Semiotic Theory: Beyond Taxonomy

WORKING COPY# 2150

“Semiotic Theory: Beyond Taxonomy”

By: Charls Pearson, Ph.D.American Semiotics Research Institute

Atlanta, Georgia, USA

[email protected]

I start by listing and explaining the four known stages of any andall sciences. Scientific stages are different from scientificparadigms as introduced by Thomas Kuhn; stages are more fundamental.A new paradigm may advance a science from one stage to the next, ortwo paradigms may compete with each other for superiority within thesame stage of a science. Stages are cumulative while paradigms areunique.

The second quarter of the paper recapitulates the history ofsemiotics thru the first two stages: the pretaxonomic stage and thetaxonomic stage, i.e. from St. Augustine thru Peirce. The final halfis devoted to explaining and illustrating the last two stages: thenomothetic stage and the abductive/sub-ductive stage (oftenmistakenly called the hypothetical/deductive stage). It shows thatat least one paradigm meets all of the requirements for all fourstages.

The name of this paradigm is the Semiotic Paradigm. Adoption ofthis paradigm results in what I call “The New Science of Semiotics”.The Semiotic Paradigm has two complementary theories which will bediscussed. They are the Universal Sign Structure Theory (USST), thestatic theory of the paradigm, and the Theory of OperationalSemiotics (TOS), the dynamic theory of the paradigm.

mailto:[email protected]

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 2 of 167X

I. INTRODUCTION:

No new science has ever been introduced but what it alsointroduced new problems, new ways of thinking about these and theolder problems, and new ways of solving all problems. The NewScience of Semiotics is no different. In fact the new semioticspromises to be more revolutionary than any new age of thinking thathas ever gone before. This is because it is the first science toconcentrate on thinking about thinking and about the nature ofthinking about inquiry and problem solving. Peirce hinted in thisdirection but concentrated on developing the new methodology. Thisis why he is known as the founder of the “Inquiry School” of Americanphilosophy.

It will be hard to talk about this new future in much detailbecause semiotics has not yet introduced all of its new methodology.Like all new sciences, its successful methods must be discoveredslowly by trial and error. Nevertheless I intend to use this lectureto show that a start has been made on doing just this.

A. Pretaxonomic Stage:

A. Taxonomy:

The next characteristic of a science that I want to discuss is howit identifies, distinguishes, and classifies its objects of concern.The study of such problems is called “taxonomy”. The onecharacteristic shared by every science is that it must adopt sometaxonomic system. Before doing that, scholars can only mumbleunscientifically (at best) and superstitiously (at worst) about theirtopic of concern.


In the case of alchemy, such mumbles were called “magicalincantations”. Alchemy only learned slowly over the centuries how toidentify and distinguish the chemical elements as it graduallytransformed itself into the science of chemistry. All sciences startin this pretaxonomic stage and gradually evolve by trial and errorinto what may be called a “taxonomic science”. We will shortly learnthat semiotics, like botany and zoology, remained in this taxonomicstage until just recently.

Aristotle attempted to develop methods of aiding this effort withhis logic of definition. The result of using Aristotle’s method ofdefinition was to develop a taxonomy. In the study of signs, manyscholars wrestled with definitions for their various categories ofsigns as the taxonomy of semiotics gradually ebbed and flowed in itsnearly fifteen hundred years of development1.

St. Augustine was the first to see the need for a science of signsand to attempt to define the important kinds of signs. He is thusconsidered the father of semiotics. But the names of other scholarsattempting to develop the semiotic taxonomy include, but are notlimited to, Albertus Magnus, Petrus Hispanus, Duns Scotus, William ofOccam, John Poinsot, John Locke, Charles Peirce, and Charles Morris.

However, it was Charles Peirce, with his discovery of the natureof triadic relations and the triadic nature of all signs2 that wasthe first to achieve a completely satisfactory and consistenttaxonomy with his science of semeiotic. But Peirce, with hisdiscovery of the three metaphysical categories and his all consuminginterest in logic, failed to see any potential for semiotics beyondthe taxonomic science needed to understand logic. In fact, Peircedied believing that logic and semiotics were coextensive. It was thegreat ambassador, Charles Morris, who foresaw the universalpossibility and potential for the science of semiotics.

1 Roughly 400 CE (St. Augustine) to 1900 CE (Peirce).2 John Deely claims that John Poinsot preceded Peirce in discovering the triadic nature of the sign, but this has little bearing on the point I’m trying to make.


Table 1: History of Chemistry

#: Stage: Characterized by:

1. Pretaxonomic Alchemy2. Taxonomic Knowledge of the

Elements3. Nomothetic Mendeleev’sPeriodic Table4. Abductive/

SubductiveBohr’s Atomic

Theory

# 163 “New Ways of Thinking – I”

Thinking about the World: Metaphysics and Epistemology 3

I. PEIRCE’S THEORY OF SEMIOTIC INQUIRY: 4

Peirce’s Philosophy of Inquiry is built totally upon his scienceof semiotics – as he so often claimed. In this lecture, I hope tohelp you understand why this must be so and why his philosophy ofinquiry is so radically different from the Aristotelian and thephenomenological viewpoints.

Peirce’s logic has been difficult to understand because it deniesthe legitimacy of both previous major logics. Aristotelian logicpoints outwardly from the mind thru an open window with no screen, asit were, directly onto the real object as it really is, and easilyleads to scientific inquiry; but Kant would object that this logicalso requires a contradictory knowledge of the ding-an-sich, apenetration of the impenetrable Kantian Veil, as it were.Phenomenological logic points inwardly from the mind thru an openwindow directly onto phenomenal feeling deep within the soul asactually experienced, and leads to phenomenological inquiry; but

3 Much of this lecture is taken from Section 7.I of The New Science of Semiotics.4 Parts of this section were developed for the dedication of the Wuhan UniversityCenter for the Study of Charles Peirce and Research in American Thought; April,2008.

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 5 of 167XPeirce would object that this logic also ignores the inexpressibilityof the first person, expression of the inexpressible, as it were.

On the other hand, Peircean logic mediates between theseapproaches. It assumes that all knowledge is obtained from signprocesses by pointing outwardly to an external world, not of realobjects as they really are, but of semiotic objects as they arerepresented by signs, and by pointing inwardly to our phenomenalworld, not directly to phenomenal feeling as actually experienced,but as a representation of an internal world achieved by means of ourcognition of signs. This leads to an integrated and unifiedmethodology for inquiry. Semiotic logic thus leads us to a newmethodology, an integrated methodology for inquiry involving theunification of science and phenomenology, yielding an integrated andunified approach to reality.

II. A NEW WAY OF THINKING; A NEW WAY OF KNOWING;A NEW WAY OF UNDERSTANDING: 5

Traditionally there have been two ways of looking at the world.The older one is often credited to Socrates, altho it was formalizedand made into an explicit logic by Aristotle. Whitehead mostimproperly called it the Platonic, and only true, philosophy.Aristotelian logic involves looking at the external world frominside-out-and-back-in. Aristotle called this “hylozoism” because itviews every existing body as a living being. The newer of thetraditional views was created first by Peirce, altho evenprofessional philosophers often associate James’s name with thephenomenological viewpoint and call it the “stream of consciousness”.Husserl is often credited with founding the science of phenomenology,altho Peirce actually began to investigate phenomenology as a sciencesome half-century earlier and succeeded in developing its logic.This viewpoint involves looking at the internal world from outside-in-and back-out, but is also called hylozoism because like Aristotle,5 Parts of this section were developed for the dedication of the Wuhan UniversityCenter for the Study of Charles Peirce and Research in American Thought; April,2008.

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 6 of 167XPeirce viewed every existing body as a living being. In fact,hylozoism has been a very popular philosophy thruout the ages. Ithas been stressed more recently by both Whitehead and Teilhard deChardin.

The New Science of Semiotics involves a new way of looking at theworld, which was also initiated by Peirce after analyzing the defectsof the two older views. This generates a new way of thinking, a newway of knowing, and a new way of understanding. It thereby gives usthe power and ability to unify science and phenomenology thusproviding an integrated and unified methodology for a new way ofinquiring. This involves looking at the world from the middle groundinside the sign, from whence one can look both outward toward allexistent bodies of the external world and inward toward all mentatingconsciousness of the internal world, i.e. what is normally called“the self”. This approach is made possible by the bilateralstructure of the sign (see Figures 1 & 2). It still involves thehylozoic assumption that in the words of Whitehead: “every grain ofsand, every electron, is alive” (P&R). In this assumption, the NewScience of Semiotics is consistent with virtually all post-PeirceanPhilosophy.

The strengths and weaknesses of all three logics can be comparedas follows.

A. Strengths of the Aristotelian Logic:

The Aristotelian logic has lasted since at least the time ofSocrates and possibly before.

Leads to an easy development of science Easy to understand Simple Superficially obvious and intuitive Explains the reality of individuals, generals, and abstractions

B. Failures of the Aristotelian Logic: Violates the Kantian Veil Leaves out all 1st person experiences


Cannot explain the reality of feelings and emotions

C. Strengths of the Phenomenological Logic: Leads to an easy development of phenomenology Concentrates on 1st person experiences Explains the reality of feelings and emotions

D. Failures of the Phenomenological Logic: Violates the Veil of Inexpressibility Cannot express the objective or the cognitive Makes science impossible Cannot explain the reality of individuals, generals, and

abstractions

E. Strengths of the Peircean Logic: Leads to an easy development of semiotics Integrates science and phenomenology Does not require violation of either the Kantian Veil or the Veil of

Inexpressibility Integrates the Correspondence, Cohesion, and Convergence theories of

truth. Explains the reality of both cognitive and affective aspects of the

world Explains all aspects of the “self”, by integrating 1st person, 2nd

person, and 3rd person experiences

F. Failures of the Peircean Logic: Complex – but only complex enough to model the complex reality of

nature Difficult to understand – but only because nature is difficult to

understand Requires development of new mathematics and science – but only

because we have not yet developed the required mathematical andscientific tools

III. HYLOZOISM AND BILATERALISM:6

6 A preliminary version of parts of this section was presented at the 2006 sessionof the Symposium on the Semiotic Writings of Charles Peirce (#127).


What we have been calling hylozoism in philosophy and bilateralismin semiotics are practically the same thing. In this section I willshow them to be inverses of each other. Hylozoism is the theory thateverything in the universe has both an external appearance that isavailable to all observers and an internal appearance that isavailable only to the living thing itself. Thus, hylozoism assumesthat everything in the universe is alive and conscious. Bilateralismis the theory that every sign has an immediate and a dynamicstructure, a bilateral structure.

Aristotle’s hylozoic philosophy starts at the outside of eachthing or neumenal object and works its way in. It assumes that everything is a physical body on the outside and a living being on theinside. If you turn this philosophic approach inside out, you getBilateralism, which was originally used in the USST for reasons ofscientific methodology, but now finds a philosophical justification.


Figure 3: A New Viewpoint for the New Science

Aristotle believed in the existence of spiritual, or nonphysical,mentalistic dimensions, in addition to the physical dimensions, andwas thereby able to conclude that everything was alive. Even stonesthat were cold, purely physical bodies, when viewed from their“outside”, were alive and conscious when viewed as they sawthemselves, from their “insides”. Today, this is known asAristotle’s Theory of Hylozoism.

There have been many statements of hylozoism down thru the ages,mostly in the spirit of Aristotle’s analysis. However, it wasPeirce’s semiotic analysis that marked a revolution in thinking abouthylozoism. Since Peirce’s analysis, hylozoism has been almostuniversally adopted, receiving many restatements, including one

This view leads to semiotic inquiryAn integrated methodology involving the unification of science and

phenomenology, yielding an

integrated and unified approach to

reality.

This view leads to scientific inquiry.

Aristotelian

ViewpointReal

object as it really

is.

This view leads to

phenomenological inquiry.

Jamesian

ViewpointPhenomenal

feeling as actually experienced.

SIGN

Kantian Veil

Inexpressibility of the 1st person

Peircean Viewpoint

Semiotic logic points outwardly to an external

world as represented by

signs and inwardly to our phenomenal world as cognition of an external

world.

Bilateral structure of the sign

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 10 of 167Xinvolving excellent examples by Whitehead, and another in the form ofa universal principle of science by Teilhard de Chardin. However,Peirce’s Theory of Semantic Structure7 is still the best overallsemiotic analysis of hylozoism (See Figures 2 & 4).

Peirce’s only known statement using the term “hylozoism”explicitly came at CP: 6.6, where he asked:

Is hylozoism an opinion, actual or conceivable, rather than a senselessvocable; and if so, what is, or would be, that opinion? What isconsciousness or mind like; meaning, is it a single continuum like Timeand Space, which is for different purposes variously broken up by thatwhich it contains; or is it composed of solid atoms, or is it more likea fluid?

However, this is enough to show that he was both aware of the problemand interested in solving it. His solution came in his semioticwritings and shows up in his discussion of “immediate object” and“dynamical object”.

When Whitehead said that everything in the universe was alive, hegave one of his very few examples. He said, “Every grain of sand isalive, even every atom8 and every electron.” (P&R:).

Teilhard de Chardin framed his statement of hylozoism in the formof a universal scientific principle, now referred to as Teilhard’sPrinciple:

Whatever is present, anywhere in the universe to any degree, is present everywhere in theuniverse to some degree.9

The reason that this is a statement about hylozoism is because ofthe simple corollary obtained by using as a minor premise the obviousobservation that “I am alive, conscious, and aware.” to obtain theconclusion that “The entire universe is, to some degree, alive,conscious, and aware.” (Divin Mileau:).

7 So named much later by Charles W. Morris.8 Of course, the word “atom” meant something far different for Whitehead than for Aristotle.9 This is by far my favorite statement of the Hylozoism Principle.


Thus, hylozoism is an ancient and honorable theory of philosophy.Bilateralism, on the other hand is a much newer theory, originatingin the late nineteenth century with Peirce’s semeiotic.10 Hylozoismand bilateralism are philosophical inverses of each other. It is a“turn the sock inside out”, or silk stocking approach. It is theapproach used intuitively by Peirce in his phaneroscopy (sp?) – laterconfused with phenomenalism – but without the formal theory ofbilateral sign structure as adopted in the USST. Phaneroscopy, ofcourse, is just the inverse of Phenomenalism. It is bilateralismthat justifies and explains Peirce’s viewpoint on semiotic inquiry,the new third way.

Peirce’s hylozoism is that aspect of his semiotic writingsinvolving bilateralism and focusing on the distinction betweenimmediate object and dynamic11 object. However, as brilliant as Peirce’stheory of semiotics12 was, it never extended beyond the status of ataxonomic theory. In particular, Peirce never had a formal,nomothetic, or explanatory theory of semiotics. To his death, Peircecontinued to believe that semiotics would never be more than ataxonomic theory.

For this reason, the analysis of bilateralism, or Peirce’ssemiotics of hylozoism, is best carried out within the SemioticParadigm, and in particular using its Universal Sign StructureTheory, where the immediate object and the dynamic object carry outtheir systematic roles within the overall explanatory theory asdiscussed in The New Science of Semiotics.

10 Developed by Peirce and systematized primarily by myself.11 His preferred spelling was “dynamical”.12 His preferred spelling was “semeiotic”.


Figure 4: Hylozoism vs. Bilateralism

# 156“Peirce’s Theory of Semiotic Inquiry”

Traditionally there have been two ways of understanding the world.The older one is often credited to Socrates, altho it was formalizedand made into an explicit logic by Aristotle. Whitehead (1929) mostimproperly called it the Platonic, and only true, philosophy. Itinvolves looking at the world from inside-out. Aristotle called this“hylozoism” because it views every existing body as a living being.

The newer view was partially developed by Peirce, altho the publicoften associates James’s name with the phenomenological viewpoint andcalls it the “stream of consciousness”. Husserl is often creditedwith founding the science of phenomenology, altho Peirce actuallybegan to investigate phenomenology as a science some half-centuryearlier and developed its logic. This viewpoint involves looking atthe world from outside-in, but is also called hylozoism because likeAristotle, Peirce viewed every existing body as a living being. In

Bilateralism: Replaces Aristotle’s neumenal world with Peirce’s semiotic world.

Hylozoism: Looks in from the neumenal world into the phenomenal.

Bilateral Sign Structure: Looks out from the phenomenal world into the semiotic

Kantian Veil

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 13 of 167Xfact, hylozoism has been a very popular philosophy thruout the ages.It has been stressed more recently by both Whitehead and Teilhard deChardin.

Peirce’s Philosophy of Inquiry is a completely new, and different,worldview and is built totally upon his science of semiotics – justas he so often claimed. In this address, I hope to help youunderstand why this must be so and why his philosophy of inquiry isso radically different from the Aristotelian and the phenomenologicalversions.

I. THREE WORLDVIEWS: A NEW WAY OF THINKING:13

Aristotelian logic points outwardly from the mind thru an openwindow, as it were, directly onto the real object as it really is,thus facilitating scientific inquiry; but Kant would object that italso requires assured knowledge of the ding-an-sich, penetration ofthe Kantian Veil, as it were. I call this the fallacy of the KantianVeil. It is also known as the ding-an-sich fallacy.Phenomenological logic points inwardly from the mind thru an openwindow, as it were, directly into the soul where phenomenal feelingsare actually experienced, and leads to phenomenological inquiry; butPeirce would object that it also ignores the inexpressibility of thefirst person, expression of the inexpressible, as it were. Itherefore call this the fallacy of the inexpressible.

On the other hand, Peircean logic mediates between theseapproaches. It points outwardly to an external world, not of realobjects as they really are, but as interpreted by signs; thusavoiding the fallacy of the Kantian Veil. And it points inwardly toour phenomenal world, not directly to phenomenal feeling as actuallyexperienced, but as a representation of an internal world achieved bymeans of our interpretation of signs; thus avoiding the fallacy ofthe inexpressible.13 A preliminary version of parts of this section will be published as section V in“Beyond Peirce: the New Science of Semiotics and the Semiotics of Law” InternationalJournal for the Semiotics of Law.


This leads to an integrated methodology for inquiry. Semioticlogic thus leads us to a new methodology, an integrated methodologyfor inquiry involving the unification of science and phenomenology,yielding an integrated and unified approach to reality.

The best way to understand the semiotic worldview is to start withthe concept of sign and use my New Science of Semiotics to explainits structure and function. That is because Peirce developed hisphilosophy in bits and pieces as an investigator – an explorer in anunexplored wilderness. And while my New Science of Semiotics isbased on Peirce, it is a complete systematization which lendsincredible power to his methodology.

II. SEMIOTICS AND THE NEED FOR BILATERAL STRUCTURE:14

We will be using the New Science of Semiotics and its primarytheory of sign structure, the USST-2000, as our tool for analyzingPeirce’s implicit theory of hylozoism. The USST-2000 was adopted asthe standard theory of semiotics at the 2000 Annual Meeting of theSemiotic Society of America, thus its name. It is the theory ofstatic sign structure for the Semiotic Paradigm and replaces an olderversion, the USST-89, by adding God as a component of every sign.The USST is specified by giving the Universal Sign Structure Diagram,USSD-2000, and three principles for interpreting the diagram. Thediagram is the heart of the theory and is shown in Figure 2: TheUSSD-2000.

The New Science of Semiotics (Pearson IP) uses Peirce’s new way oflooking at the world. This generates a new way of thinking, a newway of knowing, and a new way of understanding. It thereby gives usthe power and ability to unify science and phenomenology thusproviding an integrated and unified methodology for a new way ofinquiring. This involves looking at the world from the middle groundinside the sign, from whence one can look both outward toward allexistent bodies of the external world and inward toward all mentating14 A preliminary version of parts of this section was presented at the 2006 sessionof the Symposium on the Semiotic Writings of Charles Peirce.

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 15 of 167Xconsciousness of the internal world, i.e. what is normally called“the self”. This approach is made possible by the bilateralstructure of the sign as given by the USST, see Figures 2 and 3. Itstill involves the hylozoic assumption that in the words ofWhitehead: every grain of sand, every electron, is alive (1929). Inthis assumption, the New Science of Semiotics is consistent withvirtually all post-Peircean Philosophy. But is this bilateralismreally necessary, or is it just an ad-hoc addition to semiotic theorymade only to accommodate Peirce’s theory of inquiry?

A. The USST and Bilateral Structure:

For most problems in semiotics, the entire sign with all threelevels of sign structure in all three dimensions must be analyzed.Therefore the USST with its three levels of sign structure in each ofthree dimensions has been much discussed over the last forty years.What has not been examined in much detail is its bilateral structurein all three dimensions. But this is exactly what must be analyzedin order to investigate the process of inquiry, in fact, for thepurposes of this introduction, bilateral structure of the semanticdimension is all that must be analyzed.

1. Hylozoism and Bilateralism:

What we have been calling hylozoism in philosophy and bilateralismin semiotics are practically the same thing. In this section I willshow them to be inverses of each other. Hylozoism is the theory thateverything in the universe has both an external appearance that isavailable to all observers and an internal appearance that isavailable only to the thing itself. Thus, hylozoism assumes thateverything in the universe is alive and conscious. Bilateralism isthe theory that every sign has an immediate and a dynamic structure,a bilateral structure.

CognitiveMentellect

P

Ground I

Dynamic Object(Cognitive Context)

E

Procension

Intension

Extension


Figure 3: Structure of the Semantic Dimension


Figure 2: The USSD-2000

Aristotle’s hylozoic philosophy starts at the outside of eachthing or neumenal object and works its way in. It assumes that everything is a physical body on the outside and a living being on theinside. If you turn this philosophic approach inside out, you getBilateralism, which was originally used in the USST for reasons ofscientific methodology, but now finds a philosophical justification.

Syntactic Semanti

c

The Renvoi Relation

Medium

Shape Syntactic Context

Cognitive Mentellect

Ground

Cognitive Context

Pragmatic

EMS EMT

IS IT

S&BCS S&BCT

SpiritS

SpiritT

Godd


Aristotle believed in the existence of spiritual, or nonphysical,mentalistic dimensions, in addition to the physical dimensions, andwas thereby able to conclude that everything was alive. Even stonesthat were cold, purely physical bodies, when viewed from their“outside”, were alive and conscious when viewed as they sawthemselves, from their “insides”. Today, this is known asAristotle’s Theory of Hylozoism.

There have been many statements of hylozoism down thru the ages,mostly in the spirit of Aristotle’s analysis. However, it wasPeirce’s semiotic analysis that marked a revolution in thinking abouthylozoism. Since Peirce’s analysis, hylozoism has been almostuniversally adopted, receiving many restatements, including oneinvolving excellent examples by Whitehead, and another in the form ofa universal principle of science by Teilhard de Chardin. However,Peirce’s Theory of Semantic Structure15 is still the best overallsemiotic analysis of hylozoism.

Peirce’s only known statement using the term “hylozoism”explicitly came at CP: 6.6, where he said:

Is hylozoism an opinion, actual or conceivable, rather than a senselessvocable; and if so, what is, or would be, that opinion? What isconsciousness or mind like; meaning, is it a single continuum like Timeand Space, which is for different purposes variously broken up by thatwhich it contains; or is it composed of solid atoms, or is it more likea fluid?

However, this quote is enough to show that he was both aware of theproblem and interested in solving it. His solution came in hissemiotic writings and will show up in his discussion of “immediateobject” and “dynamical object”.

When Whitehead said that everything in the universe was alive, hegave one of his very few examples. He said, “Every grain of sand isalive, even every atom16 and every electron” (1929).

15 So named much later by Charles Morris.16 Of course, the word “atom” meant something far different for Whitehead than for Aristotle.


Teilhard de Chardin framed his statement of hylozoism in the formof a universal scientific principle, now referred to as Teilhard’sPrinciple:

Whatever is present, anywhere in the universe to any degree, is present everywhere in theuniverse to some degree17 (1955).

The reason that this is a statement about hylozoism is because ofthe simple corollary obtained by using as a minor premise the obviousobservation that “I am alive, conscious, and aware.” to obtain theconclusion that “The entire universe is, to some degree, alive,conscious, and aware.”.

Thus, hylozoism is an ancient and honorable theory of philosophy.Bilateralism, on the other hand is a much newer theory, originatingin the late nineteenth century with Peirce’s semeiotic.18 Hylozoismand bilateralism are philosophical inverses of each other. It is a“turn the sock inside out”, or silk stocking approach. It is theapproach used intuitively by Peirce in his phaneroscopy – laterconfused with phenomenalism – but without the formal theory ofbilateral sign structure as adopted in the USST. Phaneroscopy, ofcourse, is just the inverse of Phenomenalism. It is bilateralismthat justifies and explains Peirce’s viewpoint on semiotic inquiry,the new third way.

2. Bilateralism as a Necessary Property of Sign Structure:

But is this bilateral structure really necessary? Is itempirically real? Or is it just an ad hoc contrivance added simplyto justify Peirce’s philosophical Theory of Inquiry (ToI)? Accordingto my Theory of Empirical Convergence (2003), in order to beempirically real, a theory must explain more than a single propertyor law. It must explain more than it was explicitly designed toexplain.

17 This is by far my favorite statement of the Hylozoism Principle.18 Developed by Peirce and systematized primarily by myself.


A proposed theory that is justified by a single law is nothing but anad-hoc abduction from a concrete general to a hypothetical abstraction –nothing but a convenient shorthand for remembering that one law. But asingle theory that explains many different laws gains more empiricalreality with each new law that enters into its network of explanation.This gain in empirical reality is called “abductive dolemic convergence”.The answer to this question is quite simple. I began to conceive

of Bilateralism as the simplest solution to Meinong’s problem ofreference to non-existent objects, especially as discussed byRussell, while I was still studying information science, and longbefore I had ever heard of Peirce. Once postulated, I soondiscovered that Bilateralism had the power to eliminate many semanticparadoxes and as I wrote my dissertation (1977) I discovered that itexplained many puzzling results of experimental psychology,psychiatry, and ethology. I only discovered much later in analyzingthe relation between Aristotle’s and Peirce’s theories of hylozoismthat Bilateralism was also the key to Peirce’s philosophy of inquiry,thus adding to the empirical reality of Bilateralism. I will discusseight of these laws and/or properties in this section just to givethe reader a feel for the power of this concept. These include: 1)Meinong’s problem of reference to non-existent objects; 2) Peirce’sPhilosophy of Perception; 3) the phenomena of double awareness; 4)conscious vs. the unconscious; 5) to explicate important differencesin the meaning of the term “abstraction”; 6) to distinguish betweencognition and reality, i.e. Peirce’s concepts of immediate anddynamic; 7) integration of science and phenomenology; and 8) toexplicate Peirce’s new theory of Inquiry.

Most of the eight have been discussed elsewhere and so I willmerely summarize here to save both time and space. Only my twodifferent concepts of abstraction are new and so I will spend alittle more effort to explain them here.

I quantified empirical convergence in a later paper (2005) andfound three useful measures for this concept. I give them here asequations 1), 2), and 3).

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 21 of 167XEq: 1) Cij = lg2nij; (bits of information about the empiricalreality of the theory),

Eq: 2) Cij = 1 – 1/nij; (probability that the theory is anempirically real explanation of the laws), and

Eq: 3) Cij = 100(1 – 1/nij) (percentage estimate of how complete thetheory is in explaining the empirical reality represented by thelaws).

Thus, if there were no other laws than the ones I discuss here (andthere are many, many more), Bilateralism would, according to Eq: 1),present three bits of empirical information19; according to Eq: 2) ithas probability of 0.875 of being empirically real; and according toEq: 3 it gives an 87.5% complete explanation of that part of semioticreality.

a. Meinong’s problem: reference to non-existent objects:

In some theories of semantics, especially Meinong’s and Russell’s,the mention of unicorns in the subject position of Ex: 1) postulatestheir existence. However, the theory of bilateral structure allowsthe assertion of Ex: 1) without postulating the existence of itssubject term. Peirce’s immediate object allows the cognitiveprocessing of the empty designator “unicorn”, while the dynamicobject points to Carnap’s null object. In the USST, these arereferred to as “Extension” and “Object”.

Ex: 1) Unicorns do not exist.

b. Peirce’s philosophy of perception:

Peirce’s philosophical theory of perception is a good example ofthe need for bilateral structure of the sign to explain all of thesubtleties of perception, including the double awareness aspects ofperception, the conscious/unconscious aspects of perception, etc.;and the conscious/unconscious states of consciousness in general.Peirce’s theory of perception has been well explained by Delaney19 This is a very large amount of information for any semiotic theory.

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 22 of 167X(1993) in section III.3.c. It requires three levels of dynamicsemantic components for what Peirce calls “information input” andthree levels of immediate semantic components in order to develop thepresentation of the percept.

c. Double awareness phenomena:

In the philosophy of perception, it has long been known that thereis a sharp distinction between perceiving and being aware ofperceiving. It is a much more subtle phenomena that one can also beaware of being aware. But it seems to be known only by professionalphilosophers and psychologists that that is where the effect stops.Being aware of being aware of being aware is empirically the same asbeing aware of being aware. Thus the phenomena to be explained iscalled the double awareness problem and bilateral structure helps toexplain it.

The dynamic object and immediate object give us the percept. Thedynamic ground and immediate ground in addition give us simpleawareness. And the dynamic mentellect and perceptual judgment, orimmediate mentellect, give us double awareness. But there are nomore semantic levels to give us any further degrees of awareness. Itis the difference between the dynamic components and the immediatecomponents that keep these individual effects from rushing in on eachother and giving us just one muddled feeling of perception andawareness, the same difference from which Peirce stands to look bothoutward thru the dynamic components and inward thru the immediatecomponents to explain his new philosophy of inquiry.

d. Conscious vs. the unconscious:

In Peirce’s philosophy, it is the immediate components of semanticstructure that give us conscious cognition. The dynamic componentsof semantic structure allow room for the unconscious or preconscious.

e. Two concepts of abstraction:


Since this is a new distinction, I will spend a little bit of timeto explicate it here.

Many parameters related to the external structure of the sign havebeen called “information measures”. These are the more empiricallyinteresting properties of the external structure of the sign. Forthis reason, the components of the external sign structure have beencalled “information generators” (Pearson 1977). By an empiricalregularity first observed by myself, each and every information generator is also aninformation abstractor, or what I call an “abstraction generator”.

The external components of the sign are called informationgenerators because they really are dynamic. Each component generatesan infinite number of information measures, a few that we know how touse, and some less useful than others. But these same components arealso abstraction generators because the same information measuresmark information that can be abstracted. What can be generated can beabstracted. For instance, the interpretation of a sign generates thetime of interpretation which is useful as an information measure ingenerative grammar for determining tense; but in painting, the goalof the artist can sometimes be to abstract away all sense of time, asin Renoir’s “Lady with Guitar”.

Anything that can be abstracted from a sign is determined by theabstraction generators of the sign and these abstraction generatorsare the same, component by component, as the information generators.We can write this in set theoretic notation by saying that the set ofinformation generators is the same set as the set of abstractiongenerators:

{x xIG} = {y yAG}.

For instance, an artist may abstract either time or place from hiswork so that the work becomes timeless or universal. All art – inany medium – is abstract in some sense. Beethoven is interested inwhat it is to be human and he answers by saying that one thing aboutbeing human is to feel joy and he proceeds to describe musically the

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 24 of 167Xhuman feeling of joy. Not his own feeling of joy, not my feeling ofjoy, not a feeling of joy at some happy event, not a feeling of joyat some particular time, not any particular feeling of joy, but thehuman feeling of joy. He abstracts from any particular person’sfeeling of joy to the timeless, placeless, abstract human feeling ofjoy. Thus all music is abstract, all painting is abstract, allliterature is abstract, all sculpture is abstract, etc.

The kind of abstraction discussed by philosophers of science andlogic is a different kind of abstraction, a cognitive kind ofabstraction. Thus generalization is obtained by extensionalabstraction; and abstraction (in the sense of scientific logic) isobtained by extensional and intensional abstraction together, etc.

Thus we need to separate two concepts that are muddled togetherand explicate each of them. Abstraction, in the informationgenerator sense, is the separating out of an information measure thatis usually generated automatically by the interpretation of a signand eliminating it from the interpretant; while abstraction in thesense of cognitive logic is the abstraction, in the immediate sense,of the extension and intension of a sign, thus focusing on one aspectof it in the interpretant.

All painting is abstract, but only one kind of abstraction iscalled abstract painting. Abstract painting is so-called when weabstract the object of the painting. A concept is a sign in whichthe extension is abstracted leaving the intension of the sign. Anabstraction is a sign in which the extension and the intension areabstracted leaving the procension. Thus there are several structuralsimilarities between abstract art and scientific concepts.Abstraction in the information generator sense depends on the dynamic components ofthe sign, while abstraction in the cognitive sense depends on the immediatecomponents of the sign.

Let us look at how an artist might abstract the time of sourceinterpretation from his painting. To do this we must first examinehow he might deliberately mark the source time. “September Morning”

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 25 of 167Xby Alfred Sisley, ca. 1887, in the Musée des Beaux-Arts of Agen,shows a definite time – a sunny autumn morning. The artistdeliberately conveys the time of source interpretation by his use ofcolors, his subdued contrasts, the diffused shadows, and the gentleview. “The Little Meadows in Spring” by Alfred Sisley, ca. 1880, inthe Tate Gallery of London, title aside, everything in this paintingbespeaks of early spring. Shadows, the green pigments, the limbs andbranches of the trees, contrasts, shading and tonality of the colors,the excitement of the brush strokes, etc.

“Summer’s Day” by Berthe Morisot, ca. 1879, in the NationalGallery of London. The brush strokes brilliantly represent theeffect of summer sunlight on water. Lite and bright colors, excitedbrush strokes, lighting, and subject matter – boating on the lake –also the parasols – definitely not rain umbrellas, sunhats on theladies.

“The Post at Argenteuil” by Claude Monet, ca. 1872 in the Musée d’Orsay of Paris. Altho this is also summer, Monet deliberately usesshadows to convey a different sense of time. He uses lengtheningshadows and their contrasts to convey the time of a summer evening.The trees and grass are lush green. The subject matter includesstrollers and sailboats.

Now that we have seen how the artist can deliberately callattention to the time of source interpretation, let us see how thissame information measure can be deliberately abstracted. Let us lookat “Seated Girl” by Pierre-Auguste Renoir, ca. 1909, in the Musée d’Orsay of Paris. Renoir brings his subject, the seated girl, insidewhere lighting can’t betray season or time of day. The subject, asimple girl, could be any time or place. Renoir uses subtle lightingand shadows that are ambiguous as between bright sunlight, winterclouds, or the internal light of perhaps candles. His mixture ofcolors between warm and cool heightens the ambiguity of time of year.His brush strokes are neither spring-like, summer-like, fall-like,nor winter-like. They are just smooth enough to be ambiguous. There

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 26 of 167Xis nothing here that would betray a time – no windows, no foliage, nostrong shadows, etc. The girl does not even have the simplestaccoutrements in her hand, i.e., no parasol, no umbrella, no sweater,etc.

Thus we see that all of the effects of all of the fine arts,painting, music, sculpture, etc., as well as all of the informationmeasures of mathematics and the cognitive sciences require abilateral structure consisting of immediate and dynamic components ofthe sign at each level of semiotic structure.

f. Distinguishing between cognition and reality:

In analyzing Peirce’s solution to distinguishing between cognitionand reality, we will concentrate on his explication of the immediateobject and the dynamic object. For this reason it will be importantto concentrate on the semantic dimension of the USSD-2000. This isshown in Figure 3: The Structure of the Semantic Dimension. Note inFigure 3 that the semantic dimension has a bilateral structureconsisting of three levels. I have been discussing theinterpretation, meaning, and usefulness of the three levels ofsemantic structure at every meeting of the Semiotic Society ofAmerica for the last twenty years. This analysis will concentrate onthe bilateral structure, which I take up in the next paragraph.

Bilateral structure has been a part of USST science from the verybeginning. It is principle #2 of the three original principles thatoccurred to me from the very first inkling of the USST. However, ithas taken me more than 30 years to begin to see the philosophicalimplications of this scientific principle. The relations betweenCognition, Reality, Bilateralism, and the Peircean viewpoint aretotally hidden before their discovery, but totally obviousafterwards.

Hylozoism: Looksin from the neumenalworld into the


Figure 4: Hylozoism vs. Bilateralism

The phenomenal world of cognition is the psychological world ofthe mind, while the semiotic world makes as objective as possible theattempt to approach as philosophically close as possible to theneumenal world of reality given the impossibility of completeapproach caused by the Kantian Veil. Thus Peirce’s approach is aBilateral approach (his Immediate vs. Dynamic concepts) whileWhitehead’s approach is Hylozoic and violates the Kantian veil (animpenetrable curtain) from the neumenal side.

Peirce used his concepts of immediate object and dynamical object toexplicate his solution to the hylozoism problem, but this turns outnot to be sufficient for the solution of many other semanticproblems. For instance, all the problems mentioned in the last fewparagraphs require that every semantic level have the same bilateralstructure, giving us an immediate ground and a dynamical ground, andan immediate mentellect and a dynamical mentellect, as well as animmediate object and a dynamical object.

To understand the distinction Peirce was trying to make with hisconcepts of immediate and dynamic objects, it is best to go back to

Bilateralism looksout from the phenomenal world

Bilateralism: Replaces Aristotle’s neumenal world with Peirce’s semiotic world.

Kantian Veil

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 28 of 167Xhis own words. But to do so, we must remember that many of thetheories and laws discussed in the last section were not available inPeirce’s time – that he was trying to distinguish two poorlyunderstood concepts that had been muddled into one. The followingpassages are representative:

I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant, thelatter being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is theInterpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, orto a Sign, which determination is the Interpretant. But it remains topoint out that there are usually two Objects, and more than twoInterpretants. Namely, we have to distinguish the Immediate Object,which is the Object as the Sign itself represents it, and whose Being isthus dependent upon the Representation of it in the Sign, from theDynamical Object, which is the Reality which by some means contrives todetermine the Sign to its Representation. (CP: 4.536)Every cognition involves something represented, or that of which we areconscious, and some action or passion of the self whereby it becomesrepresented. The former shall be termed the objective, the latter thesubjective, element of the cognition. The cognition itself is anintuition of its objective element, which may therefore be called, also,the immediate object. The subjective element is not necessarilyimmediately known, but it is possible that such an intuition of thesubjective element of a cognition of its character, whether that ofdreaming, imagining, conceiving, believing, etc., should accompany everycognition. The question is whether this is so. (CP 5.238)The thought-sign stands for its object in the respect which is thought;that is to say, this respect is the immediate object of consciousness inthe thought, or, in other words, it is the thought itself, or at leastwhat the thought is thought to be in the subsequent thought to which itis a sign. (CP 5.286)As to the Object, that may mean the Object as cognized in the Sign andtherefore an Idea, or it may be the Object as it is regardless of anyparticular aspect of it, the Object in such relations as unlimited andfinal study would show it to be. The former I call the Immediate Object,the latter the Dynamical Object. For the latter is the Object thatDynamical Science (or what at this day would be called "Objective"science,) can investigate. Take for example, the sentence "the Sun isblue." Its Objects are "the Sun" and "blueness." If by "blueness" bemeant the Immediate Object, which is the quality of the sensation, itcan only be known by Feeling. But if it means that "Real," existential


condition, which causes the emitted light to have short mean wave-length, Langley has already proved that the proposition is true. So the"Sun" may mean the occasion of sundry sensations, and so is ImmediateObject, or it may mean our usual interpretation of such sensations interms of place, of mass, etc., when it is the Dynamical Object. It istrue of both Immediate and Dynamical Object that acquaintance cannot begiven by a Picture or a Description, nor by any other sign which has theSun for its Object. If a person points to it and says, See there! Thatis what we call the "Sun," the Sun is not the Object of that sign. It isthe Sign of the sun, the word "sun" that his declaration is about; andthat word we must become acquainted with by collateral experience.(8.183)[March 14, 1909] We must distinguish between the Immediate Object, --i.e. the Object as represented in the sign, -- and the Real (no, becauseperhaps the Object is altogether fictive, I must choose a differentterm, therefore), say rather the Dynamical Object, which, from thenature of things, the Sign cannot express, which it can only indicateand leave the interpreter to find out by collateral experience. Forinstance, I point my finger to what I mean, but I can't make mycompanion know what I mean, if he can't see it, or if seeing it, it doesnot, to his mind, separate itself from the surrounding objects in thefield of vision. It is useless to attempt to discuss the genuineness andpossession of a personality beneath the histrionic presentation ofTheodore Roosevelt with a person who recently has come from Mars andnever heard of Theodore before. … I reply, let us suppose: "It is astormy day." Here is another sign. Its Immediate Object is the notion ofthe present weather so far as this is common to her mind and mine -- notthe character of it, but the identity of it. The Dynamical Object is theidentity of the actual or Real meteorological conditions at the moment.(8.314)In respect to its immediate object a sign may either be a sign of aquality, of an existent, or of a law. (8.336)But it is necessary to distinguish the Immediate Object, or the Objectas the Sign represents it, from the Dynamical Object, or reallyefficient but not immediately present Object. (8.343)The inquiry ought, one would expect, to be an easy one, since bothtrichotomies depend on there being three Modes of Presence to the mind,which we may term

The Immediate, -- The Direct, -- The FamiliarMode of Presence.


The difference between the two trichotomies is that the one refers tothe Presence to the Mind of the Sign and the other to that of theImmediate Object. The Sign may have any Modality of Being, i.e., maybelong to any one of the three Universes; its Immediate Object must bein some sense, in which the Sign need not be, Internal. (8.354)The Immediate Object of all knowledge and all thought is, in the lastanalysis, the Percept. This doctrine in no wise conflicts withPragmaticism, which holds that the Immediate Interpretant of all thoughtproper is Conduct. Nothing is more indispensable to a sound epistemologythan a crystal-clear discrimination between the Object and theInterpretant of knowledge; very much as nothing is more indispensable tosound notions of geography than a crystal-clear discrimination betweennorth latitude and south latitude; and the one discrimination is notmore rudimentary than the other. That we are conscious of our Perceptsis a theory that seems to me to be beyond dispute; but it is not a factof Immediate Perception. A fact of Immediate Perception is not aPercept, nor any part of a Percept; a Percept is a Seme, while a fact ofImmediate Perception or rather the Perceptual Judgment of which suchfact is the Immediate Interpretant, is a Pheme that is the directDynamical Interpretant of the Percept, and of which the Percept is theDynamical Object, and is with some considerable difficulty (as thehistory of psychology shows), distinguished from the Immediate Object,though the distinction is highly significant But not to interrupt ourtrain of thought, let us go on to note that while the Immediate Objectof a Percept is excessively vague, yet natural thought makes up for thatlack (as it almost amounts to), as follows. A late DynamicalInterpretant of the whole complex of Percepts is the Seme of aPerceptual Universe that is represented in instinctive thought asdetermining the original Immediate Object of every Percept. Of course,I must be understood as talking not psychology, but the logic of mentaloperations. Subsequent Interpretants furnish new Semes of Universesresulting from various adjunctions to the Perceptual Universe. They are,however, all of them, Interpretants of Percepts. (CP 4.539)

g. Integration of science and phenomenology:

Phenomenology presents phenomena from a first person, internal,point of view and semiotically a sign consisting of internalstructure only would be necessary and sufficient for explainingphenomenology if it weren’t for the inexpressibility of the firstperson. Science presents phenomena from a third person, external,point of view and semiotically a sign consisting of external

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 31 of 167Xstructure only would be necessary and sufficient for explainingscience if it weren’t for the Kantian Veil.

Semiotics is a “super” science that integrates ordinary scienceand phenomenology into an integrated and unified whole. Itintegrates the first and third person points of view into anintegrated continuous coordinate system – a continuous point of view.

Internal structure is a first that captures the firstness ofphenomenology, while external structure is a second that captures thesecondness of physical science. The interpretant then is a thirdthat pulls the firstness of internal structure together with thesecondness of external structure. It integrates the firstness ofphenomenology into the secondness of science to form the thirdness ofsemiotics. A sign must therefore have a bilateral structure, i.e.,it must contain both an internal and an external structure.

The internal structure of the sign makes phenomena available tocognition and thus to the first person subjective experience.External structure makes the sign sensitive to some kind ofontological reality, not the epistemological reality of Peirce’sconvergent definition of truth – but some kind of neumenal,inexpressible, reality. It makes phenomena available objectively andthus to the third person experience. Thus, the integrated bilateralstructure of the sign allows for the possibility of integratingscience and phenomenology into semiotics yielding a unified,holistic, and integrated super science of experience.

Thus, the primary problem facing the philosophy of semiotics isthe integration of science and phenomenology into a super science ofexperience. This is one primary thrust of neopragmaticism, theNeopragmaticistic School of philosophy. But the accomplishment ofthis would be to revolutionize all of philosophy, not just thephilosophy of semiotics. I like to think of this philosophicalrevolution as the “Inquiry School of American Philosophy”.


This study also resulted in another important insight. One thathas important bearing on how we must go about doing semiotics, andperhaps even all of science. Relations between signs or signcomponents are internal in the USST sense and hence involve onlyphenomena. But phenomena involve the first person point of view.Hence, semiotics must involve both the first and third person pointsof view. Hence, semiotics is broader than either traditional scienceor traditional phenomenology. Semiotics is the science of triadicrelations, but the distinction between classical science andclassical phenomenology disappears in the requirements of the newscience of semiotics. There is a uniform continuity between thefirst person point of view and the third person point of view.

It is like drawing a rectangular coordinate system on a two-dimensional plane. Before drawing the x-y coordinates, one couldonly conceive of traveling back and forth in one direction along thex-axis (thinking scientifically), or traveling back and forth in theother direction along the y-axis (thinking phenomenologically).Classical science was like the x-axis and classical phenomenology waslike the y-axis, but they were distinct domains. After drawing thex-y axes as a two dimensional coordinate system and linking the twotogether, we can wander around in the whole plane and view theproblem from any angle that is most convenient for solving it. SeeFigure 5.

h. Trilateral structure of the pragmatic dimension:

This explains Bilateral Structure of the Semantic dimension. Thewhole sign has bilateral-like structure. However the Pragmaticdimension is unique, and unlike the Syntactic dimension and theSemantic dimension, the Pragmatic dimension requires a trilateralstructure. However, this is only a modified form of bilateralstructure. It is tied into the role of the Pragmatic dimension asmediator between the Syntactic and the Semantic dimension and alsobetween the Self-as-Ego and the Self-as-Other, a role of doublemediation. It is also tied into the Pragmatic dimension’s role as

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 33 of 167Xthe generator of the sign as it mediates between God and revelationand also between the feeling in the sign and the growth of theconceptual structure cognized by the sign, a second role of doublemediation. A double role of double mediation, if you will. This iswhat Peirce called the “Interpretant”.

We thus see that bilateral structure is required for the wholesemantic dimension for many reasons where it is thus available tojustify and found Peirce’s semiotic viewpoint for all of philosophy,science, and phenomenology.

Figure 5: The semiotic plane allows arbitrary viewpoints,from any balance of science-phenomenology to suit the problem needs.

III. EXPLICATING PEIRCE’S NEW THEORY OF INQUIRY: ESCAPE FROM ASEMIOTIC PRISON 20

I have shown the need for a bilateral structure of the signindependently of Peirce’s theory of inquiry. But now, given thebilateral structure and the two impenetrable veils, the situation ismuch like that of Figure 6. How do we escape the prison of the signin order to gain truth and reality, or as much of it as is humanlypossible? This is where Peirce’s Principle of Fallibility and his20 I tried out some of the ideas for this section in my entry for “inquiry” inAmerican Philosophy: An Encyclopedia (2008).

y PhenomenologicalAxis

x

Scientific

Axis

Any arbitrary viewpoint

Problem

The Semiotic Plane

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 34 of 167Xdefinitions of Truth and Reality play their role in his integratedand systematic theory of inquiry.

Peirce regarded inquiry as the process of resolving genuine doubt,and truth as the goal of inquiry.

The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief. Ishall term this struggle Inquiry, though it must be admitted that thisis sometimes not a very apt designation” (CP 5.374). … it isindispensable to say what is meant by the True: until this is done thestatement has no meaning. I suppose that by the True is meant that atwhich inquiry aims (CP 5.557).

Kant’sImpenetra

bleVeil

Peirce’sImpenetra

bleVeil

View from inside the

sign between the immediate

and the dynamic structure

CognitiveMentellect

P

Dynamic Ground I

Dynamic Object(Cognitive Context)

E

Frustrated attempt to

reach neumenal reality

Frustrated attempt to reach inner feelings as really experienced


Figure 6: The Prison of the Sign

Among the principles of Pragmatism, as Peirce formulated it,fallibilism stated that all Modern philosophy required man to beinfallible in every way, and that this just does not hold in the realworld. Therefore, any suitable method of inquiry must allow for theexistence of human errors and provide for ways of correcting them.

… philosophical inquiry which necessarily begins in ignorance, must notpursue a method by which the error of its first assumptions is allowedto retain its full effect to the end, or else it will come to naught (MS1365: Review of Spencer; 1891).In “The Fixation of Belief” (1877), he examined methods of inquiry

(fixation of belief) and determined that the only method of inquirythat had the built-in power for self correction of errors was thescientific method. Since all human behavior is fallible, heconcluded that all inquiry should employ the scientific method:

Thus it is that inquiry of every type, fully carried out, has the vitalpower of self-correction and of growth. This is a property so deeplysaturating its inmost nature that it may truly be said that there is butone thing needful for learning the truth, and that is a hearty andactive desire to learn what is true (CP 5.582).

Thus scientific inquiry became Peirce’s typical starting point inthinking about any problem.

Peirce also chided Descartes for “pretending to doubt what cannotbe doubted”, concluding that only genuine doubt had the ability tolead inquiry to a successful conclusion. A better understanding ofthe scientific method led Peirce to believe that scientific evidencecannot be a matter for the individual inquirer only, as Descartes hadclaimed, but must be public in the sense that all inquirers trainedin the particular discipline must be able to examine and subject it

Frustrated attempt to reach inner feelings as really experienced

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 36 of 167Xand its implications to critical review. Therefore, the finalarbiter of any philosophical inquiry is the entire community ofinquirers.

Since inquiry is itself fallible, the results of inquiry arealways subject to further doubts, thus generating further inquiry.Thus truth, which is the conclusion of inquiry, is not the conclusionof this particular inquiry, nor even of any finite sequence ofinquiries, but the final conclusion agreed upon at the end of alltime by all investigators who enter upon inquiry with an open mindusing the best scientific methods.

… the objectivity of truth really consists in the fact that, in the end,every sincere inquirer will be led to embrace it -- and if he be notsincere, the irresistible effect of inquiry in the light of experiencewill be to make him so. This doctrine appears to me, after onesubtraction, to be a corollary of pragmatism. I set it in a strong lightin my original presentation of the method. I call my form of it"conditional idealism." That is to say, I hold that truth's independenceof individual opinions is due (so far as there is any "truth") to itsbeing the predestined result to which sufficient inquiry wouldultimately lead (CP 5.494).Thus truth and the results of inquiry can even outlast the human

race. Finally, reality is defined simply as the object of the trueresults of inquiry. “… the only reality, there could be, would beconformity to the ultimate result of inquiry” (CP 5.211).

Thus by starting from complete ignorance and assuming that everystep of inquiry is fallible, Peirce developed the idea thatrepetitive self correction would lead after an infinite number ofsteps to the best knowledge of truth and reality available. Thisgives us something like Figure 7, but see also Figure 8.

Peirce’s concept of truth combines the concepts of process, community of investigators, fallibility, evolution, asymptotic limit, and eschatology; Pannenberg’s theology combines the same set of concepts in almost the same way and the results are very similar.

Human beings cannot fully know the Infinite in a finite time; but,given an infinite time, they can approach it. Figure 7 also gives us

some insight into how Peirce’s theory of research economics21 can eliminate a dualism that pervaded his entire philosophy – that between urgent matters and intellectual matters. It is up to the doubter, by practical judgment or use of research economics, to determine how much time would be practical to devote to a specific task of inquiry. If no time is available for inquiry, this results in what Peirce often referred to as urgent matters.

21 Peirce is generally regarded as the founder of the discipline of research economics.

Figure 7: Peirce’s Theory of Inquiry.

In the search for ultimate truth, even an infinite length of timeis not too much. This results in what Peirce referred to asintellectual matters. But if only a finite amount of time isavailable and an approximate understanding is good enough for apractical solution, this results in a practical resolution ofinquiry, a solution that Dewey attempted to reach.

Thus, rather than the dualistic pair between urgent matters andintellectual matters, Peirce’s theory of inquiry actually leads to a

Living (i.e. genuine) Doubt

Feelings and Experience

Ontological Reality

Kantian Veil

Real object as it really is

Ultimate end of all inquiry at the end of time

Truth and epistemological reality Ti

me

Peircean Veil

Feelings as really experienced

Immediately urgent, no time available for inquiry

Practical amount of time to achieve a practical amount of inquiry to achieve a practical solution

Inquiry – Infinite time for complete intellectual understanding

No

inquiry

Infi

nite

Inqu

iry

Inquiry must continually repeat in order to self correct for fallibility

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 39 of 167Xcontinuum of resolutions, all determined by the amount of timepractically available for an approximate solution.

IV. PEIRCE’S THEORY OF TRUTH AND REALITY :

A sign is true iff its immediate object is equal to its dynamicobject. The problem with this formulation is that we can never knowuntil the ultimate end of all inquiry whether this equation holds ornot. Thus we are right back to the ultimate end of all inquiry forour knowledge of truth.

In order to explain this in a logically consistent manner, Peircewas forced into an entirely new theory of truth and reality. IfAristotle’s theory of truth was called the “Correspondence” theoryand the Eleatic theory was called the “Cohesion” theory, Peirce’stheory is called the “Convergence” the ory”. This section explainshow Peirce’s Convergence theory of truth and reality explains how wegain as much truth and reality as is humanly possible, even tho thisis not our complete naïve view of truth and reality.

Since inquiry is itself fallible, the results of inquiry arealways subject to further doubts, thus generating further inquiry.Thus truth, which is the conclusion of inquiry, is not the conclusionof this particular inquiry, nor even of any finite inquiry, but thefinal conclusion agreed upon at the end of all time by allinvestigators who enter upon inquiry with an open mind using the bestscientific methods.


Figure 8: Peirce’s Convergence Theory of Truth

… the objectivity of truth really consists in the fact that, in the end,every sincere inquirer will be led to embrace it -- and if he be notsincere, the irresistible effect of inquiry in the light of experiencewill be to make him so. This doctrine appears to me, after onesubtraction, to be a corollary of pragmatism. I set it in a strong lightin my original presentation of the method. I call my form of it"conditional idealism." That is to say, I hold that truth's independenceof individual opinions is due (so far as there is any "truth") to itsbeing the predestined result to which sufficient inquiry wouldultimately lead (CP 5.494).Thus truth is an ongoing process and the results of inquiry can

even outlast the human race. Finally, reality is defined simply asthe object of the true results of inquiry. “… the only reality,there could be, would be conformity to the ultimate result ofinquiry” (CP 5.211). Note this is not the proof that he has foundthe same reality that Kant hid from us, as we might expect at thispoint, but that Peirce has defined a whole new concept of reality, asthe only kind of reality that man can ever know. In doing this, hehas violated his own ethics of terminology because in defining a newconcept, he should have given it a new name instead of calling it

t Iterations of self-

correcting methodology(i.e. the scientific

method)

Approximation to

the Truth

Ontological Truth(if it exists)

Approach to the knowledge of Truth and Reality in infinite time.

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 41 of 167XReality. But he has solved the eternal epistemological question:“What are the limits of human knowing?”.

Peirce has been criticized for assuming that all inquiry has atrue answer that has converged to a real result. In fact, he neverdoes this. Peirce never assumes that every question has a trueanswer, only that if it does, his method will find it.


New Notes:

A modification of Figure 7, showing the influence of God andrevelation on the search for truth and reality.

Ultimate end of all Inquiry at the end of all time

Reve

lati

on

Kant

ian

Veil Peircean

Veil

Genuine Doubt

Inquiry




# 157

“THE ROLE OF PEIRCEAN SEMIOTICS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF INQUIRY”

The theme for this conference is “The Role of Charles Peirce asFounder of the Inquiry School of American Philosophy”. But if one isto be a founder of a school, there must be others with the same basicapproach that follow and go beyond. Otherwise, there is no school;only one lonely philosopher crying in the wilderness. Whenphilosophers and historians look at Peirce solely as the founder ofpragmaticism, this is just what they have seen – only a lonelyphilosopher crying in the wilderness.

The purpose of this address is to suggest that this is the wrongway to characterize Peirce. American philosophy displays somethingentirely new in the history of philosophy, a major concern for thenature of inquiry, and this concern for inquiry began with Peirce.When Peirce is characterized as the “Founder of the Inquiry School ofAmerican Philosophy”, there is no problem finding his followers.They include virtually every major American philosopher and manyothers thruout the world.

This address argues that it was the semiotic approach that allowedPeirce to develop his concern for inquiry, and presents some follow-on developments that are based on his semiotics but go beyond it.

Altho semiotics received its original spark of life from St.Augustine in the fifth century C.E., for which he is rightly regardedas the “father” of semiotics, a moderate beginning of the developmentof semiotics as a science was not accomplished until the ScholasticAge (Deely 2001). In the Modern Age, the science of semiotics took astep backwards when Descartes framed modern thought in terms ofimages and ideas, both dyadic relations, altho Locke continued tomention semiotics as a goal of study. More recently, many attemptshave been made to establish semiotics as a rigorous science, the best

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 46 of 167Xknown of which are John of Poinsot in the 16th century, CharlesPeirce in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Fernand de Saussurein the early 20th century, and Charles Morris in the mid-20th century.

Among all of these beginnings, only that of Peirce was able towork out all of the logical and philosophical problems required toserve as a strong and solid foundation for the founding of arigorous, empirical science. Among the many problems that Peirce hadto solve was the invention of a philosophy, a logic, an algebra, anda geometry of relations, including those for the triadic relationswhich Peirce found to constitute the very heart of semiotics.

But if Peirce’s development is to serve as the foundation of a newscience, there must be something that comes after it – something thatgoes beyond Peirce and looks like a genuine science rather than merephilosophical eloquence. What is this “new science” of semiotics?This essay will suggest one possible answer to that question – onethat I refer to as the “New Science of Semiotics”.

Peirce called his development “semeiotic” (pronounced seem-eye-OH-tik) after Locke’s reference to the Scholastic development.Therefore I will refer to it as the “Semeiotic Paradigm”. Over theyears, my new science has come to be called the “Semiotic Paradigm”(pronounced sem-ee-AH-tik), especially within the environment of theSemiotic Society of America’s Special Interest Group for EmpiricalSemiotics (SIG/ES). I will therefore use that term to refer to it.The word “semiotics” itself only arose after an accidentalmispronunciation by the anthropologist Margaret Meade.

In order to qualify as a new science of semiotics, any developmentmust satisfy three conditions. 1) It must extend beyond Peirce in ascientific way. 2) It must satisfy all of the conditions for anyscientific paradigm, as first discovered by Thomas Kuhn (1962) butlater extended by SIG/ES. And finally, it must be able to solvegenuine semiotic problems of genuine interest to both semioticiansand semioticists and to suggest fruitful new problems and approachesto solving problems. This essay will suggest that the Semiotic

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 47 of 167XParadigm satisfies all three conditions and thus provides such a “NewScience of Semiotics”. I will start with the first condition.

I. BEYOND WHAT: CHARACTERIZING SCIENCES:

Like all things Peircean, “beyond” is a relative term. In WHAT1way is WHAT2 beyond Peirce’s WHAT3. Since my goal is to compare theSemiotic Paradigm of the science of semiotics to Peirce’s SemeioticParadigm of the science of semiotics, the question reduces to askingin what ways may sciences be characterized. I thus ask, “In whatways is my Semiotic Paradigm beyond Peirce’s Semeiotic Paradigm?”.

B. Teleology:

A second characteristic that distinguishes sciences is their useof the concept of goals, purposes, or ends. Aristotle distinguishedthese as the “final” of his four causes and determined that sciencehas no place for these “teleological”22 explanations. Aristotle’sbanishment of teleology from science worked wonderfully well formillenniums while scholars concentrated on the dyadic, or physical,sciences.

But once scientists began to examine the human, or social andbehavioral, sciences, teleology seemed to creep back into each one.It was Peirce who formally reintroduced teleology back into science,saying that teleology is always a required concept in every one ofthe triadic sciences but is never allowed in any of the dyadicsciences. In fact, teleology is one of the distinguishingdifferences between dyadic and triadic relations.

C. Triadic:

Another distinguishing characteristic for sciences refers to thekind of relations that they use to model reality. Experience hasproven that all concepts in all of the physical sciences can bemodeled mathematically by dyadic, or two place, relations. AlthoPeirce stated this initially, Faraday phrased it scientifically by

22 From the Greek word for “final”.

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 48 of 167Xsaying that all physical phenomena must be modeled in terms of fieldtheory. Later, Einstein refined this by saying that everything inall of the physical sciences can be modeled by covariant tensors. Onthe other hand, it was Peirce who also discovered that all of thesemiotic sciences require at least some triadic, or three place,relations.

Peirce’s semeiotic paradigm brilliantly introduced triadic relations and teleology into his taxonomic science, but it still remained in the taxonomic stage nevertheless.

II. BEYOND TAXONOMY:

The teleological and triadic properties are required to characterize any stage of semiotics. They are part of what it means to be a sign. Only the taxonomic property characterizes a particularstage23 of any science. Are there any characteristics beyond the taxonomic? Of course, the modern philosophy of science gives a resounding answer of “Yes” to this question.

As Colapietro says “The value of Peirce’s theory of signs resides primarily not in providing us with a formal classification of signs, but in sketching in the most painstaking detail a heuristic frameworkfor instituting and developing an empirical investigation of sign processes in their myriad forms … Formal classifications are, unquestionably, important; but they are valuable as tools of inquiry.”

Nomothetic sciences go beyond classification in search of invariances. A mere taxonomy becomes less important than the search for general laws. Peirce, himself, noted this distinction when he referred to it as the qualitative sciences vs. the quantitative sciences. In a manuscript that was unpublished in Peirce’s lifetime,he says: “… every science has its Qualitative and its Quantitative stage;” (MS 909: Chapter 1). The concepts of observation, measurement, and mathematics are introduced in this stage. Peirce’s

23 The first scientific stage.

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 49 of 167XGeneral Law of Mind was an initial attempt to develop a law of semiotics altho this was not his motivation and he never interpreted this as an extension of his semeiotic beyond the taxonomic stage. Nomothetic sciences place a heavy reliance on inductive and deductivereasoning that is absent in mere taxonomic sciences.

Abductive-subductive sciences are erroneously called hypothetico-deductive sciences. What nominalistic scholars refer to as hypotheses are usually instances of abductive reasoning, first studied and explained by Peirce; and their so-called deduction (reasoning from interpreted generals to interpreted individuals) is really instances of subduction (reasoning from interpreted abstract theories to interpreted generals). But however they are called, it is obvious that abductive-subductive sciences go beyond nomothetic sciences in search of principled explanations. Even tho the search for laws remains important, the development of abstract theories to explain these laws also becomes important. Abductive-subductive sciences are best described as promoting the invention of abstract theory, with principled explanation following by subduction from theory.

Altho Peirce developed many abstract concepts and an occasional snippet of theory, he claimed never to have had the time to develop acomplete and systematic theory to explain his science of semeiotic. I like to think of my New Science of Semiotics as what Peirce would have done had he had the time to develop it – that is, if Peirce had been a farmer instead of a backwoodsman and had had the time to plough his own fields.

To summarize the last two sections, I’ll use the history of chemistry as an example. Table 1 outlines the historical stages of chemistry. The first column shows the historical stage of progression. The second column shows the scientific stage as discussed above. The last column gives an example when chemistry wasin that stage.


III. THE NEW SCIENCE OF SEMIOTICS:

In the “New Science of Semiotics”, the Semiotic Paradigm replaces the Semeiotic Paradigm of the “Old Science” by replacing Peirce’s metaphysical categorization scheme and taxonomy with a new empirical categorization scheme and taxonomy24. The Semiotic Paradigm is the result of a ten-year campaign by the Semiotic Society of America’s Special Interest Group for Empirical Semiotics (SIG/ES) to find a wayto replace the honorific use of the word “science” in the phrase “science of semiotics” with meaningful science by extending semioticsbeyond the taxonomic stage. During this time, many paradigms competed but only the Semiotic Paradigm survived.

Additional Notes:Stages of Science:

1. Mythological/Prephilosophical

2. Philosophical

3. (Generic of) Alchemical/Astrological

4. Naturalistic

5. Taxonomic

6. Nomothetic

7. Abductive/Subductive

WORKING COPY# 150

“BEYOND PEIRCE:THE NEW SCIENCE OF SEMIOTICS AND THE SEMIOTICS OF LAW”

24 Still using Peirce’s categorization schema, however.


By: Charls Pearson

[email protected]

Altho semiotics received its original spark of life from St.

Augustine in the fifth century C.E., for which he is rightly regarded

as the “father” of semiotics, a moderate beginning of the development

of semiotics as a science was not accomplished until the Scholastic

Age (Deely 2001). In the Modern Age, the science of semiotics took a

step backwards when Descartes framed modern thought in terms of

images and ideas, both dyadic relations, altho Locke continued to

mention semiotics as a goal of study. More recently, many attempts

have been made to establish semiotics as a rigorous science, the best

known of which are John of Poinsot in the 16th century, Charles

Peirce in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Fernand de Saussure

in the early 20th century, and Charles Morris in the mid-20th century.

Among all of these beginnings, only that of Peirce was able to

work out all of the logical and philosophical problems required to

serve as a strong and solid foundation for the founding of a

rigorous, empirical science. Among the many problems that Peirce had

to solve was the invention of a philosophy, a logic, an algebra, and

mailto:[email protected]

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 52 of 167Xa geometry of relations, including those for the triadic relations

which Peirce found to constitute the very heart of semiotics.

But if Peirce’s development is to serve as the foundation of a new

science, there must be something that comes after it – something that

goes beyond Peirce and looks like a genuine science rather than mere

philosophical eloquence. What is this “new science” of semiotics?

This essay will suggest one possible answer to that question – one

that I refer to as the “New Science of Semiotics”.

Peirce called his development “semeiotic” (pronounced seem-eye-OH-

tik) after Locke’s reference to the Scholastic development.

Therefore I will refer to it as the “Semeiotic Paradigm”. Over the

years, my new science has come to be called the “Semiotic Paradigm”

(pronounced sem-ee-AH-tik), especially within the environment of the

Semiotic Society of America’s Special Interest Group for Empirical

Semiotics (SIG/ES). I will therefore use that term to refer to it.

The word “semiotics” itself only arose after an accidental

mispronunciation by the anthropologist Margaret Meade.

In order to qualify as a new science of semiotics, any development

must satisfy three conditions. 1) It must extend beyond Peirce in a

scientific way. 2) It must satisfy all of the conditions for any

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 53 of 167Xscientific paradigm, as first discovered by Thomas Kuhn (1962) but

later extended by SIG/ES. And finally, it must be able to solve

genuine semiotic problems of genuine interest to both semioticians

and semioticists and to suggest fruitful new problems and approaches

to solving problems. This essay will suggest that the Semiotic

Paradigm satisfies all three conditions and thus provides such a “New

Science of Semiotics”. The New Science of Semiotics extends Peirce’s

taxonomic science to both a nomothetic science and beyond to an

abductive/subductive science.

I. BEYOND WHAT: CHARACTERIZING SCIENCES:

Like all things Peircean, “beyond” is a relative term. In WHAT1

way is WHAT2 beyond Peirce’s WHAT3. Since my goal is to compare the

Semiotic Paradigm of the science of semiotics to Peirce’s Semeiotic

Paradigm of the science of semiotics, the question reduces to asking

in what ways may sciences be characterized. I thus ask, “In what

ways is my Semiotic Paradigm beyond Peirce’s Semeiotic Paradigm?”.

A. Taxonomy:

The first characteristic of a science that I want to discuss is

how it identifies, distinguishes, and classifies its objects of

concern. The study of such problems is called “taxonomy”. The one

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 54 of 167Xcharacteristic shared by every science is that it must adopt some

taxonomic system. Before doing that, scholars can only mumble

unscientifically (at best) and superstitiously (at worst) about their

topic of concern.

In the case of alchemy, such mumbles were called “magical

incantations”. Alchemy only learned slowly over the centuries how to

identify and distinguish the chemical elements as it gradually

transformed itself into the science of chemistry. All sciences start

in this prescientific stage and gradually evolve by trial and error

into what may be called a “taxonomic science”. We will shortly learn

that semiotics, like botany and zoology, remained in this taxonomic

stage until just recently.

Aristotle attempted to develop methods of aiding this effort with

his logic of definition. The result of using Aristotle’s method of

definition was to develop a taxonomy. In the study of signs, many

scholars wrestled with definitions for their various categories of

signs as the taxonomy of semiotics gradually ebbed and flowed in its

nearly fifteen hundred years of development25.

25 Roughly 400 CE (St. Augustine) to 1900 CE (Peirce).


St. Augustine was the first to see the need for a science of signs

and to attempt to define the important kinds of signs. He is thus

considered the father of semiotics. But the names of other scholars

attempting to develop the semiotic taxonomy include, but are not

limited to, Albertus Magnus, Petrus Hispanus, Duns Scotus, William of

Occam, John Poinsot, John Locke, Charles Peirce, and Charles Morris.

However, it was Charles Peirce, with his discovery of the nature

of triadic relations and the triadic nature of all signs that was the

first to achieve a completely satisfactory and consistent taxonomy

with his science of semeiotic. But Peirce, with his discovery of the

three metaphysical categories (see Hausman – this issue) and his all

consuming interest in logic, failed to see any potential for

semiotics beyond the taxonomic science needed to understand logic.

In fact, Peirce died believing that logic and semiotics were

coextensive. It was the great ambassador, Charles Morris, who

foresaw more of the universal possibility and potential for the

science of semiotics.

B. Teleology:

A second characteristic that distinguishes sciences is their use

of the concept of goals, purposes, or ends. Aristotle distinguished

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 56 of 167Xthese as the “final” of his four causes and determined that science

has no place for these “teleological”26 explanations. Aristotle’s

banishment of teleology from science worked wonderfully well for

millenniums while scholars concentrated on the dyadic, or physical,

sciences.

But once scientists began to examine the human, or social and

behavioral, sciences, teleology seemed to creep back into each one.

It was Peirce who formally reintroduced teleology back into science,

saying that teleology is always a required concept in every one of

the triadic sciences but is never allowed in any of the dyadic

sciences. In fact, teleology is one of the distinguishing

differences between dyadic and triadic relations.

C. Triadic:

Another distinguishing characteristic for sciences refers to the

kind of relations that they use to model reality. Experience has

proven that all concepts in all of the physical sciences can be

modeled mathematically by dyadic, or two place, relations. Altho

Peirce stated this initially, Faraday phrased it scientifically by

saying that all physical phenomena must be modeled in terms of field

26 From the Greek word for “final”.

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 57 of 167Xtheory. Later, Einstein refined this by saying that everything in

all of the physical sciences can be modeled by covariant tensors. On

the other hand, it was Peirce who also discovered that all of the

semiotic sciences require at least some triadic, or three place,

relations.

Peirce’s semeiotic paradigm brilliantly introduced triadic

relations and teleology into his taxonomic science, but it still

remained in the taxonomic stage nevertheless.

II. BEYOND TAXONOMY:

The teleological and triadic properties are required to

characterize any stage of semiotics. They are part of what it means

to be a sign. Only the taxonomic property characterizes a particular

stage27 of any science. Are there any characteristics beyond the

taxonomic? Of course, the modern philosophy of science gives a

resounding answer of “Yes” to this question, or as Peirce described

it in the first of his Harvard lectures of 1898, “As a general

proposition, the history of science shows every science growing into

a more abstract science, one higher in our scale.”. (1898: 119)

And as Colapietro says (this issue):

27 The first scientific stage.


The value of Peirce’s theory of signs resides primarily not in providing us

with a formal classification of signs, but in sketching in the most painstaking

detail a heuristic framework for instituting and developing an empirical

investigation of sign processes in their myriad forms … Formal classifications

are, unquestionably, important; but they are valuable as tools of inquiry.

For purposes of inquiry, nomothetic sciences go beyond

classification in search of invariances. A mere taxonomy becomes

less important than the search for general laws. Peirce, himself,

noted this distinction when he referred to it as the qualitative

sciences vs. the quantitative sciences. In a manuscript that was

unpublished in Peirce’s lifetime, he says: “… every science has its

Qualitative and its Quantitative stage;” (MS 909: Chapter 1). The

concepts of observation, measurement, and mathematics are introduced

in this stage. Peirce’s General Law of Mind was an initial attempt

to develop a law of semiotics altho this was not his motivation and

he never interpreted this as an extension of his semeiotic beyond the

taxonomic stage. Nomothetic sciences place a heavy reliance on

inductive and deductive reasoning that is absent in mere taxonomic

sciences.

Abductive-subductive sciences are erroneously called hypothetico-

deductive sciences. What nominalistic scholars refer to as

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 59 of 167Xhypotheses are usually instances of abductive reasoning, first

studied and explained by Peirce; and their so-called deduction

(reasoning from interpreted generals to interpreted individuals) is

really instances of subduction (reasoning from interpreted abstract

theories to interpreted generals). But however they are called, it

is obvious that abductive-subductive sciences go beyond nomothetic

sciences in search of principled explanations. Even tho the search

for laws remains important, the development of abstract theories to

explain these laws also becomes important. Abductive-subductive

sciences are best described as promoting the invention of abstract

theory, with principled explanation following by subduction from

theory.

Altho Peirce developed many abstract concepts and an occasional

snippet of theory, he claimed never to have had the time to develop a

complete and systematic theory to explain his science of semeiotic.

I like to think of my New Science of Semiotics as what Peirce would

have done had he had the time to develop it – that is, if Peirce had

been a farmer instead of a backwoodsman and had had the time to

plough his own fields.


To summarize the last two sections, I’ll use the history of

chemistry as an example. Table 1 outlines the historical stages of

chemistry. The first column shows the historical stage of

progression. The second column shows the scientific stage as

discussed above. The last column gives an example when chemistry was

in that stage.

III. THE NEW SCIENCE OF SEMIOTICS:

In the “New Science of Semiotics”, the Semiotic Paradigm replaces

the Semeiotic Paradigm of the “Old Science” by replacing Peirce’s

metaphysical categorization scheme and taxonomy28 with a new

empirical categorization scheme and taxonomy29. The Semiotic

Paradigm is the result of a ten-year campaign by the Semiotic Society

of America’s Special Interest Group for Empirical Semiotics (SIG/ES)

to find a way to replace the honorific use of the word “science” in

the phrase “science of semiotics” with meaningful science by

extending semiotics beyond the taxonomic stage. During this time,

many paradigms competed but only the Semiotic Paradigm survived.

IV. THE SEMIOTIC PARADIGM:

28 Still using Peirce’s categorization schema, however.29 To be discussed in Section IV.D.2.


The Semiotic Paradigm is a complete scientific paradigm in Kuhn’s

sense (1962) with all six required subparadigms in the SIG/ES sense

(Pearson 1981). These include a language, terminology, and

philosophy subparadigm called the language of “Menetics”; an

observational subparadigm called “experimental semiotics”, a

descriptive and invariance subparadigm called “nomothetic semiotics”,

an explanatory and theoretical subparadigm called “theoretical

semiotics”, a mathematical subparadigm called “mathematical

semiotics”, and an applications subparadigm called “applied

semiotics”.

A. The Language of Menetics:

Our first subparadigm is the Philosophy, Language, and Terminology

subparadigm, but it probably would be more appropriate to call it the

Ogden and Richards subparadigm since it is their famous book, The

Meaning of Meaning (1923), that first brought the necessity of

developing a special philosophy, language, and terminology for the

scientific study of meaning to the world’s attention. But, in point

of historical fact, it is called “Menetics”, for the language of

meaning (Pearson 1977).

1. A Special Terminology:


The language of Menetics contains a special vocabulary designed by

means of a computer science methodology used for designing computer

languages. It contains a special terminology for studying

information, meaning, and communication phenomena. Specifications

for this terminology were chosen using the procedure suggested by

Ogden and Richards in their important book, The Meaning of Meaning

(1923). It also is designed in such a way as to satisfy all three of

Chomsky’s requirements for the design of any scientific language.

For example, the language can be used to discover and describe an

invariance in the nature of the empirical reality of all concepts as

discussed next.

2. The Empirical Reality of Concepts:

a. Introduction:

One overriding question in the philosophy of semiotics concerns

the reality of concepts. Peirce asked how a concept, proposition, or

argument could achieve empirical reality and in another place

suggested that the Cartesian single-chain mode of deductive

reasoning, used by modern logic for system building, be replaced by

the multi-filament-cable mode of ampliative reasoning, used by his

postmodern logic for scientific inquiry. This was all the hint that

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 63 of 167XWendell Garner, a mid-twentieth century psychologist, needed in order

to develop a concept of ‘operational convergence’ (1974), which

explained the empirical reality of operational scientific concepts.

However, this still leaves unanswered the status of such important

concepts as facts, laws, and theories. The language of Menetics

allows Garner’s approach to be completely generalized giving a

satisfactory answer for the empirical reality of all signs.

b. Empirical convergence:

A proposed fact that is justified by a single observation is

nothing but an ad-hoc eduction from a concrete singular to a specific

individual – nothing but a convenient shorthand for recording the

data from that one observation. But a single fact that records and

summarizes the data from many different observations, all made from

an infinite population of possible observations, and each made

objectively and fairly on different individuals chosen by random

sampling from the entire population using experimental design theory,

gains more empirical reality with each new observation that justifies

it. This gain in empirical reality is called “eductive phematic

convergence”. We say that the collection of observations converges to

the empirical reality of the fact. Thus, eductive phematic

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 64 of 167Xconvergence means that one fact converges to the recording and

summarization of the data from many different observations. The

resulting fact is a proposition with a concrete singular denotation.

A proposed law that is justified by a single fact or single kind

of experiment is nothing but an ad-hoc induction from a concrete

singular to a hypothetical general – nothing but a convenient

shorthand for describing that one fact or the results of that one

kind of experiment. But a single law that describes many different

facts or the results of many different experimental paradigms all

observed from an infinite population of possible facts or paradigms

gains more empirical reality with each new fact or kind of experiment

that requires it. This gain in empirical reality is called “inductive

phematic convergence”. We say that the collection of facts or

experimental paradigms converges to the empirical reality of the law.

Thus, inductive phematic convergence means that one law converges to

a description of many facts or the results of many different

experimental paradigms. The resulting law is a proposition with a

concrete general connotation.

A proposed theory that is justified by a single law is nothing but

an ad hoc abduction from a concrete general to a hypothetical

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 65 of 167Xabstraction – nothing but a convenient shorthand for remembering that

one law. But a single theory that explains many different laws, all

derived from an infinite population of possible descriptions of

independent phenomena, gains more empirical reality with each new law

that enters into its network of explanation. This gain in empirical

reality is called “abductive dolemic convergence”. We say that the

collection of laws converges to the empirical reality of the theory.

Thus, abductive dolemic convergence means that one theory converges

to an explanation of many different laws. The resulting theory is an

argument with an abstract singular pronotation.

The above explication has been sketched out for propositions, or

signs with phematic structure. It could equally well have been done

for terms, or signs with rhematic structure, and for arguments, or

signs with dolemic structure. Thus, we have a 2-dimensional, nine-

way classification of empirical convergence as shown in Table 2.

This makes it clear that Garner’s concept of operational convergence

is just my inductive rhematic convergence. Nevertheless, Garner, who

followed a line of reasoning initiated by Peirce, provided the

necessary motivation for the above explication.


Table 2: Forms of Empirical ConvergenceConvergen

ceRhematic Phematic Dolemic

Eductive EductiveRhematic

EductivePhematic

EductiveDolemic

Inductive InductiveRhematic

InductivePhematic

InductiveDolemic

Abductive AbductiveRhematic

AbductivePhematic

AbductiveDolemic

c. Garner’s Explication:

Wendell Garner was one of the earliest psychologists to apply

Shannon’s concept of variation measures in modal statistics

(“information” – so called) to problems of perception and other areas

of experimental psychology (Garner 1954, 1962; Garner, Hake, &

Eriksen 1956; Pearson 1978a). Altho he came to use Shannon’s

quantitative measure of information less and less in later years, the

basic idea of information structure led him to develop several

interesting semiotic concepts, such as the concept of dimensional

integrality, and the concept of energic vs. informational properties

(Pearson 1978a). In applying his basic methodology of “Critical

Realism”30, he had to ask himself how his concepts could achieve

empirical reality, and in doing so, he explicated his concept of

30 Ironically, this is the same name that Peirce gave to his own philosophy.

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 67 of 167X‘operational convergence’ (Garner 1954, 1974; Garner, Hake, & Eriksen

1956; Pearson 1978a).

Garner gave as an example several of his own concepts. But one

that will be more easily understood by present readers, is that of

the many experiments involving, and the many different ways of

observing and measuring, the observational temperature, all of which

converge to essentially the same result and play the same role in the

laws of thermodynamics, thus giving to the concept of ‘temperature’

an empirical reality.

One method of achieving convergence is to show that the results of

two or more experiments based on two or more independent

observational techniques are correlated. Garner claims that such

corelational techniques provide a form of convergence themselves

(Garner 1974: 188). This process of establishing the existence and

nature of a concept based on psychosemiotic and sociosemiotic

research and then seeking the semiotic basis for the concept is the

very heart of the experimental research I have reported on over the

last 35 years. It is, in fact, the very heart of my Paradigm

Inversion Principle and its Semiotic Reinterpretation corollary

(1981). See Section B.


Since it is convergence, rather than the precision of a single

technique, that provides the empirical meaning of a concept, we

should be free to use techniques of reasoning that are not as precise

and reliable as we might otherwise prefer. As Garner says, “The

ultimate validity of a concept does not depend on any single

procedure, but on a convergent result, so the importance of any one

procedure is greatly diminished.” (Garner 1974: 188)31.

d. Summary of the General Concept of Convergence:

Four things have become obvious from performing this systematic

analysis of the source of empirical reality for all concepts. First,

concepts with empirical reality fit together systematically into a

diagrammatic system very similar to the ampliative half of the Ladder

of Scientific Reasoning (Pearson 1991). This is shown in Figure 1:

Empirical Convergence and Ampliative Reasoning. Eductive convergence

may also be called observational convergence. Inductive convergence

may also be called descriptive convergence, altho one particular form

of it, inductive phematic convergence, was called operational

convergence by Garner (1974). And abductive convergence may also be

called explanatory convergence.

31 Cf. Peirce’s concept of a multi-filament cable and his convergence concepts of truth and reality.


Second, the diagrammatic system of Figure 1 may be factored into

the product of two vectors. One vector along the semantic dimension

refers to the nature of ampliative reasoning: eduction, induction,

and abduction. Let us call it Ŝ, for semantic, so that

Ŝ = <Eduction, Induction, Abduction>.

The other vector lies along the pragmatic dimension and refers to

the grammatical complexity of the scientific sign. Let us call it Ĝ,

for pragmatic, so that

Ĝ = <Rheme, Pheme, Doleme>.

Then the convergence of ( ŜT Χ Ĝ ) gives the 3 by 3 matrix that

abstracts Table 2 and yields back all of Figure 1. Thus, we can see

that all concepts are composed of two, more elementary, semiotic

concepts; one involving pragmatic complexity and lying along the

pragmatic dimension, while the other involves the nature of

ampliative reasoning required to give empirical reality to the

concept, and lying along the semantic dimension. As is inherent in

semiotic structure, each vector consists of exactly three components

and each is also in exactly the order dictated by the Universal Sign

Structure Theory (Pearson 1977, 1981, 1982).


Third, all concepts in Table 2 involve finite sampling from an

infinite population. Can this statistical process be restricted to

either Ŝ or Ĝ, and which one, or must it involve both? I think it is

clear that the sampling process is a function of only the kind of

reasoning involved in developing the empirical reality of the concept

and is independent of the pragmatic complexity. This is easiest to

see in connection with the inductive modes of reality convergence.

Whether it is inductive rhematic convergence (Garner’s operational

convergence), inductive phematic convergence (classical Theophrastian

induction), or inductive dolemic convergence (my descriptive

convergence), the explication of the concepts above should have made

it clear that the nature of the finite sampling from an infinite

population remains the same.

Figure 1: Empirical Convergence and Ampliative Reasoning

Index

Abductive

Inductive

Convergence

Eductive Convergence

Convergence

Icon

Index

Symbol


In the case of the abductive modes of reality convergence, this is

a little more difficult to see, because of the questions of network

cohesion and inheritance from the primary convergence concept (that

of abductive dolemic convergence to a theory), but not very much

more. In the abductive process, the investigator considers a finite

sample from an infinite population of laws to abduce one abstract

explanatory theory. The principles and other propositions of the

theory and the terms and other rhematic concepts of the theory then

inherit their empirical reality from their cohesiveness in the theory

and the empirical reality of the theory itself.

I think this may be most difficult to see in the case of the

eductive modes of reasoning. This is because traditionally,

logicians and philosophers have been conditioned to thinking of

eduction as did Aristotle: as reasoning from one individual to

another. Instead, we must reason from the infinite population of

concrete singulars, the distributed collection that results from

applying deduction to every one of the undistributed members of the

concrete general. We extract a finite sample on this infinite

population using the Peircean methodology32 and reason to an

observation, fact, or procedure.32 Combining random selection with the appropriate experimental design.


Thus we can now see that all forms of ampliative reasoning require

finite sampling from an infinite population, and that this is

represented within the semantic vector Ŝ. It also follows that all

scientific concepts involve ampliative reasoning.

Fourth and last, all concepts involve the asymptotic approach of

an infinite possibility of vague proposals to a more or less precise

fixed limit concept as the appropriate sample size increases33, i.e.,

as our confidence in the knowledge of the sampling process and the

nature of the infinite population increases. This is consistent with

Peirce’s asymptotic concept of truth and its twin concept of reality,

which breach the distinction between correspondence theories of truth

and reality and cohesive theories of truth and reality.

B. The Observation Subparadigm:

Our second scientific subparadigm concerns observation,

measurement, and experiment. This section introduces a discussion of

this topic that results in the development of a semiotically oriented

understanding of semiotic observation, measurement, instrument,

experiment, evidence, and data.

33 As small as one in the case of a good guess at a theory.


All of the objects of the physical sciences are tangible. We can

grasp billiard balls and hold them in our hands. The only thing that

prevents us from grasping, touching, and holding planets in our hands

is size and distance. We could do so if we were bigger and they were

closer. On the other hand, all of the objects of the semiotic

sciences are intangible. We cannot grasp, touch, or hold in our hand

a logical form, a legal interpretation, or the meaning of a word.

For this reason, they are called ephemeral, or esoteric.

We can easily observe and measure the tangible objects of the

physical sciences. It is much harder to measure the ephemeral

objects of the semiotic sciences. But it can be done. This section

is about observing and measuring these ephemeral, esoteric

intangibles of the semiotic sciences.

1. Principles of Observational and Experimental Semiotics:

Five powerful principles have been found useful for designing

instruments, experiments, and observations in semiotics. The first

is the Principle of Semiotic Reinterpretation, a generalization of an

earlier principle enunciated for the physical sciences by Albert

Einstein. The second is the Principle of Paradigm Inversion, a

corollary of the first. The third one is the Principle of

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 74 of 167XInterdisciplinary Translation, an application of the first two.

Finally we have two principles that have always proven useful in all

of the sciences: the Principle of Gedanken Experiments and the

Principle of Logical Extremes.

a. The Principle of Semiotic Reinterpretation:

The Principle of Semiotic Reinterpretation states that all USEFUL

information measures can be reinterpreted as a natural law describing a regularity

between a semiotic measure and another measure in any discipline. This can thus

be seen as a rule for interdisciplinary translation. It was

introduced in (Pearson 1979).

A more restricted version of this rule was stated by Einstein in

such a way that it held only for the physical sciences. The

statement here holds for all semiotic sciences in general.

b. The Principle of Paradigm Inversion:

The Principle of Paradigm Inversion may be summarized as follows:

Every single experimental paradigm in each of the cognitive sciences, in each of the

information sciences, and in each of the semiotic sciences, can be inverted to supply an

experimental paradigm which may be developed for Semiotics.


It is also interesting to note in passing that the Principle of

Paradigm Inversion is a corollary of the Principle of Semiotic

Reinterpretation but it is beyond the scope of this essay to go into

this relationship here. Again, like the Principle of Semiotic

Reinterpretation, this is a rule for interdisciplinary translation.

The Paradigm Inversion Principle also enables us to distinguish

between semiotics and each of the cognitive, information, or semiotic

sciences. For instance, psychology uses known properties of signs as

a probe to investigate the structure of behavior, whereas semiotics

uses the known structure of behavior as a probe to investigate the

structure of signs. As another example of an application of the

Paradigm Inversion Principle to distinguish between disciplines,

logic uses known properties of signs as a probe to investigate the

structure of reasoning, whereas semiotics uses the known structure of

reasoning as a probe to investigate the structure of signs. And as

my final example: legal studies uses the known properties of signs as

a probe to investigate the structure of the Law, whereas semiotics

uses the known structure of the Law as a probe to investigate the

structure of signs.


The Paradigm Inversion Principle was explicated in (Pearson 1978b)

and further refined in (Pearson 1979). However, its

interdisciplinary aspects have never been fully analyzed before. We

will therefore take up this task in Section 2.b.

c. Translation Rules for Interdisciplinarity in Experimental Semiotics:

The Principle of Interdisciplinary Translation simply provides the

translation rules for interdisciplinarity in experimental semiotics.

Most of what I’m going to say in this section has already been said

in other places. However, by bringing it all together into one

context and focusing on interdisciplinary translation, a new unity

emerges.

d. Gedanken Experiment (a la Carnap):The method of “Gedanken Experiment” was popularized by Einstein

who used the term to mean an experiment that could be carried out

completely by merely thinking it thru without resort to any actual

laboratory apparatus and whose result was so clear that it settled

some outstanding question, thus the term “Gedanken”, the German word

for “thought”. However, Carnap (1958) adopted the method and used it

extensively to show how to conduct experiments in logic and other

semiotic sciences.

e. Method of Logical Extremes:


The method of logical extremes is a form of Gedanken Experiment

that has always been used to check the soundness of an observation or

result. By carrying a preliminary conclusion to its logical extreme

and comparing the result to common sense one can check on its

original soundness.

Peirce warns that this kind of speculative thought is a risky mode

of inquiry because it is susceptible to the vagaries of you and me,

but it is still essential. He explains, “Nothing is more unwise than

to carry an idea to extreme lengths, yet in speculative thought, it

is the greatest of locomotives for advancing upon the road to truth.

Indeed it is the extreme cases which alone teach you anything new”

(1898: 193).

2. A Close Relation between Interdisciplinarity, Observation, and

Measurement:

We find that there are many forms of interdisciplinarity34 and

that semiotics provides a means of interdisciplinary translation

satisfying all of them. But, in addition, the semiotic approach

yields a new understanding of interdisciplinarity, with the concept

of measurement playing the key role as the central concept of all

34 I want to acknowledge the inspirational help of Thomas Daddesio who first asked me to analyze interdisciplinary translation.

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 78 of 167Xforms of interdisciplinarity. In this respect, the Paradigm

Inversion Principle is seen as the archetypical method of

interdisciplinary translation due to its relation to the notions of

measurement and interdisciplinarity.

a. Kinds of interdisciplinarity:

In talking of interdisciplinarity, we must distinguish between

different kinds of interdisciplinarity, among which are:

Conceptual interdisciplinarity, including the concept of sign

and the concept of information measures

Representational interdisciplinarity

Linguistic interdisciplinarity

Mathematical interdisciplinarity

Theoretical interdisciplinarity

Methodological interdisciplinarity

Analysis of concepts that will reformulate the study of other

disciplines

Application to semiotics of insights and metaphors drawn from

other disciplines

Semiotics can be used to analyze signs that are the proper

object of study by other disciplines

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 79 of 167Xi. conceptual interdisciplinarity

There are several concepts that cut across many disciplines.

First and foremost among these is the concept of ‘sign’ that cuts

across all of the semiotic sciences. The Semiotic Paradigm is a

Kuhnian (1962) scientific paradigm that specifically addresses the

interdisciplinarity of sign phenomena.

Another concept that cuts across all of the semiotic sciences is

that of information measures. The Principle of Semiotic

Reinterpretation is an interdisciplinary solution to this problem.

ii. representational interdisciplinarity

Representation is an interdisciplinary problem that cuts across

all the sciences of second intention (the Cognitive Sciences, the

Informational Sciences, and the Semiotic Sciences). This problem and

its interdisciplinary nature were discussed at length in (Pearson

1982).

iii. linguistic interdisciplinarity

Most talk about language, information, and meaning in any

appropriate setting is non-testable and limited to a very narrow

range of topics. The language of Menetics was created in a

deliberate attempt to design a language that was adequate in all

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 80 of 167Xthree of Chomsky’s senses that could create linguistic

interdisciplinarity by translating in an empirically testable manner

between all of the disciplines that talk about language, logic,

information, meaning, and communication. The language of Menetics

was developed in (Pearson 1977) and discussed at length in (Pearson

1981).

iv. mathematical interdisciplinarity

The mathematical structure of information, communication, and

meaning is a universal problem across all of the semiotic sciences

and one that mathematical semiotics addresses. The mathematics of

triadic relations was developed by Peirce and discussed in (Pearson

1981) as a means of satisfying the formal needs of interdisciplinary

research.

v. theoretical interdisciplinarity

The theoretical components of the Semiotic Paradigm, the USST and

the TOS, discuss the theoretical relations between semiotics and the

various semiotic sciences and this gives us a reason for desiring

interdisciplinary translation of theory (Pearson 1981).

vi. methodological interdisciplinarity

Many experimental methods can be applied, after suitable

translation, across several discipline boundaries, giving rise to a

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 81 of 167Xconcept of methodological interdisciplinarity. The Paradigm

Inversion Principle is an interdisciplinary methodological principle

that unifies the method of translating methodology between

disciplines. The Paradigm Inversion Principle was introduced in

(Pearson 1979). The basis for using this sense of methodological

interdisciplinarity as a means for deepening our understanding of

interdisciplinarity is the thesis of the present Section.

vii. interdisciplinarity due to the reformulation of other disciplines

Finally, Semiotics can analyze concepts that will reformulate the

study of other disciplines. This will not only aid the development

of the other semiotic sciences, it will also help to develop a

systematic methodology for interdisciplinary translation. Semiotics

can use insights and metaphors drawn from other disciplines. This

will not only aid the development of semiotics, but also further aid

in the development of a systematic methodology of interdisciplinary

translation. Sign theory can be used to analyze systems of signs

that are the proper object of study by other disciplines. Such was

the meaning of Garner’s plea to study the structure of the

psychological stimulus (1974).

b. Details of the principle of paradigm inversion:


Many of the sciences related to semiotics are much more mature as

sciences than the parent discipline itself and this is especially the

case with the cognitive sciences. Examples are experimental

psychology, cognitive psychology, perceptual psychology, computer

science, linguistics, etc. This claim of maturity is simply a claim

that they have developed a more advanced empirical methodology than

has semiotics, including an inventory of experimental paradigms.

Is there any way that semiotics can avail itself of this reservoir

of experimental paradigms in the cognitive sciences? The answer is a

resounding YES! The process is called inverting the paradigm or

“turning the sock inside out”. It allows semiotics to adopt every

single experimental paradigm in each of the cognitive sciences. The

procedure is best understood by noting the role that

interdisciplinary translation played in the growth of empirical

methodology over the history of scientific development. In field

after field we see instance after instance where a controlled but

unmeasurable unit or process in one field led to the discovery of a

general result in a distinct but related field. This general result

was in turn then inverted and used as the means of measuring the

originally unmeasurable unit or process.


This process has been repeated many times in the history of

science. It is a process that is completely generalizable and holds

between semiotics and all of its related sciences. In fact,

semiotics is the common ground between all the semiotic sciences, and

it is only by taking the semiotic point of view for each of them that

their unity can be understood, and their methodology and knowledge

become interadaptable. We thus have Figure 2.

Fig. 2: The Interdependence of the Semiotic Sciences

The statement that humans are too subjective, or too variable, to

use as measurement standards just does not hold up. The use of a

fixed panel of subjects as a measurement standard is no more variable

than the use of a bar of only one length as a length standard and is

just as complete. We get entirely different concepts of temperature

(not just different units) if we change our standard thermometer from

Semiotics/

Information

Science

Computer Science

Esthetics

Economics

Ethics Sociolo

gy

Theology

Psychology

Linguistics

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 84 of 167Xalcohol to water, and mercury gives yet another. It took almost two

centuries of experimentation to arrive at the theory which

incorporated the abstract conception of temperature involving ideal

gasses. It will also take many experiments before we arrive at the

proper idealizations to replace concrete subjects in semiotics but,

in the meantime, experimentation and measurement are both possible

and necessary, and the Principle of Paradigm Inversion allows us to

proceed with our work.

c. Summary:

Several of the principles previously enunciated as guides for

empirical research in semiotics are in essence translation rules for

bringing interdisciplinarity to bear on experimental problems in

semiotics.

In subsection a., we examined nine different kinds of

interdisciplinarity and found that semiotics cuts across all of them

and that the Semiotic Paradigm, a scientific paradigm in the Kuhnian

(1962) sense, for the whole field of semiotics, has already provided

means for handling each of these senses of interdisciplinarity. The

examination further showed that the Paradigm Inversion Principle,

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 85 of 167Xwhich generates the experimental component of the Semiotic Paradigm,

was at the core of each of these concepts of interdisciplinarity.

We then proceeded to examine the Paradigm Inversion Principle in

subsection b. and found that, in interdisciplinary translation, the

experimental paradigm, the observation procedures, and the

measurement methodology were the invariant heart of the success of

the Principle.

3. Measurement:

In subsection 2., we examined the role of interdisciplinary

translation in facilitating the observation, measurement, and design

of semiotic experiments. We found that this was due to the fact that

the concept of measurement itself played an important role in our

understanding of interdisciplinary translation. In this subsection

we examine the concept of measurement in greater depth.

Those of us who grew up as working scientists have an intuitive

understanding of measurements and instruments. When faced with a

practical problem of measurement, we can perform it adequately, or

invent an instrument to do so. However, when pressed to abstract

from the concrete context of the lab and explain the nature of

measurement and instruments in general, most of us would probably be

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 86 of 167Xperplexed by the question. However, it has a direct bearing on many

of the problems faced by semiotics today. This subsection addresses

the question of the abstract nature of measurement and instruments in

general.

Fittingly enough for a tool that is to be applied in empirical

semiotics, the question is treated from a semiotic standpoint. The

phenomenon to be measured is treated as a message of nature and the

measurement itself is treated as a translation process that adds

indexical, iconic, and symbolic structure to that message in an

operationally specified way. Using this analysis, physical and

semiotic measurements have the same structure, and physical and

semiotic instruments have the same structure. Knowledge of this

structure is useful for comparing the nature of semiotic experiments

with the nature of physical experiments, and, in passing, shows that

semiotic experiments are possible and epistemologically valid. This

also legitimizes and explains semiotic evidence and semiotic data.

a. The Measurement Process:

Measurement theory tells us that measurement is a means of

determining the magnitude of some aspect of an individual object by

operationally specifying one member of a set of names to the object

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 87 of 167Xin such a way that some structure among the set of names is

algebraically homomorphic to some structure of the set of all objects

of a particular kind that includes the object being measured. The

set of names is usually chosen from some number system.

However, this measurement theory definition does not tell us

anything about the structure of the operational specification, the

real heart of the measurement. In particular, we would like to know

enough about this structure to determine if semiotic measurement is

possible, the nature of semiotic evidence, the nature of semiotic

data, whether a semiotic experiment is possible, and whether there

can be such a thing as a semiotic instrument. Also, if such things

are possible, we would like to compare semiotic measurements to

physical measurements, semiotic instruments to physical instruments,

and semiotic experiments to physical experiments.

The definition I have chosen to explicate is that a MEASUREMENT

selects a particular message of nature and:

translates this into an index by means of a transducer function

which uses an operationally specified procedure;

translates the index into an icon (or equivalently – adds iconic

structure to the index) by means of an interpretation-function which

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 88 of 167Xuses an operationally specified procedure to employ either a physical

linkage or an observer/device interaction; and finally,

translates the icon into a symbol by means of a scale function

which uses an operationally specified procedure to add symbolic

structure to the icon. The symbol is the measurement and must

preserve the original structure of interest by means of a homomorphic

mapping.

If a sign process can perform these three functions, then it will

accomplish everything that we understand by the term “measurement”.

4. Instruments:

If measurements are messages of nature, then instruments are the

communication devices that give us access to those messages.

Instruments, in conjunction with the experimental paradigm, select

one message of nature and measure that message. They provide access

to read and record the measurement in symbolic form.

Since there are a set of appropriateness conditions at each

semiotic interface, the form of the instrument must match the form of

the message, and the design of the instrument must satisfy all

appropriateness conditions.


The instrument provides for the physical or semiotic transducer,

as appropriate, the interpretation stage, and the scale; and it

assures the satisfaction of the appropriateness condition at each

interface.

5. Summary:

The important questions to be answered in this summary are four:

what are semiotic 1) measurements, 2) instruments, 3) experiments,

and 4) data; and a subsidiary result is: how do they compare and

differ from their physical counterparts.

a. Semiotic measurements:

In Section 3.a. we saw the structure of a measurement. In

addition, teleology is important in measurement because of the

presence of a true third. In a semiotic measurement, the

interpretation function is an observer/device interaction which

partakes of a true third in adding iconic structure to the message of

nature. The measurement icon is the interpretant of the

observer/device interaction and the observer becomes part of the

measurement process. Because the measurement involves a true third

and the observer becomes part of the interpretation process the

observer’s goals, motivations, aims, purposes, etc. all become part

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 90 of 167Xof that interpretation. Hence, observer training becomes critical

for accurate and reliable semiotic measurements. In semiotic

measurements, teleology becomes part of the measurement process and

good measurement methodology must take this into account.

Finally, with these caveats in place we can see that semiotic

measurements are certainly possible and that many semioticists have

already been making them for many years. We also see that semiotic

measurements are the same as physical measurements, with two

exceptions. In semiotics, the objects of measurements are regarded

as signs while physics regards them as physical objects. This is a

nominal difference only. In either case, the messages of nature

which these objects or signs – they are the same thing – generate are

called the texts of nature. However, a more important difference

between semiotic measurements and physical measurements lies in the

interpretation function which requires a true interpretive

interaction with the observer in semiotic measurements. Thus the

observer becomes part of the measurement process itself in semiotic

measurements and the measurement itself becomes a true third, or

semiotic process. This can raise all kinds of teleological problems

if not controlled in the design of the measurement process; but these

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 91 of 167Xproblems can be controlled and reliable semiotic measurements made,

as evidenced in the theory of instruction used to instruct subjects

in all contemporary experiments in cognitive psychology. Thus the

critical difference between physical and semiotic measurement is not

ontological, but epistemological.

b. Semiotic instruments:

In subsection 4., we saw that the notion of an instrument could be

generalized in such a way that semiotic and physical instruments have

the same conceptual structure with the one difference being that

semiotic instruments are designed to facilitate the observer/device

interaction which constitutes the interpretation linkage of the

measurement process. There are thus some additional technological

considerations in the design of semiotic instrumentation, but

otherwise business is pretty much the same as usual between physical

and semiotic instruments. Many psychological instruments are

semiotic instruments, such as the IQ Test, to name a notorious one,

or familiarity of words as measured in cognitive psychology. The

eidometer is a semiotic instrument that has been in use for many

years.

c. Semiotic experiments:


In this section, we saw that the generalization in the measurement

and instrument concepts that allowed for semiotic measurements and

instruments required us to distinguish the experimenter from the

observer in analyzing the structure of an experiment. Here, too, we

found the structure of both physical and semiotic experiments to be

encompassed by the same generalized concept of an experiment. This

concept, by the way, may be useful to physicists as well, as they

wrestle with concepts of observability in fundamental particle

physics. Not only are semiotic experiments possible but semioticists

have been doing them for years. The one major difference between

semiotic experiments and physical experiments lies in physics’

ability to use the experimenter as the observer and eliminate any

considerations on the design of the observer set, while semiotics

must not use the experimenter as an observer, and much care must be

employed in the design of the observer set to facilitate control and

analysis of teleological factors.

d. Semiotic data:

We have seen thruout this analysis that data is merely the

permanent recording of the measurement symbol and hence not only is

semiotic data possible and meaningful, but there is absolutely no

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 93 of 167Xdifference between semiotic data and physical data. The differences

lie in the nature of measurements and instruments.

e. Future problems for empirical semiotics:

This section showed us the importance of teleology in the conduct

of semiotic experiments. It may very well become necessary to

develop a technology of teleology, as suggested by John Dewey,

including a theory of teleology in the design of very refined

semiotic instrumentation and experiments. This is currently

encompassed in the instruction and training of the experimental

subjects, but this alone may not be enough. In fact, it may

ultimately be necessary to revise our whole understanding of the

cause-effect relation of science.

Also in Section 1., it was pointed out that the operational

specification of the observer/device interaction may present us with

new problems in triadic logic. In the meantime we must proceed with

the tools we have to develop the classical empirical interaction

between semiotic theory and experimental semiotics, because –

paraphrasing John Tyndall – with accurate experiment and observation

to work upon, imagination becomes the architect of semiotic theory.

C. Search for Invariants and Discovery of General Laws :


Our third scientific subparadigm concerns generalization, the

search for invariants, and the discovery of the laws of semiotics.

However, semiotic laws are neither so simple nor straight forward as

physical laws. This is because of the presence of a true third in

the law-like relations of semiotics and their absence in the physical

sciences.

In the last section, I introduced the concept of observation and

measurement of the intangible and ephemeral phenomena of semiotics,

the esoteric and living relations of the triadic sciences. We now

switch to trying to make semiotic sense of these experiments and

observations. Can any patterns or structure be found in semiotic

data? Can the observed facts be generalized? Not if some

philosophers are to be believed. These are the ones who say that the

introduction of any living being or any form of mentation into the

observations makes them too variable and too subjective to develop

any cognizable patterns. However, this section will give a strongly

affirmative answer to these questions.

1. Principles of Descriptive Semiotics:

The one great principle of descriptive semiotics is induction.

However, since the results of induction are never guaranteed, all

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 95 of 167Xresults of induction must be tested. This involves forms of

metaphor, deduction, and eduction as well as induction. Abduction,

Subduction, and Theoreduction also play a lesser role in the

discovery of semiotic laws and for this reason their discussion will

be delayed until Section D.

Laws are arrived at by induction from a set of facts and

observations to a general description that describes both the known

facts and observations as well as many new facts and observations not

yet observed. A law has the status of a best working description

that describes the patterns in the data. See Section A.2. for the

concept of empirical convergence of many facts to one law that

describes them all.

Induction carries us from signs with indexical structure to signs

with full iconic structure. This allows the development of general

concepts and their relations. Generalization is achieved by

induction from the observed data to a best working description of a

pattern or invariance in the data.

2. The Law of Word Interpretation, an Example:


Our example of invariant generalization shows the power of

semiotic instruments within the New Science of Semiotics to increase

knowledge and understanding across all the semiotic sciences.

This example discusses one measurable aspect of signs, generated

by semiotic shape, and a very simple and pervasive regularity which

has been found to hold between it and the interpretability of

artificial words. The technical term for this shape concept is

“eidontic deviance”, which is a metrological explication of the

strangeness of the shape of a sign.

An instrument, called the “eidometer”, was invented in order to

quantify an intuitive relation between eidontic deviance and

interpretability suggested by the work of both Shannon regarding the

shape of artificial words and that of Miller, Bruner, and Postman

regarding the interpretability of artificial words. Experimental

analysis of this relation using the eidometer led to a new law of

information, called the “Law of Word Interpretation.” (Pearson 1977,

1979, 1981) which the author described as an empirical explication of

the Miller-Bruner-Postman (MBP) Effect:

E = a + bS


Finally, in investigating deviations from the Law of Word

Interpretation, a systematic second order correction term was found

that involved an information-like function that describes a semiotic

process of immediate memory, where the fi are the occurrence

frequencies of the eight letters composing the shape of the sign

(Pearson 1979).

8

F = ⅛ lg fi

i = 1

The experiments required for isolating this function reached the

limits of reliability and precision of the Mk. IV eidometer. Without

precise quantification of the Law of Word Interpretation, it would

have been impossible to isolate this important semiotic relationship.

D. Explanation by Theory :

Our fourth subparadigm of the Semiotic Paradigm concerns abduction

and the development of semiotic explanations, i.e., semiotic

theories; however, this also requires an understanding of

transduction, subduction, and the interpretation of theories.

Theories are developed using Peirce’s method of abductive reasoning

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 98 of 167Xand tested by subductive reasoning back to empirical laws, and once

accepted they are used to explain new or other laws by subductive

reasoning back to the empirically observable world. We take up

abduction next and subduction in subsection 4.

1. Abduction and Explanation:One of Peirce’s many uses of the term “abduction” was for the

invention of abstract theory to explain the generals of nature and

life. Peirce called this “reasoning to the best explanation of the

phenomena”. This is the meaning of “abduction” as used in the

Semiotic Paradigm.

Abduction carries us from signs with iconic structure to signs

with full symbolic structure. This allows the development of

abstract concepts, principles, theories, and their relations. Thus

theory is arrived at by abduction from a set of known laws to a set

of abstract principles that explain both the known laws and many new

laws. Therefore, theory has the status of a best working hypothesis

that explains the known laws.

2. The USST:

The Universal Sign Structure Theory, (USST), is the main

explanatory tool of the Semiotic Paradigm for static structures. The

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 99 of 167Xstandard version was adopted by SIG/ES in 2000 and is therefore known

as the USST-2000. The USST is the static theory of sign structure

for the Semiotic Paradigm, explaining the static structure of all

signs. The dynamics of sign processes is explained by the Theory of

Operational Semiotics, (TOS), discussed in subsection 3.

In Subsection a., I present the details of USST-2000, explaining

the Universal Sign Structure Diagram and deriving some very

elementary but important theorems on sign structure and sign

classification that shows the intimate relation between the Peircean

theory of taxonomy and the USST theory of sign structure. Then in

Subsection b., I summarize a very few of the results of the USST,

going far beyond the taxonomic science of semeiotic.

a. The USST-2000:

i. background

The USST is an abstract theory whose purpose is to explain the

nature of semiotic laws and to aid in the understanding of all

semiotic reality. It can be developed logically as a result of

Peirce’s abduction process. A sign is an abstraction and hence

cannot really exist in the positivistic sense, but if it did exist,

that would explain … (insert here whatever semiotic law, effect, or

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 100 of 167Xphenomena you are trying to explain) … , and then apply the USST to

derive that law, effect, or phenomena. The derivation is the

semiotic explanation of the law, effect, or phenomena.

The USST may be considered a development, or outgrowth, of

Peirce’s Theory of Semeiotic. The reason for this is that thruout

our investigations we have had occasion to use several different

taxonomies, or classification schemes, for signs. Of these, only the

classification by Peirce (CP35) has proved to be satisfactory in

every empirical setting for which a classification was wanted. We

therefore ascribe the Peircean scheme an empirical reality, and would

like our theory of sign structure to explain the applicability and

usefulness of the Peircean classification scheme in terms of the

structure of the sign. This is accomplished by the first nine

theorems of the theory.

However, the USST goes beyond the Peircean theory in that it

provides not only a taxonomy, but systematic methods of description

and explanation as well. In this theory, language, meaning,

information, and information measures are interpreted as semiotic

phenomena and semiotic processes.

35 The W series was not yet available at the time the majority of this work was performed.

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 101 of 167Xii. development of the USST

The guts of the USST is embodied in the Universal Sign Structure

Diagram, (USSD). The standard version, called the “USSD-2000”, is

shown in Figure 3. The theory is universal in the sense that it

displays the structure of all categories of signs. In order to show

how this diagram explains the Peircean taxonomy, we must first state

the following three principles of the theory:

The Representation Principle: A sign must consist of a real triadic relation

that signifies. A sign, therefore, consists of three parts: a

syntactic structure, a pragmatic structure, and a semantic

structure.

The Principle of Internal/External Balance: The internal and external

structure of a sign must be balanced, consisting in the syntactic and semantic

dimensions of exactly one external component for each internal component and

vice versa, and in the pragmatic dimension of exactly two external components for

each internal component. The external components are called

“information generators” and the internal components are called

“components of meaning”. The double external structure in the

pragmatic dimension is required because of its dual mediating role

between the syntactic and the semantic dimensions and also between


the source and target interpreters. The two sets of external

components belong to the source and target structures

respectively.

The Principle of Additional Structure: Whenever a sign has more than

the minimum structure of one level in each dimension, the additional structure is

built up from the center out (as per Figure 3), and for each dimension

independently.

Using the USSD of Figure 3 and these three principles, we can now

explain the Peircean taxonomy of signs by means of nine

representation36 theorems. Internal components are represented in

the USSD by circles and the external components by ovals. Certain

rules of interpretation or translation between the theoretical

vocabulary and the observational (or less theoretical) vocabulary

will become apparent as we proceed with the proofs of these

theorems37. The rules of interpretation are obvious, and they form

an integral part of the theory. We first define the Peircean

36 “Representation is used here in its mathematical rather than its semiotic sense.37 Now called the “subduction” rules. See (Pearson 1991).

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 103 of 167Xtaxonomy38. We then give the nine representation theorems, and

finally an example proof.

38 Strictly speaking, this will not be exactly the Peircean taxonomy, but anexplication of it (in the sense of Quine (1960)) since the three classificationschemes used by Peirce to define his sign categories are significantly changed,despite bearing the same names, due to a change in the concept of semioticdimensionality (Pearson 1977a).


Figure 3: The USSD-2000

Semiotic Structure ofthe

SemanticFunction

ExternalStructure

InternalStructure

Mathematical Model

Mode ofDiscrimina

Perceiving Ontological Status

External Internal Symbol Pronotati

onCognitive Cognitive Pronensio

nProcess Arrangeme

ntSubjectiv

eMentellec

tMentellec

tIcon Connotati

onExternal Internal Intension Similarit

yLikeness Interject

ive Ground Ground

Index

Denotation

External Internal Extension Physical Object ObjectiveObject Object Stimulus

Semiotic Structure ofthe

Semantic Dimension

SemanticFunction

CognitiveFunction

MeaningProduced

Ontological Result

ConceptsEpistemologicalResul

tOntology*

Symbol Pronotation

Conceptualize

AbstractSingulars

Possibility

AbstractConcepts

Universals

World ofAbstracts

Icon Connotation

Categorize

ConcreteGenerals

Generality

GeneralConcepts

Properties

World ofGenerals

Index

Denotation

Individualize

ConcreteSingulars

Actuality SingularConcepts

Individuals

World ofIndividua

ls


* Requires only one ontology since each is but one way of looking at the single world (witha single ontology) of trinary relations.

Universals includereal:

Generals includereal:

Singulars includereal:

abstractions properties individualspossibilities aspects objects

potential theories qualities

Table 3: Implications of a USST Theory of Perception


Syntactic Context

Syntactic Context + Shape

Syntactic Context + Shape + Medium

Theory of Syntactic Structure Syntactic Structure Abstracted (Abducted)

into Syntactic Categories

Figure 4: The Syntactic Sign Category Diagram

Definition 1: A sign, which exists as an abstract quality both in itself and in its

relation to other signs, is called a ‘TONE’39.

Definition 2: A sign, which exists as a general kind, both in itself and

distinguishable from other signs, is called a ‘TYPE’.

Definition 3: A sign, which exists as an actual, single, physically existing

individual, is called a ‘TOKEN’.

39 It must be remembered that Peirce employed a great number of different anddiffering nomenclatures. The one adopted here was used in (Pearson 1977a).

On-to-sion

Medium

Ei-den-sion

Shape

SyntacticContext

Tag-men-sion

Tone

(Qua

lisign

)

Type

(Leg

isign)

Toke

n (Sin

sign)


Definition 4: A sign, whose interpretant represents it as a sign of possible

reference to its interpreter, is called a ‘RHEME’.

Definition 5: A sign, whose interpretant represents it as a sign of fact or actual

reference to its interpreter, is called a ‘PHEME’.

Definition 6: A sign, whose interpretant represents it as a sign of reason to its

interpreter, is called a ‘DOLEME’40.

Definition 7: A sign, which is related to its object by an actual, single,

existential, cause and effect relation, is called an ‘INDEX’.

Definition 8: A sign, which is related to its object by a concrete similarity

between the shape of the sign and its object, is called an ‘ICON’.

Definition 9: A sign, which is related to its object by an arbitrary convention,

agreement, or general law, is called a ‘SYMBOL’.

We may now state theorems 1 thru 9.

Theorem 1: A sign is a tone iff it has exactly one level of syntactic structure. It

therefore has one component of syntactic meaning (tagmension) and one

syntactic information generator (the syntactic context).

Theorem 2: A sign is a type iff it has exactly two levels of syntactic structure. It

therefore has two components of syntactic meaning (tagmension and

40 Peirce’s actual term was ‘deloam’ from the Greek δελωμ.

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 108 of 167Xeidension) and two syntactic information generators (the syntactic

context and the shape of the sign).

Theorem 3: A sign is a token iff it has all three levels of syntactic structure. It

therefore has three components of syntactic meaning (tagmension,

eidension, and ontosion) and three syntactic information generators

(the syntactic context, the shape of the sign, and the medium in

which it is embodied).

Theorem 4: A sign is a rheme iff it has exactly one level of pragmatic structure.

It therefore has one component of pragmatic meaning (contension) and

two pragmatic information generators (the source social/behavioral

context of the sign and the target social/behavioral context of the

sign).

Theorem 5: A sign is a pheme iff it has exactly two levels of pragmatic structure.

It therefore has two components of pragmatic meaning (contension and

purporsion) and four pragmatic information generators (the source

social/behavioral context, the target social/behavioral context, the

source interpretation, and the target interpretation).

Theorem 6: A sign is a doleme iff it has exactly three levels of pragmatic

structure. It therefore has three components of pragmatic meaning

(contension, purporsion, and emosion), and six pragmatic information

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 109 of 167Xgenerators (the source social/behavioral context, the target

social/behavioral context, the source interpretation, the target

interpretation, the source emotive mentellect, and the target emotive

mentellect of the sign).

Theorem 7: A sign is an index iff it has exactly one level of semantic structure.

It therefore has one component of semantic meaning (denotation) and

one semantic information generator (the dynamic object of the sign).

Theorem 8: A sign is an icon iff it has exactly two levels of semantic structure.

It therefore has two components of semantic meaning (denotation, and

connotation) and two semantic information generators (the dynamic

object and the dynamic ground of the sign).

Theorem 9: A sign is a symbol iff it has all three levels of semantic structure. It

therefore has three components of semantic meaning (denotation,

connotation, and pronotation) and three semantic information

generators (the dynamic object, the dynamic ground, and the cognitive

mentellect of the sign).

Proof of theorem 1: By the Representation Principle and the

Principle of Additional Structure, any sign must have at least one

level of syntactic structure and this must be the innermost, or

tagmatic, level. According to the USSD-2000 (Figure 3), the

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 110 of 167Xoutermost syntactic level consists of the embodiment of a sign in a

physical medium. But if a sign had an embodiment in a physical

medium, it would exist as an actual, single, physically existing

individual and could not exist merely as an abstract quality. It

would be a token, not a tone; therefore, a tone cannot have an

ontotic level of syntactic structure.

Also from Figure 3, the second (or middle) syntactic level

consists of the distinguishability of a sign by a shape. But, if a

sign had a distinctive, distinguishable shape, it would exist as a

concrete general, serving as an archetype for all tokens of the same

type and could not exist, etc. It would be a type, not a tone.

Therefore, a tone cannot have an eidontic level of syntactic

structure.

Thus, a tone has exactly one level of syntactic structure, which

is the tagmatic structure. By the principle of Internal/External

Balance, this structure will consist of both one internal component

and one external component. From Figure 3, we see that the internal

component is tagmension, the meaning component abstracted from the

syntactic context, and the external component is the syntactic

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 111 of 167Xcontext, the syntactic information generator abstracted from the

tagmatic level of syntactic structure. QED.

The other proofs are all similar and equally simple, but all nine

proofs may be found in (Pearson & Slamecka 1977).

b. Going beyond semeiotic:

i. some more theorems

Some other theorems may easily be added to the above.

Theorem 10: The sum of the number of syntactic and semantic levels must not be

less than four.

Letting LX stand for the number of syntactic levels, and LS stand

for the number of semantic levels, this may be easily expressed as

LX + LS ≥ 4.

Theorem 11: The number of semantic levels must not be less than the number of

pragmatic levels.

If we let LP stand for the number of pragmatic levels, then this

can be expressed as

LS ≥ LP.

This can be interpreted as saying that a term can be an index,

icon, or symbol, but a proposition can only be an icon or symbol,

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 112 of 167Xwhile an argument must only be a symbol, an observation first made by

Peirce.

The following four theorems assure that every sign must always be

able to determine an interpretant.

Theorem 12: Three level syntactic structure generates syntactic

recursion.

Theorem 13: The first three levels of pragmatic structure generate

pragmatic recursion.

Theorem 14: Three level semantic structure generates semantic

recursion.

Theorem 15: The simultaneous and joint action of syntactic

recursion, pragmatic recursion, and semantic recursion guarantee that

any sign has the possibility of being interpreted at any time in the

future.

Many other theorems of semiotic structure may easily be derived

from the above theory. These few were chosen as examples for their

simplicity, clarity, and importance. As an example of applying the

USST to obtain a satisfying solution to a famous philosophical

problem, I select Moore’s Paradox of Analysis.

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 113 of 167Xii. explaining Moore’s paradox

G.E. Moore, an early twentieth century British philosopher, was

concerned about a paradox discovered earlier by Alexius Meinong, but

which has since come to be called Moore’s Paradox of Analysis, and

may be stated as follows: if the analysis of the meaning of a

philosophical concept has the same meaning, it is trivial; but if it

has a different meaning, then it is wrong. Meinong and Moore both

knew well that philosophers very often make correct and non-trivial

analyses, but they were never able to develop a theory of analysis

which explained the paradox.

While other philosophers have tried with varying amounts of

success, the problem has never been solved completely. The most

popular approach is to say that the problem lies in the formulation

of the paradox, which assumes that meaning is either a single or a

holistic kind of thing that is either completely the same or else

totally different. Frege (1892) and Carnap (1958) both assumed that

the meaning of signs has two semantic components, but their

assumptions were for entirely different purposes. Carnap was able to

delineate the character of scientific analysis very well with his

concepts of extension and intension, but he was never able to handle

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 114 of 167Xthe kind of philosophic analysis that Meinong and Moore were

interested in. Moore himself said that he thought philosophic

analysis required something like determining the same objects by the

same properties but understanding or cognizing this determination in

a different way.

From the USSD, we note that pronension uniquely determines

intension, which in turn uniquely determines extension; while a

difference in extension ensures that two terms will have a difference

in intension, which in turn ensures a difference in pronension. We

may therefore state the solution of Moore’s Paradox as follows:

Scientific analysis requires identical extensions with a difference in intension, while

philosophic analysis requires identical intensions with a difference in pronension.

It turns out that three levels of semantic structure is just the

right amount and kind of structure to solve every known semantic

paradox. Of course, this gives us increased confidence in the

semantic structure hypothesized in the USSD.

In this section, we have described the USST, a new theory of sign

structure that explains the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic

taxonomy of signs due to Charles Peirce, and goes beyond Peirce to

begin the development of an abductive/subductive theory. Fifteen

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 115 of 167Xtheorems were given in order to show the kind of formal power this

theory makes available to the study of semiotics. Moore’s Paradox of

Analysis was solved in order to show the power of the USST-2000 to

explain difficult semiotic problems.

3. The TOS41:

The Universal Sign Structure Theory, (USST), was introduced more

than 30 years ago, (Pearson 1977, 1979, 1981, 1982; Pearson and

Slamecka 1977; Slamecka and Pearson 1977), as the theoretical part of

the Semiotic Paradigm, (Pearson 1981, 1982, 1983), in order to

provide a scientific theory that could explain all the semiotic

phenomena associated with the static structure of signs. Altho the

USST was successful for its intended purposes, it could never explain

phenomena associated with dynamic semiotic processes (what Peirce

called “semiosis”).

Now the Semiotic Paradigm has been expanded to include a second

theory that can handle dynamic sign processes. This section will

formally present the Theory of Operational Semiotics, (TOS), provide

examples of its use, and make the claim that the Semiotic Paradigm is now

able to explain all semiotic phenomena.

41 A preliminary version of this Section appeared as “The Theory of Operational Semiotics” in (Pearson 1998).


Parsing trees and linguistic transformations are too limited to

handle all of the processes of semiotics, but trees and

transformations are just narrowly restricted forms of mathematical

operators. The TOS uses the more general concept of a functor, or

operator function (Curry & Feys 1968), to explain what happens when

sign processes take place, thus introducing a theory of semiotic

dynamics to accompany the USST which is a theory of semiotic statics.

a. background

Bernard Bosanquet, British idealist philosopher (1848 - 1923),

claimed that every proposition can be factored into a predicate about

the ideal world. Thus example (1), which appears to predicate blue

of sky as in analysis (2), or even to be a two place relation

predicating blue and sky of the copula as in analysis (3), actually

is predicating a proposition, (4), of the ideal world, as in analysis

(5). This thesis was adopted by Francis Bradley, another British

idealist philosopher of the same period (1846 - 1924) and made a key

point of his logic.

(1) The sky is blue.

(2) Blue(sky).

(3) Is(blue, sky).

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 117 of 167X(4) the sky being blue

(5) The ideal world is such that it can be described by: (the sky being blue).

(6) The actual world is such that it can be described by: (the sky being blue).

Actually, their terminology was already obsolete at the turn of

the century (1885 - 1915) when they were working this out, and we now

use “sentence” and “proposition” for far different concepts than what

Bosanquet and Bradley meant, but this has little relevance for us

here and now, (Pearson, 1994; Pearson, 1995).

What is important is that Bosanquet’s analysis does not require an

ideal world; it holds for any world or genré whatever, (thus analysis

(6)), and it does not hold for every sentence but it does hold for

every utterance of an indicative type in any language. Thus we may

call this “Bosanquet’s Law of Factorization”.

b. Factoring the sentence

A similar strategy works for any mood, but I would like to use a

different example for a very simple reason. One can say both (1) and

(7), but it is hard, at least in American, to say (8). This is

merely an accident of linguistic history. Therefore I choose

proposition (9) for an example, which, at least in American, is

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 118 of 167Xfairly easy to utter in each of the more common moods: indicative,

imperative, interrogative, etc.

(7) Is the sky blue?

(8) Blue the sky!

(9) the door being open

(10) The door is open.

(11) Open the door!

(12) Is the door open?

The factorizations are as follows:

(13) The real world is such that it can be described by: (the door being open).

(14) Endeavor to make the real world such that it can be described by: (the door being

open)!

(15) Is the real world such that it can be described by: (the door being open)?

By all accounts examples (10), (11), and (12) contain the same

proposition. Analyses (13), (14), and (15) make it obvious that this

is so, a decided advantage for any system of notation. I am not

certain, but evidently I am the first to carry out this complete

analysis and so I make the universal claim: Every natural language

sentence type can be factored into a mood operator followed by a semantic operator

containing a proposition.


Propositions have been represented variously thruout history,

depending on which aspect it was desired to emphasize. I use the

gerundial form to emphasize that the proposition is an abstract

semantic operator rather than a concrete sentence, etc., (1994,

1995). Thus we have the logical form given by expression (16):

(16) M:S

where M is a mood operator and S is a semantic operator.

We have not got to the end of our analysis but already it is

yielding very surprising results. When we have finished it will

motivate an entirely new approach to semiotic theory. For now, we

merely need to notice that according to the conventional sequence:

syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, we would expect either a syntactic or

a pragmatic operator to appear in the final factored position, not a

semantic operator. But instead, this is just what we do get. This

is indeed unusual. Could we have our categories in the wrong

sequence? Should it be syntactic, pragmatic, semantic, or semantic,

pragmatic, syntactic? Actually both occur depending on whether we

are synthesizing the sign, or analyzing it. What will become clear

is that the sequence: syntactic, semantic, pragmatic used by Peirce,

Morris, Bloomfield, Chomsky, etc. is wrong, (Pearson, 1994).

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 120 of 167Xc. Factoring the mood

The next step is to break down what I have loosely called the mood

operator into its component factors. It turns out to be difficult

because so much of the structure of the sign is contained in it. One

such attempted analysis of the indicative operator showed that two

distinct interpreters were required for every sign along with a truth

warrant, an epistemic operator, a convention binding operator, etc.,

such as for instance in analysis (17), with similar analyses for each

of the other moods. It seems that all of the meaning contained in

analysis (17) is imbedded in the sentential period of examples (1)

and (10).

(17) IS(I) WARRANT to IT(YOU) that IS am placing myself under all the conventions of

LANGUAGE COMMUNITY(LC) including all punishments for not adhering strictly to all such

conventions and that IS KNOW sufficiently a restricted part of the WORLD(W) as it

relates to LC and that this part of W may be DESCRIBED(D) by:

This showed that each of the moods can be represented by an invariant

operator independently of the semantic proposition, and that each semantic

proposition can be represented by an invariant operator independently of the mood of

the sentence.

At this point I became aware of the work of the American

semiotician, John Searle, and the critical relevance it has for the

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 121 of 167Xproject of factoring semiotic operators in general. Searle’s work

relates to the factorization of what I loosely called the Mood

Operator, but concerned not so much mood itself as the pragmatic

structure of the sign in its relation to the illocutionary force, a

concept developed by the British philosopher, John Austin but

adumbrated earlier by Charls Peirce.

I later learned that an important part of this relation between

the pragmatic operator and the illocutionary force concerned the

operation of converting a type into a token, so I thus began to look

at the structure of the Type-Token Conversion Operator as part of the

structure of the Pragmatic Operator and gradually the concept of

semiotic factorization started to become clearer. To finish this

brief thought, all complete utterances have both a mood and an illocutionary

force and these are always present and distinct in every rheme token, even when they

appear identical in the surface structure of the utterance. The mood is part of the type

while the illocutionary force is part of the token.

After figuring this out, it became obvious that all sentential

utterances can be represented by a pheme operator as in equation (18).

(18) ph = X:P:S

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 122 of 167Xwhere ph is a general pheme operator governing pheme tokens, X is a

syntactic operator, P is a pragmatic operator, and S is the

semantic operator as before. Note we have arrived at the sequence:

syntactic, pragmatic, semantic which is necessary here to make

phematic analysis work. Similarly in the case of phematic synthesis

we have equation (19), containing the sequence: semantic, pragmatic,

syntactic, just as predicted. There is no way we can force the

sequence: syntactic, semantic, pragmatic to work.

(19) (S)-1:(P)-1:(X)-1 = (ph)-1

d. Developing the theory

The Theory of Operational Semiotics is abbreviated as TOS. The

TOS is intended to explain sign dynamics, or semiosis. It fits

within the Semiotic Paradigm, (Pearson 1981, 1982, 1983), as a second

theory that complements the USST rather than competing with it. The

TOS starts by assuming one basic principle in addition to the three

principles of the USST, (Pearson and Slamecka, 1977; Slamecka and

Pearson, 1977). All sign processes, all transformations, all changes

in sign structure whatever can be represented by an operator which

transforms an initial sign into a final sign. Equation (27) is

called the “Dynamic Principle”.

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 123 of 167X(27) f = f,in:in

where f represents the final sign, in the initial sign, the

structure of f and in are given by the USST, and f,in represents

the operation of changing in into f. This implies that the USST

explains the static structure of sign systems, the TOS explains their

dynamic properties, and the USST acts as a set of boundary conditions

on the TOS.

In many analyses, the structure of the are assumed given and

fixed. In such cases, the entire process is characterized by the

f,in and all attention is devoted to the study of f,in. Such for

example is the case with the study of induction:

(28) KS = ind:IS

where KS is an iconic symbol and IS is an indexical symbol. The

problem is to completely characterize the induction operator, ind.

There are similar ways of studying abduction, subduction,

deduction, analogical reasoning, and symbolic transformation,

(Pearson, 1991). When this is done, the following amazing diagram is

uncovered, which I call the “Ladder Diagram of Semantic Reasoning”,

see Figure 5.


Figure 5: The Ladder Diagram of Semantic Reasoning. (After (Pearson,

1991: p309)).

Equation (18) implies that pheme processes are represented by

equation (29):

(29) f = X:P:S:in

This may, in fact, be trying to tell us that conversion from a tone

to a token takes place in exactly the same sequence, with the same

structure as equation (30):

(30a) ph,K = X:ph,T

(30b) = X:P:ph,N

(30c) = X:P:S:in

Symbolic Transformation

Analogical Reasoning

Abduction

Induction

Icon

Subduction

Deduction

Icon

Index

Symbol Symbol

IndexEduction

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 125 of 167Xwhich implies that we could separate phematic analysis into three

distinct stages:

(31) ph,K = X:ph,T

(32) ph,T = P:ph,N

(33) ph,N = S:in

in which case, one is sorely tempted to identify equation (31) with

Chomsky’s program of transformational syntax and to predict two other

associated programs: operational pragmatics associated with equation

(32); and operational semantics associated with equation (33). This

very strongly suggests that linguists and other semioticists should

deliberately tackle the development of a science of pragmatics after

the development of syntactics (as in transformational grammar) and

before attempting systematic development of a science of semantics

(as in generative semantics).

e. Intention, intentionality, and FEMs:

The complexity of mapping the various detailed operators in any

practical sign process may be likened to unraveling the human genome.

Many investigators have already started to do this. I already

referred in subsection d. to the work of transformational linguistics

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 126 of 167Xas working out the details of X for sign systems having the

structure of linear text. Other groups working on this problem

include the speech act theorists, especially its founder, John Searle

(1969), and the logical semanticists, especially H.P. Grice (1975).

Tools that are available for the semiotic analysis of the operator

string include philosophical analysis, logical analysis, speech act

theory, discourse theory, transformational grammar, linguistic

semantics, linguistic pragmatics, cognitive science, and artificial

intelligence. Among these, Grice’s Conversational Postulates and

Searle’s Felicity Conditions, Rules, Dimensions, etc. are especially

useful with a very important caveat. Grice’s Conversational

Postulates contain a mixture of tone concepts, type concepts, and

token concepts all intermingled. I expect that the Conversational

Postulates will factor into at least three subsets referring to tone

operators, type operators, and token operators, as given by the USST.

Similarly, Searle’s analysis contains a mixture of tone, type and

token concepts. If these are distinguished, Searle’s tools become

much more powerful.

One area of semiotic operator string analysis that has been

developed extensively is speech act theory, SAT. A speech act

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 127 of 167Xcontains an illocutionary point, followed by an intentional attitude,

followed by illocutionary force indicating devices, followed by the

propositional content. Illocutionary points are such things as

asserting, reporting, promising, warning, etc., i.e., the purpose for

which the source interpreter creates the sign. Intentional attitudes

express a psychological state, such as believing, intending, wishing,

etc. Illocutionary force indicating devices are conditions that

require the propositional content to suitably match the illocutionary

act and the intentional attitude. And the propositional content

contains the abstract proposition along with modal operators,

generalization operators, abstraction operators, such as Church’s ,

along with other propositional operators.

If we let F stand for the illocutionary force of the speech act; I

stand for the illocutionary point; S stand for the psychological

state; C, for the illocutionary force indicating devices; , for the

propositional operators (such as negation); m, for the modal

operators; P, for the predicate operators; and s, for the subject

operators, then we can represent the speech act, or at least its

illocutionary force, by:

(34) F = I(S(C((m(P(s)))))),

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 128 of 167Xas long as we insist that the notation does not imply simple

functionality in the strict mathematical sense, altho, it must be

admitted that there is a strong feeling of some kind of functional

dependence hinted at by this representation. For this reason, it is

better to use an operator notation, so we write:

(35) F = I:S:C::m:P:s

for the structure of a general speech act. In this representation,

:m:P:s corresponds roughly to S in the notation of equation

(18), and I:S:C to part of P in the same notation, along with Æ,

, ð, I, , and others.

Now, a very important sign system is intentionality, including all

intentions and FEMs, (feelings, emotions, and psychological moods).

Semioticians have not always recognized that these all fit together

in one system. In fact, one of the saddest legacies of the modern

age is the separation of intentionality from emotionality along with

the separation of mind from body, and science from religion.

Semioticians have wrestled with the theory of intention and

intentionality for years, but without any good notation for

representing intentions, the job has been slow and difficult. The

operator string notation employed by the TOS gives us the desired

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 129 of 167Xrepresentation. In fact, all we have to do is drop the illocutionary

point operator from the front of the right hand string of equation

(35) and we have the TOS representation of intentions,

intentionality, and FEMs as in equation (36), where N is the

operator expression for intentionality.

(36) N = S:C::m:P:s

Suppose the operator P is the value of S that stands for the

psychological state of surprise (not the word “surprise”), likewise

the operator U the value of C that stands for the conditions that

relate surprise to unexpected events, H the value of P that stands

for the predicate (not the assertion of a predicate) of being in my

home, and B the value of s that stands for a burglar (again, not the

word “burglar”), then equation (37) represents the feeling of

surprise at encountering the unexpected event of a burglar being in

my home. This feeling need never be asserted, nor even expressed

silently to oneself. It may remain just a raw, unexpressed, feeling

of surprise. And yet equation (37) shows that the TOS has the

ability to handle even this ephemeral kind of sign.

(37) F = P:U:H:B


Now, intentions have often been defined as internal psychological

states that relate to objects, events, or conditions in the external

world, while emotions have been defined in some instances as simply

“a rush of hormones”. So it may be surprising to find that equation

(36) will handle FEMs as well by the simple expedient of defining

various of the operators in expression (36) as either null or

identity operators. For instance, if D is the value of S that stands

for the psychological state of being depressed, equation (38)

represents the feeling, or emotion, of being depressed.

(38) E = D:1:0

Not all feelings and emotions have trivial values for C, P, and

s, however. The language for discussing intentions, intentionality,

and FEMs is notoriously imprecise. Many feelings behave more like

propositional attitudes, while many others behave more like emotions,

while some even behave like internal perceptions. One advantage of

the more precise language and more powerful theory of the TOS is that

it should help to sort out and systematize much of our observation

and understanding of FEMs.

Another advantage of the TOS, not shared by any of its

competitors, is the additional insight that the TOS gives into the

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 131 of 167Xsemiotic interpretation of the sign and its relation to the source

interpreter, IS. For instance, SAT represents the utterance (39) as

an assertion of the proposition (40). This explains the linguistic

and grammatical properties of (39) very well, but also represents IS

as a disinterested party with no more personal involvement with (40)

than if he had uttered (41) as an assertion of (42). What is needed

here is an acknowledgment of the very special first person,

subjective, relation existing between IS and its feeling of sadness

that cannot be experienced or shared when it asserts someone else’s

sadness. Now, this is just what the TOS does when it lets S be the

value of S that stands for the psychological state of sadness (not

the word “sad”, nor even the proposition ‘being sad’), and explains

(39) by (43), and the assertion of (39) by (44), the assertion of G.

(39) I’m sad.

(40) my being sad

(41) Tom is sad.

(42) Tom’s being sad

(43) G = S:1:0

(44) :G


We thus see that by bringing each of the components of the USST

diagram into the representation as an operator, the TOS gains in both

power and flexibility in ways that no other semiotic theory can do,

especially a theory like SAT which is limited to such a narrow

semiotic domain as natural language42.

4. Subduction and Interpretation of Theory:

To my knowledge, subduction as a form of inference was first

explicitly noted by Carnap (1958) where he called it “the one-way

codebook”. Carnap noted many of the properties of subduction but

never managed to give it a technical name. Others43 have either

acknowledged Carnap’s work or have attempted to work out the details

on their own without acknowledging Carnap’s priority. But none of

them have given it a technical name. Therefore I called it

“subduction” (1991) to both acknowledge its existence and importance

and its nature as a form of inference inverse to abduction.

In subduction, some of the abstract terms of the theory are

interpreted44 as observational concepts so that the theory may be

42 However, Peirce, who pioneered SAT (Ransdell 2002) did not so limit his analysis.43 Such as Hempel and Popper.44 Carnap called it “translation”, or “decoding”.

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 133 of 167Xtested against reality45. The invention of good interpretations can

sometimes be as “easy” as interpreting the mass in Newton’s theory as

the weight of a body divided by the force of gravity, or as ingenious

as Gibb’s brilliant guess regarding entropy.

E. Application to Applied or more Applied Questions:

Our fifth scientific subparadigm concerns the applications of the

Semiotic Paradigm, especially those applications that might shed

light on details of the paradigm itself and help to work out those

details or help to prioritize the areas of research and development

of the paradigm. In the New Science of Semiotics, using the Semiotic

Paradigm, general problems are solved by a judicious use of laws,

theory, and facts, using triadic logic.

It’s in its applications that the new science is expected to

shine, where its empirical approach keeps it in close touch with

real-world problems and its new explanations take it beyond the

solutions of Peirce’s old taxonomic science. Here is one that is

very useful in legal studies.

1. Understanding the modes of reasoning:46

45 And because theories are invented by fallible human beings, they must be tested against reality.46 A preliminary version of this section appeared as (Pearson 1991).


This section represents just a bare beginning on an application of

the Semiotic Paradigm to understanding the modes of reasoning that is

hoped to eventually result in a semiotic theory of reasoning. It

sketches an approach to a theory of reasoning that appears to be

productive. It relates the nature of a reasoning process and its

structure to the changes in the structure of the signs involved in

that reasoning process. Seven distinct modes of semantic reasoning

are isolated, and a ladder diagram shows their interrelationships.

Only one of these modes is deductive, leaving six modes of non-

deductive semantic reasoning.

i. introduction

The general problem of reasoning is to determine, given one or

more initial signs, what other signs one ought to entertain on the

same basis. For instance, if one believes that “P” and also that

“PQ” are both true, should one also believe that “Q” is true?

Alternately, if one enjoys doing “R” and also enjoys doing “S”, does

one necessarily enjoy doing “both R and S”?

There are many forms of reasoning, some more immediate, or more

accessible, than others. For instance, to determine the truth of

“Q”, a medium might consult a crystal ball, while a trained scientist

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 135 of 167Xmight design a controlled experiment. Depending on the meaning of

“Q” either approach might be more or less appropriate under different

circumstances. We would not normally believe that the revelation of

a crystal ball would be justification for believing that the

existence of anyons could be a sufficient explanation of the

Anomalous Quantized Hall Effect. On the other hand just such a

reason could justify a lady’s belief that she will eventually meet a

tall, dark, and handsome stranger who will fall in love with her. I

think most ladies would not go to the trouble of designing and

carrying out a controlled scientific experiment to evaluate this

sign. In fact, the very doing so could well destroy the truth of

this sign, while believing the crystal ball could, in fact, help to

establish its truth.

There are many bases for entertaining signs, and some of these get

tied up with the notion of truth. For instance, if one believes a

sign, this is the same as holding in one’s mind that sign to be true.

I want to avoid a discussion of ‘truth’ for now because it is more

complex than most methods of analysis are competent to handle, and

besides, truth forms only a very small part of the concept of

‘reasoning’, altho this small part has played a dominant role thruout

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 136 of 167Xhistory in our understanding of the nature and methods of science.

It is for this reason that I defined the general problem of reasoning

around the more general and less restricting concept of ‘entertaining

on the same basis’. In addition, this freeing up of the concept of

‘reasoning’ from the concept of ‘truth’ allows us to see more of the

structure of reasoning and its relation to the signs that must be

processed in its behalf. This, in turn, will lead to a better

understanding of ‘truth’ in the long run.

In the Semiotic Paradigm, it is possible to examine some of the

relations between reasoning and the structure of the signs reasoned

with and thereby gain a better understanding of the structure of

reasoning. We find thereby seven semantic modes of symbolic

reasoning and how they fit together with each other. These are the

ones that have traditionally been called the modes of scientific

reasoning. In general, there are many more modes of reasoning than

have ever been listed in any logic book, even the ones in Peirce’s

unfulfilled dreams; and they fit together perfectly in what may be

regarded as a semiotic jig-saw puzzle. For instance, the modes of

semantic reasoning fit together to form what might be called the

“ladder of semantic reasoning” see figures 5 and 17.


It is important to determine which of these forms of reasoning are

most reasonable, i.e., have the best justification under given

circumstances. This leads to twenty-one modes of symbolic reasoning.

Seven of these are syntactic modes, (i.e., mathematical reasoning);

seven are semantic modes, (i.e., scientific reasoning); and seven are

pragmatic modes, (i.e., affective reasoning). Six of these modes are

information increasing, six are information decreasing, and nine are

information transforming.

Altho the concept of ‘sign’ dates back to the Greek medics, was

foregrounded for epistemology and logic by St. Augustine, and was

reintroduced into Western philosophy by John Locke, it was the

American philosopher, Charles Peirce, who first introduced the

concept of ‘sign structure’ and first investigated the internal

structure of the sign. Peirce was especially concerned with

reasoning, especially scientific reasoning, so it is perhaps

surprising that Peirce himself did not attempt to relate the

structure of reasoning to the structures of the signs involved in the

reasoning process. However, from the Collected Papers (CP) it

appears that he did not; but then, he only had his taxonomic science

of semeiotic to work with. Maybe some indications that he did

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 138 of 167Xattempt this kind of analysis will show up in the new “Writings”

edition (W) now in preparation. But if not, at least there is some

precedent for this kind of oversight in that Galileo, who was so

interested in inventing the clock, and who discovered all of the

necessary elements for inventing the clock, simply failed to put them

all together. Perhaps Peirce, like Galileo, was just too closely

involved with the obvious to take that final step.

ii. USST

All of the essential aspects of the USST needed for analyzing

reasoning processes are summarized in the USSD, Figure 3. of Section

IV.D.2.a.ii.

We will be working primarily with the structure of the sign. We

note specifically the syntactic structure represented by the lower

left-hand portion of the USSD, the pragmatic structure represented by

the upper portion of the USSD, and the semantic structure represented

by the lower right hand portion of the USSD. For this example we

will concentrate mainly on semantic structure and the semantic forms

of reasoning.

We will be concerned with the structure of concrete individuals,

the structure of concrete generals, and the structure of abstract

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 139 of 167Xindividuals. We recall from the definitions in Section IV.D. of

indexes, icons, and symbols that indexes can refer only to concrete

singulars, icons only to concrete generals, and symbols to abstract

singulars. In this connection we should recall that the USST

explains the structure of indexes as consisting of only the first

level of semantic structure with the object as its external structure

and extension as its internal structure. It explains the structure

of icons as consisting of both of the first two levels of semantic

structure, adding the ground and intension to the structure of the

index. And it explains the structure of symbols as consisting of all

three levels of semantic structure, adding the cognitive mentellect

and protension to the structure of the icon.

In our first cut at attempting to understand reasoning, we shall

deal only with symbolic reasoning and so we shall be dealing only

with indexical symbols, iconic symbols, and symbolic (or pure)

symbols while calling them by their shortened names for simplicity of

reference.

iii. the modes of reasoning

deduction (formerly called demonstration)


For purposes of developing theory, we select that meaning of

“deduction” which involves semantic reasoning from an interpreted

general to an interpreted singular.47

This reasoning from a general to an individual involves a process

of changing the structure of the subject of the entertained sign from

that of an icon (iconic symbol) to that of an index (indexical

symbol). For instance, from “All men are mortal.” we apply “Socrates

is a man.” to get “Socrates is mortal.”. “Mortal” and “man” are

general terms and so the predicates of the hypothesis and of the

conclusion retain the same structure. The subject of the hypothesis

is “all men”, a general term, while the subject of the conclusion is

“Socrates”, a singular term. Thus only the structure of the subject

has changed.

47 We are essentially adopting Quine’s concept of ‘explication’ (1960) wherein one

sets about refining one’s concepts in such a way as to maintain those theoretical

implications which have the strongest anchors at the lowest levels of

observability and doing the least damage in those areas where our intuitions are

not as strong. Theoretical implications which have no anchor in reality at all

have a “don’t care” impact on the design of our concepts so that in these cases we

are free to invent our refinements in such a way as to simplify the overall

theory.


The particular is already predicated in the general so that we

know for certain that the predicate applies to it. This allows

semiosis to descend by both external and internal structure, i.e., by

both a relation of secondness and a relation of thirdness, so that

both reinforce and complement each other. The descent by secondness

goes from ground to object, while the descent by thirdness goes from

ground to intension to extension to object. These descents are

illustrated in Figure 6.

The result of this descent process is to eliminate the iconic

level of structure from the entertained sign thus leaving us with an

index. We can identify this descent process with a loss of

information so that loss of information and descent from an icon to

an index are both represented by the abstract diagram of Figure 7.

One further abbreviation of the diagram process allows us finally to

collapse the diagram of Figure 7 into the diagram of Figure 8, thus

representing the overall structure of the deduction process.

Secondness

Inten-sionGround

Object

Extension


Thirdness

Figure 6: Comparison of Descents from Icon to Index bySecondness and by Thirdness.

induction

There have been many different forms of induction proposed,

ranging from mathematical, or complete, induction, to statistical

induction, to ampliative, or incomplete, induction, to even proof by

complete listing of cases. Therefore we fix our attention here on

just one of the many meanings of the word “induction”, that of

scientific, or ampliative, induction. This method of reasoning was

also first commented on by Socrates. Scientific induction, or as we

shall call it, simply, induction, has always meant something like

reasoning from a set of individuals, a set of indexical symbols, to a

general conclusion, an iconic symbol. This requires the following

steps:

(1) Observation of individuals, and their description by a set of

indexical symbols.

(2) Invention (or guess) of:

a) a set of pertinent categories (iconic symbols)


b) a general hypothesis (an iconic symbol).

(3) Transform the general hypothesis into a more convenient general

form.

(4) Testing the hypothesis for the categories over the original

individuals.

a) Design of experiment.

b) Observation of additional individuals, if necessary.

(5) Deduction from the general to new individuals in support of 4).

(6) Conclude to the general hypothesis, if warranted.

Figure 7: Descent from Icon to Index with Loss of Information.

Figure 8: The Structure of Deduction.

ICON

INDEX


Altho induction is nearly the inverse of deduction, it is

considerably complicated by the necessity for the double invention

(step (2) above), and an increase of information is occasioned by the

conclusion to unobserved individuals in step (6). From the above it

can be seen that the value added in induction is due to the increase

in structure of a set of indexes to the structure of an icon as

illustrated in Figure 9, which can be seen to be the diagrammatic

inverse of Figure 7. Thus we see that altho the diagrams help

clarify the nature of structural changes in sign processes, they are

abstractions and do not retain the full detail involved in semiosis.

For this we need the full Theory of Operational Semiotics (TOS).

Induction is an information intensive step in that it requires the

addition of extra information in the form of observation of

previously unobserved individuals and the invention of both a set of

categories and a general hypothesis. Because of these creative

steps, the conclusion of an induction can never be assured and must

always be tested.

We also note that we cannot ascend from object to ground by two

different routes as we descended in deduction. This is consistent

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 145 of 167Xwith the conclusion that induction is never self validating and must

always

Figure 9: Ascent from Index to Icon.

be verified. The general always contains individuals not contained

in the original. Because induction is only interesting when it

cannot be tested to completion (because of an infinite number of

individuals, or etc.) induction is always fallible and hence open to

revision, or refinement. We therefore see that induction as thus

defined is completely inverse to deduction in every way. We

therefore diagram induction and deduction conceptually as arrows with

the tail of deduction leading from icons and its head pointing to

indexes and the tail of induction leading from indexes and its head

pointing to icons. This conceptual diagram will determine our whole

approach to developing a theory of reasoning processes as attempts to

change the structure of given signs relative to certain

ICON

INDEX

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 146 of 167Xentertainment. We thus diagram induction as in Figure 10, which may

be compared to Figure 8.

Figure 10: The Structure of Induction.

analogical reasoning

Several forms of analogical reasoning have been described in the

literature. We use the term here to mean reasoning from one set of

generals to another set of generals by the use of arguments involving

similarity, or the reasoning from one icon to another icon while

staying on the iconic level. Such a definition would include for

instance, troth metaphor, argument by similarity, and physical

modeling.

Analogical reasoning can be a direct process, as diagrammed in

Figure 11. But it may also proceed indirectly, passing thru the

symbolic as diagrammed in Figure 12. Indirect analogy is also called

symbolic analogy, theoretical analogy, abstract analogy, symbolic

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 147 of 167Xmodeling, theoretical modeling, argument from definition, and/or

metaphor.

Figure 11: Direct Analogy.

Figure 12: Indirect Analogy.

eduction

“Eduction” is defined as reasoning from an individual to another

individual. This would correspond to reasoning from an index to an

index. Argument α) is an example of this type of reasoning. It may

be diagrammed as in Figure 13, wherein the solid arrows indicate the

valid, indirect, eduction, while the dotted arrow represents the

direct process. Eduction may also proceed by an even more indirect

process by passing up to the symbolic level and then back down.

α) This bottle of catsup is red; therefore, that jar of pickles weighs 16 oz.

ICON ICON

ICON

SYMBOL

ICON

SYMBOL

INDEX

ICON

INDEX

ICON


Figure 13: The Process of Eduction.

abduction

Peirce, who coined the term “abduction”, as well as “hypothetical

reasoning” and “retroduction”, used all three of these terms

ambiguously to stand for several forms of reasoning, as well as a

kind of inventing which included either categories, a general

hypothesis, or an abstract theory. It can be seen that two of these

forms of invention result in the creation of an icon, while the third

results in the creation of a symbol. Strictly speaking, these

inventings are not forms of reasoning, but steps in several different

reasoning processes. For this reason, and to simplify the design of

technical language that will be adequate to the resulting theory (the

first modification to the language of Menetics since it was initially

designed in 1976, (1977)), I use the term “hypoduction” for Peirce’s

invention of a hypothesis, and I use the term “abduction” for

invention of abstract explanation – reasoning from icons to symbols –

often used for development of scientific theory. We see, therefore,

that abduction, in this sense, like induction, is information

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 149 of 167Xintensive, since it too involves an invention, the hypoduction of an

abstract explanation. We diagram this as Figure 14. The steps to

abduction are thus:

Figure 14: The Semiotic Process of Abduction.

(1) The development of several general laws for which a single

abstract explanation is desired.

(2) The hypoduction (invention) of an abstract theory, including

theoretical concepts, relations between the concepts, rules for

abstract manipulation of the concepts and relations, and rules

for translating back to observable concepts (see subduction.).

(3) Manipulation of the theory by the given rules of transformation

in order to arrive at other abstract statements that may be more

convenient for interpretation (see symbolic reasoning next.).

SYMBOL

ICON


(4) The translation of certain of the abstract concepts and

relations into observable concepts and relations by use of the

code book (see subduction again).

(5) The comparison of resulting singular and general statements

with the known facts and laws.

(6) Conclusion of the abstract theory, if warranted.

symbolic reasoning

Any form of reasoning that starts with pure interpreted symbols in

the subject position of the premise, reasons to a conclusion with

pure interpreted symbols in subject position, and uses only

interpreted symbolic transformations is called “symbolic reasoning”.

Peirce also called this form of reasoning, “theorematic reasoning”

and “argument from definition”. Manipulation of theory to get from

explanatory principles to other abstract statements that are easier

to interpret observationally (as in step 3) above) is a good example

of this kind or reasoning. In science, this kind of reasoning can

often be “abbreviated” by mathematical manipulation, but there is

always a fine distinction between the semantic reasoning and the

mathematical manipulation. Since symbolic reasoning involves

arbitrary conventions, its conclusions can not be guaranteed in

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 151 of 167Xadvance and must be tested for validity. In the case of scientific

theory, this is done as part of the overall theory validation

process. We thus diagram symbolic reasoning as Figure 15.

subduction

Interpretation of theoretical concepts can be as “apparently”

simple as the interpretation of the mass of a particle by dividing

its weight by the gravitational constant or the interpretation of the

temperature of an ideal gas by the observation of a real thermometer,

or as obviously “contrived” as the interpretation of the curvature

tensor of empty space by the displaced position of stars during a

solar eclipse or the interpretation of the mean kinetic energy of an

ensemble of molecules averaged over all of the molecules in the

ensemble by the observed temperature of a real gas in a finite

container. From the most transparent to the most opaque

interpretation, all involve a step down in structure from symbols to

icons. “Temperature” can be either a pure symbol or an iconic symbol

depending on whether it is used to mark a theoretical concept or an

observable general concept. In either case it is spelled the same,

altho both meaning and structure are drastically different.

SYMBOL SYMBOL


Figure 15: The Symbolic Reasoning Diagram.

Figure 16: Structure of the Subduction Process.

Carnap was the first to isolate and study this form of reasoning

altho it was certainly used (perhaps unconsciously) by scientists

long before his time as witnessed by the examples from Newton,

Carnot, Gibbs, and Einstein in the previous paragraph. Carnap used

the term “code book” to describe these translation rules48, but it is

a peculiar kind of code book. Whereas most code books show how to

translate back and forth either way, this code book only needs to

translate in one direction, from theoretical to observable, that is,

from abstract to general. In addition, it need not translate every

theoretical term in the theory, but only a finite subset of them.

Those theoretical statements that are translatable into observable

terms must then be amenable to observation and where observation is

48 I provided the name “subduction” (1991).

SYMBOL

ICON

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 153 of 167Xin accord with the translated statements, this counts as evidence in

favor of the theory. Because not every theoretical statement is

translatable, subduction is an information decreasing process. The

diagram for Subduction is thus given by Figure 16.

iv The structure of semantic reasoning

From this cursory overview of the forms of semantic reasoning we

can construct Figure 17: The Seven Modes of Semantic Reasoning by

consolidating each of the previous seven semantic reasoning diagrams.

The result is a compact, terse diagram that is reminiscent of the

semantic structure of the sign itself. From the placement and fit of

deduction and induction, we can determine how to interpret this

diagram in an overall sense to show the relation and fit of all seven

modes of semantic reasoning49,50. The purpose of Figure 17 is to

emphasize the structure of the various semantic reasoning processes

and the way they fit and complement each other, and not to illustrate

their most intricate details.

49 This diagram was originally published as Figure 8 in my review of Rauch and Carr(1989), in the section discussing Allan Chinen’s paper (1989)50 It was Chinen who originally gave me the idea of relating the various kinds ofreasoning to each other, altho he related reasoning to the reference of signs. Itwas I who conceived of interpreting reasoning as the change in structure of thesigns used in the reasoning process, and the way these processes fit together. Ithank Chinen for his original contribution.

SYMBOL SYMBOLSymbolic Transformat

ion

Logic of Dis covery/Inven tion(Information Increasing)

Cogne-xsionCognitive Mentellect

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 154 of 167X Abstract Singular Symbolic Reasoning

Concrete General Iconic Reasoning

Concrete Singular Indexical Reasoning

Figure 17: Seven Modes of Semantic Reasoning

We must recall the great variety of usages of these names in the

literature and note that Figure 17 uses these terms each in a

particular sense as discussed above. Figure 17 can be used to

analyze many of the steps in each of the modes of reasoning and was

in fact the means whereby the steps in the above analyses were

developed.

v. Pragmatic modes of reasoning

INDEXINDEX IndexicalTransformat

ion

Deduction

ICON ICONIconicTransformat

ion

SubductionAbduction

ction

Logic of De monstration(Informatio n Decreasin g)

Exten-xsion

Object

Inten-xsion

Ground

Induction


The semantic modes of reasoning are not the only forms of

reasoning, altho they are the best known and the best studied because

they include the forms of reasoning used by science. All semantic

forms analyzed in this example were of the subject-predicate form.

Peirce pointed out the importance of studying a more general kind of

reasoning using relational forms. Mathematics employs the syntactic

modes of reasoning. But in many ways, the pragmatic modes of

reasoning are the most interesting, altho they are the least studied

and the least understood.

In a preliminary literature survey, only one name, “coduction”,

was found that referred to a specific form of pragmatic reasoning.

Coduction appears to involve the social and behavioral context of the

sign, (S&BC). It was Freud who called most attention to the need for

a better understanding of pragmatic reasoning, especially in his

discussions of the logic of dreams and his analysis of the logic of

personal relations. Likewise, Jung called attention to the logic of

the collective unconscious, again involving the social and behavioral

context of the sign.

In semantic reasoning we are involved with individuals, generals,

and abstractions, troth concrete and abstract. It was our knowledge

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 156 of 167Xof the semiotic structure of these entities51 that allowed us to

analyze the semiotic structure of semantic reasoning. In pragmatic

reasoning we are involved with feelings, emotions, moods (in the

psychological rather than the grammatical sense), and affect. We

shall have to learn more about the semiotic structure of these

entities in order to help unravel the semiotics of the pragmatic

modes of reasoning. Are emotions rhemes, phemes, or dolemes? What

is the difference between feelings, emotions, and moods? The New

Science of Semiotics is the best tool for attacking and solving these

problems.

I suspect that when the pragmatic modes of reasoning are

untangled, we shall find some kind of structural relationship similar

to that in Figure 17. Nature has a habit of preserving structure.

Much of the current investigation centers on this pragmatic

structure, especially legal inquiry, esthetic inquiry, and

theological inquiry. This offers an exciting opportunity to improve

our understanding of semiotic structure. Our early studies of

grammatical mood have done much to improve our understanding of

pragmatic structure, and these studies of reasoning will do far more.

F. Mathematical Methods and the Solution of Problems:51 Due primarily to Peirce and myself.


Our last subparadigm of the Semiotic Paradigm involves the

rigorous systematization of semiotic thinking in order to bring

mathematical reasoning to bear in solving semiotics problems.

Any serious study deserves the use of the most powerful tools

available; and the most powerful tools all include the use of

mathematics. In the new science of semiotics, math pops up

everywhere we look: in measurement, in data analysis, in discerning

exact laws to describe observed patterns, in the development of the

most useful explanatory theories, etc.. But that branch specifically

called “mathematical semiotics” usually consists of the solution

methods for the mathematical formulations of the problems of applied

semiotics.

A new golden age of mathematics is coming. The old golden age

included the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries,

wherein all mathematics was developed by physicists for solving

problems of the physical sciences. All mathematics of the golden age

was dyadic mathematics.

The new golden age will be the age of triadic mathematics. It

will be developed by semioticists for solving the problems of the

semiotic sciences. In order to be a good semioticist in the 21st

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 158 of 167Xcentury you must first be a master of mathematics. The principles of

mathematical semiotics have yet to be written. They will be written

by you.

V. NEW PROBLEMS FOR THE NEW SCIENCE:

A. A New Way of Thinking, a New Way of Knowing, a New Way of

Understanding:

Traditionally there have been two ways of looking at the world.

The older one is often credited to Socrates, altho it was formalized

and made explicit by Aristotle. Whitehead (1929) most improperly

called it the Platonic philosophy and the only true philosophy. It

involves looking at the world from outside-in. Aristotle called this

“hylozoism” because it views every existing body as a living being.

The newer view was created by Peirce, altho the public often

associates James’s name with the phenomenological viewpoint. Husserl

is often credited with founding the science of phenomenology, altho

Peirce actually began to investigate phenomenology as a science some

half-century earlier. This viewpoint involves looking at the world

from inside-out, but is also called hylozoism because like Aristotle,

Peirce viewed every existing body as a living being. In fact,

hylozoism has been a very popular philosophy thruout the ages. It

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 159 of 167Xhas been stressed more recently by both Whitehead and Teilhard de

Chardin.

The New Science of Semiotics involves a new way of looking at the

world, also initiated by Peirce. This generates a new way of

thinking, a new way of knowing, and a new way of understanding. It

thereby gives us the power and ability to unify science and

phenomenology thus providing an integrated and unified methodology

for a new way of inquiring. This involves looking at the world from

the middle ground inside the sign, from whence one can look both

outward toward all existent bodies of the external world and inward

toward all mentating consciousness of the internal world, i.e. what

is normally called “the self”. This approach is made possible by the

bilateral structure of the sign. It still involves the hylozoic

assumption that in the words of Whitehead: every grain of sand, every

electron, is alive (1929). In this assumption, the New Science of

Semiotics is consistent with virtually all post-Peircean philosophy.

B. Three Kinds of Justice; Three Kinds of Law:

For this example, we start with Aristotle’s claim that there are

only two kinds of justice.


Political Justice is of two kinds, one natural, the other conventional. A rule

of justice is natural that has the same validity everywhere, and does not

depend on our accepting it or not. A rule is conventional that in the first

instance may be settled in one way or the other indifferently, though having

once been settled it is not indifferent: for example, that the ransom for a

prisoner shall be a mina, that a sacrifice shall consist of a goat and not of

two sheep. (Quoted in Cl. Morris 1959: 21).

Augustine, on the other hand, distinguishes between two kinds of

law, which he calls eternal law and temporal, or human, law. Thomas

Aquinas proceeds to interpret these as particular and eternal law,

sometimes referred to as divine law.

However, the New Science of Semiotics explains that there are

three kinds of justice: the first is material justice. It is

directed to a particular good. This is Aristotle’s “natural

justice”. The second is conceptual justice. It is directed to the

common good. This forms part of what Aristotle called “conventional

justice, but not all. For Aristotle was a conceptualist and

recognized only the lower two levels of semantic structure. The

third is analytical justice. It is directed to ways of arriving at

new or revised good, i.e. pertaining to the eternal good, such as,

Pearson: “Beyond Peirce” Page 161 of 167Xfor example, constitutional justice. This completes what Aristotle

called “conventional justice”.

Material justice involves only the denotative/extensional level of

semantic structure in an essential way. Conceptual justice involves

both the denotative/extensional and the connotative/intensional

levels of semantic structure essentially, but does not involve the

pronotative/processional level. Finally, analytical justice requires

all three levels of semantic structure, involving all three in an

essential way.

On the other hand, the New Science of Semiotics explains that

there are three kinds of law. In fact, there is one kind of law

corresponding to each kind of justice, thus unifying Aristotle’s

theory of Justice with St. Augustine’s and St. Thomas’s theory of

Law. Material law corresponds to St. Thomas’s particular law and is

that body of law that implements material justice. Conceptual law

corresponds to what both of them called “eternal” law and implements

conceptual justice. Finally, analytical law corresponds to the laws

implementing analytical justice. Such laws are more often called

“constitutions” because they specify the purpose of laws, how they

can be changed, and how new laws can be created.


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