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Seeking a Third Way in the “Third World”: Ronald Reagan’s Cold War Strategy,

Congressional Opposition, and the Argentine Option

Latin America’s encounter with the Cold War was rarely cold. Almost immediately after

the Allied Victory, Latin American nations were burdened with the “third world” label attracting

unwanted attention from the two competing superpowers. Most political scientists identify the

period between the early 1950s to the 1990s as the height of U.S. Cold War interventionism,

acknowledging that the gradual consolidation of democracy in the 1990s ended unilateral U.S.

domination. In this narrative, President Reagan emerges as the final Cold Warrior ushering

America to victory. In contrast, my research restructures this narrative exposing how even the

capacity to execute covert operations in Latin America was increasingly challenged in the 1980s.

Through an examination of U.S. public opinion and the tensions between Reagan and Congress,

I seek to illuminate the complex political environment of that era. I argue that although Carter

did not win a second term, the human rights sentiment that initially brought him to the White

House lingered long after he was gone. Both American public opinion and Congress constituted

an enormous obstacle to Reagan’s Cold War strategy in Central America. This domestic

resistance, especially in the case of widely publicized human rights violations in El Salvador,

forced Reagan to collaborate with Argentina, which was already actively combating leftist

movements in Central America.

Moving beyond an exclusively diplomatic treatment of U.S.-Latin American relations,

my research engages in a transnational analysis of President Reagan’s Cold War strategy in

Central America. This essay is part of a larger study where I seek to understand why Reagan

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remained neutral regarding the sovereignty issue during the Falkland War. I contend that Reagan

sought to protect his developing relationship with Argentina because it was crucial to his

campaign in El Salvador, and he was acutely aware of the growing self-determination of Latin

American client states. In order to understand U.S. intervention in Central America, we must

account for hemispheric developments which include: the Cuban Revolution, the U.S. defeat in

Vietnam, the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua, the civil war in El Salvador, and the emerging

autonomy of Latin American states. I address all of these issues in my narrative, emphasizing the

contingency of multiple transnational events that created this historical conjuncture. In addition

to archival documents, I utilize U.S. public opinion polls, U.S. and Argentine news sources, and

Argentine military records to construct a more cohesive inter-American narrative.

The U.S. identity in 1980 was deeply wounded. Widespread unemployment and

uncontrollable inflation dominated the domestic political agenda; stagflation had taken its toll on

the American Dream. The United States was losing in the international arena as well. The Soviet

invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran hostage crisis both served as visceral illustrations of

American frailty. Enter Ronald Reagan: handsome, well-spoken, and unapologetically

belligerent. Reagan was the quintessential cure for the Carter syndrome. Addressing the two-

headed monster of domestic and international failure, the 1980 Republican platform tapped into

the very tangible fear of American vulnerability, “These events…mark a continuing downward

spiral in economic vitality and international influence. History could record, if we let the drift go

on, that the American experiment, so marvelously successful for 200 years, came strangely,

needlessly, tragically to a dismal end early in our third century.” 1 Although obviously

hyperbolic, Republicans articulated the widespread concern that Carter had strayed too far from

1 Republican Party Platforms: "Republican Party Platform of 1980," July 15, 1980. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The

American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25844.

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American interests in pursuit of a global community; a criticism the Reagan campaign would

exploit throughout the months leading to the election.

The criticism painted Carter as a naïve do-gooder who passively allowed the Soviet

Union to increase its international influence. In Latin America specifically, Carter’s Human

Rights agenda produced adverse effects on U.S. national interests. It was during the Carter

administration that leftists seized power in Nicaragua, and destabilized El Salvador, Honduras,

and Guatemala. Compounding the failures was the Administration’s alienation of conservative

dictatorships. Relationships that were built over decades of military and economic cooperation

were terminated or strained in light of human rights violations. Former director of the Defensive

Intelligence Agency and Reagan advisor on military matters, Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham,

condemned Carter’s policy, “There is a growing hostility toward the United States all over the

region, [you] can’t find one country which is more friendly to us now than when Carter took

office.”2

In contrast to Carter, Reagan embodied the romantic bravado of the old western cowboy.

Where Carter stressed diplomacy and compromise, Reagan proposed “peace through strength.”3

Where Carter addressed international incidents as independent occurrences, Reagan espoused the

policy of “linkage.” Where Carter saw violators of human rights, Reagan saw allies in the Cold

War. Although effective, the hardline rhetoric exposed Reagan to the accusation of

warmongering which would follow him into his presidency.

Addressing the Soviet threat was priority of President Reagan’s agenda. Within the first

month of his administration he initiated plans to address that threat. In determining where to

focus U.S. efforts, El Salvador emerged as the most attractive option because it was a low-cost,

2 Stephen Kinzer, Globe Correspondent. “Latin Rightiests Hope for Reagan Win.” Boston Globe (Pre-1997 Fulltext), Oct. 07, 1980,

http://search.proquest.com/docview/294011646?accountid=13758 (accessed October 5, 2012). 3 Ibid.

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high-reward opportunity to indirectly confront the Soviet Union. The offensive strategy,

however, was immediately constrained by public opinion and Congressional opposition. The

Administration countered this domestic resistance with the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), but

ratification proved too cumbersome. Reagan and his advisors quickly realized that Congressional

legislation was a slow and ineffective mechanism through which to achieve an aggressive Cold

War strategy. In response, the Administration sought to collaborate with Argentina in order to

circumvent Congressional oversight and avoid stoking the fears of a war-weary public.

The Reagan administration marked a decisive return to pre-détente politics and Henry

Kissinger’s policy of linkage. The new foreign policy focus was aptly articulated in a letter to

President Reagan from William J. Casey, Director of Central Intelligence. In the letter, Casey

warns that the Soviet influence in Central America posed the greatest threat to the U.S. margin of

safety, citing the fulfillment of Nikita Khrushchev’s prophecy that “Communism would ‘win not

by nuclear war, which could destroy the world, not by conventional war, which could lead to

nuclear war, but by wars of liberation.’”4 The wars of liberation Casey referenced had had

occurred on every major continent; Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, and

Nicaragua illustrated the success of subversive Soviet imperialism.5

The first meeting of Reagan’s National Security Council (NSC) concentrated on

addressing Soviet-backed Cuban influence in the Caribbean Basin. The thirty-three states of the

Caribbean Basin posed a threat because they were “small, beset by problems, and vulnerable to

outside force.”6 Although it was understood that socio-economic turmoil was one motivating

factor, it was noted by Secretary of State Alexander Haig that the “countries could manage if it

4 Letter, William J. Casey to Ronald Reagan, Dec. 10, 1984, pg. 1, Executive Secretariat Meeting Files, NSC 61-70, Box 2, Loc: 152/01/7, Ronald Reagan Library. 5 Ibid. 6 National Security Council Meeting Notes, “Caribbean Basin; Poland,” Feb. 6, 1981, pg. 2, Executive Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC 1-10 Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald Reagan Library.

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were not for Cuba.”7 Cuba quickly emerged as the ubiquitous boogeyman, subverting the

American effort and spreading the Marxist plague.

The NSC meeting narrowed in on the deteriorating situation in El Salvador. The recent

Sandinista victory in the neighboring state of Nicaragua posed the greatest threat to the U.S.-

backed government because of its potential to serve as a gateway for Cuban support. Secretary

Haig and Director Casey reported that the Cubans had already shipped seven hundred tons of

arms into El Salvador.8 Haig called for an immediate response, “The first order of business is to

show the Nicaraguans that we will not tolerate violations as did the past administration.”9 And

although there was no explicit reference to a domino effect in Central America, he was quick to

invoke the Vietnam metaphor, “The worst thing would be to have the US dragged into another

draining experience like Vietnam.”10

It was ultimately decided to test the new strategy in El

Salvador. This strategy was particularly attractive because it allowed the Reagan administration

to address all of the regional issues. If successful, it would accomplish three very important

goals: 1) provide a politically legitimate reason for intervention in Nicaragua, 2) prove the

benefit of alignment with the U.S. to the developing world, 3) and put a very public end to

Cuban adventurism in the Western Hemisphere. President Reagan reiterated his purpose, “For

too many years, we have been telling adversaries what we can’t do. It’s time we make them start

wondering what we will do.”11

Although the Reagan administration operated in a strict Cold War context, it was not

oblivious to social and economic turmoil in Central America. In January of 1981, one month

before the first NSC meeting, Reagan’s National Security Advisor, Richard Allen, described the

7 Ibid. 8 Ibid., 3 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid., 4 11 Ibid., 6

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situation in El Salvador. In his description, Allen painted the nation as a “small overpopulated

coffee republic with a tradition of oligarchical rule and military repression of popular

discontent.”12

In essence, it was like many other countries in the region, which is why it was so

dangerous. El Salvador was an archetype of social unrest in Latin America. The success or

failure of the U.S. effort in the small coffee republic would reverberate throughout the

developing world.

The developing world, however, had become much more complex. Criticism of Reagan’s

aggressive tactics emerged early on in his administration. Latin America had changed

dramatically from the days when the U.S. could act unilaterally with impunity and regional

support. Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela illustrated the rising autonomy and political

agency of Latin American states. Mexico and Venezuela, in particular, utilized their oil wealth in

dealing with the U.S. and expanding their influence in the region. 13

Many of these nations drew upon their own experience when identifying that poverty and

political repression were key factors in leftist movements, factors that the Cubans exploited but

did not create. In fact, by 1981 fourteen Latin American nations had embassies in Cuba,

compared to only one in the early 1960s. 14

The trend toward political autonomy was growing

throughout Latin America. In 1965 the Organization of American States (OAS) overwhelmingly

endorsed the U.S. occupation of the Dominican Republic. Less than two decades later the OAS

refused the U.S. request for an inter-American military force in Nicaragua.15

Reagan and his

12 Memo, Richard V. Allen to Ronald Reagan, Jan. 27, 1981, pg. 2, Executive Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC 1-10 Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald

Reagan Library. 13 Alan Riding, Special to the New York Times. “News Analysis; REAGAN AND THE LATINS; Foreign Policy Third in a Series of Occasional Articles on International Problems Facing the Reagan Administration.” New York Times, Feb. 13, 1981,

http://search.proquest.com/docview/424061020?accountid=13758 (accessed October 5, 2012). 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid.

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administration were faced with a particular challenge; they had to implement an offensive Cold

War strategy without the historic ability to rely on broad regional support.

The strategy in El Salvador consisted of a three-tiered approach. The first tier aimed to

put a decisive halt to Sandinista interventionism in El Salvador. The second tier provided

economic aid to the struggling El Salvadorian Junta. Finally, the third tier provided for military

support which included military training teams (MTT) and military hardware.

The National Security Council moved first to address the external threat of Soviet

insurgency. According to NSC intelligence, Nicaragua was the gateway for Soviet-backed Cuban

infiltration in El Salvador.16

A 1982 intelligence assessment detailed Sandinista efforts “to create

a modern military establishment capable of defending against any regional threat in Central

America.”17

The Nicaraguan effort to create a “greater military power ha[d] dovetailed with the

Communist attempts to expand influence in Central America.”18

According to the report, which

was admittedly limited by “information shortfalls,” the U.S.S.R., in conjunction with its

European satellite states, and Cuba provided approximately $127 million in arms and other

materials to Nicaragua in 1981. In February 1981 American intelligence reports estimated that

approximately eight hundred tons of arms were allocated for El Salvador from Soviet surrogates.

At the time of the report two hundred tons had already reached El Salvador and an additional six

hundred tons remained in Nicaragua awaiting transshipment.19

The Nicaraguan threat had to be

addressed; the U.S. could not allow external forces to undermine its efforts in El Salvador.

President Reagan stressed this point to his cabinet, “if the Junta falls in El Salvador, it will be

16 Memo, Richard V. Allen to Ronald Reagan, “El Salvador,” Jan. 27, 1981, pg. 1, Executive Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC 1-10 Box 1, Loc:

1521117, Ronald Reagan Library. 17 Intelligence Assessment, Office of Global Issues, “Nicaragua: Arms Buildup,” Nov. 1982, pg. 1, Executive Secretariat Meeting Files, NSC 61-70, Box 2, Loc: 152/01/7, Ronald Reagan Library. 18 Ibid., iii. 19 National Security Council Meeting Notes, “Central America,” Feb. 11, 1981, pg. 1-2, Executive Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC 1-10 Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald Reagan Library.

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seen as an American defeat…we must not let Central America become another Cuba on the

mainland.”20

In dealing with the Nicaragua issue, Reagan had inherited a convenient bargaining chip

from his predecessor. In 1979 President Carter diplomatically acknowledged the Sandinista

government, and provided approximately $100 million to support the recovery effort and to

bolster the private sector after the devastating civil war. In 1980 the U.S. Congress authorized an

additional $75 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) contingent on the determination that

“the Government of Nicaragua was not aiding or abetting violence in other countries.”21

In 1980

the Sandinista regime was on the brink of failure. The economic recovery was failing, relations

with neighboring and donor countries were becoming strained, and popular support was

waning.22

However, because the Sandinista government was recognized as a legitimate state, the

Reagan administration had to be careful not to publicly violate American law or alienate an

autonomous Central American nation. To Reagan’s benefit, the contingency within the aid made

him responsible for determining Nicaragua’s compliance, which provided the proverbial stick

and carrot.

In 1981 the U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua, Lawrence A. Pezzullo, issued a 30-day

deadline to cease the arms shipments into El Salvador or risk losing U.S. economic aid.

According to the American report, the Sandinistas admitted their involvement and guaranteed

that “they w[ould] stop because ‘the revolution [wa]s more important to them than victory in El

Salvador or friendship with Cuba.’”23

The Reagan administration responded with a calculated

delay of the President’s determination. By delaying the determination, the U.S. bought time to

20 Ibid., 5. 21 Department of State Briefing Paper, “The Nicaragua Finding and Central American/Cuban Policy,” Feb. 9, 1981, pg. 1, Executive Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC 1-10 Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald Reagan Library. 22 Ibid., 3 23 National Security Council Meeting Notes, “Caribbean Basin – Poland – F15s (S),” Feb. 18, 1981, pg. 3, Executive Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC 1-10 Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald Reagan Library.

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ensure Nicaraguan compliance, remove non-essential embassy personnel, and temper the

Nicaraguan government’s handling of propaganda regarding the determination.24

As long as the

carrot was still present, the Sandinista government would not react to the stick. In addition to

maintaining Nicaraguan cooperation, the delay served to undermine the Sandinista government.

By delaying $15 million of the $75 million, Reagan was able to put additional pressure on the

failing economy, which was already incapable of sustaining itself or feeding the population.25

Furthermore, by delaying the badly needed funds, Reagan was able to exacerbate the dire

situation in Nicaragua and remind the developing world of the challenges faced by those who did

not align themselves with U.S. interests.26

Although Reagan was successful in temporarily quelling Nicaraguan interference, that

was not the only goal. In fact, it was not even the main goal. The larger objective, as defined by

Department of State internal documents, “was not the Nicaraguan role in El Salvador, but the

Cuban role.”27

In order for Reagan to successfully effect his Cold War policy in Central

America, however, he had to gain the support of Congress and the American public.

From the beginning, Reagan and his administration understood the limitations of

Congressional oversight. Strategy meetings were replete with Congressional references;

members of the NSC constantly made recommendations with the contingency that they be

approved by Congress. In a November 10, 1981, NSC meeting on the American strategy toward

Cuba and Central America, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David Jones,

articulated the impediment caused by Congress, lamenting that even “Castro knows the President

24 Department of State Briefing Paper, “The Nicaragua Finding and Central American/Cuban Policy,” Feb. 9, 1981, pgs. 4-5, Executive

Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC 1-10 Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald Reagan Library. 25 Maggie Rivas and James L. Franklin, Globe Staff. “Ex-Nicaragua Official Raps Aggression’ Under Reagan.” Boston Globe (Pre-1997 Fulltext), Apr. 03, 1981, http://search.proquest.com/docview/294079287?accountid=13758 (accessed October 5, 2012). 26 Ibid. 27 Department of State Briefing Paper, “The Nicaragua Finding and Central American/Cuban Policy,” Feb. 9, 1981, pg. 4, Executive Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC 1-10 Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald Reagan Library.

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needs congressional support.”28

Because the Reagan administration interpreted the leftist

movements in Central America as a consequence of Cuban adventurism, they sought to pressure

Castro into talking. In contrast to Carter, who offered negotiations if Cuba ceased to export its

revolutionary efforts, the Reagan administration sought a reinterpretation of brinksmanship. El

Salvador and Nicaragua were the proving ground for the real world application of “peace

through strength,” a strategy that would be ineffective, however, if the Reagan administration

were hamstrung by Congress.29

As expected, the Administration encountered political opposition from the outset of

operations in El Salvador. One of the first groups to oppose the strategy was the Members of

Congress for Peace Through Law, a bipartisan group composed of members from both

chambers. On February 26, 1981, approximately seven weeks after Reagan was sworn into

office, Senator Carl Levin invited Ambassador to El Salvador under President Carter, Robert E.

White, and U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, to debate the issues. The gist of

the debate focused on the necessity of American intervention in El Salvador.30

White applauded

the Administration for effectively addressing Nicaragua’s involvement in El Salvador, and

argued against further military assistance. He insisted that “Now was the time – when the leftists

had been defeated – to emphasize a political solution.”31

In response, Ambassador Kirkpatrick

argued that although the move was sufficient to stop Nicaragua, the U.S. still had to deal with the

Soviets. When White asserted that the new administration was guilty of overenthusiastic

involvement in El Salvador, Ambassador Kirkpatrick reiterated the legitimacy of the threat, “I

think that there’s only one power that is actively involved in Central America, and it’s the

28 National Security Council Meeting Notes, “Strategy Toward Cuba and Central America,” Nov. 10, 1981, pg. 3, Executive Secretariat: Meeting

Files, NSC 21-30, Box 3, Loc: 152/01/07, Ronald Reagan Library. 29 Ibid. 30 “Arms Aid and Advisers: Debating the New Policy in El Salvador.” New York Times, Mar. 08, 1981,

http://search.proquest.com/docview/424070211?accountid=13758 (accessed October 5, 2012). 31 Ibid.

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Soviets by way of the Cubans.”32

The contentious debate foreshadowed the resistance Reagan

would encounter in implementing an offensive Central American strategy.

The main challenge was that two tiers of Reagan’s three-tiered approach to El Salvador

hinged on his ability to secure Congressional support. The strategy called for increased economic

aid to bolster the fledging economy of the Salvadoran government. In fiscal year 1981 the U.S.

provided $61 million in aid “directed primarily at employment generation, support of private

sector output, and agrarian reform.” 33

The preliminary report generated for Reagan by Richard

Allen on February 17, 1981, called for an increase of approximately $100 million dollars and

additional funding from the Export Import Bank.34

The economic aid was also intended to

address Reagan’s critics, who accused him of warmongering and overlooking the socio-

economic turbulence in the developing world. Unfortunately for Reagan, this strategic approach

would also endure Congressional chastisement.

Though President Carter’s humanitarian diplomacy was not politically successful, the

emphasis on human rights persisted. As early as January of 1981, bills were introduced into

Congress to stop aid to El Salvador on a humanitarian basis. On April 2, 1981, Representative

Stephen J. Solarez introduced House Bill 3009. Entitled the El Salvador Assistance Act of 1981,

the bill made all future grants of military and economic aid to El Salvador contingent on

President Reagan’s certification that the Salvadoran government: was not engaged in consistent

human rights violations, achieved control of the armed forces; implemented economic and

political reform, moved toward free elections, and demonstrated a willingness to negotiate a

32 Ibid. 33 Memo, to Richard V. Allen, “Paper for the NSC Meeting on El Salvador,” Feb. 17, 1981, pg. 5, Executive Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC 1-

10 Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald Reagan Library. 34 Ibid., 6

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diplomatic end to the conflict.35

Reagan and his cabinet protested the stipulations, arguing that

the requirements compromised the Salvadoran government’s ability to continue fighting its

volatile civil war. In an attempt to sway the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Reagan sent

President Jose Napoleon Duarte to testify on the limitations caused by the legislation. President

Duarte asserted that “the restrictive language would be ‘an unacceptable imposition on a

government friendly to the United States.’”36

Unfortunately for Reagan and Duarte, their

protestations were to no avail.

The house bill was eventually incorporated into Senate Bill 1196, a broader piece of

legislation that applied similar stipulations to all U.S. military and economic aid. The bill passed

through a Republican-dominated Senate with a vote of 57-42 and was signed into law by

President Reagan on December 29, 1981.37

Although an initial success for Reagan’s detractors,

the law was limited in application. Amid reports in the New York Times and Boston Globe of a

government massacre in the mountain village of Mozote, Reagan certified the Salvadoran

government on January 28, 1982, clearing the way for $25 million in military aid and $40

million in economic assistance.38

Because the Act did not provide a means for a Congressional

challenge to the President’s certification, $65 million in combined aid was sent to the Salvadoran

government based primarily on President Reagan’s word. Though Reagan was able to maneuver

through Congressional provisions, it was evident that the days of unencumbered intervention in

Latin America were quickly fading, a fact that was not lost on the Department of State.

35

El Salvador Assistance Act of 1981, Bill Summary and Status 97th Congress (1981-1982) H.R. 3009, The Library of Congress,

http://thomas.loc.gov. 36 “Reagan and El Salvador.” Boston Globe (Pre-1997 Fulltext), Nov. 07, 1981,

http://search.proquest.com/docview/249219121?accountid=13758 (accessed October 5, 2012). 37 International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Bill Summary and Status 97th Congress (1981 – 1982) S.1196,

http://thomas.loc.gov. 38 “Reagan’s Certification Reported Given Salvador.” Boston Globe (Pre-1997 Fulltext), Jan. 28, 1982, http://search.proquest.com/docview/294085746?accountid=13758 (accessed October 5, 2012)

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The third tier of Reagan’s approach consisted of military aid to El Salvador. Again,

Reagan’s strategy was at risk of Congressional authority. The ability to deploy American forces

is governed by the War Powers Resolution, which requires the President to consult with

Congress when utilizing the armed forces.39

Furthermore, the rise in regional criticism and the

domestic pressure to avoid another Vietnam greatly influenced the Administration’s decision to

maintain a low military profile. In addition, an increased U.S. presence would blur the line

between “trainer” and “advisor,” creating the opportunity for the legitimate introduction of

Cuban and Nicaraguan advisors.40

Adjusting for this limitation, the military effort was

consciously inconspicuous. It consisted mainly of MTTs and Operational Planning and

Assistance Teams (OPAT). The deployment of MTTs and OPATs was intended to utilize the

Salvadoran armed forces in order to demonstrate the Junta’s autonomy and minimize U.S.

visibility. And although the initial presence of MTTs did not trigger the War Powers

requirements, the Reagan administration fully expected to introduce more American military

personnel into El Salvador. The Department of State considered several options to circumvent

Congressional authority, but ultimately accepted that the strategy would need some form of

Congressional support.41

In an effort to avoid conflict with Congress, the Department of State

encouraged Reagan to involve “Congress directly in deciding how the U.S. should respond to

[the] communist challenge close to the United States.”42

The stifling nature of these limitations

made collaboration with Argentina, a Latin American regime already involved in Central

American operations, all the more appealing.

39 Memo, to Richard V. Allen, “Paper for the NSC Meeting on El Salvador,” Feb. 17, 1981, pg. 7, Executive Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC 1-10 Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald Reagan Library. 40 Ibid., 4 41 Ibid., 7-9 42 Ibid., 7

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In executing their Cold War policy, Reagan and his administration made a concerted

effort to avoid the constraints of Congress, and they were successful to a limited degree.

Ultimately, however, they had to contend with more than just Congressional conflict; they also

encountered resistance from the American public and the international community. In the eyes of

the American public, only six years removed from the ravages of Vietnam, Reagan posed a

threat to peace. This concern was present even before Reagan was President. In a New York

Times/CBS poll administered in September of 1980, thirty-five percent of those polled registered

a concern that Reagan would lead the U.S. into war.43

When contesting aid to El Salvador the

following year, Republican Representative, Silvio O. Conte, cited the increased correspondence

he had received from his constituents. According to Conte, of the six hundred letters he had

recently received, they were approximately 25 to 1 against military aid and advisors in El

Salvador.44

Similarly, aides to Republican Senator and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee and Sponsor of Senate Bill 1196, Charles H. Percy, reported that the Senator had

received over three hundred letters a week, seventy-five percent of which expressed opposition

to the military aid.45

Representative Michael D. Barnes, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs

subcommittee on Latin America, concurred with his colleagues that “El Salvador was the

‘heaviest issue around’ and that ‘100 percent’ of his letters were against the Administration’s

policy.”46

It would be an overstatement to assert that the increased correspondence represented a

unanimous American opinion however. In fact, a Gallup poll taken in March of 1981 revealed

that only sixty-three percent of Americans were informed on the El Salvador issue. In the poll,

43 Adam Clymer. “Reagan and Carter Exchange Charges on Election Fears.” New York Times, Sep. 23, 1980,

http://search.proquest.com/docview/423971749?accountid=13758 (accessed October 5, 2012). 44 Judith Miller, Special to the New York Times. “Congress Mail Heavy on El Salvador Issue.” New York Times, Mar. 26, 1981,

http://search.proquest.com/docview/424058971?accountid=13758 (accessed October 5, 2012) 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid.

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“informed” was defined as aware of the struggle in El Salvador and knowledgeable of the

American stance. Of the sixty-three percent that were “informed,” twenty-eight percent

recommended some form of assistance. However, only two percent, of the twenty-eight percent

that advocated involvement, supported sending American troops.47

Polemics aside, what is

evident from the reports of increased Congressional correspondence and public opinion polls is

that opposition to American involvement prompted Congressional action, and those who did

advocate action supported a non-military approach.

In addition to the fear of becoming embroiled in yet another Cold War quagmire, the

Reagan administration had to contend with post-Cold War attitudes. Senator Paul Tsongas of

Massachusetts articulated this new understanding of conflict in Central America and the

developing world. In his criticism of Reagan’s policy, Senator Tsongas drew on his early

experiences as a Peace Corps volunteer in Africa in the 1960s asserting that the East-West

approach was “all right when you’re dealing with Europe or Russia, but it doesn’t make sense

when you’re dealing with the third world.”48

Tsongas’ attitude was shared by many leaders in the

international community. French Foreign Minister, Jean Francois-Poncet, whose government

strongly opposed Soviet interventionism, called for an emphasis on “reform and political

reconciliation” in lieu of a military solution.49

In Latin America, where the OAS had recently

demonstrated an increased independence and a deliberate shift away from U.S. cronyism, the

sentiment was the same. Mexico and Venezuela, both of which were demonstrating increased

autonomy as a result of oil wealth, expressed their belief that turmoil in El Salvador was the

result of the “intolerable condition of life in that beleaguered land,” as opposed to a “’textbook

47 Ibid. 48 Benjamin Taylor, Globe Staff. “N.E. Congressmen Lead El Salvador Opposition.” Boston Globe (Pre-1197 Fulltext), Feb. 24, 1982,

http://search.proquest.com/docview/294131160?accountid=13578 (accessed October 5, 2012). 49 Bernard Gwerzman, Special to the New York Times. “REAGAN’S MOVES ON SALVADOR MEET WITH MIXED RECEPTION; News Analysis. “New York Times, Feb. 26, 1981, http://search.proquest.com/docview/294131160?accountid=13578 (accessed October 5, 2012).

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case’ of Soviet-inspired insurgency.”50

It appeared that Reagan’s policy in El Salvador had

drawn criticism on every front. Congress, the American public, and the international community

were hesitant to accept the old argument that Soviet insurgency justified American

interventionism.

President Reagan responded to the intense public criticism with the Caribbean Basin

Initiative (CBI). A Central American reinterpretation of the Marshall Plan, the policy called for

$650 million in economic aid, $60 million in military aid, and trade incentives to countries at the

greatest risk of Cuban-inspired insurgency. Reagan had long accused the Carter administration of

undermining American interests by alienating U.S. allies and empowering leftist revolutionaries.

He moved to rectify the situation by enacting a sustained policy that demonstrated American

resolve. Reagan put the stakes into perspective for his National Security Council, declaring that

“Cuban adventurism must be met in our own front yard not only to defend our local interests, but

also to defend our global stakes in the rule of law and international order….”51

In developing its

strategy, the Administration recognized that “unless the root social, economic, and political

causes [were] effectively addressed, insurgency remain[ed] an ever-attractive alternative for the

alienated population.”52

Furthermore, it became the useful political token CBI architect and

National Security Advisor, Richard Allen, called for at the Administration’s first NSC meeting,

“We need a positive policy for the region that provides justification for everything we do.”53

By the time CBI was announced in February of 1982, Reagan was a veteran of

Congressional warfare. When he requested economic aid for the Salvadoran government, it was

50 “America’s New Foreign Policy.” New York Times, Aug. 23, 1981, http://search.proquest.com/docview/294131160?accountid=13578

(accessed October 5, 2012). 51 Memo, L. Paul Bremer to Richard V. Allen, “Paper for NSC Meeting March 26,” March 24, 1981, pg. 2, Executive Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC 1-10 Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald Reagan Library. 52 Ibid., 10. 53 National Security Council Meeting Notes, “Caribbean Basin; Poland,” Feb. 6, 1981, pg. 6, Executive Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC 1-10 Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald Reagan Library.

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tied up for several months in political wrangling. When we moved to introduce military

personnel in El Salvador, Congress responded with allegations of warmongering and invoked

references to Vietnam. CBI was an intentional effort to address his critics and reestablish a

strong working relationship with Latin American neighbors. Strategically announcing the

initiative at a meeting of the Organization of American States, Reagan moved to reframe his

Cold War rhetoric asserting that socio-economic turmoil had “provided a fresh opening to the

enemies of freedom, national independence and peaceful development.”54

CBI was his economic

weapon; a weapon that would make a strong statement to the world while keeping American

boots off foreign soil. The initiative received mixed reactions. Some critics focused on the

conspicuous fact that a large portion of the aid would be sent to El Salvador and that although the

funds were intended for economic development, there were no restrictions on its use.55

Domestically, criticism focused on Reagan’s willingness to spend money abroad while executing

huge budget cuts at home.56

Even though he enjoyed the benefit of a Republican-dominated

Senate, it would be another two years before the initiative was ratified by Congress. Reagan was

repeatedly forced to justify an aggressive Cold War strategy; it appeared that the

Administration’s policy in Central America was destined for political limbo. There was another

option, however, an option his predecessor was not willing to exploit.

In November of 1979, Georgetown Professor, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, published an

impressively comprehensive analysis of the Carter Administration’s foreign policy in

Commentary Magazine. In the article, entitled “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” she

dissected Carter’s policy with academic precision. Her criticism focused on the failure of a

54 “Reagan Unveils Caribbean Plan; Hopes to Aid Trade, Ensure Security in Region.” Boston Globe (Pre-1997 Fulltext) Feb. 24, 1982,

http://search.proquest.com/docview/294131160?accountid=13578 (accessed October 5, 2012). 55 Curtis Wilkie, Globe Staff. “Reagan Proposes $350m Aid Plan for Caribbean Area.” Boston Globe (Pre-1997 Fulltext), Feb. 25, 1982,

http://search.proquest.com/docview/294131160?accountid=13578 (accessed October 5, 2012). 56 Associated Press. “Central Americans Split on Reagan Plan.” Boston Globe (Pre-1997 Fulltext) Feb. 25, 1982, http://search.proquest.com/docview/294131160?accountid=13578 (accessed October 5, 2012).

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policy built on an impractical humanitarian ideology, “The foreign policy of the Carter

Administration fail[ed] not for lack of good intentions but lack of realism about the nature of

traditional versus revolutionary autocracies and the relation of each to the American national

interest.”57

Kirkpatrick illustrated the consequences of this approach through the examples of

Iran and Nicaragua, citing that the Administration not only failed to achieve its goal, “it actively

collaborated in the replacement of moderate autocrats friendly to American interests with less

friendly autocrats of extremist persuasion.”58

The article’s greatest impact was its eloquent articulation of the realpolitik approach that

Reagan would espouse throughout his presidency. In addressing the corruption of dictatorships,

a concept that strikes at the very heart of American democracy, Kirkpatrick observed that leftist

autocrats were guilty of the same vices. Through her perspective, right-wing regimes were the

lesser evil because of their proclivity toward American interests. Building on her analysis of Iran

and Nicaragua, she highlighted the value of both, asserting that they “were not only anti-

communist, they were positively friendly to the United States.” They were active in Washington

political and social spheres, they consistently voted in accord with the U.S. in the United

Nations, and they “regularly support[ed] American interests and positions even when these

entailed a personal and political cost.”59

Kirkpatrick was so successful in articulating the failures

of the Carter administration and the justification for allying with right-wing autocracies, Reagan

would recruit her into his administration and appoint her his Ambassador to the United Nations.

The impact of this shift in U.S. foreign policy is best illustrated by the Latin American

response to the Carter-Reagan campaign. As early as July of 1980, Carter’s efforts in Guatemala

57 Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, “Dictators and Double Standards,” Commentary, November 1979, pg. 13,

http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/dictatorships-double-standards/ 58 Ibid., 1 59 Ibid., 2

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were impeded by the impending vote. Ruling generals and conservative businessmen spurned

Carter’s call for further land reform and the nationalization of the country’s banks, opting instead

to gamble on a Reagan victory.60

In Bolivia the sentiment was much the same. After the July 17th

coup of the Bolivian government, Carter cut off economic aid. The director of Bolivia’s national

bank registered his response in the New York Times, stating his confidence that Reagan would

restore the aid if elected, “After all he said, ‘we are fighting against communism just as you

are.’”61

In El Salvador, the results of the election became apparent within sixteen days when two

murder victims were discovered with a sign that declared, “With Ronald Reagan, the miscreants

and guerillas [sic] of Central America and El Salvador will be finished.”62

Although the latter

incident was the fanatical expression of right-wing extremists, it is a poignant example of the

potential impact of U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. Because of their parallel political

interests right-wing regimes understood their value to a President like Reagan. After all,

subversive socialist movements posed the same threat to Reagan’s policy as they did to

conservative dictatorships. These benefits would be almost immediately exploited by a Reagan

administration facing consistent pressure and criticism from Congress, the American public, and

the international community.

Reagan’s willingness to work with right-wing regimes was evident throughout his

election campaign. He consistently criticized Carter for destabilizing U.S. foreign policy and

alienating American allies. In contrast to Carter’s emphasis on diplomacy, the Reagan doctrine

asserted that the best defense was a strong offense, and he moved to establish that offense prior

60 Alan Riding, Special to the New York Times. “U.S. Loses Ground in Central America and Backs Changes in Bid to Recoup, New York Times, (1923-Current File); July 9, 1980; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2008) pg. A10,

http://search.proquest.com/docview/294131160?accountid=13578 (accessed October 5, 2012). 61 Frank del Olmo, “For Reagan, New Trouble to the South? Some in Latin America Think He Could Encourage Military Regimes There,” Los Angeles Times (1923-Current File); Sep. 4, 1980; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2008),

http://search.proquest.com/docview/294131160?accountid=13578 (accessed October 5, 2012). 62 “Reagan and Latin America.” The Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 20, 1980, http://search.proquest.com/docview/294131160?accountid=13578 (accessed October 5, 2012).

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to being elected into office. In October of 1980, Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham visited Argentina on

Reagan’s behalf; the prototypical nation that Reagan referred to when condemning Carter of

alienating U.S. allies in Latin America.63

After assuming power in 1976, the Argentine Military

Junta embarked on a campaign to persecute socialist movements within Argentina and

throughout Latin America. As a result of this campaign and the subsequent litany of human

rights violations, the Carter administration severed diplomatic relations with the country. When

commenting on these abuses, Graham emphasized Reagan’s realpolitik approach, “One has to

treat it as an independent state….We didn’t create the situation down there and we can’t change

it that much.”64

Another Reagan advisor, Roger Fontaine, went further, declaring that “as

President, Reagan would ‘stop engaging in public pillorying of the regime.’” In the context of

Kirkpatrick’s intellectual argument and Reagan’s political stance, Argentina emerged as a

valuable resource for pursuing the Administration’s policy in Central America.

In the early stages of strategic planning for the deteriorating situation in El Salvador,

Reagan made his stance very clear to his administration. From the NSC meeting notes it is

evident that Reagan operated in a strict Cold War rationale. He reminded his staff that the

conservative dictatorships, which had been so badly chastised by the previous administration,

were not “as guilty of human rights violations as [were] Cuba and the USSR.”65

He further

encouraged them to reestablish these relations, proclaiming that “We don’t throw out our friends

just because they can’t pass the ‘saliva test’ on human rights.”66

Ambassador Kirkpatrick, the

author of “Dictators and Double Standards,” emerged as the architect of the Administration’s

63 Stephen Kinzer, Globe Correspondent. “Latin Rightiests Hope for Reagan Win.” Boston Globe (Pre-1997 Fulltext), Oct. 07, 1980, http://search.proquest.com/docview/294011646?accountid=13758 (accessed October 5, 2012). 64 Ibid. 65

National Security Council Meeting Notes, “Caribbean Basin; Poland,” Feb. 6, 1981, pg. 4, Executive Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC 1-10

Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald Reagan Library. 66

Ibid.

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strategy. Illustrating the value of these relationships to her NSC colleagues, she asserted that “El

Salvador had to be stabilized first. Then we should move on Nicaragua and let others do the

work for us.”67

The work that Kirkpatrick referred to was training. However, sending the requisite

military personnel into El Salvador was a very delicate issue within the Reagan administration

for various reasons. Domestically, it was an unattractive option because it would require

Congressional approval under the War Powers Resolution. Even worse, it would serve to

substantiate Democratic claims that Reagan was a warmonger, embroiling the U.S. in a tragic

reenactment of Vietnam. Internationally, deploying military personnel would send the wrong

message to Latin American leaders. In friendly nations, it threatened governments looking to

remain independent. To Cuba and Nicaragua, an augmented American force could serve to

legitimize the introduction of communist advisors into El Salvador.68

Again, it was Ambassador

Kirkpatrick who stressed the Argentines as a viable solution, noting that “The Argentine military

has a very good training capability and [were] active in Bolivia.”69

It was a political no-brainer.

Collaborating with the Argentine military would allow the Reagan administration to pursue an

offensive strategy in El Salvador while circumventing Congressional authority, evading the

Vietnam issue, reassuring Latin American allies, and avoiding political legitimation for Cuban

interventionism.

By the time President Reagan took office, the global political climate had changed

dramatically. Gone were the days when U.S. policy makers could rely on unanimous regional

67

National Security Council Meeting Notes, “Strategy Toward Cuba and Central America,” Nov. 10, 1981, pg. 4, Executive Secretariat: Meeting

Files, NSC 21-30, Box 3, Loc: 152/01/07, Ronald Reagan Library. 68

Memo, Richard V. Allen to Ronald Reagan, “El Salvador,” Jan. 27, 1981, pg. 3, Executive Secretariat: Meeting Files, NSC 1-10 Box 1, Loc:

1521117, Ronald Reagan Library. 69

Department of State Briefing Paper, “The Nicaragua Finding and Central American/Cuban Policy,” Feb. 9, 1981, pg. 5, Executive Secretariat:

Meeting Files, NSC 1-10 Box 1, Loc: 1521117, Ronald Reagan Library.

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support for unilateral policies in Latin America. Longtime client states such as Mexico,

Venezuela, and Brazil demonstrated increasing autonomy and expanded their influence in the

region. Even crossing the communist line was no longer as dangerous as it once was, as

evidenced by Argentina’s disregard for Carter’s Soviet grain embargo.70

More importantly,

communism had established a foothold in the Western Hemisphere. The successful Cuban

Revolution and subsequent efforts to support emerging communist movements in Africa and

Latin America undermined U.S. hegemony. The consequence of this diminished influence was

clearly illustrated by the OAS’ refusal to support an inter-American intervention in Nicaragua. In

sharp contrast to the overwhelming support for the occupation of the Dominican Republic in

1965, many Latin American states were now openly pursuing their own agenda independent of

U.S. policy.

The domestic political climate had also been transformed. The moral and military

superiority that followed World War II had been overshadowed by political scandals and the

Vietnam tragedy. Americans were now much more aware of the domestic consequences of U.S.

foreign policy and were less willing to send young men to die for policy alone. Additionally, the

human rights agenda that had been growing in Congress since the Nixon administration was now

strong enough to influence U.S. policy makers.71

Backed by a deluge of correspondence from

concerned citizens, legislators from both parties constituted a major obstacle to President

Reagan’s strategy in El Salvador. Constrained by the Congress and U.S. public opinion, Reagan

sought to collaborate with Argentina because they were already active in the region and they

were free of Congressional oversight. Examining Reagan’s strategy in a transnational context

70

Ariel C. Armony, “Transnationalizing the Dirty War,” in In From the Cold: Latin America’s New Encounter with the Cold War, ed. Gilbert M.

Joseph and Daniela Spenser (Durham: Duke UP, 2008), 141 71

James N. Green, We Cannot Remain Silent: Opposition to the Military Dictatorship in the United States (Durham: Duke UP, 2010), 248-253

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allows for a more cohesive narrative that accounts for contingencies beyond diplomatic

concerns. Examining the Administration’s actions during the Falkland War through this critical

lens I seek to construct an inter-American analysis of this brief but consequential conjuncture.