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Strategic TrendsSouth Asia Series Volume 1 Issue 1, September 2011

Observer Research Foundation

Myanmar's Changing Political Landscape:

Key Players and Recent Trends

K. Yhome

Observer Research Foundation

K. Yhome



2011 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may bereproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from ORF.

Strategic Trends presents a broad scrutiny of events and actors in

the contemporary geo-political context for an informed appraisal of the

near future. This series forms an important part of ORF's Net

Assessment Project launched in January 2011. The project, in the

present edition, is an attempt to study key developments and policy

makers, especially in the political and military sphere, in South Asia with

a view to map the emerging challenges facing India.

About the Author:

K. Yhome is a Research Fellow at the Observer Research

Foundation (ORF), New Delhi. He completed his Ph.D from Jawaharlal

Nehru University, New Delhi. His research interests include India’s

neighbourhood, Southeast Asia and China’s Southwest Provinces. He

has published a book, Myanmar: Can the Generals Resist Change?, and

contributed chapters and articles in edited books and journals. He can be

contacted at [email protected]

yanmar has recently undergone a major political

transition from military to “civilian” rule. In November M2010, the country conducted its first national elections in

two decades in which the military party, the Union Solidarity and

Development Party (USDP) won a massive victory. The first

parliamentary session was held in February 2011 during which a new

President of the country was elected and a new government formed.

However, the overall political situation remains fragile owing to lack

of national reconciliation between the military, the pro-democracy

supporters led by Aung San Suu Kyi and the ethnic groups with fierce

fighting between some ethnic armed groups and the Burmese army

continuing. The future direction of the country's politics remains

uncertain. In the midst of these uncertainties, there are some factors

that will continue to remain important including the role of the

military in politics, the ethnic parties/groups, and the pro-democracy

groups. This paper attempts to provide an understanding of key

players in Myanmar's domestic politics and the emerging political

trends.

In the past few years, Myanmar has witnessed significant political

developments, which in some ways had precipitated the November

2010 elections. In September 2007, the military government

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Introduction



confronted its strongest challenge in two decades as monks led

protest demonstrations on the streets chanting national

reconciliation, democracy and economic development. After initial

reluctance, the security forces launched a bloody crackdown on the

monk-led demonstrations that killed dozens of protesters and

thousands were arrested, including monks. In May 2008, the country

held a referendum on the new constitution in the midst of a

devastating cyclone that hit the most fertile Irrawaddy region. The

government claimed that the constitution was approved by an

overwhelming 92.5 per cent of the voters. Most of the major armed

ethnic nationalities rejected the new constitution saying that it had

excluded their long-standing demand of a federal system. The

National League for Democracy (NLD) and other pro-democracy

groups, both inside and outside Myanmar, rejected the constitution

on the ground that they were not part of the National Convention that

drafted the constitution.

In early 2008, the military government had announced that it would

hold elections in 2010. The NLD decided to boycott the elections. As

part of its preparation of the elections, the military government

proposed the Border Guard Force (BGF) to allow the ethnic armed

groups to participate in the November elections. The BGF plan was

rejected by several major ethnic armed groups and as a result the

Burmese army attacked the Kokang ethnic armed group, a relatively

small group in the Sino-Myanmar border region, in August 2009.

Elections were held as scheduled without the participation of the

NLD and other ethnic groups that rejected the BGF proposal. Just a

week after the November 7 elections, Aung San Suu Kyi was released

from house arrest on November 13, 2010.

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ORF Strategic Trends

MAJOR POLITICAL PLAYERS

The Military (or the Tatmadaw): Role in Politics

Myanmar has been under military domination for almost five decades

since its independence in 1948. The Tatmadaw under Gen. Ne Win

staged the first military coup in 1962 and ruled for 26 years under the

guise of “Burmese Way to Socialism”. The second military coup was

staged by Gen. Saw Maung in 1988 and the Tatmadaw continued its

rule till March 2011. The origin of the Tatamadaw's role in politics can

be traced back to the days of the country's independence struggle in

the 1940s. Having surfaced as a force fighting for independence, the

army and national political goals became synonymous. It was this role

as “the liberating force” that politicized the Tatmadaw from the very 1beginning.

The Tatmadaw's role in national politics was buttressed when the

country plunged into civil war soon after independence. Various

ethnic nationalist and communist armed groups waged war against

the central government. This provided the military not only an

opportunity to involve itself in civilian affairs but, more importantly,

deeply shaped the mindset of Tatmadaw officers. The military began

to see itself as a “uniting force”. The split in the ruling civilian party in

the late 1950s “led to a parliamentary crisis and weakened the 2

legitimacy of civilian governance in the eyes of the military”. In the

face of the political crisis, Prime Minister U Nu asked the Tatmadaw

to take over power and a caretaker government under the Tatmadaw

was established in 1958. The caretaker government provided an

opportunity to the Tatmadaw to centralize the government

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Myanmar's Changing Political Landscape: Key Players and Recent Trends

administration and get first-hand experience in the management of

state affairs.

This experience and the Tatmadaw's view of itself as the “uniting

force” gave the confidence and the rationale to Gen. Ne Win to stage

the first military coup in March 1962 when the civilian government

was engaged in talks with leaders of an ethnic minority on the issue of

autonomy. The Tatmadaw viewed granting autonomy to the ethnic

minority as a threat to the country's territorial integrity. Gen. Ne Win

created the Revolutionary Council and transformed the country from

a parliamentary democracy into a socialist democracy. The Council

revoked the 1948 Constitution, dissolved parliament, abolished

political parties and imprisoned political leaders. One of the first

things the Council did was to “depoliticize politics and ban 3

independent organizations” and gradually “militarize governance” .

Military leaders were brought to state political power and their 4

civilian opponents purged. The regime also set up a Tatmadaw-led

socialist party called the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP).

The 1974 Constitution was drafted by Tatmadaw officers that

allowed the BSPP to be “the only centre of power on the political and

legal order [and] to sustain its indirect military rule”, as it envisaged 5only one party, the BSPP. It banned other political parties and

independent unions and restrictions were put on right to freedom of

expression and assembly. Retired Gen Ne Win who served as the

chairman of the Revolutionary Council became the chairman of the

party and also the president of the country. Both retired and active

Tatmadaw officers dominated the highest decision-making body of

the party called the Central Executive Committee (CEC). The

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Tatmadaw was seen as “the main pillar” of the party. Ne Win's

“attempt and failure” to build a party-state stalled the development

of civilian institutions while “it institutionalized Tatmadaw

intervention into every field of the government.” As a result, the

Tatmadaw became “the most powerful political actor” in the country 6

and ensured durability of its rule.

The Tatmadaw government's sudden demonetization in 1987 led to

student demonstrations which ultimately resulted in a mass

movement calling for the return of democracy in mid-1988. The

BSPP collapsed in the midst of the demonstrations. However, the

Tatmadaw remained united and stage the second coup in September

1988 under Gen. Saw Maung. The demonstrations were crushed

with brutal force, and thousands of people were killed. Having

revoked the 1974 socialist constitution and with the socialist

parliament dissolved, the Tatmadaw set up a new regime called the

State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) with all the

executive, legislative and judicial powers vested on the chairman of

the Council. Soon after taking over power, the regime promised

multi-party democratic elections.

In the 1990 elections, the National League for Democracy (NLD) led

by Aung San Suu Kyi, won a landslide victory. The pro-military party,

the National United Party was defeated. However, the Tatmadaw

refused to transfer power to the newly democratically elected party.

The Tatmadaw government then set up a National Convention to

draft a new constitution. Most of the delegates were handpicked by

the Tatmadaw.

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The 1988 pro-democracy uprising and the results of the 1990

elections were seen as wakeup calls for the Tatmadaw. A massive

state-building programme, including transformation of the Tatmadaw 7

was launched. As part of this, the Tatmadaw government entered

into ceasefire agreements with several ethnic armed groups in the late

1980s and early 1990s. This was done primarily to prevent

cooperation between the pro-democracy groups and the ethnic 8

armed groups. To centralize its control, the Tatmadaw government

set up law and order restoration councils at every level of government,

including the village and ward levels. Decision-making at all levels was

controlled by the Tatmadaw and civilian participation was negligible.

Retired Tatmadaw officers were made civilian administrative officers

at the lowest level. Civil bureaucracy was further militarized when

the regime appointed many retired Tatmadaw officers as director

generals and to other senior ranks.

The Tatmadaw regime renamed itself as State Peace and

Development Council (SPDC) in 1997 and ruled for two decades. In

2003, the Tatmadaw government announced a seven-step “roadmap

to democracy” and as part of the roadmap the controversial

November 2010 elections were held in which the military party, the

Union Solidarity and Development Party, won a huge victory.

Ethnic Nationalities

Ethnic nationalities are yet another significant factor in the political

scene of Myanmar. The majority Burmans or Bamars represent an

estimated 60-65% of the population of about 55 million and the

balance 40% comprises of several ethnic groups or nationalities as

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they call themselves. There are more than 100 languages and dialects

in Myanmar. Most of the ethnic groups live in mountainous

borderlands. The largest ethnic nationalities are Shan and

Karen/Kayin groups while others include Mon, Rakhine, Chin,

Kachin, Karenni/Kayah, Chinese, Indian, Danu, Akha, Kokang, Lahu,

Naga, Palaung, Pao, Muslim Rohingya, and Wa peoples (See

Appendix-I). While the majority Burmans in Myanmar are Theravada

Buddhist, the majority of ethnic Kachin and Chin and a significant

minority of Karen are Christian. Rohingyas are Muslim.

Ethnic conflicts in Myanmar have deep historical roots. Most of the

ethnic nationalities revolted against the state when the Burman-

dominated government sought to make the Burmese language,

Buddhism and Burman culture as the single identity for the country in

the early years of its independence. After decades of armed conflicts

between several ethnic armed groups and the Burmese army, in the

late 1980s and early 1990s, the military government entered into

ceasefire agreements with many of the ethnic armed groups. The

politics of opposition through armed struggle also underwent

dramatic changes as a result of mutinies of Wa and Kokang ethnic

groups, which led to the collapse of the Communist Party of Burma in

1989.

The sudden change in ethnic politics was seen by the government as

an opportunity to manage conflicts with the hope that it could bring

the groups under its influence and bind them with certain

agreements. The government immediately proposed ceasefires with

the armed groups. The ceasefire agreements provided autonomy, and

allowed the ethnic groups to maintain their arms, but the political

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solution was left to be resolved by a new elected government. Soon,

over twenty armed groups signed ceasefire agreements with the

government. However, several major ethnic armed groups remained

outside the ceasefire arrangement and the conflicts continue till

today.

The relationship between the army and the ethnic groups, which had

signed the ceasefire agreements, worsened in April 2009 when the

army served an ultimatum to the groups to become Border Guard

Force (BGF). The BGF plan gives greater control of ethnic armed

groups to the army by putting all ethnic armies under the command of

the commander-in-chief of the army with all the key positions with

the Burmese army. Seventeen ceasefire groups and factions accepted

the BGF plan or became local militia (See Appendix III) just before

the November elections and supported politicians and/or political

parties. However, twenty-three major ethnic armed opposition forces

rejected the BGF proposal (See Appendix III). In August 2009 the

army attacked and seized control of ethnic Kokang (Myanmar

National Democratic Alliance Army) on the Sino-Myanmar border,

but the huge protest that followed stopped the army from taking any

further military action as it turned its focus on the elections.

Pro-democracy Groups led by the NLD

Since the 1990 elections, the NLD, to which Daw Suu Kyi belongs,

has been regarded as the main leader of the movement for the

establishment of democracy. The NLD was formed in September

1988 within days of the BSPP's collapse, incorporating Daw Suu Kyi,

Brig Gen. Aung Gyi, former chief-of-staff, Brig. Gen. Tin Oo and

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other retired army personnel and politicians. Within a month of its

formation, membership swelled to thousands. By April 1989, the

NLD claimed over a million members drawn from throughout the

country. The NLD won the 1990 general elections with 59% of the

national votes and 81% (392 of 485) of the seats in Parliament.

However, many of its leaders have been imprisoned and the party has

faced harsh government suppression. A number of elected

representatives escaped arrest and formed the National Coalition

Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), the government-in-

exile, headquartered at Manerplaw along the Thai-Burmese border in

order to carry on the struggle for democracy and freedom.

Following the NLD's deregistration for deciding not to contest the

November 2010 elections, the new party–the NDF (National

Democratic Force) was established by a number of senior NLD

members who had been in favour of participation. The release of

Aung San Suu Kyi last year raised the hope that the 2000 other

political prisoners would also be freed. Since coming to power, the

new government has granted amnesty to some prisoners, but it is not

clear if this included political prisoners. The initiatives and issues

Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD have been taking up could bring them

in direct confrontation with the new government. On June 29, the

state media warned Suu Kyi that her planned national tour could 9trigger riots.

The Buddhist clergy

Buddhism is the major religion in Myanmar, with 85 per cent or 48

million followers of the faith. The activism of the monks and nuns is

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significant in the light of the role played by them in Myanmar's

political history. Buddhist monks have played a key role as advisers to

Burmese kings and exerted influence over political and diplomatic

affairs. They played a pivotal role in the nationalist movement against

colonialism in the early twentieth century. Their activism continued

after independence; they took part, for example, in the pro-

democracy uprising of 1988, in which a number of monks were killed,

tortured, and imprisoned. They also led the September 2007 protests

rallies, in which many monks were arrested and according to some

human rights activists, there are still 255 monks behind bars.

The monks and nuns, or the Sangha community, are about 400,000 in

number and are considered “the strongest institution in Myanmar

after the armed forces.” The military regime has tried to build closer

relations with the Sangha community. It has been the practice of the

regime's officials to visit temples, build large pagodas, or make

offerings, to keep the monks on their side. The State Sangha Maha

Nayaka Committee (comprising mainly elderly senior monks) was set

up in 1980 by the Ne Win government as a means towards this end. In

the 2007 demonstrations, it was the young monks who took the lead,

despite the State Sangha's advice against the protests. Critics say that

many of the senior monks, who have been accepting gifts and large

donations from the regime, have become “government tools” and

question their ability to stand up for the interests of the Sangha

community and the Burmese people. In recent years, questions have

been raised about whether there is division within the Sangha

community.

MAIN FEATURES OF THE 2008 CONSTITUTION

The 2008 Constitution provides immense power to the Tatmadaw.

One of the six basic principles of the constitution states that the

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military will be able to participate “in national political leadership role

of the state”. The Tatmadaw is granted broad powers to suspend all

“fundamental rights if necessary” during an emergency. The Supreme

Court's power to issue writs, including habeas corpus, is similarly

suspended in times of emergency. The President may declare a state

of emergency during which the Tatmadaw Commander-in-Chief,

aided by the National Defence and Security Council (six of whose 11

members are Tatmadaw), assume “legislative, executive and judicial

powers”. Such emergency powers are extendable to at least a year.

Soldiers, nominated by Tatmadaw Commander-in-Chief, would

comprise a mandatory 25 per cent of members of both houses in the

national parliament and one third of state and regional assemblies. A

Tatmadaw member must be one of the three candidates for President,

to be elected by parliament, and at the very least must be one of the

two vice-presidents. Ministers for “defence, security/home affairs

and border affairs” must be Tatmadaw members in the national, state,

and regional governments. Soldiers may also be appointed to other

ministries. Parliament has no standing committee on security or

defence. If necessary, an ad-hoc committee (Defence and Security

Committee) may be formed (for a limited period), but it must consist

of Tatmadaw members only, with civilians added only “if necessary”.

The Tatmadaw is self-administered, independent of other state

organs. The Supreme Court has no powers over military courts, and

final decisions on matters of military justice rest with the

Commander-in-Chief. The President is not answerable to any court

or parliament in exercising his duties. No legal action may be taken

against those “who officially carried out their duties according to their

responsibilities” during the period of the Tatmadaw governments.

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THE NOVEMBER 2010 ELECTIONS

The electoral field was heavily tilted in favour of the regime's Union

Solidarity and Development Party due to strict regulations on

registration, the cost of registering candidates, and the limited time

for parties to organize. Despite the restrictions, democratic

opposition parties participated in the polls to make the best use of the

limited space available. The question which most of the political

players confronted was whether to participate or not in the less-than-

fully-democratic elections. Some felt that by boycotting elections, it

would only lessen their voice in public policy; by participating in the

elections they could work for reform and progress from within the

system.

Overall, 3,069 candidates from 37 parties ran for seats in the Upper

House, the Lower House, Region and State assemblies; 1,148 were

elected. The government claimed that 22.18 million or around 76 per

cent of the 29 million voters aged 18 and above voted across the

country on November 7, 2010. More than 4.5 million votes were

either cancelled or lost. The elections opened up new arrangements in

Burmese politics, which are likely to play out over the course of the

next several years.

POLITICAL TREND LINES

Old Issues, New Players

The formation of a new government in March 2011 has lead to the

dissolution of the previous military government, the SPDC, which

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ruled for two decades. The new cabinet includes a host of ex-military

men, many of whom were cabinet members under the SPDC. Since

the new administration came to power a few months ago, there are

few discernible trends that show both continuity and change from the

past. These trends also provide an indication of how politics in

Myanmar will shape up in the coming years. The government's nation

“rebuilding” project, in a society deeply fragmented on the lines of

ideology and ethnicity, remains far from even getting started.

Myanmar has entered a new phase in its political history, but the long-

standing political issues remain unresolved with the potential of

throwing the country back to the days of civil war. This is so because

the root causes of the conflicts remain unresolved and there are no

signs of any early resolution to these issues.

The ethnic nationalities' demand for a genuine federal system and the

pro-democracy groups' demand for greater freedom have not been

met by recent political changes initiated by the previous military

government. The 2010 elections and the formation of the newly

elected government have not brought an end to the triangular politics

involving the military, the pro-democracy groups, and the ethnic

nationalities—they continue to dominate the post-elections politics

of the country. In addition, new players have been introduced in the

country's political arena, most notably the new military leadership

and the new ethnic political parties.

For a long time, the ethnic aspirations and grievances were

represented by the ethnic armed groups. The emergence of several

ethnic political parties—about 16 parties were elected in both the



National Parliament and the State Assemblies (See Appendix

III)—has resulted in a parallel representation of the ethnic cause

which in some ways undermines, if not challenges, the ethnic armed

groups' claim of being the sole representatives of the ethnic people.

Again, for over two decades, Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD have

been the torch-bearers of the country's pro-democracy forces. Today,

there are political parties who speak the same language such as the

National Democratic Force and Democratic Party, among others.

This does not imply that the ethnic armed groups and Aung San Suu

Kyi's NLD have lost relevance in the new political landscape. What is

significant, however, is that the increasing number of players will have

their own agenda resulting in opposition politics of the country

undergoing a change from the past. It is in the backdrop of the

evolving political dynamics that a few political trends are identified

below.

Incremental Reforms

There have been significant changes that have been taking place since

the November 2010 elections. A clear departure from the previous

military rule is the fact that members of parliament have been

“expressing dissenting opinion” and the new parliament has been

exhibiting “unprecedented levels of accountability”, as could be seen

in the way parliament discussed issues of national importance

including the national budget and accountability. Unlike in the

previous military government where all the state structures were

dominated by military personnel, today the legislative branch of the

government is composed of a combination of civilian and military

officers, both in the national and regional parliaments. However,

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many believe that the government will not be able to carry out radical

reforms as the political situation remain fragile and the new

government has budgetary limitations to undertake meaningful

reforms, particularly in social services, education, and health.

Since its formation, the new government has sent “mixed signals” on

reforms. Even as the media remains heavily regulated, the govern-

ment has relaxed censorship of apolitical journals, which some argue 10

is “marginal” . The pressure for reforms is likely to increase in the

coming years. However, pressure may not be strong enough to push

for radical change. This, coupled with the government's own fear that

rapid reform may threaten its hold on power, will ensure that reforms

are incremental with high tendency of centralisation.

Rift between civilian and military leadership

Although the top leaders of the new government have shown unity,

the possibility of personal rivalry among the top leaders exists. In the

absence of Than Shwe, there would be competition for the top

position.

Despite the fact that the USDP and the new army leadership wield all

powers, there are “tensions and conflicts of interest” between the 11new army leadership and the USDP , and some believe that there

may be an eventual spilt between the two. It has been reported that

many top USDP leaders are not satisfied with their new civilian

status. This may push them to exert a degree of parliamentary

authority. If the elected candidates try and exert power both at the

national and provincial levels, there would be areas where they would

find it difficult as the military may constrict such political space.



Having said this, the new “civilian” government's relationship with

the military is likely to continue and it may take a long time for the

government to emerge out of the military's shadow; such a possibility

is unlikely during the reign of the current government. The new

leaders of Myanmar have been groomed by Than Shwe who continues

to remain the de facto ruler. As long as Than Shwe is alive, he will

continue to guide the new government and control the government

from behind the scenes. More importantly, the fear of losing power

may provide the glue for the USDP leadership and the military to

stick together at least in the foreseeable future.

The military will remain a key political player

The new political set-up provides immense powers to the military,

ensuring its role in the functioning of the government. Under the

2008 Constitution, 25 per cent of the legislative seats are reserved for

serving military personnel and the Commander-in-Chief has

enormous powers in appointments and decision-making. Most of the

military appointees in the new parliament have been filled with low-

ranking officers–Majors and Captains with a small number of

Colonels. Some see this as deliberately designed to keep the military 12

bloc “cohesive and compliant with the wishes of military superiors”.

About one third of ministers have been reappointed from the

previous cabinet with the same portfolios. Again, the most important

executive organ of the country–the National Defence and Security

Council (NDSC) includes the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence

Services, the Deputy Commander-in-chief and the Minister for

Defence. The previous military government introduced compulsory

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National Service in December 2010, which may also bolster the social

power of the military in the future.

A new generation of leaders has taken over the leadership of the

military with the Commander-in-Chief of the Defences Services,

General Min Aung Hlaing replacing Than Shwe. The military retains a

strong influence in security matters and the economy. In one of his

first public speeches after taking over as the new Commander-in-

Chief of the Defence Forces, General Min Aung Hlaing, while

acknowledging the “transition to multi-party democracy system”,

also said the military could “handle political issues if necessary” and

on “assuming state's responsibility”, the military would “implement 13the seven-step roadmap step-by-step”. The military still to sees

itself as an important player in the country's political transition

process and the fragile politico-security climate of the country will

ensure that the military continues to have a role in the country's

politics.

Conflict may intensify in ethnic areas

The new President's move to make the ethnic nationalities issue a top

priority and call to build national unity is certainly a major move away

from how previous governments had approached the ethnic issue.

Even as symbolic gestures have been made by the appointment of Sai

Mauk Kham, an ethnic Shan, as the Second Vice President and calls

made for national reconciliation, the ethnic question remains

problematic with a resolution unlikely in the near future. Even with a

new administration in power, fierce fighting between the ethnic

armed groups and the Burmese army continues. Little has been



achieved so far in finding a way to resolve the ethnic question. In fact,

recent developments in the ethnic areas suggest that there has been

no change in the government’s approach towards the ethnic groups.

Renewed fight began between government troops and the Shan State

Army-North (SSA-N) immediately after the 2010 elections leading

to the SSA-N losing its bases and in June 2011 with the Kachin

Independence Army (KIA) in Kachin Region. Furthermore, the

defeat of a proposal to find a peaceful resolution with the ethnic

armed groups in the new parliament (520 votes to 106 votes) on

March 25, 2011 suggests that the new government has no intention to

resolve the ethnic issue peacefully. Even as the government seemed

determined to pursue a military solution, in February 2011, eleven

ethnic non-ceasefire and former ceasefire groups, including the SSA-

N, formed a military alliance–the United Nationalities Federal

Council (UNFC)–as a reaction to the army's offensives. This

indicates that both sides are not willing for a compromise. The ethnic

military alliance will certainly embolden and strengthen the ethnic

groups to resist any army offensive. Some ethnic armed groups such

as the Wa (UWSA) or Mongla (NDAA) have remained insulated from

the current conflict. However, some observers believe that a direct

attack on them could draw these groups also into the conflict.

The major issue for the ethnic minorities is in finding a political

resolution to their long-standing demand for establishing a federal

system. But finding a way to resolve this will not be easy. The

government's military approach will have far-reaching consequences.

Not only will it have huge social and humanitarian consequences on

the civilian population with increased human rights abuses and

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displacement of villagers, it would also reinforce the mistrust

between the ethnic groups and the Burman majority.

The ethnic parties that won in the elections have, for the first time,

got a certain role to play in state affairs. They will try to assert their

role in both the national parliament and the provincial assemblies.

They are well placed to play a role in mediating between the

government and the ethnic groups. However, the possibility of their

taking the side of the ethnic groups is high if the army continues its

military offensives against the ethnic groups.

The ceasefire agreements between the army and the ethnic armed

groups have become irrelevant in the context of the renewed conflicts

and could come under further strain, endangering a full scale civil war.

There are also the issues of the internally displaced and refugees that

are unlikely to be resolved in the near future. New issues are emerging

in the ethnic areas as a result of the large projects such as hydro-power

and mining which will add more problems to already existing

complexities. But above all, the army's resolve on a military solution

to the ethnic question is beginning to show clear signs that conflict in

ethnic areas is likely to intensify in the future.

Suu Kyi still holds the trump card

Since June 2011, Aung San Suu Kyi has been allowed to move freely

around country to meet her supporters. Earlier, the appointment of U

Myint–a close friend of Suu Kyi, and a former United Nations

official–as chief economic adviser showed a change in the

government's approach towards “the lady”. For the time being, Suu



Kyi is focusing her attention on reorganising her party, the NLD,

which officially is deemed as “null and void”.

Suu Kyi began her first provincial tour to Pagan in Mandalay Region.

The first and the most worrying aspect is her security. There have

been voices raised over this matter. Just before she began her trip, the

government had warned her and the NLD not to carry out any

political activities during the tour. While some of her supporters hope

that her country-wide tour may revitalise the NLD and create a new

democratic wave across the country, they are also apprehensive about

her security. Certainly, the party will get a new life, but such hopes

may be dashed if Suu Kyi were to be re-arrested. The government has

also informed the NLD that it has been acting “against the law”. If the

government finds Suu Kyi and the NLD guilty of any violations, the

most likely possibility is that she could be imprisoned again.

In the short-term, Suu Kyi may try to avoid direct confrontation with

the government. However, the activities she involves herself may be

seen by the government as a direct threat. Apart from how the

government deals with Suu Kyi, there is also the question of how she

deals with the new political landscape. After spending several years

under house arrest, the challenge before Suu Kyi is to reconnect

herself with a new generation and a new set of opposition groups.

Despite these possibilities and challenges, Suu Kyi still holds the

trump card. Her crowd-pulling personality and the ability to galvanise

people into a political force are factors that the government fears the

most. These will put her in conflict with the government sooner than

later.

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CONCLUSION

In the short and medium term, Myanmar's politics will be dominated

by the three main players–the military, the pro-democracy supporters

led by Suu Kyi and the ethnic nationalities groups. There could be

more splits within each of the major players which could lead to

political instability. Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD's activities will

bring them directly in confrontation with the government and the

possibility of Suu Kyi's re-arrest cannot be ruled out. The army and

the ethnic armed groups are likely to engage in conflicts and if these

spread, the army's role in the government would only be enhanced. In

the short-term, the confrontational politics of the three major players

will remain intense.

Pressure on the ethnic groups and the Suu Kyi camp may push these

two forces closer as they find more common ground to fight the

government. This will further ensure the military's role in politics.

Oppositional politics may undergo drastic change as most of the

opposition groups adopt a longer-term strategy in their approach to

reform. Hence, chances of an open confrontation with the

government may decrease. However, because conflicts in the ethnic

areas are likely to continue, the possibility of these conflicts spiralling

into major civil war is still high.

In the long-term, there will be a whole new generation of leadership in

all the political forces. Ethnic conflicts may gradually subside, as most

of the present armed groups may be weakened as a result of military

offensives and also because they may slowly adopt approaches other

than armed struggle. In the fast changing geopolitical dynamics as a



consequence of globalisation, there are increasing voices among

ethnic intellectuals questioning armed violence as a method of

struggle. Myanmar's politics may then enter a phase of normalisation

and stability which may provide the political climate for genuine

democracy to grow as the military finds its role curtailed in such as

scenario.

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********************

Appendix I: Ethnic Map



Sl. No Party Upper House Lower House State/Region TOTAL

1. Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)

129 258 496 883(76.5%)

2. National Unity Party (NUP) 5 12 45 62(5.4%)

3. Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP)

3 18 36 57(4.9%)

4. Rakhine Nationalities Development Party (RNDP)

7 9 19 35(3.0%)

5. All Mon Regions Democracy Party(AMRDP)

4 3 9 16(1.4%)

6. National Democratic Force (NDF) 4 8 4 16(1.4%)

7. Chin Progressive Party (CPP) 2 4 6 12(1.0%)

8. Pao National Organization (PNO) 1 3 6 10(0.9%)

9. Chin National Party (CNP) 2 2 5 9(0.8%)

10. Phalon-Sawaw [PwoDemocratic Party (PSDP)

3 2 4 9(0.8%)

11. Kayin People's Party (KPP) 1 1 4 6(0.5%)

12. Taaung (Palaung) National Party (TNP)

1 1 4 6(0.5%)

13. Wa Democratic Party (WDP) 1 2 3 6(0.5%)

14. Unity and Democracy Party of achin State (UDPKS)

1 2 2 5(0.4%)

15. Inn National Development Party (INDP)

– 1 3 4(0.3%)

16. Democratic Party (Myanmar) (DPM)

– – 3 3(0.3%)

17. Kayan National Party (KNP) – – 2 2(0.2%)

18. Kayin State Democracy and Development Party (KSDDP)

1 – 1 2(0.2%)

19. National Democratic Party forDevelopment (NDPD)

– – 2 2(0.2%)

20. 88 Generation Student Youths (Union of Myanmar)

– – 1 1(0.1%)

21. Ethnic National Development Party (ENDP)

– – 1 1(0.1%)

22. Lahu National Development Party (LNDP)

– – 1 1(0.1%)

Independent candidates 1 1 4 6(0.5%)

TOTAL 168 325 661 1154

A total of 1157 seats were contested in the elections.5 However, in 3 constituencies (all in Mongla township, Shan state) no balloting was held, so no representatives were elected.

Appendix II: Results by political party

Appendix III: Ethnic Politics

1. Elected to the legislatures 2010

1. All Mon Regions Democracy Party

2. Chin National Party

3. Chin Progressive Party

4. Ethnic National Development Party

5. Lahu National Development Party

6. Inn National Development Party

7. Kayan National Party

8. Kayin People's Party

9. Kayin State Democracy and Development Party

10.Pao National Organization

11.Phalon-Sawaw Democratic Party

12.Rakhine Nationalities Development Party

13.Shan Nationalities Democratic Party

14.Taaung (Palaung) National Party

15.Unity and Democracy Party of Kachin State

16.Wa Democratic Party

2. Electoral parties that did not win seats1. All National Races Unity and Development Party (Kayah State)2. Kachin State Progressive Party3. Kaman National Progressive Party4. Khami National Development Party5. Kokang Democracy and Unity Party6. Mro or Khami National Solidarity Organization7. Northern Shan State Progressive Party8. Rakhine State National Force of Myanmar9. Wa National Unity Party

3. Parties from 1990 election in 2002 United Nationalities Alliance (boycotted 2010 election)1. Arakan League for Democracy2. Chin National League for Democracy3. Kachin State National Congress for Democracy4. Kayah State All Nationalities League for Democracy5. Kayin (Karen) National Congress for Democracy6. Mon National Democratic Front7. Shan Nationalities League for Democracy8. United Nationalities League for Democracy9. Zomi National Congress

4. Ceasefire groups and Non-ceasefire groups (rejected Border Guard Force status)Ceasefire groups:

1. Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (5thBrigade)2. Kachin Independence Organisation3. Kayan New Land Party4. KNU/KNLA Peace Council

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5. New Mon State Party6. Shan State Army-North/Shan State Progress Party7. United Wa State Army8. National Democratic Alliance Army (eastern Shan state)

Non-ceasefire groups:1. Arakan Liberation Partya2. Chin National Front3. Hongsawatoi Restoration Party4. Karen National Union5. Karenni National Progressive Party6. Lahu Democratic Front7. National Socialist Council Nagaland (Khaplang faction)8. National United Party of Arakan9. Palaung State Liberation Front10. Pao National Liberation Organisation11. Rohingya Solidarity Organization12. Shan State Army-South13. Wa National Organization

A number of other small groups, including ethnic Burman militants, also exist on the borders. Some, such as the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation, no longer pursue armed struggle. Most are affiliated to the National Council Union of Burma or Ethnic Nationalities Council.

5. Border Guard Forces and Militia 1. Border Guard Forces (established 2009-10)

1. BGF Battalion Number Former Name/Description2. BGF 1001-3 New Democratic Army-Kachina 3. BGF 1004-5 Karenni Nationalities Peoples Liberation Front4. BGF 1006 Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army-

Kokang5. BGF 1007 Lahu militia, Mongton (Maington), Shan state 6. BGF 1008 Akha militia, Mongyu (Maingyu), Shan state7. BGF 1009 Lahu militia, Tachilek, Shan state8. BGF 1010 Wa militia, Markmang (Metman), Shan state9. BGF 1011-22 Democratic Karen Buddhist Armya 10. BGF 1023 Karen Peace Force (ex-KNU 16th battalion)

2. Ceasefire groups or factions that have become militia (pyithusit)1. Kachin Defence Army (ex-KIO splinter group)2. Lasang Awng Wa Peace Group (ex-KIO splinter group)3. Mon Peace Defence Group (ex-NMSP splinter group)4. Mong Tai Army Homein (Homong) Region5. Pao National Organisation 6. Palaung State Liberation Party 7. Rawang Militia (ex-Rebellion Resistance Force)8. Shan State Army-North (3 and 7 Brigades)

There are over 50 local militia under the Myanmar Army Commands.



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Endnotes

1. Win Min, “Civil-Military Relations in Burma”, paper presented at the Public Forum Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Stress: Lessons from Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Myanmar/Burma, 1 September, 2009, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand, p. 1

2. Ibid, p. 3.

3. Ibid, p. 4.

4. Mary Callahan, “Burma: Soldiers as State Builders”, in Muthiah Alagappa, ed. Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 422.

5. Win Min, “Civil-Military Relations in Burma”, paper presented at the Public Forum Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Stress: Lessons from Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Myanmar/Burma, 1 September, 2009, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand, p. 4

6. Nakanishi Yoshihiro, Civil-Military Relations in Ne Win's Burma, 1962-1988, (Unpublished Dissertation), Kyoto University, March 2007.

7. Mary Callahan, “Burma: Soldiers as State Builders”, in Muthiah Alagappa, ed. Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 424.

8. Andrew Selth, Transforming the Tatmadaw, (Canberra: Australian National University, 1996), p. 34.

9. See New Light of Myanmar, 29 June, 2011.

10. Francis Wade, “Illusion of freedom in Myanmar”, Asia Times Online, 15 June, 2011.

11. Ashley South, “Burma's New Challenges”, PacNet #32, June 16, 2011.

12. “Myanmar's Post-Election Landscape”, International Crisis Group, N 118, 7 March 2011, p. 3.

13. The Commander-in-Chief made this remark during an address at the passing thout parade of the 114 intake of the Defence Services (Army) Officers

Training School in Bahtoo Tatmyo on 8 April, 2011. See New Light of Myanmar, 9 April, 2011.

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