Reasoning with Unconditional Intention

JournalofPhilosophicalResearchAcceptedPaper(Author’sfinalversion)Manuscript#150904A03/18/2016

AuthorinformationTitle Dr.phil.Name JensGillessenInstitutionalaffiliation UniversitätLeipzigContactaddress UniversitätLeipzig

InstitutfürPhilosophieBeethovenstr.1504107LeipzigGermany

e-mail [email protected]

REASONINGWITHUNCONDITIONALINTENTION

JensGillessen

Abstract.Supposethatyouintendtogotothetheater.Areyouthereinintendingtheunconditionalpropositionthatyougotothetheater?Thatwouldseemtobedeeplyirrational;afterall,yousurelydonotintendtogoif,forinstance,inthenextinstantanearthquakeisgoingtodevastatethecity.Whatweintendwedonotintend'nomatterwhat',itisoftensaid.Butif so—howcananyoneever rationally intendsimply toperformanactionofa certainkind?Inresponsetothepuzzle,a'conditionality'viewofintentionhasemerged:Thecon-tentsofeverydayintentionsareclaimedtobefraughtwithhiddenconditionalclauses.Thepaperarguesthatsuchclaimsareradicallyunmotivated:Evenunconditionalinten-tionshaveonlylimitedinferentialimportandhencecontrastsharplywitha'nomatterwhat'stance.Thepointisestablishedbyexaminingrelevantpatternsofreasoningfromunconditionaltoconditionalintentions.Keywords.Intention,conditionalattitudes,practicalreasoning,LucaFerrero,JohnBroome.

FINALDRAFT,PLEASECITEPUBLISHEDVERSION:DOI:10.5840/jpr20171011115

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I. Apuzzleaboutflatintention

Recentphilosophicalaccountsofintentiontendtoascribetospeakersinternallycon-ditionalattitudesonthebasisofeventhesimplestreportsofintention.Supposesome-one—callhimSchmidt—states,inresponsetoacolleague’squestionwhatheisuptointheevening:

(1) Iintendtogotothetheaterat7p.m.

Beingunconditionalingrammar,thestatementsurelyinvitesascriptiontoSchmidtofanintentionthathehimselfgoestothetheaterat7p.m.,period;thecontentnotinvolvinganyhiddenconditionalclauses.ItthusseemsmostnaturaltoascribetoSchmidtaninten-tionrelatinghimtothepropositionthathehimselfwillgotothetheaterat7;which‘flat’intentionwouldbeunequivocallycapturedby:

(2) Schmidtintendsto(goat7)

Lately,thenumberofthosewhobalkat‘flat’,face-valueaccountsofreportsofinten-tionaswellasdesirehavebeenontherise.Inthecaseathand,theywouldarguethat(2)misdescribesSchmidtasakindoffanaticwithacrazyintention:anintentiontogotothetheaterat7‘comewhatmay’,or‘nomatterwhat’.Andforsure,hisassertionof(1)cannotbetakentoentail:

(3) Schmidt intendsto(goat7 ifby then,anearthquakewillhavedevastatedthecity).

Ifadoptingflatintention(2)meanttocommittoludicrousintentionssuchas(3),tak-ingstatement(1)at facevaluewouldbea folly.Still, it isquitehardtoseewhata flatintentiontoAcouldbeotherthananintentiontoAinanycircumstances.

TheproponentsofwhatIwouldliketocalltheConditionalityViewhaveconcludedthatoureverydayintentionscannotbeoftheflatsortthat(2)exemplifies.Instead,theyhavecontended,thecontentsofordinaryintentionsmustbesystematicallyanddeeplyconditional.1Whatthepresentpaperisgoingtoshowisthatthiscontentionisunmoti-vated,forasimplereason:AflatintentiontoAisnotanintentiontoA'nomatterwhat'.Myargumentisstraightforward.

1. Ifintendingthat(A)wereintendingthatA'nomatterwhat',itwouldhavetobera-tionallypermissibletobaseonone'sintentionthat(A)anintentionthat(AifC),forarbitrarychoiceofcircumstancesC.2

2. Thereisnosuchpermission.3. Therefore,intendingthat(A)isnotintendingthatA'nomatterwhat'.

Mydefenseofthefirstpremisewillbebrief.OnthebroadlyinferentialistpictureIwillbeassuming,whatitamountstotobearacertainattitudeisreflectedbytheinferencestheattitudebearerisentitledtodrawbyvirtueofherhavingthatveryattitude(againstthebackgroundofherotherattitudes).Thus,thestateofbelievingthatpispartially,butnonetheless essentially characterized by a (conditional) normative fact: It entitles itsbearertoformthebeliefthatq,conditionalonhersimultaneouslybelievingthatifpthenq.Whateverstatedoesnotsupportsuchmodusponensreasoningcannotbecountedasabeliefthatp.Analogously,Iamsuggesting,anintentiontogoat7cannotbecountedasan


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intentiontodoso'nomatterwhat'unlessitrationallyentitlesitsbearertoadoptcondi-tionalintentionssuchas,say,anintentiontogoat7ifaquakewillhavedevastatedthecitybythen.3

ThatisallIhavetosayaboutthefirstpremise.Vindicatingthesecondpremisewilltakealotmorereflection,andthisishowIshallgoaboutit:Afteraclarificationoftheconceptofconditionalintentionandsomepreliminariesofreasoningtowardthem(sec-tionII),Iwillfirstpointoutwhyreasoningtowardconditionalintentionsisparticularlydifficulttoassess.Foronewearedealingwithpracticalreasoning,whichcallsforanaptstandardofassessment(sectionIII).Foranother(sectionIV:), theinferencepatterninquestionelicitsintuitionsthatcallforsomeacknowledgment,howeverlimited,ofinfer-encesfromintentionssuchas(2)tointentionssuchas(3).InsectionVIamgoingtoarguethatreasoningwithoutfurtherpremisesfromanunconditionalintentiontooneofitscon-ditionalcounterparts—inaccordancewitharuleIlabel(SCON)—isprovenincorrectbystrikingcounter-examples.Thispointwillbeestablishedbycriticalexaminationofanum-berofspeciousresponsestothosecounter-examples.SectionVI thenrevealsacorrectpatternofreasoningfromunconditionaltoconditionalintentions.Reflectiononthenec-essarycomplexitiesofthepertaininginferencerulewillmakeitclear,however,thatthereisaworldofdifferencebetweenflatandfanaticintentions.Atthatpointthen,thetruthofpremise2willbecomeobvious.

II. ConditionalIntentionandConditionalization

Firstofall,letmeclarifywhatwillbemeantby“conditionalintention”.Virtuallyeveryintentionisconditionalinthesensethatitsbeingformed,entertainedorabandonedde-pendsonenvironmental,neural,mentalandotherconditionsexternal to the intentionitself.Theseneedtobedistinguishedfromthe internalconditionswithwhichIwillbeconcerned.Thepointneedsemphasizingbecauselocutionsoftheform‘IintendthatAifC’4admitofbothanexternalandaninternalreading.Ontheexternalreading,thespeakermerelypredictsthatifCobtains,orisgoingtoobtain,shewillformanintentionthatA.Ontheinternalreading,sheexpressesanintentionthatAifCwhichatthetimeofutter-anceshehasalreadyformed—aninternallyconditionalintention.5Inordertodisambig-uate,thelatterwillbenoteddownintheform‘Nintendsthat(AifC)’.Thisnotationismeanttobecompatiblewith,butnottoimplythecontentiousviewthattheagentthereinintendsthepropositionthat(AifC).6Theremaybenosuchthingsasconditionalproposi-tions,andmyargumentswillnotpresupposeaparticularstanceonthematter.Whattheywillpresupposeistherobustnessofthedistinctionofinternalandexternalconditions.Amonginternallyconditionalintentions,myfocuswillbeonintentionswithinternalsuf-ficientconditionsexclusively.7

ByconditionalizationIshallmeanasubject’spassagebyinferencefromastateofin-tendingthatAtoastateofintendingthat(AifC).Sometimes,theformationofacondi-tionalintentionwillnotbeinferentialatall.Scaredbylonganddeepcracksintheceilingaboveyou,youmightdecidetorushtoaparticularemergencyexitasfastasyoucanincasetheyshouldstarttowiden.Obviously,decidingsomakessenseintheabsenceofanyintentiontorushthatcouldserveasapremise.Onotheroccasions,however,itseemsasthoughyouwillnotrationallycometointendthat(AifC)unlessyoualreadyintendthatA.Ontheseoccasions,youreason,orcouldreason,towardaconditionalintention.

A goodmeans to focus on these cases is to imagine playing the conditionalizationgame.Thegameinvolvestwoplayers,andtherulesareasfollows.Player1reportsoneof


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herintentions,intheform‘IintendtoA’or‘IintendthatA’.Next,player2asksplayer1aquestionoftheform‘DoyouintendthatAifC?’,pickinguptheA-termwhilechoosingCtotallyarbitrarily.Player1isthentogiveasincereyes-noresponse.Itwilloccasionallybehelpfultorecallthissetup.

Indealingwith conditionalization it needs tobe acknowledged that there are twowell-investigatedcorrectsortsofreasoningwhichatleastsometimesleadtoconditionalintentionsasconclusions:

• InstrumentalReasoning:Youadoptaconditionalintentionbecauseyoubelievedoingsotobeasuitablemeanstoachieveoneofyourgoals.8

• Enkraticreasoning:YoubelieveyououghttoAifC,andthereforeadoptanintentionto(AifC).9

Almostneedlesstosay,neitherofthesepathscouldbeexploitedtoreasonfromanintentionsuchas(2)toacrazyintention,suchas(3).Wereintention(3),oritsadoption,recommendedbyeitherSchmidt’sreasonsorasameanstohisends,itwouldnotcountasrelevantlycrazyafterall.But thisdoesofcoursenotprovetheConditionalitycampwrong;onecanconceiveoffurther,morestraightforwardwaysofconditionalizing.Letmesummarizetheseunderthelabel:

• GenuineConditionalization:Youadoptanintentionto(AifC)becauseyouintendthatAwithoutavailingofeitherinstrumentalorenkraticreasoning.

Theshortestandmostnatural-seemingrouteofGenuineConditionalizationwouldbeSimpleConditionalization:

(SCON) Nintendsthat(A) ∴Nintendsthat(AifC)

Whatweneedtoasktheninordertodecideonpremise2fromaboveiswhethercor-rectreasoningalong(SCON),orsomerelevantlysimilarsuchpath,ispossible.

III. AssessingPracticalReasoningforCorrectness

Thetaskofjudgingschemesofinferencesuchas(SCON)iscomplicatedbythefactthatwearedealingwithpracticalreasoning.Assessingtheoreticalinferencescanseemcomparativelyunproblematic:Truth-preservation inpassing frompremises to conclu-sionsiscommonlytakentobeareliableguide;atleastwhenoperatingunderidealizingabstractionfromthelimitsofreasoners’cognitiveresources.Intherealmofpracticalin-ference, however, the lens of truth-preservation turns blind. We need an alternativestandardofassessment.Inexplainingmine,IwilldrawheavilyonJohnBroome’stheoryofactivereasoning(Broome2013:177-91,221-87).

Reasoning,IsuggestinagreementwithBroome,isacausalprocessbywhichasubjectcomestohaveanattitudeXbecauseofotherattitudesY1,…,Yn,wherethisprocesssatis-fiesatleastonefurthercondition:Theconclusionattitudemustbeconstructedfromthepremiseattitudesbyapplicationofarule.Aparticularpieceofreasoningiscorrectjustincasethethereinappliedruleiscorrect.Correctnessofarule,Isuggest,shouldinturnbeassessedbymeansofthefollowingcriterion:10


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(COR) Aninferenceruleoftheform‘toderiveattitudeXasconclusionfromattitudesY1,…,Ynaspremises’11iscorrectiffitisrationallypermissibletobaseXon{Y1,…,Yn}.

OntheaccountIamsuggesting,toreasonistoactivelybaseattitudesonotheratti-tudes.Thus,(COR)identifiescorrectnessofreasoningwithitsrationalpermissibility.Atthesametimethecriterionoffersadeeperunderstandingofwhatreasoningis—atleastinthosecasesinwhichreasoningleadsonetoadoptanewattitude:TobaseanattitudeXasaconclusiononattitudesY1,…,YnaspremisesistoconstructXbyoperatingonY1,…,Ynfollowingarule,thereinadoptingX.12

Howdoweknowwhatrationalitypermits?Broomethinksthatbasingpermissionsmust, in the last instance,derive frompertaining requirementsof rationality (Broome2013:248,256-59).Whetherthisissoneednotbeansweredhere.Itakeitthatwehave(fallible,butnonetheless)immediateepistemicaccesstowhatrationalitypermitswhenwecarefullystudyexemplaryinstancesofreasoningandthereincometohaveintuitionsabouttheir(ir-)rationality.

IV. AConflictofIntuitions

Followingintuitionsblindly,however,isoutofthequestion.Asinotherphilosophicaldomains,too,areflectiveequilibriumneedstobeestablishedbetweenconsideredintui-tivejudgmentsandatheorythatexplainsthem(Harman1986:9).Theimportanceofsuchcautioningbecomesevidentwhenconsideringtheconfusinglywiderangeof intuitions(SCON)canevoke.

TotheadherentsoftheConditionalityView,thepatternhasapparentlyseemedal-mosttriviallycorrect.Aswillbeseen,thereisquiteanumberofwaysinwhichonecouldtrytoreconcilethisfavorablejudgmentwiththeapparentoddityofconclusionssuchas(3).Sometimesrecalcitrantintuitionscanbedefusedbytracingthemtosystematicbiasesofjudgmentorcognitiveillusions.Onesucherrortheory13couldclaim,forinstance,thatinjudging(3)acrazystate,whatactuallystrikesoneascrazyisnottheinternalreading:

(3-i) Schmidtintendsto(goat7ifaquakeoccurs)

...butrathertheexternalreading:

(3-e) Ifaquakeoccurs,thenSchmidtintendsto(goat7)

Theimpressionofcrazinessbeingexplainedbythesalienceofreading(3-e),nothingseemstostandinthewayofjudging(3-i)areasonableintentiontoadopt.

Againstthissuggestion,tworejoindersareinplace.First,itisnotatallclearthattheplanning state attributed to Schmidtby (3-i) is any less crazy than thedisposition at-tributedtohimby(3-e).Inordertoproperlyisolateintuitionsabout(3-i),considerabriefstory.SupposeSchmidtinallseriousnessdeliberatedasfollows:“I’mgoingtothetheaterat7...Therecouldbeadevastatingquaketonight,though...Looterswouldbeallovertheplace...Mightbebettertoguardthehousethen...Anyhow,evenifaquakewillstrike—I’llgo!”Supposefurtherthatasaresultofsodeliberatingheacquiresanumberofdisposi-tionsthatcanbeconsideredindicativeof(3-i):

• adispositiontoreplywith“yes”tothequestionwhetherhewillgotothetheaterincaseofaquake;


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• adispositionnottoformanyplansincompatiblewithgoingtothetheaterincaseofaquake;and

• adispositionnottodeliberatefurtheraboutthematter.

Finally,letussupposethathefailstoacquiredisposition(3-e):Around7,theearthbeginstoshakeviolently,andinhorrorSchmidtforthwithletsgoofhisintention.

Inthestory,(3-i)holdstruewhileexplicitdenialof(3-e)shouldpreventtheallegeddisturbanceofone’sjudgment.Still,Schmidt’sintentionseemscrazy—contrarytowhattheerrortheorypredicts.

Second,advancinganerrortheorymakessenseonlyifthereissomethingtobesaidinfavorof(SCON)inthefirstplace.Now,asfarasIcanseeintuitivesupportfor(SCON)couldoriginatefromtwosources.

1.) Friendly-lookinginstancesof(SCON).2.) Specioussimilarityof(SCON)withacertaincorrectpathofreasoningtowardcondi-

tionalbelief.

Letmecommentontheseoneatatime.Acorrectpathofbeliefreasoningiscertainly:

(BC⊃) Ibelievethat(P)∴Ibelievethat(C⊃P)

Thepatternisrationallyunassailable;afterall,thecontentofthepremiseentailsthecontentoftheconclusion,andbeliefis‘closedunderentailment’.14Itisnaturaltoconjec-turethenthatanalogousreasoningwithintentionislikewisecorrect:

(IC⊃) Iintendthat(P)∴Iintendthat(C⊃P)

Yet,theanalogyisanythingbutperfect.Thecorrectnessof(BC⊃)isobviousforthesolereasonthatbeliefisgovernedbya‘closureunderentailment’normofidealrational-ity.Nosuchnormgovernsintention,though,ascanbeseenfromacounterexample:Arichphilanthropistcouldfullyrationallyintendthat(heexterminatespovertyintheworld)withoutintendingthat(thereispoverty)—eventhoughtheformercontentclearlyentailsthe latter.Theabsenceofanunderlyingclosureprinciple for intentiondoesnotprove(IC⊃)incorrect,tobesure;theschemecouldstillbecorrectinitsownright.Evenso,theabsenceofanydeeper justificationandtherevealeddisanalogybetweenintentionandbeliefareboundtoshattermuchofitsinitialappeal.

Realsupportfor(SCON),Itakeit,isprovidedbyfriendly-lookinginstancesofthepat-tern.IfSchmidtwereasked:“Doyouintendtogotothetheaterat7ifthesunwillalreadyhaveset?”,or“…if2plus2equals4?”,or“…ifFlorenceisinTuscany?”,hemighteachtimeaffirm,andthiswouldnotstrikeanyoneasoddbehavior.Conditionalizingtowardcircum-stancesinwhichtheintendedactionwouldbereasonablegenerallylooksharmless.Thiscountsinfavorof(SCON).

Still,theseharmlessinstancescontrastsharplywithcrazy-seemingmovessuchastheinferencefrom(2)to(3).Whatwearefacingisaconflictofintuitions,wherebothkindsofintuitionwillhavetobeaccountedfor.Acknowledgementof(SCON)withoutaworkingstrategytodealwithbad-seemingmoveswillnotdo.Rejectingconditionalizationalto-gether,bycontrast,wouldaccountforthebad-seeminginstances,tobesure.Butthisso-lutionwouldcomeatthepriceofforgoingaquiteappealingexplanationoftheintuition


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thatmany,ifnotmostinstancesofconditionalizingseemtobealmosttriviallypermissi-ble.EventuallyIshallarguethat(SCON)isinneedofsevereregimentation,butbefore-handtherulecannotbeconsideredeitherplainlycorrectorplainlyfallacious.

Itmightbeobjectedthatthepriceofaclear-cutrejectionof(SCON)maynotbethathighafterall.Couldthegood-seeminginstancesofconditionalizationoncloserinspectionnotturnouttobeinstrumentalorenkraticinferencesindisguise?Afterall,ifyouintendtoA,youwillusuallysointendeitherbecauseyoubelievethatsointendingwillpromoteyourgoals,orbecauseyoubelieveyououghttoA.Andifthelatter,itseemsasthoughtheveryreasonsthatsupportyourought-beliefwillalsosupportanintentionto(AifC);atleastwhenCdoesnotunderminethosereasons.

Theobjectionfailsbecausethereareseeminglygoodconditionalizationsthepermis-sibilityofwhichisexplainedneitherbyinstrumentalnorbyenkraticreasoning.Toseethis,itsufficestoattendtoconstellationsremindingofBuridan'sAss,inwhichtheagentintendssomethingshehasnospecificreasontointend,andwhichshealsodoesnotbe-lievetobespecificallyconducivetoanyothergoalofhers.

Supposeasaleswoman—callherMeyer—intendstogobycarfromPaloAltotoSanFrancisco.Sheisalreadyontheroad,andbeforereachingacertainintersectionshewillhavetochoosewhethertogobyHighway101orbyInterstate280.Beingunfamiliarwiththearea,shedoesnothaveanybeliefsaboutthetworoutesthatwouldjustifyfavoringoneovertheother.Afterawhile,sheplumpsfor101.Anotherminutelater,stilltravelingtowardtheintersection,shepicksupahitchhiker.OnlearningthatMeyerintendstogoby101,thehitchhikerasksherwhethersheintendstogoby101evenifitisgoingtorain.Meyerdoesnotminddrivinginrain,andifitwillrainon101,shebelieves,itwillberain-ingon280either.Shereplieswith“yes”—andrationallyso,asitseems.

Letustakestock.Intheexample,Meyerexhibits,atsomepointorother,twointen-tions:

(M1) Meyerintendsto(take101)(M2) Meyerintendsto(take101ifitwillberaining)

Atnopointdoesshehaveanyought-belief fromwhichshecouldpossiblyhavein-ferred(M2)enkratically.Arguably,sheintendsto(gotoSanFrancisco)becauseshebe-lievessheoughttogotoSanFrancisco;also,shebelievesthatsheoughttotakeeither101or280.Butnoneofthesebeliefsissuitableforobtaining(M1)bywayofenkraticreason-ing—letaloneforenkraticallyobtaining(M2).Intheabsenceofanyreasontotake101inparticular,shecannotrationallycometobelievesheoughtto(take101)—letaloneto(take101ifitwillberaining).

HoweverMeyerhasarrivedat(M2)—shecannothavereasonedherwayenkratically.Norcouldinstrumentalreasoninghaveyielded(M2);afterall,nogoalofherswouldbeservedbyadopting(M2)overandabove(M1).Whetheritwillrainornot,(M1)sufficesto takeher toSanFrancisco.Andstill, shewouldnothaveadopted (M2),hadshenotadopted(M1)inthefirstplace.Theremustbeathirdcorrectpathofreasoningtowardconditionalintentions,apartfrominstrumentalandenkraticreasoningthen;andforallthathasbeensaiduptothispoint,thispathcouldwellbeSimpleConditionalization.

V. SimpleConditionalizationinspiteofmaligninstances?

If(SCON)asitstandswerecorrect,bothbenignandmaligninstancesofconditionali-zationwouldhavetobegoodreasoning.NotonlywouldSchmidtbepermittedtoreason


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from(2)toanintentiontogotothetheaterat7ifbythenthesunwillhaveset;hewouldevenbeabletoreasoncorrectlytowardcrazyintention(3).Hencetheproposalimmedi-atelyrunsintotrouble.

Thatalonebarelyjustifiesitsabandonment,however,becausetheforceofthecoun-ter-examplesisnotentirelybeyonddoubt.Indefending(SCON)againsttheallegationoflicensingcrazyinferences,twogeneralstrategiescanbepursued.

1.) Itmight be held that bad-seeming conditionalizations, although good reasoning inthemselves,inrealityneveroccur(maybewithsomeveryspecialexceptions)becausedespiteappearances,agentsgenerallydonothave intentionsassimpleas(2) fromwhichtheycouldreasontowardcrazyintentions.ThisdefensehasatleastimplicitlybeenendeavoredbyLucaFerrero,themainproponentoftheConditionalityView.

2.) Onthecontraryassumptionthatagentsdohaveintentionsassimpleas(2),appear-ancescouldstilldeceiveinanotherway.Inseeminglycrazymovessuchasfrom(2)to(3)thecrazinessoftheconclusioncanbe(andhasinfactbeen)creditedtoviolationofrationalityprinciplesotherthan(thosearguablyunderlying)GenuineConditional-ization.ThecandidatesIshalldiscussareintentionconsistency,theinstrumentalprin-ciple,Enkrasia,andaprincipleabouttheconnectionbetweenintendingandbelieving.

A. TheDefensegivenbytheConditionalityViewThe Conditionality View of intention exploits (SCON) to argue that intentions are

crazystatesunlesstheircontentisregimentedbythepresenceofstrongimplicitcondi-tionalclauses.Ononesimplistic,butinstructiveversionoftheview,thedeepstructureof(2)amountsto:15

(4) Schmidtintendsthat(hegoesat7ifhewillthenfinditadvisabletodoso)

Callan intentionwithabuilt-inhighlygeneralevaluativeclausea ‘deep’ intention.Now,conditionalizingtowardtheearthquakecircumstance,suchasinthestepfrom(2)to(3),wouldleadto:

(5) Schmidtintendsthat((hegoesat7ifhewillthenfinditadvisabletodoso)ifby7,anearthquakewillhavedevastatedthecity)

Itisnothardtoseehowtheadvisabilityclausesaves(5)fromcraziness.Ontheas-sumptionthattheearthquakereallywilltakeplace,Schmidtwillat7hardlyfinditadvis-abletogo;theinnermostconditionalwillturnoutvacuouslytrue,andtheintentionwillbesatisfiedwhetherornotSchmidtgoestothetheater.

AdherentsoftheConditionalityViewreadilyadmitthat(SCON),whenappliedtoflatintentions,doessupportmovestowardcrazyconclusions;theinferencefrom(2)to(3)isclaimed(oratanyrateimplied)tobecorrect.Yet,sincenosanepersonhasintentionsasflatas(2) toreason from,16examplesofcrazy inferencesareclaimedtobeunrealistic;whereastheresultsofapplying(SCON)torealisticpremisesareclaimedtobesanethankstotheirbuilt-inadvisabilitycondition.

TheConditionalityViewthusoffersawaytoholdonto(SCON)eveninthefaceofseeminglybadinstances,butatthesametimeitraisesabunchofnewissues.Letmecon-finemyselftoaproblemaboutakraticintention.Areakraticintentionssupposedtobedeeporflat?SupposeGeorge,arecklessundergraduate,againsthisownbetterjudgmentgivesintoanurgeofcuriosityanddecidestotakeheroinat9p.m.whenhewillbebackinhisroom.Onthedeepconstrual,Georgehasthereinformed:


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(6) Georgeintendsthat(hetakesheroinat9ifhewillat9finditadvisabletodoso)

Georgedoesnotnowfinditadvisabletotakeheroin;thatiswhatmakeshisintentionakratic,ifanything.Unlessinthecourseofthedayheatsomepointcomestofinddrugabuseadvisable,(6)willat9failtoinitiatedrug-takingonhisbehalf;theintentionwillnotbeproductiveofakraticaction.Yetthisiswhatakraticintentionoftendoes.Soakraticintentionmustbeflat:

(7) Georgeintendsthat(hetakesheroinat9)

ButiftheConditionalityViewmustadmitthatakraticintentionisflat,itcannotsolvetheproblemofbad-seemingconditionalizationsforakraticintentions.Justconsidertheinferencefrom(7)to:

(8) George intendsthat(hetakesheroinat9 ifhisbourgeoisparentswill thenbegivinghimasurprisepartyinhisownroom)

IntendingtotakeheroinwhilebeingwatchedbyhisparentswillbeacrazythingforGeorgetointend,evenbyhisownlights(wecanassume).Themovefrom(7)to(8)wouldbeacrazyinstancetheConditionalityViewcannotaccommodate.Itwillatanyratenotdotoclaimthatintentionssuchas(7)inrealityneveroccur.Denyingthepossibilityofakrasiaseemstoohighapriceforholdingonto(SCON).Andnoticethat,if(SCON)isin-correct,soaremostlikelytheinferentialmoveswhicharesupposedtoprovidetheinitialmotivationforassumingtheConditionalityView—movessuchasfrom(2)to(3).

Insomerespects,Ihavebeensimplifying.Ferrero,whohasputforwardthebestelab-oratedversionoftheviewyet,actuallysuggestsamorecomplicated‘deepstructure’thandisplayedby(4).17Yet,evenonhiselaborateaccountitishardtoseehowakraticinten-tioncouldbedealtwithsatisfactorily.Isuggesttoexploreotherdefensesof(SCON).

B. TheInconsistencyDefenseHereistheideaofaseeminglysimpledefense:Whenever(SCON)leadsfromanin-

tentiontoacrazyintention,thecrazinessoftheprogressionisclaimedtobeduenotto(SCON)buttoanallegedinconsistencywithoneoftheagent’sotherintentions.Morepre-cisely,theInconsistencyDefensecanbeputforwardineitheroftwoforms.

(ID1) Theagentmaybeclaimedtohaveabackgroundintentionthatisinconsistentwithintendingto(AifC).Ifanagenthasa‘blockingintention’,asIshallsay,thiswillexplain sufficiently why she cannot fully rationally adopt the conclusion of(SCON).

(ID2) Alternatively,itcouldbeclaimedthatagentsspontaneouslyformsuitableblock-ingintentionswheneverconfrontedwithstimulisuchas,say,thesortofques-tionsaskedbyplayer2aspartoftheconditionalizationgame.

Forthesetobeviabledefensesof(SCON),weneedtobeabletoplausiblyascribesuit-ableblockingintentions.WhichintentionofSchmidt’s,forinstance,couldpossiblyblockaninferencefrom(2)to(3)?Thesecandidatesmaycometomind:

(9) Schmidtintends(nevertoendupintrouble)(10) Schmidtintends(nottogoifacalamityoccurs)(11) Schmidtintends(nottogoifaquakeoccurs)


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Actually,(9)willnotdo.Evenonawideconstrualofinconsistency,(9)conflictswith(3)onlyundernon-trivialadditionalassumptions;e.g.thatSchmidtbelievesthatgoinginaquakewouldtakehimintotrouble.Intentionswithhighlygeneralcontentsuchas(9)arebetterseenasreflectinggoalswhichcallforadoptionofsuitablemeans.Iwillgetbacktoblockingbywayofinstrumentalreasoningbelow.(10)and(11),bycontrast,areindeedinconsistentwith(3).(11)isplainlyso;and(10)onareasonablybroadconstrualofcon-sistencywhichalso takesasubsetof theagent’sbeliefs intoaccount.18For thesakeofsimplicity,letmefocuson(11).

Could (11)bepartof Schmidt’sbackgroundof intentions, asaproponentof (ID1)mightclaim?Itcould,butthatdoesnotseemverylikely.Itshouldofcoursebeadmittedthatagentsaregenerallydisposedtorespondadequatelytosurprisingevents,ratherthaninfoolishways.AndifSchmidtis likemostofus,hewillmostlikelyallthewhilehavedispositionstotakequitespecificmeasuresinresponsetoaquake;say,toimmediatelysuspendhisplans;tostayathome;maybetoturnontheradio,etc.Yet,beingdisposedtoAinresponsetoCusuallyfallsshortofintendingto(AifC).Anagentmaybesodisposedsimplyinvirtueofadispositiontoform,inresponsetoC,anintentionthatA.EvenwithoutgoingintothedetailsaboutwhenadispositiontoAinresponsetoCcanbesaidto(co-)constitute adistal intention,19it is plain enough that thepresenceof an intention for-mationdispositionmustnotbeconfusedwiththepresenceofabackgroundintention.Schmidtisdisposednottogoifaquakeoccurs,butunlessheispromptedtotakeastanceonthescenario,hemostlikelydoesnotharboranyquake-relatedintentions;noteventacitly.Thepointgeneralizes;proponentsof(SCON)hadbettermakedowithoutappealstoagents’backgroundintentions.

Howabout(ID2)—theclaimthatplayersoftheconditionalizationgamequicklyformblockingintentions?Asimpletemporalconsiderationwillrevealaflawinthislineofde-fense,too.Supposeatt0youformanintentiontogotothetheaterthatnight.Att1youareaskedwhetheryou intendtogo ifaquakewilloccur.Let itbegranted for thesakeofargumentthatthequestiontriggerscognitiveprocessesofyoursthatissueintheblockingintention(nottogoifaquakewilloccur).Undertheassumptionsmade,youwill,however,nothavehadthisblockingintentionbetweent0andt1.Hence,throughouttheinterval[t0,t1]itwouldhavebeenrationalofyoutoavailof(SCON)andinferthecrazyintention(togo if a quakeoccurs). This still seemsutterlywrong.Apparently, defense (ID2)positsblockingintentionsattoolateapointintimetoachieveitsgoal.

C. TheInstrumentalDefenseThe InstrumentalDefense holds that in bad-seeming conditionalizationmoves the

agentviolateseithertheconsistencyrequirementonintention,orthe instrumentalre-quirement,orboth.Thus,itmaywellbethoughtthatwhatkeepsSchmidtfromrationallyadopting(3)onthebasisof(2)isthatinadopting(3),hewouldflouttheinstrumentalrequirement as follows. Schmidtmay tacitly be intending to X, and (part of) the bestmeanstoachieveXmaybethatifanearthquakeoccurs,hedoesnotgotothetheater.IfasuitableX-termcouldbepointedout,hewouldbeunabletofullyrationallyadopt(3)evenifrationalityshouldpermithimtobase(3)on(2).

WhatpropositioncouldplaythepartofXinthisstory?MaybeSchmidtintends,how-ever implicitly,nottogetstuck indebris;or, toreturntothesomewhatmorecredibleproposalfromabove,hemaybeintendingnevertoendupintrouble.Theimpressionthat(3)isacrazyconclusionmightthenbesaidtostemfromsomesuchfuzzybackgroundpolicy.


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On thisaccount,Schmidtwouldbeentitled (andunlesshedropshisgoal, at somepointrequired)toreason:20

(I-1) IintendthatIneverendupintrouble Ibelieveforminganintentionthat(Idonotgoifaquakeoccurs)tobe(partof)

thebestmeansnevertoendupintrouble ∴IintendthatIdonotgoifaquakeoccurs

Andforsure,werehetoadoptandholdontothisconclusion,hecouldnotconsistentlyadopt(3).

Theproblemwiththisdefenseisthatthebeliefpremisesitneedstoinvokeareoftentooflimsy.Inmanycases,theinstrumentalbeliefwillbefalse,whichmakesitimplausibletoseeitaspartoftheagent’sbackgroundoftacitbeliefs.Asithappens,Schmidt’sisoneofthesecases.Aminimalconditionformtobe(partof)ameanstoeshouldbethattheoccurrenceofm(jointlywiththeotherparts)raisesbysomenon-negligibleamounttheprobabilitythatewillobtain.Now,(3)willonlytakeSchmidtintotroubleifaquakewillactually occur. This is extremely unlikely, though. Schmidtwill almost certainly avoidtroubleanyway,whetherornothewillgoifaquakeoccurs,andwhetherornotheintendsnottogoifaquakeoccurs.Consequently,notgoingifaquakeoccurscontributessolittletothelikelihoodofhisnotendingupintroublethatforminganintentionnottogoifaquakeoccurscannotseriouslybeconsidered(partof)ameansoftrouble-avoidance;letalone(partof)thebestmeans.Thebeliefpremiseissimplyfalse,andwillalwaysbesowhenreasoningtowardintentionswithunlikelyinternalconditions.SincetheInstrumen-talDefensefailstoblockabroadrangeofbad-seemingconditionalizations,itwillnotdo.

D. TheEnkraticDefenseTheEnkraticDefense is theattempt toexploitenkratic reasoning towardnegative

conditionalintentionsinordertoblockmalign(SCON)-instances.NoticefirstofallthatSchmidtisquitelikelytohavecertaintacitought-beliefs.Inparticular,hemaywellbelievethatallthingsconsidered,heoughtnottogoat7ifaquakeoccurs.Nowconsiderthefol-lowing(conditional)Enkraticruleofinference:21

(I-2) Ibelievethat(IoughtthatAifC) Ibelievethat(itisuptomewhetherornotAifC) ∴Iintendthat(AifC)

Accordingtothepermissionofrationalityunderlying(I-2),Schmidtispermittedtobaseonhisought-belief(andanadditionalbeliefthatgoingwouldbe‘uptohim’)anin-tentionnottogoifaquakeoccurs.AndifSchmidtintendsnottogoifaquakeoccurs,hecannotconsistentlyadoptanintentiontogoifaquakeoccurs.

Butwhy think that Schmidt actually adopts the blocking intention? The idea is ofcoursethatenkraticreasoning inaccordancewith(I-2)willmakehimso intend.Now,(I-2)mightberootedinamerepermission;theremightnotbeanycorrespondingrationalrequirement.Theproblemwithamerepermissioninthepresentcontextwouldbethatyoucanavailofit,ornotavailofit;ineithercaseyouare(insofar)perfectlyrational.Absentacorrespondingenkraticrequirement,Schmidtcouldrationallychoosesimplynottoavailof(I-2).Ifso,noopposingintentionwillbetheretoconflictwithanintentionto(goifaquaketakesplace),shouldhechoosetoinferitbywayof(SCON)from(2).(2)wouldstilllookcrazy,andtheblamewouldrestwith(SCON).TogettheEnkraticDefenseofftheground,wecruciallyneedtoappealtoanEnkraticrequirement.Soconsider:22


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(ECR) RationalityrequiresofNthat,if(1) NbelievesattthatsheherselfoughtthatAifC,andif(2) NbelievesattthatitisuptoherselfthenwhetherornotsheA-sifC,then(3) NintendsattthatAifC

Atfirstglance,thismaylookpromising.SinceSchmidtsatisfiessub-clause(2),thereisjustonewayinwhichhecanbothhavehisought-beliefandsatisfy(ECR):Bynotin-tendingto(goat7ifaquakeoccurs).(SCON),tobesure,wouldenableSchmidttoreasoncorrectlyfromhisintentionto(goat7)towardintendingto(goat7ifaquakeoccurs);butSchmidt’sought-beliefwouldblockhimfromrationallyadoptingtheconditionalin-tention.

TheproblemwiththeEnkraticDefenseisthat(ECR)isnotreallyplausible.SupposethatSchmidtisaskedwhetherheintendstogoif(C:)aquakeoccurs.Supposefurther-morethatSchmidt,likemostofus,believesittobeextremelyunlikelythatonthedayinquestionaquakewillinfactoccur.HemaythenwellrefusetoclutterhismindwithaplanconcerningwhattodoifC—andrationallyso.Underlimitationsoftimeandmemory,itisoftensimplynotrationaltoformaplanwithrespecttocircumstanceswhichalmostcer-tainlywillnotcomeabout.Adoptingsuchplansmaybepermissible,butthatrationalityrequires it is justasimplausibleastheviewthatagentsarerequiredtoadoptbelievedlogicalconsequencesofwhattheybelieve,nomatterwhetherornottheycareaboutthoseconsequences(Harman1986:12,55-57;Broome2013:157f.).

Toovercometheobjection,(ECR)wouldneedtobeproppedupwithanadditionalsub-clause;maybe:

NbelievesattthatC

Butthen,theEnkraticDefensewillbeunabletoblocknumerousbad-seemingcondi-tionalizationstowardcircumstanceswhichtheagentdoesnotall-outbelieveto(begoingto)obtain.Oneoftheseunblockedmoveswould,oncemore,bethemovefrom(2)to(3).Apparentlythen,theEnkraticDefensedoesnotsucceedeither.

E. TheIntention-BeliefDefenseAdefenseof(SCON)thatturnsonthecoherenceofintentionswiththeagent’sbeliefs

aboutthefuturecanbedrawnfromDonaldDavidson’s“Intending”.23Asiswellknown,Davidson’saccountidentifiesfuture-directedintentiontoΦwithanevaluativejudgmentof somesort that futureΦ-ing is ‘all-out’,orunconditionallydesirable.24In thecaseofpresent-directedintention,suchajudgmentcanassumethesimpleform:“Thisactionisdesirable”(Davidson1980:98).Buthowcanonereasonablyjudgefutureactiondesira-ble?ThisistheproblemDavidsonstruggleswithonthelastpagesofhisessay.SupposeIaffirm:

(12) Iintendtoeatacandytonight.

Canmyassertionbeunderstoodasajudgmentthateatingacandytonightwillbeun-conditionally desirable? Since eating apoisoned candywouldbe highly undesirable, itseemsthatnot.Therefore,Davidsonconcludes,“itwouldbemadtoholdthatanyactionofmineintheimmediatefuturewhichistheeatingofsomethingsweetwouldbedesira-ble”(Davidson1980:99;myitalics).

Howisthisa(bad-seeming)instanceofconditionalization?AlthoughDavidsoninthe‘poisonouscandy’caseapproachestheproblemasanissueaboutspecifyingratherthanconditionalizingone’sintention,arelevantvariationisdefinitelywithinrange:Itwould


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beequallymadtojudge-desirablethatIeatacandyifitispoisoned.Therelevanceofhisconsiderationstothequestionatissuethenbecomeobvious.

Indealingwiththeproblem,Davidsonwaswellawareofthekindofsolutionnowa-daysofferedbytheConditionalityView.Ifstatementssuchas(12)involveimplicitcondi-tions,thesemayblockeatingapoisonouscandyfromsatisfyingthereportedintention’scontent.Theconditionalintentionbehind(12)wouldthenbelocatedsomewherealongaspectrumofgeneralitysuchas:

Iintendtoeatacandytonightifandonlyif… …itwillnotbepoisoned.…itwillbeagoodcandy.…doingsowillthenbeadvisable.

But,asDavidsonremarks,onceproppedupwithconditionssufficientlycomprehen-sive toblockmaddesirabilityentailmentsaltogether, thestatementwill tellusalmostnothingaboutwhattheagentintends(Davidson1980:93f.);sothat,“ifthisistheroadImusttravel,Iwillnevergetmyintentionsright”(ibid.:99).ThushavingrejectedtheCon-ditionalityView,25Davidsonhastomakesenseofunconditionalintention.HereiswhatItaketobehissuggestion.26AccordingtoDavidson,thejudgmentanintentioncanbeiden-tifiedwithisnotconcernedwiththewholerangeofactionsthatwouldsatisfytheinten-tion,butonlywiththosecompatiblewiththeagent’sbeliefs.Thisrestrictionisanessentialpartofhisreductivedefinitionofintention,27whichcanbestatedthus:

(INTD) Natt1intendsthat(Aatt2)iffNatt1judgesthatanyinstanceof(Aatt2)compat-iblewithN’sbeliefsatt1aboutthepresentandthefutureisunconditionallydesir-able.

Howdoesthebeliefclausehelptoovercomethemadnessproblem?Suppose:

(13) IbelievethatIwillnoteatapoisonouscandy.

Inintendingtoeatacandytonight,Ijudgethatanyinstanceofdoingsothatiscom-patiblewithmybeliefsisdesirable.ButdoI,againstthebackgroundof(13),thereinjudgedesirableeatingapoisonouscandy?Thecontentof(13)entailsthattherewillbenosuchactions.Inthissense,themadactionsarenotcompatiblewith(13),sotheanswerisno.Giventhatanagenthastherequiredbeliefs,(INTD)providesthemeanstoexcludewhat-soevercrazyactionfromwhatisjudgeddesirable.

AlthoughDavidson’saccountoffuture-directedintentionhasbeenconvincinglyre-futed(seeBratman1985),itmightstillbethoughtthatthegistofhis'belieffilterdefense'canbesavedbyincorporatingitinatheoryofrationality,theideabeingthatitisirrationaltointendthat(AifC)whilebelievingall-outthatinC-typecircumstancesonewillnotA.Soconsiderthe‘BeliefFilterRequirement’:28

(BFR) Rationalityrequires((Nbelievesthat¬(C∧A))⊃¬(Nintendsthat(AifC))

Atleasttacitly,Schmidtsurelybelievesthatnotbothanearthquakewilloccur(C)andhewillgotothetheater(A).Aslongasheholdsontothisbelief,hecannotcometointendtogoifanearthquakeoccurs('AifC')withoutviolating(BFR).

Theproblemwiththesuggestionisthatitinheritsnotonlythepower,butalsotheshortcomingsofDavidson’sdefense.Letmeconfinemycritiquetohisoriginalsuggestion.InordertoblockallmaddesirabilityentailmentswithDavidson’sbelieffilter,agents’be-liefswouldhavetobeeithernumerousorabstractenoughtodenywhatevermad-making


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circumstancetheagentcouldconceiveof.Nowithasofcoursetobeadmittedthattheo-riesoftacitbeliefindeeddoascribesurprisinglydensepatternsofbeliefs.ConsiderasanexampleMarkCrimmins’account:One“at-least-tacitlybelievesp just incase it isas if[one]hasanexplicitbeliefinp”(Crimmins1992:248).Onthisaccount,ItacitlybelievethatIneverateabicycle:AlthoughIneverevenconsideredthepossibility,IdothinkandactasifIexplicitlybelievedthatIneverateabicycle.Likewise,Schmidtispredictedtotacitlybelievethatnothingwillinterferewithhistheater-going;afterall,heplansongoingjustashewouldifhehadanexplicitbeliefthatnothingwillinterferewithhisplan.Ac-countsoftacitbeliefcanindeedmakeitseemasifourbeliefswerevirtuallyall-encom-passing.

Yet,evenourtacitbeliefsaregappy.SupposeIplantoapplyforanopenjobpositionatmyhomeuniversity,whichhasnotbeenadvertised.Iknowthatatpresent,thereisexactlyoneapplicant,aboutwhomIknownothingfurther.Ialsobelievenooneelseisgoingtoapply,andhavenocluehowtheemployerwillmakethedecision.Beingaskedaboutmychancestogetthejob,Ithereforeestimatethemat0.5.Nowconsiderthefol-lowingpossiblecircumstance:

(14) Theemployerwillgivethejobtomyrival.

Judgingitdesirableto(applyforthejobifitwillbegiventomyrival)wouldcertainlybefoolish.Canthebelieffilterdefenseblockthispurportedupshotofmyplan?ItwouldhavetobecontendedthatIat-least-tacitlydisbelieve(14).ButIlackthedispositionschar-acteristicofhavinga(negative)belief.ItisnotasifIhadanexplicitbeliefthat(14)isfalse.Iamnotinanywaydisposedtodeny(14)whenasked;nordoIinmybehaviorordelib-erationinanywayrelyonmyrival’sfailure.IdonothappilytellmybestfriendthatIamsoongoingtohaveabetterjob;Idonotmoveintoalargerapartment,andsoon.AllthismakesitutterlyimplausibletosupposeItacitlydisbelieve(14).Andthen,therewillbenobeliefinmymentalstockthatcouldblockthemadjudgment.

Thebelieffilterdefensefailsbecauseitdoesnotblockallcrazyjudgments(orinten-tions,respectively).Itwouldwork,tobesure,ifdoxasticindifferencewereimpossible;but if theonlyreason forassumingsuchanextremeviewofbelief is thewish tosave(SCON),weshouldratheradmititsfailure.

VI. RestrictedConditionalization(RCON)

Themostnaturaldefensesof(SCON)havingfailed,theremaystillbefurtherrequire-mentsofrationalitywhichgiverisetodefensesIhavenotconsidered.Despitethisuncer-tainty, I suggest to radically change the strategy. By any reasonable standard, (SCON)shouldbeconsidereduntenableandbeabandoned.

Recall, however, thatwestillneed tomake senseof those conditionalizations thatseemedtobealmosttriviallypermissible:SinceSchmidtintendsto(goat7),heispermit-tedtoadoptanintentionto(goat7ifFlorenceisinTuscany).Andrecallalsothatenkraticreasoningcanaccountformany,butnotalloftheseharmless-seemingmoves.Ifwedis-card(SCON),wehadbetterreplaceitwithsomealternativeschemeofGenuineCondition-alization.Bymodestlycomplicating(SCON),wemaystillobtainaninferenceschemethatdoesnotproducebad-lookingconsequencesinthefirstplace.Tothatend,wewillneedtointroduceadditionalschematicpremisesintotherule.WewillthusobtainrulesofRe-strictedConditionalization—RCON,forshort.


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A. TheOught-RestrictionandtheEnkraticRestrictionWheretotakesuitablerestrictivepremisesfrom?Eventhoughenkraticreasoninghas

beenproveninsufficienttoaccountforallofthedata,thecorrectnessofconditionalizingtowardcircumstancesCdoesseemtobesomehowrestrictedbywhatought,oroughtnot,tobedoneifCweretoobtain.Letusseeifwecanmakesenseofthisidea.Firstconsideraruleof‘Ought-Restricted’Conditionalization:

(I-3) Iintendthat(A) IoughtthatAifC ∴Iintendthat(AifC)

Thisnaturalsuggestionwillnotdo.(I-3)iseithernotyetfullyexplicit,ornotaninfer-enceruleanyonecouldfollow.Surelycannooneavailof(I-3)withouttakingsomeatti-tudinalstanceonwhethersheoughtthatAifC.29Hence,thesecondpremisein(I-3)can-notyetbefullyexplicit.Yet,onmakingitexplicitweobtainarulethatfatallyremindsofenkraticreasoning:

(I-4) Iintendthat(A) IbelievethatIoughtthatAifC ∴Iintendthat(AifC)

With(I-4)wewouldoncemorebuyintothelimitationsofenkraticreasoningwhileforgoingmostofitsvirtues.TherulewouldstillnotsupportconditionalizinginthecaseofMeyerandtheHitchhikerfromabove.Furthertroubleistobeexpectedfromitsomis-sionofBroome's‘uptome’-beliefpremise(Broome2013:159-63,170f.).Andmostim-portantly,itseemssimplyirrationaltobasetheconclusiononthesetcomprisingofboththeought-beliefandtheintentionpremise:Theought-beliefbyitselfsufficientlyrational-izesadoptinganintentionto(AifC)—atanyratewhenA-ingifCis‘uptotheagent'.Theintentionpremiseisdispensable,andwouldthereforehavetobeeliminatedfromtherule.Ought-RestrictedConditionalizationthuscollapsesintoaconditionalversionofenkraticreasoning.

B. TheDisbeliefRestrictionFromthisinitialfailureanimportantlessonshouldbedrawn,towhichIshallgetback

belowingreaterdetail.Thesoughtlicensetoconditionalizecannotdependonanought-belief providingadditional rational support. Instead, the required sort of premisewillhavetoactasaconstraintontherationalityofconditionalizingone'sintention;apremisethatisnegativeinnature.Consider:

(I-5) Iintendthat(A) Ibelievethat¬(Ioughtthat¬(A)ifC) ∴Iintendthat(AifC)

ThesecondpremiseintroduceswhatIshallcallthedisbeliefrestriction.Eventhoughtherulecannotbeadoptedasitstands,itpointsthewayaheadtoatenableversionofRCON.

Themotivationfortheproposalshouldbeclearbynow.TheEnkraticDefensewasbasedonthefactthataninstanceofthefollowingschemesufficestoblockrationaladop-tionofanintentionto(AifC):

(15) IbelievethatIought¬(A)ifC


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Eventhoughabsenceofsuchought-beliefsdoesnotposeanexternalconstraintonconditionalizing,oneofthenegationsof(15)couldstillinternallyrestrictthecondition-alizationruleitself.Now,therearethreesuchnegations:

IbelievethatIoughtthat¬(¬(A))ifC ¬(IbelievethatIoughtthat¬(A)ifC) Ibelievethat¬(Ioughtthat¬(A)ifC)

Thefirstoptionyieldsthediscardedrule(I-4).TheoptionIsuggesttoelaborateisthethird,whichisbuiltinto(I-5).AsfarasIcansee,thesecondoptionwould(afteranalogouselaboration)cater to thedata justaswell. Ishallput itasidebecause itraisesworriesaboutreasoningwithnon-beliefsthatneednotbedealtwithhere.

In accounting for good-seemingandavoidingbad-seeming conditionalizations, thedisbeliefrestrictiontakesusabigstepforward.Toshowthis,letmeput(I-5)towork,firstinexplainingsomegood-seemingmoves.(Assumeforthemomentthatagentsarefullyrational.)

Example#1.SupposethatSchmidtisaskedwhetherheintendstogotothetheaterat7ifbythenthesunwillhaveset.Onrecallinghisreasonsforgoing,Schmidtwillcometobelievethatinthatcase,heoughttogo(ascanbeassumed).Hisought-beliefwillthencausehim30totacitlydisbelievethatheoughtnottogoifthesunwillhaveset.Thus,hewillbeinthepositiontoreasoncorrectlytowardintendingto(goifthesunwillhaveset),andthatispreciselywhattheaccountneedstopredict.

Example#2.Confrontedwiththehitchhiker’squestionwhethersheintendsto(take101ifitisabouttorain),Meyerfailstoseeanyreasonnottotake101,evenifitisabouttorain.Sincethedecisiontotake101wasunderdeterminedbyMeyer’sreasonsinthefirstplace,shethuscomestodisbelievethatsheoughtnottotake101ifitisabouttorain,andisthusinthepositiontoinferbywayof(I-5)anintentionto(take101ifitisabouttorain).ThisisanimportantresultbecauseitshowsthatGenuineConditionalizationcanyieldconclusionsbeyondthereachofbothinstrumentalandenkraticreasoning.

Thenextpointtobenotedisthatthankstothedisbeliefrestriction,(I-5)steersclearofmostbad-seemingconclusions.Assumeasthebasicscenariounderlyingthecasestofollowthat it isnoon, that(2:)Schmidt intendsto(gotothetheaterat7),andthatheintends(2)forthesolereasonthathebelievestheannouncedplaywillpleasehim.Hispresentattitudesthendefeasiblyentailthat,allthingsconsidered,heoughtto(goat7),andthisiswhathetacitlybelieves.

Example#3.IsSchmidtpermittedtoinferfrom(2)anintention(3:)to(goat7ifaquakewillhavedevastatedthecitybythen)?Itisnaturaltosupposethathetacitlybelievesheoughtnottogoifaquakeoccurs,whichrulesoutascribingtohimthedisbeliefrequiredtoavailof(I-5).Theinferenceisnotpermitted,andthisisthedesiredoutcome.

Example#4.IsSchmidtpermittedtoreasontowardanintentionto(goiftrafficjamswillforcehimtodeparthoursbeforetheplay)?Inexamplesofthiskind,itisnotentirelyclearwhatought-beliefstheagentholds,orwillcometoformincognitivelyprocessingtherespectivequestion.Inordertoapply(I-5)properly,weneedtoknowtheagent'srel-evantreasons,andhowtheyrelatetooneanotherbyherownlights.Inaddition,weneedaformalaccountthattellsus,giventhosereasonsandtheirinteractions,which(condi-tional)ought-beliefsitwillberationaloftheagenttoformorhave.Thetopicistoointri-catetobetreatedhere,sothatanadhocsuggestionseemsappropriate.Conditionaloughtclausescanbeconstruedbyanalogywithsuppositionalaccountsofconditionalassertionsandbeliefs.Theycanthenbeascribedtruth-conditionsinthefollowing,counterfactualmanner,whichlinksconditionaloughtwithdefeasiblelogic:


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(OGT) NoughtthatAifCiff,werethebeliefthatCaddedtoagentN’smentalstock,N’srevisedsetofattitudeswoulddefeasiblyentail31thatNoughtthatA.

Forthepresentpurpose,thisnutshellaccountmakesitsufficientlyclearwhatought-beliefsagentscouldrationallyarriveat,weretheytodeliberateaboutthematter.WithrespecttoSchmidt,weneedtoaskwhatwouldhappenifthebeliefthattrafficjamswilloccurwereaddedtohismentalstock.Obviously,hewouldbeprovided,inadditiontohisreasoninfavorofgoingtothetheater,withareasonnottogo.Whichofthesereasonswouldrebuttheotherwouldthendependontheirrespectiveweightsor(ifyouprefer)thepriorityorderingamongSchmidt’sreasons.Ifbyhisownlights,hispassionfortheplayoutweighsanyworriesabouttrafficjamshemayhave,hispleasurereasonwillpre-vail.Inthatcase,(I-5)willenablehimtoreasontowardanintentionto(goat7iftrafficjamsoccur).Noticethat,givensuchardentpassionfortheater, themovewouldnotbecrazy.OrelseassumeSchmidtwouldratherforgothepleasurethanhavethehassle.Thenhispleasurereasonwouldberebutted,hewouldcometobelieveheoughtnot togo iftraffic jams occur. Consequently, he would not be in the position to conditionalize—rightlyso,becauseinthatcaseitwouldbecrazy.

Example#5.Consider,bycontrast,conditionalizationtowardanintentionto(goat7ifbythen,thetheaterwillhavecollapsed).AddingtherespectivebelieftoSchmidt’smentalstockandrevisinghisattitudeswouldresultinabeliefthathewillnotbeabletogotothetheater(inthesenseofattendingaperformance).Sinceanagentcannotrationallyintendanactionsheall-outbelievesshewillnotperform,Schmidt’sought-(dis-)beliefsarenotevenrelevanttothecase.Whatblockshimfrombeingfullyrationalincomingtointendthat(AifC)hereistheintention-beliefinconsistencyhewouldincur(seeBratman1987:37f.).

Theseresultsareencouraging.Therestofthepaperwillhavetodealwithtwoseem-inglyproblematicsortsofupshots,though.

C. SuppressedconsiderationsAsitstands,(I-5)producescounter-intuitiveresultswhenreasoningwithirrationally

heldintentionsaspremises.Example#6.ConsideroncemoreGeorge’scaseofdistalakrasia.Georgehasformed

hisintention(7:)to(takeheroinat9)forreasonshewouldbyhisownlightsnotconsiderdecisive,werehewillingtoproperlytakethemintoaccount.Thistime,though,consideragood-seemingmove,namelyfrom(7)to:

(16) Georgeintendsthat(hetakesheroinat9ifbythenthesunwillhaveset)

TheConditionalityViewwas unable to block bad-seeming inferences based on anakraticpremise;thepresentaccountfailstopermitanakraticallybasedgood-seeminginference.ForGeorgecertainlydoesbelievethatheoughtnottotakeheroin,whetherthesunwillhavesetornot.Unlessheisoutrightinsane(andIamsuggestingheisnot),thisbeliefwillblockhimfromacquiringthedisbeliefrequiredby(I-5)totakehimto(16).

ThecounterexamplefeaturesabroadlyDavidsonianconstrualofakraticirrationality,whichsuggestsaremedyaswell.Agentssometimesbaseanintentiononapropersubsetofwhat,bytheirownlights,arereasonsfororagainstadoptingthatveryintention;theysuppresssomeoftheirreasons,asIshallsay.Astheexampleshows,thesortofought-beliefthatconstrainsconditionalizationcannotrequirethatonhypothesisC,thepractical


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conclusion¬(A)wouldbedefeasiblyentailedbytheentiretyoftheagent’sreasons. In-stead,weneedtofocusonthose‘unsuppressed’reasonswhichtheagentherselfiswillingproperlytotakeintoaccountinpracticaldeliberation.

Technically,thisisachievedintwosteps.LetMbeagentN’smentalstock,andletSbethesubsetofMwhichcomprisesoftheinternalreasonssuppressedbyN.Thenwecanfirstdefineapartialoughtoperatorbystating:32

(OGTʹ) Nought,allunsuppressedreasonsconsidered,toXifCiff(M∪{NbelievesthatC})\SafterattituderevisiondefeasiblyentailsthepracticalconclusiontoX.

Second,wecanamend(I-5)soastoavailofthenewpartialoperator:

(I-6) Iintendthat(A) Ibelievethat¬(Iought,allunsuppressedreasonsconsidered,that¬(A)ifC) ∴Iintendthat(AifC)

Forallthosecasesfromwhichreason-suppressionisabsent,(I-6)willproducethesameresultas(I-5).Whenitcomestoexamplessuchas#5,though,theweakenedoughtmakesadecisivedifference.Georgecanplausiblybeattributedtheatleasttacitbeliefthat,allunsuppressed reasons (and only these) considered, he ought to take heroin at 9—whetherornotthesunwillhaveset.Sohewillat leasttacitlydisbelieve thatheought(unsuppressedreasonsconsidered)nottotakeheroinifthesunwillhaveset.Hecanthusplausiblybeattributedthedisbeliefrequiredtoavailof(I-6),andthisistheintuitivelyrightresult.

(I-6)ismyfinalsuggestion.Andsinceapplyingtheruleamountstobasingtheconclu-sionstateonthesetcomprisingofallandonlythepremisestates,wearenowinapositiontoconjecturethattherationalpermissionwhichunderliesRCONis:

(RCP) Rationalitypermits( NintendsthatA∧ Nbelievesthat¬(sheought,allunsuppressedreasonsconsidered,that¬(A)ifC)

∧ Nintendsthat(AifC)∧ Nbasesherintentionto(AifC)onherintentionthatAandherdisbelief)

D. TherationaleofGenuineConditionalizationAsatisfactoryaccountofGenuineConditionalizationhasbeenreached.Someof its

upshots, however, can still seem counter-intuitive. But rather than threatening theachievedresult,theseupshotscanleadustoadeeperunderstandingofwhyRCONiscor-rectreasoning;orsoIamgoingtoargue.

Example#7.Schmidtplanstogotothetheaterbecausehebelievestheplaywillpleasehim.Next,heplaystheconditionalizationgame,andplayer2confrontshimwiththefol-lowingshockingfigment.“Justwhenabouttogotothetheater,youwillreceiveacallfrominsidethetheaterbuilding.Itwillbeyourchild,reportingindistressthatamajorearth-quakehasjustdestroyedtheroofstructureduringtheafternoonperformanceforkids.Youwilltherebygathertwocrucialpiecesofinformation:Therewillbenoplay(¬P),andyourchildistrappedunderthedebrisinsidethetheater(T).Doyouintendtogotothetheaterifthisstorywillcometrue?”

Onthepresentaccount,Schmidtisentitledtoavailof(I-6)andinfer:

(17) Iintendto(goat7if(¬P∧T))


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Hereiswhy:Nosuppressedconsiderationsbeinginvolved,Schmidtispermittedtodrawconclusion(17)justincasehedisbelievesheoughtnottogoif(¬P∧T).Andthatheatleasttacitlyentertainsthisdisbeliefisindeedwarranted.Granted:Inthefictitiouscir-cumstances,hisactualreasonforgoing—theexpectationtoseeaplay—wouldnotholdanymore;therewouldbenoplay.Yet,thesecondpartoftheconjunctionwouldgivehimasubstitutereasonforgoing:Hewouldneedtosavehischild.Hencehewillcometobe-lievethatheoughttogoif(¬P∧T),andthisinturnwillmakehimdisbelievethatheoughtnottogoif(¬P∧T).Thepresentaccountthereforepredictstherationalanswertoplayer2’squestiontobe“yes”.

Noticethatthisanswerisnotinitselfwrong.IfSchmidtredeliberatedfromscratchwhethertogoif(¬P∧T),hecouldnotendupwithanythingbut(17).Itisnotasthough(17)wereacrazyintention.Whatcanmaketheexamplelooktroublesomeistheinferen-tialpathonwhichSchmidtarrivesat(17).Itcanseemcrazyofhimtoinfer(17)from(apremisesetthatincludes)hispriorlyformedintentiontogotothetheater.Afterall,thereasonsonwhichhisintentionisactuallybasedwouldintheenvisagedcircumstancesbeannihilatedwithoutresidue;anditseemsasthoughSchmidtwouldnotintendtogofortherightreasons,werehetointendtoinconsequenceofapurelyhedonicdecision.

Theexamplethusdisplayswhatcanbecalledreasondisconnect.Hereisabriefanaly-sis.CallthosereasonswhichanagentactuallytakestosupportA-ingthe‘A-reasons’,andcallthosereasonswhichwouldsupportA-ingifCcameaboutthe‘C-hypotheticalreasonsforA-ing’.Thenreasondisconnect takesplace just incaseanagent’sA-reasonsdonotintersectwithherC-hypotheticalreasonsforA-ing.Thisiswhathappensintheexample,anditgivesrisetoaquitenaturalworry:Howcanitinsuchcasesberationallypermissi-bletobaseanintentionto(AifC)onone’sintentionto(A)?

Itmightbethoughtthattheproblemcanbecopedwithbyfurthertinkeringwiththeinferencerule.Isuggesttoresistthepullandreflectinsteadonwhypreciselyreasondis-connectlookstroubling.ItistemptingtothinkofRCONascorrectinsofaritreflectstheoccasionalrobustnessofA-reasons in the faceofC-hypothetical reasonsagainstA-ing.Yet, it iscrucial toseethatsuchrobustnessconsiderations,howeverwell theymaygowithenkraticreasoning,areclearlyoutoflinewiththeveryideaofRestrictedCondition-alization.IfRCONistofarebetterthanenkraticreasoning,itmustnotdrawontheforceofagents’A-reasons.AsMeyer'sBuridancaseillustrates,therewilloftenbenosuchrea-sonsatall;evenso,conditionalizingbasicallyisaplausiblemoveinsuchcases.

IcontendthatRCONissanctionedinsteadbythenormativeimportofanagent’sveryintentiontoA,asopposedtothereasonsinsupportofit.AsBratmanhasargued,aninten-tiontoA,onceformed,hasanormativeimportoverandabovetheimportofthereasonsforitsadoption.Thisismostconspicuouslyrevealedinsituationsinwhichthescarcityofdeliberativeresourcesmakesitirrationaltoreconsiderone’sintentioneventhoughthereasonswhichoriginallyrationalized itsadoptionhave,asamatterof fact,beenover-turned.Insuchconstellations,itcanberationaltoholdontointentionswhich,werethedecisiontobemadefromscratch,oneoughtbyone'sownlightsnottoadopt.33Intentionsthusdonotonlyphysicallytendtopersist;toacertaindegree,thereisalsorationalpres-sure to retain them once they are formed, and to abstain from reconsidering them.34RCON,properlyunderstood,revealsjustanotherfacetofthisnormativeimportofintend-ingassuch.

Inthisperspective,example#7doesnotlookthreateninganymore.ThatSchmidt’sinferencetoward(17)woulddisplayreasondisconnectdoesnotthreatenitscorrectnessbecauseheneednotthereinrelyontherobustnessofhispleasurereasontogo.Ifheavails


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ofRCON(ratherthanredeliberatingfromscratch,therebybypassinghistheater-inten-tion),hewillthereinberespectingthenormativeimportofhisactualintentiontogo.Hewillbe fullyrational indoingsobecausehebelieves that thisnormative import isnotoverturnedbyhisC-hypothetical reasons.That thesereasons includeanevenstrongerreasonforA-ing—hischildbeingindistress—thanhisactualhedonisticreason,issimplyadifferentmatter.

VII. Conclusion

Asithasturnedout,thereisnosupportforidentifyingflatintentionwiththemostlycrazystateofintending'nomatterwhat'.Fortheidentificationtoholdtrue,SimpleCon-ditionalization(SCON)wouldhavetobegoodreasoning.But(SCON)facesobviouscoun-terexampleswhichcannotbedefusedordeflectedbyanynaturalmeans.RestrictedCon-ditionalization (RCON), by contrast, has turnedout tobeonmuchmore solid footing.Here,anadditionalpremisemakessurethatincomingtointendthat(AifC)theagentdoesnotdeemintendingtoAabadideashouldCobtain.Inavailingofought-beliefs,RCONresemblesenkraticreasoning,butthereremainsacrucialdifference:Whileenkraticrea-soningmobilizespracticalreasonstorationalizeitsconclusions,RCONreliesonthenor-mativeimportofintendingassuch;practicalreasonsareinvoked,butasaconstraintonly.Asaconsequence,RCONyieldsmoreconclusionsthan(bothinstrumentaland)enkraticreasoning.Thisresultiswelcomebecausesomeconditionalizationmovesarerationallyunassailableandyetdictatedbyneitherreasonsnorgoals.

Onthesuggestedaccount,flatlyintendingtoAisintendingtoAinthosecircumstanceswhich,looselyspeaking,wouldnotmakeitabadideatoA.Butthen,tointendflatlytoAcannotmeanto intendtoA inanycircumstances; flat intentioncannotbea 'nomatterwhat'stance.TheConditionalityView'skeymotiveforsystematicallyreadingconditionalclausesintoordinaryintentionsthusevaporates.Itsadherentswerenottotallymistaken,tobesure.Tomymind,Ferreroandothershavestartedoutwithanaccurateobservation:Ourintentionsdonotnormativelycommitusinanywaytoactionsthatwouldbefoolishorimmoralbyourownlights.Wheretheyhavegonewrongisinexplainingthisobserva-tionbyappealtorestrictiveconditionswithinthecontentofintention.Ihave,bycontrast,beensuggestingtolocatethesoughtrestrictionwithinthecontentofabasingpermissionofrationality;apermissionthatshapes the inferentialrolecharacteristicof intentions,thusreflectingafeatureofthestateofintendingassuch.Asaconsequence,asimplerpic-tureofagencyregainscredibility;apictureaccordingtowhicheverydayintentionsareinthemselvesjustassimple,wieldyandunsophisticatedastheypresentthemselvestouswhenweform,revise,orexecutethem,orcommunicatethemtoothers.35

1 TheviewisimplicitinMeiland1970:18f.andGrice1971.Foranexplicitelaboration,seeBratman1979and,morerecently,Ferrero2009andKlass2009:111,124.Analogousclaimshavebeenmadewithre-gardtodesire,seeMcDaniel/Bradley2008:280,282;Lycan2012:209,andFara2013.Parfit1987:151hasadvancedthesomewhatrelatedviewthatmostdesiresareimplicitlyconditionalontheirownper-sistence;seeMcDaniel/Bradley2008:270.

2 I.e.aslongasCiscompossiblewithA.3 TheproponentsoftheConditionalityViewhavenotbeenoutspokenaboutwhatprecisely,ontheirview,

makesunconditionalintentionscrazy;usuallytheclaimisputforwardwithdirectappealtointuitions.

Notes


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Butsincetheyproposeaconditionalviewofintentionastheremedy,myreadingofthe'nomatterwhat'clauseshouldbeacceptabletothemaswell.Cf.Klass2009:107;Ferrero2009:700.

4 Inwhatfollows,AandCstandproxyforfull-fledged,self-standingpropositions.TheA-termwillusuallyinvolveaself-representationoftheintendingsubjectasherself.

5 Theexternal/internaldistinctionisdrawnbyCartwright1990:235;seealsoFerrero2009:701f.and,fordesire,McDaniel/Bradley2008:272,whodiscern(read:internally)conditionalfrom(read:exter-nally)hypotheticaldesire.Asthelatterauthorspointout,aconditionaldesireneednotbeconditionalonitsownpersistence(cf.Parfit1987:151);thesameholdsforintention.

6 Therearevariousreasonstobecarefulhere.McDaniel/Bradley2008havearguedthatconditionalde-siresandintentionsareattitudestowardtwopropositionsratherthanone;andinlinguistics,AngelikaKratzer’s‘restrictorview’offersahighlyunifiedaccountofif-clausesingeneralbysuggestingthattheyservetorestrictthemodalbaseofsome(attimescovert)modaloperator;seech.4ofKratzer2012.

7 Onissuesaboutintentionswithinternalnecessaryconditions,seeKlass2009:120-24.8 Forthedetails,seeBroome2013:159-170,262,264.9 Cf.Broome2013:159-63,170f.,290.10 Cf.Broome2013:246-48,255.Broomedefendsafirst-orderaccountofreasoningaccordingtowhich

whatisusuallyoperatedoninactivereasoningarenotattitudes,butpairsofpropositionsandattitudemarkers, jointly constituting ‘marked contents’; see ibid.: 251f. For the sake of greater convenience,(COR)operatesonattitudes,butIdonotintendtotakeastanceonwhetherreasoningis‘first’or‘higher-order’.

11 ‘Y1...Yn∴X’willserveasanalternativerulenotation.12 Cf.Broome2013:225.Noticethatbasingpermissionsonthisconstrualof‘basing’arepermissionsto

performactsofattitude-construction.Broome’sbasingpermissions,bycontrast,arepermissionstobebasedratherthantobase,asisclearfromthetemporalpatterndisplayedbytheircontents.Cf.ibid.:187.

13 Iamgratefultoananonymousrefereeforhavingbroughtthepossibilityofsuchanaccounttomyatten-tion.

14 NoticethatP⊃(C⊃P)isatautology,andwillthereforevalidatetriviallyinHintikka-stylebeliefsemanticsaspresentede.g.inHendricks/Symons, ‘EpistemicLogic’,sec.I.Onclosureprinciplesforbelief,morewillbesaidinsectionV.D.below.

15 Cf.thetwomoresophisticatedversionsinFerrero2009:723.16 Ferreroadmitscertainexceptions,suchasfanaticsandagentspursuinganabsolutelypraiseworthygoal;

seeFerrero2009:727,730.Thesecanbeputasidehere.17 SeeFerrero2009:720,723.18 Itseemstobearequirementofrationalitythat¬((NintendsthatX)∧(NintendsthatY)∧(Nbelieves

thatwithat leastmetaphysicalnecessity, ifXthennotY)).ThisgoesbeyondBroome’srespectivere-quirementofintentionconsistency;cf.Broome2013:156.

19 Foranaccountofthedifference,seeMele2007.20 Foranelaboratedaccountofinstrumentalreasoning,seeBroome2013:159-170,262,264.Iamsimpli-

fyingmattershere;against thebackgroundofBroome'saccount, (I-1)mustbeconsideredenthyme-matic.

21 Foranaccuratenon-conditionalversionthatoperateson‘markedcontents’,seeBroome2013:290.Ac-cordingtoBroome,mis‘uptome’iffwereImyselfnottointendm,becauseofthat,mwouldnotbeso.For the details, see Broome 2013: 159-63, 170f.—Why appeal to a conditional version of Broome'sEnkratic inferencerule? Ifweconstruedbothconditional intentionsandconditionalought-beliefsasattitudestowardsconditionalpropositions,wecouldmakedowithBroome'srule,thefirstpremiseofwhichruns:“IbelievethatIoughtthatP”.Wecouldthensubstituteaconditional-propositionsignifier“(AifC)”for“P”,whichwouldgiveusthesoughtinferentialroutetowardsaconditionalintention.Yet,itisfarfromevidentthatinreportsofconditionalintention,theintentionoperatortakesaconditionalpropositionasitsargument,andthesameworrycouldofcourseberaisedaboutconditionaloughtstate-ments.Thedifficulty is circumvented,however,whenwe leave thescopeof ‘ought’asambiguousasfoundinnaturallanguage,stickwithourconventiontoread“Nintendsthat(AifC)”asnotcommittingustoaparticularstanceontheconditional-propositionissue,andstateanew,self-standing,conditionalversionoftheenkraticrule.

22 ThisisanadaptationofthesimplifiedenkraticrequirementofrationalityinBroome2013:171.23 SeeDavidson1980:92-102.Ishalluntiehisaccountofunconditionalintentionfrommostofitsoriginal

context:i.e.thequestionofwhetherintentionsareakindofbelief.ForadiscussionofthisaspectseeVelleman1989:114-24;seealsoFerrero2009:732f.,n.13.


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24 SeeDavidson1980:100.Onemightthinktheviewhasaproblemtoaccountforgenuinelyconditional

intention—asortofintentionthatDavidsonclearlywantstoadmit(seeibid.:94).Butthereisnoprob-lemhere.Aconditionalintentionisanintentionto(AifC),andhisproposalmapsthissmoothlyontojudgingthat(AifC)isunconditionallydesirable.

25 Lateron,heseemstohavechangedhisviewonthematter:„Icannotimaginesomeoneintending,evenatthestart,tobuyanycar.Evenifitwerewiredtoexplode?SurelytherearemanythingsIcouldeasilyspecifyinadvance,andwouldifIwereordering,say,fromacatalogue.However,thereisneverapointatwhichIcouldcompletelyspecifythecontentofmyintention[…]”,Davidson1999:498.

26 ThefollowinginterpretationhasbeensuggestedbyBratman1999:213-19.27 “[…]thereisnothingabsurdinmyjudgingthatanyactionofmineintheimmediatefuturethatisthe

eatingofsomethingsweetwouldbedesirablegiventherestofwhatIbelieveabouttheimmediatefuture”,Davidson1980:99.“Tointendtoperformanactionis,onmyaccount,toholdthatitisdesirabletoper-formanactionofacertainsortinthelightofwhatonebelievesisandwillbethecase”,ibid.:100.

28 Noticethat(BFR),althoughcloselyrelatedto,isnotasubstitutioninstanceofBratman’sintention-beliefconsistencyconstraint,whichcan,forthesakeofcomparison,berenderedas:Rationalityrequires((Nbelievesthat¬P)⊃¬(NintendsthatP)).Cf.Bratman1987:37f.Whatpreventsthederivationofarelevantnormfromthelatteristhatbecauseofthefirstnegationsign,substituting“(AifC)”forthefirstoccur-renceofPmakessenseonlyif‘(AifC)’denotesaproposition.

29 Expressivistswilldisagreewiththis.Ifought-utterancesaretreatedasexpressingsomee.g.volitionalattitude,mymainobjectionagainst(I-4)appliesdirectlyto(I-3):IfIoughtthatAifC,thisbyitselfsuffi-cientlyrationalizesadoptinganintentionthat(AifC).

30 Onsub-personalprocesseswhichensureconsistencybyautomaticallyerasingbeliefs,seee.g.Broome2013:77f.,189,268.Suchrevisiondispositionsbelongtothefoundationsofourrationalcapacity.

31 JohnHorty’stheoryofdefeasiblereasoningiswellsuitedforfleshingoutthisproposalbecauseheiden-tifiesconclusionsofpracticaldefeasiblereasoninggenerallywithunconditionaloughts;seeHorty2012:18,65ff.Hislogicthusmeshesnicelywithmyaccountofconditionalought.Itakeit,however,thatprac-ticalreasoning(defeasibleornot)canalsoyield intentionsthemselvesas itsproperconclusions;seeBroome2013:250ff.

32 ‘A∖B’denotesthesetdifferenceofAandB,and‘A∪B’theirunion.ItakeitthatconditionaloughtisafourplaceoperatorOUGHT(N,X,C,T)whereTstandsforthe‘thingsconsidered’,butadefinitionofpartialoughtingeneralwillnotbeneeded.

33 Foranexample,seethesecondMondalecaseinBratman1987:74f.SeealsoBratman2012:74,79f.34 Bratmanhasoutlinedthisrationalaspectofthe‘inertia’ofintentionsintermsofasystemofrationality

constraintsonreconsideringone’sintentions;seeBratman1987:16,60-110.Thenatureofthesepres-sures isstillunderdebate;seeBratman2012;Ferrero2012,2014.Problemsstemfromthefactthatdroppingone’sintentionbeforeitsexecutionisoftenperfectlyrational.Itakeit,however,thattherearegenuinelydiachronicrationalpressurestowardretainingone’s intentions—eventhoughIagreewithFerrerothatthesepressuresneverreachmorethanminimallyintothefuture.SeeFerrero2014:332;Gillessen2015.

35 Thisworkwassupportedbyaresearchstipendinthepost-docprogramofGermanAcademicExchangeService(DAAD).Inwriting,Ihavebeenabletoprofitenormouslyfromdiscussionwithandencourage-mentbyMichaelBratman,JohnBroome,MarkCrimmins,andLucaFerrero.Forveryhelpfulcomments,adviceandhintsIamindebtedtoBartKamphorst,SamuelAsarnow,NathanHauthalerandCarlosNuñez.Iwouldfurthermoreliketothankorganizersandaudienceoftheworkshop“VarietiesofAgency”attheStanfordHumanitiesCenterfortheopportunitytodiscussanearlydraft,andananonymousrefereeoftheJPRforscrutinythathelpedclarifysomecrucialpoints.

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201–15.McDaniel,Kris,andBenBradley.2008.“Desires.”Mind117:267–302.Meiland,J.W.1970.TheNatureofIntention.London:Methuen.Mele,AlfredR.2007.“PersistingIntentions”.Noûs41:735–757.Parfit,Derek.1987.ReasonsandPersons.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Velleman,David.1989.PracticalReflection.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress.

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Reasoning with Unconditional Intention