SECURING ENERGY INTERESTS - Wikimedia Commons

Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive

DSpace Repository

Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items

2019-12

SECURING ENERGY INTERESTS: HOW TO

PROTECT ENERGY SECTORS IN BULGARIA

FROM RUSSIAN MANIPULATION

Pombar, Alexander J.

Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School

http://hdl.handle.net/10945/64051

Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE

SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

SECURING ENERGY INTERESTS: HOW TO PROTECT ENERGY SECTORS IN BULGARIA


by

Alexander J. Pombar

December 2019

Thesis Advisor: Kalev I. Sepp Second Reader: Daniel A. Nussbaum

Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE

December 2019 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's thesis

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE SECURING ENERGY INTERESTS: HOW TO PROTECT ENERGY SECTORS IN BULGARIA FROM RUSSIAN MANIPULATION

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

6. AUTHOR(S) Alexander J. Pombar

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A

10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

A 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) The Russian government has manipulated distribution of its non-renewable energy supplies to its advantage and to the detriment of bordering states. NATO and the EU lack the focus to counter this energy threat even among their member states. Bulgaria may be the most vulnerable to Russian influence and, as a member of both organizations, requires greater assistance to break its Russian energy shackles. The research analyzes the history of Georgia and Ukraine, with specific emphasis on the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and the current Ukraine Crisis, to reveal how Russia uses dependence on its petroleum reserves to gain a marked advantage over both states. Next, the research compares the two conflicts to the current energy situation in Bulgaria, delves into similarities and differences, and proposes solutions to NATO and the EU for countering Russian manipulation of non-renewable supplies to Bulgaria. The research finds that, while Russia has not recently been in direct conflict with Bulgaria as it has in Ukraine and Georgia, Bulgaria has tremendous vulnerabilities in its energy sector and requires quick intervention by the EU and NATO to increase its energy security. The stronger Bulgaria’s energy sector, the stronger the EU and NATO's influence will be in the Balkans and throughout Europe.

14. SUBJECT TERMS energy, security, Bulgaria 15. NUMBER OF

PAGES 117 16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified

18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified

19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified

20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU

NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18

i


ii

Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

SECURING ENERGY INTERESTS: HOW TO PROTECT ENERGY SECTORS IN BULGARIA


Alexander J. Pombar Major, United States Army

BA, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 2008

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS (IRREGULAR WARFARE)

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 2019

Approved by: Kalev I. Sepp Advisor

Daniel A. Nussbaum Second Reader

Kalev I. Sepp Chair, Department of Defense Analysis

iii


iv

ABSTRACT

The Russian government has manipulated distribution of its non-renewable

energy supplies to its advantage and to the detriment of bordering states. NATO and the

EU lack the focus to counter this energy threat even among their member states. Bulgaria

may be the most vulnerable to Russian influence and, as a member of both organizations,

requires greater assistance to break its Russian energy shackles. The research analyzes

the history of Georgia and Ukraine, with specific emphasis on the 2008 Russo-Georgian

War and the current Ukraine Crisis, to reveal how Russia uses dependence on its

petroleum reserves to gain a marked advantage over both states. Next, the research

compares the two conflicts to the current energy situation in Bulgaria, delves into

similarities and differences, and proposes solutions to NATO and the EU for countering

Russian manipulation of non-renewable supplies to Bulgaria. The research finds that,

while Russia has not recently been in direct conflict with Bulgaria as it has in Ukraine

and Georgia, Bulgaria has tremendous vulnerabilities in its energy sector and requires

quick intervention by the EU and NATO to increase its energy security. The stronger

Bulgaria’s energy sector, the stronger the EU and NATO’s influence will be in the

Balkans and throughout Europe.

v


vi

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. THE RUSSIAN DILEMMA .................................................................................1 A. PROBLEM .................................................................................................1 B. RESEARCH QUESTION .........................................................................4 C. BACKGROUND ........................................................................................4 D. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................6

1. Strategic Vision ..............................................................................6 2. Russian Hybrid Warfare ...............................................................7 3. Russian Hybrid Warfare in the Balkans .....................................9 4. The European Energy Sector ......................................................10 5. Methodology .................................................................................11

II. GEORGIAN HISTORY AND ENERGY ..........................................................15 A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................15 B. RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN GEOPOLITICAL HISTORY .......................15 C. BUILDUP TO THE RUSSO-GEORGIAN WAR .................................26 D. WAR IN GEORGIA ................................................................................29 E. THE WAR’S AFTERMATH ..................................................................30 F. GEORGIAN ENERGY STRENGTHS AND

VULNERABILITIES ..............................................................................31 G. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................37

III. UKRAINIAN HISTORY AND ENERGY .........................................................39 A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................39 B. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE KIEVAN RUS’ AND THE

COSSACK ................................................................................................39 C. MAZEPA AND THE EXPANSION OF THE RUSSIAN

EMPIRE....................................................................................................44 D. DEVELOPMENT OF THE UKRAINIAN IDENTITY .......................47 E. THE BOLSHEVIKS, WORLD WARS, AND A TASTE OF

INDEPENDENCE....................................................................................49 F. POST-WAR LIFE UNDER THE SOVIETS .........................................55 G. LEAD UP TO WAR.................................................................................58 H. WAR ..........................................................................................................60 I. UKRAINIAN ENERGY STRENGTHS AND

VULNERABILITIES ..............................................................................62 J. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................66

viii

IV. IMPROVING ENERGY SECURITY IN BULGARIA....................................69 A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................69 B. BULGARIAN HISTORY ........................................................................70 C. BULGARIAN ENERGY STRENGTHS AND

VULNERABILITIES ..............................................................................79 D. COMPARISON AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................83

1. Decrease Corruption ....................................................................84 2. Diversifying Supplies ...................................................................85 3. Economic Might ...........................................................................86 4. Ride the Positive European Attitude, Fix the Poor NATO

Perception .....................................................................................86 E. CLOSING REMARKS ............................................................................87

LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................89

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .................................................................................101

ix

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Russian borders and Balkan land disputes. ..................................................3

Figure 2. Russian oil and natural gas pipelines into Europe .......................................6

Figure 3. Access points into Russian territory ..........................................................16

Figure 4. The territory of Lazica (also known as Colchis and Egrisi) and Alans .....18

Figure 5. The Mozdok-Tbilisi gas pipeline ...............................................................28

Figure 6. The Georgian power capacity by type .......................................................33

Figure 7. The Dzuarikau-Tskhinvali gas pipeline .....................................................35

Figure 8. Rus’ Territory and Mongol invasion routes ...............................................40

Figure 9. The Great Northern War Conquests from 1700–1721 ...............................45

Figure 10. Ukraine’s oil and gas regions by concentration of resources ....................63

Figure 11. Bulgarian territory in the 7th century and Bulgarian migration as the Khazars migrated west ...............................................................................71

Figure 12. Bulgarian energy installed capacity ...........................................................80

x


xi

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ESCD Emerging Security Challenges Division EU European Union GW Gigawatt GWh Gigawatt hours HPP Hydropower Plant IBEX Independent Bulgarian Energy Exchange IIESR International Index of Energy Security Risks MW Megawatt NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NDS National Defense Strategy NSS National Security Strategy OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development RES Renewable Energy Source TPES Total primary energy supply TW Terawatt TWh Terawatt hours USD United States dollars USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

xii


xiii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Dr. Kalev Sepp and Dr. Daniel Nussbaum for their steadfast

support during my research, both financially and intellectually, as my advisor and second

reader, respectively. They supported me in all my academic pursuits, and I would have

been lost without them. I would also like to thank Dr. Doug Borer for providing me

feedback and additional ideas while I developed my thesis proposal and thesis outline.

LTC Stephan Bolton, MAJ Ivan Zapryanov, Dr. Arnie Dupuy, Dr. Ryan Maness, Dr. Sidita

Kushi, and Dr. Wolfgang Peters also proved extremely helpful, willing to answer my

questions, and provided insights to refine my research. Most importantly, I want to thank

my wife, Candice, and my children, Grace, Emmelyn, Griffith, and Judah, for supporting

me as I pursued my graduate degree, long days at school, and my demanding Army career.

Thank you all from the bottom of my heart!

xiv


1

I. THE RUSSIAN DILEMMA

A. PROBLEM

The majority of the Balkan countries have historically played East and West against

one another as it benefits their national interests. Since 2004, says Dimitar Bechev in Rival

Power: Russia’s Influence in Southeast Europe, Romania has been a stronger opponent of

Russian expansion and influence. Romania President Trian Basescu ran on a campaign

more opposed to Russia than his predecessors and wanted to lead the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU) efforts to expand the Western alliances

into the Balkans. Additionally, he helped initiate the Community of Democratic Choice, a

pro-Western economic trade initiative that provided an alternative to the Commonwealth

of Independent States trade agreements with Russia.1 Additionally, Romania is one of the

few states not dealing with border disputes or state sovereignty. However, Romania’s state

of affairs is rare among the other Balkan countries, which leaves Romania very isolated as

a source of Western influence in the Balkans. According to Bechev, its neighbor Bulgaria,

maintains a somewhat pro-Russian population, which former President Georgi Parvanov

leveraged during the 2014–2015 presidential race. He repeated common Kremlin anti-

Western arguments stressing the adverse effects of joining the greedy EU and of American

imperialism. Additionally, he created a slogan on the Bulgarian national day displaying

historical gratitude to Bulgaria’s eastern neighbor: “It was not the EU but Russia that

liberated us from the Turkish yoke.”2 While Bulgaria struggles with a population that

shows pro-Russian tendencies, some of the other Balkan states often struggle over border

disputes.

1 Dimitar Bechev, Rival Power: Russia’s Influence in Southeast Europe (London, GB: Yale University

Press, 2017), 100. 2 Bechev, 108–9.

2

Sven Milekic and Maja Zivanovic from the Balkan Insight state that Croatia has a

border dispute with four of its five neighbors. Croatia disputes territorial waters in the Piran

Gulf and over multiple areas along its national borders between it and Slovenia. The

Croatian government has a territorial dispute with Bosnia and Herzegovina at two

locations. With Serbia it disputes large areas along its 325-kilometer border, and even at

two locations along its short border with Montenegro.3 The constant arguing and inability

to compromise provides Russia the opportunity to influence. In Moldova, NATO has

repeatedly insisted that Russia leave the contested area of Transnistria.4 Additionally, in

2008, Russia aided separatists to create the internationally unrecognized provinces of

Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia5 and, similarly, used separatists to help annex

Ukraine’s Crimea in 2014.6 These overt Russian actions further divide and destabilize the

region. Figure 1 shows the increasing vulnerability of the Balkans to Russian influence

wherever interstate and intrastate relations are in a constant state of conflict. Additionally,

the figure shows how Romania can become increasingly isolated if other Balkan states

decide that Western institutions are less favorable, or a threat, to their national security.

3 Sven Milekic and Maja Zivanovic, “Border Disputes Still Bedevil Ex-Yugoslav States,”

BalkanInsight, July 3, 2017, https://balkaninsight.com/2017/07/03/border-disputes-still-bedevil-most-ex-yugoslav-states-07-01-2017-1/.

4 Madalin Necsutu, “NATO Urges Russia to Withdraw Troops from Moldova,” BalkanInsight, July 12, 2018, https://balkaninsight.com/2018/07/12/nato-urges-russia-to-redraw-its-troops-from-moldova-07-12-2018/.

5 CNN Library, “2008 Georgia Russia Conflict Fast Facts,” CNN, accessed February 18, 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/13/world/europe/2008-georgia-russia-conflict/index.html.

6 “Ukraine Crisis: Timeline,” November 13, 2014, sec. Europe, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275.

3

Figure 1. Russian borders and Balkan land disputes.7

The option to stop pursuing accession into NATO and the EU may appear unlikely

for many of these countries. However, since some are incredibly dependent on Russian

non-renewable resources and infrastructure investments, these states could decide against

joining NATO or join NATO and subvert unity in the alliance in concert with Putin’s

desires. NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD) has taken particular

interest in energy security and must seek solutions to facilitate energy independence and

security in the Balkans. If the ESCD creates and implements solutions to energy security

in the Balkans, it ensures current and future allies do not fold under Russian threats to cut

non-renewable energy supplies to their countries. However, if NATO members allow the

growth of Russian energy dependence, many Balkan states may move into Russia’s sphere

of influence and create a comfortable buffer for Russia against the West.

7 “Google Maps,” Google Maps, accessed October 21, 2019,

https://www.google.com/maps/place/Ukraine/@45.2497749,21.8000243,2561462m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m5!3m4!1s0x40d1d9c154700e8f:0x1068488f64010!8m2!3d48.379433!4d31.1655799.

4

B. RESEARCH QUESTION

How can NATO ESCD mitigate energy sector vulnerabilities in the Balkans?

C. BACKGROUND

Since 2017, the United States has been increasingly interested in the Balkans

against Russian hybrid influence and threats. According to Sewell Chan of the New York

Times, Vice President Pence visited Montenegro following its acceptance into the NATO

to affirm the importance the Balkans have in the United States’ strategy to counter Russian

power projection. Pence, in front of a community of Balkan leaders from Montenegro,

Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia,

commended Montenegrin courage to join the Western alliance in the face of Russian

interference, which included a Russian-sponsored coup attempt to halt the acceptance

process.8 Additionally, during his trip around Europe, Pence pledged to assist Kosovo join

NATO and the Serbian government join the EU.9 The gesture of the United States to assist

these small, poor, and often corrupt countries to join NATO and the EU indicates the

amount of risk the United States is willing to accept to gain influence over these countries

and counter Russian influence on Europe’s Balkan front.

NATO should focus significant effort into the Balkan region because it is often

vulnerable to Russian influence. Many of the Balkan states share close ties with Russia

including culture, religion, language, private sector industry. They also rely on Russian oil

and natural gas to meet their energy needs. Therefore, NATO must navigate many of these

issues to contain Russian expansionism into Europe. However, while the Balkans

occasionally overlook some of their historical connections with Russia when it is in their

national interests, their dependence on Russian oil is a near century-and-a-half relationship

that works very effectively in Russia’s favor. In 1873, Russia was a global leader in the oil

8 Sewell Chan, “Mike Pence, in Montenegro, Assures Balkans of U.S. Support,” The New York Times,

December 22, 2017, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/world/europe/pence-montenegro-markovic-nato.html.

9 “Thaci Says Pence Pledges To Support Kosovo’s NATO Bid,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, accessed March 8, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/pence-praises-montenegro-standing-up-russian-pressure/28653934.html.

5

industry and built a significant pipeline system, which continued to expand as the Russian

Empire and the Soviet Union grew into a global power. The Soviet Union extended its

pipelines from the northern Russian, Siberian, and Caucasus crude oil and natural gas fields

into its western satellites, relying on Russian oil for energy.10 Dr. Arnold Dupuy states

that, given the Balkans’ dependence on Russian non-renewable energy resources, the

collapse of the Soviet Union had little effect on the geopolitical importance of Russia and

its petroleum resources. The Russian Federation has continued building its massive

pipeline network in the Balkans and across Europe’s eastern front. Nord Stream, Yamal,

Soyuz, Bratstvo, Trans Balkan, Blue Stream, and the future completion of both the Nord

Stream II and South Stream pipelines display the ever-expanding network of Russian

energy supply into Europe.11

As shown in Figure 2, the majority of these pipelines traverse the Balkans with

most extending into Central and Western Europe. The Federation’s ability to provide

significant non-renewable energy resources into the Balkans and Europe have given Putin

the ability to influence and manipulate policy. From 1990 to 2015, in fifteen separate

instances, Russia restricted non-renewable energy supplies into Eastern and Central

European countries, often occurring during political tensions between Russia and the

affected state.12 As NATO continues to support Balkan countries as they pursue admission

into the alliance, energy remains a critical component of Putin’s manipulation of policy

and his attempt to halt NATO’s growth.

10 Arnold C. Dupuy, “Patterns of Regionalism and Security: Energy as a Transformational Influence in

the Black Sea Region,” April 26, 2016, 113, https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/bitstream/handle/10919/71637/Dupuy_AC_D_2016.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

11 Dupuy, 128. 12 Gabriel Collins, “Russia’s Use of the ‘Energy Weapon’ in Europe,” IN EUROPE, n.d., 3.

6

Figure 2. Russian oil and natural gas pipelines into Europe13

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Strategic Vision

President Donald Trump signed his 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS). The

document renews the nation’s focus on revisionist state competition between the United

States, Russia, and China.14 Concerning Russia, Trump outlines the increased threat of

Russian subversion in European security institutions and his desire to work with the NATO

and EU to improve European military capabilities and economic stability against Russian

manipulation. The former Secretary Defense (Ret.) Jim Mattis refines the details of the

NSS in his National Defense Strategy (NDS), stating that Russia wants to influence nations

along its border to alter international security and economic institutions in its favor.15 He

adds that Russia uses a variety of indirect and direct manipulation, such as corruption,

coercive economic measures, diplomatic subversion, proxies, and threatening conventional

military force as a means to reach its foreign policy objectives. Therefore, to deter further

Russian aggression, NATO must maintain a relevant purpose, capability, and

responsiveness, especially along the NATO periphery. However, neither document

13 “Conscious Uncoupling - European Energy Security,” accessed March 10, 2019,

https://www.economist.com/briefing/2014/04/03/conscious-uncoupling. 14 Donald J Trump, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (Executive Office of

the President, Washington DC, United States, 2017), 25. 15 Jim Mattis, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy,” n.d., 2, 5, and 9.

7

outlines a specific plan for how the United States, NATO, and other organizations or states

can work toward an effective strategy to counter malign Russian influence.

2. Russian Hybrid Warfare

Russia has implemented various forms of influence throughout Europe. According

to Andrew Higgins of the New York Times, in France, the Kremlin built its Holy Trinity

Cathedral along the Seine in a neighborhood of Paris. The location may appear benign.

However, the Kremlin funded the purchase of the land and the costs for the building, which

is located next to the Palais de l’Alma—a palace used to conceal the French presidency’s

most highly guarded secrets. Not only does the enormous religious structure provide

a visual symbol of Russia religious influence and power, but it projects a natural allure

to a growing group of people looking for an institution opposed to globalization,

multiculturalism, and homosexual rights.16

In Georgia and Crimea, the effects of Russian subversion were far more destructive

and intrusive. Russia supported separatists in Georgia to justify military intervention in

South Ossetia and Abkhazia.17 In 2014, Kremlin-backed separatists in Crimea overthrew

local leaders and established a pro-Russian government. President Vladimir Putin

supported the revolution with Russian military aid and signed a bill annexing Crimea into

the Russian Federation.18 All across Europe, Russia uses a wide variety of methods to

manipulate local and national culture, government, grievances, or any other areas of

leverage to advance its goals.

The type of warfare Russia wages is most often call hybrid warfare and remains the

topic of study for government officials and political analysts.

“Hybrid” terminology, including the phrases “hybrid warfare” and “hybrid threats,” remains prevalent in many NATO and national strategies, despite

16 Andrew Higgins, “In Expanding Russian Influence, Faith Combines with Firepower,” The New York

Times, January 20, 2018, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/14/world/europe/russia-orthodox-church.html.

17 C.N.N. Library, “2008 Georgia Russia Conflict Fast Facts,” CNN, accessed February 19, 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/13/world/europe/2008-georgia-russia-conflict/index.html.

18 “Ukraine Crisis: Timeline.”

8

having acquired so many different definitions that the term is effectively useless. When considering Russia, an additional layer of confusion is added by the fact that since 2016, the phrase gibridnaya voyna—the literal translation of “hybrid warfare” from Western discussion—has begun to appear in Russian writing as well. At present, anybody researching hybrid warfare and Russia may thus confirm the false notion that this is also a recognized concept in Russia itself.19

Additionally, many scholars and commentators on Russia’s hybrid warfare describe

it as a type of warfare altogether unique. “Fourth generation warfare,”20 “sharp power,”21

and the “gray zone”22 are phrases commonly used to describe Russian hybrid warfare or

aspects of hybrid warfare—phrases which may give the impression that the type of warfare

of the 21st century is somehow new. Albeit some of the methods to which nations wage

hybrid war are new, many of the concepts and foundations remain the same. The West is

witnessing the development of Russia trying to minimize its weaknesses, promote its

strengths, while simultaneously manipulate NATO’s weaknesses and reduce the

organization’s strengths. Putin is using concepts that have been used by weaker state and

non-state actors for millennia. Some authors provide insightful research regarding the brute

facts of Russian hybrid warfare. However, studies focused on historical uses of hybrid

warfare, how states have countered this type of warfare, and applying solutions to current

Russian hybrid warfare is lacking. Furthermore, the energy sector provides a particularly

significant weakness in Europe and its southeastern flank. Considerable research and

solutions must be found to avoid a degradation in NATO’s relative strength and influence

compared to that of Russia.

19 "Hybrid Conflict: The Roles of Russia, North Korea, and China" (Dutch National Network of Safety

and Security Analysts, May 2018), 5. 20 Thomas X. Hammes, “Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation:” (Fort

Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, January 1, 2005), 1, https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA430089.

21 Christopher Walker Ludwig Shanthi Kalathil, Jessica, “Forget Hearts and Minds,” Foreign Policy (blog), accessed February 18, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/14/forget-hearts-and-minds-sharp-power/.

22 Joseph L Votel et al., “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone,” Joint Forces Quarterly 80, no. 1 (2016): 102.

9

3. Russian Hybrid Warfare in the Balkans

The Balkans have an interesting historical relationship with Russia which has and

should continue to spark the interest the United States and NATO into how Putin leverages

hybrid warfare in the region. Unlike Ukraine, Bulgaria and Romania do not have a

significant Russian population, therefore, beneficial cooperation, rather than coercion, is

more effective in influencing both governments.23 However, as Bechev explains, neither

country is exempt from Russian “infiltration of state institutions, security services,

domestic politics, and economic structures, disinformation, and cyberattacks.”24

Additionally, Bechev continues, while Romania has been a stronger ally to the West,

Bulgaria has traversed the spectrum of support and opposition toward the Russian

Federation. Since both countries are NATO members and border the strategically important

Black Sea, the United States and its NATO allies should strongly consider how to aid some

of their most reliable allies in the region in countering Russian control of the Black Sea.

However, the recommendations on how to combat Russian irregular warfare are hard to

find and what little is available does not define precisely how NATO should deal with

Russia strategically. NATO understands it must prepare and deter hybrid threats and defend

its allies.25 These objectives are not a strategy; but, rather, what their strategy needs to

accomplish. NATO wants to work with Russia but will not cooperate with a regime that

maintains forces in Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova—countries that have not invited or

given consent to station foreign troops within their sovereign borders.26 However, no

solution is offered to maintain the status quo, never mind regain the territory occupied by

Russian forces.

The lack of solutions to the problems facing NATO is especially worrisome

because its primary adversary in the Russian Federation has a single vision and ensures all

23 Bechev, 192–193. 24 Bechev, 193. 25 NATO, “NATO’s Response to Hybrid Threats,” NATO, accessed February 19, 2019,

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_156338.htm. 26 NATO, “Relations with Russia,” NATO, accessed February 19, 2019,

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50090.htm.

10

facets of the government support its vision. To achieve the same level of unity, NATO

would have to reach a consensus among many nations and military forces that each have

their competing interests and agendas. Without a clear strategy and plan of implementation,

it is unlikely that the member states will achieve unity. If Russia decided to reach a level

of violence no longer acceptable to NATO, this could unite the member states to take

aggressive action against the Kremlin. However, based on current trends, Putin will

continue to remain below a threshold of violence and manipulate the international system

without NATO intervention.

4. The European Energy Sector

The European energy sector may be the most vulnerable aspect of security to the

West and an area that could inhibit NATO from gaining influence into the Balkans.

Right now, a dozen European countries rely on Russia for more than 75 percent of their natural gas needs. This makes U.S. Allies and partners vulnerable to having their gas cut off at Moscow’s whim. Vladimir Putin has repeatedly proven his willingness to use Russia’s gas supply as a weapon, having blocked the flow of gas to neighbors in 2006, 2009, 2014, and most recently in March of last year.27

As Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Energy Resources Francis Fannon stated, the

United States is using its liquefied natural gas to lower market prices, increase energy

diversity, increase energy security, and increase competition in the energy market to create

more affordable options for Europeans. Additionally, he warned that Russia is trying to

prevent diversification in the European market to maintain energy dominance and political

coercion when Putin needs it.28 As displayed in the Crimean Crisis, Russia’s ability to

manipulate a sovereign state through energy security is a real threat to the West. And, as

France and Germany continue to support the construction of the Nord Stream 2 project,29

27 “Europe Must Retain Control of Its Energy Security,” U.S. Mission to the European Union, February

8, 2019, https://useu.usmission.gov/europe-must-retain-control-of-its-energy-security/. 28 “Briefing on European Energy Security and the Nord Stream 2,” U.S. Department of State, accessed

March 8, 2019, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/12/287983.htm. 29 Dave Keating, “Why Did France Just Save Nord Stream 2?,” Forbes, accessed March 10, 2019,

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davekeating/2019/02/08/why-did-france-just-save-nord-stream-2/.

11

Russia may cease transiting gas through its Ukrainian pipelines. This move would put

Ukraine in a precarious position since they heavily rely on Russian gas for domestic energy

and the Ukrainian government receives $2-3 billion annually from Russia to transit gas into

Europe.30

Some analysts suspect that Russia’s state-owned energy company, Gazprom, will

not be able to fulfill its domestic and international contracts because of the company

running inefficiently.31 If this becomes a reality, Russian operations against the West’s

energy infrastructure may become more aggressive. Russia will keep its failing energy

supply competitive with Western markets under constant cyber-attack and disenfranchise

populations with information campaigns that create mistrust with democratic institutions.

It is plausible that infrastructure attacks would begin in the very dependent Balkan states

that require Russian energy and injure the West’s ability to maintain those countries as

close allies.

5. Methodology

The United States has become complacent in the decades following the collapse of

the Soviet Union, specifically in the information and cyber domains within the energy

sector, leading to massive security gaps. The research question this study seeks to answer

is: how does the NATO ESCD mitigate energy vulnerabilities in the Balkans? History and

interviews provide the basis for the research completed in this study. History has wide

acceptability and applicability to political and military leaders and can help guide them in

future decisions.

Vicarious experience acquired from the past, even the remote past, gives such guidance to the present that history becomes more than its reward. Knowledge conveys wisdom; ignorance courts trouble. Persons of good sense are bound to study history in sheer self-interest reaching out for

30 Ariel Cohen, “Russia’s Nord Stream II Pipeline Is Ukraine’s Worst Nightmare,” Forbes, accessed

March 10, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2018/06/18/russias-nord-stream-ii-pipeline-is-ukraines-worst-nightmare/.

31 Andreas Heinrich, “Under the Kremlin’s Thumb: Does Increased State Control in the Russian Gas Sector Endanger European Energy Security?,” Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 9 (November 2008): 4, https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130802362292.

12

reference points of likely future relevance and cramming in vicarious experience from each.32

Using the 2008 war in Georgia and the 2014 Crimean Crisis, this study analyzes the

similarities and differences between the means and effects achieved by attacks against

infrastructure behind enemy front lines and the psychological operations that supported

those operations.

While each conflict has different cultural, historical, and strategic contexts, these

conflicts provide similarities in conducting infrastructure attacks. In addition, each

conflict indicates the current cyber and information threats in the Russian “arsenal.”

This study charts those threats, analyzes current Western defenses to those threats, and

identifies defense vulnerabilities or threats against which the West has no protection.

Lastly, the study makes policy recommendations, strategy implementations, or needed

technology reform to enhance the forward defense of Europe and United States’ interests

in the Balkans.

This study uses interviews and the advice from Dr. Daniel Nussbaum, Dr. Arnold

Dupuy, and leadership at the Hybrid Center of Excellence, the Marine Corps University,

the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence, and the Paul Scherrer Institut in

Switzerland. Dr. Nussbaum is a chair of the Naval Postgraduate School’s Energy Academic

Group and advises the Secretary of the Navy’s Executive Energy Education program. He

provides significant insight into Europe’s energy initiatives and how Russia may

manipulate policy in Europe through the energy sector. Dr. Dupuy specializes in Black Sea

security and energy studies. His expertise provides additional insight into Russian power

in the Balkans and how the Federation may influence Balkan states using non-renewable

energy resources.

Furthermore, the additional energy organizations listed employ experts in the

energy field that study energy security throughout Europe and are working on current

projects to help the states across Europe achieve energy independence. Their expertise and

32 Richard E Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers

(Simon and Schuster, 2011), 232.

13

cultural understanding provides the framework of the feasibility and acceptability of any

recommendations this study provides.

By analyzing the current energy sector threats, the study more completely addresses

what NATO has done well to counter Russian influence and what it needs to adjust to

address the threat better. This study provides the NATO Emerging Security Challenges

Division and EU a better understanding of infrastructure vulnerabilities historically in

addition to where and how the alliance can better mitigate weaknesses according to present

security conditions. This study does not develop all aspects of Russian hybrid influence or

threats but presents the Emerging Security Challenges Division with the most efficient and

productive elements of countering Russian manipulation against energy infrastructure.

14


15

II. GEORGIAN HISTORY AND ENERGY

A. INTRODUCTION

Georgia and Russia share a checkered past of political friendship and animosity.

Georgia often relied on Russian protection and resources to maintain its sovereignty and

influence in the Caucasus and Black Sea region. Other times, Russian or Soviet troops

viciously suppressed Georgians. Often officials in Russia used the Caucasian state as a tool

to strengthen Russian influence. Furthermore, Russian leaders have persistently used

kinetic and non-kinetic methods, mainly leveraging ethnic divisions in the regions of South

Ossetia in the north and Abkhazia in the northwest of Georgia, to maintain a buffer between

Russia and the rest of Georgia. Prior to, during, and after the Russo-Georgian War, the

Kremlin used its dominance in Georgia’s energy sector to manipulate Georgia and provide

the Russian government a marked advantage over Georgian authority. While the war lasted

only five days, the impact was enormous. Since the completion of the 2008 conflict, the

Georgian government has reformed domestic policies and energy security strategy to

protect its economy and population from Russian coercion. However, energy weaknesses

remain, and those security risks put the state at higher risk to foreign malignant influence.

B. RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN GEOPOLITICAL HISTORY

Before addressing the Russo-Georgian War, it is important to understand Georgian-

Russian geopolitical history and Georgian persecution under multiple Russian rulers. An

in-depth historical review reveals how the war began and why Abkhazia and South Ossetia

continue to assist Russia in improving their position on the global stage. As shown in

Figure 3, Russia’s adversaries have used multiple gaps along its eastern, southern, and

western borders to invade Russian territory historically. To protect its foreign and domestic

interests, the Soviet Union was able to secure most of the gaps through central control or

alliances.33

33 Peter Zeihan, The Accidental Super Power: The Next Generation of American Preeminence and the Coming Global Disorder (New York, NY: Twelve, 2016), 185.

16

34 “The Accidental Superpower Maps – Peter Zeihan,” accessed July 10, 2019, http://zeihan.com/the-map-room/.

Figure 3. Access points into Russian territory34

17

Given Georgia’s strategic location as a buffer between Russia, Turkey, and Middle

Eastern powers, Russian leaders have consistently manipulated Georgia, Abkhazia, and

South Ossetia for their political advantage. According to Heidi Tagliavini in the

Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Russia views

itself, particularly concerning Georgia, as a historical protector and primary influencer of

modern civilization whereas Georgians take pride in their distinguished culture and history

of independence that dates back to 4th century establishment of the first independent

Georgian Church. This esprit de corps among Georgians along with their national memory

of Russian mistreatment provide the bedrock to tensions between the two states. Georgia

views Russian preeminence as an existential threat while Russia feels exasperated by what

it perceives as ingratitude from a nation who has greatly benefitted from Russian influence,

especially over the past three-hundred years.35 Currently, it appears that Russia wants to

maintain influence in its past Soviet sphere as the Kremlin likens its manipulation of the

area to the United States’ leadership in the Western Hemisphere.36 Therefore, the Kremlin

uses ethnic divisions between Georgians and minorities within the Georgian state to

maintain as much control of Georgian territory as possible. However, it is vitally important

to understand how the often-volatile history between Georgian minorities and ethnic

Georgians began.

Today, the northwest region of Georgia, known as Abkhazia, is home to the

Abkhaz. Centuries ago, around 570 AD, the king of Lazica (the land known today as

Abkhazia), Tsate II, died and passed his power to the ruling class of Abkhazia. The

Abkhazian leaders began hereditary rule and expanded their authority across the region

35 Heidi Tagliavini, “Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia” (Council of the European Union, 2009), 12, http://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG_Volume_I2.pdf.

36 Ryan Maness, Discussion on Russian Hybrid Warfare, May 2, 2019.

18

known as Colchis (Greco-Roman), Lazica (Latin), or Egrisi (Georgian) forming Abkhazia,

displayed in Figure 4.37 The Ossetians, also known as Alanians, are of Iranian decent,

settled in the Alans with the territory eventually splitting into two with North Ossetia

located within Russia and South Ossetia lying in northern Georgia.38

Figure 4. The territory of Lazica (also known as Colchis and Egrisi) and Alans39

37 Donald Rayfield, Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia (London: Reaktion Books, 2012), 50–53. 38 Rayfield, 8. 39 “Lazica,” in Wikipedia, May 8, 2019,

https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Lazica&oldid=896042215.

19

As described by Donald Rayfield in Edge of Empires, early in their history, eastern

Georgian kingdoms and Abkhazia enjoyed a reciprocal relationship. Despite a destructive

war between the Abkhazian kingdom in the west and the Kakhetian kingdom in the east in

the early 800s AD, the two kingdoms aligned together against Bugha the Turk by the

middle of the century. Bugha invaded the region with the intent to utterly destroy Tbilisi,

the capitol city of Georgia, and persecute the Armenian and Iberian Christians. Bugha

achieved significant victories initially, but could not sustain his military ambitions and left

the region for Albania.40 These events led to a unification effort between the Abkhazian

and Georgian kingdoms and, by 1008, the two kingdoms united as the Georgian

Kingdom.41 Their unity lasted until the 15th century when the modern area of Abkhazia

became a suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. Despite significant Ottoman efforts to convert

the Abkhaz to Islam, the princes in the region balanced their religious, cultural, and

political leanings between obligations to the Ottoman Empire and their desire to maintain

a Georgian identity.42 The Abkhaz’s cultural and political ties to Georgia only started to

waver when conflict erupted between the Ottoman Empire and a Georgian-Russian

alliance.43 By the 1800s, many of Abkhaz Muslim rebels, known as makhadjiri,44 began

emigrating from the region to the Ottoman Empire as the Russians took greater control of

the Caucasus with the Russian Caucasian command ordering depopulation of the Abkhaz

in entire districts and replacing them with Christian peoples to include Armenians, Greeks,

Georgians, Estonians, and Poles.45 Only a very small contingent of ethnic Abkhaz

remained in Abkhazia following enforcement of Russian depopulation policies.46

40 Rayfield, Edge of Empires, 59. 41 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation (Indiana University Press, 1988), 32. 42 Emmanuel Karagiannis, Energy and Security in the Caucasus (Routledge, 2013), 74. 43 Alexandros Petersen, “The 1992-93 Georgia-Abkhazia War: A Forgotten Conflict,” Caucasian

Review of International Affairs 2, no. 4 (2008): 12. 44 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Syrian Refugees Grapple with Adapting to Life

in Abkhazia,” Refworld, accessed July 28, 2019, https://www.refworld.org/docid/548ad6b74.html. 45 Georgi M Derluguian, “The Tale of Two Resorts: Abkhazia and Ajaria Before and Since the Soviet

Collapse,” n.d., 266. 46 Petersen, 12.

20

Caught between the Russian and Ottoman empires, Georgia became allies with the

former rather than the latter since Russia offered Georgia independence, even if they only

offered empty promises. According to Ronald Suny in The Making of a Georgian Nation,

in 1783, the Georgian king, Erekle II, agreed to sign the Treaty of Georgievsk—a document

that guaranteed Russia’s recognition of Georgian territory and promised military assistance

if requested. Moscow would control Georgia’s foreign policy decisions.47 The treaty

between Russia and Georgia proved a detriment for Georgians. Rayfield assesses that,

realistically, Russia could not provide timely military assistance with the Caucasian

mountains significantly restricting north to south movement between the two states and

Georgian leaders could not make efficient foreign policy decisions as they waited on long

delays to receive approval from Russian officials. Moreover, the document infuriated many

Georgians since they forfeited some of their rights and autonomy to a foreign country.

However, the king and his advisors felt signing the document was the only option to avoid

Russian invasion.48 Ultimately, the agreement was worthless. As revealed in The Making

of the Georgian Nation, Catherine the Great removed all Russian troops from Georgia in

1787 to fight the Russo-Turkish War and, eight years later, the Iranian khan invaded

Georgia, slaughtered the population, and destroyed critical infrastructure King Erekle II

worked tirelessly to build.49 Not only were the Russians entirely absent during the conflict,

historians believe that Catherine the Great purposely ignored Georgian requests for

assistance, believing it easier to absorb Georgian territory into Russia if war had already

decimated the state.50 This assessment appears to be true since, in 1801, the Russian

government approved eastern Georgian areas as a province of Russia.51 Suny describes

how the Russian administrators over Georgia provided an additional layer of security using

the Russian military, but with the added protection came many strings attached. The

Russians quickly diminished the roles of the Georgian nobles’ prestige, the nobles’ ability

47 Suny, 58. 48 Rayfield, 251. 49 Suny, 59. 50 Rayfield, 256. 51 Suny, 59.

21

to maintain serfdoms, and transitioned their trade into European markets.52 These

contingencies, along with other grievances, quickly led to rebellion.

As Rayfield states, South Ossetia and other Georgian provinces often fought against

one another, but now they agreed that conditions under the Russians were unbearable. The

Russians forced the Ossetians, Georgians, and their livestock into horrific work conditions,

pushed them to exhaustion, failed to feed them, and caused many to die. In 1804, Georgian

and Ossetian rebel leaders recruited 4,000 members and attacked their Russian oppressors.

The uprising was nearly successful, but failed to destroy the Russian troops before

reinforcements arrived. The newly arrived soldiers killed or captured the rebels brave

enough to remain and fight.53

Despite many instances of these centuries of peaceful co-existing and alliance

against common threats, the 20th century brought desires for independence from Georgia

by both in-state ethnic minorities, the Abkhaz and South Ossetians. In his research,

Rayfield found that, in November 1917, Abkhazian leadership established an independent

National Council but invasion by Georgian forces followed seven months later and the

Georgian government regained total control of the territory. In February 1918, South

Ossetia decided to withhold its taxes from the Georgian government.54 Suny describes

how, by June 1918, the Bolsheviks began influencing and organizing armed detachment of

northern Georgians, including the Ossetians, to rebel against the government. The

Georgian government quickly sent troops to respond to the rebellions, which were violently

suppressed and defeated.55 The Georgian government eventually granted partial

autonomous rule to Abkhazia but perceived the Ossetians as a Red Army proxy.56 In 1919,

the Georgian government truly lost credibility and trust between it and the Abkhaz. The

Abkhaz requested military assistance from Georgia to fight the Red Army, but the

52 Suny, 65–69. 53 Rayfield, 263. 54 Rayfield, 324–26. 55 Suny, 197–98. 56 Rayfield, 327.

22

Georgians used the request for assistance to control the Abkhazian government and

violently control the region.57 On the other hand, once the Soviets established their control

in Russia, they offered Abkhazia and South Ossetia more autonomy than either one

received under Georgian rule.

Georgia lost its independence in February 1921 when the Soviet Union brought the

Bolsheviks to power58 and, in the spring, the Soviet government named Abkhazia an

independent Soviet Socialist Republic within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

(USSR). However, under pressure from the Soviets in Georgia, Soviet Union leaders

re-named Abkhazia an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within Georgia in 1931—

a clear demotion of status.59 Petersen found that between 1956 and 1978, Abkhazian

leaders tried three times to sever their relationship with Georgia through the Soviet Union.

However, Soviet leadership avoided that request and, instead, showed preferential

treatment to Abkhazia over Georgia, which exacerbated the ethnic tensions between the

two groups.60 Another contributing factor to anxiety between the Abkhaz and Georgians

came from population growth. By 1989, ethnic Georgians composed 70.1% of the

population and the Abkhaz only 1.8%.61 Specifically in Abkhazia territory, between 1959

and 1989 the percentage of ethnic Georgians increased from 39.1% to 45.7%62 and only

17.8% of the population in the region was of Abkhazian descent.63 While Abkhazian

leaders claimed the population growth was a Georgian scheme to assimilate Abkhazia, the

Georgians claimed the growth was a product of economic necessity.64

57 Rayfield, 332. 58 Rayfield, 338. 59 George Hewitt, “History in the Context of the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict,” Iran and the

Caucasus 18, no. 3 (2014): 308, https://doi.org/10.1163/1573384X-20140305. 60 Petersen, 12–13. 61 Petersen, 11. 62 Evgeny M. Kozhokin, “Georgia-Abkhazia,” in U.S. and Russian Policymaking With Respect to the

Use of Force, ed. Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1996), 75, https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF129/CF-129-chapter5.html.

63 Petersen, 12. 64 Kozhokin, 75.

23

The Abkhazian animosity toward Georgia reached a climax in 1989. According to

Petersen, 30,000 Abkhazian separatists met in Lykhny village, a historically important

location for Abkhazian princes, and signed a declaration demanding restoration of their

1925 constitution, which would upgrade Abkhazia's status back to a Soviet Republic and,

therefore, restore its sovereignty separate from Georgia. Petersen also claims Abkhazian

actions led to massive, Georgian, anti-separatist demonstrations in Tbilisi. However, what

started as anger toward Abkhazian independence eventually transformed into a Georgian

movement promoting succession from the Soviet Union. In April 1989, Soviet soldiers

violently suppressed Georgians during a demonstration that led to the death of nineteen

Georgians, most of whom were women. This event, named the “Tbilisi massacre,” greatly

enhanced the Georgian independence movement. Petersen states that the Georgian

Supreme Soviet released a Soviet dissident leader, Georgians condemned Russian

annexation in 1921, and independence leaders stated that they would refuse to obey any

Soviet law that undermined Georgian interests. Finally, in March 1990, the Georgian

government declared its sovereignty from the USSR and attempted to outlaw regionally

based parties from participating in the newest parliamentary elections in an attempt to

prevent Abkhazia and South Ossetia from gaining power in the new government.65

As described in Edge of Empires, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, an adamant and outspoken

critic of Soviet rule, created an alliance among multiple political groups that became known

as the Round Table. Gamsakhurdia could not brutally force his way into power, but his

followers subversively blocked a railway junction and prevented petrol and cigarettes from

reaching Tbilisi until August 1990. Without these critical resources, the urban population

became irate, ready to storm the offices of the Supreme Soviet. Under this extreme political

pressure, the Georgian Soviet government decided to hold free elections without Soviet

interference. The Round Table won a plurality of seats in the parliament, Gamsakhurdia

became the Supreme Soviet, and the newly elected leaders carried Georgia into greater

autonomy from Soviet control.66

65 Petersen, 15–16. 66 Rayfield, 379.

24

Despite the creation of its Declaration of Independence on April 9, 1991, the Soviet

system had a lasting effect on Georgia and its ability to regain control of Abkhazia and

South Ossetia.67 Stalin purposely created rifts between Georgians, the Abkhaz, and

Ossetians to ensure the USSR maintained manageable republics.68 Presumably, Stalin

created rifts to maintain tension and conflict between smaller regions of the USSR rather

than on the central government. This objective could be why the Soviet government began

the bold Inguri Dam project—a massive hydropower plant with critical infrastructure

located in Georgia and Abkhazia. Additionally, Gamsakhurdia’s domestic policies also

failed to provide an inclusive environment for minority regions: “[he] then did a lot in terms

of nationalism to alienate the two smaller political-territorial entities of Abkhazia and

South Ossetia from the Georgian independence project, proclaiming ethno-centrist slogans

such as ‘Georgia for Georgians’. Nationalism and even chauvinism from all sides together

with questionable political actions added to the tensions.”69 Gamsakhurdia greatly

damaged an already fractured relationship with the Ossetian and Abkhazian minority

groups. Further still, Gamsakhurdia publicly announced plans to negate Abkhazian

sovereignty. The president of Abkhazia, Vladislav Ardzinba, responded by requesting a

Russian airborne assault battalion to deploy to the Abkhazian capital of Sukhumi.70

If these events did not aggravate tensions enough, the early 1990s proved disastrous

for Ossetian-Georgian relations. There was a harsh winter in December 1990, no gas or

electricity was exported into South Ossetia form Georgia, local militias looted food trucks

sent into the region from North Ossetia, the Ossetian president was invited to Tbilisi in

January 1991 and subsequently arrested, and Georgian gangs burned over one-hundred and

ten Ossetian villages.71 While the Ossetians responded in kind by burning Georgian

villages, the ethnic cleansing of Ossetians was extensive with many fleeing either north

67 Tagliavini, 12–13. 68 Martin E. Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (New York: Free

Press, 1994), 442. 69 Tagliavini, 13. 70 Petersen, 16. 71 Rayfield, 379.

25

into Russia or south to the city of Gori in Georgia, which led to South Ossetia losing nearly

half its population.72

According to Petersen, in 1992, Gamsakhurdia was overthrown and, taking

advantage of the political chaos, Ardzinba, the president of Abkhazia, promoted the

Abkhazian separatist cause through nullifying multiple Georgian laws, placing the military

and police under Abkhazian jurisdiction, and creating a special regiment of troops under

the command of the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet. The Abkhaz National Guard attacked the

Ministry of Internal Affairs in Sukhumi as the ministry was the only guardian of Georgian

control in the region. South Ossetians began receiving increased Russian assistance to

include Russian aviation support to attack Georgian villages, which forced the new

Georgian president, Eduard Shevardnadze, to sue for peace with the Abkhaz. However,

soon after signing a ceasefire agreement, Abkhazian officials declared the restoration of

the 1925 constitution reinstating their sovereignty from Georgia and separatists abducted a

high-ranking Georgian delegation and took them into Abkhazia. Petersen asserts that

Georgian officials deployed the National Guard into the region allegedly to rescue the

hostages, but quickly maneuvered tanks into Sukhumi and began firing into the Abkhazian

capital city. An additional 1000 Georgian troops moved into the northwest city of Gagra to

seal the border between Abkhazia and Russia. Despite the surprise attack, Abkhazian

fighters held against Georgian forces and a ceasefire was signed on August 15.73 The peace

lasted a fragile three days before Georgian forces seized the capital, occupied the

parliament, established a military council, and Shevardnadze declared victory.74 However,

the fighting was far from complete. Since the Georgian military failed to secure the Russian

border, resistance fighters crossed into Abkhazia freely with many North Caucasian

fighters joining in the hostilities.

72 Rayfield, 379. 73 Petersen, 17–18. 74 Petersen, 18.

26

Cease-fire talks failed consistently over the following year and continuous conflict

led to the displacement of 200,000 Georgians from Abkhazia to Georgia proper.75

According to Petersen, the Georgian army completely fell apart allowing resistance fighters

to take the port of Poti and block critical supplies from reaching Tbilisi. Shevardnadze was

forced to ask Russia for assistance and, in exchange for that assistance, had to enter the

Commonwealth of Independent States and negotiate basing agreements to allow Russian

troops into Georgia.76 After the conflict in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, one million

Georgians left the country for Ukraine and Russia and a quarter of a million people fled

from the breakaway states into Tbilisi.77 Ethnic tensions remained and hatred between

Georgia and Russia intensified in the 21st century.

C. BUILDUP TO THE RUSSO-GEORGIAN WAR

In the late 1990s, the EU and NATO expanded their partnerships and influence into

some of the formerly Soviet controlled nations of Central and Eastern Europe.78 By 2000,

Russia elected Vladimir Putin as president—a man who believed the dissolution of the

Soviet Union was the greatest disaster of the 20th century and mourned the loss of the

buffer states between Russia and the West.79 Putin despised Shevardnadze for what he

perceived as treacherous behaviors toward Russia.80 According to Rayfield, during the

winter and spring 2003, Russian officials ceased providing gas, electricity, and oil through

lines from their territory into Georgia, at times resulting in explosions occurring along the

lines. Corruption prevented foreign investment, which was particularly devastating since

United States energy companies wanted to invest in Georgian domestic energy sources but

could not justify the benefits compared to the enormous risk. He further noted that

75 Ronald Asmus, A Little War That Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West (St.

Martin’s Press, 2010), 61–62. 76 Petersen, 18-19. 77 Rayfield, 384. 78 Sarah Pruitt, “How a Five-Day War With Georgia Allowed Russia to Reassert Its Military Might,”

HISTORY, accessed July 1, 2019, https://www.history.com/news/russia-georgia-war-military-nato. 79 Pruitt. 80 Rayfield, 391.

27

whenever NATO invited Georgia to join the organization, Russia would provide S-300

missiles to Abkhazia.81 In 2004, Georgians elected a new president, Mikheil Saakashvili.82

Rayfield says Saakashvili maintained a decent relationship with Moscow and promised to

reopen the railway from Abkhazia to Armenia. However, in July 2004, Russian backed

Ossetians kidnapped fifty Georgian police officers who were travelling in South Ossetia.

Saakashvili’s attitude to Russia turned sour. Rayfield adds that Saakashvili demanded the

reduction of Russian troops in South Ossetia and announced his intention to join NATO in

defiance of Russian opposition. Moreover, Saakashvili spoke in support of the Orange

Revolution in Ukraine, which effectively made him Putin’s enemy.83

Tensions continued to rise through 2006. Rayfield discloses that Russian officials

announced that eighty percent of the Abkhaz and South Ossetians had Russian passports

and any Georgian aggression against these minorities would be dealt with harshly. Russian

military demonstrations of force began in the Caucasus and Black Sea, the Georgian

government expelled four Russian spies, and Russia cut gas entirely to Georgia or doubled

the price.84 In 2006, the BBC reported the dire energy situation in Tbilisi:

Part of the freezing Georgian capital, Tbilisi, is now receiving gas again, but many of the city’s residents still lack gas, Georgian officials say. Georgia’s energy woes were compounded by the destruction of a power line... Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili told the BBC the near simultaneous attacks close to Georgia’s border were pre-planned actions orchestrated by Russia…. The electricity transmission line in Russia’s southern region of Karachayevo-Cherkessiya—also near the Georgian border—was brought down by an explosion just hours later… Two explosions occurred on the main branch and a reserve branch of the Mozdok-Tbilisi gas pipeline.85

As shown in Figure 6, the gas pipeline was a critical source of energy for the

Georgian capital since Georgia had not yet built alternative gas pipelines. Furthermore,

81 Rayfield, 391. 82 Pruitt. 83 Rayfield, 394. 84 Rayfield, 396. 85 “Desperate Georgia Gets Some Gas,” BBC News, January 23, 2006,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4638566.stm.

28

Saakashvili rightfully suspected malicious intentions from Moscow since Georgian

government officials received numerous threats from their Russian counterparts that the

Kremlin would punish Georgia if officials did not give pipelines to Russia.86

Figure 5. The Mozdok-Tbilisi gas pipeline87

Rayfield discovered that over the following two years, Georgia increased tax

collection to improve its defense spending and readiness, which reached one billion United

States dollars (USD) by 2008. The Georgians bought ships and armaments from other

countries but lacked aircraft and often had incompatible weaponry. Despite these

disadvantages, Saakashvili was eager to reclaim the minority territories that he felt plagued

stability in Georgia. Yet, simultaneously, Russia was waiting for a reason to increase

86 “Desperate Georgia Gets Some Gas.” 87 “Desperate Georgia Gets Some Gas.”

29

instability in Georgia and prevent its acceptance into NATO.88 The Kremlin created the

conditions for Saakashvili to fall into a trap that would facilitate its foreign policy

objectives.

D. WAR IN GEORGIA

At the end of July 2008, separatists in South Ossetia shelled Georgian villages and,

despite Georgian special envoy visits to Tskhinvali to defuse the situation, Georgian forces

increased along the Abkhazian and South Ossetian border.89 In August 2008, Saakashvili

calculated this time was the best to attack. Putin was attending the Beijing Olympics and

he thought John McCain, a top-ranked presidential candidate, might support Georgian

independence and sovereignty over its entire territory as a part of his political platform,90

and Georgia should receive U.S. support since it had one of five infantry brigades in Iraq

making it the largest non-American contributor to the conflict there.91 Rayfield reports that

the Ossetian militia killed three Georgian soldiers and injured additional police officers,

which gave Saakashvili the justification to attack South Ossetia. On August 6, Georgian

artillery bombarded enemy positions and, on August 8, 16,000 Georgian troops and 150

tanks either took part in the main attack into South Ossetia or provided a deterrent force

outside of Abkhazia.92 However, the Russians appeared to have expected the attack some

days in advance and, in addition to an overwhelming Russian military response by land,

sea, and air, the Kremlin used effective cyberattacks against Georgian financial, banking,

and government computer systems.93

Rayfield asserts that Georgian forces failed to control the Roki tunnel, which

allowed Russian troops and tanks to move freely into Georgia along with Chechen irregular

fighters. Poor Russian communication and effective Georgian anti-aircraft fire helped

88 Rayfield, 397. 89 Asmus, 165. 90 Rayfield, 397. 91 Asmus, 172. 92 Rayfield, 397. 93 Asmus, 166–69.

30

delay defeat, but the Ossetian-Russian forces with their 320 aircraft soundly defeated the

Georgian offensive. Russian forces carefully and systematically destroyed Georgia’s

improved military capabilities (while keeping Russian-owned infrastructure unharmed);

and they continued their movement from South Ossetia into Georgia, captured Gori, and

seized the major road and railway that runs east to west through Georgia.94 On August 10,

Russian-supported Abkhaz attacked Georgian forces in the west and routed them

quickly.95 The United States, Great Britain, and NATO called for a ceasefire and, on

August 12, both sides agreed to stop the conflict.96

E. THE WAR’S AFTERMATH

The five-day conflict caused $35 million in damages to the Georgian energy

infrastructure and greatly diminished the energy security of Georgia; its largest source of

energy production, the Inguri hydropower plant, was split between a separatist state and

Georgia. Today, the Georgian government controls the dam and reservoir, but the turbines

and generators are within Abkhazian territory.97 Rayfield describes that, on August 26,

Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent republics and took over the

economies of both. The conflict ended Georgia’s consideration for acceptance into NATO,

but the United States and the European Union (EU) gave Georgia two billion U.S. dollars

(USD) to rebuild its destroyed infrastructure. He adds that international investors stopped

their development projects out of fear of wasting more money. The most notable project

was the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, which failed to secure funding for two years. However,

despite the risks, Iranians decided to invest in the hurting nation since it was one of few

places they could visit without a visa. According to Rayfield, Georgia began to fix its

dilapidated infrastructure, and the loss of Georgian governance in South Ossetia and

94 Rayfield, 397. 95 Rayfield, 398. 96 Pruitt. 97 Mamuka Tsereteli, “Impact of the Russia-Georgia War on the South Caucasus Transportation

Corridor” (The Jamestown Foundation, 2009), 11, https://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Impact_of_the_Russia-Georgia_War.pdf.

31

Abkhazia helped normalize conditions in politics and daily life.98 However, tensions still

exist between Georgia and Russia over these “independent” regions.

F. GEORGIAN ENERGY STRENGTHS AND VULNERABILITIES

In its 2009 interim report, the World Energy Council reported that in 2007, Georgia

had no bituminous, sub-bituminous, or lignite coal production.99 Georgia only had 35

million barrels of crude oil reserves while only producing 1000 barrels per day,100 and had

eight billion cubic meters in natural gas reserves with no market production.101 Georgia

maintained a 3,152 Megawatt (MW) capacity in hydroelectric power,102 but was in the

process of building an additional fourteen hydropower plants (HPPs) with a capacity of

785 MW.103 In the World Energy Council’s 2016 report, by 2014, Georgia had 201 million

tons in hard coal reserves (hard coal includes anthracite, bituminous, and sub-bituminous

coal), had 700 million tons of hard coal resources, and has a remaining 900 million tons of

hard coal potential.104 Georgia mostly imports oil through Azerbaijan, but does have five

million tons in reserves.105 The report stated that approximately 27,610 kilometers (km)

of natural gas pipelines would be built in Europe between 2015 and 2020, with 71% of the

new pipelines within the borders of Georgia.106 Georgia now produces a net eighty

Terawatt hours (TWh).107

98 Rayfield, 398-99. 99 Pierre Gadonneix et al., “Survey of Energy Resources Interim Update 2009” (World Energy

Council, July 2009), 14. 100 Gadonneix et al., 22-23. 101 Gadonneix et al., 33–34. 102 “Data from the Power System,” Georgian State Electrosystem, 2019,

http://www.gse.com.ge/momkhmareblebistvis/monatsemebi-elektroenergetikuli-sistemidan. 103 Theresa Sabonis-Helf, “The Future of Hydropower in the Country of Georgia,” accessed June 22,

2019, https://www.hydroworld.com/articles/hr/print/volume-36/issue-7/articles/the-future-of-hydropower-in-the-country-of-georgia.html.

104 “World Energy Resources 2016” (World Energy Council, October 2016), 103, https://www.worldenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/World-Energy-Resources-Full-report-2016.10.03.pdf.

105 “World Energy Resources 2016,” 195. 106 “World Energy Resources 2016,” 219. 107 “World Energy Resources 2016,” 368.

32

Adding to its energy diversification, Georgia uses another 193.12 GWh in

geothermal energy108 and has two nuclear power plants under construction.109 Leman

Zeynalova reports that companies from four different countries are investing in the

Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania Interconnector (AGRI), which will transport Azerbaijani gas

through Georgia and to its Black Sea Coast. Georgian gas companies will liquefy the gas

and transport it to Romania for Romania’s domestic use or transportation into other

European markets.110 Furthermore, in 2016, Georgia built and ran its first wind farm, the

20MW Kartli Wind Power Plant, and experts in the industry believe the country has a five

GW wind power potential.111 Figure 7 shows the overall distribution of the Georgian

power system. The inner circle is divided into three portions: the blue is hydropower at

76.9% (3152 MW) of total power capacity; the orange is thermal power at 22.6% (925

MW), and renewables in dark green at .5% (20 MW). The World Bank reported, “Georgia

has introduced rules and regulations that make it easier to do business, and the country’s

international ratings on governance and the investment climate have soared.”112 In 2018,

Georgia received 1.23 billion USD in foreign direct investment with 157.2 million USD

going to the energy sector, the third largest amount of foreign direct investment in a single

sector.113 With wide spread improvement and investment in Georgia only 11 years after

the Russo-Georgian War, Georgia is in a perfect position to secure its energy sector from

Russian influence. However, despite its major efforts to diversify and sever Russian energy

dependence, Georgia still needs significant improvements to the energy sector.

108 “World Energy Resources 2016,” 643. 109 “World Energy Resources 2016,” 989. 110 Leman Zeynalova, “Timeframe for Implementation of AGRI Project Revealed,” Trend, March 8,

2019, https://en.trend.az/business/energy/3030148.html. 111 “Kartli Wind Park Generates over 7m KWh of Electricity in January,” Georgian News, Agenda.ge,

February 1, 2018, http://agenda.ge/en/news/2018/239. 112 “Georgia: From Reformer to Performer,” Systematic Country Diagnostic (World Bank Group,

2018), 14, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/496731525097717444/pdf/GEO-SCD-04-24-04272018.pdf.

113 “Azerbaijan, UK, Netherlands Are Georgia’s Top Investor Countries in 2018,” Agenda.ge, accessed July 28, 2019, http://agenda.ge/en/news/2019/658.

33

Figure 6. The Georgian power capacity by type114

Georgia is heavily dependent on hydroelectric power and, of the 76.9% produced,

the Inguri HPP is 1300 MW115 or approximately 41% of the total hydropower capacity.

The significant reliance on Inguri poses a problem to Georgian energy security especially

since Inguri HPP requires significant repairs. In Abkhazia, the government estimates it

would take 30 to 35 billion rubles to repair the dam116 or approximately 476 million to

555 million USD. According to the United States Agency for International Development

(USAID), the estimated cost to fix the Georgian infrastructure on the Inguri Dam would

cost another 20 million USD and would entail a four-year pre-construction and

construction period,117 which doubtlessly would include power outages to the large swaths

of the population that rely on the Inguri HPP for their electricity. Furthermore, critical

114 “Data from the Power System.” 115 Sabonis-Helf, “The Future of Hydropower in the Country of Georgia.” 116 “Abkhazia, Georgia’s Energy Security at Risk,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, accessed

July 21, 2019, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/abkhazia-georgias-energy-security-risk. 117 Roland Sikharulidze et al., “Enguri 1 HPP Pre-Feasibility Study: Upper Enguri Rivver Basin,”

USAID, September 20, 2012, 19, http://www.energy.gov.ge/projects/pdf/pages/Enguri%201%20Hesi%20710%20geo.pdf.

34

infrastructure of the Inguri HPP lies in both Georgia proper and Abkhazia. Georgian

officials were forced to work with the Russian energy company Inter RAO to negotiate

future operation of the HPP since, as Mamuka Tsereteli states, the Georgian Minister of

Energy had to share control of the HPP after the Russo-Georgian War for two reasons.

First, if the Russians controlled the Abkhazian portion of the HPP, they would help

maintain security against Abkhaz separatists. Secondly, Inter RAO owns two thermal

power generating plants, manages two other HPPs, and owns seventy-five percent of

Telasi—a Tbilisi energy distribution company.118

Georgia has significant potential to diversify and expand its energy sector and

energy security. However, since the end of the Russo-Georgian War, Georgian officials

and energy companies have yet to expand into certain sectors. According to a Klynveld,

Peat, Marwick, Goerdeler (KPMG) Network report on the Georgian energy sector, the state

has twenty-four, unused, annual TWh using hydro resources. Additionally, it has another

108MW in potential solar energy, and 1500MW in wind power.119 While the Georgian

government try to take advantage of this potential, the Kremlin has and will continue to

push the limits of international laws and norms within Georgia.

Russia clearly seeks non-renewable energy dominance throughout Europe. The

Russians, in collaboration with South Ossetians, built the Dzuarikau-Tskhinvali gas

pipeline, which opened on August 26, 2009, the first anniversary of South Ossetian

independence as recognized by Russia.120 Figure 8 shows the location of the pipeline. The

Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs vehemently opposed the pipeline’s construction and

operation without consultation or request through Tbilisi. The Georgian government stated

that the pipeline violated state sovereignty, international rules, and domestic laws.121 The

pipeline made South Ossetia significantly more dependent on Russian non-renewable

118 Tsereteli, “Impact of the Russia-Georgia War on the South Caucasus Transportation Corridor,” 12. 119 “Power Sector Overview: Georgia” (KPMG Network, December 2016), 9–10,

https://home.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/ge/pdf/2017/Georgia%20-%20Power%20Sector%20Overview.pdf. 120 Anna Chichinadze, “Tbilisi Protests Dzuarikau-Tskhinvali Gas Pipeline,” Georgia Today, August

27, 2009, http://old.georgiatoday.ge/news_details.php?id=806&version=. 121 Chichinadze.

35

energy and allowed the Russian government to continue to manipulate the ongoing conflict

for its benefit.

Figure 7. The Dzuarikau-Tskhinvali gas pipeline122

The Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, which runs from the Caspian to the Black Sea in

Azerbaijan and through Georgia, posed a viable alternative to the Russian oil provided by

the Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline and, therefore, risked the Kremlin’s near monopoly on

the European petroleum market.123 Using continued ethnic tension in Georgia, Russian

troops and South Ossetian separatists moved their demarcated border further south just far

enough that the new border included a 1,605-meter portion of Georgia’s oil pipeline.124

122 “Dzuarikau–Tskhinvali Pipeline,” in Wikipedia, February 15, 2019,

https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Dzuarikau%E2%80%93Tskhinvali_pipeline&oldid=883483468 and https://www.google.com/maps/place/Georgia/@41.9262943,44.7678423,7.5z/data=!4m5!3m4!1s0x40440cd7e64f626b:0x4f907964122d4ac2!8m2!3d42.315407!4d43.356892.

123 Karagiannis, Energy and Security in the Caucasus, 85. 124 “Russian Troops Demarcate Georgian Pipeline,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, accessed July 6,

2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-troops-demarcate-georgian-oil-pipeline/27126985.html.

36

Additionally, the new border is only a mile away from a major highway linking the east

and west regions of Georgia.125

As of 2018, Georgia ceased importing Russian natural gas and transitioned to

importing 99.65% of its total gas imports from Azerbaijan.126 The history between Russia

and Georgia, especially when it comes to Russia providing Georgia reliable natural gas

exports, explains why Georgia ceased buying and using Russian gas. However, this

decision greatly compromised its energy security. Azerbaijan has proven a trusted source

of gas, but it now controls close to 100% of Georgia’s total gas imports—gas being 43%

of Georgia’s total primary energy supply (TPES) in 2015.127 Additionally, the reliance on

Azerbaijan in the gas sector is alarming since Azerbaijan and Georgia have had border

disputes, which have led to minor conflicts.128 In 2016, experts discovered 3.8 billion

cubic meters of natural gas reserves in Georgia, which could provide a convenient

alternative to complete dependence on Azerbaijan.129 However, the reserves remain

virtually untapped and Georgia is in great need of more and updated gas storage

facilities.130 Moreover, Georgia acts as a transitory state for natural gas from Azerbaijan

to Turkey and relies on the income gas transit brings. Georgia has protected its pipelines

well, but can do little to assist when pipelines are targeted outside its borders. Kurdish

insurgents attacked the BTC pipeline four times since 2008. The first attack occurred in

125 George Mchedlishvili, “What’s behind Russia’s Actions in Georgia?,” August 10, 2015, sec.

Europe, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33675488. 126 Vasili Rukhadze, “Azerbaijan Becomes Monopoly Supplier of Natural Gas to Georgia,”

Jamestown, accessed July 15, 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/azerbaijan-becomes-monopoly-supplier-natural-gas-georgia/.

127 “Georgia Energy Factsheet,” International Energy Agency, 2017, 1, https://www.eu4energy.iea.org/Documents/Georgia-Final-HD.pdf.

128 Rukhadze, “Azerbaijan Becomes Monopoly Supplier of Natural Gas to Georgia.” 129 “Huge Natural Gas Reserves Discovered in Eastern Georgia,” Georgian Journal, accessed June 21,

2019, https://www.georgianjournal.ge/business/32160-huge-natural-gas-reserves-discovered-in-eastern-georgia.html.

130 Margarita Antidze, “Georgia to Build Natural Gas Storage, Coal-Fired Power Plant,” Reuters, November 29, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/georgia-energy-idUSL8N1NZ4WS.

37

August 2008, right before the Russo-Georgian War, and caused massive losses in

revenue.131 Another attack occurred in 2012 and two more in 2015.132

G. CONCLUSION

The long and disruptive relationship between Russia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and

Georgia have put Georgia at a massive disadvantage. Constant conflict between the

breakaway regions and Georgia, with the Kremlin antagonizing the rifts between them, has

led to Putin’s ability to cause security issues within the energy sector. While Georgia has

adjusted to the geopolitical environment and improved its energy diversification, the

Georgian government still relies heavily on very few non-renewable and renewable energy

resources and facilities to supply energy to large portions of its population. As previously

stated, Georgia receives nearly all of its gas from Azerbaijan. Additionally, as a transit

corridor for gas and oil, Georgia relies on income from transporting gas and oil through its

borders from Azerbaijan to Turkey, but has little control over the safety and security of the

pipelines outside its borders. The Inguri HPP provides significant amounts of electricity to

the population, but is in need of significant repair and has facilities in the separatist region

of Abkhazia. However, Georgia has developed business and investment-friendly

environments that encourage significant foreign investment that is showing signs of

improving its energy security long term. Georgia has made significant strides over the past

decade, but Georgia must prioritize the continued development of the energy sector and

avoid heavy reliance on any particular ally or facility providing massive amounts of energy

to the Georgian population. Georgia provides an excellent example of what a government

can do immediately following conflict where Russia used non-renewable energy as a

means to manipulate Georgia for its own malign intentions. Additionally, Georgia shows

the potential for military options to protect energy interests against Russia’s hybrid warfare.

131 “Turkey: Implications of a Blast on the BTC Pipeline,” Stratfor, accessed July 21, 2019,

https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/turkey-implications-blast-btc-pipeline. 132 “PKK Terrorists Attack Pipeline in Turkey’s Northeastern Kars Province,” DailySabah, accessed

July 21, 2019, https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/2015/08/24/pkk-terrorists-attack-pipeline-in-turkeys-northeastern-kars-province.

38


39

III. UKRAINIAN HISTORY AND ENERGY

A. INTRODUCTION

Russia and Ukraine share a deeply intertwined history. Since Ukrainian

independence, however, the two nations have been at odds. Adding to the complexity of

the conflict is the fact that many of the people in Ukraine are ethnically Russian, and the

two states share many similarities in culture and religion. Another layer of difficulty comes

from Russia’s contemporary reliance on Ukraine as a transit corridor for its petroleum

resources. However, as the Italians circumvented trade routes through Kiev, Ukraine’s

capital, to the Byzantine Empire, Asia Minor, and the Middle East in the 13th century,133

Russia now seeks to bypass Ukraine and provide Europe its petroleum needs through the

Baltic States or the Baltic Sea.

B. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE KIEVAN RUS’ AND THE COSSACK

The original settlers of Kiev, the current capital of Ukraine, found it to be an

excellent location. As Orest Subtelny discusses in his book Ukraine: A History, near the

Dnieper River, the settlers discovered they could control trade from the Baltic Sea to the

north down to the Mediterranean Sea in the south with central control of trade managed

by a political entity known as the Kievan Rus’.134 Between the 10th and 12th centuries,

Kiev experienced excellent economic, religious, and cultural growth that made its leaders

rich and ambitious, acquiring lands surrounding Kiev that became known as the Ruskaia

zemlia or lands of Rus’. However, by the 13th century, infighting between rulers of the

lands of Rus’ and the loss of its two largest trading partners, Constantinople and

Baghdad, facilitated its final downfall when the Mongols seized the city in 1240 AD.135

Figure 9 displays the territory of the lands of Rus’ with the Mongol invasions.

133 Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, 2nd Edition (University of Toronto Press, 1994), 38. 134 Subtelny provides this origin of the term "Rus'", but, as mentioned by Paul R Magocsi in A History

of Ukraine (pp. 52–54), the debate as to the origins of the word is still widely up for debate. 135 Subtelny, 25–41.

40

Figure 8. Rus’ Territory and Mongol invasion routes136

According to Paul Robert Magocsi in A History of Ukraine, following the fall of

the Kievan Rus’ entity, Lithuania rose in power and, by the 1330s, established a prince in

Kiev under the supervision of a Golden Horde official. However, the northeast Rus’

principality of Rostov-Suzdal (also known as Vladimir-Suzdal) developed into the

Muscovy grand duchy and its leaders claimed patrimonial and ancestral rights to Kiev.137

Beginning in the late 14th and early 15th centuries, Polish leaders began spreading the idea

that Lithuanian and Kievan Rus’ lands were their ancient patrimony. By 1447, Poland and

Lithuania united under one ruler, but with Lithuania maintaining its independence.138 The

Lithuanians allowed orthodox Rus’ under their rule to maintain hereditary princes, but in

the 15th and 16th centuries, Lithuania’s central government in Vilnius disbanded local rule

and emplaced limited-term appointees. This action, along with occasional discrimination

against orthodox practitioners and leaders, led to the emigration of the Rus’ to Muscovy,

136 “Is There a Map of Kievan Rus’ with the Complete Boundaries of Modern Belarus, Russia, and

Ukraine? - Quora,” accessed July 29, 2019, https://www.quora.com/Is-there-a-map-of-Kievan-Rus%E2%80%99-with-the-complete-boundaries-of-modern-Belarus-Russia-and-Ukraine.

137 Magocsi, 129. 138 Magocsi, 133.

41

giving the Muscovites more substantive ancestral claims to Kiev.139 A statement from the

Muscovite government to Aleksander Jagiellonczyk, the Polish-Lithuanian ruler in the

1500s, explains its grievance:

It is well known to our son-in-law, the King and Grand Prince Aleksander, that all the Russian land, according to God’s will, is our patrimony and from our ancestors and since antiquity… and not only those cities and provinces that are now in our possession are our patrimony, [but] the whole Russian land, Kiev and Smolensk and other cities that he holds in the Lithuanian land, according to God’s will is our patrimony from our ancestors and since antiquity.140

Despite its pleas, by the mid-1500s, Lithuania, southeastern and southern Kievan Rus’

lands where absorbed by the Polish Kingdom.141

According to Geoffrey Hosking in Russia: People and Empire, 1512–1917, during

these pleas to Lithuania for the return of Kievan lands to the Muscovy Duchy, Ivan III and

his son, Vasili III, continued to expand the duchy, establishing a rudimentary bureaucracy

to manage the new lands and people they conquered. These two rulers started occasionally

using the term Tsar (meaning Caesar or Emperor). In 1547, Ivan VI received a coronation

as Tsar of the growing Russian Empire.142

As the Muscovite grand duchy developed, the Ottoman Empire came to power and

threatened the Ukrainian steppes. As described by Magocsi, the Golden Horde ruled the

Crimea until the Mongolo-Tatar Empire began to fracture, creating multiple smaller

khanates. The Crimean Khanate, specifically the Nogay tribes, found lucrative business

with the Ottomans in the slave markets. In addition, the tribes could prey upon the

unsuspecting villagers in the southern and southwestern borderlands, or Ukraine, of

Lithuania-Poland. Opposing Nogay raiders, the “Ukrainians” developed a frontier

mentality and developed advanced self-defense capabilities. Their skills in fighting helped

139 Magocsi, 134. 140 Jaroslaw Pelenski, “The Origins of the Official Muscovite Claims to the Kievan Inheritance,”

Harvard Ukrainian Studies Vol. 1, no. Issue 1 (1977): 49–50. 141 Magocsi, 136–37. 142 Geoffrey A Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917, Harvard University Press, 1997, 46–

47.

42

them develop offensive mentalities and soon they raided the Nogay raiders and Tartar trade

caravans. These proficient fighters became known as Cossacks and served as the main

defense forces on the frontier, hired and paid by Lithuanian officials. While the Cossacks

subjugated themselves to the Polish king and their respective magnate employers, their

excellence in fighting, often in austere conditions, permeated their culture of seeking

independence and, in the 16th century, they developed a political and military identity that

often changed allegiances with powers in Europe and the Balkans.143

According to Magocsi, the Cossacks became a convenient solution for the Poles to

fight the Ottomans, initiating a strange conflict cycle between Poland, the Ottomans, and

the Cossacks. Since the Cossacks became its own political and military entity, the Poles

would hire them to fight their battles making it harder for their foe to find Poland culpable.

However, the Ottomans consistently held the Polish government responsible for any

Cossack attacks in their empire. Therefore, the Ottomans would invade Poland. Once the

Ottomans invaded, the Polish would rescind their orders to the Cossacks and halt Cossacks

attacks against the Ottomans. However, the Cossacks would occasionally continue raids

against the Ottomans, forcing Poland to use military force to enforce their orders. The

Cossacks would respond to Polish military force by invading Poland. Eventually, each side

would find peace and return to their respective territories. The cycle would then repeat.

However, the Cossacks believed that, eventually, the Poles would increase Cossack

liberties given their unwavering devotion to the king and fighting Polish wars. The Poles

not only failed to provide those greater liberties, but also regularly sent Polish military

expeditions against the Cossacks. These events facilitated the Cossacks’ resentment toward

the Poles.144

143 Magocsi, 173–82. 144 Magocsi, 185–86.

43

Hatred of the Poles led to Cossack revolutions in 1637 and 1638, but culminated

with the 1648 Cossack uprising led by Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi, a man the Polish suspected

of participating in the 1638 revolution. As discovered by Subtelny, in 1646 a local Polish

rival leader seized Khmel’nyts’kyi’s moveable property from his estate and beat his son

(who died shortly after), causing enough trauma to Khmel’nyts’kyi’s wife that she died the

same year. Khmel’nyts’kyi’ was able to motivate the Cossacks against the Poles and was

elected the senior military leader for the Cossack force. He secured an alliance with the

Crimean Tartars and, by May 1648, had one two decisive battles against Polish forces and,

on May 16, the Polish king died. These events motivated additional Cossack uprisings

against local Polish rulers and any organization or person that suppressed their ability to

practice Eastern Orthodox Christianity. Following his victories, Khmel’nyts’kyi’ sent

modest demands to Warsaw since all he wanted was justice for his estate and family. The

Polish Diet was happy to oblige. Unfortunately, what started as a personal vendetta turned

into something more significant. Other Cossack leaders continued the fight against Polish

political and religious leaders while also persecuting local Jewish populations. When the

Poles responded to the continued uprising, Khmel’nyts’kyi’ decided to continue his

conquest west. He moved to the city of Zamosc, but stopped and sent more bold demands

to Warsaw. The Polish king said, like many kings before him, that he would try to fulfill

the demands. For reasons unknown, Khmel’nyts’kyi’ returned to Kiev and a hero’s

welcome and vowed to free the Cossacks from Polish rule. However, over the next five

years, he was unable to win a decisive bout with the Polish; he received little help from the

Tartars, and never gained traction in securing allies in Lithuania, Moldavia, the Ottomans

or Transylvania. Therefore, he felt he only had one other option: to ally with Muscovy.145

145 Subtelny, 126–34.

44

In 1654, Khmel’nyts’kyi’ negotiated with Muscovy ambassadors, ending in an

alliance and the signing of the Perieaslav accords. The Cossacks had to swear allegiance to

the tsar, but received many rights in return, including independent Cossack court system,

the army and urban centers would elect their own leaders, the tsar would provide the

Cossacks military supplies, and the Orthodox Church in Poland-Lithuania would be under

the protection of the patriarch in Moscow. The tsar’s actions advanced his control over

historical Kievan lands and he changed his title from Tsar of All Rus’ to Tsar of All Great

and Little Rus’146

C. MAZEPA AND THE EXPANSION OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

Over the following half a century, foreign invasion and civil unrest ravaged

Ukrainian territory, as it was often the battlefield between the regional powers of Poland,

Muscovy, and the Ottoman Empire.147 However, the Great Northern War in the early

1700s opened opportunities for one of the Ukrainian rulers, Ivan Mazepa. According to

Magocsi, Charles XII’s Sweden was the dominate power and, with Peter’s I desire to

develop Saint Petersburg, Muscovy needed to expel the Swedes from the eastern coast of

the Baltic. Peter I secured Poland’s and Denmark’s support and controlled Mazepa’s

troops located in Muscovy’s eastern portion of Ukraine. Charles XII subdued Danish and

Muscovite forces in the early years of the war (as shown in Figure 10), moved to and

seized Warsaw and Cracow, and established a pro-Swedish king in Poland, King

Stanislaw.

146 Magocsi, 213. 147 Magocsi, 228.

45

Figure 9. The Great Northern War Conquests from 1700–1721148

Charles’ actions divided the Polish population into those who supported Stanislaw

and those who backed the previous king, King August of Saxony. Peter panicked at the

young king’s successes and requested Mazepa to maneuver into the Ukrainian Right Bank

(the western, Polish areas of Ukraine), cross into Poland, and support anti-Swedish forces.

148 “Great Northern War,” in Wikipedia, July 9, 2019,

https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Great_Northern_War&oldid=905548234.

46

In 1705 and 1706 AD, Mazepa wrested control of the Right Bank from the regional ruler

and united most of Ukrainian lands (with the southern areas still under Crimean Tartar

control). Yet, once Mazepa controlled both east and west Ukraine, his loyalties began to

shift. As it increasingly became apparent that Sweden was likely to win the war, Mazepa

and the Swedes began secret negotiations to decide if he would support Charles XII’s

military conquests. Additionally, Mazepa was not appreciative of Muscovy rule. Muscovy

military conquest and the dangerous environment of Saint Petersburg had cost the lives of

many Cossacks, not to mention the sweeping complaints from Ukrainian peasants

concerning abusive behavior by Muscovite troops in Ukraine. Mazepa’s allegiance to

Muscovy approached a critical juncture in 1708. As Stanislaw’s troops prepared to attack

Left Bank Ukraine, Mazepa contacted Peter for military assistance. It was to no avail. Peter

stated he did not have any military forces he could spare, which was to say he could not

save Ukrainian forces from assured destruction. This decision to break a critical agreement

in the Pereiaslav accords, in conjunction with all of Mazepa’s complaints against Muscovy

rule, led Mazepa to join Charles XII.149

Peter was stunned at Mazepa’s defection and quickly invaded the Left Bank, sacked

and razed the capital.150 When Swedish and Muscovite forces finally met on the Left Bank,

the tsar gained a crushing victory, capturing most of the Swedish leadership, although,

Charles the XII and Mazepa escaped to the Ottoman Empire. This battle led to the

precipitous decline in Swedish power and the growth of Peter’s and the Russian Empire’s

power in Europe. By the late 18th century, Catherine the Great absorbed the eastern regions

of Ukraine under the Russian Empire, eliminated all aspects of Cossack autonomous rule,

and centralized governmental organizations and decision-making under Saint Petersburg’s

control.151 By 1795, Poland was eliminated from the European map152 with Russian

acquiring most Poland’s territories in western Ukraine, and, with the decline of the

149 Magocsi, 243–47. 150 Subtelny, 164. 151 Magocsi, 276. 152 Glenn E. Curtis, Poland: A Country Study (Washington: US Library of Congress, 1992),

http://countrystudies.us/poland/11.htm.

47

Ottoman Empire’s control, gained control of Crimea. The only Kievan lands not under

Russian rule were the western areas of Galacia, Belz, Bukovina, and Transcarpathia —

lands ruled by the Austrian Empire.153

D. DEVELOPMENT OF THE UKRAINIAN IDENTITY

In an effort to curb the growth of Ukrainian identity, the Russian Federation

inadvertently developed policies that helped ethnic Ukrainians learn their heritage, culture,

and history. The first policy was the Charter of the Nobility of 1785. The charter allowed

Cossack nobility to retain their elite status under Russian rule,154 but they had to submit a

well-researched justification for their status.155

In order to prove their general premise that the whole Cossack starshyna [or nobility] was the equivalent of the Russian nobility (dvorianstvo), or to justify the merits of specific requests that certain individual Cossacks were indeed of noble status according to local ‘Little Russian’ conditions, the supplicants were forced to examine a host of treaties between Ukrainian hetmans and Muscovite tsars, charters with Polish kings and Lithuanian princes, and other documents including chronicles, historical and familial memoirs, genealogies, and descriptions of local traditions.156

Another policy was the need to establish Ukrainian universities to train and develop

imperial bureaucrats. The first two universities were built in Kharkiv and Kiev. At Kharkiv

University, founded by a local philanthropist, instructors taught in western languages such

as Latin, French, and German. Many of the professors came from countries speaking those

languages and, naturally, brought with them the ideology burgeoning in the west at the

time: nationalism. The University of Saint Vladimir in Kiev started as a Russian

government project to suppress Polish leanings and russify the population. However,

through the two universities, students learned and developed detailed Russian and

Ukrainian history. Initially, the Russian government did not envision a problem with

153 Magocsi, 301–2. 154 Magocsi, 355–56. 155 Taras Koznarsky, “Izmail Sreznevsky’s Zaporozhian Antiquity as a Memory Project,” Eighteenth-

Century Studies Vol. 35, Issue no. 1 (2001): 92, https://doi.org/10.1353/ecs.2001.0062. 156 Magocsi, 356.

48

students learning the history of Ukraine since, as they perceived, it was an integral part of

Russian history. However, the histories exposed Ukrainian students to the (mostly) liberal

societies of the Cossacks and increasingly delineated Ukrainian and Russian history, even

at times highlighting the negative aspects of Ukrainian life under Russian rule. The newly

published histories of Ukraine inspired a generation of Ukrainian nationalists.157

The Ukrainian nationalists experienced the ebbs and flows of building a movement

under strict, centralized government control from the late 1700s to the early 1900s.

However, by 1900, Ukrainian nationalist groups established illegal and small political

movements disguised as cultural groups.158 Magocsi explains, by 1905, following Tsar

Nicholas’ II failed campaign in the Russo-Japanese War and during the revolution of 1905,

the Tsar felt he had no choice but to ease censorship of Ukrainian nationalists, leading to

the beginning of Ukrainian newspapers, establishment of political parties, and Ukrainian

nationalist party representation in the short-lived Dumas. Unfortunately, after Nicholas

regained control of the population, the Tsar’s “democratic” leanings ended and now the

Ukrainian nationalists were exposed. Several members of the nationalist party were

arrested, forcing the organizations back underground or into exile. Despite the massive

setback and the near dissolution of all nationalist sentiment in eastern Ukraine, the

movement grew and prospered among the Ukrainians in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.159

Western Ukrainians enhanced their national identity while under the Austro-

Hungarian Empire. As previously mentioned, after the complete partition of Poland and

the declining power of the Ottomans in 1795, the Austrian Empire acquired Kievan lands

in the northwest areas of Ukraine. While these Ukrainians advanced slightly in nationalist

feelings prior to 1848, the revolution in the Austrian Empire in 1848 greatly enhanced

Ukrainian identity across all Kievan areas under Austrian rule. While Ukrainians in Galatia

evolved the most, all Ukrainians had the ability to join political organizations, gained

recognition of the Ukrainian language in culture, literature, news, and education,

157 Magocsi, 358–61. 158 Magocsi, 357–78. 159 Magocsi, 380–82.

49

emancipation from serfdom, and even created military units in Galatia loyal to the

Habsburg king. The Galatian-Ukrainian experience was the polar opposite to their

Ukrainian counterparts under Russian rule.160 According to Subtelny, by the 1890s and

leading to 1914, the Ukrainians in the Austrian Empire were, in some cases, able to

negotiate between their Austrian leaders and local Poles to create political parties and elect

their own representatives in the government. However, the political changes in favor of

Ukrainians often came after violent protests where Ukrainian peasants were killed,

maimed, or arrested. Ukrainians from Russia that travelled to Austria were amazed at the

progress their comrades had made under Western rule. Western Ukrainians remained poor

and illiterate, but nationalism survived and impressed those from Russia. Unfortunately,

these conditions would change drastically as the major powers in Europe prepared and

declared war.161

E. THE BOLSHEVIKS, WORLD WARS, AND A TASTE OF INDEPENDENCE

World War I, among other events, halted the moves toward Ukrainian

independence. World War I had a Balkan front where the Galatian and Bukovinan

Ukrainian territories in Austria changed rulers multiple times as Russian forces attempted

to control the region.162 Once Austria regained these territories and reestablished

governance, the Ukrainian outcry for independence grew stronger. However, officials in

Vienna procrastinated in creating policies to address their grievances. Conversely, under

Russian rule, Ukrainians found an opportunity to seek independence as the Tsar struggled

to combat two Russian revolutions in 1917.163

The first Russian Revolution of 1917 ended with the dissolution of the monarchical

system of government and the Duma ushered in the Provincial Government that planned

160 Magocsi, 416. 161 Subtelny, 330–35. 162 “Ukraine In World War I (1914-1917),” accessed August 20, 2019, https://geomap.com.ua/en-

uh10/260.html. 163 Magocsi, 463–70.

50

to establish a parliamentary democracy.164 Magocsi says that, as the Provincial

Government focused their limited efforts and resources in St. Petersburg, Ukrainians

underwent a three-phase process of revolution: the Central Rada, the Hetmanate, and the

Directory; civil war; and Bolsheviks. The Central Rada consisted of up to nine hundred

representatives from leftist progressive, soviet, and democratic socialist organizations and

political parties. Since the 900 members met infrequently, the Central Rada created a Little

Rada with only 60 members that met to write and enact policy for the state and, in June

1917, selected a General Secretariat, a cabinet composed of eight to fourteen ministers.

The main purpose behind the Central Rada was to represent the vast majority of the

Ukrainian region and people, no matter a person’s ethnicity or background. One of the first

policies discussed and passed was a resolution to separate the nine “Ukrainian” provinces

from Russian governance and make the provinces a special administrative area, which

would remain autonomous while remaining within the territorial boundaries of Russia.

Additionally, the resolution called for Ukrainian school systems and a Ukrainian army. The

Provisional Government avoided a direct response to the resolution and nationalism spread

rapidly among Ukrainians including those serving in the Russian military.

The First Ukrainian Military Congress met and supported the establishment and

expansion of Ukrainian national units and recognized the Rada as the leading political body

of an autonomous Ukraine. Surprisingly, the Provisional Government showed little

concern over Ukrainian actions. The Rada began calling on the population to pay a special

tax to the Ukrainian government to support its cause and, without Provisional Government

approval, declared itself autonomous. The news of the declaration confounded the

Provisional Government and caused them to send a delegation to Kiev immediately. The

two nation’s agreed that the Rada would make no further demands for autonomy until after

the first meeting of the Russian constituent assembly, but the General Secretariat could

continue to govern under instructions from St. Petersburg. However, the agreement

changed the reality of governance in Ukraine insignificantly because the Provisional

164 Subtelny, 344–45.

51

Government struggled to control another revolution from April 1917 to November 1917:

the Bolshevik Revolution.165

While the Bolshevik movement quickly gained support in Russia, the Ukrainian

government resisted the transition of power. The uprising, under Lenin’s leadership, spoke

to the grievances of the proletariat and worked through the local Russian soviets, groups

that each had its own military units known as the Red Guards. By November 7, 1917, the

Bolsheviks abolished the Provisional Government and seized control. The Central Rada

denounced the coup in Saint Petersburg, but quickly enacted drastic socialist programs to

consolidate power and protect its political influence from a Bolshevik, soviet movement in

Russia.166 Additionally, Subtelny says that for the first time, the Rada declared the nine

provinces of Ukraine (which did not include the Crimea) the Ukrainian National Republic.

Showing its displeasure in the change of leadership in Russia, the Central Rada declared

that one of its goals was “to work for the creations of a ‘federation of free and equal

peoples’ in the former Russian Empire.”167 However, the Rada’s ability to maintain

allegiance with Ukrainian Bolsheviks lasted for a short time and, as the Rada controlled

most of Ukraine, the Bolsheviks established their own Soviet Ukrainian government in

Kharkiv with members of the soviet, industrial workers of eastern Ukraine.

To aid their Soviet brothers in Ukraine, the Russian Bolsheviks sent an army to

Kharkiv, which seized Kiev. The Ukrainian National Republic moved west to avoid the

onslaught and quickly travelled to meet with Germany and Austria. All three countries

agreed on an alliance. Ukraine needed their support to counter Bolshevik aggression.

Germany and Austria needed the natural resources from Ukraine.168 Each signed the

Treaty of Brest-Litovsk leading to Lenin’s recognition of the treaty. Lenin could no longer

afford to continue fighting against Germany and Austria in World War I especially as

Finland, Poland, and the Baltic states declared or were about to declare independence. He

165 Magocsi, 470–77. 166 Magocsi, 477–79. 167 Subtelny, 350. 168 Subtelny, 350–53.

52

needed to consolidate power and take control of Soviet territories. Lenin agreed to remove

all Soviet troops from the independent territories of Ukraine. Despite the promise,

Bolsheviks continued to fight in Ukraine and, although the Germans and Ukrainians took

back Kiev, the country was largely split between Kiev and Kharkiv governments.

Moreover, the revolution had taken a large toll against the peasants. With the Treaty of

Brest-Litovsk, the Ukrainian National Republic had to supply the Germans with food and

raw resources. However, its displeased peasantry was hardly able to survive, much less

support a foreign government. The Ukrainians failure to support Germany allowed the

German government, with the help of Austria, to establish its own Hetmanate government

in Kiev and discard the Central Rada.169

The period of the Hetmanate under German and Austrian supervision lasted less

than eight months. Ukrainian support for the government continued to deteriorate and

wartime production lagged behind expectations. Moreover, Ukrainian peasants chafed

under the new government confiscating their crops, giving land to rich landowners, and the

military abuses committed in their villages. As it became clearer that the Entente would

win World War I, the Ukrainian Hetmanate, despite receiving German military support,

sought an alliance with and support from the Entente. Rebellions across Ukraine made

foodstuff collection nearly impossible. An opposition group formed in Ukraine created its

own government known as the Directory and vowed to take Kiev by force. Hetmanate and

German forces protected Kiev as Directory troops tried to seize the city but, once Germany

signed an armistice with the Entente and their troops began the journey home, the

Hetmanate collapsed and the Directory reinstituted the Ukrainian National Republic

again.170 However, the Directory did not bring stability between the new government and

the Bolsheviks. The Ukrainian National Republic experienced near constant political chaos

as this concluding phase of Ukrainian revolution ended in October 1920. Ukraine

experienced invasions by the Bolsheviks, White Russians, the Entente, and Poland while

169 Magocsi, 482–87. 170 Subtelny, 355–59.

53

peasants and anarchists controlled the rural areas.171 Even the Crimea could not avoid

chaos and, while it experienced fewer invaders, leadership changed between the nationalist

Tartars, the White Russians, and ended with the Bolsheviks. By 1921, The Crimea,172

Eastern, and Central Ukraine became Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics,173 Eastern

Galicia was under Polish control,174 Romania controlled northern Bukovina, and

Transcarpathia was governed by Czechoslovakia.175

Most of Ukrainian territories became a Socialist Republic under the USSR in 1921.

The first constitution from Moscow allowed the Ukrainian SSR to maintain some

autonomy (mostly culturally-related functions). Nevertheless, as Moscow released updated

constitutions, the USSR progressively diminished Ukrainian autonomy and centralized

control.176 According to Magocsi, Stalin initially wanted a Soviet Ukrainian government

promoting Ukrainian culture and identity. The Bolshevik party did not have much support

from the rural population of Ukraine and the Ukrainian identity had already spread

throughout the countryside. To strengthen the Bolshevik legitimacy and gain support from

the rural population, Stalin calculated that it would be best to promote a sense of Ukrainian

autonomy, even if it was mostly in name only. The Bolsheviks promoted three policies of

Ukrainianization: 1) governmental, administrative, and demographic structure changes, 2)

return Ukrainian cultural leaders to Ukraine form Europe, and 3) modernize Ukrainian

culture and education. Structures changes consisted of emplacing ethnic Ukrainian

leadership across the state, facilitating urban population growth, and increasing the amount

of Ukrainian-language publications. The return of cultural leaders fostered an environment

171 Magocsi, 503. 172 Anastasiia Tatarenko, “The Legal Status and Modern History of Crimean Autonomy,”

Verfassungsblog (blog), April 2, 2014, https://verfassungsblog.de/the-legal-status-and-modern-history-of-crimean-autonomy/.

173 “Ukraine Profile,” BBC News, July 29, 2019, sec. Europe, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18010123.

174 “The Problem of Eastern Galacia, 1919-1923” (Central Intelligence Agency, March 4, 1944), 9, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP08C01297R000500160027-3.pdf.

175 Alexander Gogun, Stalin’s Commandos: Ukrainian Partisan Forces on the Eastern Front (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015), 5.

176 Magocsi, 526–28.

54

of freethinking and promoted free intellectual debate and learning within Ukraine SSR’s

universities. Finally, modernization brought drastically higher literacy levels among youth

and adults in Ukrainian language, a boom in Ukrainian art, painting, sculpture, literature,

theater, and music, and, lastly, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church chose independence from

the Russian Orthodox Church.177

Despite these initial accomplishments to maintain a Ukrainian identity, the late

1920s and 1930s would prove disastrous for the Ukrainian SSR. First, Stalin implemented

forced collectivization and the mass emigration and executions of Ukrainian kulaks,

defined as any Ukrainian landholder with between 10–15 acres, livestock, whose net worth

was approximately $600-800. However, a kulak or a kulak-sympathizer eventually became

any person unwilling to fold to Stalin’s demands or anyone not meeting food quotas

required for the urban, industrial proletariat.178 The Great Famine soon followed. Between

the “dekulakization” and the Great Famine, 5.8 million Ukrainians died of starvation or

were imprisoned in remote areas of the Soviet Union. By 1933, the Soviet Union began to

purge non-Communist and Communist leaders in Ukraine deemed disloyal to the socialist

programs and ideology of the Soviet Union. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian party

leaders and members would be purged with many replacements coming from Russia.

Additionally, by 1938, the Ukrainian Bolshevik party would reverse many

Ukrainianization policies and replace education, the arts, and literature with pro-Soviet,

Russian-language programs and works.179 However, despite his advances to indoctrinate

Ukraine, World War II stalled Stalin’s Ukrainian socialist project. Germany invaded the

Soviet Union, seizing all Ukrainian lands. The Soviets had to retake the territories

controlled by Germany and, by 1944, the USSR not only retook land lost to Germany, but

also seized all Ukrainian ethnographic territories, including Ukrainians that fell under

Czech, Polish, and Romanian authority previously.180

177 Magocsi, 533–46. 178 Subtelny, 409–11. 179 Magocsi, 557–71. 180 Subtelny, 453–80.

55

F. POST-WAR LIFE UNDER THE SOVIETS

Following the war, the Soviet Union had significant hurdles to overcome in

Ukraine, including rebuilding a war-torn state and integration of Western Ukrainians that

for centuries fell under western European rule. The USSR was able to integrate, or at least

forcibly integrate, all Ukrainian lands under Moscow’s central rule,181 but, by 1953, Stalin

would die and the Soviet-Ukrainian dynamic would change dramatically.182

Under Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev, Ukraine experienced a dramatic

decrease in central control in Moscow, which is displayed through a few major events. One

of the major events was the reintroduction of Ukrainian literature and the rejection of forced

russification in the Ukrainian education system.183 Another major event was the

decentralization of industrial and agricultural planning and execution in Ukraine, which

allowed Ukraine to make independent decisions but under the oversight of Ukrainian

communist leaders (although, many of the policies for decentralization were never fully

realized).184 A third event occurred when the Soviet Union gifted the Crimea to Ukraine.

The region contained almost no Tartars, and was a three to one ratio of Russian people to

Ukrainian. The second event was the 300th anniversary of the treaty of Pereiaslav. The

anniversary was celebrated as the original union of Ukrainians and Russians and amplified

the feeling of Ukrainians as equals to Russians. Khrushchev allowed Ukraine to maintain

a mission at the United Nations, greater representation in government, and gave more

cultural freedom to the region. By the 1960s, Ukraine saw a resurgence in Ukrainian culture

and prosperity. Literary works on the language, history, and culture of Ukraine were

published (presumably without strong protest from the Soviet Union), Ukraine saw healthy

economic growth, and a growing urban population created greater energy demand

especially from the natural gas industry. The higher energy demand led Ukraine to build

181 Yaroslav Bilinsky, The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II. (New Brunswick,

NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1964), 84–184. 182 Zbigniew Wojnowski, “The Soviet People: National and Supranational Identities in the USSR After

1945,” 2015, 1–4. 183 Borys Lewytzkyj, Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine, 1953-1980 (AMIA/Editorial Milá, 1984),

32–37. 184 Lewytzkyj, 72–86.

56

multiple hydroelectric plants along the Dnieper River, and new natural gas and thermal

plants. However, the Soviet Union predicted the demand for energy would outpace

production, despite the advances in hydro, natural gas, and thermal energy sectors.

Therefore, the Soviets funded four nuclear plants to stabilize Soviet Ukraine’s energy

sector: Chernobyl, Rivne, Kuznetsovs’k, and Zaporizhzhia.185

Despite what appeared to be positive reforms for Ukraine, it suffered under

Khrushchev’s rule (along with the rest of the Soviet Union) because Krushchev’s reforms

were massive and unpredictable, causing volatility in government and, therefore, in the

agricultural and industrial sectors. Seeing the destructiveness of Krushchev’s reforms, the

Soviet Union’s Communist Party removed Khrushchev and replaced him with Leonid

Brezhnev. While he wanted to ease tensions between the USSR and the United States, he

also ceased the near-constant social reform found under Khrushchev’s rule and re-

consolidated power under the Communist Party, limiting many of the liberalizing policies

which allowed the reemergence of Ukrainian culture in the 1960s.186 In Ukraine, Petro

Shelest ruled the Ukrainian Communist Party from 1963–1972 and, despite Brezhnev’s

best efforts, tried to reinforce the perception of Ukrainian autonomy. While Shelest was an

ardent pro-Soviet, he also felt Ukraine was unfairly treated compared to other republics of

the Soviet Union, deserved more input into Soviet policies created in Moscow, and

promoted the distinctiveness of Ukrainian language and culture.187 Eventually, Brezhnev

no longer tolerated Shelest’s leadership in Ukraine and replaced him with a true loyalist to

the Soviet Union, Volodymyr Shcherbytsky. Shcherbytsky followed every policy and order

from Moscow and quickly purged the party of all members supportive of Shelest.188

Shcherbytsky remained in power through the end of Brezhnev’s and into

Gorbachev’s reign. Gorbachev committed the Soviet Union to perestroika and glasnost,

restructuring and openness, hoping these reforms would bring the Soviet Union out of

185 Magocsi, 653–57. 186 Magocsi, 659. 187 Lewytzkyj, 94–105. 188 Subtelny, 511–14.

57

economic stagnation and continue its ability to compete with the United States. However,

in doing so, Gorbachev allowed the people of the Soviet Union to see how decrepit their

country was, compared to western nations. Industrial workers and farmers noticed how the

socialist system produced dysfunctional results.189 Additionally, the 1986 tragedy of the

Chernobyl nuclear power plant reopened cultural wounds in Ukraine:

The initial reaction of the Gorbachev government to provide information about life-threatening radioactive fallout perhaps more than anything else alienates the ordinary citizen from the Soviet system. ‘Chernobyl’, in the words of one Ukrainian political activist, ‘helped us understand that we are a colony.’190

By the late 1980s, dissenters formed the Rukh, a political movement that supported

Ukrainian sovereignty, democratization, and a unique Ukrainian culture. Huge

demonstrations began in L’viv and migrated to Kiev. In March 1990, Ukraine held free

elections and, to the surprise of the Soviet Union, the Democratic Bloc of Ukraine won 90

of the 450 seats in the Ukrainian parliament. A watershed moment occurred when, in July

1990, miners in Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk, both heavily ethic-Russian and pro-

Communist areas, participated in massive strikes that reached 250,000 members. On July

16, 1990, despite being in the minority, the Democratic Bloc was able to write and ratify

the declaration of Ukrainian sovereignty allowing Ukraine to manage its own affairs

separate from the desires of Moscow. An attempted coup by Communists in Russia failed,

and, on 24 August 1991, the Ukrainian democrats seized upon Russian governmental

instability to push through a vote of independence in parliament. Ukraine, through a near

unanimous vote, declared complete independence from the Soviet Union.191

The 1990s proved difficult for Ukraine as the government tried to transition from

one dependent and subservient to the Soviet Union to an independent democracy. A

189 Magocsi, 666–67. 190 Magocsi, 669. 191 Subtelny, 575–81.

58

positive move was the fully democratic election of Leonid Kuchma over Leonid Kravchuk.

However, even under the new president, the economy and political reform stagnated.192

Ukraine’s economy contracted annually between 9.7 and 22.7 percent in 1991–1996. The country experienced hyperinflation and an exceptionally huge production decline for a country not ravaged by a major war…The budget deficit was, at 14.4 percent of GDP, exceptionally large. Barter and the use of surrogate moneys and foreign currencies prevailed…. A shadow economy swelled and compensated for an unknown share of the economic collapse.193

G. LEAD UP TO WAR

Ukrainians wanted a change of leadership in the early 2000s and, in 2004, elections

showed the pro-Russian candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, the victor.194 However, according

to the reporter William Schneider, evidence surfaced that showed Yanukovych received an

additional one million fraudulent votes in his favor. Supporters of Yanukovych’s opponent,

Viktor Yushchenko, were adamant about free and fair elections and they were confident

the pro-western, democratic Yushchenko would prevail. In widespread demonstrations

wearing anything orange, the protests became known as the “Orange Revolution.”195 The

revolution achieved its objective and Ukrainian elections occurred leading to

Yushchenko’s election as Ukrainian president on December 26, 2004.196 While many

Ukrainians hoped Yushchenko would quickly lead Ukraine to westward reforms and

political and economic liberalization, his democratic allies were slow to create change.

Additionally, Yanukovych’s party won a majority in the parliament and was able to

192 New East Network, “Post-Soviet World: What You Need to Know about Ukraine,” The Guardian,

June 9, 2014, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/09/-sp-post-soviet-world-need-to-know-ukraine.

193 Pekka Sutela, “The Underachiever: Ukraine’s Economy Since 1991,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed August 26, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/09/underachiever-ukraine-s-economy-since-1991-pub-47451.

194 New East Network, “Post-Soviet World.” 195 William Schneider, “Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution,’” The Atlantic, December 14, 2004,

https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/12/ukraines-orange-revolution/305157/. 196 Askold Krushelnycky, “Ukraine’s New President Takes Oath Of Office,”

RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, January 23, 2005, https://www.rferl.org/a/1057026.html.

59

become prime minister.197 By 2007, ironically, Yanukovych was the most popular

politician in Ukraine.198 However, neither his nor Yushchenko’s rise to prominence

brought political or economic stability.

Andrew Kramer reports that, in 2009, Russia cut gas supplies to Europe, including

Ukraine, with Putin claiming Ukraine was siphoning gas transiting its country and not

paying for it. Russia sought to raise gas prices from $179.50 per one thousand cubic meters

to $450 to make up for unpaid gas and other payments. The then deputy chief executive of

Gazprom, Aleksandr Medvedev even went as far as to blame the halting of Russian gas to

Europe on Ukraine stopping gas through the pipeline.199 Seemingly, while Putin’s main

objective was to hurt Ukraine as they requested acceptance into NATO, the ceased gas

flow to Europe was to pressure other countries to force Ukraine to pay Russia and to signal

that Putin fervently opposed any western leanings of Yushchenko. Putin may have also

wanted to hurt Yushchenko’s reelection campaign. Whether or not this was Putin’s

objective, Yanukovych won the 2010 presidential election. Despite his prior relationship

with Russia, Yanukovych appeared to follow Ukrainian desires to join western institutions.

From his election to 2013, he negotiated and prepared to sign an association agreement

with the EU, much to the celebration of his people. Yet, at the last minute, Yanukovych

backed out of the deal. The Ukrainian population was furious leading to the Euromaiden

protests in November growing to over one hundred thousand protesters and violent clashes

between them and Ukrainian police.200 The deadliest clashes occurred between February

18–20, 2014 with approximately one hundred protesters killed and many injured.201

197 New East Network, “Post-Soviet World.” 198 “Profile: Ukraine’s Ousted President Viktor Yanukovych,” BBC News, February 28, 2014, sec.

Europe, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25182830. 199 Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia Cuts Gas, and Europe Shivers,” The New York Times, January 6,

2009, sec. Europe, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/07/world/europe/07gazprom.html. 200 Lucie Steinzova and Kateryna Oliynyk, “The Sparks of Change: Ukraine’s Euromaiden Protests,”

RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, November 21, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-politics-euromaidan-protests/29608541.html.

201 Yuliya Talmazan, “Maiden Massacre Anniversary: Ukraine Remembers Bloody Day of Protests,” NBC News, February 20, 2019, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/maidan-massacre-anniversary-ukraine-remembers-bloody-day-protests-n973156.

60

By February 21, Yanukovych signed a compromise deal with opposition leaders and by

the next day had fled the country.202 Protesters occupied the presidential palace and

parliament voted to remove Yanukovych as president declaring the next presidential

elections would take place on May 25.203 However, Putin would not stand for further

losses of control in Ukraine.

H. WAR

As the Ukrainian government tried to stabilize following massive protests and the

dismissal of the president, New York Times reports that unknown pro-Russian forces

seized government buildings in Simferopol, the capital of Crimea on February 27. The

takeover of the government by pro-Russian politicians and gunmen, took the local

population by surprise. Nearly simultaneously to the February 27 takeover, President Putin

ordered large ground and air military exercises along the Russia-Ukraine border. Prime

Minister Dmitri Medvedev claimed the turmoil in Kiev presented a serious danger to the

ethnic Russians’ health and welfare, which gave officials in the West a higher level of

concern that Russian military forces would intervene in Crimea to protect “their

people.”204 By March 1, the Russian parliament approved military force in Ukraine to

protect the lives of ethnic Russians with no limitations on troop or deployment levels in

the Crimea.205

202 “Ukraine Crisis.” 203 Sam Frizell, “Ukraine Protestors Seize Kiev as President Flees,” Time, February 22, 2014,

http://world.time.com/2014/02/22/ukraines-president-flees-protestors-capture-kiev/. 204 Andrew Higgins and Steven Erlanger, “Gunmen Seize Government Buildings in Crimea,” The New

York Times, February 27, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/world/europe/crimea-ukraine.html. 205 Kathy Lally, Will Englund, and William Booth, “Russian Parliament Approves Use of Troops in

Ukraine,” The Washington Post, March 1, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russian-parliament-approves-use-of-troops-in-crimea/2014/03/01/d1775f70-a151-11e3-a050-dc3322a94fa7_story.html?noredirect=on.

61

The crisis continued to evolve over the coming months. On March 18, Putin signed

a bill annexing Crimea to Russia206 and, on April 7, protesters seized government

buildings in Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk, raised Russian flags, and demanded

independence from Ukraine.207 Ukrainian government forces quickly regained control of

Kharkiv,208 but Donetsk and Luhansk declared independence on May 11 following local

elections.209 Therefore, these eastern regions rejected Ukrainian presidential elections that

would follow two weeks later, which led to the election of Petro Poroshenko.210

Poroshenko signed an EU Association Agreement in June 2014211 and the EU and United

States have placed significant economic sanction against Russia since the beginning of the

conflict.212 There appears to be no end in sight to the crisis as Ukraine and Russia continue

fighting over eastern Ukraine, consistently signing ceasefires, only to resume fighting

shortly after.213

206 Steven Lee Myers and Ellen Barry, “Putin Reclaims Crimea for Russia and Bitterly Denounces the

West,” The New York Times, March 18, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/19/world/europe/ukraine.html.

207 Bridget Kendall, “Ukraine: Pro-Russians Storm Offices in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv,” BBC News, April 7, 2014, sec. Europe, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26910210.

208 “Ukraine Crisis.” 209 “Ukraine Separatists Declare Independence,” Al Jazeera, May 12, 2014,

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/05/ukraine-separatists-declare-independence-201451219375613219.html.

210 Shaun Walker and Alec Luhn, “Petro Poroshenko Wins Ukraine Presidency, According to Exit Polls,” The Guardian, May 25, 2014, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/25/petro-poroshenko-ukraine-president-wins-election.

211 Andrew Higgins and David M. Herszenhorn, “Defying Russia, Ukraine Signs E.U. Trade Pact - The New York Times,” New York Times, June 27, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/28/world/europe/ukraine-signs-trade-agreement-with-european-union.html.

212 Ivan Gutterman and Wojtek Grojec, “A Timeline Of All Russia-Related Sanctions,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, September 19, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-sanctions-timeline/29477179.html.

213 Phil McCausland, “Russia Announces Another Cease-Fire Deal with Ukraine Amid Tensions with West,” NBC News, February 18, 2017, https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-crisis/russia-announces-another-ceasefire-deal-ukraine-amid-tensions-west-n722841.

62

I. UKRAINIAN ENERGY STRENGTHS AND VULNERABILITIES

Since the conflict continues in Ukraine, its energy sector, a sector highly dependent

on Russian support, continues to suffer. As of 2017, Ukraine relied on Russia to provide

approximately $1.5 billion USD in petroleum products.214 Additionally, Ukraine relies

heavily on coal, gas, and nuclear energy to provide electricity to its population. In the coal

sector, Ukraine has 33.873 billion tonnes in reserves, seventh most in the world. However,

the vast majority of coal in Ukraine lies in the Donets Basin—a basin mostly located in the

Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Luhansk.215 Since Donetsk and Luhansk declared

independence, Ukraine does not benefit from their coal production and, ultimately, the coal

resources benefit Russia.

In the gas sector, the West has encouraged Ukraine to develop its lucrative domestic

gas deposits. According to Todd Wood of the Washington Times, in 2019, Ukraine began

auctioning subsoil gas deposits to improve its energy security and independence. Four

companies bid on the most profitable subsoil plot near Odessa, called Dolphin. Two

American companies, one Ukrainian company, and the Azerbaijani Caspian Drilling

Company (CDC) bid on the resources. Wood reports that the CDC is leading the bidding

war. The most troubling aspect of the possibility that CDC wins the bid is that they are tied

to Lukoil, the Russian energy giant. Lukoil is known for investing in the most profitable

oil and gas energy resources and stalling projects as they did in Romania. The legal

purchase of Dolphin’s gas resources would also help Lukoil avoid sanctions, unlike

Russia’s illegal seizure of Black Sea territory following the annexation of Crimea.216

Additionally, the independence of Donetsk, Luhansk, and annexation of the Crimea put

vast swathes of gas and oil basins under Russian control. Figure 14 shows the gas and oil

214 “Products That Russia Exports to Ukraine (2017),” The Observatory of Economic Complexity,

accessed September 19, 2019, https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/rus/ukr/show/2017/. 215 “Countries with the Biggest Coal Reserves,” accessed September 19, 2019, https://www.mining-

technology.com/features/feature-the-worlds-biggest-coal-reserves-by-country/. 216 L. Todd Wood, “In a Masterstroke of Statecraft, Russia May Soon Control Ukraine’s Gas Fields,”

The Washington Times, July 8, 2019, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/jul/8/russia-may-soon-control-ukrainian-gas-fields/.

63

basins throughout Ukraine with the Far East, north to west, and Crimean regions containing

the majority of the gas and oil resources.

Figure 10. Ukraine’s oil and gas regions by concentration of resources217

Therefore, the Kremlin, using the protection of ethnic Russians as a front, pulled

the most resource-rich areas under its influence stealing vast amounts of wealth from

Ukraine. Issues in the gas sector also occur domestically. Ukraine continues to struggle in

suppressing and stopping corruption. The World Bank provided viable options for Ukraine

to unbundle its largest gas company, Naftogaz.218 However, quantifiable change has been

slow. Ukraine has made many policy changes to unbundle its gas sector, but the oligarchs

217 “Invest Ukraine - Open for U,” Ministry of Economic Developmetn and Trade of Ukraine, accessed

September 19, 2019, http://investukrmap.org.ua/en/RegionPassports/Maps?map=3. 218 World Bank, “Ukraine - Unbundling Options for Gas Transmission and Storage” Washington, D.C.:

World Bank Group, 2016, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/860491467995388686/pdf/104506-WP-P151927-PUBLIC-Ukraine-gas-unbundling-options-for-TSO-and-SSO-executive-summary-FINAL.pdf.

64

who own much of the gas sector are not motivated to give up personal ownership. For

example, one oligarch owns two-thirds of the gas distribution grid in Ukraine.219

In the nuclear sector, according to the Kyiv Post, Ukraine is dependent on nuclear

fuel from Russia. Russia still owns 54% of Ukraine’s nuclear fuel market and, in 2017

Ukraine dealt with scandal between the nuclear sector and a Ukrainian politician. Ex-

politician Mykola Martynenko was arrested for embezzlement and participation in

organized crime. He is suspected of selling Kazakh uranium ore at a price that would allow

the state-run Eastern Ore Dressing Plant to earn massive profits and provide embezzled

bonuses to those involved in the transaction, allowing Martynenko to allegedly embezzle

$17 million USD.220 Political corruption extends into the green energy sector.

Ukraine is investing heavily in green energy, but at an enormous cost to the

consumer and potentially to the detriment of Ukrainian green energy long-term. According

to Alisa Yurchenko of the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, the

Ukrainian government passed laws incentivizing green energy investment with the laws to

expire on January 1, 2020. Therefore, Ukrainian investors have been pouring money into

green energy to take advantage of the incentives. However, the rich and powerful of

Ukraine stand to benefit most from the green energy initiative. The government artificially

raised green tariffs, or the cost to the consumer for purchasing renewable energy from the

electricity market, to incentivize companies to make heavy investment in renewables since

initial costs were so high. While solar and wind technology has become significantly

cheaper to purchase, the green tariffs remain very high: the solar tariff remains thirty

percent above market price and wind tariffs ten to fifteen percent over market price. While

a few politicians are trying to lower tariffs, many politicians and politically well-connected

investors are the individuals investing and building the renewable energy plants. It is

unlikely that any reform will pass. Therefore, the average Ukrainian will have to wait until

2029 to see rates drop; assuming legislators do not pass laws maintaining the higher rates.

219 Wolfgang Peters, Ukrainian Gas Markets, E-mail, August 26, 2019. 220 Ilya Timtchenko, “Westinghouse Seeks Bigger Share of Nuclear Fuel Supply,” KyivPost, June 8,

2018, https://www.kyivpost.com/business/westinghouse-seeks-bigger-share-of-nuclear-fuel-supply.html.

65

Additionally, any renewable power built after the January 1 deadline will receive closer-

to-market- prices, which will inevitably de-incentivize more renewable energy projects

since it will be near impossible to compete with companies receiving inflated, government-

sanctioned tariffs.221 Ukraine certainly faces tremendous obstacles, but the government is

trying to stabilize and secure its energy sector.

While the nuclear sector is still heavily reliant on Russian imports, the inclusion of

imports from the United States through the company Westinghouse has strengthen

Ukraine’s ability to open the nuclear market and get better prices on materials. According

to Timtchenko, only two companies sell the type of fuel Ukraine requires in its nuclear

facilities: Westinghouse and Russia’s Rosatom. Therefore, given the limited suppliers,

Ukraine is best leveraging both companies to achieve better contracts. Smartly, Ukraine

negotiated a contract with Westinghouse that included a clause, which requires

Westinghouse to provide materials for thirteen of its reactors within twelve months.

Additionally, Westinghouse is investing in a subsidiary company of Ukraine’s nuclear

company allowing Westinghouse to provide additional nuclear fuel fabrication materials

in south Ukraine and plans to provide engineering services to increase Ukraine’s nuclear

power efficiency.222

In the gas sector, Ukraine has strengthened progress in market reform policy,

despite its struggles to change oligarchical control this particular energy sector. Ukraine

used Northwest European traded markets for at least two years and, given Ukraine’s

transparency and reliability using western gas markets over those two years, Ukraine is

allowed to use 100% indexation based on western European markets. This indexation

greatly increases Ukraine’s ability to trade and pay for gas resources.223 Additionally,

Dominik Istrate from Emerging Europe reports that Ukraine reached a seven-year high in

natural gas storage reserves. To achieve significant amounts of stored gas, Ukraine has

221 Alisa Yurchenko, “The Rich and Powerful Cash In From Ukraine’s Green Energy Gold Rush,”

OCCRP, May 9, 2019, https://www.occrp.org/en/investigations/the-rich-and-powerful-cash-In-from-ukraines-green-energy-gold-rush.

222 Timtchenko. 223 Peters.

66

been purchasing gas from Europe to hedge against the possibility of Russia cutting gas

exports to Ukraine ahead of the 2019–2020 winter season.224 If the Ukrainian government

could fully transform the gas sector into a sector that is business-friendly and transparent,

Ukraine could begin developing its underground, domestic gas reserves—reserves that

amount to 905 bcm that could provide heat and power to the country for decades.225

Ukraine is making similar progress in the oil industry. In July 2019, Reuters says,

Ukraine received its first shipment of crude oil from the United States. Ukraine is trying to

diversify oil resources, especially after an April incident where Russia exported

contaminated oil through the Druzhba pipeline. Ukraine has expanded its coal imports

since most of its domestic supply lies within the contested Donbass region. According to

Istrate, Ukraine imported nearly 590,000 tons of Donbass coal from Belarus in 2018

compared to 600 tons the year before.226 In addition, in 2018, Ukraine agreed to purchase

coal from the United States to replace its losses in coal production.227

J. CONCLUSION

Ukraine’s energy sector continues to suffer from systemic corruption and an on-

going conflict in its eastern regions and the Crimea. Its gas sector is controlled by a handful

of oligarchs, domestic production is low, and Russian-influenced companies are trying to

disrupt any future gas production. The vast majority of coalmines are under separatist

control. Ukraine underutilizes its oil fields and the nuclear sector is mostly reliant on

Russian resources. However, Ukraine is in the midst of trying to reverse years of corruption

and Russian dependency. The Ukrainian government has legislated policies to subvert

224 Dominik Istrate, “Ukrainian Gas Reserves Hit Seven-Year High as Country Prepares for Russia

Talks,” Emerging Europe, September 11, 2019, https://emerging-europe.com/news/ukrainian-gas-reserves-hit-seven-year-high-as-country-prepares-russia-talks/.

225 Todd Prince, “After Years Of Stalling, Can Ukraine Finally Become Energy Self-Sufficient?,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, accessed September 21, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-foreign-investment-imports/30165068.html.

226 Dominik Istrate, “Suspicions Emerge That Ukraine is Importing Coal From the Donbass, Via Belarus,” Emerging Europe | News, Intelligence, Community, February 22, 2019, https://emerging-europe.com/news/suspicions-emerge-that-ukraine-is-importing-coal-from-the-donbass-via-belarus/.

227 Alessandra Prentice, “How a U.S. Coal Deal Warmed Ukraine’s Ties with Trump,” Reuters, February 19, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-usa-coal-idUSKCN1G31V8.

67

corruption and state-run monopolies. Additionally, the government has sought to diversify

the energy sector by importing materials from western Europe, the United States, and

others to either halt its dependence on Russia or, potentially, cease using Russian non-

renewable energy resources altogether. Despite a long and at times beneficial relationship

with its Kievan relatives, Ukraine is breaking its ties with Russia while continuing to

resolve a conflict that still burns in the Donbass. Given the lessons learned from Georgia

and Ukraine, NATO and EUCOM can learn and present strategies to strengthen energy

security in the Balkans and prevent Russia from taking advantage of weaknesses in our

southeastern European allies.

68


69

IV. IMPROVING ENERGY SECURITY IN BULGARIA

A. INTRODUCTION

NATO and the EU should work together closely to decide how they will approach

energy security in the Balkans. This research recommends how to do so. An important

principle is that, rather than spread money thinly across many problems, focus on one

particular state at a time, improve its energy security, and then move to the next state while

monitoring the progress of other states who received energy security assistance. This

chapter will recommend the first state NATO and the EU assist is Bulgaria for a few

significant reasons. Firstly, Russia is the sole international provider of natural gas to

Bulgaria, exporting 17.8 bcm annually228 and ninety percent of Bulgaria's annual

consumption.229

Secondly, Gallup asked a group of Bulgarians an open-ended question: which

country posed the biggest threat to EU members in Eastern Europe? Fourteen percent of

the respondents said the United States, a NATO ally, presented the greatest threat. The

United States was the most mentioned country as a threat to Bulgarians according to the

poll.230

Lastly, politicians in Bulgaria have a difficult time politically opposing Russia.

Bechev mentions in Rival Power that, in 2004, the Bulgarian foreign minister, Solomon

Passy, said, "This administration has shown that equally good ties could be maintained

with the U.S., with Europe and with the Soviet Union—with Russia, I beg your pardon.

There is no trade-off whatsoever."231 Sergei Stanishev, the Bulgarian Socialist Party

228 “Foreign Partners: Bulgaria | Gazprom Export,” Gazprom, accessed October 22, 2019,

http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/partners/bulgaria/. 229 Tony Barber, “Bulgaria’s Reliance on Russian Gas Almost over,” Financial Times, November 28,

2016, https://www.ft.com/content/4a413060-9a07-11e6-8f9b-70e3cabccfae. 230 Neli Esipova and Julie Ray, “Eastern Europeans, CIS Residents See Russia, U.S. as Threats,”

Gallup.com, April 4, 2016, https://news.gallup.com/poll/190415/eastern-europeans-cis-residents-russia-threats.aspx.

231 Bechev, 86.

70

chairman from 2001 to 2004, said "With Europe but never against Russia."232 Bulgarian

tendencies to consider Russian attitudes, along with Bulgarian dependence on Russian gas,

stresses the importance of messaging the benefits of Western institutions to Bulgarians.

This research will review Bulgarian history and its energy sector, delve into the similarities

and differences between it and the other crises analyzed in chapters 2 and 3, then make

specific recommendation on countering Russian non-renewable energy manipulation in

Bulgaria.

B. BULGARIAN HISTORY

The Bulgarians' origins are very convoluted and shrouded in mystery, but the

Georgian historian, Plamen Tzvetkov, argues the modern Bulgarian comes from a mix of

Balkan autochthons, Iranoids, and Mongoloids. There are theories of the Bulgarians being

closely related or descending from Slavs, but ancient literature commonly distinguishes

between the Bulgars and the Slavs. Even the argument that the Slavic and Bulgarian

languages are closely align falls short during intense scrutiny of the two.233 The Russian

government often connects its language with other Cyrillic-based languages, but Byzantine

and Bulgarian scholars emigrated to Moscow and standardized the Russian language in the

15th century.234

Tzvetkov says the era of Bulgarian kings began between 603 and 635 AD. While

still a generally nomadic people, the Bulgars generally controlled the territory between the

Danube River delta and the Caspian Sea as shown in Figure 11. Some Bulgars even

travelled north into modern-day Russia and formed the Volga-Bulgarian state, which stood

until the 16th century. However, as news of the Khazars immigration west reached the

Bulgars, they moved west also to avoid confrontation. Some Bulgars settled near the delta

of the Danube, others in Pannonia—a group that eventually moved and settled in Central

Macedonia in the late 7th century AD. By 681, the Bulgars achieved multiple military

232 Bechev, 86–87. 233 Plamen S T︠zvetkov, A History of the Balkans: A Regional Overview from a Bulgarian Perspective,

vol. 1 (Edwin Mellen Pr, 1993), 1-56. 234 Tarasine Buck, “A History of the Russian Language,” Brigham Young University, February 24,

1998, http://linguistics.byu.edu/classes/Ling450ch/reports/russian.html.

71

victories against the Byzantine Empire, leading Constantine IV to sue for peace. The

Byzantine Empire recognized the territory north of the Balkan Mountains (a range running

east to west through the central modern Bulgaria) and south of the Danube River as Bulgar

territory. The first Bulgarian Khan, Asparukh, began a chronicle of all Bulgarian leaders

and created shelter for up to 800,000 people to protect his fellow Bulgarians.235

Figure 11. Bulgarian territory in the 7th century and Bulgarian migration as the Khazars migrated west236

235 T︠zvetkov, 73–98. 236 “R/MapPorn - Bulgar Migration Map in the 7th Century [2180x1430],” Reddit, accessed October

28, 2019, https://www.reddit.com/r/MapPorn/comments/76xcnb/bulgar_migration_map_in_the_7th_century_2180x1430/.

72

While the Bulgarians and Byzantines battled over territory, the Byzantines were

only successful at defeating and deporting Slavs, not Bulgarians, to other regions in Asia

Minor, according to Tzvetkov. Ironically, despite persistent conflict between the two,

Emperor Justinian II requested assistance from Khan Tervel, Asparukh's son and successor,

following a revolt that ended in Justinian's overthrow. The khan took advantage of the

situation and helped Justinian regain the throne. In return for his loyalty, Justinian gifted

the region south of the Balkan Mountains to Tervel and gave him the title of Caesar or

Tsar. However, peace was short-lived and, by 708, the Byzantines again attacked Bulgaria.

No emperor or khan decisively beat the other over the course of the 8th century, but, by

809, Khan Krum would come to power and Bulgaria history would change course

dramatically.237

Krum and his son Omurtag waged war against the Byzantines and the Frankish

Empire in Europe. Krum acquired present day Sofia and the Struma Valley, allowing him

to unite his Bulgarian Empire with the Bulgarians of Central Macedonia. Additionally, he

expanded his empire east until reaching the border of the Frankish Empire.238 Tzvetkov

states that Omurtag defended his father's territorial gains by defeating Byzantine attacks

and Frankish incursions. Otmurtag's exceptional military skill allowed him to obtain peace

treaties between his Bulgaria, Leo V in Byzantium, and the Frank king, Louis the Pious.239

However, following Omurtags's rule, the Great Bulgarian Empire was constantly at war

with its neighbors—the Serbs, Hungarians, Kievan Rus', and the Byzantines—which began

its slow decline and eventual absorption into the Byzantine Empire in 1018.240 According

to A History of Bulgaria: 1393-1885 by Mercia MacDermott, Bulgarians attempted to free

themselves from the Byzantines, but were unsuccessful until two men, Peter and Asen, led

a revolt in the city of Turnovo in 1185. The revolt led to regaining Bulgarian independence

and the Second Bulgarian Empire. Asen was named Tsar and the Bulgarian Church claimed

independence from Byzantium. Bulgarian leaders maintained control for nearly a century,

237 T︠zvetkov, 98–109. 238 Lyubomir Ivanov, 6. 239 T︠zvetkov, 112–14. 240 T︠zvetkov, 114–47.

73

but in 1277, popular discontent boiled over into peasant revolts. However, by 1331, Ivan

Alexander ruled the territory and led on of the most prosperous periods in medieval

Bulgarian history. His rule, ending in 1371, was followed by a three-state Bulgaria, each

ruled by a different tsar. The tsars’ inability to unify partially, if not mostly, led to the

successful Turkish conquest of Bulgaria, which the Turks completed by 1396. The

Ottoman Empire annexed southern Bulgaria into its territory and northern Bulgaria became

a vassal state.241

Bulgaria and most of the Balkans remained under Ottoman rule through the 15th,

16th, and 17th centuries says Svetkov. While there were Bulgarian attempts to regain

independence during that time, all were unsuccessful. Additionally, Bulgarian life

stabilized under the Ottomans compared to the period of the Second Bulgaria Empire.

However, the Bulgars never stopped their desire for independence and many of them

believed Musocvy could be a reliable and formidable ally against the Turks.242

MacDermott says, in 1589, the patriarchs of the Eastern Church in Constantinople, which

included the Metropolitan of Turnovo, promoted the metropolitanate of Moscow to the

status of Patriarch. As Russia gained power in the region, the pleas for help grew stronger.

By 1688, during Peter the Great's reign, many Balkan leaders, to include those from

Bulgaria, contacted the Russian government to request an Orthodox Russian Army to

liberate the Balkans and Constantinople. Peter took great interest in Eastern Europe and

especially the Bulgars. Peter wanted the Bulgarians to organize a Russian translation of

Slavic history, including a chapter on Bulgaria. Moreover, he requested the Turks grant

Balkan Christians freedom of religion and reserved the right to protect Christians from

excessive taxation. By 1710, Peter declared war against the Ottomans claiming Eastern

European Christians languished under Turkish rule. However, Russian forces were

eventually defeated and Bulgarian hopes of freedom were put on hold. Under Catherine

the Great, Russia regained the right to protect Orthodox Christians, through a series of

241 Mercia MacDermott, A History of Bulgaria: 1393-1885 (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praegerm

Inc., 1962), 20–21. 242 T︠zvetkov, 231–71.

74

treaties called the Treaty of Kuchuck Kainardji and Jassy.243 Over the next century-and-a-

half, Bulgaria would begin to break away from the Ottomans and again realize an

independent nation.

According to MacDermott, by mid-18th century, the Bulgarians would experience

slow, but marked economic growth, the development of the Bulgarian bourgeoisie, and a

group of "Awakeners" that would call upon Bulgarian patriotism. Additionally, despite

suffering greatly during the Russo-Turkish wars, the war from 1806-1812 saw a significant

increase in positive Russia-Bulgarian relations, which included Bulgarians providing

intelligence to Russian military commanders and forming Bulgarian-pure units to fight the

Turks on behalf of the Russians.244 However, as seen in Georgian and Ukrainian history,

Bulgarians were solely a tool for Russia to leverage against the Turks. Following the

Turkish War of 1828-1829 and the Adrianople Peace agreement afterwards, all the

Bulgarian contributions to the war effort against the Turks were for naught. Russia gained

no concessions on behalf of the Bulgarians and, when Georgi Mamarchev, a Georgian

military commander, tried to begin a revolution, the Russians had him arrested to avoid

international relations complications between Russia and the Ottomans.245

Against the odds and setbacks, the Bulgarians finally organized and planned their

uprising against the Turks in April 1876, states Zhivko Stanchev from Radio Bulgaria.

However, to say the April Uprising was bittersweet would be an enormous understatement.

The uprising ended in the massacre of 30,000 Bulgarian men, women, and children, the

razing of eighty villages and the pillage of another 200. The events were so horrific that

Western Europe took immediate interest in the treatment of Bulgarians under the Turks

and, ultimately, led to Bulgarian independence.246

243 MacDermott, 57–59. 244 MacDermott, 88–112. 245 “Георги Мамарчев,” Община Котел, accessed October 31, 2019, https://kotel.bg/en/vidni-

lichnosti-rodeni-v-kotel/georgi-mamarchev/. 246 Zhivko Stanchev, “1876 April Uprising Placed Bulgarian National Issue into European Agenda,”

Radio Bulgaria, April 20, 2012, https://bnr.bg/en/post/100150355/1876-april-uprising-placed-bulgarian-national-issue-into-european-agenda.

75

The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 was the straw that broke Turkey's back.

According to MacDermott, the Russian Army crossed the Danube River in June 1877 and

began a multi-pronged attack against the Turkish Army contingents in Bulgaria. While

losing some battles, the Russian Army was able to continue repelling the Turkish Army

and, finally by December-January of 1877 and 1878, respectively, the Turkish Army was

soundly defeated. The Treaty of San Stefano signaled the slow collapse of the Ottoman

Empire and created the Autonomous Bulgarian Princedom, which would only remain

provisionally governed by Russia for two years. The Bulgarians had finally gained freedom

from the Turks after 500 years.247

The years following their independence were anything but stable. Richard

Crampton states in his A Short History of Modern Bulgaria that, as multiple princes tried

to organize and modernize Bulgaria, the state quickly ran out of money and consistent

uprisings disrupted efforts for the newly formed nation to compete with its Western

European peers. More importantly, by 1915, Bulgaria joined the conflict that would

become World War I and fought on behalf of the Central Powers. The Bulgarian army was

successful initially in Macedonia, but Romanian joined the war and allied itself with the

Entente. The Serbs dealt a serious blow to Bulgarian forces in Macedonia and the Bulgarian

army divested soldiers to join Turkish forces against the Romanians. The Bulgarian

government eventually could not sustain proper amounts of food and supplies to the troops

and little remained to support the population. Among the people, unrest boiled over and

the army's morale bottomed out through 1917. By 1918, the Bulgarian army was in retreat,

the cost of living was unbearable to the average Bulgarian, and the government lost all

legitimacy. The Bulgarian government signed a cease-fire on September 29, 1918.248

247 MacDermott, 292–99. 248 Richard J Crampton, A Short History of Modern Bulgaria (Cambridge University Press, 1987), 21–

71.

76

The interwar years yielded mixed results for Bulgaria. The state developed and

implemented democratic rule from 1919 to 1923 and dabbled in it from 1931 to 1934.

However, coups ended both episodes of democracy in Bulgaria.249 Derek Aldcroft says in

his book Europe's Third World: the European Periphery in the Interwar Years, by 1923,

Bulgaria achieved near parity with its pre-war economy:

overall output was slightly down but industrial production, which recorded a dramatic jump between 1919 and 1923, was 53 per cent higher than in 1910–12, stockbreeding 10 per cent higher, but agricultural production 15 per cent down. After that there were some equally impressive gains so that industrial production by the end of the decade had more than doubled, while crop production had increased by around one quarter.250

However, Aldcroft continues, Bulgaria was dealt a serious blow during the Great

Depression. Agriculture prices, which Bulgaria was heavily dependent on for revenue, fell

by over 65% by 1934. Overall, export earnings in 1933 were less than half of what earnings

were in 1929. All sectors in the Bulgarian economy felt the pain of the global economic

crisis. Nevertheless, Bulgaria was able to weather the storm and achieve economic growth

again. By the end of the decade, Bulgaria exceeded pre-depression livestock and crop

production levels. The hardship of economic depression caused many people in agriculture

to find other profitable crops, leading to greater diversification in the agriculture sector.

Additionally, Germany became a huge trading partner to Bulgaria, buying fifty-nine

percent of its exports and providing fifty-two percent of its imports. The significant bond

between Bulgaria and Germany also facilitated the Bulgarian government's desire to invite

German military advisors to train its army. By the end of the 1930s, Bulgaria needed

significant economic improvements, but the economy was improving mostly thanks to

Germany.251 Moreover, the close ties between the two states arguably predetermined their

future alliance.

249 Agnes Cornell, Jørgen Møller, and Svend-Erik Skaaning, “The Real Lessons of the Interwar

Years,” Journal of Democracy 28, no. 3 (2017): 25, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2017.0040. 250 Derek Howard. Aldcroft, Europe’s Third World : The European Periphery in the Interwar Years,

Modern Economic and Social History (Aldershot, Hants, England ; Ashgate Pub. Co., 2006), 71. 251 Aldcroft, 71–76.

77

Bulgaria's close ties to Germany essentially restrained the then King Boris III to an

alliance with the Axis Powers. Crampton says the Nazi-Soviet pact led to stronger Soviet-

Bulgarian relations and, following a commercial treaty with Moscow, Soviet film and

literature became extremely popular in Bulgaria. Boris attempted to avoid an alliance with

any side. Boris refused a mutual assistance pact with the Soviets despite Moscow's offer to

help regain lost territory from the Romanians. Additionally, Boris refused to join the

Balkan entente in 1940 because he felt the organization leaned too closely to the western

powers. Any alliance with the West would enrage Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini, who could

then block the eastern Mediterranean from enemies of the axis powers. Eventually, with

the initial Nazi military successes and a growing popularity of the communists among the

Bulgarian people, Boris felt he had no other option but to ally with the Axis Powers in

April 1941. Boris once complained "'My army is pro-German, my wife is Italian, my

people are pro-Russian, I alone am pro-Bulgarian."252 Ultimately, Bulgaria's alliance to the

Axis Powers led to massive destruction of its economy, people, and landscape.

While joining the alliance was initially welcomed, Hitler's attack on the Soviet

Union in June 1941 quickly stunted Bulgarian exuberance.253 According to Irina Gigova

in her article The City and the Nation: Sofia's Trajectory from Glory to Rubble in WWII,

from November 1943 to April 1944, allied bombings caused enormous panic and

migration:

The capital stood empty for months, leading to the breakdown of state infrastructure and government… the air raids on Sofia paralyzed the country. They also unveiled the fragility of the Bulgarian national project: the material ventures of the previous decade proved too brittle, and even worse, national unity cracked under the first pressure.254

Crampton says, by September 5, Bulgarian officials desperately cut relations with Germany

to salvage negotiations with the Allies, but not before the Soviet Union declared war on

Bulgaria, further complicating Bulgaria's foreign policy objectives. Soviet troops entered

252 Crampton, 121–24. 253 Crampton, 125. 254 Irina Gigova, “The City and the Nation: Sofia’s Trajectory from Glory to Rubble in WWII,”

Journal of Urban History 37, no. 2 (2011): 156.

78

Bulgaria on September 8 unmolested and met with diffuse support from the population. A

communist party expediently took control of the arms of Bulgaria's government.255 By

October 28, the Bulgarian government was forced to sign the Armistice Agreement in

Moscow, amounting to a near unconditional surrender and forfeiting of any consolation in

favor of Bulgaria.256 The Soviet's Iron Curtain had fallen across Europe and included

Bulgaria.257

In Europe, Nations, and Modernity, life in the Soviet Union was difficult for

Bulgarians, especially in their attempt to rid themselves of their national identity in favor

of a Soviet identity. The Soviets copied and pasted their social, political, and economic

system onto Bulgaria, while attempting to discard Bulgarian religious practices, cultural

identity, and common education. Nevertheless, the Soviets allowed ethnic minorities,

especially the Turks, to maintain certain aspects of their cultural identity in the hopes of

transferring these loyal Soviet, socialist minorities to their home countries and spread

communism from the local level up. However, by 1958, the USSR ceased providing

exemptions, required total subservience to the Soviet ideal, and forced assimilation into the

Bulgarian nation under its empire. 258 While many socialist policies hurt the Bulgarians

long term, the state benefitted greatly from Soviet aid. According to J.F. Brown in his

RAND study, The Challenge to Soviet Interests in Eastern Europe: Bulgaria and

Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union cherished the generally positive relationship between it

and Bulgaria. Bulgaria bordered two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, and eventually

became its strongest and last remaining ally in the Balkans. Therefore, Bulgaria received a

disproportionate amount of financial aid from the USSR compared to other Soviet

255 Crampton, 133–34. 256 The Government of United States of America, The Government of United Kingdom, and The

Government of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, “The Armistice Agreement with Bulgaria; October 28, 1944,” Text, The Avalon Project, October 28, 1944, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/bulgaria.asp.

257 Peter Frankopan, The Silk Roads: A New History of the World (London, GB: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015), 396.

258 Atsuko Ichijo, ed., Europe, Nations, and Modernity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 86-97, http://www.dawsonera.com/depp/reader/protected/external/AbstractView/S9780230313897.

79

republics. Bulgarian officials took advantage of the strong financial support to build and

support better economic strength.259

As stated in Europe, Nations, and Modernity, eventually, as the end to the Soviet

Union approached and Bulgaria reaped the benefits of forced modernization, Bulgarians

revolted against Soviet restrictions and promote their national identity. Sometimes

reformers in the Bulgarian Soviet party even discussed how to reconnect with Europe.

After regaining its independence from the USSR in 1989, Bulgaria began its transition into

a free market, democratic society. While Bulgaria maintains a stable democracy and its

membership in the EU, Bulgaria is the poorest of the EU members. Additionally, other EU

members and Bulgarians perceive Bulgaria as the most corrupt. Even worse, Bulgarians do

not feel accepted as European. This perception is most unfortunate because, given the deep

dissatisfaction with how their state government is functioning; Bulgarians consistently poll

at higher than average rates among EU member populations as feeling trust between them

and EU governmental institutions.260

C. BULGARIAN ENERGY STRENGTHS AND VULNERABILITIES

The organization Export.gov explains how Bulgaria does enjoy a diverse and

advanced energy sector, allowing Bulgaria to be a net exporter of energy in the Balkans.

Figure 12 shows the diversity in the Bulgarian energy sector.

259 J.F. Brown, “The Challenge to Soviet Interests in Eastern Europe: Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, December 1986), 4–6, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/2009/N2498.pdf.

260 Atsuko Ichijo, ed., Europe, Nations, and Modernity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 86-103, http://www.dawsonera.com/depp/reader/protected/external/AbstractView/S9780230313897.

80

Figure 12. Bulgarian energy installed capacity261

Bulgaria’s development of nuclear power plants (NPPs) began in the 1970s starting

with the electricity production from the Kozlody NPP. The Belene NPP has been on hold

since the 1980s since the reactor vessels, two pressure compensators, and twenty-four

hydraulic accumulators are Russian-made. While Bulgaria closed some of the nuclear units

within the Kozlody NPP complex, Bulgaria has replaced lost energy with thermal power

plants (TPP). The Maritza Iztok Mining complex was built as the Kozlody units closed and

provides a significant amount of energy through the consumption of lignite coal. Bulgaria

has incorporated a significant amount of renewable energy sources (RES), accounting for

fourteen percent of energy production in the country.262

261 “Bulgaria—Power Generation | Export.Gov,” Export.gov, September 19, 2019, https://www.export.gov/article?id=Bulgaria-Power-Generation-Oil-and-Gas-Renewable-Sources-of-Energy-and-Energy-Efficiency.

262 “Bulgaria - Power Generation | Export.Gov.”

81

Bulgaria made minor improvements to open its energy sector to the free market. In

2014, Bulgaria introduced its Independent Bulgarian Energy Exchange (IBEX) index,

attempting to increase market transparency and set prices based on the free market.263

Additionally, according to Dimitar Zwaitkow of CMS Law Firm, Bulgarian officials

passed a law forcing energy producers to trade on the free market if those energy producers

provided one MW to four MW of energy to the market. Experts expect liquidity to increase

in the IBEX, which will increase electricity available and lower prices. Bulgaria, in

accordance with a ruling from the Court of the Justice of the EU, should cease taxing

energy producers for exporting electricity to other European countries. This ruling will

benefit Bulgarian producers as they received market value for the energy they produce.

IBEX has been coordinating with markets in multiple surrounding countries to unify

markets and stabilize prices.264

Besides these few positives, the Bulgarian energy market needs significant

improvements. State-owned companies control a majority of the market. For example,

Bulgarian Energy Holding owns Maritza East Mines, Maritza East 2 TPP, Kozlody NPP,

the National Electricity Company, Bulgargaz, Bulgartransgaz, and Bulgartel.265

Unbundling Bulgaria's energy sector would go a long way to securing its energy market.

According to an energy report from the Center for the Study of Democracy, Bulgarian

officials provided strong incentives to invest in RES in 2008-2009. By 2011, because of

massive investment in this part of the energy sector, rather than reverse the incentive

programs, the government added layers of bureaucratic red tape to disincentivize RES

investment. The legislation promoted corruption and the public providers of RES energy

263 “IBEX - Independent Bulgarian Energy Exchange,” Association of European Energy Exchanges,

January 1, 2015, https://www.europex.org/members/ibex-independent-bulgarian-energy-exchange/. 264 Dimitar Zwiatkow and Maria Harizanova, “Bulgaria: The Drive for Full Liberalization of the

Energy Market and the Upcoming Changes,” CMS Law Firm, April 29, 2019, https://cms.law/en/bgr/publication/bulgaria-the-drive-for-full-liberalization-of-the-energy-market-and-the-upcoming-changes.

265 Ministry of Economy and Energy of Bulgaria, “Republic of Bulgaria Ministry of Economy and Energy Is Recruiting for the Management Team of Bulgarian Energy,” Government, Ministry of Economy and Energy of Bulgaira, May 16, 2009, https://web.archive.org/web/20081221111445/http://www.mee.government.bg/doc_vop/Job%20Ad%20Visual_final_etap1_EN.pdf.

82

have not paid significant debts to the private RES producers. Additionally, Bulgaria

continues to prioritize the South Stream project despite having little control over its

execution, having to adjust to a price tag that has increased three times, and ignoring EU

warnings that the project breaches EU legislation on free competition and energy. The

report continues to describe how two members of parliament tried to change the status of

the project to circumvent EU legislation. The members of parliament's disregard for

agreements and international law highlighted to the EU the depth of corruption within the

government.266

The degree of insecurity in the Bulgarian energy sector comparatively to other

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries is

astounding. Bulgarian ranked third worst in the International Index of Energy Security

Risks (IIESR) of the Institute for 21st Century Energy at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

The only countries with a higher (or worse) score were Iraq and Singapore.267Stefanov says

Bulgaria has very high-energy poverty with only one-third its population able to afford

heating costs and sixty percent uses coal and wood to heat their homes. Additionally, the

inability for people to pay for none-renewable energy causes the government to keep prices

low artificially, which hurt energy producers' bottom line. Those producers are often state-

owned, passing the debt to (who else but) the Bulgarian population. Bulgaria also loses

approximately fifty percent of its energy as it traverses the energy grid, compared to thirty

percent in most of Europe. Bulgaria spends annually between eight to thirteen percent of

GDP on non-renewable energy, almost all of which is imported. Therefore, the economy

suffers greatly whenever international prices increase. Furthermore, Jo Harper of Deutsche

Welle reports Russia supplies ninety percent of the gas needed for Bulgaria's consumer

market, therefore, when the Russia-Ukraine gas disputes occurred, Romania and Bulgaria

failed to receive the gas needed for their populations. Bulgaria now looks to Israel as an

266 Ruslan Stefanov et al., “Energy Sector Governance and Energy (In)Security in Bulgaria” (Sofia,

Bulgaria: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2014), 11–12. 267 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “International Index of Energy Security Risk: Assessing Risk in a

Global Energy Market” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Institute of 21st Century Energy, 2013), 102–3, https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/InternationalIndex-Final2013.pdf.

83

alternate supplier of gas, but progress is slow.268 With all the issues within its energy sector,

the suspected priorities of the government should be policies that would fix these issues.

However, Bulgaria continues to stress the importance of building the Belene NPP and the

South Stream pipeline, neither of which would diversify its market to any significant

amount and would keep prices high for consumers and debt high for producers.269

D. COMPARISON AND RECOMMENDATIONS

With Bulgarian history and energy sector analysis in mind, comparing history,

strengths, and vulnerabilities between Georgia, Ukraine, and Bulgaria will provide insight

into how NATO and the EU can improve energy security in Georgia.

The first similarity between all three is the relatively close historical connection to

the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and historical ethnic links to Russia. Georgia,

Ukraine, and Bulgaria fell under the influence or direct control of Moscow through the

existence of the Soviet Union. Additionally, Russian propaganda claims Russia has been

protectors of these smaller neighboring countries, especially as saviors of each from the

control of the Ottoman Empire. Russia has repeatedly attempted to depopulate or

manipulate minority groups in each state. Russian officials tried to eradicate Tartars from

the Crimea, the Abkhaz in Georgia, and spread communism through the Turks in Bulgaria.

Russia used proxies and/or conventional forces to regain control of the Crimea and eastern

Ukraine, to influence the Abkhaz and Ossetians against the Georgian government, and used

ultra-nationalists to suppress anti-Russian protests and to protect the Russian Wolves biker

gang during the Wolves' trip through Bulgaria.270 Each share a common Eastern Orthodox

belief system with Russia and struggle with corruption, albeit different degrees of

corruption. Each country enjoys a small degree of energy sector diversification, but rely

heavily on a few critical nodes to provide a bulk of the energy to their respective

268 Jo Harper, “Bulgaria Tries to Loosen Russian Grip with New Gas Pipeline Deals | DW |

23.02.2018,” dw.com, February 23, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/bulgaria-tries-to-loosen-russian-grip-with-new-gas-pipeline-deals/a-42695513.

269 Stefanov et al., 13. 270 Mariya Cheresheva, “Russian ‘Wolves’ Ride Into Trouble in Bulgaria,” Balkan Insight (blog), June

30, 2016, https://balkaninsight.com/2016/06/30/arrival-of-putin-s-bikers-provokes-tensions-in-bulgaria-06-30-2016/.

84

populations. Following non-renewable energy manipulation, each country has tried to

diversify their energy imports to mitigate economic repercussions. Each has experienced

significant cyberattacks purportedly by the Russian government or its proxies. Lastly, as

each state experienced stronger central control in Moscow over their state's independence,

each grew increasingly rebellious and earned their independence from the Soviet Union.

The similarities are extensive, but there are critical differences.

Bulgaria has not been through a recent armed conflict with Russia, while Georgia

and Ukraine have seen the most aggressive form of Russia's foreign policy. The critical

factors that most likely contribute to Bulgaria's relative safety from direct war with Russia

is geographical location and its membership into the EU and NATO. Georgia and Ukraine

felt the destructive results of cyberattacks in concert with military or paramilitary force

maneuver. Allegedly, the Russian government attacked Georgian officials and institutions

following the Georgian purchase of U.S. F-16 fighter aircraft, but the cyberattacks did not

affect the energy sector and armed conflict was not a factor.271 The critical differences in

the energy sector between Bulgaria and the other two states are Bulgaria does not have

domestic supply of non-renewable energy resources outside of lignite coal and it does not

receive gas resources directly from Russia, but through pipelines that traverse multiple

other states before reaching domestic distribution. Given the similarities and differences,

what could be some possible solutions to create better energy security in Georgia and

increase the strength of our alliances?

1. Decrease Corruption

The international community and the Bulgarian population has a deep-seated

perception that the government engages in widespread corruption. The EU and NATO

could look to Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) agency

for potential remedies. According to Gent Salihu of the Oxford University Politics Blog,

271 Ihvan Radoykov, “Bulgaria: Cyberattack Targets Premier, Top Officials,” Anadolu Agency, July 23,

2019, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/science-technology/bulgaria-cyberattack-targets-premier-top-officials/1539564; Marc Santora, “5 Million Bulgarians Have Their Personal Data Stolen in Hack,” The New York Times, July 17, 2019, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/17/world/europe/bulgaria-hack-cyberattack.html.

85

USAID considers the ICAC as possibly the most successful agency in diminishing

corruption in a state. Its success results from not only an aggressive prosecution of high-

profile corruption, but also the change of public perception.272 The Bulgarian government

will likely protest the establishment of such an agency in its country, but the EU and NATO

could offer lucrative and layered incentives to improve Bulgaria's corruption issues.

Layered incentives would provide additional incentives as the corruption problem

improves and have detailed markers of what Bulgaria would have to improve to receive

additional incentives. Additionally, anti-corruption policy within the energy sector should

promote greater market transparency and massive cuts to bureaucratic red tape in Bulgaria

to increase interest from foreign investors. Anti-corruption efforts and improvement should

be high, if not first, on the EU's and NATO's priority list since this likely inhibits Bulgaria's

progress in all economic sectors, including energy, and affects the confidence of the

population.

2. Diversifying Supplies

The EU and NATO should assist Bulgaria in finding and supporting its exploration

of alternate suppliers of energy resources, with priority towards acquiring alternate gas

exporters. Moreover, the EU should support pipelines from Europe to Bulgaria, allowing

it to receive Russian gas through Western Europe much like Ukraine since the Crimean

and Eastern Ukrainian crises. While Bulgaria pursues alternate energy resources, the EU

and NATO should invest heavily to influence Bulgarians against Russian narratives.

According to Mark Snowiss from Voice of America, the United States suspected Gazprom

and Russian influence when the Bulgarian government decided to block shale exploration

in Bulgaria, causing the cancellation of Chevron's license for unconventional gas

exploration. The government's decision came after widespread anti-fracking protests.

However, Bulgarians showed little interest in ecological issues previously and the

population pays some of the highest gas prices in Europe. Despite supporting exploration

272 Gent Salihu, “Fighting Corruption: Effective Examples from Surprising Places,” The Oxford

University Politics Blog (blog), November 26, 2012, https://blog.politics.ox.ac.uk/fighting-corruption-effective-examples-from-surprising-places/.

86

that would benefit the economy and their wallets, their protests stopped explorations.273 If

the EU and NATO could promote the benefits of exploration and the potential benefits to

the average Bulgarian, there is high possibilities to not only hurt the Russian economy, but

also better Bulgarian energy security. In addition to expanding the gas sector, the EU could

provide some options for expansion in the energy sector.

3. Economic Might

While sanctions have proven as an effective tool against actors that violate

international law,274 the EU could pursue options that help our allies against our

adversaries. In addition to providing incentives to Bulgaria for improving corruption levels,

the EU could also provide monetary benefits to companies within the energy market (and

other markets) to help states that benefit the EU's economic alliance. For example, to

mitigate some of the risks of operating in Bulgaria, the EU could provide tax incentives for

companies that meaningfully improve Bulgaria's energy security. As companies increase

operations in Bulgaria, they will demand more transparency in the energy market and anti-

corruption policies, promote messages for greater energy resource exploration, improve

the economy, and decrease unemployment rates. This policy could reinforce other EU and

NATO efforts to provide greater energy security in Bulgaria.

4. Ride the Positive European Attitude, Fix the Poor NATO Perception

Bulgarians, especially younger generations, have very favorable impressions of the

EU with 77% holding favorable views over 20%.275 However, only forty-seven percent of

Bulgarians would support defending other NATO allies (compared to sixty-eight in

Hungary, eighty-one in Romania, and ninety in Poland).276 NATO, in addition to other pro-

273 Mark Snowiss, “Bulgaria Key Battleground in US-Russia Energy War,” Voice of America,

February 23, 2015, https://www.voanews.com/europe/bulgaria-key-battleground-us-russia-energy-war. 274 Kathy Gilsinan, “A Boom Time for U.S. Sanctions,” The Atlantic, May 3, 2019,

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/05/why-united-states-uses-sanctions-so-much/588625/. 275 Richard Wike et al., “Views on the European Union across Europe,” Pew Research Center’s Global

Attitudes Project, October 14, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/10/14/the-european-union/. 276 Martin Dimitrov, “Pro-EU Bulgaria Has Little Faith in NATO,” Balkan Insight (blog), March 5,

2018, https://balkaninsight.com/2018/03/05/pro-eu-bulgaria-has-little-faith-in-nato-03-02-2018/.

87

Western messaging, needs to improve its own image. The organization should explore the

cognitive dissonance between the EU and NATO gap in support and improve its image. It

could tie into improving economic and regional security efforts to ensure the average

Bulgarian feels safe and help change perception on corruption in the government as

corruption cases are prosecuted. Additionally, NATO must focus efforts on cybersecurity.

Russian hacking severely damaged the personal lives of average Bulgarians. NATO could

help build defenses in the cyber domain and promote messages that hurt Russia and help

NATO. As the energy sector diversifies and grows, it is reasonable to suspect that Russia

will try to manipulate non-renewable energy resources or conduct cyberattacks against the

energy sector to increase grievances among the population as it did in Georgia and Ukraine.

Therefore, it is critical NATO build cyber defenses now when the cyber threat is lower

than and not as pervasive as shown in Georgia and especially Ukraine.

E. CLOSING REMARKS

As seen in the extreme cases of the Russo-Georgian War and the crisis in Ukraine,

Putin and the Russian government are willing and capable of vast disruption in the energy

market. NATO and the EU should begin to focus resources and effort on critical

vulnerabilities. Bulgaria is one of the most reliant on Russia for gas resources, lacks

domestic supplies, and is one of the most energy poor in the world. The EU and NATO

should look for more effective ways to improve energy security in Bulgaria and stabilize

the West's influence in the Balkans. This will aid in mitigating vulnerabilities in the energy

sector and could provide a blueprint for improving energy security among the less

vulnerable states in each alliance.

88


89

LIST OF REFERENCES

“The Accidental Superpower Maps – Peter Zeihan.” Accessed July 10, 2019. http://zeihan.com/the-map-room/.

Agenda.ge. “Azerbaijan, UK, Netherlands Are Georgia’s Top Investor Countries in 2018.” Accessed July 28, 2019. http://agenda.ge/en/news/2019/658.

Agenda.ge. “Kartli Wind Park Generates over 7m KWh of Electricity in January.” Georgian News, February 1, 2018. http://agenda.ge/en/news/2018/239.

Al Jazeera. “Ukraine Separatists Declare Independence,” May 12, 2014. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/05/ukraine-separatists-declare-independence-201451219375613219.html.

Aldcroft, Derek Howard. Europe’s Third World : The European Periphery in the Interwar Years. Modern Economic and Social History. Aldershot, Hants, England ; Ashgate Pub. Co., 2006.

Antidze, Margarita. “Georgia to Build Natural Gas Storage, Coal-Fired Power Plant.” Reuters, November 29, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/georgia-energy-idUSL8N1NZ4WS.

Asmus, Ronald. A Little War That Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West. St. Martin’s Press, 2010.

Bank, World. “Ukraine - Unbundling Options for Gas Transmission and Storage.” Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group, 2016. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/860491467995388686/pdf/104506-WP-P151927-PUBLIC-Ukraine-gas-unbundling-options-for-TSO-and-SSO-executive-summary-FINAL.pdf.

Barber, Tony. “Bulgaria’s Reliance on Russian Gas Almost over.” Financial Times, November 28, 2016. https://www.ft.com/content/4a413060-9a07-11e6-8f9b-70e3cabccfae.

Bechev, Dimitar. Rival Power: Russia’s Influence in Southeast Europe. London, GB: Yale University Press, 2017.

Bilinsky, Yaroslav. The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1964.

Buck, Tarasine. “A History of the Russian Language.” Brigham Young University, February 24, 1998. http://linguistics.byu.edu/classes/Ling450ch/reports/russian.html.

90

Chan, Sewell. “Mike Pence, in Montenegro, Assures Balkans of U.S. Support.” The New York Times, December 22, 2017, sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/world/europe/pence-montenegro-markovic-nato.html.

Chichinadze, Anna. “Tbilisi Protests Dzuarikau-Tskhinvali Gas Pipeline.” Georgia Today, August 27, 2009. http://old.georgiatoday.ge/news_details.php?id=806&version=.

Cohen, Ariel. “Russia’s Nord Stream II Pipeline Is Ukraine’s Worst Nightmare.” Forbes. Accessed March 10, 2019. https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2018/06/18/russias-nord-stream-ii-pipeline-is-ukraines-worst-nightmare/.

Collins, Gabriel. “Russia’s Use of the ‘Energy Weapon’ in Europe.” IN EUROPE, n.d., 8.

“Conscious Uncoupling - European Energy Security.” Accessed March 10, 2019. https://www.economist.com/briefing/2014/04/03/conscious-uncoupling.

Cornell, Agnes, Jørgen Møller, and Svend-Erik Skaaning. “The Real Lessons of the Interwar Years.” Journal of Democracy 28, no. 3 (2017): 14–28. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2017.0040.

“Countries with the Biggest Coal Reserves.” Accessed September 19, 2019. https://www.mining-technology.com/features/feature-the-worlds-biggest-coal-reserves-by-country/.

Crampton, Richard J. A Short History of Modern Bulgaria. Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Curtis, Glenn E. Poland: A Country Study. Washington: US Library of Congress, 1992. http://countrystudies.us/poland/11.htm.

DailySabah. “PKK Terrorists Attack Pipeline in Turkey’s Northeastern Kars Province.” Accessed July 21, 2019. https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/2015/08/24/pkk-terrorists-attack-pipeline-in-turkeys-northeastern-kars-province.

Derluguian, Georgi M. “The Tale of Two Resorts: Abkhazia and Ajaria Before and Since the Soviet Collapse,” n.d., 32.

“Desperate Georgia Gets Some Gas.” BBC News. January 23, 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4638566.stm.

Dupuy, Arnold C. “Patterns of Regionalism and Security: Energy as a Transformational Influence in the Black Sea Region,” April 26, 2016. https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/bitstream/handle/10919/71637/Dupuy_AC_D_2016.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

91

“Dzuarikau–Tskhinvali Pipeline.” In Wikipedia, February 15, 2019. https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Dzuarikau%E2%80%93Tskhinvali_pipeline&oldid=883483468.

Esipova, Neli, and Julie Ray. “Eastern Europeans, CIS Residents See Russia, U.S. as Threats.” Gallup.com, April 4, 2016. https://news.gallup.com/poll/190415/eastern-europeans-cis-residents-russia-threats.aspx.

Frizell, Sam. “Ukraine Protestors Seize Kiev As President Flees.” Time, February 22, 2014. http://world.time.com/2014/02/22/ukraines-president-flees-protestors-capture-kiev/.

Gadonneix, Pierre, Francisco Barnés de Castro, Norberto Franco de Medeiros, Richard Drouin, C P Jain, Younghoon David Kim, Mary M’Mukindia, et al. “Survey of Energy Resources Interim Update 2009.” World Energy Council, July 2009.

Gazprom. “Foreign Partners: Bulgaria | Gazprom Export.” Accessed October 22, 2019. http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/partners/bulgaria/.

“Georgia: From Reformer to Performer.” Systematic Country Diagnostic. World Bank Group, 2018. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/496731525097717444/pdf/GEO-SCD-04-24-04272018.pdf.

GeorgianJournal. “Huge Natural Gas Reserves Discovered in Eastern Georgia.” Accessed June 21, 2019. https://www.georgianjournal.ge/business/32160-huge-natural-gas-reserves-discovered-in-eastern-georgia.html.

Georgian State Electrosystem. “Data from the Power System,” 2019. http://www.gse.com.ge/momkhmareblebistvis/monatsemebi-elektroenergetikuli-sistemidan.

Gogun, Alexander. Stalin’s Commandos: Ukrainian Partisan Forces on the Eastern Front. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015.

Google Maps. “Google Maps.” Accessed October 21, 2019. https://www.google.com/maps/place/Ukraine/@45.2497749,21.8000243,2561462m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m5!3m4!1s0x40d1d9c154700e8f:0x1068488f64010!8m2!3d48.379433!4d31.1655799.

“Great Northern War.” In Wikipedia, July 9, 2019. https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Great_Northern_War&oldid=905548234.

92

Gutterman, Ivan, and Wojtek Grojec. “A Timeline Of All Russia-Related Sanctions.” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, September 19, 2018. https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-sanctions-timeline/29477179.html.

Hammes, Thomas X. “Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation:” Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, January 1, 2005. https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA430089.

Heinrich, Andreas. “Under the Kremlin’s Thumb: Does Increased State Control in the Russian Gas Sector Endanger European Energy Security?” Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 9 (November 2008): 1539–74. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130802362292.

Hewitt, George. “History in the Context of the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict.” Iran and the Caucasus 18, no. 3 (2014): 289–314. https://doi.org/10.1163/1573384X-20140305.

Higgins, Andrew. “In Expanding Russian Influence, Faith Combines With Firepower.” The New York Times, January 20, 2018, sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/14/world/europe/russia-orthodox-church.html.

Higgins, Andrew, and David M. Herszenhorn. “Defying Russia, Ukraine Signs E.U. Trade Pact.” New York Times. June 27, 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/28/world/europe/ukraine-signs-trade-agreement-with-european-union.html.

Higgins, Andrew, and Steven Erlanger. “Gunmen Seize Government Buildings in Crimea.” The New York Times, February 27, 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/world/europe/crimea-ukraine.html.

Hosking, Geoffrey A. Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917. Harvard University Press, 1997.

“Hybrid Conflict: The Roles of Russia, North Korea and China.” Dutch National Network of Safety and Security Analysts, May 2018.

Institute for War and Peace Reporting. “Abkhazia, Georgia’s Energy Security at Risk.” Accessed July 21, 2019. https://iwpr.net/global-voices/abkhazia-georgias-energy-security-risk.

International Energy Agency. “Georgia Energy Factsheet,” 2017. https://www.eu4energy.iea.org/Documents/Georgia-Final-HD.pdf.

“Is There a Map of Kievan Rus’ with the Complete Boundaries of Modern Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine?.” Accessed July 29, 2019. https://www.quora.com/Is-there-a-map-of-Kievan-Rus%E2%80%99-with-the-complete-boundaries-of-modern-Belarus-Russia-and-Ukraine.

93

Istrate, Dominik. “Suspicions Emerge That Ukraine is Importing Coal From the Donbass, Via Belarus.” Emerging Europe | News, Intelligence, Community, February 22, 2019. https://emerging-europe.com/news/suspicions-emerge-that-ukraine-is-importing-coal-from-the-donbass-via-belarus/.

Ivanov, Lyubomir. “Essential History of Bulgaria in Seven Pages,” 2–3, 2007.

Karagiannis, Emmanuel. Energy and Security in the Caucasus. Routledge, 2013.

Keating, Dave. “Why Did France Just Save Nord Stream 2?” Forbes. Accessed March 10, 2019. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davekeating/2019/02/08/why-did-france-just-save-nord-stream-2/.

Kendall, Bridget. “Ukraine: Pro-Russians Storm Offices in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv.” BBC News, April 7, 2014, sec. Europe. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26910210.

Kozhokin, Evgeny M. “Georgia-Abkhazia.” In U.S. and Russian Policymaking With Respect to the Use of Force, edited by Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1996. https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF129/CF-129-chapter5.html.

Koznarsky, Taras. “Izmail Sreznevsky’s Zaporozhian Antiquity as a Memory Project.” Eighteenth-Century Studies Vol. 35, no. Issue 1 (2001): 92–100. https://doi.org/10.1353/ecs.2001.0062.

Kramer, Andrew E. “Russia Cuts Gas, and Europe Shivers.” The New York Times, January 6, 2009, sec. Europe. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/07/world/europe/07gazprom.html.

Krushelnycky, Askold. “Ukraine’s New President Takes Oath Of Office.” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, January 23, 2005. https://www.rferl.org/a/1057026.html.

Lally, Kathy, Will Englund, and William Booth. “Russian Parliament Approves Use of Troops in Ukraine.” The Washington Post, March 1, 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russian-parliament-approves-use-of-troops-in-crimea/2014/03/01/d1775f70-a151-11e3-a050-dc3322a94fa7_story.html?noredirect=on.

“Lazica.” In Wikipedia, May 8, 2019. https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Lazica&oldid=896042215.

Lewytzkyj, Borys. Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine, 1953-1980. AMIA/Editorial Milá, 1984.

94

Library, CNN. “2008 Georgia Russia Conflict Fast Facts.” CNN. Accessed February 18, 2019. https://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/13/world/europe/2008-georgia-russia-conflict/index.html.

Ludwig, Christopher Walker, Shanthi Kalathil, Jessica. “Forget Hearts and Minds.” Foreign Policy (blog). Accessed February 18, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/14/forget-hearts-and-minds-sharp-power/.

MacDermott, Mercia. A History of Bulgaria: 1393-1885. New York, NY: Frederick A. Praegerm Inc., 1962.

Magocsi, Paul R. A History of Ukraine. University of Toronto Press, 1996.

Malia, Martin E. The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991. New York, NY: Free Press, 1994.

Maness, Ryan. Discussion on Russian Hybrid Warfare, May 2, 2019.

Mattis, Jim. “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy,” n.d., 14.

McCausland, Phil. “Russia Announces Another Cease-Fire Deal with Ukraine Amid Tensions with West.” NBC News, February 18, 2017. https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-crisis/russia-announces-another-ceasefire-deal-ukraine-amid-tensions-west-n722841.

Mchedlishvili, George. “What’s behind Russia’s Actions in Georgia?,” August 10, 2015, sec. Europe. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33675488.

Milekic, Sven, and Maja Zivanovic. “Border Disputes Still Bedevil Ex-Yugoslav States.” Balkan Insight, July 3, 2017. https://balkaninsight.com/2017/07/03/border-disputes-still-bedevil-most-ex-yugoslav-states-07-01-2017-1/.

Ministry of Economic Developmetn and Trade of Ukraine. “Invest Ukraine - Open for U.” Accessed September 19, 2019. http://investukrmap.org.ua/en/RegionPassports/Maps?map=3.

Myers, Steven Lee, and Ellen Barry. “Putin Reclaims Crimea for Russia and Bitterly Denounces the West.” The New York Times, March 18, 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/19/world/europe/ukraine.html.

NATO. “NATO’s Response to Hybrid Threats.” NATO. Accessed February 19, 2019. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_156338.htm.

Necsutu, Madalin. “NATO Urges Russia to Withdraw Troops from Moldova.” Balkan Insight, July 12, 2018. https://balkaninsight.com/2018/07/12/nato-urges-russia-to-redraw-its-troops-from-moldova-07-12-2018/.

95

Network, New East. “Post-Soviet World: What You Need to Know about Ukraine.” The Guardian, June 9, 2014, sec. World news. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/09/-sp-post-soviet-world-need-to-know-ukraine.

Neustadt, Richard E, and Ernest R. May. Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2011.

The Observatory of Economic Complexity. “Products That Russia Exports to Ukraine (2017).” Accessed September 19, 2019. https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/rus/ukr/show/2017/.

Pelenski, Jaroslaw. “The Origins of the Official Muscovite Claims to the Kievan Inheritance.” Harvard Ukrainian Studies Vol. 1, no. Issue 1 (1977): 29.

Peters, Wolfgang. Ukrainian Gas Markets. E-mail, August 26, 2019.

Petersen, Alexandros. “The 1992-93 Georgia-Abkhazia War: A Forgotten Conflict.” Caucasian Review of International Affairs 2, no. 4 (2008): 187–99.

“Power Sector Overview: Georgia.” KPMG Network, December 2016. https://home.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/ge/pdf/2017/Georgia%20-%20Power%20Sector%20Overview.pdf.

Prentice, Alessandra. “How a U.S. Coal Deal Warmed Ukraine’s Ties with Trump.” Reuters, February 19, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-usa-coal-idUSKCN1G31V8.

Prince, Todd. “After Years Of Stalling, Can Ukraine Finally Become Energy Self-Sufficient?” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. Accessed September 21, 2019. https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-foreign-investment-imports/30165068.html.

“The Problem of Eastern Galacia, 1919-1923.” Central Intelligence Agency, March 4, 1944. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP08C01297R000500160027-3.pdf.

“Profile: Ukraine’s Ousted President Viktor Yanukovych.” BBC News, February 28, 2014, sec. Europe. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25182830.

Pruitt, Sarah. “How a Five-Day War With Georgia Allowed Russia to Reassert Its Military Might.” HISTORY. Accessed July 1, 2019. https://www.history.com/news/russia-georgia-war-military-nato.

RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. “Russian Troops Demarcate Georgian Pipeline.” Accessed July 6, 2019. https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-troops-demarcate-georgian-oil-pipeline/27126985.html.

96

RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. “Thaci Says Pence Pledges To Support Kosovo’s NATO Bid.” Accessed March 8, 2019. https://www.rferl.org/a/pence-praises-montenegro-standing-up-russian-pressure/28653934.html.

Rayfield, Donald. Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia. London: Reaktion Books, 2012.

reddit. “R/MapPorn - Bulgar Migration Map in the 7th Century [2180x1430].” Accessed October 28, 2019. https://www.reddit.com/r/MapPorn/comments/76xcnb/bulgar_migration_map_in_the_7th_century_2180x1430/.

Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. “Syrian Refugees Grapple with Adapting to Life in Abkhazia.” Refworld. Accessed July 28, 2019. https://www.refworld.org/docid/548ad6b74.html.

“Relations with Russia.” NATO. Accessed February 19, 2019. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50090.htm.

Rukhadze, Vasili. “Azerbaijan Becomes Monopoly Supplier of Natural Gas to Georgia.” Jamestown. Accessed July 15, 2019. https://jamestown.org/program/azerbaijan-becomes-monopoly-supplier-natural-gas-georgia/.

Sabonis-Helf, Theresa. “The Future of Hydropower in the Country of Georgia.” Accessed June 22, 2019. https://www.hydroworld.com/articles/hr/print/volume-36/issue-7/articles/the-future-of-hydropower-in-the-country-of-georgia.html.

Schneider, William. “Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution.’” The Atlantic, December 14, 2004. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/12/ukraines-orange-revolution/305157/.

Sikharulidze, Roland, Keti Skhireli, Gigla Sikharulidze, Vasil Sulkhanishvili, Guram Rodonaia, Gvantsa Pochkhua, and Davit Mujirishvili. “Enguri 1 HPP Pre-Feasibility Study: Upper Enguri Rivver Basin.” USAID, September 20, 2012. http://www.energy.gov.ge/projects/pdf/pages/Enguri%201%20Hesi%20710%20geo.pdf.

Stanchev, Zhivko. “1876 April Uprising Placed Bulgarian National Issue into European Agenda.” Radio Bulgaria, April 20, 2012. https://bnr.bg/en/post/100150355/1876-april-uprising-placed-bulgarian-national-issue-into-european-agenda.

Steinzova, Lucie, and Kateryna Oliynyk. “The Sparks of Change: Ukraine’s Euromaiden Protests.” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, November 21, 2018. https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-politics-euromaidan-protests/29608541.html.

97

Stratfor. “Turkey: Implications of a Blast on the BTC Pipeline.” Accessed July 21, 2019. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/turkey-implications-blast-btc-pipeline.

Subtelny, Orest. Ukraine: A History. 2nd Edition. University of Toronto Press, 1994.

Suny, Ronald Grigor. The Making of the Georgian Nation. Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988.

Sutela, Pekka. “The Underachiever: Ukraine’s Economy Since 1991.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Accessed August 26, 2019. https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/09/underachiever-ukraine-s-economy-since-1991-pub-47451.

Tagliavini, Heidi. “Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia.” Council of the European Union, 2009. http://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG_Volume_I2.pdf.

Talmazan, Yuliya. “Maiden Massacre Anniversary: Ukraine Remembers Bloody Day of Protests.” NBC News, February 20, 2019. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/maidan-massacre-anniversary-ukraine-remembers-bloody-day-protests-n973156.

Tatarenko, Anastasiia. “The Legal Status and Modern History of Crimean Autonomy.” Verfassungsblog (blog), April 2, 2014. https://verfassungsblog.de/the-legal-status-and-modern-history-of-crimean-autonomy/.

Timtchenko, Ilya. “Westinghouse Seeks Bigger Share of Nuclear Fuel Supply.” KyivPost, June 8, 2018. https://www.kyivpost.com/business/westinghouse-seeks-bigger-share-of-nuclear-fuel-supply.html.

Trump, Donald J. “National Security Strategy of the United States of America.” EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT WASHINGTON DC WASHINGTON United States, 2017.

Tsereteli, Mamuka. “Impact of the Russia-Georgia War on the South Caucasus Transportation Corridor.” The Jamestown Foundation, 2009. https://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Impact_of_the_Russia-Georgia_War.pdf.

T︠zvetkov, Plamen S. A History of the Balkans: A Regional Overview from a Bulgarian Perspective. Vol. 1. Edwin Mellen Pr, 1993.

“Ukraine Crisis: Timeline,” November 13, 2014, sec. Europe. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275.

98

“Ukraine In World War I (1914-1917).” Accessed August 20, 2019. https://geomap.com.ua/en-uh10/260.html.

“Ukraine Profile.” BBC News, July 29, 2019, sec. Europe. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18010123.

“Ukrainian Gas Reserves Hit Seven-Year High as Country Prepares for Russia Talks.” Emerging Europe, September 11, 2019. https://emerging-europe.com/news/ukrainian-gas-reserves-hit-seven-year-high-as-country-prepares-russia-talks/.

U.S. Department of State. “Briefing on European Energy Security and the Nord Stream 2.” Accessed March 8, 2019. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/12/287983.htm.

U.S. Mission to the European Union. “Europe Must Retain Control of Its Energy Security,” February 8, 2019. https://useu.usmission.gov/europe-must-retain-control-of-its-energy-security/.

Votel, Joseph L, Charles T Cleveland, Charles T Connett, and Will Irwin. “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone.” Joint Forces Quarterly 80, no. 1 (2016).

Walker, Shaun, and Alec Luhn. “Petro Poroshenko Wins Ukraine Presidency, According to Exit Polls.” The Guardian, May 25, 2014, sec. World news. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/25/petro-poroshenko-ukraine-president-wins-election.

Wojnowski, Zbigniew. “The Soviet People: National and Supranational Identities in the USSR After 1945.” Nationalities Paper, no. 43 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2014.953467.

Wood, L. Todd. “In a Masterstroke of Statecraft, Russia May Soon Control Ukraine’s Gas Fields.” The Washington Times, July 8, 2019. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/jul/8/russia-may-soon-control-ukrainian-gas-fields/.

“World Energy Resources 2016.” World Energy Council, October 2016. https://www.worldenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/World-Energy-Resources-Full-report-2016.10.03.pdf.

Yurchenko, Alisa. “The Rich and Powerful Cash In From Ukraine’s Green Energy Gold Rush.” OCCRP, May 9, 2019. https://www.occrp.org/en/investigations/the-rich-and-powerful-cash-In-from-ukraines-green-energy-gold-rush.

99

Zeihan, Peter. The Accidental Super Power: The Next Generation of American Preeminence and the Coming Global Disorder. New York, NY: Twelve, 2016.

Zeynalova, Leman. “Timeframe for Implementation of AGRI Project Revealed.” Trend, March 8, 2019. https://en.trend.az/business/energy/3030148.html.

Община Котел. “Георги Мамарчев.” Accessed October 31, 2019. https://kotel.bg/en/vidni-lichnosti-rodeni-v-kotel/georgi-mamarchev/.

100


101

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 2. Dudley Knox Library Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California