Upload
co
View
0
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
Diplomatic immunity is a principle of international law by which
certain foreign government officials are not subject to the
jurisdiction of local courts and other authorities.. Today,
immunity protects the channels of diplomatic communication by
exempting diplomats from local jurisdiction so that they can
perform their duties with freedom, independence, and security.
Under the concept of reciprocity, diplomats assigned to any
country in the world benefit equally from diplomatic immunity.
The rules of diplomatic law enshrined in the Vienna Convention
have been described as ‘the cornerstone of the modern
international legal order.’ (Eileen Denza, 2008). But the
principle of diplomatic immunity dates back far further than
1961. It is one of the oldest rules of international law.
Diplomatic immunity was well‐established by the end of the
seventeenth century, evolving out of the principles of equality
of states and immunity of the sovereign, who was said to embody
1
the state. As Satow put it, ‘immunity … is not a personal
immunity but in reality the immunity of
the sending state’. (Satow, 1979).
As Hazel Fox describes in her authoritative text on state
immunity, diplomatic immunity is given
i) as recognition of the sovereign independent status of
the sending State and of the public nature of the acts
which render them not subject to the jurisdiction of the
receiving State; and
ii) as protection to the diplomatic mission and staff to
ensure their efficient performance of functions free from
interference from the receiving state. (Fox, 2008)
The concept of diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal
proceedings has established itself as a fundamental of customary
diplomatic law. It is one of international law’s most successful
and enduring rules, with 185 states currently recognising the
rules of diplomacy as stated in the Vienna Convention of 1961.
Under the Convention, diplomats are not subject to arrest of
detainment (Article 29); they are immune from the criminal
jurisdiction of the receiving state (Article 31); and immune from
2
civil jurisdiction for acts committed within their official
capacity (Article 31). The family of the diplomatic agent enjoys
the same immunity status (Article 37). Mission‐staff also enjoy
variable levels of immunity (Article 37).
In July 2012, Venezuela ambassador to Kenya Gerardo Carillo Silva
was accused of sexual impropriety and harassment to the junior
staff. In their complaints, the staff claimed the diplomat had
acted indecently towards them on diverse dates and some had been
forced to quit their employment after failing to withstand the
offending overtures. A watchman from the Securex Company who had
been guarding the diplomat's home claimed the ambassador had
acted indecently towards him on diverse dates forcing him to
quit. The diplomat’s driver confessed in his statement to the
police that he too hard fallen prey to the ambassador's
overtures. A long-serving cook said he was surprised to see the
diplomat stark naked in the kitchen on the morning of last
December 8. The incident took place at about 6 am when the cook
arrived to start his day of work at the ambassador’s residence.
His driver told police on April 29 this year that the diplomat
3
attempted to grab him sexually last December at the residence but
he managed to get away. However since Silva enjoyed diplomatic
immunities, he could not be prosecuted under International Law
and he was later recalled without facing any charges.(Daily
Nation, July 2003)
Still in Kenya, in May 2011, Nigeria ambassador to Kenya Dr
Chijioke Wilcox Wigwe, was accused of assault, battery and
cannibalism on his wife but faced no charges in Kenya because,
before the application to waiver his immunities could be
processed, he had already been recalled back to Nigeria. (Daily
Champion, May 2011)
In November 1982, a 23-year-old student shot and seriously
wounded a night club bouncer in Washington D.C. When identified
as the son of the Brazilian ambassador he was immediately
released and left the US.1 The Brazilian student was charged with
assault once before but charges were dropped and he was allowed
to remain in Washington on the ground of diplomatic immunity. In
1981, a man linked to at least 15 rapes at knife point in the New
York City area was arrested and positively identified by two
4
victims. He was then released because he was the son of Ghana's
ambassador to the United Nations. The man spent 45 minutes in
custody and was reported as leaving the police station laughing.
(Trescott, 1986)
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
A fundamental principle of international law is that members of
diplomatic missions are shielded from legal process. A common
misconception is that diplomatic privileges and immunities confer
a license to commit wrongs.
This has led to diplomats, their families, personal servants, and
staff abuse this privilege to escape prosecution for a variety of
offenses ranging from minor traffic violations to the most
heinous criminal acts, such as the child abuse or murder.
Diplomatic immunity also permits diplomats to escape civil
liability in personal injury actions.
Everyday practice indicates that both states and diplomatic
agents still have problems with interpreting the relevant
provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Immunity.
Unfortunately the diplomats are more likely those who
occasionally tend to misinterpret the extent of their privileges5
and thus make use or, to be more precise and correct, abuse their
inviolability and immunity. Such abuses may still be tolerable by
the receiving state in the name of securing effective performance
of diplomatic functions, if these abuses involve merely minor
offences or crimes. But do receiving states and the international
community have to tolerate personal inviolability and diplomatic
immunity in case of serious crimes such as murder and conspiracy
as well as war crimes and crimes against humanity?
The approach adopted by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations of 1961, fails to take cognizance of elementary
interests of the receiving State and individual values which
might be put into jeopardy if diplomatic privileges, e.g., the
inviolability of diplomatic premises, are conceived as precluding
even measures against acts which aims at the safety of the
receiving State or threaten human 1ife. It seems hardly
acceptable that in extreme situations the receiving State is left
with the option either to grant protection to individuals or,
even more dramatically, to ensure its own self-preservation, or
to comply with international law.
6
The present article intends to address such issues and examine
possible solutions to these problems and possible remedies
1.3 OBJECTIVES
i) Examine the existing remedies in response to diplomatic
crimes
ii) Examine possible proposal for reforms to counter the
issue.
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The study attempted to answer the following questions,
i) What measures exists to curb the issues of diplomatic
violations?
ii) To what extent do the existing remedies to curb
diplomatic crimes effective?
iii) Which are the possible proposal reforms to counter the
crime?
1.5 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS
i) The measures put in place to deal with diplomatic crimes are
ineffective
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
7
i) Other scholars and researchers are bound to benefit
especially those interested in the same subject as a source
of reference.
ii) The recommendations made will help identify areas for
future research by scholars who want to further on the same
study.
iii) Personally the researcher benefits in marks earned to
pass the final exams.
1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
1.7.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter includes the process undertaken in order to realize
research objectives. It includes research design, research site,
population, sampling techniques, research instruments, details on
data collection and description of data analysis.
1.7.2 RESEARCH DESIGN
The research design for this study is a descriptive design. In
view of this, the study adopted the field survey method to
collect both quantitative and qualitative data. The field survey
8
implies the process of gaining insight into the general picture
of a situation, without utilizing the entire population (Gall,
Borg and Gall, 1996: 28).
A sample of the respondent was selected from the population using
purposive technique where the researcher hand- picks the staff
that is informative and can facilitate results. The researcher
adopted a descriptive research design involving the researcher
visiting the ministry of foreign affairs, Protocol registry to
ask questions on the state of affairs as it is on records
appraisal and disposal. The researcher reports the findings as
they are.
1.7.3 SITE
Most of the research was carried out at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of Kenya between the months of May to
August 2012
1.7.4 THE TARGET POPULATION
The population of the study was drawn from protocol division in
the ministry of foreign affairs which is responsible for
accrediting diplomats
9
The population involved the entire group of ministry of foreign
affairs as a targeted organization. The focus was centered on
staff in protocol division which comprise of;
The chief of protocol
Deputy Chief of protocol
Privileges and Immunities department staffs
Diplomatic safety and security staff
1.7.5 RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS
Data was collected using structured questionnaires, interviews
and observation. Open discussions were used where validation of
data was necessary.
a) Questionnaires
10
The researcher gave questionnaire to seven Privileges and
Immunities staff. The reason behind this was that it was easier
to reach a large group of respondents within a short time and the
questionnaires helped in avoiding biasness and they provided the
respondent with enough time to reflect and respond.
From the respondent of questionnaires, it was evident that
violation of diplomatic immunities is rampant but at the same
time agreed that some measures have been put in place to address
the problem.
b) Interviews
Interviews were administered to senior members of protocol
division. The researcher therefore carried out interview to Chief
of Protocol Ambassador Kinyanjui and Principal Counsellor of
Diplomatic Safety and Security Mr. David Musyoka.
Use of interviews helped the researcher to probe the respondents
and therefore get more in-depth information, it was possible to
clarify questions in order to get relevant response from
respondents and it was possible to get complete and honest
answers by respondents.
11
From the interview of both Chief of Protocol and Principal
Counselors of Diplomatic Safety, it was evident that diplomatic
crimes were very rampant and many cases had been filed at MFA and
Diplomatic police station at Gigiri. They also admitted that the
measures put in place to curb the crimes are not very effective
due to bureaucratic process.
1.7.6 DATA ANALYSIS
Data was analyzed qualitatively. Analysis of qualitative data
collected using interviews and document analysis was an ongoing
process where emerging themes were categorized based on the
research questions. As the research progressed, some of the
questions were refined while new ones were formulated to fill in
the research gaps detected. Any questions arising during
categorization were also included.
In the early stages of fieldwork data collection, data analysis
involved developing simple categories based on the
characteristics of respondents and the events that appeared in
the research context.
1.7.7DATA PRESENTATION
12
The analyzed data will be presented in form of report submitted
to the supervisor after the research is completed. Texts in prose
form, though summarized will be used to explain the research
findings.
CHAPTER TWO
2.1 HISTORIC BACKGROUND OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The Ministry has its origin in the governor’s office (Government
house, now state house) under the chief secretary Sir Walter
Coutts. The offices were later moved to Harambee House but later
relocated its present building (old treasury building) after the
ministry of finance moved to its current location.
[http//www.mfa.go.ke.]
13
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was established after Kenya
became independent in 1963 to articulate Kenya’s foreign policy.
For a long time, Kenya pursued foreign policy based on
fundamental principles of promotion of peaceful co –existence,
respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states
and preservation of national security, peaceful settlement of
disputes, non-interference in the internal affairs of other
states, non-aligned, national interest and adherence to the
charters of the United Nations and African Union. Kenya has now
shifted its foreign policy orientation and currently the strategy
rests on four interlinked pillars of economic diplomacy, peace
diplomacy, environmental diplomacy and Diaspora diplomacy.
[http//www.mfa.go.ke.]
14
CURRENT ORGANOGRAM
15
MINISTER
ASSISTANTMINISTER
PERMANENT SECRETARY
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION DIRECTOR OF
POLITICAL AFFAIRS
1. KENYA DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS2. AGENCIES
CHIEF OF PROTOCOL
ADMINISTRATION
PERSONNEL
SECURITY
SUPPLIES
COMMUNICATION
TRANSPORT
POLITICALDIVISIONS
FUNCTIONAL DIVISIONS
AFRICA AND AU
AMERICAS
ASIA AND AUSTRALIA
MIDDLE EAST
EUROPE AND COMMONWEALTH
EAST AFRICANCOMMUNITY
IOC AND SMALL ARMS
LEGAL AFFAIRS
WELFARE,
EDUCATION ANDTRAINING
ECONOMICS & TRADE
RESEARCH SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY
PRESS AND PUBLIC RELATIONS
PROTOCOLDIVISION
ICT AND RESEARCH
CENTRAL PLANNING
UNIT
HORN OF AFRICA
FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING
2.2 Ministry’s Mandate
The MFA is mandated to articulate Kenya’s foreign policy as per
the presidential circular No.1/2008 on the Organization of
government states the mandate as:
i. Foreign policy
ii. Bilateral and Multilateral Relations
iii. International and Regional Organizations
iv. Kenya embassies abroad
v. Foreign missions in Kenya
vi. Treaties, conventions and Agreements
vii. Diplomatic privileges and immunities
viii. State and official visits
ix. Protocol matters
x. Consular services
xi. Joint commissions with other countries
xii. Government spokesman of foreign affairs and global issues
16
[http//www.mfa.go.ke.]
xiii. Peace initiatives
xiv. Commonwealth affairs
xv. Kenyans in Diaspora
xvi. International jobs office
xvii. Foreign Service institute (http://www.mfa.go.ke/)
2.3 Mission and vision
The vision of MFA is to be a world- class diplomatic service in
pursuit of Kenya’s National interest globally. This is further
elaborated through its mission statement: To pursue the
interests, values of the Kenyan people, and those of Africa,
through effective diplomatic engagement. (http://www.mfa.go.ke/)
2.4 Core functions
These include Foreign policy, Joint Commissions with other
countries, international and Regional Organizations, Kenya
missions Abroad, Kenya missions in Kenya treaties, Conventions
and immunities, state and official visits, Protocol Matters,
17
peace initiatives, Pan- African Affairs, Commonwealth Affairs,
International Jobs, and Kenyans in Diaspora, Foreign service
institute. (http://www.mfa.go.ke/)
2.5 Core values
The values that guide us in discharging our duties are:
Patriotism, Team spirit, Collective Responsibity,
Professionalism, Discipline, Dignity, Integrity, and Equity.
(http://www.mfa.go.ke/)
2.6 POLICY PRIORITIES
2.6.1 Promotion of Peace and Security
Kenya’s role in ensuring international peace and security has
contributed significantly in promoting and projecting a positive
image of the country. Participation in peacekeeping missions in
various parts of the world and involvement in regional peace
initiatives has earned the nation international acclaim and
goodwill.
2.6.2 Promotion of Good Governance
18
Governance issues have achieved pre-eminence in international
relations. The promotion of democratic principles, human rights,
zero tolerance for corruption, transparency and accountability,
and respect for the rule of law have become central in global
politics.
2.6.3 Promotion of Economic Interest
Economic recovery as the overriding objective of the Government
should influence Kenya’s Foreign Policy. In this regard, the
country’s Foreign Policy will seek to compliment domestic
policies that have been adapted to rejuvenate economic growth as
articulated in the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and
Employment Creation (ERSWEC). (http://www.mfa.go.ke/)
2.6.4 Divisions and departments
The ministry is divided into four main departments that fall
under various divisions namely:
A) Protocol division
i. Host country and consular matters
B) Administration
19
i. Human resources management
ii. Finance
iii. Economics
iv. Information Communications and Technology
v. Accounts
vi. Public Affairs and communication
vii. Procurement
viii. Central planning and Project Monitoring
ix. Legal Affairs
x. Kenya Missions Abroad
C) Political Affairs
i. International organization and Conferences
ii. Europe and Commonwealth
iii. Americas
iv. Middle East
v. Africa
vi. International Jobs and Diaspora
vii. Asia and Australia
viii. Horn of Africa
20
ix. East African Community Affairs
x. Great Lakes Region
xi. China desk.
D) Foreign Service Institute
i. Human resource Development
ii. Library
iii. Research (http://www.mfa.go.ke/)
2.7 MISSIONS ABROAD
The ministry doesn’t have any branches within the country but has
established 51 fully fledged Missions to date with multiple
accreditations, bringing Kenya’s diplomatic coverage to 100
countries for purposes of ensuring Kenya’s strategic presence
throughout the world. It also maintains 8 multilateral Missions 4
of which are accredited to the United Nations and its agencies
(New York, Geneva, Vienna and Nairobi); Rome is accredited to the
food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the world Food
21
Programme (WFP); Brussels to European Union (EU); Addis Ababa to
the African Union (AU) and Lusaka to the Common market for
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). (http://www.mfa.go.ke/)
2.8 MY AREA OF ASSIGNMENT
PROTOCOL DIVISION
During my Internship period, I worked in Protocol Registry. It is
the busiest division in Foreign Affairs and all other divisions
are linked to protocol. This is because for any meeting to take
place in the ministry, the preparations are done with the staff
at the protocol division in conjunction with the respective
division.
Protocol registry is a section under protocol division that
adopts a decentralized registry system covering protocol
functions.
The Protocol registry in the MFA serves the protocol division
which is charged with the execution of Government’s international
obligations as signatory to the Vienna and Geneva conventions on
diplomatic and consular relations. The division is also
22
responsible for the management of presidential visits abroad and
for receiving all state and official guests in the country.
The section is headed by a Records manager. The major key
services provided by protocol registry include:
Designing mail systems (incoming and outgoing mails)
Receiving incoming mails and filing them in relevant files
and distributing them to relevant action officers
Designing filing systems
Designing tracking systems
Receipt of mail (operating and sorting of mails)
Registration of mail
Storage of files/records
Custody and security of records
Dissemination of information
Preparation maintenance and reviewing a viable file
classification scheme
Preparing and review of retention/disposal schedule
Appraisal or weeding of ephemeral records and disposing of
them.
23
Effecting prompt disposal of closed records to the national
archives and documentation service and obtaining destruction
authority for value less records
All documents that are from any foreign country have to reach the
ministry through their foreign mission which coordinates with the
protocol division and the documents go through a certain chain of
command and the protocol division ensures that this protocol is
followed.
Protocol division is subdivided into smaller units for easy and
effective management of tasks, this includes: the Airport wing,
Security, Protocol Registry. The airport wing has an office
situated at the Jomo Kenyatta International airport. Their main
mandate is to ensure that the dignitaries are ushered safely from
the time they arrive into the country until they reach their
destination within the country. They are also in charge of
confirming that their accommodation is secured. Furthermore they
escort these dignitaries to their appointed meetings.
Security wing is in charge of ensuring safety of the building and
its employees. Protocol registry is in charge of diplomats
24
documents. This is where diplomatic identity cards are made; VAT
exemptions are verified and granted to the individuals who
deserve them. This is a very busy division all year round.
I worked mostly in the Protocol Registry and my main duties
included making of Diplomatic Identity Cards, I also worked on
VAT exemptions for diplomats, I was allowed to attend meetings
when different heads of states came to Kenya. The part of my
experience that I enjoyed the most was networking. Protocol is
the best place to network because when you go for the lunch,
dinner and breakfast meeting you get an opportunity to interact
with diplomats among many other important people who can be very
important contacts in the near future.
I think that this is a very organized and relevant division. This
is because it has been sub divided to ensure that specific issues
are handled by a specific teams, this avoids confusion and incase
of a problem it is very easy to know who is in charge. This helps
to keep the staff alert and hardworking because of individual
responsibility. The staff of this Division is busy all year round
and not only certain months of the year so are they always
25
relevant. It is also important to note that this is a very
dangerous division to work in terms of job security. A very small
mistake can lead to one being sent home.
In fact, protocol office never relaxes because the services
offered by this office are constant and continuous. Embassies and
International Organizations will constantly have documents like
Notifications of Departure, Notifications of Arrival, Customs
clearance documents, requests for Diplomatic Identity cards, VAT
Exemption, Airport passes, Application for visas among other
documents that always need to be worked on.
26
CHAPTER THREE
3.1 MEASURES PUT IN PLACE TO CURB DILPOMATIC CRIMES
3.1.1 THE persona non grata PROCEDURE
This has been one of the measures put in place to regulate and
control the violation of diplomatic privileges and immunities.
Persona non grata in diplomacy literally meaning "an unwelcome
person", refers to a foreign person whose entering or remaining
in a particular country is prohibited by that country's
government. It is the most serious form of censure which one
country can apply to foreign diplomats, who are otherwise
protected by diplomatic immunity from arrest and other normal
kinds of prosecution.
27
Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations Article 9, a
receiving State may at any time and without having to explain its
decision, notify the sending State that the head of the mission
or any member of the diplomatic staff of the mission is persona
non grata or that any other member of the staff of the mission is
not acceptable. In any such case, the sending State shall, as
appropriate, either recall the person concerned or terminate his
functions with the mission. A person may be declared non grata or
not acceptable before arriving in the territory ofthe receiving
State.
While diplomatic immunity protects mission staff from prosecution
for violating civil and criminal laws, depending on rank, under
Articles 41 and 42 of the Vienna Convention, they are bound to
respect national laws and regulations. Breaches of these articles
can lead to a persona non grata declaration being used to punish
erring staff.
Article 41 states that without prejudice to their privileges and
immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such
privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of
the receiving State. They also have a duty not to interfere in
28
the internal affairs of that State. The premises of the mission
must not be used in any manner incompatible with the functions of
the mission as laid down in the present Convention or by other
rules of general international law or by any special agreements
in force between the sending and the receiving State.
Some historic examples of diplomats declared persona non grata
includes
I. In September 1952, the American Ambassador to the Soviet
Union, George F. Kennan, was declared persona non grata after
making a statement which the Soviets believed linked them to
Nazi Germany. The Soviets refused to allow Kennan to reenter
the Soviet Union.
II. In 2008, President of Bolivia Evo Morales declared U.S.
Ambassador Philip Goldberg persona non grata, claiming that the
U.S. government conspired against him and supported his
opponents
III. In October 2008 Serbia expelled ambassadors of Montenegro
and the Republic of Macedonia after these countries
recognized the independence of Kosovo. In November 2008
29
Serbia also expelled the ambassador from Malaysia after
Malaysia recognized Kosovo's independence
IV. In 2008 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel declared a
UN staffer persona non grata American Princeton University
professor emeritus of international law Richard A. Falk when
he was the United Nations Human Rights Council's United
Nations Special Rapporteur on "the situation of human rights
in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967." Stating
this was because Falk previously had compared Israel's
treatment of Palestinians to Nazi treatment of Jews, Israel
barred him in May 2008 and December 2008. As of March 2011
Falk was still banned from Israel.
V. In January 2009, following Venezuela expelling Israeli
diplomats due to Israel's offensive in the Gaza Strip,
Israel ordered Venezuelan diplomats to leave the country,
declaring them personae non gratae in Israel"
VI. On June 8, 2009, Russia declared Finnish diplomat Simo
Pietiläinen, persona non grata, due to a controversial action
by Pietiläinen where he smuggled Anton Salonen out of Russia
30
following a long custody dispute between his Finnish father
and Russian born lover.
VII. On March 30, 2011, The Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs,
declared three Iranian diplomats, including the Ambassador,
persona non grata for allegedly spying. Upon on orders from His
Highness the Emir of Kuwait, the deputy prime minister, and
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, expelled the high ranking
Iranian diplomats
VIII. On May 1, 2011 The Libyan ambassador to the United Kingdom,
Omar Jelban, was given 24 hours to leave the country after
Foreign Secretary William Hague said he was persona non grata.
The expulsion was in response to attacks on British embassy
premises in Tripoli following the death of Colonel Gaddafi's
son in a NATO air strike
IX. On January 6, 2012 the United States notified the Venezuelan
government of the declaration of Venezuelan diplomat Livia
Acosta Noguera as a persona non grata and demanded that she
leave the United States by January 10, 2012. The declaration
was announced by the United States on January 8, and came
after an FBI investigation into allegations reported in a
31
Univision documentary. The documentary purported that
several diplomats from various countries, including Iran and
Cuba had been in contact with a group of Mexican hackers
connected with the National Autonomous University of Mexico.
X. On April 8, 2012 Israel declared German poet Günter Grass,
recipient of the 1999 Nobel Prize in Literature, persona non
grata[44] because of his poem What Must Be Said which warned
that Israel threatened an "already fragile world peace"
XI. On September 7, 2012, the Canadian government declared all
Iranian diplomats in Canada personae non gratae. The Canadian
embassy in Tehran also was closed.
(Wikipedia.org/diplomatic_immunity.htm/)
3.1.2 WAIVER OF IMMUNITY
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention allows the sending state to
waive the diplomat's immunity. The article states that the
immunity from jurisdiction of diplomatic agents and of persons
enjoying immunity may be waived by the sending State, waiver must
always be express, the initiation of proceedings by a diplomatic
agent or by a person enjoying immunity from jurisdiction under
article 37 shall preclude him from invoking immunity from
32
jurisdiction in respect of any counterclaim directly connected
with the principal claim and Waiver of immunity from jurisdiction
in respect of civil or administrative proceedings shall not be
held to imply waiver of immunity in respect of the execution of
the judgment, for which a separate waiver shall be necessary.
(Vienna Convention, 1961)
The drafters included this provision to allow a sending state to
contest civil claims in domestic courts when waiver would not
impede the daily performance of the foreign mission. The Vienna
Convention requires the sending state to make an express waiver
of this privilege. One commentator has argued, however, that a
diplomat's lawbreaking activity can constitute a constructive
waiver of diplomatic immunity. (Ben-Asher, 2008).As a matter of
practice, the sending state will not subject its diplomats to the
criminal or civil jurisdiction of the receiving state. Although
the sending state may not opt to waive the immunity of its
diplomats in the receiving state, this does not preclude the
sending state from prosecuting the crime.
As diplomatic immunity belongs to the sending state and not to
the diplomatic agent, it is only the sending state that has the
33
right to waive the immunity (Article 32(1)). Also as explained
earlier, waiver must always be expressed and once given, the
waiver is irrevocable. The requirement of the expressisverbis waiver
reduces the possibility that the receiving state mistakenly
considers, for example, an oral statement from the sending state
as a valid waiver of immunity. It has to be borne in mind that
proceedings in the same case, but on different stages, are to be
regarded as a whole and thus one waiver is enough. The ILC also
stated that it goes without saying that proceedings, in whatever
court or courts, are regarded as an indivisible whole and that
immunity cannot be invoked on appeal if an express waiver was
given in the court of first instance. (ILC Yearbook, 1958. Vol II
p.99)
History knows of very few cases when sending states have agreed
to waive the immunity of their diplomatic agents. The sending
state more likely prefers to recall the diplomat or dismiss him
from its service in such cases (Brown, 1988). The request for
waiver of immunity usually means that the criminal offence in
question is of such a degree that if the sending state does not
waive the immunity, the receiving state is no longer prepared to
34
accept the diplomat in issue as a diplomatic agent. States,
however, have waived the immunity of their diplomatic agents and
one of such instances concerns a Georgian diplomat. The second-
highest ranking diplomat for the Republic of Georgia in the
United States, Gueorgui Makharadze, was involved in a tragic
automobile accident that resulted in the death of a sixteen-year-
old girl, a Brazilian national, on 3 January 1997 in Washington
D.C. He was alleged to have been driving at a speed of eighty
miles per hour and under the influence of alcohol, but due to his
diplomatic status he was not given a breathalyzer or blood test.
This incident was followed by public uproar, particularly when
Georgia prepared to recall the diplomat. Finally, due to intense
public pressure, the Georgian president agreed, as a moral
gesture, to voluntarily waive Makhardze’s immunity. The diplomat
consequently pled guilty and currently serves his sentence in the
United States. (M.S.Zaid, 1998)
The waiver of immunity does not prevent committing of serious
crimes, but can allow justice to take its course where such
crimes have been committed. Even then there is no guarantee that
states will waive the immunity of their diplomats and as a
35
traditional rule, an undertaking by the state or its agent that
immunity will be waived if dispute arises is of no legal effect
(Lewis, 1990).
3.1.3 SELF-DEFENCE
Scholars who tend to challenge the absolute nature of diplomatic
immunity from criminal jurisdiction often argue that the
receiving state may invoke self-defense as the basis for trial
and punishment of offending diplomats. This was a popular view
among writers in the 15th to 17th centuries, when conspiracy
became quite a common crime committed by ambassadors. The main
argument was that diplomatic immunity cannot be more important
than the security of the receiving state, but nevertheless the
sovereigns did not follow this line of argument and used other
means to deal with the diplomats in question. (Mahmoudi, 1990)
However, one has to make a distinction between self-defense as a
basis for trial and punishment and as an immediate and
proportionate reaction to a crime which can endanger the lives of
other people. The latter concept is definitely more acceptable
and reasonable and it is likely to be correct to argue that the
36
offending diplomat could even be killed in self-defense.
Therefore the receiving state may, without breaching its
obligations under the principle of personal inviolability, detain
a diplomatic agent if he commits a crime, which is a flagrant
breach of law, in order to ensure both the security of the
diplomat himself and the public. This kind of detention should
not be interpreted as punishment or subjecting the diplomat to
the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state. Consequently,
self-defence could be used as an immediate measure of prevention
in the case of threat of irreparable damage to person or property
regardless of whether the threat is directed against the state,
its agents, or its nationals. (Mahmoudi, 1990)
Support for the principle of self-defence as a remedy against the
crimes committed by diplomats can also be found in the commentary
of the International Law Commission (ILC) on the article on
personal inviolability. It states that being inviolable, the
diplomatic agent is exempted from certain measures that would
amount to direct coercion, but this, however, does not exclude
self-defence. (ILC Yearbook, 1958. Vol II p.138)
37
The ILC considered self-defence as a measure of immediate
reaction and not as a ground for trial and punishment (the latter
has actually never left the realm of the doctrine). The ICJ,
referring to the principles of personal inviolability and
diplomatic immunity from jurisdiction, also said that naturally
it does not mean that a diplomatic agent caught in the act of
committing an assault or other offence may not, on occasion, be
briefly arrested by the police of the receiving state in order to
prevent the committing of the particular crime. (ILC Yearbook,
1958. Vol II p.138)
It is very rare, but states have still availed themselves to the
principle of self-defence. One of such incidents happened in
Paris on 31 July 1978 following a hostage-taking operation by a
Palestinian inside the Embassy of Iraq. The ambassador, who acted
as a mediator, managed to reach an agreement with the Palestinian
and the latter finally left the mission premises escorted by two
French policemen. But at the moment when the Palestinian was
going to get into the police car waiting for him at the gate of
the embassy, the diplomats started to fire at them from the
38
mission premises, killing two (including a policeman) and
injuring others. The police returned fire immediately in self-
defence and consequently killed one of the Iraqis. They also
arrested three others for participation in the shooting and they
were soon expelled from France. The response of the police was
surely justified and proportional and constituted an immediate
measure to eliminate danger of injuries to person. When
commenting on this case, the government of France refrained from
any official reference to the principle of self-defence. This is
understandable, because there are no clear rules when and under
what circumstances this principle may be applied as a response to
serious crimes committed by diplomats, and any use of self-
defence entails the risk of arbitrary application. Self-defence
should be used with due regard to the requirement prescribed in
this respect in the classic Caroline case, namely a necessity of
self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means,
no moment for deliberation and proportionality. ( Rousseau, 1980)
39
3.1.4 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The principles of personal inviolability and of diplomatic
immunity only restrict the jurisdiction of the receiving state
and possible transit states, thus not having an ergaomnes effect
(towards everyone). Therefore, offending diplomatic agents can be
prosecuted in certain circumstances as discussed above. But in
addition to those there is one more possibility, namely where
such diplomats are subject to criminal proceedings before certain
international criminal courts.
The issue is addressed in the Rome Statute but in addition to the
question of liability, the statute considers also the question of
jurisdiction. Firstly, the Rome Statute applies equally to all
persons without any distinction based on official capacity, and
the latter in no case exempts a person from criminal
responsibility. But secondly, article 27, paragraph 2 of the Rome
Statute clarifies that “immunities or special procedural rules
which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether
under national or international law, shall not bar the
[International Criminal] Court from exercising its jurisdiction
40
over such a person”. Therefore, a person cannot hide behind his
diplomatic immunity in order to escape criminal proceedings
before the ICC as long as the crime occurred on the territory of
a state party to the Rome Statute or the person accused of the
crime is a national of a state party to the Rome Statute (Rome
Statute Article 12) The latter possibility means that if the
sending state of the criminal diplomat is party to the Rome
Statute and the sending state has failed to initiate criminal
proceedings or conduct such proceeding independently or
impartially, the ICC can initiate its own criminal proceedings.
However, the initiation of criminal proceedings is hindered by
one factor — if the diplomat concerned is still in the receiving
state and the sending state has refused to waive its immunity.
Article 98, paragraph 1 of the Rome Statute states that the ICC
may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require
the requested state to act inconsistently with its obligations
under international law with respect to the diplomatic immunity
of a person, unless the ICC can first obtain the co-operation of
the respective third state for the waiver of immunity. In other
words, the Rome Statute does not permit the receiving or transit
41
state to violate personal inviolability or diplomatic immunity in
order to extradite the criminal diplomat to the ICC. Therefore,
such immunity can still be an obstacle to criminal proceedings,
but at least retired or former diplomats can no longer hide
behind continuing immunity in respect of official acts.
Nevertheless, the ICC is an important step ahead in securing the
prosecution of people who otherwise would escape legal proceeding
due to their privileged status. (Schabas, 2001)
3.1.5 LEGAL REFORMS: RE-NEGOTIATION OF THE 1961 VIENNA CONVENTION
A typical reaction to flagrant abuses of diplomatic immunity is
to argue that re-negotiation of the Vienna Convention ...seems to
most logical step to prevent future abuse. A number of reforms
have been proposed they vary from restricting the scope of
immunities to carrying out an inspection of the diplomatic bag.
In this regard, some proposed amendments focus on limiting
diplomatic immunity to all or some accredited persons so that it
will apply only to official acts or other limited categories of
conducts. The personal immunities of administrative and technical42
staff, and perhaps those of families, should be restricted. The
appeal of this proposal lies in the fact that a very high
percentage of crimes committed by protected persons is attributed
to low ranking officials and dependents. ( Pianin, 1987)
In the arena of Problem-specific amendments, one specific
proposal concerns the inviolability of the diplomatic bag.
Following the Libyan embassy and Dikko incidents, the British
considered an amendment that would provide for compulsory opening
of the diplomatic bag upon request following reasonable
suspicion, or return of the bag to its point of origin.306
Indeed, the existence of weapons of mass destruction - nuclear,
chemical or biological - does raise serious concerns about state
terrorism and possible abuse of the diplomatic bag. However, both
the British government and the House of Commons Committee clearly
rejected the amendment as a solution due to practical
difficulties. It was thought that securing amendments to the
Vienna Convention in accordance with proposals of the UK and
like-minded countries would be virtually impossible. Other
proposed amendments include the removal of personal immunity
43
after participation in acts of state terrorism, and withdrawal of
the inviolability of the diplomatic premises if used for acts of
state terrorism. Like the bag search proposal, and for similar
reasons, all these ideas have been strongly rejected. (Foreign
Affairs Committee, 1984)
3.1.6 TERMINATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
The receiving state can break relations with the sending state.
These are some extreme conditions necessary for governments to
terminate diplomatic relations. Some of these include; terrorism
acts committed by sending states or their accomplices, spying
acts by sending states to receiving states or if any of the state
fails to honor an agreement previously entered.
These two incidents below provide examples of the extreme
conditions necessary for governments to terminate diplomatic
relations. Governments will not, as a matter of course, these two
incidents provide examples of the extreme conditions necessary
for governments to terminate diplomatic relations. Governments
will not, as a matter of course, resort to such a drastic
measures.
44
On April 17, 1984, demonstrators gathered outside the Libyan
People's Bureau in London to protest the practices of Colonel
Muammar Qaddafi's regime. Officials of the British government had
been forewarned that if the demonstration was allowed to take
place, Libya “‘would not be responsible for its consequences.”’
Suddenly, during the demonstration, machine gunfire erupted.
Shots were fired from inside the Libyan embassy toward the crowd.
Constable Yvonne Fletcher was killed, and eleven others injured.
This tragedy led to termination of diplomatic relations between
the United Kingdom and Libya. Similarly, the United States, after
much internal debate, broke diplomatic relations with Iran after
terrorists seized the United States Embassy in Tehran and held 52
United States nationals hostage.
CHAPTER FOUR
4.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
4.1 CONCLUSION
Diplomatic immunity, as the majority of the international
community interprets the principle, protects diplomats in an
attempt to ensure diplomatic relations. This protection
45
essentially amounts to a license to break the law. Diplomatic
immunity protects violators from punishment for failing to obey
the law of the receiving state. The international community must
seriously rethink this policy which places not only diplomats,
but their families, staff, and personal servants above the law.
The international community, through a forum such as the United
Nations, must reevaluate the ancient principle of diplomatic
immunity. The United Nations needs to establish new guiding
principles that could preserve the basic concept of diplomatic
immunity while defining reasonable limits as to who is entitled
to immunity. The participants in this international debate must
consist not only of international legal scholars and those who
conduct diplomacy, but also the victims of diplomatic crime.
In the interim, the diplomatic crimes legislation that is pending
is a small step in attempting to confront the abuses of the
diplomatic privilege. This legislation, however, does not address
the fundamental problems inherent in the current application of
diplomatic immunity. The current interpretation of diplomatic
immunity requires fundamental change. No justification exists in
international law, or in any other principle of law or principle
46
of justice, for murder, rape, robbery, and assault to go
unpunished.
4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
4.2.1 A CLAIMS FUND
Theorists have proposed the establishment of a claims fund to
compensate those injured by diplomats. Under this proposal,
victims who could not successfully bring actions under the
Diplomatic Relations Act could draw compensation from a nation
government funded financial pool. This proposal sought to provide
compensation for injured citizens where the diplomats who caused
injury were both immune from jurisdiction and carried no
liability insurance.
The proposal requires all states to establish a "Bureau of
Claims" to ascertain causation of injuries stemming from
instances involving a diplomat. The bureau would then determine
the amount of compensation due to the victim. The success of
this proposal requires the diplomat's participation in the
compensation procedure. The diplomat becomes a "witness" in the
47
determination of liability, without affecting diplomatic immunity
status.
The claims fund proposal contains some fundamental flaws. In all
probability, foreign missions will not voluntarily reimburse the
claims bureau. If the mission refuses to compensate the Bureau of
Claims for damages expended to compensate a victim of a
diplomat's wrongdoing, the Receiving states has limited avenues
of recourse.
4.2.2 A MANDATORY INSURANCE SCHEME
Another recommendation is the need for implementation of a
mandatory insurance scheme to solve the problem of diplomatic
immunity abuse.
The proposed scheme requires embassies to obtain insurance for
their diplomats and staff as a prerequisite to maintain
diplomatic relations with the Receiving States.
4.2.3 A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC CRIMINAL COURT
There proposed the establishment of a Permanent International
Diplomatic Criminal Court (court) with mandatory jurisdiction
48
over diplomats accused of committing criminal acts. This proposal
places the court in an inquisitorial mode, with the court acting
as both the prosecution and the defense. This court would have
the power to impose monetary fines and, if necessary, to imprison
diplomats in its own penal facilities.
The practical advantages of this proposal are twofold. First, the
court could operate free from the potential unfair bias of local
proceedings. Second, the use of a court outside a bilateral
relations structure precludes the termination of diplomatic
relations in extreme cases
This proposal has some distinct advantages and is one worth
further examination.
4.4.3 DIPLOMATIC CRIMES ACTS LEGISLATION
In response to controversy in the many states over abuses of the
diplomatic privilege, there is need to introduce Diplomatic Crime
Acts at national level to curb the issue.
For instance, Senator Jesse Helms of USA introduced the
Diplomatic Immunity Abuse Prevention Act (the Act) into the
Senate on October 8, 1987. In addition, various members of the
49
House of Representatives introduced similar measures. The Senate
initially approved the
Act as part of an authorization bill for the State Department,
but the proposal is currently stalled in Congress.
The act should address some of the problems associated with
diplomatic crime; the act should impose certain duties on the
Director of the State Department's Office of Foreign Missions in
order to assist local law enforcement.
The Director must maintain records on every incident involving an
immune diplomat and submit annual reports on these incidents to
Legislature; the legislation requires the Director to educate
local law enforcement officials on the levels of immunity
different diplomats possess and to assure the prosecution of
diplomats within the limitations imposed by the Vienna
Convention.
The Act should also mandate the development of procedures to
identify members of foreign missions in any state who actually
have immunity.
Finally, the legislation should authorize the President to take
necessary steps to prevent illegal use of the diplomatic pouch,
50
such as transporting weapons or illegal narcotics. This provision
is consistent with international law, as the Vienna Convention
limits the contents of the diplomatic pouch to documents and
articles intended for official diplomatic use.
51
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Black, Ian ‘Search for PC Yvonne Fletcher’s Killer Casts Old
Shadow Over Libya’s New Era’, The Guardian [online], 3 September
2010. Available from
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/03/yvonne ‐ fletcher ‐
killer ‐ search
CHUCK ASHMAN & PAMELA TRESCOTT, OUTRAGE: THE ABUSE OF DIPLOMATIC
IMMUNITY 127-134 (1986).
D. Ben-Asher. Human Rights Meet Diplomatic Immunities: Problems
and Possible Solutions. Available at:
http://www.law.harvard.edu/Admissions/Graduate_Programs/publicati
ons/papers/benasher.pdf (30.7.2003).
Eric Pianin, Bounds of Diplomatic Immunity; Victims to Testify in Support of
Helm's Bill Limiting Exemptions,
WASHINGTON POST, August 5, 1987
E. Denza. Diplomatic Law: A Commentary on the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1988, pp. 279–281.
52
Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘The Abuse of Diplomatic Immunities
and Privileges’ (London: House of Commons, 1984), 1984/85 HC 127.
Fox, Hazel, The Law of State Immunity 2nd Edition (Oxford, 2008).
G. SICK, All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran,
288-89 (1985)
J. E. Donoughue. Perpetual Immunity for Former Diplomats? A
Response to “The Abisinito Affairs: A Restrictive Theory of
Diplomatic Immunity?” – Columbian Journal of Transnational Law,
1988–1989, vol. 27, pp. 615–630.
J. Brown. Diplomatic Immunity: State Practice under the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. – International and
Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 37, 1988, p. 78.
McFadden, The U.N. and the City: Obligation, Opportunity and Irritation, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 20, 1983.
Satow, Ernest, Satow’s Guide to Diplomatic Practice 5th Edition (London,
1979).
53
S. L. Wright. Diplomatic Immunity: A Proposal for Amending the
Vienna Convention to Deter Violent Criminal Acts. – Boston
University International Law Journal, 1987, vol. 5, pp. 177–211.
Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations (1961)
W. A. Schabas. An Introduction to the International Criminal
Court. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 64.
QUESTIONNAIRE
Dear Participant,
I am Stephen Githaiga of Maseno University conducting research as
part of the partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award
of degree in International Relations and diplomacy with I.T
54
You have been selected to participate in this study. The main
purpose of the study is to examine the measures put in place to
address diplomatic crimes. The findings of the study will be used
to help all the parties concerned to address the issue and
particularly MFA will benefit in that the study will be an
additional knowledge as the study explores the challenges faced
and how they can be solved as a guide to improve and achieve
their goals and objectives
Participant declaration
I consent to voluntarily participate in this study whose purpose
has been explained to me by Githaiga Stephen of Maseno University
knowing and believing that the results of this study will only be
used for this research and shall not be used to victimize anyone
and the respondents will remain anonymous and their names shall
not be revealed to anyone.
1 BACKGROUND DATA
Gender
o Male
55
o Female
Department working?
o Privileges and Immunities Department
o Diplomatic safety and security Department
o Office of Chief of Protocol
In average, how many diplomatic related crimes are reported to
MFA per year?
o < 1
o > 2 and < 5
o > 6 and < 10
o > 10
Which are some of the crimes involving diplomats that have ever
been reported?
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………............
Do you think Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Privileges of 1961
has gives so many privileges to diplomats that they find it
easier to violate?
56
o Yes
o No
What measures have been put in place to regulate the violation?
o Persona non grata
o Waiver of immunity
o Self-defence
o Termination of diplomatic relations
o Legal procedures
Are the above measures effective?
o Yes
o No
Which do you think is the most effective measure?
o Persona non grata
o Waiver of immunity
o Self-defence
o Termination of diplomatic relations
o Legal procedures
57
Does the ministry have any legal procedure to ensure that the
victims of diplomatic crimes are compensated?
o Yes
o No
If yes, which?
…………………………………………………………………………….
…………………………………………………………………………….
Which are some of the recommendations you would give to curb
violation of diplomatic crimes?
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
58