Russia's Climate Policies and Local Reality

This article was downloaded by: [Dr Liza Skryzhevska]On: 10 July 2015, At: 08:21Publisher: Taylor & FrancisInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: 5 Howick Place, London, SW1P 1WG

Click for updates

Polar GeographyPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tpog20

Russia’s climate policies and localrealityYelizaveta Skryzhevskaa, Veli-Pekka Tynkkynenb & Simo Leppänenc

a Department of Geography, Miami University of Ohio, Oxford, OH,USAb Department of Social Research & Aleksanteri Institute,University of Helsinki, P.O. Box 42, FI-00014 University of Helsinki,Finlandc Center for Markets in Transition, Aalto University School ofBusiness, P.O. Box 21230, FI-00076 AALTO, FinlandPublished online: 10 Jul 2015.

To cite this article: Yelizaveta Skryzhevska, Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen & Simo Leppänen (2015) Russia’sclimate policies and local reality, Polar Geography, 38:2, 146-170

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1088937X.2015.1052031

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever orhowsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arisingout of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &

http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/1088937X.2015.1052031&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2015-07-10

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tpog20

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1088937X.2015.1052031

Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Dr

Liz

a Sk

ryzh

evsk

a] a

t 08:

21 1

0 Ju

ly 2

015

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Russia’s climate policies and local reality

YELIZAVETA SKRYZHEVSKAa*, VELI-PEKKA TYNKKYNENb andSIMO LEPPANENc

aDepartment of Geography, Miami University of Ohio, Oxford, OH, USA;bDepartment of Social Research & Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki,

P.O. Box 42, FI-00014 University of Helsinki, Finland;cCenter for Markets in Transition, Aalto University School of Business, P.O. Box 21230,

FI-00076 AALTO, Finland

(Received 9 May 2015; accepted 13 May 2015)

In their latest report, the IPCC acknowledges the importance of local govern-

ments in conducting climate change (CC) adaptation measures. However, therole of local governments has not been widely discussed in the CC policyliterature. In this paper, we attempt to bridge this gap by utilizing the unique

interview data from 14 Russian localities, the results of which revealed three keyfindings. First, the federal government of Russia recognizes the problem of CC,but due to budget constraints local authorities cannot implement adaptation

actions in their regional planning. Second, only 2 of the 14 surveyed regions havea CC adaptation plan, while a few others incorporate some adaptation measuresin their socio-economic development plans. Third, regions with notable agricul-

tural, forestry and fishing sectors have experienced a more significant impactfrom CC on their economies, and most of the interviewed regional authoritiesperceived these effects as negative.

1. Introduction

The latest IPCC (2014) report confirms with ever greater certainty the existence ofclimate change and remains highly confident that human actions have had and willhave notable involvement in this process. According to the report, climate change(CC, henceforth) will impact a wide array of areas including among others,ecosystems, food security and public health. Consequently, different sectors andregions have a wide variety of options on how to best adapt to these changes inorder to minimize damages and capitalize on potential benefits.

Global climate discussions have typically concentrated on international mitiga-tion efforts, but consensus seems to be shifting towards acknowledging thathumanity could face global warming of 2˚C even with rapid and concrete mitigationefforts. Thus, some level of adaptation will be required to cope with the loomingCC impacts. As the policy-related CC literature has concentrated on the politics ofmitigation, discussion on the politics of adaptation has remained scarce. Corre-spondingly, while mitigation is foremost a concerted global effort, adaptation istreated as mainly a local issue since the CC impacts will vary significantly betweenregions depending on geographical location, economic structure and available

*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]

Polar Geography, 2015

Vol. 38, No. 2, 146–170, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1088937X.2015.1052031

# 2015 Taylor & Francis

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Dr

Liz

a Sk

ryzh

evsk

a] a

t 08:

21 1

0 Ju

ly 2

015

mailto:[email protected]

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1088937X.2015.1052031

financial resources. For example, Dell et al. (2012) found that CC will negativelyaffect the growth of developing countries while there will be no significant effect fordeveloped countries.

The IPCC (2014) acknowledges the increasing recognition of the importance ofnot just international coalitions and national governments but also that of theprivate sector and local governments in implementing adaptation measures. Theseadaptation measures consist of, for example, economic diversification, disasterpreparedness and water resource management. However, the local political aspectof adaptation is virtually absent in the CC policy literature. As such, this paperstarts to address this gap through unique interview data from Russian localities.Russia represents a highly interesting subject of study in this respect for variousreasons. First, Russia has a very versatile climate and thus potentially faces avariety of CC impacts within its borders. Second, Russia has experienced clearlymore significant warming than the global average in recent decades. Third, Russiahas – at the time of writing – excluded itself from international CC discussions andis carving its own targets and guidelines concerning mitigation and adaptation.Finally, as stated in the Decree of the Russian government on the implementation ofthe Climate Doctrine for the period prior to 2020 published in 2011, regionalauthorities are responsible for the implementation of the federal government CCpolicies in their development planning.

Consequently, the goal of this study is to understand the realities of design andimplementation of CC adaptation policies at the level of Russia’s local adminis-trative units such as oblasts and krays (roughly equivalent to the US states). Thus,this study will investigate the following questions: Do the local governments havesufficient information about the local climatic changes? Do they recognize theimportance of CC and the possible positive and/or negative impacts of CC on theireconomies? Do they utilize the available information on CC impacts to developadaptation plans for the current and predicted changes in climate or incorporateadaptive measures into their plans for socio-economic development? We alsodiscuss why Russia’s current political situation might hamper these adaptationmeasures.

The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we will briefly review CC scenariosfor Russia and what the literature has concluded on the potential CC impacts onRussia. Section 3 discusses Russia’s climate policies in an international and nationalcontext and explains why politics might hamper adaptation. Section 4 presents theinterview data and results followed by final conclusions in Section 5.

2. CC and its expected impacts on Russia

To further motivate this study, it is worth illustrating why Russia is such aninteresting case regarding CC. Given its geographical location and size, Russia is anauspicious subject of study owing to its versatile climatic conditions. Russia consistsof Arctic, subarctic, moderate and subtropical climatic zones. Moreover, theaverage annual temperatures between the western and eastern parts of the countrydiffer by a maximum of 15 ˚C between the south-west and north-east corners ofRussia (Kotlyakov 2002). Roughly, two-thirds of Russia’s land area is dominatedby permafrost. Due to the expected rise in sea levels, coastal areas are generallyamong the most vulnerable regions concerning CC; however, Russia remainsrelatively safe from this threat as its coastal areas are not densely populated.

Russia’s Climate Policies and Local Reality 147

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Dr

Liz

a Sk

ryzh

evsk

a] a

t 08:

21 1

0 Ju

ly 2

015

The aforementioned temperature patterns among Russian regions are clearly shown

in Figures 1 and 2 with a general pattern of warmer southern and western regions

versus the colder northern and far eastern regions.

Russia is a relatively cold and dry country, as evidenced in Figures 3 and 4,

wherein Russia’s climatic conditions are contrasted with two other large countries,

China and the USA. While the monthly temperature on average is very similar

between those latter two, Russia is clearly lower by roughly 5 ˚C in the summer

months to 20˚C in the winter months. Regarding precipitation, Russia fares lower

than both countries, although slightly higher than China during winter.

However, Russia has been subjected to notable warming in recent history.

According to the Russian Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environ-

mental Monitoring (Roshydromet 2014), Russia’s surface temperature has

increased by an average rate of 0.43 ˚C per decade from 1976 to 2012. This is

clearly higher than the global average rate of 0.166 ˚C per decade during the same

period. However, estimating the precipitation change in Russia is much more

uncertain due to measurement issues, but according to Roshydromet (2014) it has

increased at a rate of 0.3–0.8 mm/month per decade from 1976 to 2012. In Figures 5

and 6, one climate scenario (A2) is presented to provide some sense of how climate

is expected to change regionally in Russia in the next few decades.

As seen in Figures 5 and 6, CC varies regionally quite substantially due to

Russia’s geographical size and differences, but at the aggregate level Russia is still

expected to become warmer and wetter in the coming decades. Because Russia is a

relatively cold and arid country as shown above, it is often expected that Russia will

benefit from CC at least in the initial phase, for example, through the opening up of

new maritime transport routes in the Arctic. However, there are regional and

seasonal differences. For example, both Roshydromet (2014) and Leppanen et al.

Figure 1. Russia’s annual average temperature and a rough rendition of the location of theregions.Regions: 1, Altay Kray; 2, Arkhangelsk; 3, Kaluga; 4, Karelia Rep.; 5, Khabarovsk Kray; 6,Leningrad; 7, Moscow; 8, Murmansk; 9, Nizhny Novgorod; 10, Novosibirsk; 11, Rostov; 12,Ryazan; 13, Sverdlovsk; 14, Vologda.Source: Calculated as the 1995–1999 average from the GAEZ database.

148 Y. Skryzhevska et al.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Dr

Liz

a Sk

ryzh

evsk

a] a

t 08:

21 1

0 Ju

ly 2

015

(2014) conclude that, in the next few decades, CC will increase crop productivity in

colder Russian areas while conversely the impact will be negative in the warmer

regions. Also, Leppanen et al. (2014) conclude that the maximal crop benefits will

be obtained with a roughly 2˚C increase in temperature after which the benefits will

Figure 2. Russia’s average annual sum of precipitation and a rough rendition of thelocation of the regions.Regions: 1, Altay Kray; 2, Arkhangelsk; 3, Kaluga; 4, Karelia Rep.; 5, Khabarovsk Kray; 6,Leningrad; 7, Moscow; 8, Murmansk; 9, Nizhny Novgorod; 10, Novosibirsk; 11, Rostov; 12,Ryazan; 13, Sverdlovsk; 14, Vologda.Source: Calculated as the 1995–1999 average from the GAEZ database.

Figure 3. Monthly temperature (˚C), 1960–1990.Source: World Bank (2014).


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Dr

Liz

a Sk

ryzh

evsk

a] a

t 08:

21 1

0 Ju

ly 2

015

start to diminish. Moreover, an increase in human deaths in Russia has been

recently detected during both heat and cold waves (Revich 2008), and as CC will

increase the former and decrease the latter the net effect is not yet clear. However,

the main threats from CC in Russia are related to droughts that harm agricultural

Figure 4. Monthly precipitation (mm), 1960–1990.Source: World Bank (2014).

Figure 5. Predicted change in annual temperature from the 1995–1999 average to the 2050s(Climate scenario A2).Regions: 1, Altay Kray; 2, Arkhangelsk; 3, Kaluga; 4, Karelia Rep.; 5, Khabarovsk Kray; 6,Leningrad; 7, Moscow; 8, Murmansk; 9, Nizhny Novgorod; 10, Novosibirsk; 11, Rostov; 12,Ryazan; 13, Sverdlovsk; 14, Vologda.Source: Calculated from the GAEZ database.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Dr

Liz

a Sk

ryzh

evsk

a] a

t 08:

21 1

0 Ju

ly 2

015

production and increase the risk of forest fires. Another notable threat to Russia’sinfrastructure is posed by the thawing of the permafrost. According to Roshy-dromet (2014), Russia is already spending some 55 billion rubles (roughly 1.7billion USD at the average 2013 exchange rate) annually to mitigate the damage torailroads and pipelines caused by this thawing. Geographically, a more detaileddescription of the potential regional CC impacts and adaptation measures can beobserved in Table 1.

3. Russia’s climate policies in domestic and international contexts

During the last decade, the Russian government and the Roshydromet introducedseveral key documents, which have become guidelines for further research on CC andits possible effects, as well as measures for adaptation and mitigation. These includeamong others the Climate Doctrine adopted in 2009 (Order of the President of theRussian Federation 2009), a Decree of the Russian government on implementation ofthe Climate Doctrine for the period prior to 2020 (Decree 2012) and a Macroeconomicassessment of consequences of climate change in the Russian Federation prior to 2030(Roshydromet 2011). The most recent document entitled ‘The second assessmentreport on climate change and its consequences for the Russian Federation’(Roshydromet 2014) was published in April 2014 by Roshydromet. These documentsprovide the scientific and legislative background for the development of adaptationand mitigation policies in various administrative units of Russia.

The Russian Academy of Sciences has joined a group of 18 national academiesand signed a joint statement endorsing the consensus position that CC is human-induced and a serious problem that must be tackled by the nations of the world.However, it took a far longer time for Russian academia to reach this consensus

Figure 6. Predicted annual sum of precipitation from the 19995–1999 average to the 2050s(Climate scenario A2).Regions: 1, Altay Kray; 2, Arkhangelsk; 3, Kaluga; 4, Karelia Rep.; 5, Khabarovsk Kray; 6,Leningrad; 7, Moscow; 8, Murmansk; 9, Nizhny Novgorod; 10, Novosibirsk; 11, Rostov; 12,Ryazan; 13, Sverdlovsk; 14, Vologda.Source: Calculated from the GAEZ database.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Dr

Liz

a Sk

ryzh

evsk

a] a

t 08:

21 1

0 Ju

ly 2

015

Table 1. Expected CC and Adaptation Measures in the Russian Regions

Region Expected CC Expected consequences of CC Adaptation measures

North-west (surveyregions: Archangelsk(south), Karelia,Leningrad, Vologda)

(1) Significant increase in aver-age temperatures: winter�1.7 ˚C �2 ˚C; summer�0.9 ˚C �1 ˚C

(2) Increase in precipitation:winter �5 �7%; summer�1 �6%

(3) Fluctuation of cold andwarm temperatures; un-stable climate

(1) Shorter heating period(2) Deterioration of buildings and

structures due to changingtemperatures

(3) Increasing cost of airconditioning

(4) Floods (in northern areas)(5) Insufficient river discharge (in

southern areas)(6) Increase in the growing season(7) Improved agricultural

productivity

(1) Change in heating standards(2) Improved weather monitoring(3) Flood protection management(4) Diversification of agricultural crops(5) Monitoring of forest fires(6) Adaptation of agricultural practices to

new climatic conditions

Central (survey regions:Kaluga, Moscow,Ryazan)

(1) Increase in average tem-peratures: winter �1.0 ˚C�1.6 ˚C; summer

(2) �1.0 ˚C �1.1 ˚C(3) Insignificant increase in

precipitation(4) Heat waves in summer(5) Decreased precipitation in

winter

(1) Shorter heating period(2) Deterioration of buildings and

structures due to changingtemperatures

(3) Increased frequency of forestand peat fires

(4) Decrease in flooding; waterdeficit

(5) Decline of crop productivitydue to insufficient soilmoisture

(6) Decrease in droughts inautumns

(1) Preventive monitoring for tornado, heatand cold waves

(2) Preventive medicine for elderly popula-tion susceptible to changing weather

(3) Water resource management(4) Provision of additional water supply for

Moscow City and Moscow oblast(5) Forest protection(6) Adaptation of agricultural practices to

new climatic conditions

Southern (survey region:Rostov)

(1) Increase of average summertemperatures (by 1.3 ˚C)

(2) Extreme heat(3) Decrease in precipitation(4) Droughts(5) Strong rainstorms

(1) Availability of renewablesources of energy (solar, wind)

(2) Deficit of water(3) Floods generated by strong

rainstorms(4) Increase in agricultural

productivity

(1) Improvements in AC technology(2) Use of renewable sources of energy(3) Forest protection(4) Water resource management(5) Irrigation

152

Y.Skryzhevsk

aet

al.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Dr

Liz

a Sk

ryzh

evsk

a] a

t 08:

21 1

0 Ju

ly 2

015

Table 1 Continued


(5) Worsening of populationhealth due to hot weather(high occurrences of strokesand cardiovascular diseases)

(6) Transition to subtropical agriculturalcrops (cotton, grapes, subtropical fruitsand vegetables)

Volga (survey region:Nizhniy Novgorod)

(1) Moderate warming: winter –by 0.9 ˚C �1.3 ˚C; summer –by 1.0 ˚C �1.2 ˚C

(2) Extreme heat(3) Moderate increase in

precipitation

(1) Shorter heating period(2) Availability of renewable

sources of energy (solar)(3) Improved water supply(4) Improved agricultural condi-

tions (sufficient moisture)

(1) Improvements in forest industry (protec-tion of forest from invasive pest species)

(2) Development of recreation and tourism(3) Transition to drought-resistant crops(4) Increase in production of corn, sugar

beets, sunflower seeds, canola oil, andcotton

Ural (survey region:Sverdlovsk)

(1) Significant warming: winter�1.5 ˚C �1.6 ˚C; summer�0.9 ˚C �1.1 ˚C

(2) Moderate increase inprecipitation

(3) Moderate droughts

(1) Shorter heating period (by 4 –5 days)

(2) Thawing permafrost (in north-ern areas)

(3) Increased frequency of floods(in southern areas)

(4) Increased frequency ofdroughts

(5) Worsening of populationhealth due to extreme heat

(6) Forest fires

(1) Measures to improve security of pipelinesin the areas of thawing permafrost

(2) Increase in use of air conditioning(3) Use of solar energy(4) Forest protection(5) Monitoring for forest fires(6) Diversification of agricultural crops:

introduction of corn, soy, sugar beets,sunflower, and drought – resistant speciesof wheat

Siberia (survey regions:Altay Kray,Novosibirsk)

(1) Significant warming inwinter

(2) Significant increase of pre-cipitation in winter

(3) High accumulation of snow(4) Increasing speed of snow

melting

(1) Shorter heating period(2) Thawing permafrost(3) Forest fires(4) Increase of water resources in

northern areas and decrease insouthern areas

(5) Increased frequency of floodsand mud slides due to intensesnow melting.

(1) Measures to maintain secure use of pipe-lines and railroads

(2) Extreme weather monitoring(3) Measures to improve river navigation(4) Forest protection(5) Improvement of agricultural productivity(6) Introduction of corn and sugar beets in

agriculture(7) Introduction of rearing of animals

Russia

’sClim

ate

Policies

andLocalReality

153

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Dr

Liz

a Sk

ryzh

evsk

a] a

t 08:

21 1

0 Ju

ly 2

015

Table 1 Continued


(6) Improved river navigation(7) Improved agricultural prac-

tices due to increasedtemperatures

Far East (survey region:Khabarovsk Kray)

(1) Significant warming innorthern areas in winter (by1.5 ˚C �1.7 ˚C), and in sum-mer (by 0.7 ˚C �1.0 ˚C)

(2) Increase in average amountof precipitation (by6 – 10%)

(1) Shorter heating period(2) Thawing permafrost(3) Increased river discharge(4) Improved river navigation(5) Floods(6) Increased growing season

(1) Use of wind and solar energy(2) Improved practices in forest industry(3) Development of recreation and tourism(4) Diversification of agricultural crops to

benefit from increased temperatures

Arctic (survey regions:Archangelsk (north),Murmansk)

(1) The most significant warm-ing (compared to otherregions of Russia)

(2) Intense cyclone activities(3) Significant increase in

precipitation(4) Significant decrease in ocea-

nic ice cover(5) Intense decrease of long-

term ice accumulation

(1) Shorter heating period(2) Extreme weather conditions in

off – shore areas(3) Accessibility of Northern Pas-

sage (ice free forextended time)

(4) Accessibility of off-shore min-eral deposits

(5) Coastal erosion due to thawingpermafrost

(6) Floods(7) Negative effects on indigenous

populations (change in tradi-tional lifestyle and health)

(1) New approaches to Arctic climateresearch

(2) Development of governmental pro-grammes directed at improvements inquality of life including environmentalconditions in the Arctic region

Source: Roshydromet (Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring of Russia) (2011), Assessment of MicroeconomicConsequences of Climate Change in the Russian Federation for the period prior to 2030 and Further Perspective [Otsenka makroekonomicheskihposledstviy izmeneniya klimata na territorii Rossiyskoy Federatsii na period do 2030 goda I dal’neyshuyu perspektivu]. (Moscow: Roshydromet) (inRussian).

154

Y.Skryzhevsk

aet

al.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Dr

Liz

a Sk

ryzh

evsk

a] a

t 08:

21 1

0 Ju

ly 2

015

compared to the situation in international climate science. This can be partly

explained by the changes in Russia’s stance on global CC policies leading up to the

ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2004 (e.g. Wilson Rowe 2012: 712–13). Thisdecision to allow CC to be considered a human-induced problem in its domestic

debate finally led to the adoption of Russia’s Climate Doctrine in 2009. Despite the

fact that the Doctrine and subsequent policy decisions can arguably be described as

mere ‘window-dressing’ and an international image campaign, CC as a political and

societal challenge has been internalized among the Russian political elite (Kokorin

and Korppoo 2013). The resulting potential level of emission cuts discussed by

Presidents Dmitry Medvedev (2008–2012) and Vladimir Putin (2012–present) –from 20% to 25% lower than the 1990 emissions – would still remain modest as

present emissions are approximately still 35% lower than in 1990. Yet, even this

modest pledge would entail some mitigation measures in the near future. As with

the present trend, this 10% difference would be consumed relatively quickly. That

said, it is striking how strong the CC denial discourse in Russia remains, even after

seemingly clear ‘evidential’ events – such as the forest and steppe wild fires caused

by the 2010 draught – which point to the intensification of CC and its negative

impacts on Russia (Kokorin and Korppoo 2013: 6; Henry and Sundstrom

2012: 1302).

It is not a difficult task to surmise a possible motive in promoting CC denial

discourse in Russia and not to engage in deliberate climate policy with emission

cuts. The Russian economy and, one might argue, the entire society are heavily

dependent on the extraction, refining, transport, use and export of fossil energy.

Oil, gas and coal are extremely important export commodities that constitute about

half of Russia’s federal budget revenue, and the oil and gas industries alone

constitute 20% of the national GDP (Kokorin and Korppoo 2013). In addition, gas

plays a central role in domestic energy supply, whereas coal is the main energy

source in the Russian Far East. Thus, the motive is obvious for the Russian energy

sector and the political elite tightly connected to the former to oppose both CC as a

scientific fact and the advancement of climate policies. The promotion of the

concept of ‘undecided climate science’ or ‘risk-free climate impacts for Russia’ is inthe interest of the energy elite to ensure an absence of a strong grass-roots level

opposition which might advocate for Russia to adopt a ‘follower’ role in

international CC mitigation commitments. That said, it must be conceded that in

the Russian semi-authoritarian context the link between public attitudes and

political decisions is not as strong as in liberal democracies (Henry and Sundstrom

2012: 1298). However, this link is not fully absent either. Therefore, it can be argued

that, as Russia has become more affluent and its middle class has expanded, the

population is becoming more demanding of its leaders compared to the beginning

of the 2000s, not to mention the political alienation of the 1990s. For example, in

the sphere of social provisioning, the yardstick has changed significantly.

Moreover, by promoting gas as an energy commodity rather than investing in

regionally promising renewable energy sources, the political elite has strengthened

their position through the state-owned gas giant Gazprom over regional political

forces who are possibly aiming at energy self-sufficiency via regional (renewable)

sources of energy (Tynkkynen 2013). Thus, the motives behind unambitious climate

policies resonate both with the specific interests of the energy elite to enable the

sector to proceed ‘business-as-usual’ and with the general interests of the political


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Dr

Liz

a Sk

ryzh

evsk

a] a

t 08:

21 1

0 Ju

ly 2

015

elite to reduce the probability of popular criticism towards the hydrocarbon-basedsystem.

The interplay between international and domestic climate science and Russia’sclimate policy has been studied extensively (Tynkkynen 2010; Henry and Sund-strom 2007, 2012; Wilson Rowe 2012). Also, perceptions of international climatescience in Russia have been studied previously by Wilson Rowe (2009, 2012). Withregard to the diffusion of international climate science knowledge into and withinRussia, it is somewhat easy to depict ‘an epistemic community’ that attempts topromote this global mainstream knowledge in their own context. In the wake ofRussia’s Climate Doctrine and the resulting policy obligations which officiallyrecognized human-induced CC to be a highly likely phenomenon, climate scientistshave gained a minor ‘victory’ in framing the public discourse on CC in agovernment-friendly newspaper in late 2000s (Wilson Rowe 2009). As such, thedenialists must seek other means than the scientific knowledge – policy nexus topromote their cause. Moreover, there is probably no such clearly defined group ofexperts, media representatives and politicians that are trying to promote a certainunderstanding, as has been the case in the USA with the ‘climate science sceptics’funded by the oil industry (Boykoff 2011: 159–160).

Despite the fact that President Putin’s return probably will not dismantle thosepolicy objectives set during Medvedev’s presidency, we argue that the justificationsfor these measures are changing. If energy efficiency measures promoted underMedvedev’s rule in the name of modernization were sought due to economic andforeign policy gains (Henry and Sundstrom 2012), the need to please foreignaudiences has decreased dramatically since 2012. Putin’s more authoritarian stancesince his re-election in 2012 is visible both in his domestic policy (e.g. freedom ofexpression, gay rights, etc.) and foreign policy (e.g. the firm position on the Syriancrisis, the arrest of Greenpeace activists, the war in Ukraine, etc.).

We argue that during Putin’s third term the need to pay heed to international orEuropean objectives has diminished significantly, i.e. Russia’s image as a respons-ible energy producer has gradually waned. We do not wish to claim that Putin’sreturn is directly connected to the increased opposition to international climatescience, mitigation measures in the domestic arena and deliberate climate policies.However, other studies (e.g. Gustafson 2012) hint that Putin’s agenda relies not onthe diversification of the Russian economy but on granting the hydrocarbon sectoran even greater role in Russia’s future development. In other words, this paperhypothesizes that Putin’s return and the consequent political changes promotethose voices in Russian society that abide by approaches that place more emphasison sovereignty than international cooperation, on Russia’s economic interests thaninternational image and on growth of the hydrocarbon sector than environmentalpolicies. These political imperatives will likely lead to an absence of ambitiousclimate mitigation measures at the federal level instead of emphasising the potentialfuture gains in adopting a key role in international climate policy.

4. Interviews with local authorities

4.1. Research method and data sources

To understand how the local authorities in Russia’s administrative units perceiveCC and whether or not they implement adaptive measures in their development


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Dr

Liz

a Sk

ryzh

evsk

a] a

t 08:

21 1

0 Ju

ly 2

015

planning, we conducted a series of on-site and phone interviews with relevant localgovernmental authorities and scholars, who study CC effects on socio-economicdevelopment in their respective regions, and collected data from online documentsissued by the local governments. Due to an absence of uniform governmentalstructures that deal with adaptation policies in surveyed regions, most of theinterviewed individuals were selected from the regional ministries of economicdevelopment, environment and conservation, and natural resources. In addition tothat, we interviewed several representatives of academia and the scientificcommunity who provide consultancy to regional authorities on CC impacts andadaptation.

A sample of surveyed administrative units consists of the 12 oblasts and 2 kraysof the Russian Federation. Table 2 demonstrates some characteristics of thesurveyed regions, and Figures 1, 2, 5 and 6 show their geographical location. Theselected regions represent seven federal regions of the Russian Federation, such asNorth-West, Central, Southern, Volga, Ural, Siberia, and Far East, and illustrate abroad range of climates from the cold subarctic in the Kola Peninsula (Murmanskregion) to the warm and arid Rostov region. Additionally, the regions included inthe sample represent areas with various soils, vegetation cover and incidents ofextreme weather conditions during the past five years.

A written questionnaire, translated into Russian, was sent to each respondentprior to the interview. The questionnaire consisted of 21 questions organized intofour groups: (1) adaptation to CC measures and socio-economic developmentplanning; (2) CC information; (3) experience with CC; and (4) CC and the localeconomy. Questions in the interview surveys addressed the following issues:

Survey themes

. Do the regions have a comprehensive CC plan?

. What percentage of the plan is devoted to policy actions directed at thereduction of carbon dioxide emissions (reducing your contribution to CC)?

. What percentage of the plan is devoted to CC adaptation (adjusting to theeffects of CC)?

. What is the level of awareness, information availability and knowledge of CCand its consequences in the regions?

. What information is needed to make better planning decisions regarding CC?

. What are the most important CC issues experienced by the regions?

. What natural disasters have the regions experienced during the last five years?

. How has CC affected peoples’ way of life and health?

. How has CC affected different sectors of the regions’ economy?

. What opportunities do they see resulting from CC?

. What problems do they see resulting from CC?

. Do they consider CC as mostly positive, negative or neutral in their regions?

During the course of this study, we faced a challenge with low participation ratesamong the local governmental authorities. In some regions, repeated attempts toschedule interviews were not successful. In these instances, we used regional web-based information available via regional governmental portals. Since one of thegoals of this study is to understand how local authorities respond to the initiativesof the federal government and governmental agencies regarding the pressing issuesof CC, we summarized the information from the Roshydromet report entitled‘Macroeconomic assessment of consequences of climate change in the Russian


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Dr

Liz

a Sk

ryzh

evsk

a] a

t 08:

21 1

0 Ju

ly 2

015

Table 2. Characteristics of the surveyed regions.

Oblast/Kray RegionArea

(1000km2)Population2012, 1000s

Dominant Economic Sectors(gross value added, percentage

of the total, 2011)

Altay Kray Siberia 168 2 399 Manufacturing (20%), retail and repair(19%), agriculture, hunting and forestry(18.5%) forestry, real estate (7.2%),military/security (6.9%), andtransportation (5.8%)

Arkhangelsk North-West/Arctic

589.9 1 202 Mining (30.2%), manufacturing(13.8%), transportation (13.5%), retailand repair (7.8%), construction (7.5%),government/security (6.4%), agriculture,hunting, and forestry (2.8%)

Kaluga Central 29.8 1 006 Manufacturing (38.2%), retail andrepair (12.7%), real estate (9.0%),construction (8.2%), agriculture,hunting, and forestry (7.4%),government/security (5.8%), andtransportation (5.4%)

Karelia North-West

180.5 637 Mining (15.5%), manufacturing(15.2%), retail and repair (11.3%),government/security (11.2%),transportation (7.4%), real estate(6.4%), agriculture, hunting, andforestry (4.9%), and healthservices (7.6%)

KhabarovskKray

FarEast

787.6 1 342 Transportation (17.1%), retail andrepair (13.2%), construction (12.5%),manufacturing (9.0%), government/security (9.0%), real estate (9.0%),agriculture, hunting, andforestry (6.9%)

Leningrad North-West

83.9 1 751 Manufacturing (26.1%), Construction(17.3%), transportation (12.6%), retailand repair (11.3%), energy productionand transfer (7.4%), real estate (7.1%),agriculture, hunting, andforestry (6.5%)

Moscow Central 1.1 11 980 Retail and repair (23.9%),manufacturing (23.1%), real estate(12.8%), transportation (10.6%), energyproduction and transfer (6.5%),construction (5.3%), government/security (4.7%), agriculture, hunting,and forestry (3.1%)

Murmansk Arctic 144.9 780 Mining (18.9%), manufacturing(15.5%), retail and repair (9.8%),government/security (9.5%),transportation (9.1%), fishing (7.8%),health services (6.9%), energyproduction and transfer (5.9%), realestate (5.9%), agriculture, hunting, andforestry (0.8%)


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Dr

Liz

a Sk

ryzh

evsk

a] a

t 08:

21 1

0 Ju

ly 2

015

Federation prior to 2030’ (see Table 1) and utilized this summary to compare the

surveyed regions for suggested adaptation measures and policies, and their actual

implementations.

4.2. Interview results

Out of the 14 surveyed regions, the regional authorities and CC specialists from the

9 regions agreed to participate in the interviews either on-site or by telephone. The

information required for the remaining five regions was obtained from govern-

mental web-based sources. Below, we present our results summarized under four

broad topics.

Table 2 Continued

Oblast/Kray RegionArea

(1000km2)Population2012, 1000s

Dominant Economic Sectors(gross value added, percentage

of the total, 2011)

NizhniyNovgorod

Volga 76.6 3 290 Manufacturing (29.9%), retail andrepair (17.2%), transportation (11.3%),real estate (11.2%), construction (8.0%),government/security (4.8%), energyproduction and transfer (4.2%),agriculture, hunting, andforestry (3.8%)

Novosibirsk Siberia 177.8 2 710 Manufacturing (14.7%), retail andrepair (19.2%), transportation (12.7%),real estate (14.2%), agriculture, hunting,and forestry (6.8%), government/security (6.2%), and health careservices (5.1%)

Rostov South 101 4 254 Manufacturing (19.4%), retail andrepair (18.8%), agriculture, hunting, andforestry (12.8%), transportation (9.8%),real estate (8.5%), construction (7.8%),energy production and transfer(5.6%),government, and security (5.5%)

Ryazan Central 39.6 1 144 Manufacturing (29.5%) retail and repair(16.7%), agriculture, hunting, andforestry (8.9%), transportation (8.9%),government/security (7.1%), energyproduction and transfer (5.9%),construction (5.8%), and realestate (5.7%)

Sverdlovsk Ural 194.3 4 316 Manufacturing (28.4%), retail andrepair (19.5%), mining (4.1%),construction (6.1%), and government/security (4.1%)

Vologda North-West

144.5 1 196 Manufacturing (41.1%), transportation(14.1%), construction (8.8%),agriculture, hunting, and forestry(4.5%), retail and repair (8.9%), andgovernment/security (5.6%)

Source: Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation [ROSSTAT].


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Dr

Liz

a Sk

ryzh

evsk

a] a

t 08:

21 1

0 Ju

ly 2

015

4.2.1. Adaptation to CC measures and socio-economic development planning

Interview surveys and web-based information revealed the relative unimportance ofCC issues in comparison with demographic and economic problems in the regions.This discovery is consistent with the results of a recent study by Johansen andSkryzhevska (2013) conducted in the Kola Peninsula municipalities in 2012 whichconcluded that CC adaptation is not the highest priority in socio-economicplanning due to the more pressing socio-economic problems associated with thepost-Soviet transition. The findings of the interviews are summarized in Table 3.

As evidenced from Table 3, only two regions, Kaluga and Khabarovsk, havecomprehensive plans for adaptation. In addition, some adaptive measures are alsoincluded in their plans for socio-economic development. Similarly, authorities in thesix regions of Karelia, Leningrad, Moscow, Murmansk, Nizhniy Novgorod andRyazan stated that they incorporate some measures of adaptation in their socio-economic planning. However, none of these individuals elaborated on the details ofthese adaptive initiatives. For the remaining six regions, neither direct responses noronline government information indicated the existence of adaptation plans oradaptive measures implemented into socio-economic planning. During the course ofthe interviews, several interviewees mentioned that there is a disconnect between theadaptation policies of the federal government and the local realities at the regionallevel. A lack of budgetary resources and pressing socio-economic issues in theregions render implementation of CC adaptation policies difficult, if not impossible.

In the instances of Altay, Arkhangelsk, Novosibirsk, Rostov, Sverdlovsk andVologda, we determined that the scholarly community in these regions do recognizethe importance of CC despite absence of adaptation plans and measures. Recentpublications in Russian scholarly outlets suggest adaptation measures exist forregions such as Altay (Rotanova et al. 2012), Siberia (Obiazov 2008) and Ural(Teterin 2013). The authors of these publications use regional historical climatedata to demonstrate climatic changes in their respective regions and recommendadaptive measures specific for the local conditions. In Arkhangelsk region’sstrategic plan for socio-economic development that came into effect in 2008, CChas been identified as an opportunity and a challenge for future development in theregion. However, the plan does not go beyond this identification to provide specificmeasures for adaptation. The Arkhangelsk region has access to the three importantnorthern seas: the Barents, the White and the Karsk. It is also home to the port ofArkhangelsk which is a key hub of the transportation network between foreign anddomestic markets. Given its beneficial geographic location, the region could profitsignificantly from the rising winter temperatures and prolonged navigation period.However, none of these potential benefits of CC have been clearly incorporated inthe strategic regional planning.

Among the specific development goals and strategies designed because of pastand projected CC, the following points were mentioned: flexibility of plans thattake into account CC; ability to diversify the economy by promoting small business;increasing exports to reduce dependence on local markets; improvements in healthcare to combat diseases emerging as a result of changing climate; improvements inquality of life to reverse negative demographic trends and out-migration; attractionof investments to the regions; protection of ecosystems affected by CC; use ofrenewable energy sources; preparedness for natural disasters; and reduction ofcarbon dioxide emissions.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Dr

Liz

a Sk

ryzh

evsk

a] a

t 08:

21 1

0 Ju

ly 2

015

Table 3. Adaptation plan and CC experiences

Plan for adaptation

Administrativeunit(oblast/kray)

Comprehensiveplan

Adaptivemeasuresincluded inplans forsocio-

economicdevelopment

No plan oradaptivemeasures,

butrecognize

CCimportance

Informedabout CC CC experience

Opportunitiesfrom CC

Problemsfrom CC

Positive,negative,

orneutralCC

effects

Altay No No Yes Yes High winds,droughts

Improvedagriculturalproductivity,Improvedtourism andrecreation

Soil erosion,forest fires

Bothpositiveandnegative

Arkhangelsk No No, butthere is

mention ofCC in socio-economicstrategicplanning.

Yes Yes Warming Improvednavigation, betteraccess to offshorefossil fueldeposits

Floods, forestfires, increasedmorbidity(Tularemia),thawingpermafrost

Mostlypositive

Kaluga Yes Yes n/a Yes (useinformationfrom federalgovernment) ,but need moreinformationon localconditions(40-yearforecast)

Increasedprecipitation,extremetemperaturesduring winter andsummer seasons

Developinnovativetechnologies,diversifymanufacturingproduction tomeet newdemands affectedby CC

Degradation ofsmall rivers,higher morbidity,infrastructureproblems (roads,buildings)

Cannotsay.Need 40-yearclimateforecast

Russia

’sClim

ate

Policies

andLocalReality

161

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Dr

Liz

a Sk

ryzh

evsk

a] a

t 08:

21 1

0 Ju

ly 2

015

Table 3 Continued

Plan for adaptation


Comprehensiveplan


economicdevelopment


butrecognize

CCimportance



Problemsfrom CC

Positive,negative,

orneutralCC

effects

Karelia No Yes n/a Yes Warm and Opportunities Increased Neutralhumid summers;average annualtemperatures inKarelia are now+1.5C;precipitationincreased by 36%in 2013,snowaccumulationdecreased

in fishingindustry andagriculture

morbidity,proliferation ofencephalitis ticks,decreasing riverdischarge, forestfires

Khabarovsk Yes Yes n/a Yes Fluctuatingtemperatures andprecipitation

Cannot say Agriculture,fishing, tourism,andtransportationwill be negativelyaffected by CC

Mostlynegative

162

Y.Skryzhevsk

aet

al.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Dr

Liz

a Sk

ryzh

evsk

a] a

t 08:

21 1

0 Ju

ly 2

015

Table 3 Continued

Plan for adaptation


Comprehensiveplan


economicdevelopment


butrecognize

CCimportance



Problemsfrom CC

Positive,negative,

orneutralCC

effects

Leningrad No Yes n/a Yes Unstableweather,fluctuatingtemperatures,cold winters andvery hot summers

Use less fuel andenergy during thewarm winters,constructionseason mayincrease, moretourists come tothe region, betterriver navigation

Unpredictablechanges inweather andclimate. Floodingin coastal areas,the Gulf ofFinland freezesduring coldwinters

Bothpositiveandnegative

Moscow No Yes n/a No. Limitedaccess to CCinformation.

Unstable climate,extreme heat,extreme cold,

No Immigration ofinvasive species(encephaliticticks),

Mostlynegative

Governmentdoes not wantto publicizeCCinformation

high winds ecosystemproblems, waterdischarge in therivers isdecreasing due todroughts

Russia

’sClim

ate

Policies

andLocalReality

163

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Dr

Liz

a Sk

ryzh

evsk

a] a

t 08:

21 1

0 Ju

ly 2

015

Table 3 Continued

Plan for adaptation


Comprehensiveplan


economicdevelopment


butrecognize

CCimportance



Problemsfrom CC

Positive,negative,

orneutralCC

effects

Murmansk No Yes n/a No. There is alack of

informationon CC and its

impacts

Increasedtemperatures,decreased icecover in theBarents Sea andadjacent seas

Increase in bio-productivity (fishpopulation willincrease)

Mostlynegative,but thereare somepositiveeffects

NizhniyNovgorod*

No Yes(adaptive

measures toprotect

biodiversityaffected bycurrent andprojected

CC)

n/a Yes Warming,extreme heat,rainstorms

Cannot say Worsening ofpopulation healthconditions due toextreme heat

Mostlynegative

Novosibirsk* No No Yes Yes Warming,thawingpermafrost,increasinggrowing season

Energy savingbecause of risingtemperatures,possibility todiversify crops

Worseningpopulationhealth,disturbance ofindigenous people

Mostlynegativewithsomedegree of

164

Y.Skryzhevsk

aet

al.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Dr

Liz

a Sk

ryzh

evsk

a] a

t 08:

21 1

0 Ju

ly 2

015

Table 3 Continued

Plan for adaptation


Comprehensiveplan


economicdevelopment


butrecognize

CCimportance



Problemsfrom CC

Positive,negative,

orneutralCC

effects

traditionalpractices,imbalance inecosystems,proliferation ofencephalitis ticks,infrastructureproblems

positiveimpacts

Rostov No No Yes No (need Extreme cold, Energy saving Populationmoreinformationonregional CC)

extreme heat,droughts

due to risingtemperatures,more productiveagriculture

health problems,droughts

Mostlynegative

Ryazan* No Yes n/a Yes Warming,increasingprecipitation,droughts,changing bio-diversity

Energy savingdue to risingtemperatures

Forest fires Mostlynegative

Russia

’sClim

ate

Policies

andLocalReality

165

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Dr

Liz

a Sk

ryzh

evsk

a] a

t 08:

21 1

0 Ju

ly 2

015

Table 3 Continued

Plan for adaptation


Comprehensiveplan


economicdevelopment


butrecognize

CCimportance



Problemsfrom CC

Positive,negative,

orneutralCC

effects

Sverdlovsk* No No Yes Yes Fluctuatingtemperatures,decreasing windspeed, extremeheat,extreme cold


Worsening airquality inindustrial cities,worseningpopulationhealth, forest fires

Mostlynegative

Vologda* No No Yes Yes Warming,decreasing snowaccumulations inwinter time,decreasing riverdischarge


Forest fires,droughts,decreasing riverdischarge

Mostlynegative

*Repeated attempts to interview regional authorities were not successful. Information presented in this table was found in web-based materials availablevia governmental portals and scholarly publications.Source: Compiled by authors using data from on-site and telephone interviews, online surveys and governmental web-based sources.

166

Y.Skryzhevsk

aet

al.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Dr

Liz

a Sk

ryzh

evsk

a] a

t 08:

21 1

0 Ju

ly 2

015

4.2.2. CC information

When queried about CC awareness, most of the interviewees responded positivelyindicating the Roshydromet reports as their major source of information. However,the representatives of the Moscow, Murmansk and Rostov regions admitted asignificant lack of information specifically on regional climatic trends. They furthersuggested that if such data were available, the process of developing adaptationplans would be much easier.

4.2.3. Experiencing CC

The most frequently mentioned CC experiences were the following: warming, increasedlevels of precipitation, extreme winter and summer temperatures, high winds, unstableweather and fluctuating temperatures. In fact, these experiences were mentionedregardless of the regions’ geographic location. In the Arctic and subarctic regions,there were frequent mentions of decreasing ice and snow accumulation and resultingriver discharge, and thawing of the permafrost. When asked about natural disasteroccurrences in the regions during the last five years, the following were mentioned:floods, hurricanes, forest and peat fires, droughts, tornadoes and severe rainstorms.

4.2.4. CC and local economy

As indicated in Table 2, all of the surveyed regions are well-developed industrial andagricultural territories with quite a significant share of the manufacturing gross valueadded in the total regional output. Some of the regions’ economies are based heavily onnatural resources (e.g. Murmansk and Arkhangelsk) while others are notable industrialproducers (e.g. Nizhny Novgorod and Vologda) and in some regions (e.g. Rostov andAltay Kray) agriculture maintains a relatively high importance. Thus, in addition toclimatic zones, the interview regions also constitute a relatively wide sample of differentregional economic structures.When questioned about the positive and negative effects ofCC on economic sectors, the interviewees’ responses (summarized in Table 4) variedbasedmainly on their respective regions’ geographic location. Intuitively,manufacturing,mining and education were mentioned as the sectors affected the least by CC.

Interviews conducted in Murmansk indicated that there is concern that warmingwill negatively affect the bio-productivity of the Barents Sea and increase theprobability of icebergs in the northern passage. However, they expect some positiveeffects of extended ice-free periods on navigation in the Barents Sea. For example,tourism was mentioned as one of the region’s economic sectors that may benefitsignificantly from rising temperatures.

During the course of the interviews, it became clear that the northern regions andregions less dependent on mining and mineral extraction and processing havehigher concerns about CC. However, due to budgetary limitations and otherpressing issues, adaptation measures for CC are not being consistently planned.

Despite the existing CC policies of Russia’s federal government that call foradaptation measures, and the CC predictions and estimates available throughRoshydromet and other relevant agencies (Table 1), there is an obvious lack ofactual adaptation on the local scale in the Russian regions. This finding supports thestudy of Sharmina et al. (2013), in which they concluded that factors such as limitedtransparency, unclear attribution of responsibilities to develop and implementadaptation measures at the regional level, along with the legacy of bureaucracy,tend to slow down implementation of adaptation policies in Russian regions.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Dr

Liz

a Sk

ryzh

evsk

a] a

t 08:

21 1

0 Ju

ly 2

015

5. Conclusions

In this paper, we have discussed Russia’s climate policies and their regional reality.

It is evident from this study that, despite the recent appearance of federal

programmes on CC adaptation in Russia and recognition of the important role

of regional governments in developing and implementing adaptation measures, the

actual design and implementation of such measures on the regional level remain

problematic. From the interviews and surveys conducted in the 14 administrative

units in Russia, we conclude that adaptation to CC is not a high priority in the

majority of the surveyed regions mainly due to more acute socio-economic

problems. The lack of clearly assigned responsibilities to design and implement

adaptive measures within regional governments also contributes to a neglect of

important CC problems.

The federal government of Russia does recognize the problem of CC and the role of

local governmental authorities in developing and implementing adaptation strategies

as indicated by the Climate Doctrine issued in 2009. However, due to budget

limitations, local authorities cannot implement adaptation actions in their regional

planning. All of the interviewed regional authorities mentioned budget limitations as

the primary obstacle for implementation of CC adaptation measures, and only two

regional authorities (Kaluga and Khabarovsk) mentioned that they do have an

adaptation plan. All of the others confirmed that they are aware of the problem of a

changing climate and its effects on the economy, but they have yet to produce a

separate plan for adaptation. They incorporate some adaptation measures in their

plans for socio-economic development or attempt to solve CC issues as they arise.

Table 4. Positive and negative CC effects on economic sectors as seen by interviewees.

Economic sectors that experience positiveCC effects

Economic sectors that experience negativeCC effects

Fishing (northern regions) – reduction of icecover results in higher yields.

Fishing (southern regions) – decreasing riverdischarge reduces fish populations.

Construction (northern regions) – warmingcontributes to an extended constructionperiod.

Recreation and Tourism (northern regions) –warming negatively affects volumes oftourists at ski resorts and other winter sportsfacilities.

Recreation and Tourism (northern regions) –warming contributes to higher volumes oftourists.

Ocean shipping (northern regions) – warmingcontributes to increased occurrences oficebergs.

Ocean shipping (northern areas) – warmingcontributes to an increased number of ice-free days, which improves navigation.

Construction (northern regions) – thawingpermafrost affects buildings and structures.

Agriculture (northern regions) – warmingaffects the growing season, possibility todiversify crops.

Forestry (northern and southern regions) –forest fires, proliferation of invasive species.

Oil and natural gas industry (northernregions) – warming makes extraction sitesmore accessible.

Agriculture (southern regions) – droughtsnegatively affect productivity of crops.

Deer herding (northern regions) – warmingaffects tundra vegetation cover that serves asa feed for reindeer.

Source: Compiled by authors using data from on-site and telephone interviews, onlinesurveys and governmental web-based sources.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Dr

Liz

a Sk

ryzh

evsk

a] a

t 08:

21 1

0 Ju

ly 2

015

The agriculture, forestry and fishing dominant regions have experienced more CC

effects on their economies, while the industrialized regions and the regions reliant on

mining and fossil energy have experienced less. All of the interviewees mentioned

certain effects on population health, but only a few attributed these directly to CC.

Most of the interviewed regional authorities mentioned that the effect of CC on their

economies is negative. However, the interviewees in Leningrad and Murmansk

regions asserted that the resulting positive and negative effects have thus far balanced

out. Several of the interviewees could not clearly identify the effects as being either

positive or negative due to a lack of relevant information on CC in their region.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding

This work was supported by the Academy of Finland under [grant number 255635] and

National Science Foundation under [grant number ARC- 0909191].

References

BOYKOFF, M., 2011, Who Speaks for Climate? Making Sense of Media Reporting on ClimateChange. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

DELL, M., JONES, B.F., and OLKEN, B.A., 2012, Temperature shocks and economic growth:Evidence from the last half century. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,4(3), pp. 66–95.

DECREE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION from April 25, 2011, N 730 – r(edited on 07.30.2012). About the approval of the comprehensive implementationplan for the climate doctrine of Russian federation for the period prior to 2020.

[Rasporiazhenie pravitel’stva Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 25.04.2011 N 730 = p (red. ot30.07.2012) Ob utverzhdenii kompleksnjgj plana realizatsii Klimaticheskoy doktriniRossiyskoy Federatsii na period do 2020 goda. Moscow. (In Russian).

GAEZ – Global Agro-Ecological Zones, Joint Database of Food and Agriculture Organ-

ization of the United Nations (FAO) and the International Institute for AppliedSystems Analysis (IIASA). Available from: http://gaez.fao.org [Accessed on June19, 2014].

GUSTAFSON, T., 2012, Wheel of Fortune: The Battle for Oil and Power in Russia (Cambridge:Harvard University Press).

JOHANSEN, H., and SKRYZHEVSKA, Y., 2013, Adaptation priorities on Russia’s Kola Peninsula:

climate change vs. post-Soviet transition. Polar Geography, 36(4), pp. 271–290.HENRY, L., and SUNDSTROM, L.M., 2007, Russia and the Kyoto protocol: Seeking an

alignment of interests and image. Global Environmental Politics, 7(4), pp. 47–69.HENRY, L.A., and SUNDSTROM, L.M., 2012, Russia’s climate policy: International bargaining

and domestic modernisation. Europe-Asia Studies, 64(7), pp. 1297–1322.IPCC, 2014, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II

and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. (Geneva,Switzerland: IPCC), 151 pp.

KOKORIN, A., and KORPPOO, A., 2013, Russia’s Post-Kyoto Climate Policy. Real Action or

Merely Window-dressing? FNI Climate Policy Perspectives 10.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Dr

Liz

a Sk

ryzh

evsk

a] a

t 08:

21 1

0 Ju

ly 2

015

http://gaez.fao.org

http://gaez.fao.org

KOTLYAKOV, V., 2002, Russia’s climate – description. Land resources of Russia CD-ROM.The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), August 2013. 45(1),pp. 193–216.

LEPPANEN, S., SAIKKONEN, L., and OLLIKAINEN, M., 2014, Impact of Climate Change on CerealGrain Production in Russia (Mimeo).

OBIAZOV, V., 2008, Regional climate change: Developing adaptation strategies. [Regional’nieizmeneniya klimata: virobotka strategiy adaptatsii]. International Symposium “Cli-mate Change in Central Asia: Socioeconomic and Environmental Consequences”,Izdatel’stvo Zabaykal’skogo gosudarstvennogo gumanitarno-pedagogicheskogo uni-

versiteta, pp. 182–184, Chita. (In Russian).ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION from December 17, 2009, Ν 861-rp,

About the Climate Doctrine of the Russian Federation [Rasporiazhenie PresidentaRF ot 17.12.2009 N 861рп “O Klimaticheskoy Doktrine Rossiyskoy Federatsii]. (In

Russian).REVICH, B.A., 2008, Climate change alters human health in Russia. Studies on Russian

Economic Development, 19(3), pp. 311–317.ROSHYDROMET (FEDERAL SERVICE FOR HYDROMETEOROLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

OF RUSSIA), 2011, Assessment of Microeconomic Consequences of Climate Change inthe Russian Federation for the period prior to 2030 and Further Perspective [Otsenka

makroekonomicheskih posledstviy izmeneniya klimata na territorii RossiyskoyFederatsii na period do 2030 goda I dal’neyshuyu perspektivu] (Moscow: Roshy-dromet). (In Russian).

ROSHYDROMET (FEDERAL SERVICE FOR HYDROMETEOROLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

OF RUSSIA), 2014, The Second Roshydromet Assessment Report on Climate Changeand its Consequences in Russia Federation [Vtoroy otsenochniy doklad Rosgidro-meta ob izmeneniyah klimata i ih posledstviyah na territorii Rossiyskoy Federatsii]

(Moscow: Roshydromet). (In Russian).ROSSTAT, 2013, Regioni Rossii Database. Available from: www.gks.ru [Accessed on June 7,

2015].

ROTANOVA, I., HARLAMOVA, N., and OSTANIN, O., 2012, Climate change in the Altai duringinstrumental studies [Izmeneniya klimata Altaya za period instrumental’nih issledova-niy]. IzvestiyaAltayskogoGosudarstvennogoUniversiteta, 3/2, pp. 105–109. (InRussian).

SHARMINA, M., ANDERSON, K., and BOWS-LARKIN, A., 2013, Climate change regional review:Russia Climate change regional review. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: ClimateChange, 4(5), pp. 373–396.

TETERIN, A., 2013, Changes in major climatic characteristics in the Ural Region during

Instrumental Studies [Izmeneniya osnovnih harakteristik klimata na Urale za periodinstrumental’nih nabludeniy]. Vestnik Ural’skogo otdeleniya RAN, 3(45), pp. 44–55.(In Russian).

TYNKKYNEN, N., 2010, A great ecological power in global climate policy? Framing climatechange as a policy problem in Russian public discussion. Environmental Politics, 19(2),pp. 179–195.

TYNKKYNEN, V., 2013, Russian bioenergy and the EU’s renewable energy goals: Perspectivesof security. In Russian Energy and Security up to 2030, S. Oxenstierna and V.Tynkkynen (Eds.), pp. 95–113 (Abingdon: Routledge).

WILSON ROWE, E., 2012, International science, domestic politics: Russian reception ofinternational climate-change assessments. Environment and Planning D: Society andSpace, 30(4), pp. 711–726.

WILSONROWE, E., 2009,Who is to blame?Agency, causality, responsibility and the role of experts

in Russian framings of global climate change. Europe-Asia Studies, 61(4) pp. 593–619.WORLD BANK, 2014, Climate Change Knowledge Portal (Data Retrieved). Available from:

http://sdwebx.worldbank.org/climateportal/index.cfm [Accessed on February 7, 2014].


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Dr

Liz

a Sk

ryzh

evsk

a] a

t 08:

21 1

0 Ju

ly 2

015

www.gks.ru

www.gks.ru

http://sdwebx.worldbank.org/climateportal/index.cfm

Documents

Russia's Climate Policies and Local Reality