among other things, tbat the value assigned will be a set tbat contains allthe elements satisfying the variabie. For example, when the speaker says JOHNandBill ran away or It wasJohn andBill who ran away, the hearer has a right toconelude that only two people ran away. If more (or fewer) people actually ranaway, the speaker would be deceiving him. (For more details concerning tbeexhaustiveness implicature see chapter 1, section 2.9.)

It is these connotations of contrastivcness, emphasis and exhaustiveness that willaften induce a speaker to use a specificational (e.g. cleft) sentence rather than anonspecificational one. For example, in

(32) I've been bit once already by a German shepherd. It wasreally scary. 1Iwas an outsiele meter the woman had. I readthe gas meter and was walking back out... (Prince 1978: 894)

it would have been possible for the speaker to use the simple nonspecificationalsentence The woman had an outside meter instead of the eleft, but by using the eleftthe speaker puts contrastive emphasis on an outside meter, thereby stressing arelevant point in the situation described: if the meter bad been inside, the owner ofthe dog would have been aware of his visit and would have kept tbe dog from bitinghim.

3.2.2. A minor factor that may determine the choice of a cleft (ratber than anoneleft sentence) is that a cleft consists of two clauses, sa that seeminglyincompatible adverbials can be related to different verb phrases. This is the case in(33,a), where the corresponding simplex (noneleft) (33,b) is of questionableacceptability:

(33)(aJ Today it is five years ago that John died.(b) ??Today John died five years ago.

14. It concurs with this observation that there is actually na implication of contrast in thesespecificational sentences that do not assign a value 10 the variabie but rejeet a candidate as thecorrect value for the variabic :

(ij I don't know who damaged the car but I'm sure that(al JOHN dion': do it.(b) it wesn'! JOHN who did it.(cl the one who did ft wasn 't JOHN

Similarly, a sentence like 1t might have been Betty who would have been the nextvictim shows how the use of a cleft makes it possible to combine two differentmodal auxiliaries, which is impossible in the corresponding noncleft "Betty mightwould have been the next victim:'!

3.2.3. Another reason why the speaker may choose to use a cleft rather than asimple sentence is that the former suggests a higher degree of involvement of thehearer with what is being said. The reason is that in a cleft sentence the variabie partis mostly introduced by a WH-word that can also be used as an interrogativepronoun. Because of this, even those c1eftsthat are not used in answer to an explicitquestion seem to imply such a question: they suggest than an answer is being givento a question that is implicitly present in the mind of the hearer. This is elear whenwe compare the noneleft (34,a) with (34,b-c):

(34)[a] Jack is Smith's murderer.(b] (The one] who murdered Smith is Jack.(cl It is Jack who murdered Smith.

The explicit presence of a WH-elause entails that (34,b-c) more easily suggests theinterpretation 'You would like to know who murdered Smith? Well, the answer is:Jack'. Tbese sentences therefore more easily suggest interest and involvement on thepart of the hearer than the noneleft (34,a).

3.2.4. The speaker may prefer to use an (unaccented-anaphoric-focus or disconti­nuous) eleft rather than a simple sentence if he wishes to create suspense, i.e. if hewishes to suggest that what he is saying wil! turn out to be important for the futuredevelopment of his story. Consider e.g.:

(35] During the next two weeks Ann and I went out togetherseveral times. ft was during one of those evenings out thatshe suddenly began coughing.

The use of the iJ-eleft here suggests that the fact that Ann began coughing is veryimportant, perhaps even a tuming-point in the story. It creates the impression ofimpending misfortune, in a way th at the corresponding noneleft would be unable todo. The passage would easily fit in a story in which the heroine eventually becomesi11and dies of pneumonia, but it would be very unnatural if the writer did notpursue the topic of coughing in the rest of his story.

The reason why unaccented-anaphoric-focus elefts and discontinuous elefts cancreate this impression is that they represent new information as if it were known.Thus, the i/-c1eft of (35) suggests that everybody knows about the fact that Annbegan coughing, hence that this fact was of special consequence.

15. Delahunty (1981: 43) notes that this observation presents a serious problern 10 those who holdthat clefts are derived from noneleftsentences.

3.3. In section 3.2 we have considered a couple of factors which may induce thespeaker to prefer a eleft to a noncleft sentence. In this section we wil! investigatewhy the use of a particular type of eleft (viz. an it-eleft, WH-elause-initial WH-eleftor WH-elause-fmal WH-eleft) may often be preferred to the use of another. Hereagain the factors are probably numero us, but the following appear to be the mostimportant.

3.3.1. The principal factor playing a role in the choice of a particular type of eleftprobably bas to do with the thematic organization of the sentence and the discourseof which it forms part. It is well-known that when a number of sentences followeach other "the same theme tends to be held constant" .(Bates 1976: 169). A stretchof discourse does not normally consist of unrelated sentences, but of sentences thatform what Givón (1983) calls a 'thematic paragraph', i.e. "a string of clauses whosemain/primary topic remains the same'' (p.9). Now an important observation(which we wiU attempt to interpret and explain below) is that the choice of aparticular type of eleft often appears to be determined by the tendency to process acontinuous topic as first element of the sentence (i.e. as focus of an it-eleft or as thesubject clause of a (WH-clause-initial or WH-elause-final) WH-eleft. Consider, forinstance, the following sentence involving an unaccented-anaphoric-focus it-cleft:

(36) However, it turns out that there is rather interesting indepen­dent evidence for this rule, and it is to that evidence thaf wemust now turn. (Prinee 1978: 9021

Tbis is a fluent complex sentence, apparently because the primary topic of theelause preceding the it-eleft is also processed as the first NP constituent of the eleft.Sentences like (37,a-c) show that the same fluency is achieved (for the same reason)whenever that evidence is the first element of the second clause, e.g. when it is thesubject of a WH-clause-final (unaccented-anaphoric-focus) WH-eleft, the topica­lized element in a clause that has undergone Y-movement or the subject of apassive:

(37) However, it turns out that there is rather interesting indepen­dent evidence tor this rule,(a] and that evidence is what we must now turn to.(b] and that evidence we must now turn t~.(c) and that evidence must naw be turned to.

However, the sequence will become much less natural if the it-eleft is replaced by astructure in which that evidence is no longer the first NP element in the elause, e.g. aWH-clause-initial WH-eleft or a noneleft elause with a different subject:

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(38) However, it turns out that there is rather interesting indepen­dent evidence for this rule,(a) and what we must naw turn ta is that evidence.(b) and we must naw turn to that evidence.

So, one of the principles determining the choice of possible constructions appearsto be that an NP will preferably be put at the beginning of a clause if it continues theprimary topic of the preceding cIause.

The following is another, though slightly different iIlustration of this principle:.

(39)[a) Have you found everything you need? - Weil, 1have foundIhe handbooks that I need, but I have not found the diction­ary.

(b) Have you found everything you need? - Weil, 1have foundthe handbooks that 1need, but what I have not found is thedtcuonsry.

In (39,a) the reply is an impeccable sentence because its two clauses open with thesame subject. The reply in (39,b) is also fine because the subject of the WH-eleft(what I have not foundï links up with the theme of the preceding discourse, viz.whether 1 have found everything 1 need and what exactly 1 have found. Using anÏt-eleft or a WH-clause-final Wll-cleft, however, yields a much less naturalsequence, because the thematic line is then broken up completely:

(40)(a) Have you found everything you need? - Weil, I have foundthe handbooks but it's the dictianary that I haven 't found.

(b) Have you found everything you need? - Weil, I've found thehandhooks but the dictionary is what I tievent tound.

If the speaker uses (40,a-b) rather than (39,a-b) he violates the principle of themecontinuity and the hearer will infer that he does so deliberately. For this reason thereplies in (39,a-b) and (40,a-b) will suggest slightly different interpretations. Thefact that the variabie part (thatlwhat I haven'tfoundi in (40,a-b) is not put in initialposition will be interpreted as meaning that it does not link up with the theme of theprcvious discourse. Whereas the variabie part of the WH-eleft in (39,b) is 'known'in so far as it can be inferred from the preceding context (via 'bridge-building'), thevariabie part of the clefts in (40,a-b) wil! be taken to be purely and simply known,For this reason (40,a-b) suggests that the fact that the speaker bas been unable tofind something must have been known to the hearer before the sentences wereuttered, rather than being deducible from the elauses preceding the clefts,

The examples in (39)-(40) involve what we have labbelled 'contrastive cIefts'.The principle of theme continuity observed in conneetion with unaccented­anaphoric-focus clefts is thus also applicable to contrastive clefts: if the variabIe partis to be represented as knowable (via bridges) from the preceding context, it wil!normally be put in initial position (i.e. a Wll-clause-initial WH-eleft will bepreferred to an it-cleft or a WH-c1ause-final WH-eleft).

The principle of theme continuity also plays a role in the use of discontinuousclcfts, Consider, for example, the following sentences:

(41Ha) The boat was rolling heavily and it was with the greatestdifficulty Ihat we managed to keep our tootheld.

(b) I know that the nominanon is a great honour. It is with greatpride that I accept it.

(c) The fire brigade was quickly on the spot, but it was with Ihegreatest difficulty that they managed to put out the fire.

In sentences like these the choice of a cleft involving a particular focal item seems tobe determined by the speaker's desire to construct a stretch of discourse in which thesentences logically link up with the preceding ones. Sentences (41,a-c) reflect thefollowing trains of thought:

(42)(a) rolling heavily - and (Iherelore) - difficult 10 keep one'stoothold

(b) a qreat honour - (hence) - great pride(c) quickly on the spot - but - difficult to put out the lire

The most important element in the third link is the idea 'with difficulty/pride'. It isthis element that links up with the previous links in the logicalline. For this reasonthe speaker will preferably process it as the first element of the second part of hissentence, and the use of an it-c1eftoffers him the possibility of doing this."

The above examples (36)-(41) suggest a double eonelusion. First, in a chain ofclauses there is a tendency to keep the primary topic continuous. Second, there is atendency to put such a continuous topic earlier in the sentence, and the choice of aparticular type of cleft is dependent on this. The following sentences provide afurther iIlustration of these two tendencies:

(43)A. But why are you so interested in Paris?B. (a) Paris is the place where 1met my wife.

(b) ??The place where I met my wife is Paris.(c) Paris is where I mei my wife.(d) ??Where 1met my wife is Paris.(e) 1Iis in Paris that 1met my wife.

The c1ear difference in acceptability (in this context) between the sentences of(43,B) confirms that one of the factors determining the speaker's choice of a

16. This concurs with the followingremarks which Halliday (1982: 81) makes in conneetion withso-called'conjunctiveadjuncts': "if thespeakerincludessome elementexpressingthe relationshipto what has gone beforc (...) it is natural for him to make this his point of departure (...) TheTheme of the message then becornes an indication of its significanee at that point in thediscourse."

""'"

particular eleft or noneleft construction consists in a tendency to continue thethematic line of a stretch of discourse by processing the most continuous topic at thebeginning of the sentence. Although there can be rio doubt about the observations,there may be some discussion as to the interpretation and evenmal explanation ofthe facts. Everything depends upon the particular theory of theme/topic that onewishes to accept as the correct one. Different theories are, indeed, available and theywill interpret the observations in a different way. I will briefly consider what seem tobe the two most important alternatives.

A. Halliday (1967, 1970b, 1982) makes a distinction between thc 'thematicstructure' of a sentence and.its 'information structure'. The information structure isdetermined by what is new or known (old) information; the thematic structure is aquestion of whether a particular part of the sentence is processed as 'theme' or as'rheme'. The 'theme' is the "communicative point of departure" of the clause and istherefore put in initial position. This means that in noneleft sentences the theme willnormally be the subject NP or a 'setting adverbial', In a WH-deft the theme iswhichevcr NP (i.c. the focus NP or the WH-clause) is put first (cf. Halliday 1967:226, 1982: 68-69). Thus, in a WH-elause-initial WH-eleft the theme is theWH-c!ause; in a WH-elause-final WH-eleft it is the NP functioning as value(focus). In U-clefts it is the clefted constituent that functions as theme.

There is often arelation between the tbematic structure of a sentence and itsinformation structure, in the sense that old information is more likely to beprocessed as theme than new information. However, this relation is by na meansabsolute: in it-clefts, for example, it is the elefted constituent that is the theme,although the Wll-clause contains the old information (at least in contrastiveclefts).

Hallidays's distinction between information structure and thematic structure isrelated to the distinction (made e.g. in Barry (1975), Bates (1976), Keenan &Schieffelin (1976), Van Dijk (1977), Levy (1982), Davison (1984» between the'discourse topic' and the 'sentence topic' (or 'clause topic'). The discourse topic isthe theme that persists through a number of sentences and which is the topic that thestretch of discourse is about. However, each of the sentences in this discourse has itsown sentence topic, which, even if the sentence continnes the discourse topic, maybe different from the latter. For example:

(44)A. What's the matter with Mary?B. John has been nagging her again.

In (44) the 'discourse topic proposition' is 'something is the matter with Mary', Thepro-ferm her in (44,B) represents old information and continues this discoursetopic. Tbe sentence topic of (44,B), however, is John. This Np' which representsnew information, is the theme in Halliday's sense because it is the 'communicativepoint of departure' of the clause.

It goes without saying that the observations we have made in conneetion with thespeaker's preferenee for using a particular type (or particular types) of (non)cleftsentences fits in perfectly with the above theory. We have observed that elementsthat continue the thematic line of the preceding discourse are preferably placed ininitial position in a cleft or specificational nondeft. In Halliday's terms this simplymeans that an element that is already thematic in the preceding context wiUpreferably also be the theme of the foUowing specificational sentence. This iscompletely in keeping with the observation that in a stretch of discourse "the sametheme tends to be held constant" (Bates 1976: 169).

B. Another theory oftheme/topic, advocated e.g. by Givón (1983), holds that thetopic is not an "atomic, discrete entity" (p.5), i.e. a single constituent of a clause.Tbis means that a clause may have several topics. These topics are 'participants' inthe sense that they are semantic arguments of the verb and may be grammaticallymarked for the semantic role that they express. For example, in a norm al Englishsentence the subject is the "primary grammaticalized topic" (Givón 1983: 6) andthe semantic role expressed by it is most frequently that of agent. A topic that alsooccurs in the preceding context is a 'continuous topic'; a topic that is entirely new isa 'discontinuous' one. In between the two extremes there is a whole range of'degrees of continuousness'. Zero anaphors and unaccented/bound pronouns areby definition the most continuous topics; referential indefinite NPs are the mostdiscontinuous ones. A number of dauses that are about the same theme constitute a"thematic paragraph" (p.8).

The observations that we have made can be fitted in this theory (only theessentials of which have been summarized here) if we assume that in English the'primary topic' tends to be put in initial position and, conversely, that an NP in frontposition tends to be interpreted as the 'primary topic'. These assumptions areconsistent with thc following observations :a. The subject Np, which is most often the 'primary grammaticalized topic', is

usually found in initial position: English is an SVO language (at least, this is theorder of the constituents on the surface).

b. In contrastive structures, where the contrastive element is the primary topic (cf.Givón 1979: 217), this primary topic wil! usually be put at the beginning. This isthe case in it-elefts, left-dislocated structures and sentences that have undergoneY-movement (contrastive topicalization).

c. If our assumptions are correct, the first NP element of a WH-eleft will beconsidered to be the primary topic. This is in keeping with the fact that thiselement (whether it is the focus NP or the WH-clause) is also the grammatical(syntactic) subject of the WH-cleft.

d. It is pointed out by Prince (1978: 899) that in all her examples of'informative-presupposition' it-c1eftsthat have an NP (rather than an adverbial)as focus, the NP invariably functions as subject of the WH-clause. This lends

support to the hypothesis that an NP in front position (which in this case is theclcfted constituent of the i/-deft) is normally interpreted as the primary topic.

ln the above theory, according to which the primary topic tends to be put ininitial position, the observations we have made in conneetion with (36)-(43) lead tothe conclusion that, when processing the material for bis sentence, the speaker wil!preferably assign the role and position of primary topic to an element that wasalready a topic in the preceding sentence(s). Whether this is a tendency that showsup in specificational (especially cleft) sentences only, is a question that falls outside .the scope of this werk.'?

It should be noted, finally, that whichever theory of topic is advocated, the factsof (36)-(43), which clearly reveal a tendency to put known information earlier inthe sentence, lead to the conclusion that WH-clause-final Wll-clefts are closer toit-clefts in usage than to WH-clause-initial Wfi-clefts.

3.3.2. It follows from the above principle of theme continuity that a focus NP thatis anaphoric wil! normally be processed before the WH-clause. Next to thistendency (but possibly related to it) there also appears to be a preferenee for puttingthe shorter of the two elements first (irrespective of wh ether it is the clefted NP orthe WH-clause), even when it is not anaphoric. That is, in the structures

(45)(a) tt is X +WH-clause (it-cleft)(b) X is WH-clause (WH-clause-final WH-cleft)(c) WH-clause is X (WH-clause-final WH-cleft)

X tends to be short in (45,a) and (45,b) but long in (45,c). Conversely, theWH-clause tends to be long in (45,a) and (45,b), but short in (45,c). The followingsentences il1ustrate these tendencies:

(46J(a) John should be punished because it is he who broke thevase.

(b) John should be punished because he is the one who brokethe vase.

(c) ??John should be punished because tne one who broke thevase is he/him.

(47J(a) Who broke that vase? - ft was John wno did it.(b) Who broke Ihat vase? - John was the one who did it.(c) Who broke that vase? - The one who did it was John.

In (46) the pronoun he virtually has to be processed first because it is both short andanaphoric. In (47) there is astrong tendency to put John in the first NP position in

17. Right-dislocated structures, in which the dislocated element is also mostly a continuous topic,appear to he an exception to this principle (seeGivón 1983).

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the e1eft: (47,a-b) are definitely more natural than (47,c). Yet, it is notJohn but theWH-clause that is a continuous topic. Tbe tendency to put a very short element atthe beginning of a eleft has tbus proved stronger here than the tendency to processcontinuous information first.

The following sentences further illustrate tbe point:

(48)(a) Good morning, sir. /s this what your son ordered by te/e­phone last night? Mywife was not sure she had undersloodhim correctly.

(b) 'Good morning, sir. /s what your son ordered by telephonelast night this? Mywifewas nol sure ...

(49)(a) It is tootbalt that most men (but very few women) would like10see on Ielevision every nighl.

(b) Football is what most men (but very few women) would like10 see on Ielevision every nighl.

(c) What most men (but very few women) would like to see ontelevision every nighl is tooibalI.

In (48) the very short focal NP this has to be put fust, even though it is notanaphoric.ë In (49) the WH-c1ause may be a continuous topic (e.g. ifthe sentencesare used in answer to What would most men like 10 see on television every night?),but (49,c) is nevertheless somewhat awkward, while (49,a-b) are fine. Here againtbe very short focus NP tends to preeede the comparatively long WH-elause.

3.3.3. There are still other factors that can determine the choice of a particular typeof eleft. A wel!-known factor in the choice between an it-cleft and a WH-eleft is thatthe range of WH-words is too narrow for every it-e1eftto be matched by a WH-eleft(see e.g. GundeI1977b: 551, Mackenzie & Hannay 1982: 49). This is the case in(50), where no WH-word appears to be available:

(50)(a) lI's wilh greal honour and pleasure that I announce our nextspeaker.

(b) The? that I announce Durnext speaker is with greal honourand pleasure.

18. Cataphoric this is,however,a possibleexception.Since it aanounces the followingsentence,it canalso be placed in final position (i.e.just beforeits referent).Compare (i.a-b) (with cataphoric thiJ')with (ii.a-b) (where anaphoric that is used):(i)(a) This is what they say we should do: we should sell this plaee and move 10

London.(b) Whal they say we should do is this: we should sell Ihis plaee and move 10

London.(ii)(a) (Their car has broken down.) - Thai is what I have been lelling you would

happen all along.(b) (Their car has broken down.) - 'What I have been lelling you would happen all

along is that.

There is a similar restrietion on ïr-clefts: if the value takes the form of athat-dause or whether-dause, only a WH-deft is quite acceptable:

(51)la) Whal I told him was that I was ill.(b) ??It was that I was ill that I told him.

00 the whole, however, thé cases in which an it-deft is ruled out while a WH-deftis possible are less numerous than the cases in which it is the other way round. Thereason is that the variable part of a WH-cleft opens with a WH-word (e.g. what;which; who, whose) which has specific syntactic and semantic properties, while thethat-c1auseof an it-eleft is compatible with nearly any kind of value, irrespective ofwhether it is a (human or nonhuman) Np, a prepositional phrase or an adverbia!.The fact that in 'informative-presupposition' it-elefts involving a that-dause there isno WH-word such as what; who, etc. also entails that the specificatiooal meaning ofsueh elefts is often less strongly marked. Thus, the it-eleft in

(32J I've been bit once already by a German shepherd. lt wasreally scary. Jt was an outside meter the woman had. I readthe gas meter and was walking back out ... (Prince 1978:894J

is hardly felt to specify a value for a variabie since there is no 'known' variabie (thealleged variabie part in faet contains new information) and there is no WH-wordexplieitly introdueing a variabie either. The function of this eleft is therefore not the(normally primary) function of identification (i.e. of specifyiog a value for avariable) but the (normally derived) funetion of marking emphasis.'? For thisreason the U-eleft cao hardly be replaced by a WH-e1eft (What the woman had wasan outside meter) because the presence of the WH-word what ioevitably means thatthere is a variabie to be identified.

This, then, is also an important pragmatic difference between otherwiseinterehangeable it-defts aod WH-elefts: when used as unaccented-anaphoric-focusclefts or discontinuous elefts (i.e. when there is 00 'old' variabie), the WH-defts willexplicitly establish a variabie, while the i/-clefts will not do so. Therefore only anU-deft win be appropriate if the speaker is looking for a means of marking emphasis(often for contrast) rather than for a construction in whieh a value is speeified for avariabie.

The above observation, that unaccented-anaphoric-focus and (especially) dis­continuo us U-elefts may be just emphasizing rather than identifying (specifica­tional), is corroborated by the following facts:

19. Thc view that "English uses the construction with it is in two functions: to emphasize and toidentify" (Kruisinga & Erades 1953: 144) was already familiar in traditional grammar. Theemphasizing function has also been revealedby tbc experiments made by Engelkarnp& Zimmer,which have led them to conclude that placing a concept in clefted position has the effect of"focussing the listener's attention on this concept" (Engelkamp & Zimmer 1983: 1) 9).

a. In section 2 we noted that discontinuous WH-defts and it-elefts can be used asdiscourse openers. However, it-defts appear to be much more frequent in this usethan Wll-clefts, (For example, Prince (1978) appears to have found noexamples of discourse-initial WH-clefts in her corpus, although there are quite afew examples of discourse-initial it-elefts.) The reason is that, because of theexplicit WH-word in WH-elefts, these clefts remain elearly specificational,whereas this is not true of it-elefts. The latter need not always presuppose avariabie involving old information and can therefore more easily be used at thebeginning of a stretch of discourse ..

b. As noted in ehapter 1 (section 4.6.B), tbe focal item of a eleft cannot normally bea universal pronoun like everybody:

[52) A. Who helped you?B. (aJ "ft was (not) everybody who he/ped me.

[b) *The one(s) who he/ped me was/were (not) every­body.

(53) *What a nice piece of work! The one(s) who c,,!n do thisis/are not everybody.

However, such a universal pronoun can sometimes be found as the focal item ofa discontinuous it-cleft:

(54](aJ What a nice piece of work! It is not every one who can dothis. (Kruisinga & Erades 1953: 144J

(b) It is not everybody that cares for early Staffordshire pottery.(Kruisinga 1932a: 386)

The reason why everybody cannot be used in (52,B) and (53) is that these cleftsare c1early specifieational, i.e. identifying. As we saw in section 4.6.B of chaptcr1, identifying sentences serve to piek out a member (or members) from a set ofcandidates and will therefore never involve a value part that refers to the set ofcandidates as a whole (i.e. a value part with a universal meaning). Indiscontinuous it-defts, however, this identifying function is absent or at leastsubordinate to the function of emphasizing a constituent, so that items like (not)everybody can more easily appear in focal position.ë'

c. The observation that, in many discontinuous it-elefts, the copula be is no longerfeit to be specificational concurs with the fact that be is often felt to have themeaning of happen or of some other dynamic verb (cf. Poutsma 1928: 141,Kruisinga 1932a: 503, Visser 1970: 50). Thus, be is more or less equivalent tohappen in

20. The exarnples that J have found are all ncgative. Pcrhaps the construction is impossible withoutnot. 1have no cxplanation for this restriction.

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(55)(a) It is not aften that we have snow here in september.(b) It is nearly twenty years ago that a human being set laat on

the maan lor the lirst time.

In (56) it was not for a week that.: can be paraphrased as 'a week lastedbefore ...':

(56) 1Iwas not lor a week that she wake Irom all this furniture andthose baoks and clothes. (Kruisinga & Erades 1953: 144)

d. As noted before, all specificational sentences, ineluding c1efts, have theimplicature of exhaustiveness. This means that the hearer has a right to coneludethat the value that is assigned to the variabie is not only correct but alsoexhaustive (i.e. that no other elements can also satisfy the variable). For thisreason, restricters like only orjust cannot normally be added to the focal item ofa (truly specificational) eleft (except in the negative -cf. chapter 1, section2.9):

(57) Who broke that bottle? - 1Iwas (*onlyl"just) John who brokeit.

There is one exception to this ruie. If the speaker knows or thinks that the heareroverestimates the number of elements in the vaIue, he can use a restricter in tbeclefted constituent to correct this false assumption. For example:

(58) At least thirty people were killed. - Oh no! ft was only thepilot who died. AII the others escaped wilh Iheir lives.

Now, if it is correct that unaccented-anaphoric-focus i/-elefts and discontinuousit-elefts may be emphasizing rather than specificationaI, we may expect that suchclefts do not (or hardly) have thc exhaustivencss impheature any more and thatrestricters can therefore be found in the elefted constituent. This expectation isactually borne out, as appears from the examples (59,a-c), in which the restrictercan even hardly be omitted:

(59)(a) 1Iis only of late that I have lound out how hard il is to forgivehim. (Poutsma 1928: 141)

(b) The reading ol ambiguous sentences Iike (22) in which thespeaker is responsible lor the description is called thetransparent reading; that in which the subject is responsibleis called Ihe opaque reading. ft iS'only in the opaque readingthat substitutivity and existential generalization are ru/ed out.(Heringer 1969: 91)

(c) 1\is only women who live alone that can know what it is toyearn 10 have a rnan's strang hand.

e. lt goes without saying that in a truly specificational cleft the clefted constituent

must be a single phrase, or a sequence consisting of conjoined elements, but not asequence of two or more discrete elements. That is, we can use either (60,a) or(60,b) but not (60,c), because it is not possible for the c1efted constiuent tospecify more than one variabie at a time:

(60Ha) It was JOHN who arrived yesterday.(b) It was YESTERDAY that John arrivee,(c) *It was JOHN YESTERDAY that arrived.

However, Delahunty (1981: 187) draws attention to exampies Iike thefollowing:

(61Ha) II was at Knock a century ago that Ihe Virgin appeared tolocal peasants.

(b) II was during a heated discussion at the Berlin Olympics in1936 that Hitier decided on his "Anschluss" policy.

I wouid account for these "apparent counterexamples to the claim that only asingle phrase may be focussed" (Delahunty 1981: 187) as follows. The examplesin question are elearly of our 'discontinuous cleft' type. As I have been arguing,this type of eleft may easily be used to emphasize rather than identify (specify). Ifit is used in this way, the restrietion that only one variabie can be specified at atime becomes irrelevant. If the eleft just serves to emphasize a sequence, there isno reason why the sequence in question shouid not consist of two differentconstituents (as long as these are not toa dissimilar in categorial status, i.e. theymay be two setting adverbiais, but not e.g. au adverbial and an NP).

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4. SPECIAL TYPES

I will conclude this chapter by pointing out a couple of special uses of clefts. Firstof aU, it is possible that a special accentuation pattern has the effect of changing thenormal function of a particular subtype of cleft, For example, in (62,B,b) and(62,B,d) unaccented-anaphoric-focus clefts are used to specify a value for a known(and given) variabie and therefore have the same function as the contrastive clefts(62,B,a) and (62,B,c), respectively:

(62)A. I hear you met someone in Paris?B. (a) Yes. ft was JOHN that / met there. (contrastive it·cleft)

(b) Yes. It was there that I met JOHN. (unaccented­anaphorlc-focus it·cleft)

(c) Yes. The one / met there was JOHN (contrastiveWH-cleft)

(d) Yes. That's where I met JOHN (unaccented-anaphoric-focus WH-cleft)

The reason is that the strong emphasis on John entails a specificationalinterpretation in which John is the value assigned to the variabie 'the one I met inParis', so that John is as contrastive in the unaccented-anaphoric-focus clefts (whereit is not the focus) as in the contrastive clefts (where it is the focus).

A similar use of emphasis is to be observed in 'correcting' clefts:

(63)A. Why did you hit her?B. (a) I beg your pardon! ft was SHE who hit ME!

(b) I beg your pardon! SHE was the one who hit ME!

The fact that two constituents are strongly accented entails that two specificationalacts take place (viz. 'the one who hit was: she' and 'the one who was hit was: me').These two acts of specification are necessary for the correcting effect: twopresuppositions of (63,A) have to be corrected (viz. 'you were the one who hit' and'she was the one who was hit'), In (63,B) only one ofthe two value NPs can take theposition of the c1efted constituent. The other value NP must therefore occur in theWH-c1ause, where contrastive emphasis marks it as the value NP of a specifica­tional act.

It is not only in correcting clefts that this double act of specification is to beobserved. The same thing happens when the cleft is used in answer to a questionthat contains two question words:

(64)A. About that fight, I want to know delinitely who started hittingwhom.

B. It was BILL who started hitting RONALD.

Another type of cleft that seems somewhat special is the following:

(65)A. Was lt John who complained?B, Of course, It is ALWAYS John who comoîsine.

This c1eft is of a kind that is emphasizing rather than specificational. Because thec1eftft is John who complains is a reiteration of the preceding question, the point ofthe sentence is no longer the specification of John as val ue for the variable. Rather itis to emphasize the idea of always, which is therefore inserted in the c1eftedconstituent. (Inserting it in the WH-clause would lead to an unnatural resultbecause always would not receive the necessary emphasis.) A/ways thus appears inthe c1efted part, not because it is the value assigned to a variable, but just foremphasis.

Apart from the special use of emphasis observed in (62)-(65), we may drawattention to a type of e1eft that really seems to be exceptional:

(66)(a) Here's good news lor you, You're not under arrest any more./t's the inspector who's made e mistske. The real culprit hasbeen found now.

(b) Don't worry. There's nothing wrong with the car, /t's the driverwho's a little tipsy.

(c) That story really makes me feel sick. I never did any of thethings referred 10 in that artiele. n's the reporter who hasinvented everything,

In e1efts like these bath the focus and the 'presupposition' are entirely new, yet theclefts as a whole are clearly discourse-conditioned, i.e. they require that somerelevant information has been given. It would therefore be impossible to use themas discourse openers. What is especially striking about thcm is that they hardly lookspecificational: they do not seem to assign a value to a variable, For that reason thefocus is not really contrastive (although it is heavily accented): in (66,a-c) there isno implication that anyone else might have made amistake, might have been tipsy,or might have invented the story. For the same reason these sentences do not involvea presupposed variabie either. Unlike other defts, they do not appear to provide ananswer to a question involving the same presupposition. It is possible that sentenceslike these should not be treated as clefts at al! but should be analysed as structuresinvolving 'pseudo-modifiers'." However, I do not as yet understand such sentencessufficiently to go further into them here.

21. 'Pseudo-modifiers' is the term used by Declerek (1981a) to refer to relative clauses, participialclauses and prepositional phrases that seeminglymodify a noun head but are neither restrietivonor nonrestrietive in the usual sense.For example:

lil What you hear is John (who is) working upstairs.See ~eclerek (1981a) for a fulldiscussionof sueh eonstruetions. (A brief summary hasbeen givenIn ehapter 2, seetion 7.).

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5. CONCLUSION

5.1. It has been argued that both it-elefts and WH-elefts may be subdivided intothree major subelasses, viz, contrastive elefts, unaccented-anaphoric-focus elefts anddiscontinuous elefts. This taxonomy goes far beyond that suggested by Prince(1978), since Prince treats WH-elefts as a unitary elass and distinguishes only twosubelasses of it-elefts.

5.2. The fact that both i/-clefts and WH-elefts can belong to each of the threesubtypes means that they basically have the same meaning and will be used inessentially the same way. Still, there are a number of pragmatic factors that maycause the speaker to prefer or rule out one of the alternative constructions in certaincontexts. The most important of these pragmatic factors has to do with the possibleor preferred selection of a particular element as (primary) topic of the sentence. Wehave observed that the (primary) topic of a specificational sentence is normally putat the beginning and preferably links up with the primary topic of the previoussentence(s). This has a bearing on the use of elefts because the element that isinterpreted as the primary topic of the eleft is the focus part in an U-cleft orWH-clause-final WH-eleft and the WH-clause in a Wll-clause-initial WH-eleft.

Other pragmatic factors have been identified. For example, a short focus orWH-elause will preferably take the initial position in any type of cleft, Anotherfactor is that, unlike 'informative-presupposition' WH-c1efts, unaccented­anaphoric-focus i/-elefts and discontinuous it-elefts do not explicitly establish avariabie, and may therefore easily be emphasizing rather than identifying(specificational). This resulted in a frequent use of it-clefts where WH-clefts wouldnot be appropriate.

5.3. Various factors have been pointed out that can induce a speaker to prefer a eleftto a noneleft sentence: the use of a specificational structure allows the speaker toexpress connotations such as contrast, emphasis and exhaustiveness; using a eleftmay be a means of creating suspense or of suggesting a higher degree ofinvolvement of the hearer with what is being said; or a eleft may be preferredsimply because it offers the syntactie advantage of involving two elauses.

5.4. I have stressed, finally, that the principles suggested here are possibly only thetip of the iceberg, and have drawn attention to a couple of exceptional types of cleftsthat deviate from regular elefts in various ways.

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CHAPTER 6. SPECIFICATIONALINTERPRETATION AND

WORD ORDER.When we use a sentence that we intend to be interpreted specificationally, we can

make use of several devices to make sure that the addressee hits upon the correctspecificational reading. In spoken English the usual way of conveying a specifica­tional reading is the use of contrastive accent (cf. chapter 1, section 2.8). In writtenEnglish, where accentuation is not available, we can recur to the use of a typicallyspecificational structure such as an ft-eleft. However, whether we are writing orspeaking, there is still another device at our disposal, viz. the manipulation of theword order of our sentence.

As a first example illustrating the potential impact of word order, let us comparethe following sentences :

(1Ha) To express so-called 'escapable obligalion', Ihe auxiliaryshould is used.

(b) The auxiliary should is used 10express so-called 'escapableobligalion'.

When these sentences are pronounced with the neutra! intonation pattern (i.e.when there is no contrastive accent on a nonfinal open cIass constituent) or whenno accentuation is available (because the sentences are part of a written text or areproduced in the monotonous way typical of a talking robot), we feel there to be adifference of meaning between them: the two sentences seem to provide an answerto different questions, i.e. (l,a) is an answer to (2,b), whereas (l,b) is an answer to(2,b):

(2Ha) Which auxiliary is used 10express sa-cal/ed 'escapableobligatian' ?

(b) Whal meaning is expressed by the auxiliary shou/d?

As we saw in chapter I (section 2.3), senten ces that provide an answer to awh-question are by definition specificational: they specify a value for the variabierepresented by the question-word. The semantic difference between (l,a) and (l,b)is therefore a difference between two specificational readings: the sentences areinterpreted as (3,a) and (3,b), respectively:

(3)(a) To express so-ca/led 'escapable obligation' Ihe to/lowingauxiliary is used: should.

(b) The auxiliary should is used tor Ihe fo/lowing purpose : 10express so-called 'escapable obliqatlon',

24~

(H snouiu oe oorne In nunc tnat 1 am now consmering (t.a-o) as u tney were. usecin isolation and without accentuation. It is, of course, true that (l,b) win beinterpreted as (3,a) if there is contrastive accent on the subject ~P (the ~uxiliaryshould) or if it is explicitly used in answer to (2,a). 1 am now disregarding suchextemal factors and concentrating purely on the different word order of thesentences.)

There is a similar difference of meaning between the following sentences :

(4)(a) When a person is against war or violen ce, he is ~ pacifist.(b) A person is a pacifist when he is against war or violence,

Sentence (4,a) just predicates of a particular kind of person tha~ he has th.echaracteristic of being a pacifist. The normal interpretation of (4,b), m contrast, IS

that a person is a pacifist if (and only if) he is against war or violence. That is, (4,b)can serve as a definition of what a pacifist is, whereas (4,a) will not normally beused for the purpose of such a definition. (If (4,a) were used in answer to thequestion What is apacifist? it would be a somewhat evasiv~ answer. It would se~mto refer to one of the cases in which one can speak of a pacifist rather than provideus with a straightforward definition of the concept itself.) . .

This distinction between (4,a) and (4,b) is a distinction between a predicationaland a specificational reading: whereas (4,a) conveys the predic~tional meaningparaphrased by (S,a), (4,b) suggests the specificational interpretation paraphrasedby (S,b):

(5)[a) When a person is against war or violence he has thecharacteristic of being a pacifist.

(b) A person is a pacifist in Ihe following case: if he is againslwar or violence.

In sum, the sentences of pairs Iike (1,a-b) and (4,a-b) suggest differ~ntinterpretations simply because they have a different word order. The ensumggeneralization would seem to be that for a specificational interpretation. to bepossible, the part representing the value must not preeede the part representmg thevariable,

To avoid any misunderstanding, I repeat that this is not by any means an absolut~principle. Tbere are several cases in which the speaker or writer need not observe rtbecause there are other factors that guide the listener or reader towards aspecificational interpretation. For example, the valu~ do~ preeede .the variabie inÎt-clefts but this does not obscure the intended specificational reading because (a)it-clefts' are typically specificational and (b) the division into a cleft~d consti~uentand a WH-clause leaves no doubt as to what is the value and what IS the vanable.Another case is that of copular specificational sentences such as The murderer ofKennedy was Lee Oswald or What I need is a new coat. As noted before, suchsentences are in principle reversible. However, we saw in chapter S that there are

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VälJOW; piagiuauc factors (naving to 00, amongst otner tnmgs, witn tne thematicorganisation of the stretch of discourse) which can make the inverted versionpreferable to the noninverted one or vice versa. If all these factors (and others, suchas context and accentuation) are eliminated, copular sentences probably alsoobserve the general principle. However, I will not go into this question here. Toavoid any problems, Iwill henceforth concentrate exclusively on specificationalsentences that are not of the copular type.

As noted above, another case in which the general principle is overruled is whenthe sentence involves contrastive accent, i.e. when the nuclear accent falls on aconstituent which would not receive it under neutral sentence accentuation. In thatcase the constituent in question is interpreted as the value of a specificationalconstruction, irrespective of whether it precedes or follows the variable part. (Thus,although (l,b) will not be interpreted as (3,a) under neutral sentence accentuation,it does acquire this interpretation when the NP the auxiliary shouJd receives thenuclear accent of the sentence.

A further case in which the general principle is overruled is when the sentence isused in a context which clearly invites a specificational interpretation. Tbus, inanswer to the question What meaning does used to express? sentence (6,a) mightserve as a suitable specificational answer, even though it would clearly be preferableto change the word order so as to get (6,b). (It should be noted, however, that (6,a)cannot receive the neutral intonation pattern here, so that we can only speak of aseparate type of exception when the sentence is used without accentuation (as e.g. inwriting).

(6)(a) The idea of 'habit in the past' is expressed by used to.(b) Used to expresses the idea of 'habit in Ihe pas!'.

Contrastive accent and embedding in a suitable context do not always allow thegeneral principle to be violated. Violation seems to be belter possible when the partthat is to be interpreted as the value is an NP than when it is an adverbial.Compare:

(7)A. Which term do you use 10express Ihis idea?8. (a) To express this idea we use Ihe term radiation.

(b) We use Ihe term radiation 10express this idea.(8)A. Which idea is expressed by the term radiation?

B. (a) We use the term radiation to express the idea of...(b) "To express Ihe idea of... we use the term radiation.

In both (7) and (8) the Asentences ask for specificational information. The (a)sentences of the answers provide this information in accordance with the rule thatthe variabIe should preeede the value. The (b) sentences in both cases violate thisrule, but the result is much worse in (8) than in (7). This shows that the generalprinciple may sometimes continue to hold, even when a specificational interpreta­tion is enforced by the context and by the use of contrastive accent. Thc following

245

question-answer pair is a further illustration of this:

(9)A. When did he leave?B. (a) He left yesterday

(b) ·Yesterday he left.(c) ??YESTERDAY he left.

Since the principle that we are investigating is overruled in marked sentencestructures like it-clefts and may be overruled when the sentence is a copular one,when there is contrastive accent, or when the sentence is embedded in a particularcontext, Iwill henceforth restriet the discussion to sentences that have an unmarkedstructure, involve no copula or contrastive accent, and are used out of context. Insuch sentences a specificational reading appears to suggest itself only when the valuepart follows the variabie part. The following sentences can serve as a furtherexample:

(10)(a) This type of vegetable is grown in Egypt.(b) In Egypt th is kind of vegetable is grown.

Sentence (IO,a) is ambiguous between a predicational reading ('This type ofvegetable is not unfamiliar in Egypt (and probably in other co~ntries as well') and .aspecificational reading ('It is in Egypt (and onIy there) that this type of vegetable IS

grown'). This specificational reading (on which in Egypt is the value part) IS nalanger available in {l O.b).'

How can the principle observed be accounted for? An answer that immediatel.ysuggests itself is that this principle follows from the rules that govern the thematic

I. In this context we can also note Chomsky's weïl-known examples(i) Beavers build dams.(ii) Dams are built by beavers.

Chomsky (1975: 97) observes that (i) "states that beavers have a certain property~namely,walthey are dam builders", while (ii) "states that it is a property of dams that they are built by,~vcrs.Under this interpretation, the sentence is false, since some dams are not built by beavcrs . In myopinion, (ii) is Ielt to be falsebecause by beavers, as a result of its end position, is felt 10be the focusof a specificational reading and is therefore interprered as 'only by beavers' (~cause of theexhaustiveness implicature attached 10 specificational sentences, cf. chapter 1, sectien 2.9): lf bybeavers is moved away from its end-position (as is possiblee.g, in Duteh, where a sentence likeB(beavers dams are built is fully grammatical), the specificational reading gets lost and by beovers IS

therefore no longer interpreted as 'only by beavers'. (That is, this sentence is assigned the sam.epredicational interpretation as (i).) (It should also be noted that (ii) remains unacccptable.Jf it IS

interprered predicationally rather than specificationally,because this inte~retatlon too entails thatthe sectenee makes a false statement: the predicational reading is something like 'Dams have tbecharacteristic of being built by beavers', which is of course a false generalization.)

24ó

organisation of sentences. Though there are several different theories of howsentences are structured in terms of theme and rheme or topic and comment(compare the Functional Sentence Perspective theory of the Prague school withHalliday (1967, 1970a, 1970b, 1982) and Givón (1983)), all theories agree thatthere is astrong tendency to process old (known, shared) information beforeinformation that is new? Since in a specificational sentence the variabie part isnormally old information whereas the value part is always new,3 the principleobserved is quite in keeping with this general rule of thematic organization.However, th is observation does not account precisely for those sentences that weare now considering, viz. the sentences that are used out of context (e.g.discourse-initially). Such sentences do not contain any information that is oId:everything is new information. Yet we have seen that it is precisely this type ofsentence that provides the best illustrations of the principle.

Another theory that looks like a plausible candidate for accounting for ourprinciple is Bolinger's (1965b) theory of 'linear modification'. Bolinger alsoobserves that alternations in word order may often have a semantic import.According to him, the reason is that "elements as they are added one by one to forma sentence progressively limit the semantic range of all that has preceded. Thiscauses beginning elements to have a wider semantic range than elements toward the

. end." (p.279). Thus, "before the speaker begins, the possibilities of what he willcommunicate are practically infinite. (...) When the first word appears, thepossibilities are vastIy reduced, but that first word has, in communicative value forthe hearer, its fullest possible semantic range. The second word follows, narrowingthe range, the third comes to narrow it still further, and finally the end is reached, atwhich point the sentence presumably focuses on an event - usually aided by agesture, a physical context in which only one of several possibilities can be e1ected,or what not." (p.281)

According to Bolinger, this theory predicts that constituents that are to imply'selective contrast' will be put as far back in the sentence as possible, for the idea ofcontrast is heightened as semantic narrowing proceeds. For example, we will use(lI,a) rather than (lI,b) if we wish to establish a contrast between open and'closed'. But if we wish to see the door contrasting with other objects, we will prefer(ll,b) to (ll,a):

2. See, for example, Lyons (1977: 507), who notes that "there is a very high correlation, not only inEnglish, but in al! languages, between occupying initial position in the utterancc and beingthematic, rather than rhematic". (This claim amounts to the same thing as saying tbat oldinformation is preferably expressedbefore new information, since "the theme is commonly defincdas the expressionwhich refers te wbat is given and the rheme as that part of the utterance whichcontains new information" (ibid.)

3. As noted in chapter 1 (section 2.6), the value part need not be new in the sense of 'not mentionedbefore', but it is always new in the sense that the assertion that it is this value that satisfies thevariabie is presented as new informarion.

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(11)(a) I pushed the door open.(b) I pushed open the door. (p.291)

Similarly, when we compare (I2,a) with (I2,b), we notice that only the latter"lends itself to the implication 'but not before' - selective contrast" (p.289) :

(12)(a) When you come 1'11 help you.(o) 1'11 help you when you come.

Bolinger adduces a great many other illustrations, all of which he claimssubstantiate his principle of linear modification. It is interesting to see that s~m~ ofthese examples are also good illustrations of the 'variable-before-value' principlethat we have observed. For example:

(13)(a) If you come 1'11 help you(b) 1'11 help you if you come.

Bolinger notes that of these two sentences "the first envisages more affrrmati,:,elythe possibility ofthe person's coming - has, that is to say~a meaning that goes a littlebeyond mere condition and may amount almost to an invitation; the second lendsitself more readily to the implication Til help you ONLY if you come' - selectivecontrast. When the if-clause is placed first, it serves as a frame for all that follows."(p.289) Bolinger's observation that only (13,b) readily suggests '?nly if you co~e'concurs with our claim that (when used out of context and without contrasnveaccent) only (13,b) yields the specificational interpretation '1'11help you i~ thefollowing case: if you come'. The idea of 'selective co~trast' then autornaticallyfollows from this reading (since a specificational reading IS always contrastive - cf.chapter I, section 2.8), and the same thing is tru~ ofthe id~ 'onl~ ir, which followsfrom the exhaustiveness implicature that is typical of specificational sentences (cfchapter 1, section 2.9).4 .

It would seem then that the principle of word order that we have observed inspecificational se~ten~s can be explained from Boling~r's .more gene~al principle ~flinear modification : since (according to the latter principle) selective contrast IS

4, Although Bolingerhimselfwas unaware of the fact when he published bis paper, ~e principleoflinear modit'ication (semantic narrowing) accords perfectly with the Functional Sent~ncePerspective theory of the Prague school, at least with the version that i~ expounded by Firbas(1964), According to Firbas, whether an expressionis thematic or rhematic depends on lts degreeof 'communicative dynamism' (= CD): thematic elements show a low degree of CD, w~ereas ahigh degree of CD is typical of rhematic elements. "It is obvious that elements CO,nvcymg.ne~unknown information show higher dcgreesof CD than elernentsconveyingknown information.(Firbas 1964: 270) One of the factors determining the deg,reeof ~D i~ "the capability ?f ~hesentencc positions of gradually raising the degrees of CD, m the direction from the beginningtowards the end of the scntcncc." (ibid.)

most likely to be associated with a sentence-final constituent, the value part of aspecificational sentence, which by definition implies selective contrast, wil!normally be put in that position. Constituents that occur before the variabie partwill not normally be taken to convey selective contrast (uniess, of course, theyreceive the nucIear accent) and will therefore not be interpreted as the value part ofa specificational reading.

Still, Bolinger's theory does not appear to explain everything. Although Bolingerconsiders examples in which selective contrast is involved as major evidence for hlstheory, it seems doubtful whether the principle of linear modification (according towhich there is semantic narrowing as the sentence proceeds) offers a fullexplanation of the observation that selective contrast is preferably associated withsentence-final position. Let us consider again the sentences of (11 .a-b):

(11Ha) I pushed open Ihe door,(b) I pushed the door open.

In (11 ,a) the selective contrast (uniess otherwise marked by contrastive accent on Ior pushedi is on the door; in (lI,b) it is on open.Yet, it does not seem to be the casethat the door narrows the semantic range of what precedes (by identifying wh at Ipushed) more drastically in (II,a) than in (ll,b). In both sentences the doorfollowspushed, so that the semantic narrowing is the same in both cases. Similarly, thenarrowing down from the idea of pushing to the idca of pushing open happens asclearly in (ll,a) as in (Ll.b): in both cases open follows push ed.Bolinger's principletherefore does not really predict the different location of selective contrast in (l l,a)and (ll,b).

The same remark can be made in conneetion with examples like thefollowing:

I!

III1III

1

II

(14)(a) Try 10force back Ihis bolt.(b) Try 10force this bolt back.

Bolinger correctly observes that it is natural for the adverbial partiele back to beput in post-position if it is to express selective contrast (p.290). However, this is notreally predicted by his Iheory, since back narrows down Ihe idea expressed by forcethe moment it is placed after this verb, irrespective ofwhether it precedes or followsthe direct object.

It would seem, then, that the principle of linear modification, even though it isright in stating that selective contrast increases with semantic narrowing, fails tooffer a full explanation of the fact that contrastive elements (such as the values ofspecificational sentences) favour end-position, In my opinion, the principle thatdoes account for this is the principle of intonational end-prominenee (rather thanBolinger's principle of semantic end-prominence, though the two are of course

closely related). As noted in chapter 1 (section 2.6),5.the constituent which, und~rneutra1 sentence intonation, receives the nuclear (primary) accent of the clause IS

the last open-class constituent of the sentence, i.e. the n~u.n, verb, adver? oradjective that occurs most to the right in the sentence. (Prepositions may so~et1m~also receive the nuclear accent, but pronouns never do.) In accordance wl~h .th.lsrule the nuclear accent is on this bolt in (14,a) and on back in (14,b), and th~ IS lil

keeping with the fact that it is these constituents that imply selective contrast I~.therespective sentences. If we add to the sentences an adverbia1 that takes end positron,neither this bolt nor back implies selective contrast any longer:

(15)(a) Try 10 force back this bolt with a screwdriver.(b) Try to force this bolt back with a screwdriver.

Under neutral sentence intonation the nuclear accent is now on screwdriver, andthis constituent is therefore the only one that can imply selective contrast.

The relation between the neutra! position of the nuclear accent and the neutralposition of the constituent implying selective contrast is also clear from thefollowing examples:

(16)(a) He threw the oranges back.(b) He threw back Ihe oranges.(c) He threw the oranges back 10 her.(d) He Ihrew back the oranges to her.(e) He threw the oranges back to the shopkeeper.(1) He lhrew back the oranges 10the shopkeeper.

In (16,a) and (16,c) back is the constituent that receives the nu.dear ~ccent andwhich expresses sc1ective contrast. In (16,b) and ~~6,d.)that constituent IS orange~.In (16,e-f), on the other hand, the NP in final positron IS no ~ongera ?ronoun and itis therefore this NP that receives the primary accent and the mtormauon focus of ~hesentence. It follows that back and oranges no longer clearly ~xpress selectivecontrast. When used out of context and without special contrastive acce.nt~bot~(l6,e) and (16,f) have their nuclear accent on the shopkeeper, so that u IS thisconstituent that implies selective contrast.

Let us consider one more example:

(17)(a) Have you already seen him?(b) Have you seen him already?

The adverb already receives greater emphasis in (17,b) than in (17,a). (1_7,b)istherefore the better means to suggest that the speaker is surprised that something hasalready happened. (That is, it is (17,b) that implies contrast between what has

5. Sec also Quirk et aL 1972: 943, Hajicova& Sga1l1975: 31, Dekeyscr el aL 1979: 4, etc.

happened and what had been expected to happen.) This contrastiveness followsfrom the emphatic end-position of a/ready, and is not really predicted by Bolinger'sprinciple of semantic narrowing.s

The conclusions that we have arrived at can be summarized as follows. When thevalue part of a specificational sentence cannot be identified from the context, fromthe use of special contrastive emphasis or from the use of a marked sentencestructure, it is the word order of the sentence that determines which constituent eanbe interpreted as the value part of a specificational reading. The principle appears tobe that the constituent in question normally fills the position at the end of thesentence, thus following the part that is to be interpreted as the variable,

This principle is in keeping with the well-known rule that new information ispreferably processed after old information and with Bolinger's theory of linearmodification (semantic narrowing). These two theories, however, do not comp­letely account for the principle in question. My suggestion is that the preferenee forthe value part of a specificational sentence to go in end-position is linked up with thefact that it is in that position that a constituent receives the primary accent andinformation focus of the sentence. Since the value part of a specificational sentenceis by definition contrastive, it is only natura1 that, other things being equal, theconstituent expressing the value should favour the position where the idea ofselective contrast is most naturally evoked.

Let us note, finally, that this conclusion is perfectly in keeping with Halliday'swell-known distinction between thematic structure and information structure.Although he agrees that the theme is very often something that is known rather thansomething that is new, Halliday holds that it is actually inforrnation-structure that isdetermined by whether something isgiven or new. He also points out that, at least inEnglish, information-structure is primarily a matter of stress (or rather accent) andintonation: constituents that convey new information are generally accented, andconstituents that convey information that is represented as known or recoverablefrom the context are de-accented, It goes without saying that this theory accordsperfectly with what I have argued. When a particular constituent is presented as thevalue of a specificational reading (and is therefore to be interpreted contrastively),this automatically means that the constituent in question is new (in the sense definedin footnote 3). It follows that it will normally occupy the position that receives theheaviest accent in the sentence, viz. the position of the last open-class item.

I1~t

111{!!

6. In a Laterpublication (viz. The phrasal verb in Englislz)Bollager (197l: 45-60) recognizes theconneetion between the position of the nuclear accent and the identificationof the constituent thatis the "semantic peuk" of thc sentence.

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