Quest for Ethnic Identity and Autonomy in Ethiopia

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the institute for peace and Security studies (IPSS).Addis Ababa University and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung(FES).

An Anthology ofPeace and Security Research

Institute for Peace and Security Studiesin collaboration with Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

August 2011

An Anthology of peace and Securiy Reseach

TAblE oF ConTEnTS

Foreward, by Prof Andereas Eshete, President, Addis Ababa University

Preface to this volume, by Mulugeta Gebrehiwot, Director, Institute for Peace and Security Studies

Preface to this volume, by Arne Schildberg, Resident Representative, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

I.Inter-Group Conflicts in the Awash Valley of Ethiopia: The Case of Afar and Karrayu oromo, by Asnake Menbere

list of Tables Pages

CHAPTER onE

1.InTRoduCTIon 11.1 Background 21.2 Statement of the Problem 3 1.2.1 Research Gaps 31.3 Objective of the Study 3 1.3.1 General Objective 3 1.3.2 Specific Objectives 41.4 Research Questions 41.5. Scope of the Study 41.6 Significance of the Study 41.7. Limitations of the Study 51.8. Methodology and Research Design 5 1.8.1 Methodology 5 1.8.2 Sampling Technique and Size 5 1.8.3 Data Collection methods and Sources: Primary Sources 6 1.8.3.1. In Depth-Interview with Key Informants 6 1.8.3.2. Focus Group Discussion 6 1.8.4. Secondary Sources: Document Analysis 6 1.8.5. Method of Data Analysis 7

CHAPTER TWo

2. literature Review and Theoretical Framework 8 Introduction 8


2.1 Ethnic Conflict in Pastoral Setting 82.2. Trends of Ethnic Conflict –The Ethiopian Experiences 102.3. Inter-Group Conflict in the Awash Valley 11 2.4. Theories on Ethnic Conflicts 12

CHAPTER THREE

3. Framing the Context of the Conflict 14 Introduction 143.1 Geography of the Afar Area 143.2 Afar: A Brief Historical Overview 143.2.1 History of Origin 143.3 Social Organization and Livelihood 153.2.1 Socio-Political Organization of the Afar 153.3.2 Mode of Livelihood (Subsistence) 153.4 The Karrayu Oromo: Geography, History of Origin and Settlement 163.4.1 Geography 163.4.2. History of Origin and Settlement 163.5 Aspects of Karrayu Socio-political Organization 173.6. Economy of the Karrayu 183.7. Historical Contexts of the Conflict 18

CHAPTER FouR

data Presentation and Analysis 204. The Contemporary Afar- Karrayu Conflict: A Post-1991 Perspective 204.1. The Afar and Karrayu: History and Nature of Relationships 204.2. Structural Causes of the Conflict and Trend Analysis 23 4.2.1 Economic Factor 23 4.2.1.1. Inappropriate (inconsiderate) Development Policies 23 4.2.1.2. Natural Resource Scarcity 25 4.2.2. Political Factor 26 4.2.2.1. Marginalization and Lack of Good Governance 26 4.2.3. Security Related Factors 27 4.2.3.1. Contested Borders 27 4.2.3.2. Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons In Pastoral Context 28 4.2.4. Socio-cultural Factors 29 4.2.4.1. Culture and Tradition of Violence 29 4.2.4.2. The Decline of Cultural and Traditional Systems 31 4.2.4.3. Similarities of Pastoralists Lifestyles 314.3. Proximate Causes (Triggers) 32 4.3.1 Cattle Raiding and Homicidal Acts 32


4.3.2. Looting and Robbery 33 4.3.3. Drought and Famine 34 4.3.4. Spoilers 354.4. Analysis of Actors 36 4.4.1. National Actors 36 4.4.1.1. Central Government 36 4.4.1.2. Government Commando Force and Militia Involvement 37 4.4.1.3. Political Parties 37 4.4.2. Regional Actors 38 4.4.3. Local Actors (Ethnic Groups) 38 4.4.3.1. Religious Leaders and Religious Institutions 38 4.4.3.2 Elders and Clan Leaders 38 4.4.3.3. Pastoral Women 39 4.4.3.4. Pastoral Youth 404.5. Conflict Dynamics: Escalation or De-escalation 40 4.5.1. New Trends, Structures and Opportunities from 1991 to the Present 41 4.5.2. Intensity of the Conflicts 434.6. Responses to the Afar-Karrayu Conflict 44 4.6.1. Regional Level 44 4.6.2. National Level 44 4.6.3. Regional State Level (Afar and Karrayu) 46 4.6.4. Local (Community) Level 464.7. Reasons for the Failure of Peace Efforts 47

CHAPTER FIVE

5. Conclusions and Recommendations 485.1. Conclusions 485.2. Recommendations 50References 52Appendices 58

II. CEnTER-PERIPHERY RElATIon In THE ConTEXT oF PoST 1991 ETHnIC POLICY AND RELATIONS: EXPERIENCES FROM GAMBELLA, BY DAWIT BYAZEN

CHAPTER onE:

Introduction 40Background of the Study 40Context of Post-1991 Ethnic Policy and Relations in Ethiopia 40Statement of the Problem Methodological Issues 64


CHAPTER TWO:

Review of Related literature 66Center-Periphery Perspective Worldwide and in Ethiopia: A Review 66Historical Peripheries in Ethiopia 67

CHAPTER THREE:

data Types and Methods 70Pre-1974 Context of Anuwa-Nuer Relations: 70Changes in Relation-Defining-Contexts: The Derg Period 71 ‘Ethnicized’ Inter-Group Relations in Post 1991 Gambella: the Regional Context 74‘Ethnicized’ Inter-Group Relations in Post 1991 Gambella: the National Context 77

CHAPTER FOuR:

Conflict Structures and the Center Periphery Dynamics in Gambella: Analyzing the Nexus The pre 1974 Context 80Changes and Continuities: The Derg Period 86Prospect of Oil and an Emerging Trend 98

Chapter Five: Summary and Conclusion 101References 103

III. CIVIL WAR IN SOMALIA AND ITS IMPLICATION TO NATIONAL SECuRITY OF KEnYA, bY PATRICK WERRE SIMIYu

CHAPTER onE

InTRoduCTIon 112 1.1 Background to the Problem 1121.2 Statement of the Problem 1131.3 Significance of the Study 1141.4 Rationale and Justification of the Study 1141.5 Objectives of the Research 115 1.5.1 Main Objective 115 1.5.2 Specific Objectives 115 1.6 Research Questions 115 1.6.1 Main Research Question 115


1.7 Delimitation 1161.8 Limitation 116

CHAPTER TWo 2. ConCEPTuAl/THEoRETICAl FRAMEWoRKS And dEFInITIon oF TERMS2.1 Introduction 1172.2 Conceptual Framework 1172.3 Theoretical Framework 1182.4 Definition of Terms 119 2.4.1 National Security 119 2.4.2. Islamic Fundamentalism 120 2.4.3 Terrorism 120 2.4.4 Jihad 120

CHAPTER THREE

3. LITERATuRE REVIEW3.1 Introduction 1213.2 National Security 1213.3 Human Security 1213.4 Africa’s Security Dilemma 1233.5 Horn of Africa Regional Security Dilemma 1243.6 Al Shabab and Other Radical Groups’ Activities against Kenya 1253.7 Identified Gaps 128

4 CHAPTER FouR

4. METHodoloGY4.1 Introduction 129 4.2 Research Method and Design 129 4.3 Methods of Data Gathering and Instruments 129 4.4 Study Area Description 130 4.5 Selection of Study Subject 130 4.6 Selection of Research Participants 130 4.7 Sampling Techniques and Sample Size 131 4.8 Methods of data analysis 131 4.9 Verification and Validity 131 4.10 Reporting and Submission of Findings 131 4.11 Ethical Considerations 132

CHAPTER FIVE

5. RESEARCH FIndInGS 5.1 Introduction 133


5.2 Background to the Research Findings 1335.3.1.How can Kenya identify and proactively deal with the threats to its national security occasioned by the civil war in Somalia? 1345.3.2.What are the main threats to Kenya’s national security posed by the civil war in Somalia? 1365.3. 3.What is the impact of the civil conflict in Somalia on Kenya’s national security? 1395.3.4.Is al Shabab recruiting and training Kenyan youths in Somalia to engage them in terrorist activities? 1425.4 Suggested Area for Further Research 143

CHAPTER SIX

6. ConCluSIonS And RECoMMEndATIonS6.1 Introduction 1456.2 Conclusion 1456.3 Recommendations 147Bibliography 149

IV. The Quest for Common Ethnic Identity and Self-Governance in The Southern Regional State Within the Context of Ethiopian Federal System: The Case of The Gewada-dhobase (Ale) Ethnic Group, by Temesgen Thomas Halabo

CHAPTER onE Introduction 1541.1 Background to the Study 1561.2 Statement of the Problem 159 1.2.1 Research Questions 1591.3 Objectives of the Study 159 1.3.1 General Objective 159 1.3.2 Specific Objectives 1591.4 Significance of the Study 1601.5 Research Methodology 160 1.5.1 Research Design 160 1.5.2 Sampling Techniques 161 1.5.3 Methods of Data Collection 161 1.5.3.1 Interview 161 1.5.3.2 Focus Group Discussion (FGD) 161 1.5.4. Method of Data Analysis and Fieldwork Challenges 162 1.6 Organization of the Thesis 163


CHAPTER TWo

Theoretical Approaches and Review of Related literature 2.1 Theoretical Approaches 164 2.1.1 Theoretical Approaches on Ethnicity 164 2.1.1.1 Primordialist Approach 164 2.1.1.2 Constructivism Versus Instrumentalism 165 2.1.2 Federalism 168 2.1.2.1 Federalism as an Option for Managing Ethnic Conflict in Multiethnic State 1682.2 Related Literature: Ethiopian Experiences 170 2.2.1‘Ethnic Questions’ and Ethnic Policy in Ethiopia: the Root to Ethnic Federalism 170 2.2.1.1 The Derg Regime and Its Attitude towards the ‘Nationalities Question’ 172 2.2.1.2 The Emergence of EPRDF and the Route to Ethnic Federaism 173 2.2.1.2.1 The 1995 FDRE Constitution: the Right to Self-determination 174 2.2.1.2.2 The Dynamics of Continuing Ethnic Claims for Self-determination in the South 175

CHAPTER THREE 23

The Ale Historical and Socio-Economic backgrounds 3.1 The Ale Myth of Origin: the Group’s Self-ascription 1793.2 The Ale Language and Religion 1813.3 The Ale Social Organization 181 3.3.1 The Boģolho System: Basic Element in Maintaining ‘Distinctive’ Group Identity 182 3.3.1.1 The Sarko: Decisive in Maintaining Peace and Order 183

CHAPTER FouR

The Quest for Common Ethnic Identity by the Gewada and Dhobase: Traditional and Historical legacies 1854.1 The Historical Legacy and its Impact on the Ale Ethnic Identity 1854.2 The Origin of the Existing Different Names for One Ethnic Group 186 4.2.1 The First Contending View: Attributing the Customary Administrative Organization 188 4.2.2 The Second Contending View: Attributing the Historical Legacy 188 4.2.3 The Third Contending View: Attributing the Traditional Practice in the Area 189


4.3 Misconception among Scholars towards the Ale Ethnic Identity 1904.4 The PDRE Government and the Ale Ethnic Identity 1914.5 The EPRDF Regime and the Development of Ethnic Consciousness in the South 192 4.5.1 Too Late to Develop: the Ale Ethnic Consciousness 194 4.6. Politicization of Ethnic Identity by the Local Ruling Elite: A Serious Challenge For The Ale Cause 1964.7 Endorsement of the Gewada-Dhobase Common Ethnic Identity as the “Ale” 198

CHAPTER FIVE

Constitutional Protections of Ethnic Groups: The Challenge of the South 5.1 Dynamics of Ethnic Claims for Self-determination in the South: The Case of the Ale 201 5.1.1 Creating Minority-Within-Minority: Basic Cause for Assertion of Ethnic Identities 203 5.1.2 Rising Expectation and Relative Deprivation: The Major Cause for 2008 Ale Conflict and Violence 206 5.1.2.1 The Triggering Cause for the Conflict and Violence 207 5.1.2.2 The Gewada Peace Conference and Its Resolutions 208 5.1.2.3 The Post Conflict and Violence Inter-Ethnic Relations 208 5.2 The Challenges and New Prospects for Peace 210 5.2.1 Ethnic Group Status of the Ale and the Right to Self-determination 211

CHAPTER SIX

Conclusion and Recommendation 6.1 Conclusion 2146.2 Recommendation 2156.2.1 Reorganizing Southern Regional State 215 6.2.2 Organizing Additional Zones Or Special Woredas 215

References-- 216

V. INDEGINOuS CONFLICT RESOLuTION MECHANISMS: THE CASE OF THE EN-noR GuRAGE, By Wubeyed Kumel

CHAPTER onE Introduction

1.1 Statement of the Problem 2251.2 Objectives of the Study 226 1.2.1 General Objective 226


1.2.2 Specific Objectives 2271.3 Research Questions 2271.4 Research Methodology 227 1.4.1 Primary Sources of Data 127 1.4.2 Secondary Sources of Data 1281.5 Review of Related Literature 129 1.5.1. Definition of Key Terms a 129 1.5.2 Perspectives on Sources of Conflict 230

CHAPTER TWo

Research Findings2.1 overview of the Gurage and the Study Area 2322.2 Conceptualization of Conflict among the Ennor 2332.3 The Ennor View of Conflict 2342.4 Types of Conflict in the Study Area 2342.5 Values and Belief Systems 2352.6 Major Types of Indigenous Conflict Resolution Mechanisms 2412.7. Structures of Conflict Resolution 2472.8. Conflict Resolvers 2522.9 Conflicting Parties 2532.10. Sanctions and Decision Enforcing Mechanisms 2552.11. Change and Continuity 256 2.11.1 Changes Imposed by External Actors 256 2.11.2 Changes Initiated by the Local People 258 2.11.2.1 Documentation and Renewal of Kitcha 258 2.11.2.2 Relations with Formal Court System 262

CHAPTER THREE

Conclusion 265

References 266


Preface to this volume

This is the second volume of the Anthology of Peace and Security Research of the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), Addis Ababa University. It comprises five theses which have topped 33 studies of the batch in terms of quality, novelty and policy relevance both nationally and sub-regionally. The selection of the five theses by no means indicates the agreement of the Institute, the assessors and the editors with the findings of the research. Although the Institute believes that the ideas and recommendations mentioned are important to the development of knowledge in the area, I want to make it clear that the theses are solely owned by their authors. All the five theses focus on various sub-themes under peace and security issues.

The first one analyses the underlying causes and the dynamics of conflicts in the Afar and Oromia national regional states of two Woredas; namely Awash Fentale and Fentale Woredas. The study has concluded that the causes of conflict in these areas are multiple, related to socially generated natural resource scarcity, inappropriate development interventions, cattle rustling and related revenge attacks, culture of violence emanating from cultural values and devaluing of traditional institutions, including drought and famine. It further argues that there is a negative correlation between conflict and drought because, incidents have been occurring in rainy seasons and good years; hence, it recommends that peace building endeavors should consider the diametrically opposed interests of the parties to address major cause/s of the conflicts through both changes in attitude and in the application of policies designed within the context of the region and consult the local people.

The second study explores the interplay between conflict relations and center-periphery dynamics in the post 1991 period focusing on the particular context of Gambella’s multi ethnic regional state. Retrospectively, the protraction of both horizontal and vertical conflict relations demonstrates the persistence of a peripheral outlook on the part of the present government as they prove EPRDF’s assumptions, about inter-groups relations in Gambella as simplistic. Consequently, it risks further inter-group polarization and conflict in post 1991 period. In addition, the prevalence of the conflict relations in post 1991 period raises questions as to how the EPRDF government, which has become an increasingly critical party in the conflict, could at the same time spearhead Gambella’s move away from its historical peripherialization.The third examines the Gewada-Dhobase (Ale) quest for common ethnic identity


and self- governance within the continuing dynamics of ethnic claims for self-determination in Southern Regional State of Ethiopia. The study indicates that the Ale social organization is a ‘confederation’ of nine egalitarian clans governed by their respective chieftain called Boģolho. Each clan has its own territorial identifications designated as Gewada, Dhobase and so forth. The research concludes that by conglomerating 56 ethnic groups into one federated unit, the existing political order has created minority-within-minority in the south. As a result, those ethnic groups who have been given their own sub-regional units have acquired political majority over the subsumed ethnic groups. This, in turn, has created feelings of being dominated and marginalized by the subsumed ethnic groups at the local level. This is the basic cause for the Ale claim for self-governance since 1995. The study recommends two policy options: one is to restructure Southern Regional State; and the second and one is to organize additional sub-regional units for some of the subsumed ethnically defined groups.The fourth study is aimed at putting together researched evidence about the activities of insurgents in Somalia that are a danger to the people of Kenya and thus the government alongside the entire Horn of Africa region. It proposes that the government of Kenya and other neighboring states of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Djibouti prioritize the resolution of civil war in Somalia as a recipe for Kenya’s own peace and security and that of IGAD region if not the world at large. It recommends that UN Security Council should now intervene in Somalia by sending in an army composing of 40,000 plus troops from across the world to occupy Somalia and restore peace. The world cannot watch as whole generations are wiped out while others are displaced daily.

The fifth one focuses on the role of an indigenous conflict resolution mechanism in the Ennor Guraghe area in maintaining peace and harmony of the society. It is serving as source of justice for the local people and it is also easing the burden of the state apparatus of peace and justice. It helps the local people to improve their productivity by saving their times and costs, that could have been incurred in search of justice out of their work place. And it also creates sustainable peace among disputants by reducing animosity and vengeance that would otherwise be a challenge for economic, social, cultural and political development of the society.

Finally, I would like to thank FES for sponsoring the publication of the Anthology, Dr Asnake Kefale, Dr Kassahun Berhanu and Dr Taddesse Berriso for assessing and selecting the five theses and Dr. Taye Regassa for editing. I am also indebted to my colleague Yonas Adaye for organizing the process of selection, editing and publication of the Anthology.Mulugeta Gebrehiwot, Director, Institute for Peace and Security StudiesAddis Ababa University


Preface

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung would like to extend its gratitude for its partnering organization- Institute for Peace and Security Studies for inviting us to support such an initiative. We would also like to thank the IPSS Staff and the staff of FES. Without their diligent cooperation this would not have possible.

This publication is a collection of thesis submitted to the Institute of peace and Security Studies (IPSS) of Addis Ababa University, towards the fulfill-ment of the requirements to complete Graduate Studies at the aforemen-tioned Institute. It is also a result of goodwill and cooperation between the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) and the Institute of peace and Security Studies of Addis Ababa University.

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung is a German political foundation committed to the values of social democracy. It runs various projects in more than 100 countries. The foundation promotes dialogue on democracy and develop-ment broadly- contributing to peace and security and the maintenance of solidarity in a globalized world.

FES Addis Ababa is a part of a close network of FES offices in Eastern Africa. It works closely with other colleagues in Nairobi, Kampala, Dar Es Salam and Khartoum. Within this network of Eastern African Offices FES Addis is specializing in Security Policy issues. In fact it is the regional competency centre on Security policy for FES eastern African regional work.

For the last couple of years, FES Addis Ababa has focused on challenges in conflict resolution, democracy and sustainable development. To that end, it has supported research projects which center on issues of peace and security; it has organized a series of expert meetings on security issues and published research findings. Accordingly, this publication is part of the at-tempt of the foundation to contribute towards information dissemination and the enactment of responsive security policies.

It is our sincere hope and belief that you find this publication informative and useful.

Arne Schildberg (Mr.) Resident Representative.


I Inter-Group Conflicts in the Awash Valley of Ethiopia:

The Case of Afar and Karrayu oromo, By Asnake Menbere

An Anthology of peace and Securiy Research

Page 1

CHAPTER 11. Introduction 1.1 background Conflict is an inevitable phenomenon (Amadou, 1999; Conteth, 1999) since it chained in the system of human interest, interaction and interdependence. In line with this, Amadou (1999:23) explained that the pursuit of different goals, values, needs, and interests by individuals or groups, and competition for the control of scarce resources make conflict inevitable and global phenomena. Of the many types of conflicts, ethnic conflict persists against the expectation of theorists. In the 1950s and 60s, for example, modernization theorists suggested the deleterious impact of modernization upon ethnic identities and groupings; and the subsequent creation of larger communities. Contrary to their assumption, however, ethnic identities and interests remain solid and fightings along ethnic line have escalated just transcending the North- South dichotomy (Brown, 2005:211).

In post colonial period, Africa is mired in intra and inter-state conflicts often provoked by factors like the fragile nature of the state, endemic poverty, economic inequality, and exclusionary political arrangements as well as the recent democratization process that gave the existing situation a momentum (Nhema 2004:11-13). Ethiopia can offer a strong evidence of such dynamics of intra and inter-state conflicts that have been largely provoked by factors already mentioned.

Of causes of ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia, Bahru,(2008) distinguished over centralization, marginalization, deliberate elites’ exploitations and competitions for scarce resources as major ones. For the post-1991 period, Asnake (1994:55) suggested the possible factors under three broad divisions with related instances: competition and conflicts in multiple identity regional states; tensions in majority-minority relations, and boundary delineation. With the same categorization, Tesfaye (2007:79) by citing Ayele and Getachew (2001), mapped the conflict factors with instances as follows :(a) resource based; Afar and Issa from early 1950s on wards, Afar and Amhara in north Shewa since 1920s; (b) boundary issues: Borana and Gari; (c) language: Gammo and Wolayta after WOGAGODA Project. However, it is my strong contention that such broad categorization of causes has its own merit and drawbacks. The merit is the fact that it offers


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a general insight and common framework so that researchers can use it in the analysis of specific ethnic conflict. Its drawback is related on the danger of overgeneralizations and the subsequent misinterpretation of specific conflicts like that of Afar-Karrayu the detail of which are supposed to be presented later.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Of the many areas in Ethiopia which have been prone to such violent conflicts is the Middle Awash Valley, a home for pastoralists, agro-pastoralists, and cultivators. As empirical researches show, the Afar and Karrayu Oromo have been traditional enemies engaged in intermittent raids and counter raids (Ayalew, 2001; Buli, 2001; Getachew, 2001).

The Afar-Karrayu conflict is explained in terms of competition for scarce resources. In his seminal work on the Karrayu, Ayalew (2001) rightly argued that the underdog status of the pastoralists in the Awash valley has considerably shaped their relations and aggravated inter-ethnic conflicts in the area. As the same source stated, development intervention carried in the Awash Valley, specifically the ever-expansion of commercial farms, worsened the conflict. Corroborating Ayalew’s view, Buli (2001:76) adds the role of culture, especially prior to the launching of state farms in the area, to the causes of conflict between the groups in focus.

Furthermore, as many scholars (Asnake, 1994; Merera, 2000; Bahru 2008) have rightly argued, the ethno federalism, presented as a solution to the perennial ethnic questions, has saddled the existing ethnic problems by giving a new dimension. This new dimension is partly asserted by Markakis (1994:13) who remarks the necessity of looking at the factors of pastoral communities’ conflict beyond the old agitating reasons such as warrior ethos and disagreement upon pasture land and water; as they began to act in collaboration with other social groups and across ethnic boundaries which mark a departure from the traditional practice. Thus, to have a complete picture of the Afar-Karrayu conflict, one needs to look at the impact of the radical state restructuring of the post-1991 period and the resulting salience of ethnicity on the political and social arenas of the country within the context of conflicts between the stated groups.

However, despite the growing interest in the study of inter-ethnic conflicts, yet much is left either unstudied or scantily addressed. The same holds true for the Afar-Karrayu case, which has so far not been exhaustively researched. Without doing an exhaustive empirical research on this conflict, it is impossible to put it in one broad category.


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1.2.1. Research Gaps

The above explanations with all the academic virtue and merit of explaining different aspects of pastoralist conflicts do not give the full picture. As such, the impact of multiple level changes on inter-group relationships, modality of peace and conflict, coping mechanisms and mode of control of states, and identity groups are left unexplained. In addition to this, the underlying local social dynamics, national and regional changes and how they impact on the needs and aspirations of identity groups and inter-group relationships require to be clearly and fully captured. Besides, the process involved in the deterioration of relationships between these groups into conflict such as contexts, structures, relationships and actors that maintained protracted influx across decades are vital aspects little addressed by the above mentioned cases.

Above all, giving a remedy to the conflict badly demands a correct understanding and interpretation of the conflict situation. Logically, this entails identification of its underlying causes and triggers, actors and their needs, interests and positions and the changes and transformations of causes and contributing factors to the dynamics it underscored over time. However, the studies made so far are general and hence give a very limited account of the Afar-Karrayu conflict. As such, there exists a knowledge lacuna. Accordingly, this study intends to make its contribution by filling the existing knowledge gap in the aforementioned area.

1.3 objectives of the Study1.3.1. General objective

The general objective of this study is to understand the context and the causes of the Afar-Karrayu conflict and examine the nature and the dynamics of the conflict in relation to the political development that has taken place mainly at the state level and its impact on the conflict between the groups.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

To explore the nature of the Afar-Karrayu relations from 1991 to the present.To uncover the interplay of causes, structures and actors in the conflict.To explore the ebb and flow of post-1991 Afar-Karrayu conflict as correlates of the restructuring of the Ethiopian state and (re)formation


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of multifaceted relations. To assess the role of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms the groups have been using and state interventions to resolve and/or manage the conflicts

1.4 Research Questions

What were the causes and structures of the conflict and who were the actors involved in the conflict?What correlates of the restructuring of the Ethiopian State constitute post-1991 Afar-Karrayu Conflict?What major interventions and modalities of resolution and/or management were undertaken at different levels in the period under discussion?

1.5. Scope of the Study

This study specifically explores the context and nature of the relationship between the two groups focusing on the post 1991 perspective. This is held in the Awash Fentale and Fentale woredas of the Afar and Oromia National Regional States respectively. More specifically, the researcher systematical focused on Lagaa Banti, Kobbo and Harro Qarssa kebeles in the Fentale woreda of the Karrayu while Doho, Dudub and Sabure were selected in the Awash Fentale, although the problem is available in other kebeles of the two woredas.

1.6 Significance of the Study

A proper understanding of conflict situation is a principal precondition to proffer practical solution and a means of avoiding any jeopardy upon the management and resolution processes of conflicts. Viewed from such angle, the study would hopefully have the following paramount contributions. In the first place, in unveiling some of the causes of the conflict in the area in order to better manage conflicts, identifying the causes can be as much as going half way the road to the solution. It may also contribute to a better understanding of the role of the political and economic policy adopted at the centre at different times in determining the interaction between the two ethic groups. As such the findings of this research will be invaluable for policy makers, NGOs and other stakeholders who work on conflict. Being, of course, a spur for other researchers, using this particular case study, they can search a proper entry point of intervention for the


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management and resolution of the perennial conflicts between the two ethnic groups. Furthermore, the findings can offer, though implicitly, some general directions for the concerned government bodies and other conflict workers to effectively deal with the conflicts that the two ethnic groups have with others.

1.7. limitations of the Study

This thesis has encountered financial, situational, environmental and cultural limitations. In the first place, the meager fund allocation tied the researcher’s interest of gathering data from a reasonable number of informants. Secondly, since the period of field work coincided with the May 2010 election, some informants long hesitated to provide information suspecting the researcher as an agent of either the government or opposition parties, until they proved his neutrality. Thirdly, the inhospitably hot climatic condition of the area together with the long journey to rural kebeles on foot remained a real challenge. Because of their cultural orientation, females are not normally supposed to interact with aliens particularly with males.

1.8. Methodology and Research design 1.8.1 Methodology

The methodology adopted in this study is a qualitative one. To use the words of Holliday,’ in opposition to the notion of survey in quantitative research, in qualitative one the aim is to go deep into a definable setting in which phenomena can be placed meaningfully within specific environment. Such an environment can be groups of people, institutions, cases, geographic areas and communities.’(2002:37).Other scholars like Flick (2002) also stressed on advantages of qualitative approach in the study of social relation and in easily attaining the perspectives of the participants and their diversity. Hence, my study employs a qualitative research design and the data will be analyzed qualitatively.

1.8.2 Sampling Technique and Size

In the sampling process, the two woredas were represented by six kebeles taking three from each. The selection of key informants was through purposive sampling, a non-probabilistic method. To qualify this purpose, snowball sampling was used; as I relied on my first contact persons, i.e. village chiefs who in turn help me to identify and contact with other key informants in each parish. As such the traditional Gada leaders of Karrayu, clan leaders on the Afar side, religious leaders, chiefs, counselors, and


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government appointed provincial administrators, political representatives and members of peace committees and others who were directly or indirectly affected by the conflict were included.

1.8.3. Data Collection Methods and Sources: Primary Sources

Empirical data were gathered on the various aspects of the conflict including the historical and socio-cultural relationships of the two communities since the imperial regime. In the data gathering process, efforts were made to attain information regarding the genesis, sole factors in current conflict, historical state of affairs between the two communities and the like. The empirical data were collected employing different techniques throughout the fieldwork which lasted for 45 working days. These included:

1.8.3.1. In-depth-Interview with Key Informants

The researcher has undertaken a series of unstructured and semi-structured interviews with key informants. For instance, viable interviews were held with elders of the community who are the opinion leaders in the traditional arena as they participate in the daily management of community affairs. One of the easing factors for viability of most interviews was that most of the elders were willing to participate in the interviews as they assumed it a good opportunity to teach their customs as well as preserve the traditional knowledge. In addition to this, the researcher’s ability of communication in the Oromo language and the availability of effective field assistant further eased the in-depth-interview with the key informants.

1.8.3.2. Focus Group discussion

Inter-ethnic conflict is a very sensitive issue which demands a critical weighing of information. As such, for the purpose of data triangulation and methodological merit, FGD has ‘high face validity’. In the FGD that I arranged, local chiefs, clan leaders and others who have a good deal of knowledge about the issue were partakers. Although focus group discussion arrangement is a time taking task, the researcher was successful in making two FGDs each of which embraced 6-7 individuals, which is a very standard arrangement for researches upon provocative and controversial topics of this kind. (Bryman 2004:35).

1.8.4. Secondary Sources: Document Analysis

So as to have a comprehensive picture of the Afar-Karrayu conflict; the researcher analyzed local government documents and other theory based


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secondary sources. The local oriented sources included study reports and conferences on inter-woreda conflicts, minutes of peace conferences, and situation reports collected from security office of the woredas. Besides, in order to put the trend of ethnic conflict in context both at global and national levels, different books, periodicals, and statistical publications were consulted.

1.8.5. Method of data Analysis

Qualitative research design equipped with Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) model was employed to analyze this inter-group conflict relation. Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) model focuses on analysis of conflict structures, actors, and dynamics (DFID, 2002) that in reality they are closely inter-linked and should be viewed holistically. The first step has been to analyze the long term factors underlying violent conflict in the two woredas in order to make an assessment of its structural vulnerability to the outbreak or intensification of conflict. Besides through SCA model, case study data were closely examined in order to find constructs, themes, and patterns that can be used to describe and explain the phenomenon being studied.


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CHAPTER 22. literature Review and Theoretical Framework Introduction

The chapter introduces a brief literature review that explains the different scholarly justifications forwarded on the why of inter-group conflicts; its changes and continuities mainly along with post-1991 restructuring of the national government, literary works directly on the Awash Valley social conflicts and pertinent theories that are believed to be instrumental for the actual analysis.

2.1 Ethnic Conflict in Pastoral Setting

The end of the Cold War was accompanied by myriads of changes in causes, nature and types of social conflicts in the global, regional and national level (Kaldor, 2001). One major shift in this respect is the localization of civil wars, in which the peripheral regions of Horn of African countries can be the leading witness for its protracted local conflicts (Kratli, 2001; Clapham, 2008). The Horn of Africa including Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya is home to the largest numbers of traditional livestock producers in the world and at the same time represent the above assertion (Markakis, 1993). Pastoralism, as both production and social system, requires vast area to perform patterned transhumant mobility across seasons. Given the fragility of the environment and their nearly absolute dependency on livestock production and reproduction, changes affecting their environment continue to affect the totality of their existence and social relation (Markakis, 1993; Buli, 2001; Getachew, 2001).

The issues that drive ethnic conflicts cannot be easily explained simply because there are numerous causes. The literature, however, points out that struggle over disputed territory, competitions over resources, economic development and marginalization that may increase inequality can cause inter-group conflicts.

In an attempt to explain why ethnic conflicts occur under different circumstances, Horowitz, (2000) concluded that ethnicity can be looked at from three perspectives. First, ethnic conflicts are remnants of traditional practices supposed to be overtaken by modernity. The assumption here


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is that modernization will diminish the utility of allegiance to ethnic groups. Secondly, ethnic conflict is viewed as traditional and as a strong impediment to modernization. This can be seen from the pre-independence movements that spearheaded the struggle against colonial rule which used their strong ethnic support base, hence, setting the stage for ethnic-nationalism. In post-colonial states, therefore, ethnicity emerged as a superior base for political solidarity and community mobilization (Fukui, 1994). Thus, ethnicity took the centre stage in politics of many ‘modern’ countries and posed challenges to the cohesiveness of the states. Thirdly, ethnic conflict can be viewed as part of, or even an outcome of, the process of modernization. The distribution of the benefits of modernization, for example, in economic and education opportunities as well as political representation, can act as motivating factors for ethnic competition. Horowitz further pointed out that in many of the so called “Modern’ states in Asia and Africa, inter-ethnic competition is rife in the post-colonial politics, some among the goals being to control state resources and to exclude others from the “centre”. These could be through the influence of those in power who project interests that would directly translate into the interests of the group they represent. The excluded groups would in turn become bitter at what they see as “their ethnic exclusion” by “others” as the ground for potential conflict. Horowitz continues to argue that even modern day democratic politics, does not assure ethnic peace. The emergence of multi-party democracies has been known to bring about split along ethnic lines, which sometimes degenerates into violent ethnic strife (Horowitz, 2000). Horowitz again outlines the role of cultural pluralism and clash of economic interests as other explanations of ethnic conflicts. He posits that cultural identity is among the things used by an ethnic group to distinguish itself from others and can be a source of conflict in multi-ethnic settings. Likewise, economic competition between ethnic groups can result in conflict when one ethnic group controls the means of production depended upon by other groups (Horowitz, 2000).

Homer-Dixon (1991) has posited the theory of environmental scarcity as a potential source of conflict. The theory postulates that the rising demands for key resources and the unequal distribution of such resources may result in violent conflicts. This theory can be applied to ethnic conflicts in the pastoral regions of Africa, where conflicts of different kinds have been the norm, but in recent years, assumed ethnic and/or political dimension. Since resource scarcities are considered to lead to conflicts, Homer-Dixon argues that such environmental scarcities will have profound social consequences contributing to insurrections, ethnic clashes, urban unrest, and other forms of civil violence, especially in the developing world (Homer-Dixon, 1991:76).


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More specific studies in East Africa also show that resource scarcity and the absence of strong informal institutions to handle the situation are the principal causes for recurrent conflicts among different pastoral groups (Ayalew, 2001; Getachew, 2001; Bekele, 2008). The social structure of most pastoralists is organized along clan and clan confederacies and strategic resources like land and water points which are communally owned. Community obligations, social networks and kin solidarity are central codes to share such resources and survive their harsh environment. When these elders and traditional authorities, institutions and value systems fail to play their central role, conflict becomes inevitable (Homer-Dixon, 1995).

For some other scholars, ethnic conflict is highly attached with certain policies of the former colonial powers mainly upon internal border demarcations and indirect rules formulated to achieve their administrative objectives. This affected the customary system of negotiating resource access, a reciprocal relationship that has existed among various pastoral groups before the advent of colonialism. These agitate pastoralists to cross over colonial demarcations and national state administrative borders that precipitated into immediate conflicts (Markakis, 1993:1). Markakis (1994) also brought out a vital perspective on resource scarcity and the subsequent “marginalization of herders approach”. For him the commercialization of pastoralists’ resources by the state that apparently fosters evictions and shrinking of grazing land become “catalysts of conflict” in such areas.

Inter-ethnic conflict can also occur due to political differences. For instance, in a multiethnic setting, politics can find its way into myriads of issues such as development projects, decisions on education, affairs of local or national unions, and jurisdictions on land and business systems. It is, therefore, argued that in societies where ethnicity is part of organizational life, all political issues develop ethnic appendages that often lead to conflict (Horowitz, 2000). Political problems at the central government level such as the recurring instability and fragility of states of the Horn, long and protracted civil wars, nature of state borders and borderland occupied by a population of same ethno national origins are the most often mentioned causes for ethnic conflict (Medihane, 2001).

2.2. Trends of Ethnic Conflict –The Ethiopian Experiences

The history of Ethiopia is riddled by intra and inter-ethnic conflicts. In its modern history, the country has to withstand several external aggressions. Internally as well, Ethiopia experienced, acute social, political and economic contradictions (Asnake, 2004). Similarly, Merera (2000:118) characterizes


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the history of the Ethiopian state as the history of conflict with varying dimensions based on class, ethnic, religious and regional sentiments. Even in the post-1991 period in which federalism is presented as a better political instrument of managing the country’s ethnic relations, inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts have accompanied the federalization process (Merera, 2000; Aklilu, 2003; Asnake, 2004).

The Ethiopian ethnic federalism and the recognition of the right to self-determination including secession is designed to avoid ethnic domination and lay a favorable condition for lasting peace. However, in the years of its implementation, the major challenge remains to be unprecedented ethnic conflict and border disputes. For that matter, the ethnic conflict in Gambella and Sidama and the border dispute between Somalia and Oromia, and Benishagul and Oromia regional states provide practical cases in point. (Yishak, 2008; Peter, 1997). One of the basic driving factors for such conflicts are the “self-government” structure of the day itself that separated different ethnic groups who were in the past living within the same administrative borders but now became different regional states like that of the Boran and Dogdi groups in Oromia and Somali Regional States respectively (Abdulahi, 2004).

2.3. Inter-Group Conflict in the Awash Valley

For years researches have been conducted on the ethnic conflicts in the Awash Valley; and many of the researchers look at the Karrayu conflict from the “marginalization of herders approach”. As such Ayalew (2001), Bekele (2008), and Alemmaya (2008) all blamed the commercial land expansion policies of governments since the Imperial regime for the root causes and intensification of the Karrayu conflict with their neighbors such as the Afar, the Argoba, the Arsi and occasionally the Issa Somali. In the same fashion, another scholar by the name Melakou also declared that “pastoralists are faced with a double-edged marginalization: first, as a member of “dominant ethnic groups” and second as pastoralists” (Melakou, 2001:84). For him, as one of the dominant ethnic groups in Ethiopia, they faced national oppression while as pastoralists they are considered as ‘uncivilized’ and neglected by the dominant ruling classes that in the end gives birth to intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic conflicts. (Melakou, 2001:85)

The aforementioned reductionist view of marginalization runs a risk of overgeneralization as it neglected environmental, cultural, social, security and other factors as causes of conflicts in pastoral areas. As a result some writers tried to reconcile the marginalization paradigm with other specific factors. Ali (1994) for example analyzed the multiple impacts of


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the large-scale mechanized irrigation schemes in the Awash Valley with environmental alienation. His work contained detailed analysis of how environmental vulnerability of producers, coupled with external factors like the policy environment, will eventually cause and aggravate conflicts between and among producer communities. In the same token Baxter, (1999) cited in Kebede (2005:81), stated that fighting and raiding have been regular features in these areas particularly in the dry season and in the prolonged drought years. In addition to these environmental analysis, the role warfare, culturally motioned livestock ride, livestock ride to restock after drought and cattle epidemic and other internal agitating factors are also well addressed by writers like Buli (2001) and Gamaldin (1993).

From the general observation of the above cases, there is one important conclusion we should draw as far as analyzing different cases of conflict in Ethiopia is concerned. This is the fact that in parallel to the diversity of the production systems, the population profiles and the different roles played by indigenous and state institutions, the nature and causes of conflict escalations vary with the geographic and administrative differences of various case areas in the country. Accordingly, one or the other approach may apply asymmetrically for analysis of the situation in case areas.

2.4. Theories on Ethnic Conflicts

One area of theoretical contention and discussion laid upon conflict is its technical definition. To begin with, in most cases, conflict is taken to be analogous with competition which “although competition produces conflict, not all instances of conflict reflect competition” (Madhane, 2007:16). In the first place, there are many factors other than competition that lead ethnic groups to conflicts as competition presumes aiming at a particular tangible resource. In other words, there are intangible resources (norms and values) over which competition is theoretically impossible but due to which conflict is tenable. Second, there are also other ways of dealing with competition like transfer, mediation, exchange and others that are usually free from conflict. Having this in mind, it is advisable to locate the debate on the meaning of ethnic-conflict. Quoting from Michael Brown again, ethnic conflicts “are inherent in multiethnic societies and are not necessarily violent conflicts…” (Michael Brown, 2005:96). Most other scholars agreed with Brown that ethnic conflicts are not violent, but none of them denied the existence of ethnic clashes as existential problems fueled by other factor/s. Traditionally, however, inter-ethnic conflicts are interpreted in terms of the existence of detest or abhorrence of a group usually arising from “past or present injustice, or from a threat seen to be posed by the other group” (Hinde


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and Rotblat, 2003:73). This seems plausible as far as it does not dictate the appearance of violent conflict between the conflicting groups especially in post cold war world.

Resource scarcity and its impact on inter-ethnic conflict is another source of discourse. One stated that “the survival of all depends upon no one putting anyone else in the community at risk, no one is likely to give up the ghost’’ (Hildyard, 1999:40). Hildyard is successful in refuting these theories and also in providing us with another dimension of scarcity that he preferred to call a Socially Generated Scarcity (Hildyard, 1999). Traditionally pastoralists have adapted themselves with time proved ways of managing their own resources especially grazing lands and water. In that case, the intervention of the state in the life of the pastoralists in a manner that destructs their socio-economic bases, being informed with the conceptions of the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’, is simply an act of socially generated scarcity.

In any case the literature reviews and conflict theories that are popularly used in conflict analysis in pastoral setting in general and in the study area in particular might not be totally adequate to capture the social dynamics that underlies conflict between these two ethnic groups. To this end, the thesis is entirely dependent on Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) model which is adopted by the UK Department for International Development (DFID). The rationale for adopting such a methodology is the fact that it relies on conflict structures, actors and dynamics in an integrated and inter-related manner which, in turn, will make the different conflict episodes between the Afar and Karrayu easy for analysis and elucidation of factors and forces of tension and conflict (Madhane, 2007).


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CHAPTER 33. Framing the Context of the Conflict 3.1 Geography of the Afar Area

The Afar region is located in north eastern part of Ethiopia sharing international border with Eritrea and Djibouti. In terms of area coverage, the Afar region is the fourth largest in the country with a total area of 100,860 square kilometers and structured into 5 zones and 29 woredas; out of these only one woreda namely, Awash Fentale, has been covered in this study. This woreda is found in the southern and south western part of the Afar region. Awash Fentale Woreda has six kebeles out of which 3 were purposively selected from the district in such a way that the sample reflects inter-ethnic relations, state pastoralist relations and the like. The three sites, namely Dudub, Doho and Sabure, are found in the southern part of the region located in the Middle Awash Valley. These are riverine areas where irrigated state-owned and private farms are located. The three sites share boundaries with the Karrayu, an Oromo clan in the east and south east, with the Issa, a Somali clan in the north and north east, and with the Argoba, a small ethnic group in the south west. The Afar pastoralists are also bordered by the Amhara in the west and south west.

3.2 Afar: A Brief Historical Overview3.2.1 History of origin

Peoples of Afar are the earliest to live in the Horn of Africa. They claim to be the descendents of Ham supposed to be the second son of the biblical Noah. Weeks (1984) argued that the Afar claim decent from Arabs, their most celebrated mythic ancestor being Har-al-Mahis. The Afar speak an eastern Cushitic language (Weeks, 1984:10). Historically, the Afar people living in the Eastern Horn of Africa, are tribal Muslims who call themselves Afar, better known to outsiders by their Arabic name Danakil. The Tigreans call them ‘Taltal’, but the Amhara and Oromo named them-Adal. Beneath their universally professed adherence to Sunni Islam, remnants of Cushitic animist cult of their traditional religion persist. Afars of the study area encompass two clans namely Debine and Weima. The area of Awash Fentale was traditionally inhabited by the Debine Afar. Meanwhile the Weima Afar were consistently pushed further and further away from their traditional habitat by Issa Somali and kept moving into the Debine Afar territory (Ayalew, 2001:249).Currently these two groups of the Afar live harmoniously in the stated area.


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3.3 Social Organization and Livelihood 3.2.1 Socio-political Organization of the Afar

Central to the Afar social organization are decent and affine ties. The Afar have a patrilineal decent system based on which a person belongs to a particular clan (Mela). Afar settlements are composed of a mixture of clans although each locality is identified with a major clan and affine. This makes it easier to organize social, economic and political support in times of crisis (Yayneshet and Kelemework, 2004:10). Similarly, Weeks asserted that the Afar nomads live in camps generally made up of kinsmen by blood or marriage. Like their Somali neighbors to the south, the Afar often graze their camels at some distance from their main camps in the care of young warriors, while the rest of the group remain closer to water sources with the less hard livestock (Weeks 1984:11). According to Yayneshet and Kelemework, the Afar exercise exogamous marriage and polygamy is exercised in accordance with Islamic laws. There are several marriage patterns; these include inter-clan marriages between unrelated people, and cross-cousin marriage (Absuma). Leviratic arrangements (widow inheritance) are widely practiced. It is claimed that cross-cousin marriages are stronger than marriages between unrelated persons because of the fact that no serious harm is inflicted on one’s own blood and flesh in times of conjugal conflict (Yayneshet and Kelemework, 2004). According to Lewis (1969) cited in Kelemework (2004:32), the Afar are classified into two distinct decent groups, these are Asaimara “red” and Adoimara “white”. The Asaimara are considered nobles, while the Adoimara are said to form the class of commoners and these demarcation is well known even by European writers. Under their traditional administration system, the Afar are divided into four paramount sultanates: Tajura and Raheito in Djibouti and Awsa and Biru in Ethiopia that are in turn composed of smaller confederate chiefdoms. Afar overlords had powers of taxation, but their main role was as arbiters of disputes over grazing and water rights (Kebede, 2005:78). Beyond the clan structure and their confederations, the Afar society has developed a hierarchical political structure known as sultanates. In Ethiopia, the sultanate of Aussa whose centre was located in Assaita was created in the seventeenth century; and the sultan has still remained in power with the exception of the Derg regime (Getachew and Shimelis, 2004:79).

3.3.2 Mode of livelihood (Subsistence)

Pastoral livelihoods have evolved over many centuries and are a rational response to a region with low and erratic rainfall. As a result, 90% of the Afar economy relied on subsistence movable livestock, rearing of sheep, goats,


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cattle and camels (Getachew,2001; Francois, 2007) In addition to this, the Afar agro-pastoralists are found in the highland region and their economy is based on crop, honey and livestock production. Today, pastoralist movements are linked to urban areas on seasonal basis for subsistence. As they usually face recurrent drought, insecurity and economic difficulties, pastoralists have been forced to change their spatial strategies. They began to be more close to urban centers. As a result, the proportion of their income linked to livestock is decreasing (Getachew, 2001:10)

3.4 The Karrayu Oromo: Geography, History of Origin and Settlement 3.4.1 Geography

Geographically, the Karrayu inhabited the area known as Fentale woreda located in the Eastern Showa Zone of Oromia Regional State. This woreda has a total of 20 kebeles out of which 10 are pastoralist, 8 are agro-pastoralist and the remaining two are urban kebeles. For this study purpose, three kebeles have been selected; these are Haro Kersa, Koboo and Lega Banti. The neighbors of the Karrayu Oromo are the Debine Afar in the north, Arsi Oromo in the south, and Awash National Park in the east, the Ittu Oromo of Western Hararghe in the south east, the Argoba in the west and the Amhara in the south-west.

3.4.2. History of origin and Settlement

The big Oromo ethnic group is divided into two major clan federations called Borana and Barentuma. While the Borana inhabit the central, southern and western parts of today’s Oromia Regional State, the Barentuma Oromo occupy the eastern and Rift Valley parts of the former West Hararghe. The Karrayu trace their descent from Oromo through Barentuma whom they regard as their genealogical father while they consider the Ittu as their genealogical brother. According to popular belief, Karrayu begot two sons known as Dullacha and Basso, which represent the two major genealogical groups within the Karrayu. The Karrayu consider a location called Meda Wolabu, a natural lake located between the Borana and Bale areas, as their place of origin. Oral tradition has it that the Karrayu settled around Fentale mountain where they had been residing around Lake Basaqa in the Sabober plains and the Metahara area for the past 200 years (Ayalew, 2001:151-152).

According to Alemayehu et al. (2006), though Karrayu elders explain that the two branches of Karrayu Oromo known as Basso and Dulacha had their distinct settlement area, one branch can settle in the area of the other. These authors noted that Dulacha is the elder of the two branches while


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Basso (majority whose members are followers of Islam) is said to be the younger branch. Accordingly, the settlement pattern of the two branches followed the general Oromo rule of seniority. Thus, while the Dulacha took the right direction, Basso settled on the left direction (Alemayehu, et al. 2006:201). Similarly, Ayalew (2001:165) stated that up to the last one or two generations, the Dulacha and Basso had their own respective territories. The area of the Basso in those times stretched from Dega Iddu, a locality east of Mount Fentale, and encompassed the whole of this land now effectively controlled by the Awash National Park as well as the neighborhood of Little Fentale ( Fentale Tino).

The Dulacha, on the other hand, used to inhabit the place where largely the Argoba are now living, namely, Chercher, Melka Jillo, Kogne, Arole, and the lands of the Kasam River which they call Bulga (Ayalew, 2001:165). Based on oral information, Alemayehu et al. (2006:202) stated that different enemies have surrounded the tribe. As a result, Dulacha’s settlement that was initially very wide is now progressively decreasing in size. According to Ayalew, until about the 1950s and 1960s, the present day Fentale district had long been inhabited by the Karrayu as a single dominant group. But since the last three to four decades, however, other groups like Ittu and the Somali have migrated and put up permanent settlement in the traditional Karrayu territory (Ayalew, 2001).

3.5 Aspects of Karrayu Socio-Political Organizations

Many societies of Ethiopia do have their own way of socio-political organizations. The Oromos, for example, are famous for their Gada that probably set out as age set social system (Asmerom, 1973:50). According to Ayalew (2001), as one part of Oromo society, the Karrayu tribes have their respective autonomous Gada rule. Under this indigenous system the Karrayu society was organized into five Gada classes (Gada Shenen). These five Gada grades alternately assume political, social, economic and religious responsibilities every eight years. The other important institution in the Oromo society is the Qallu. According to Asmerom, the Qallu institution is complex and highly instructive. It plays a central role in the traditional socio-political system. The Qallu (ritual leaders) are the most senior men in the kinship system. All major conflicts between clans may be taken to them for adjudication. Their villages are the spiritual centers around which political debate is organized. Nevertheless, due to the continued encroachment of the state authority into the local communities as well as the expansion of Islamic practices; these two traditional socio-political institutions of the Karrayu are on a real decline.


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3.6. Economy of the Karrayu

Economically, the Karrayu are fundamentally defined as transhumant pastoralist community. But more recently, they began to create a supporting or an alternative way of life. One of these alternatives is that the encroachment of large scale farming and the establishment of the Awash National Park have curtailed their pastoral mobility, forcing them to shift to sedentary life styles that relied on rain-fed and irrigated agriculture. Currently, they have started to cultivate maize, sorghum, groundnut and onion both in rain fed and small irrigated plots of land. As far as marketing is concerned, more animals than normal are currently being sold as well as more firewood is reaching urban areas. For individuals like Ayalew (2001:83), such economic dynamism among the Karrayu is a response to the expropriation of their pastoral land and the subsequent weakening of their pastoral means of livelihood

3.7. Historical Contexts of the Conflict

The middle Awash Valley after the Second World War has been a nodal point of contentions for central government. Three basic contradictions are structural in this respect. First, tension between forces of centralization and decentralization characterized the region, especially that of the Afar autonomous awraja up to the coming of the revolution (Markakis, 2001). Second and most important, there was a contradiction between pastoralist (re)production of economy and the central politics and system of governance which was imbedded in settled agriculture production as the economic and social base of the center as opposed to the marginal role of pastoral economy (Getachew, 2001; Yakob, 2001). Thirdly, communal contradictions involving multiplicity of identity and cultural groups represent the above two contradictions.

To make highlights on how state (re) structuring in post-1991 period affects the Afar-Karrayu conflict dynamics requires exploring same in later decades. The first contradiction has geo-political, economic, security and social dimensions. As a continuation of the aspects of state building efforts, the incorporation of local authorities and the territories they had reigned on has ushered the penetration of traditional socio-political system, organization and action by alien state structures. This is evident from Clapham’s assertion that collaboration with the state for local authorities had the consequence of social alienation of the latter (2008). For instance, Ali Mirah’s (Sultan of Afar in Awusa) collaboration with the emperor (only rewarded him with “Bitweded” title) cut the Middle Awash basin Afar from the center - Awusa


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set of the sultanate. The consequent commercialization of vast Afar and Karrayu pastoralist land for both Afar and Karrayu had been sources of grievance (Markakis, 2001). A case in point is the introduction of the Awash valley Authority (AVA), the Koka dam, the national parks and game reserves in both Afar and Karrayu land that have negatively affected their relation. Such land expropriation for commercial purpose has grabbed nearly 60,000 hectare of dry and wet season pastoralist grazing land which could be mentioned as sources of conflict between the pastoralists of the Awash valley (Buli, 2001).

Geopolitically, access to the coast and the necessity to care for the safety of the railway and later for the highway that traversed these territories made inhabitants of the area subject to state punitive measures. Clapham (2008) argued that the Somali aggressions caused garrisoning of military camps which resulted in the eviction of Ittu Oromo and Weima Afar clans from Assebot highlands. This was partly to co-opt the Issa Somali clan which in turn brought new elements to the Middle Awash Valley.

Economically, the continued marginalization of pastoralist production and social system i.e. bias towards the highland settled agriculture, eviction, falling victim of development induced poverty in a fragile ecosystem was source of frustration against the center. According to Melakou, it constituted double dimension of marginalization of the pastoral for the agrarian. On one hand, ethnic minority lowlanders against the majority highlanders and, on the other hand, absolute monarchical and military systems continued imposing heavy handed rule on these people. Their rarely open resistance at times had brought them under military attack, including aerial bombing (Melakou, 2007). Moreover, traditional institutions and their role in social affairs including peace management had been severely weakened.


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CHAPTER 4data Presentation and Analysis4. The Contemporary Afar- Karrayu Conflict: A Post-1991 Perspective

This chapter mainly emphasizes the analysis of structural causes of the conflicts. In this part, attempt was made to exhaustively rely on primary sources but at times where there exists lack of primary data; gaps will be filled by secondary sources. The chapter also focuses on the identification of primary and shallow actors with their vested interests and the role they play in the conflict situation. Finally, this chapter tries to address the dynamics of the conflict the two pastoral groups of Afar and Karrayu community have been experiencing since 1991. 4.1. The Afar and Karrayu: History and Nature of Relationships

The Afar and Karrayu pastoralists have had a long history of relationship marked by cordial coexistence and serious conflict. The two pastoral groups have histories of animosity, friendship and temporal alliance and violent conflict. They have shared symbiotic relationships in the spheres of utilization of grazing resources and other social functions since long time in the past. Thus, before looking into their conflictual relations, first revisiting the harmonious relationship they used to have is pertinent to assess the trends of social dynamics. The term “symbiosis” is often used by several scholars in reference to the cooperative aspects of relations between different groups. It also implies mutual beneficial relations enabling both communities to preserve their separate cultural and physical identities (Hussien, 1998:18).When we look into the relationship of mutual interdependence between Afar and Karrayu pastoralists, we find that both in terms of perception and actual sense, there has been diverse and essential forms of symbiotic relations between them. One of my informants from Afar reveals this reality in the following way:

We were allies even in war against others, for instance, during our Assabot times. Afar, Karrayu, Shoa Oromo and Hawiya were friends/comrades/ in arms against the Issa. The Karrayu were with us in Assabot war against Issa invasion.


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Thus, the informant was recalling that they had wonderful times of cordiality and fraternity with the Karrayu. Both sides have had memories of mutual respect, and there have been times when both groups were camping and settling together with the least doubt of any will against each other. The same informant reveals that they accessed water and grazing sources for their animals in ponds and streams mutually. Thus, on some occasions the Karrayu used to live with the Afar in

places like Adoda, Doho, and Dulacha areas. Similarly, in a place called Lega Banti, a Karrayu territory, Afar camels used to trek with no problem and those of the Karrayus did the same to the Afar territory in the dry season . During those days, they used each other’s language in markets where the two communities interacted, exchanged their resources such as food and clothing, and their best way of animal adaptation and use, as well as useful customs and traditions. There had also been inter-marriage between the two groups. Similarly, one of the Karrayu clan leaders stated that there had been friendships that formed an important institutionalized relationship of reciprocity between the Afar and the Karrayu. They also had a channel through which they interacted both in terms of peace and calamities that could be natural and man-made. This kind of friendship is termed by the Karrayu as ‘jaala’. It is formed through deliberate efforts, common understanding, and geographic proximity. After it is established through the link of reciprocity, the relationship is further consolidated and would remain a life time informal contract. The relationship is also characterized by ”inheritance’’ from the forefathers to the sons. Contrary to the bond-friendship, there are social institutions that destabilize their relations. According to one of the Afar elders , this is an essential clan-based social institution. The institution is referred to by the Afar as Fi’ema which is organized by the pastoral youth having the same age groups. The intention behind this youth institution is to make offensive attack, looting and revenging out group “enemies’’. The other most important type of linkage was market linkage. Despite irregular types of exchanges in the dry season, exchange linkages take place in the most vital and regular markets. Thus, the Afar used to exchange market commodities in Matahara town. Likewise, the Karrayu made the same in Awash Sebat and Sabure safely. Ayalew’s argument with regard to the Arbore and Hamar clams that trade links a network of relationships between ethnic groups (Ayalew, in Hogg.1993). Revealing the memories of alliance, the views of one of the Karrayu informants reads like this: _____________________________________1 Harbui Kobene is one of the members of a government-organized peace committee. I interviewed him on 2 January, 2010 in Awash town.2 Harbui Kobene is an elder and one of the members of a government -organized peace committee in Doho Kebele. Interviewed on 2 January, 2010 in Awash town.


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We used to live in Assebot-Afar land during the Imperial era. The clash between “them” and “us” is not that much severe and pronounced. It occurs intermittently, if we go into clash in the rainy season where there is shortage of pastureland and water wells, we usually share these resources and have good relationships in the dry season. The herders from both sides look after the herds together. Besides, we have gone to similar markets and exchanged our commodities peacefully; even our relation went to the extent that we buried our dead in the same cemetery.

Findings also revealed that the two groups have co-existed peacefully and shared resources inside one another’s territory. As a result, inter-marriage was also practiced widely between the two groups (Ayalew, 2001). The current state of relations between the Karrayu Oromo and the Afar shows deterioration of cooperative behaviors from time to time which has now reached a stage of unprecedented scale. Afar pastoralists ceased to come to Karrayu markets and the Karrayu took the same measure against their Afar counterparts. All other forms of symbiotic relations including the dry season movement of people with their herds to better grazing areas and water points have been interrupted affecting both groups mutually. As one of the Afar informants reveals, a turning point in the Afar-Karrayu relation came following an incident where a Karrayu killed an Afar and robbed his cattle, and the latter reciprocated. Although the criminals - two Karrayu men and an Afar - were given prison sentences for six years in Adama, this incident led to the initial momentum of unabated theft, cattle raiding and homicide that continued from the Imperial era to date. In a similar vein, the informant’s memory of antipathy during the 1985 famine is self-evident of inheritance of antipathy. An Afar informant from Awash Fentale Woreda recollects events as:

In the most dreadful famine which the Afar called Kadda Harbi (Grand famine) in 1985, the Karrayu denied us water while we were trying to escape death under the growing forth of consummating famine, and at a time we were being displaced in trucks to resettlement camps, Karrayu denied us the last drop of tolerance and kindness by seriously opposing it. They refused to give us water at the most critical moment of need, indeed denied us the most expedient help unforgettable. Let alone to live among them, we could not stop down off a vehicle to drink water.

_______________________________________________ 3 Hawas Fentale, is the spiritual leader in Deresede Kebele. I had an interview with him on December 16 2010 in Matehara town. 4 Abdo Ali, is one of the community elders in Awash Fentale Woreda of Doho Kebele. I had a discussion with him on 24 December 2009 in Doho Kebele at his personal residence. 5The data was gathered from Sheik Mussa Waqo, a religious leader of Ittu Oromo living in Kobo Kebele. He is also a student in 6th grade at Lega Banti Primary School. I interviewed him on 14 February 2010 at his personal home in kobo.


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The above statements clearly indicate that contexts of subjective historical memories and mutual exclusive interpretations of threats are powerful in enemy image formation. Hence, the current state of relations between the Karrayu Oromo and the Afar shows that the gradually deteriorating cooperative behaviors have now reached an unprecedented stage. Afar pastoralists now ceased to come to Karrayu markets and vice versa. It is against this historical context that the correlate of changes in Afar-Karrayu post-1991 changes at regional and local level are discussed here below. Integrating parts of contemporary conflict in the past is meant to avoid retrospective examination6This information was generated from Ali Mohammed who is both a renowned elder and one of the members of a government-organized peace committee at Doho Kebele of Awash Fentale Woreda. I interviewed him on 30 December 2009 in Awash Town.

of roots, changes and continuities of the past while discussing post-1991 Afar-Karrayu conflict as contemporary.

4.2. Structural Causes of the Conflict and Trend AnalysisIt is undisputed that conflict is a complex and dynamic social process. As such, there are no single-cause explanations. In precise words, the causes of a conflict are multifold. These multiple causes can be classified as inherent and proximate based on the degree of their contribution to the prevalence, recurrence as well as intensity of conflict as a phenomenon. Inherent causes are those which create the material conditions for conflict in a dynamic process. Proximate causes, on the other hand, are the psychological conditions resulting in behavioral changes for conflict.

4.2.1 Economic Factor 4.2.1.1. Inappropriate development Policies

There are two contradictory positions on pastoralism in Africa and the strategies these pastoralists have on natural resource management. On the one hand, pastoralists have been criticized for degradation of land because it is assumed that they are fond of augmenting their livestock and over-exploiting or overgrazing pastures. On the other hand, pastoralists have endured for centuries because they have been subjected to different adaptation strategies and hence have developed a good management of their own land (Helland, 1997). Most scholars, however, share that governments consider pastoralists to be poor without having a better understanding of pastoral way of life. Consequently, the pastoralist and semi-pastoralist Afar and Karrayu have been repeatedly deprived of their right to hold and use their grazing lands and access to water points


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due to the inconsiderate state economic development policies and intervention strategies. The trend in such an endeavor started during the Imperial regime and continued till now and is briefly analyzed here. To have a direct presence in the area, the Imperial government established the Awash Valley Authority (AVA), which had taken charge of the irrigational development projects, game reserves and National Parks (Ayalew, 2001). This brought to the pastoralists a socially generated scarcity that in turn exacerbated competition and conflicts among the two pastoral groups in the area. Since, the Military junta controlled state power in1974, it continued large-scale irrigation schemes especially in the Middle and Lower Awash valleys. Similarly, the overthrow of the Derg in 1991 only ended up dissolving some of the state agencies. The above trend analysis reveals that such a great loss explains the almost every day conflicts that exist among the Afar and Karrayu pastoralists - intermittent violent conflicts with state versus pastoralist. It can also elucidate that those interventions were made and imposed by the government on pastoralists without their involvement or with no regard to their way of life that enhanced group conflicts among pastoralists. Conflict between the Afar and Karrayu ethnic groups is not only due to these inconsiderate policies but also because of lack of equal benefit from these state oriented development projects. According to one of the Karrayu elders , whenever there is unequal benefit, for instance, from the neighboring Kesem Kebena development project conflict arises. The Karrayu in this regard complained as being disadvantaged especially after the Karrayu daily laborers were dismissed from the project by the federal government in 2004 due to individual clashes with Afar. This became an issue of debate that did not still get any solution. One of the officials in Fentale Woreda asserts his view in relation to the inconsiderate expansion of commercial farms, game reserves, national parks and development projects like Kesem Kebena and its impact on pastoralist life as:

Given the growing size of human population with declining climatic assets and resource base, the expansion of commercial farms has destabilizing effect along the course of the Awash Valley. The local community’s interest and livelihood have not been considered. The search for free land and water points turned the two ethnic groups into conflict as pastoralist and agro-pastoralist groups search access and control over meager resources. Besides, Lake Basaqa (salty water) is rapidly expanding and covering environmental resources that were useful before and the pastoralist production systems.

Here lies the tragedy of the pastoralists. The establishment of large scale mechanized farms and the eviction of pastoralists was not followed by compensation for their future livelihood. As a result, they lost their traditional


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rights to land, and faced the socially generated scarcity which made them vulnerable to the ever augmenting inter-ethnic conflicts in the search for grazing lands and water stations. Interventions like development projects and pastoral extension system projects have been insignificant compared to the loss to large scale mechanized agricultural and conservation projects.

4.2.1.2. natural Resource Scarcity

Often, conflicts are associated with the decline of the “resource pie”. This is due to interwoven factors like population pressure and rangeland degradation. Hence, deficiency of grazing resources brought the two pastoral societies to the scene of the conflict. As mentioned above, rapid population growth is one among the many reasons for scarcity. Information obtained from

the Focus Group Discussions at Doho and Lega Banti Kebeles reveals that increase in the number of population is mainly attributed to the religious and cultural custom of polygamy and the absence and/or resistance of family planning practices. The pastoralists of both communities believe that children are brought to this world by the “will of Allah” and will be taken care of by Him. Marriage is a source and manifestation of communal bondage for the community, hence parents consider having more children as a potential for making more relatives within the community. The 2007 population census shows that the total population of Afar reached 1,411,092 while Oromia region constituted 27,158,471 people. Out of this, the study woredas i.e. Awash Fentale and Fentale, hold 37,835 and 82,225 respectively (CSA, 2007). This shows the steady increase of human population from time to time. As a result, competition has been aggravated. Competition for pasture made both communities adopting a strategy of armed group herding for effective herd management. In sum, the augmenting of pastoral population has increased both resource scarcity and inter-group conflict. Secondly, the migration (displacement) of people from their original land to other areas also has a disastrous effect on inter-ethnic conflict. _______________________________________6 This information was generated from Ali Mohammed who is both a renowned elder and one of the members of a government-organized peace committee at Doho Kebele of Awash Fentale Woreda. I interviewed him on 30 December 2009 in Awash Town. 7 The data were obtained from the interview with Haji Mussa Guro. He is a clan leader in Haro Karsa Kebele of Fentale Woreda. The discussion was conducted on 10 December 2009 at Haro Karsa.8 Haji Tedecho Gutto is currently an administrator of Fentale Woreda. He was interviewed on 22 December 2009 at Matahara.


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Ayalew’s work best explains this undisputed truth of how further expansions of state commercial farms into the land of the Afar and Karrayu caused the displacement of Weima Afar and Ittu Oromo and scarcity of resources and aggravated the conflict (Ayalew, 2001) Thus, population congestion had a dual impact in that, one, it brought scarcity of resources, and two,it caused competition for the use and control of that meager resource. The final result is obviously inter-group conflict. Last but not least, unlike scattered grazing, concentrated grazing resulted in rapid rangeland degradation leading to competition and confrontations. In short, rangeland degradation pushes the pastoralists to look for another grazing land resulting in inter-group conflict. However, the desire to acquire more cattle at the expenses of either community is a psychological precondition of competition to raiding as a form of conflict. The above conflicts clearly manifest the changing condition of supply and demand. The supply of pastoral land is declining because of degradation of rangelands, increasing aridity and desertification at the fringes, drawing out of pastoral lands for irrigated farming and national parks into the traditional grazing areas. Therefore, the degree of relations between resource scarcity and inter-ethnic conflict basically relies on the relative importance of the resource explained by taking its socio-economic dimension as a backdrop. However, scarcity - who gets what to eat and who does not - can be a necessary condition but cannot be a sufficient condition for the appearance of inter ethnic conflicts at least in the case area. Thus, we need to address other factors to which we now turn to.

4.2.2. Political Factor 4.2.2.1. Marginalization and Lack of Good Governance

As elsewhere in the world, Afar and Karrayu pastoralists have been marginalized from the political “games” of the state. According to Gamaldin (1993) and Melakou(2001), the pastoralists in the Awash Valley were incorporated into the Ethiopian state only about a century or so ago. The relationship between political marginalization and inter-ethnic conflict is explained in terms of this arrangement. Ethic/group boundaries were/are artificially drawn and redrawn by policy makers of the centre. This has been intensified especially after the adoption of ethnic federalism in1991. Territorial conflicts existing between the Karrayu border and Awash Fentale of Afar can be a lucid example for this marginalization in the present situation. Conflict also arises due to lack of good governance. Religious leaders of Afar and Karrayu , revealed that local leaders and administrators of Afar and Oromia have had destructive roles in the relations among the two pastoralists. They argued that some kebele leaders, have their own organized paramilitary group that undertakes raids and some have attachments with opposition political parties like the Oromo Liberation Front


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(OLF). Similarly, government officials were seen as obstacles to peaceful negotiations between the Afar and Karrayu ethnic groups (Joint report, 2007). Thus, political affiliations of some individuals have been exaggerating problems of their own ethnic group in the discussion of peace process. Afar and Karrayu informants revealed that political authorities have failed to give appropriate and immediate solutions to the pastoralist problem in relation to conflict . This supports Azar’s (1996) argument that in a situation where the political capacity of the state fails to impartially address human need like quality of resource base, institutions, structure of power, participation and decision making, social conflict is most prevalent.

11Information on such issues was obtained from Sheik Muktar Fentale who is the Gada leader in the Karrayu community. The other informant on this issue was Hulay Hussen, a renowned elder at Doho Kebele. of Awash Fentale Woreda. I had a discussion with them on 1 February 2010 at Doho Kebele.

Therefore, irresponsiveness to the public problem, allegiance of local politicians to their clans and the prevalence of pseudo-commitment on the part of the government-organized members of peace committees on both Afar and Karrayu sides are clear manifestations for the lack of good governance. Such a situation widens the gap between the population and the government. According to informants, the well-known and widely used cultural and spiritual institutions in peace building have been weakened and ceased to play their role as an alternative mechanism in the event of dispute with neighboring communities . Thus, failure of the government to give recognition to the age-old practices of indigenous institutions which the Afar and Karrayu have been using to resolve conflicts can be a lucid instance to the lack of good governance.

4.2.3. Security Related Factor 4.2.3.1. Contested borders

The border line between the Afar and Karrayu is not yet clearly delineated. Such blurred demarcation is verdant for conflict to crop up between these historical enemies. This has also complicated resource use and accountability of people in regional governments and acts as a breeding ground for conflict. _____________________________________________9 FGD was conducted at Laga Banti Primary School on 10 February 2010. The FGD encompassed the kebele, religious and clan leaders. The second FGD with Afar elders and community leaders was conducted at a place called Doho on 26 February 2010.10 Sheik Mussa Waqo was a religious leader of the Ittu Oromo living in Kobo Kebele. I interviewed him on 14 February 2010 at Kobo Kebele.And Abdo Ali is one of the renowned and respected community elders in the Awash Fentale Woreda of Dudub Kebele. I had a discussion with him on 24 December 2009 at Dudub Kebele.


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Pastoral way of life is characterized by mobility; moving from one place to another in times of scarcity. They stayed in one place for sometime even if the area is not part of their respective territory. The Afar and Karrayu land is demarcated by relic boundary like, the Fentale Mountain and the Awash national park. Thus, people under the banner of the “principle of effective control” over a certain territory, try to control the area that they temporarily settled in as if it were permanently their own. By residing in some places for some months, they instigate conflict that ultimately causes boundary disputes. There are, in fact, studies conducted jointly by the Afar and Oromia Regional States depicting the historical grievance and animosity between the two pastoral communities in relation to boundary claims. The following oral history by a Karrayu Oromo is worth mentioning:

In the early days, we (the Karrayu Oromo) were living in Awash Fentale Woreda, Sabure Kebele, currently inhabited by the Afar only. Through time, the Afar began pushing and waging war against us to settle in what is known as Haro Kersa - an area entirely inhabited by the Karrayu. During that time, in an attempt to defend the Afar pressure, repeated fighting took place. The remnant of the Karrayu Oromo in Sabure Kebele is self evident that once the area was inhabited by the Karrayu Oromo (Afar-Oromo Regional state joint report, 2007:11).

From the above excerpt, it is possible to deduce that the Karrayu Oromo still claim that the area around Sabure Kebele of Afar belongs to them. The conflict that arises as a result of contested border is directly related to the absence of clear demarcation which ultimately brought constant insecurity problem in the region.

4.2.3.2. Proliferation of Small Arms and light Weapons in Pastoral Context

Besides the security factor, contested border is related to increased proliferation of small arms. One of the Karrayu elders reveals that adults and pastoral youths have keen interest jn owning small arms due to the following reasons:

Since individuals, families or communities live in these cyclical scenarios of conflict, the possession of fire arms by large number of people is perceived as necessary for individual and communal security. Due to cultural reasons, we attach great importance to the ownership of semi-automatic rifles.

_______________________________________12 This data were obtained from Sheik Muktar Fentale –a Gada leader in the Karrayu community. Interviewed on 28, December 2009 at a place called Gelcha


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Owning such a rifle is considered as a guarantee to gain power over ethnic counterparts. Besides, both of us believed in that the ownership of a weapon is viewed as an indication of wealth and signifies manhood and a means of self protection.

Therefore, the possession of arms has somehow a great place from the point of view of pastoralist culture and tradition. The increased availability of automatic rifles has exacerbated inter-ethnic conflicts in the areas. As Homer-Dixon argued, local conflicts sometimes have global sources (Homer Dixon, 1995). Hence, the global production and distribution of small arms devours local inter-group relation. The ever-increasing appetite for arms among the pastoralists of Afar and Karrayu has created a favorable condition for individuals to form groups and commit murders and undertake livestock raids of other groups. Retaliatory acts have frequently led them to bloody clashes. Individual crimes then became causes for organized group violence. As the joint report of the two regional states (2007) reveals, the 2002 episode of Afar-Karrayu clash can be seen from such perspective.

4.2.4. Socio-cultural Factors 4.2.4.1. Culture and Tradition of Violence The existence of a culture of war and violence had been a cause and sustaining factor for inter-ethnic conflicts in the area under study. As earlier experiences depict, conflicts among the various ethnic groups were instigated by cultural factor. Such culture-induced conflicts had been fought particularly between the Karrayu and Argoba, Afar and Karrayu, and Issa and Afar. These groups fought one another for the sake of hunting individual or collective fame and displaying their bravery (Buli, 2001). Even though, Buli traced the importance of this culture-induced conflict back to the 1960s. My interview result from the Afar and Karrayu pastoralists confirms that the culture of violence sill persists with its impact on the conflict between the two groups. The reason behind is that pastoralists of the area still practice the same tradition with little change in behavior. As a matter of fact, they inculcate this culture of violence in the minds of the young generations. One of the Afar informants reported how cultural practices of the two ethnic groups have the potential to induce conflicts:

Culture related war was the direct offspring of the much valued, revered and praised practice. Its influence is quite distinct from conflicts over other issues at least on one basic ground.The distinction could be found from the fact that such war was fought based on the mutual consensus of the conflicting parties.

_________________________________________________The data were gathered from Haji Roba Saqale who is a well known Karrayu elder in Dhebiti Kebele of Fentale Woreda. He is one of the members of government-organized peace committee. I interviewed him on 21 December 2009 at Matahara town.


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The above statements rightly assert that the belligerent ethnic groups were expected to adapt themselves to the “rule of the game”. It was what I called “rule of the game” that inhibited the warring groups from making any surprise attacks on their “enemy”. In addition, the ‘rule’ also directed the groups not to hurt or offend the messenger sent from either side. As a war it is an agreed-upon war . The following examples are self evident in Karrayu and Afar cultural practices in connection with conflict. In the Karrayu tradition, for instance, one of the Gada leaders explained the role of violent culture in sustaining conflicts as:

In transition from boyhood to youth a socially endorsed ritual initiation, one requirement has been killing another out-group man and castrating the genital of the slain as evidence of qualifying for manhood.

The belief is that for a “man” in order to be a ‘man’ and get married, he should get men genitals as evidence of being victorious over the “enemy”. This is evident in the Karrayu culture. The Focus Group Discussion with Afar elders at Doho Kebele reveals that cultural traits of conflict manifested among the Afar herder communities include:

An Afar should kill a member of the ethnic groups with which they are in conflict to be called a man, and demonstrate this by presenting a proof after cutting male genital parts of his victim or his blood stained clothes. Ten days after the incident, his family with other members of the community will celebrate his transformation with other members of the community at a ceremony called “eidecha” where he receives congratulations. After he is celebrated as a “killer”, he will have the following privileges as an indication of his social status: At traditional holidays, he will be the lead song-maker and receives rewards; his traditional knife called “dubit” will not be used to slaughter animals. It is rather one belonging to those who have not killed yet that is used for such a purpose. At wedding ceremonies, there is a specially decorated place where only “killers” are allowed to dance; once an Afar killed 4 men, he will further be promoted and has the privileges of wearing decorations on his wrist, neck and ears.

____________________________________14 The data were generated from Hulay Hussen, a renowned elder at Doho Kebele of Awash Fentale Woreda. He is a Debine Afar whom I had a discussion with on 1 February 2010 in his own home at Doho.15 Sheik Muktar Fentale is the Gada leader in the Karrayu community aged 47. He is a knowledgeable person on the Gada tradition. I had a discussion with him on 28 December 2009 at a place called Gelcha/Harore Hedhe16 Sheik Muktar Fentale. The interview was conducted on 28 December 2009 at a place called Gelcha/Harore Hedhe


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On the contrary, those who have not gained the status of “killer” yet will have a hard time making a bridal match; they are verbally harassed and generally considered as cowards. Therefore, it is not illogical to argue that the culture of vendetta always leads to conflict escalation. The presence of such wars over cultural values could be supported by linguistic evidence. Here I argue that the compound word Burra-Karrayu usually used in the Amharic lexicon in times of quarrel between individuals is derived from the Afar-Karrayu ethnic conflict. The etymological meaning can be found by splitting the compound words into its components as, Burra - the war song of the Afar used at war times to scare an enemy, and Karrayu - the name of an Oromo ethnic group frequently in war with the Afar. Therefore, the Afar say Burra-Karrayu so as to threaten the other group in times of violent conflict. This is not to deny the historical animosity existing between these two groups that led to hatred towards each other.

4.2.4.2. The decline of Cultural and Traditional Systems

In Afar and Karrayu community elders were responsible for maintaining peace and order and resolving disputes. They have far-reaching political, social and economic functions. In recent years, however, customary traditional governance institutions have been weakened partly due to the failure of the governments to recognize the role of the traditional institutions in management at the community level . This is self evident in the work of Chesos (2002) that traditionally, African societies were dominated by elders who were responsible for the governance of the community. Therefore, the status and functions of the elders as resource managers have been simultaneously eroded and undermined. Thus, resource scarcity being a necessary condition, the absence of well performing institution is a sufficient condition for violent conflict to erupt.

4.2.4.3. Similarities of Pastoralists lifestyles

Some conflict analysts state that similarity rather than difference of lifestyle provides a wider chance for the augment of conflicts. Dwayt (2004) argued that society having similar life-style like sharing alike material resources and spiritual needs are more vulnerable to conflict than societies experiencing different way of lifestyle. In this regard, one of the local politicians in Afar working as expert in conflict prevention and management argued having similar way of life as causes of conflict than differences in the following manner:____________________________________17 FGD with Afar elders and community leaders was conducted at Doho, on 26 February 201018 The data were obtained from Sheik Muktar Fentale (Gada leader in the Karrayu community). Interviewed on 28 December 2009 at a place called Gelcha.


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There are certain common characteristics concerning the lifestyles between the Karrayu and Afar pastoral communities. First, the two pastoralists in the area derive a substantial share of their livelihoods from livestock and share communal rangeland resources. The rangelands are, in turn, influenced by erratic rainfall that considerably varies between and within years. The rainfall patterns also have direct implications both for livestock mobility and land livestock ratio i.e. carrying capacity or grazing pressures of the rangelands. Second, in the arid pastoral areas of the two regions, the production potential of livestock and the rangeland resources are low due to rainfall patterns. Third, the threat of looting and raiding which is an age-old practice in the Karrayu and Afar communities forced them to engage in conflict. All these similarities in their way of life and their common interest to fulfill them led to continuous conflict.

The above statements clearly depict that livestock significantly contributes to the pastoral production, herd size affects pastoral human welfare, and hence, livestock wealth accumulation is a desirable goal. Other than similarities in life style as causes for the inter-group pastoral conflicts, the interaction of the pastoralist community with government structure is contradictory and occasionally causes conflicts. Whenever the government orders the pastoralist communities to share pasture, water and other natural resources with other communities through its structure, they negatively react to this imposition. Therefore, since government imposition is perceived by the pastoralists as a threat to their value systems, any state or society measures against group values carry implications of the group’s strong resort to maintain it.

4.3. Proximate Causes (Triggers) 4.3.1 Cattle Raiding and Homicidal Acts

In the pastoral society of Afar and Karrayu, cattle rustling is generally considered as an acceptable means to acquire assets whether in times of retaliatory conflicts or under normal circumstances. One of the Afar elders stated the relevance and the reasons behind cattle rustling in this way:

The need for cattle is very important for young men who have no assets, especially when their inheritance is small because it is divided among many siblings. Moreover, cattle rustling has taken on a commercial character providing income to the youth.

________________________________________19 This information was generated from a discussion with Mohammed Awel who is working as an expert in the area of conflict prevention and management office in Semera. I had a discussion with him on 5 February 2010 in his office at Semera, Afar. 20 Mohammed Awel , interviewed on 5 February 2010 in his office at Semera, Afar 21 Gerekale Hilim is an Afar elder at Doho. I had a discussion with him on 27 December 2009 at Doho Kebele.


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The evolving rationale behind cattle raids is multiple. One is the ritual importance of acquiring enemy livestock as a proof of masculine warriorhood. Hence, cattle raiders are driven by symbolic and pecuniary motives. Raids occur in retaliation to prior attacks in order to (re)acquire stolen stock and to replenish decimated herds. Pastoralists’ deep love for livestock is exemplified by the following observation by Irungu and Omiti

Pastoralists believe that all livestock on earth including those owned by other people are theirs by right and that there is nothing wrong in going after them and taking them by force. Accordingly, a pastoralist must be prepared to die in pursuit of this belief which, Soper, (1986) cited in Irungu, (2002:18) termed it as cattle-culture complex.

This practice of taking away the basic source of survival of the pastoralist does nothing but makes the conflicts continue rather than stop. In a similar vein, one of the Karrayu elders reveals the rationale behind cattle raids as:

Demand for more cattle and the subsequent raiding are created when mostly young members of either community are planning to get married but are short of property to show up. In addition, raiding is said to constitute a vehicle for climbing out of herd-poverty and for gaining a culturally endorsed social status.

Therefore, due to both cultural and commercial significance, pastoralists have been absorbed in the act of cattle rustling. As a result, they sell their assets including domestic animals for the purchasing of fire arms. This raiding certainly brings about the expansion of “black market” of rustled cattle in the neighboring regions. This “black market” encourages the continuation of cattle rustling and illegal circulation of arms. Such practice is believed to be one of the biggest factors contributing to livestock raiding which eventually results in the extension of conflict and pervasiveness of lawlessness that destabilizes the peace and security of the region.

4.3.2. looting and Robbery

In the context of Afar and Karrayu pastoralists, looting is carried out at individual level while robbery is practiced on an organized group basis. These acts have become common among some members of the pastoral communities of Afar and Karrayu. As the same Karrayu informants reveal: _____________________________________ 22 Abullo Ushuru is an experienced Karrayu elder. I had a discussion with him on 15 December 2009 at Tututi Kebele. 23 Abullo Ushuru, interviewed on 15 December 2009 at Tututi Kebele.24 Mohammed Awel interviewed on 5 February 2010 in his office at Semera, Afar


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Group of people go organized in most cases during rainy seasons to rob/loot, and they depart sparing nothing behind, like livestock, equines, camels anything of value including women, they take them home. Those who are victims of robbery and looting go after them into war to restore what has been taken away from them. This leads to new retaliatory attack and hence exacerbates conflict. For instance, in the Karrayu tradition, when a young man asks a lady for marriage, parents of the lady may ask an established societal pre-condition which in oromic goes as “Waa hatataa, waa hirphataa?” which literally means on occasions of food shortage at home, is the would be husband capable of looting and bringing things for his wife?

I argue that such societal expectations and the resultant positive reaction by the pastoral youth to this established social expectation has the potential to instigate the youths for looting either to get married or accumulate wealth. Conflicts become cyclical in the region as every youth is engaged in raiding/rustling for such a purpose.

4.3.3. drought and Famine

Drought and famine are almost regular realities in pastoralist way of life. Constant search for grazing land and water will reach its peak during drought and famine. This would exacerbate the unfriendly relations that pastoralists have among each other. Findings also confirm that Issa incursion into Afar territory and Afar herders’ movement into other groups’ territory increases in times of drought, resulting in more frequent violent confrontations in most cases with the Issa” (Tadesse and Yonas 2007:14). In this regard, the need to accumulate herds after periods of animal losses due to droughts is usually presented as a strong motivation of inter-ethnic raids and violent pastoral conflicts. This convincing and logically consistent way of reasoning would mean that periods after droughts would show an increase in inter-ethnic raids because, many livestock deaths during droughts would lead to a greater motivation to restock through raiding others. The increased frequency and intensity of droughts in the past decades and associated heavy losses of livestock is believed to have increased the number of inter-ethnic conflicts and incidents of human killing in the recent compared to the distant past . However, there are clear indications that violent incidents occur much more often in rainy seasons and during relatively good years, than in dry seasons and during droughts years. Thus, I argue that drought and conflict have negative correlation.


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4.3.4. Spoilers

The major spoilers in the inter-ethnic conflicts of Afar and Karrayu are the Hawiya clan of Somali ethnic group who were living together with the Ittu and Karrayu Oromo for many years.One of the Karrayu elders asserted the destabilizing role of the Hawiya clan in the Afar-Karrayu relations in the following way:

Formerly this Hawiya clan of the Somali had been extremely hostile neighbors to Afar, and waged frequent armed conflict with them. But nowadays, they have shifted alliances and started to live with the Afar clans. It is a recent phenomenon that the Hawiya at times deliberately spread fabricated lies that bring about conflict between the Karrayu Oromo and Afar more frequently and more ferociously than before.

From the above statement one can understand that the involvement of external actors’ i.e., outside the two ethnic groups under study has a negative role in the relationship of the two groups and exacerbates conflicts. Besides the Hawiya that live in the Karrayu and Afar communities there are traditional fortunetellers who instigate members of their respective ethnic group to raid cattle and loot other “enemy” belongings. If the fortune telling is successful, the rustlers or raiders share 25% of the looted property or cattle on the basis of prior concession to the witchcrafts. In both Afar and Karrayu society, fortunetellers have acceptance because, they persuade the society as if they have magical power of bullet proofing. Thus, witchcrafts trigger conflicts by persuading the pastoral communities to go to war. For example, they encourage pastoral communities saying “Now is your time, go and take away your land by chasing away the settlers found there.” These fortunetellers are named as kalawale and gilen in Afar and Karrayu society respectively.

Figure 4.1 Summary of the Interplay of Causes and Causal Relations of Afar-Karrayu Conflicts


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4.4. Analysis of Actors

The identification of “primary actors” that are visible and “shadow actors” whose presence may not be obvious but certainly has some interest to peruse in the conflict as described by Best (2004) has never been an easy task to be accomplished. In the Afar-Karrayu case, primary actors are definitely ethnic groups while the rest are shadow actors even if their ‘shadow role’ depends on their impact on the conflict seen both retrospectively and prospectively.

4.4.1. national Actors 4.4.1.1. Central Government

The role of the central government has largely been that of a strong shadow actor in most of the conflicts except in few circumstances of armed struggle for perceived or actual threats against established political groupings that preferred direct combat. The land policies and development programs of the centre include appropriation and restriction of prime grazing lands for the establishment of large scale commercial farms, national parks, ____________________________________ 25 Sheik Mussa Waqo aged 48 is an elder and religious leader in the Ittu Oromo living in Kobo Kebele who recollects his memory on the negative role played by the Hawiya clan of Somali in destabilizing the relationship of Afar and Karrayu pastoralist. He is also a student of grade 6 in Lega Banti Primary School. I interviewed him on 14 February 2010 at his home in Kobo Kebele.


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game reserves which led to resource scarcity that endangered the security and survival of these pastoralists and ultimately led them to inter-ethnic conflicts.

4.4.1.2. Government Commando Force and Militia Involvement

In the conflicts episode that arose between bordering kebeles of Sabure with Haro Kersa, Dudub with Benti, and Doho with Kobo in 2004, additional actors were involved. Particularly in the conflict between Haro-Kersa and Benti kebeles, it is indicated that there was an involvement of a government commando force. This was politically organized group in the Awash Valley of Ethiopia known as Uguguma. It had actively participated as a reaction against the Afar-Karrayu conflict in which many Afar and Karrayu were killed. Afar and Karrayu informants argued that the reaction taken by this commando force against the local people was a deliberate action of the government. They considered this act as an overreaction of government and lack of recognition to the potential of indigenous institutions. According to the Fentale Woreda administrator, those police and security forces who side their relatives and involved in crimes explained with regret that they had lost their credibility by other pastoralist community members. Therefore, in view of their strong allegiance and obedience to their clans, those police and security forces have a special role in relation to conflict triggering and escalating as actors.

4.4.1.3. Political Parties

The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) was accused by the Regional governments of exacerbating the Karrayu-Afar ill-relations (Joint Report, 2007). One of the elders of Afar revealed that besides the OLF, Oromo National Congress (ONC) also had its role to play in the inter-ethnic conflicts in the area. ONC’s major objective for the Oromo was self-governance within the context of the Federal system of governance in Ethiopia. The same elder stated that ONC has been repeatedly encouraging Karrayu to claim territories from the Afar. To this end, the party raised the issue that Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO) has given Awash town to Afar pastoral communities “which had for long been under Oromia Regional State.” Because of this, a conflict was triggered and erupted between the two pastoral communities. The Fentale Woreda Administration officials claimed that the ONC party has gained political benefit by creating a gap between the government and the community under the pretext of the fact that ‘the government had neglected the people’. ______________________________________26 This interview was made with Harbui Kobene, who is one of the members of a government- organized peace committee in Doho Kebele of Awash Fentale Woreda on January 2, 2010 in Awash Town. . I interviewed Haji Roba Saqale, a Karrayu elder in Dhebiti Kebele of Fentale Woreda and a government-organized peace committee, on 21 December 2009 in Matahara.


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4.4.2. Regional Actors These encompass the woreda and kebele administrators who had a dual contradictory role of destabilizing and stabilizing the conflict scenario. Studies reveal that in the Afar Kebeles, there were members of the government officials who were involved in the conflict that took place in 2004 (Joint report, 2007). According to one of the Karrayu informants , the allegation from the side of the Afar pastoral community members is that the clan leaders and elders had both positive and negative contributions to the eruption of conflicts. Negatively they show loyalty and side with their keens. Positively they avoid ethnic disputes and act to enforce the rule of law. It would seem plausible to say that pastoral conflicts in the area recur unabatedly because of the inefficiencies embedded in the judicial system and their poor enforcements of the rule of law. The behavior of local politicians in election-related conflicts, in manipulating ethnicity for electoral gains, was also becoming emerging concerns.4.4.3. Local Actors (Ethnic Groups) The major ethnic groups and units largely in conflict with each other are the Afar and the Karrayu Oromo. Their day to day life relies on the use and protection of grazing lands and water resources and hence is committed to paying any sacrifice for the equitable use of the resources among each other. The degree of tension among these ethnic groups vis-a-vis one another depends on proximity to the resource in question and to some extent on the existing trans-generational animosity of groups.

4.4.3.1. Religious leaders and Religious Institutions

There are conditions in which religious institutions and religious leaders have been taking part in the peace of the two pastoral communities. Especially the Afar elders argued that due to the long history of religious beliefs among the Afar pastoral communities, the influence and capacities of religious leaders are significant. Similarly, Afar and Karrayu elders stated that the situation then was quite challenging in that even though religious leaders used to have an influence in the community, their repeated efforts to bring about lasting peace have failed and this clearly shows that they lost their power and influence in the community. From this assertion it is possible to argue that the role of religion and religious institutions in conflict resolution has declined from time to time.

4.4.3.2 Elders and Clan leaders

Elders and clan leaders in the Afar and Karrayu society have an influential role in both peace-making and conflict scenarios. Conflicts in this society


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had been resolved through mediation and direct involvement of elders and clan leaders. Elders from both sides noted that the police and courts play a minimal role in resolving conflicts that arise in the Afar and Karrayu society. On the other side of the spectrum, they are involved in conflict by giving support to grievances of their community or clans. Cognizant of the amount of power that prominent clan leaders and elders have in the community, their failure to exert influence on the herder to keep away from conflict and their reluctance to stop conflicts show that they either get some kind of benefit from the conflicts or that they themselves push the herder into conflicts with their counterparts. Thus, it is reasonable to argue that retaliatory attacks and animal raids held by the young Afar against the Karrayu or the vice versa might have been carried out either with the full knowledge or subtle approval of elders and clan leaders.

4.4.3.3. Pastoral Women

In both Afar and Karrayu Oromo pastoral communities, women play a significant role in both peacemaking and conflict. Their role in a conflict like this is not serving as combatants but as instigators of revenge. During confrontations, they disseminate war news to other men of their group usually through crying. When conflict erupts, they participate through fetching water to fighters and providing care to the injured. Revealing their role, one of the Karrayu informants noted that:

Women provide logistics like water, milk, and other necessary provision during war time. They provide psychological support like ululation and hailing for war-in Oromo parlance saying “Ajo Hura–Ajo Hura.”Ajo is an Oromo term which means a tree that falls almost into very fine dust, thus Ajo Hura means reduce the enemy into ash and their bullets into water drops.

Nevertheless, they are the most vulnerable and worst victims of conflicts. In Afar pastoral communities since the killing of a women is taken as genocide, a women does not suffer punishments that goes beyond flogging. As far as their role in peace making is concerned, the same Karrayu informants stated that:

When the exchange of a woman as a mechanism of inter-group conflict resolution becomes successful; they have a positive effect in conflict resolution and peace. Karrayu Oromo for instance, have also a tradition of providing their women to their “enemy” group for the sake of peace and tolerance. And usually “enemy” groups ask for Oromo women. Peace will prevail at least for a moment if the Oromo leaders decide to send their women to the group who requested for one.


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However, when similar efforts fail, conflicts could soon break out. This was what happened among the Ittu Oromo and the Weima Afar in the 2006 conflict where the Weima Afar asked for 30 women to be given to them and the Ittu refused, and clashes broke out immediately between the groups. This age-old culture of bringing female members of the community onto negotiation table by the Oromo and Afar pastoral communities shows the significant role women have in conflict resolution and peacemaking.

4.4.3.4. Pastoral Youth

In the Afar-Karrayu conflict, every capable youth and adult men most frequently dominate war front and hence they are frontline actors in the conflict. The pushing factor behind the youth to the conflict cycle is partly due to their keen interest of accumulating asset and fulfilling the age-old pastoral social value of raiding or rustling to get recognition of “status of bravery”. In line with this, Ayalew identified two kinds of pastoral youth institutions that are aimed at rustling and raiding cattle. He writes:

Gaddu is an institution in which five to eight armed youths launch a cattle rustling attack after the best possible choice of time. Orisa is an organized raid with the objective of plundering masses of livestock belonging to an enemy group. (Ayalew, 2009:28-30). ]

Cognizant of this fact, however, pastoral youth have been nearly excluded from peace effort. Focus could be given for the youth who are both major agents of violence and spoilers. Hence, breaking the exclusion of the youth and allowing them to take part at negotiation table, organizing youth association for peace and separate youth platform, empowering them with their own agency for peace would be important to reduce the level and frequency of violence.

4.5. Conflict Dynamics: Escalation or De-escalation

The term “dynamics” refers to forces or properties that stimulate growth, development and change within a system or process. In conflict research, conflict dynamics lies between “conflict formation and conflict transformation” (Galtung, 1996:76). Based on the analysis of actors and structures, trends of conflict escalation or de-escalation on the subject under investigation can now be analyzed._____________________________________27 Ali Mohammed is one of the members of a government-organized peace committee at Doho Kebele of Awash Fentale Woreda. I interviewed him on 30 December, 2009 in Awash Town. And Hulay Hussen is an elder at Doho Kebele of Awash Fentale Woreda. I had a discussion with him on 1 February 2010 at Doho.28 Sheik Muktar Fentale –Gada, leader in the Karrayu community, was interviewed on 28 December 2009 at Gelcha.


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4.5.1. New Trends, Structures and Opportunities: 1991 to the present

New trends in the conflict are manifested forms of conflict observed in recent incidents. It also included increased sentiments of hostilities and offensive and defensive preparedness. Analysis of such trends is crucial because they show the obvious results of increase in intensity in future conflicts and new negative patterns of relations in the future. Information sources regarding the overall conflict situation from 1991 to the present show that subsequent to the emergence of new government structures and administration, new issues which were not usually observed before came into being. Violent conflict in the study area materializes in different forms, such as shifting alliances and successive changes within the regional government, recurrent ethnic-based fighting and the consequent redefinition of sources of claim among local actors i.e. Afar and Karrayu. The conflict in the study area is attributed to a sense of alienation and marginalization; the presence of weak political parties, including their political exploitation of ethnic differences and weak conflict management institutions and mechanisms. The emergence of new political views that had never been to the scene during the Imperial and Derg period began to explode with conflict having a new dimension and content. Regional state borders became areas where theft and robbery are committed repeatedly.

Following the new government’s federal system, the delimitation of Oromia and Afar Regional States and the inclusion of pastoralist communities in the territories of these regional states have become inconsistent with the mobile life style of pastoralist’s communities. The nature and causes of conflicts had changed and increased in frequency and intensity. The FGD conducted at Doho Kebele with the Afar elders depicts the changing nature of the conflict as:

Conflict has been a reality since the Imperial period, but currently the frequency and level of violent clashes have grown to an unprecedented scale. In a place called Lege Banti (Karrayu land), Afar camels used to trek with no problem but now it is no longer possible. This is because, on both sides of us, the death of one Afar/Karrayu is avenged on any one member of one or the other group. Unlike earlier days, there is no inte-rmarriage or market exchange.

_________________________________________29 Haji Tedecho Gutto is a Fentale Woreda administrator. He was interviewed on 22 December 2009 in Matahara.30 Haji Qeseru Jillo is a Karrayu elder. I had interviewed him on 15 December 2009 at Metehara. And Abdo Ali a community elders in Awash Fentale Woreda of Dudub Kebele. I made a discussion with him on 24 December 2009 at Doho Kebele.


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The above statement implicitly tells that the informants are implying the polarization of inter group antagonism that justifies the ethnic-based violent behavior of actors that plunged them in a cycle of violence. Hence, an indicator of ethnification of conflict is taken as a mere acceptance of group behavior and mode of organization for action. Currently, the common causes of pastoral community conflict such as pasture, water, looting, cattle raiding and rustling have gone beyond being immediate triggers of conflict and become the instrument for the fulfillment of clear objective of the need for the demarcation of administrative boundaries in a new way. Areas in and around development projects are characterized by constant conflict. One of the Karrayu informants, explaining the new trends of the conflict, said the following:

In the earlier days conflict between the two neighboring woredas used to end with no spillover effect. Unlike those days, currently, if a conflict comes about between, for instance, Haro Karsa and Sabure, other Afar from distant places like Awash Arba and Gewane arrive immediately in the conflict area in support of their ethnic groups and vice versa. This is true because of the relatively adequate infrastructure and mobile communication. Even individual pastoral quarrels are immediately turned into group conflict and such conflict has identity referenced and ethnic undertone. Such explanation can be best exemplified by the expulsion of 36 Karrayu daily laborers from Kesem Kabana project in 2004. The cause of the problem was individual quarrel and this implied that development projects have become bone o f contentions.

The lack of timely intervention by the government on the conflict aroused over this development project made the Karrayu communities feel relatively deprived, neglected and forgotten. This makes the communities try to ensure justice by themselves rather than wait for the government. The same informant arguing, the government rather than giving a lasting solution to the conflict, it worsened the situation by favoring the Afar pastoral communities giving them land of the Karrayu i.e, Awash sebat town. The informant further argues that the representation of the Afar community in the government structure is much higher than that of the Karrayu pastoral community . However, this view has to be challenged because, the Afar people holding a fifth of the national area deserves more seats in the parliament than their Karrayu counterparts._______________________________________31 Haji Tedecho Gutto, a Fentale Woreda administrator. I interviewed him on 22 December, 2009 at Metehara.32 Ibid. I interviewed him on 22 December 2009 in Metehara.FGD with Afar elders was held at Doho on 26 February 2010 in the environ of Doho health centre.33 Sheik Mussa Waqo is religious leader of the Ittu Oromo at Kobo Kebele. I had an interview with him at Lega Banti Primary School on 14 February.


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Some of the conditions observed during the transition period in post-1991 included; looting and subsequent retaliation reached a level where social networks and economic interactions including business activity were interrupted. Hence, pastoralists from Afar and Fentale woredas who used to freely engage in trade exchange stopped coming to the markets of their counterparts.

According to the Afar and Karrayu elders , there were also unfamiliar events never seen before 1991. They said that members of the police and security forces in the two woredas took part fighting on the side of their respective groups, putting ethnic allegiance and loyalty before the rule of law. This exacerbated the conflict. The two informants further stated that killings and retaliations were committed while elders were engaged in the process of negotiations so as to return looted properties to their owners and arrange compensation for the damage done. Criminals who foresaw that resumption of law and order result in legal punishment on them tried to ignite even worse conflicts that would go beyond the control of the clans and ethnic groups.

4.5.2. Intensity of the Conflicts

The transformation of conflicts in the Awash Fentale and Fentale woredas was to a serious level. Conflicts in the area changed their previous nature. For instance, in the earlier days conflict used to occur less frequently and had never been beyond the capacity of indigenous mechanisms. Now-a-days, conflict has becomes a day-to-day affair and its management has gone beyond the level of the traditional institutions. Unlike earlier days, conflicting parties have developed a sense of hatred towards each other, a feeling of relative deprivation and the conflict involves a variety of actors. Points unveiling the intensity of the conflicts included; the number of actors involved with different personal interests and, mission has increased and their provocation has complicated the situation. At he back of every conflict is a question of ownership/tenure rights of land and this has made the conflict very serious. The already shrunk pastureland due to the extensive land expropriation for state farms is now further exacerbated by the insistent expansion of Lake Beseka. _____________________________________34 Sheik Mussa Waqo, I interviewed him on 14 February 2010 at his personal home in kobo Kebele.35 This interview was made with Harbui Kobene, one of the members of government-organized peace committee. I interviewed him on 2 January 2010 in Awash Town.36 Hawas Fentale is the spiritual leader in Deresede kebele. He was interviewed on December 16 2010 in Matehara town.


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The ever-increasing of commercial trade and proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the area has created a complimentary condition for every pastoralist to own a gun which makes them opt for settling disputes in the barrel of gun than peaceful means. The low level of collaboration of government officials to handover suspected criminals and the boost in the number of retaliatory actions have made the conflict more intense.

Besides, practices of intermarriage, common marketing and the bond friendships that used to strengthen social interaction and prevent conflict have now become very. The low level of commitment on the part of kebele officials and elders to implement and obey decisions made at each peace conferences eroded the hope/confidence of the members of the community to the extent that the former lost credibility. This made conflict resolution efforts futile. The discouraging result of peace making and conflict prevention efforts in the period under discussion left the conflict more pervasive. Even though, the conflicts in the area seems to be caused by common pastoralist related issues like competition for pasture and water, there is a tendency of the cause transforming itself into a boundary dispute.

4.6. Responses to the Afar-Karrayu conflict 4.6.1. Regional level

At the regional level, the attempt made to address the issue of inter-ethnic conflicts in the Awash Valley was inadequate. Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) for instance, only addressed the conflict between Afar and Issa. However, this regional organization put forth no effort on the Afar-Karrayu case, which now-a-days deserves due consideration owing to its degree of intensity and recurrence.

4.6.2. national level

The responses to the problems in the Awash Valley should have been attempts to address the underlying factors of those conflicts mainly the expansion of large scale irrigated farms. The measures adopted by the central government as “compensations” have two different but integrated approaches. The first was a settlement schemes designed to the settle displaced pastoral households. This has been there since the beginning of the socially generated resource scarcity in the 1960s. _______________________________________37 Mohammed Awel has been a civil servant since the Derg periods. He notes that in post 1991 period the government with its new structures established joint peace committees from the regional to the kebele level. I interviewed him on 5 February 2010 at Semera.38 Haji Mussa Guro is a clan leader Fentale woreda. I had a discussion with him on 10 December 2009 in Haro karsa Kebele.


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Such measures, even if repeatedly put into practice by the different regimes of Ethiopia, largely proved to be futile because, they intended to settle pastoralists in the manner contradictory to the inherent nature of pastoralism. The second project has concentrated on the provision of irrigated pastures (Gamaldin, 1987; Ayalew, 2001).Such measures however, were failures in comparison to what those pastoralists have. Hence, these projects might aggravate the inter-ethnic conflicts even further.

The attempts to respond to the Afar-Karrayu conflict in the post-1991 periods have the following general features. First, attempts have been made by the government to establish joint Peace Committees in all tires of the federal structures Establishment of this structure by itself created the forums of communication for authorities of conflicting parties, opportunity of having discussions of conflict management options and publicizing the conflict to the general public. Often government media does not report incidences of conflict as they occur. Secondly, documenting conflict incidents and resolution meeting proceedings is a new beginning for the possibility of conflict analysis and assessment of possible options of conflict resolution. Thirdly, the government employed the strategy of public participation in conflict management and resolution. Although, this strategy had its own short comings, realization of the need for active community participation is a major step forward. However, the general direction being pursued by the current government suffers from several drawbacks. First, there seems to be lack of realization as to how to effectively deal with conflicts in respect to choosing between focusing on conflict management and resolution. This is openly manifested in the contents of action plans and activity reports of the peace committees. These reports indicate that the activity of authorities mainly focus on measures that may contain conflicts temporarily such as punishment of criminals, return of lost property. Secondly, it has been the general belief of the government that it had laid the foundations for regulating inter-ethnic relations by the constitutional provisions of the right of self determination (article 39) and public ownership of land (article 40). However, empirical evidences have demonstrated the insufficiency of these legal frameworks. In addition, the need for effective community participation and exploiting the potentials of indigenous conflict management practices has been underemphasized.

_________________________________________ 39 Haji Qeseru Jillo, Ex-Gada leader of the Karrayu Oromo and Sheik Muktar Fentale the present Gada leader. I interviewed them on 15 2009 in Metehara and on 29 December 2009 in Gelcha Kebele.


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4.6.3. Regional State level (Afar and Karrayu)

Starting from the year 1995 onwards, joint security and peace committees usually referred to as “peace committee” have been restructured and devolved up to kebele levels. The major activities undertaken as outlined in the 1996 action plan and the 1997 activity report of the Zonal Peace Committee were; try to send police units to conflict areas as soon as reports on conflict escalation are made; create public awareness on the impacts of violence; and involve elders in conflict management.

As a result, the years 1997 and 1998 were reported as being relatively effective years of conflict management. However, the periods of escalation of conflict beyond the management capacity of local authorities were reported to be from 1999 to 2003. This period, according to informants , has been a period of recurrent drought and conflict escalation. Conflicting parties started to realize that local authorities could not bring about sustainable resolution to the conflict due to lack of administrative capacity and legal mandates to make crucial decisions like border delimitation. In this period, meetings of peace committees were largely unsuccessful due to differences of opinion based on allegations as well as counter-allegations of community favoritism and reluctance to implement planned activities.

4.6.4. local (Community) level

The two pastoral communities under investigation have their own indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms. According to the Karrayu Gada leaders , part of the practices of conflict resolution commonly used by the Afar and Karrayu communities is Guma. They described the scenario in this way:

Guma is the payment of blood money in case of homicide based on the common penalty act of the community drawn by elders, religious and clan leaders. Guma is determined by the nature, state and manner of homicide as much as economic and other contingent elements are considered in formal courts. Negotiation and further dialogue are aspects of determining quantity and quality of Guma. Elders from the slaying and the slain side perform rituals putting/immersing their hands in the contents of slaughtered belly of cattle to symbolize termination of intention of revenge and retribution. Getting into marriage arrangement by offering a girl from one of the group in solemn matrimony is a ritual of relationship fading away these days. By applying the Guma tradition, the criminal is cleansed through kupha (Oromic term) which is purification of an individual who committed homicide in obscurity but the aadaa (culture) prescribes for such cases one fellow suite. Otherwise the aadaa sets that inclusion with fellow clansmen/women is unacceptable.


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Thus, the individual who committed homicide to get fellow clan’s acceptance has to make kupha baassaa. This is a practice in which a man with other person’s blood in his hand cannot be re-assimilated into normal life like sitting for a meal with others. Hence the aadaa prescribe to perform purification rituals of the type stated above to reconcile in prayers of forgiveness with the creator. List of punishments as prescribed by the tradition for example, on theft of a head of cattle is to be compensated by two. If a head of cattle unintentionally included into some one’s stock, it is expected that it should be sent back where it belonged. The aadaa is almost similar among the Karrayu Oromo and Afar clans. There is an agreed upon social rule that theft is prohibited in the tradition and even missing cattle is to be returned to its owners. There has been encouraging progress and promising results because of the above efforts. Government and representatives of the community on their part have tried to pursue the finalization of the peace process by establishing common peace committees.

4.7. Reasons for the failure of peace efforts

Despite many efforts, variegated changes in political systems and mode of interventions, the Afar-Karrayu conflict sustained and remained unabated. This is attributed to a number of interrelated factors. First, negligence and lack of capacity on the government side to implement decisions, allegiance by clan leaders to their respective ethnic groups, and lack of good governance had a role to play. Second, factors like exaggeration by clan leaders of the problems to their respective groups, the absence of adequate logistic and security support by the government to undertake continuous peace and reconciliation, reluctance of the government to demarcate the boundaries of the two regional states also had their own contribution to the conflict.


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CHAPTER 55. Conclusions and Recommendations5.1. Conclusions

The study attempted to examine and assess the context, history of relations, underlying causes and dynamics as well as the level and extent of involvement of actors in the conflict between Karrayu and Afar pastoralist communities of the Awash Fentale and Fentale woredas. The Afar-Karrayu conflict constitutes pastoralist features in essence but only partially. The sources of competition and conflict are basically seen in terms of resource use explained in the context of socially generated scarcity. Socially generated scarcity is not only an underlying cause of the conflict but also a determinant factor in the protracted nature of the violent conflict in the area. Though, pastoral conflict is explained in terms of resource scarcity, Markakis argued that contemporary pastoral conflicts in Ethiopia are strongly linked to ongoing processes of state expansion in the framework of ethnically defined federalism. Most importantly, the ongoing complex process of federalism and political liberalization that has taken place since the early 1990s has laid a strong contextual foundation in the ebbs and flows of conflicts in pastoralists (Markakis, 1994). As pastoral societies are being incorporated into the newly emerging wider political and economic systems, the rational of conflicts and violence is changing. In effect, post-1991 administrative decentralization has politicized kinship relations, reconfigured spatial relations between pastoral groups and their territory and co-opted customary authorities and peacemaking. Therefore, it is not illogical to argue that federal administration structure that categorized Karrayu and Afar pastoralist communities within Oromia and Afar regional states respectively, has temporarily become inconsistent with the mobile lifestyle of pastoralists communities. Although it would be overgeneralization to argue that the Ethiopian federal model aggravated ethnic problems, there is equally less evidence to prove that it reduced ethnic conflict.

Above all, memories of past historical animosities between the two ethnic groups laid the fundamental ground for the protracted nature of the conflict. Moreover, conflicts arising over attached cultural values, marginalization and issues of security are also among the causes of violent conflict in the area that may have greater impact on the actors’ perceived or actual


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interests and the positions they held. Conflict and insecurity also arise from lack of development and inappropriate government development strategies that fail to consider the changing demographics and environmental realities. Even though, pastoralism is a natural choice for arid and semi-arid environments, it appears that there is no change in the mindset of policy makers to recognize it as a way of life. Marginalization of pastoralists from major political, economic and other considerations, and prejudice attributed to the pastoralist way of life are also long standing factors that contribute to silent progress of protracted social conflict in the area.

The most profound change in the dynamics of the conflict is that the old common causes of pastoral conflict such as pasture, water, looting, cattle raiding and rustling are no more considered as immediate triggers of conflict but are rather the instruments for the accomplishment of political objectives like territorial expansion of administrative boundaries. Another factor leading to increased conflict in the study area included failure to demarcate the new boundaries. Additionally, inadequate policing and state security policies are other factors. Police and security services not only failed to provide security to pastoralist community but also were surprisingly involved in conflicts siding with their clan. Small arms availability in the two woredas has also made traditional raiding more deadly, which in turn has made conflict management and resolution more difficult. Furthermore, the intensification of violent conflicts can be attributed to weak institutional performance in preventing as well as managing conflicts. According to Bekele, the existence of strong informal institutions can reduce potential violent conflicts through effective sanctioning mechanisms and flexible way of handling controversial claims (Bekele, 2008). This is an inherent problem in the existing relation between the Afar and Karrayu pastoralists in that clan leaders and elders on state-organized mediation forums make “pseudo-commitments”. Nonetheless, the effectiveness and acceptability of the customary dispute settlement mechanisms nowadays radically contradicts this undisputable truth of history. In this regard, formal institutions that allow legitimate state intervention are essential because violent conflicts can be exacerbated by factors beyond the scope of informal institutions. Further, the development attempts to transform the underlying causes and hence prevent, contain and resolve the increasing conflicts are far from adequate. In response to the recurring Afar-Karrayu conflict, the Ethiopian government that happened to preside over the case had not been addressing the problem properly but was rather responding to the issues loosely hanging to the conflict, not the basic causes that determine the total underpinning elements of one of the longest pastoralist conflicts


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in the area. Therefore, peace building endeavors should consider the burning and at times diametrically opposed interests of the parties. They have to address major cause/s of the conflicts through both changes in attitude and in the application of policies designed within the context of the region.

5.2. Recommendations

Conflict manifestations in the Afar and Karrayu region should be tackled with a series of political, legal, social, and economic measures which should be taken in ways that may allow the root causes to be dealt with. In this regard, the following recommendations may be worth suggesting.

A. At the community level

First, involving the community in general and pastoral youth in particular in the conflict prevention and resolution might have some positive outcome. Second, notifying conspiracies and attempted plots by third parties such as illegal traders, armed dealers and organized groups with a destructive political objective to the pertinent government bodies may reduce potential spoilers.

b. At kebele administration level

Providing awareness creation session to community leaders who should in turn educate and organize the community and establishing a committee that would work towards the returning of cattle either looted by raiders or captured while searching for water or pasture is necessary.

C. At woreda administration level

Facilitating regular forum at which selected members of the community, elders, government officials and clan leaders come together at short intervals to discuss and evaluate the situation in the area would help. Besides, creating a network of information for the community to expose and hand over individuals involved in killing and looting would be important. Grassroots reconciliation should also be undertaken in order to have lasting peace. All stakeholders should develop mutual trust through the arrangement of national level negotiation in the two woredas. All parties or their representatives should avail themselves in the negotiation so that they would reach a general consensus and aim at transforming the existing political power relations.


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d. At regional government level

Establishing institutions that would give mutual social services like the teaching of Afar and Karrayu children in the same class might have positive future prospect. Though, the fruit of this may not be seen in a few years, it could create a generation totally uncontaminated, and if not, less influenced by memory of the past. Cognizant of the prevalence and intensity of the conflict, adequate budget has to be allocated so that continual public conferences and awareness creation meetings could be held.

E. At national level

The Federal government should also adopt and ratify a proclamation governing illegal circulation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) replacing the existing but outdated directive issued during the Imperial regime. It can adopt the Nairobi Protocol of April, 2004 to which Ethiopia is one of the signatories as a steppingstone and develop a full-fledged and more applicable national proclamation so that regional states follow suits. A clear demarcation has to be made between the two regional states so that either of the two ethnic groups will not encroach into the other’s territory. Although the present constitution guarantees pastoralists that they have the right to free grazing land and cultivation together with the right not to be evicted from their own lands, it is not yet backed by proclamations that would allow institutional arrangements for the implementation of such rights.

Last but not least, underlying factors of the conflict should be addressed. Especially development schemes and policies should encourage territorial based local development. The former functional regional development paradigm has proved itself to be unworkable especially in the Awash Valley of Ethiopia. Hence, being cognizant of the “decline of pastoralism”, further research should be conducted to complement other forms of development and pastoralism.

Even though it is not the objective of this thesis to provide exhaustive list of envisaged actions and strategies, the proper and timely implementation of the above stated measures might have some contributions. To materialize this, inclusive integration at all levels from the central state level down to the kebele might have paramount significance. As a result, the Afar-Karrayu conflict could even be transformed into a story, story, …. tale and tale for the coming Afar-Karrayu generations.


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Bryman, A. (2004). Social Research Methods. New York: Oxford University Press.Buli Edjeta (2001). The Socio-Economic Dimensions of Development Induced Impoverishment: The Case of the Karrayu Oromo of Middle Awash Valley. Published MA thesis in Social Anthropology: AAU

Clapham, C .(2008).The Road to the Sea: the Regional Politics of Ethiopia’s Trade in Friedrik Soderbaum and Ian Taylor (eds.) Afro regions in the Dynamics of Cross Border Micro-regionalism, in Africa, Nordiska Afrika Institute, Uppsala: Sweden.

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Yayneshet Tesfay and Kelemework Tafere (2004). Indigenous Rangeland Resources and Conflict Management by the North Afar Pastoral Groups in Ethiopia. A pastoral Forum organized by the dry lands Coordination Group (DCG) in Ethiopia: June 27-28 2003 Mekele; Ethiopia. OSSREA: Published article

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ACRonYMSEHRCO Ethiopia Human Rights CouncilEPRDF Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic FrontGPLM Gambella People’s Liberation MovementERTA Ethiopian Radio and Television AgencyGPDF Gambella People’s Democratic FrontGPDUP Gambella People’s Democratic Unity PartyGPLMI II Gambella People’s Liberation Movement II


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ICG International Crisis GroupHRP Human Rights ProgramIHRC International Human Rights ClinicOLF Oromo Liberation FrontONLF Ogaden Nation’s Liberation FrontSNNPR Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples RegionSPLA Sudan People’s Liberation MovementSMNE Solidarity Movement for New EthiopiaTPLF Tigeray People’s Liberation Front WW4R World War 4 ReportAppendix A

Acronyms

AVA - Awash Valley AuthorityCEWARN - Conflict Early Warning and Response EPRDF - Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic FrontFGD - Focus Group Discussion IGAD - Inter Governmental Authority for Development NGOs - Non-Governmental OrganizationsONC - Oromo National Congress OPDO - Oromo Peoples Democratic OrganizationSALWs – Small Arms and Light WeaponsSCA - Strategic Conflict AssessmentWOGAGODA – Wolayta, Gammo, Gofa, and Dawro Language Project.

Glossary

Abba Gada - Head of the assembly in the Oromo society or traditional leader. Absuma - A cross-cousin marriage arrangement practiced among the Afar communities.Ajo Hura- A hailing for war in Oromo parlance usually instigated by Karrayu women in times of conflict against their ‘enemy’.Bitweded -A title given to higher government appointee officials in a particular area.Burra - Refers to the war song of Afar which they use during war times to threaten their enemy. Dubit - A traditional knife usually held by the Afar youth.Eidecha - A ceremony that rejoices the transformation of Afar youth given the status of a “killer” by members of the community where he receives congratulations.Fe’ima-A clan based social institution in the Afar society organized by the youth having the same age groups.


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Gilen - Individual traditional witchcraft believed to have a “magical power” in the Karrayu society.Godantu- A practice of transhumance in pastoral society from their environs to another place with their animals during dry season.Guma – Blood compensation in the case of homicide based on the common penalty act of the community drawn by elders, religious and clan leaders.Jaala- A bond friend ship within similar and/or different ethnic origin. Kaadaa Harbi –A grand famine in 1985 believed to be a turning point for the Afar-Karrayu conflicts. Kala Wale - Individual traditional witchcraft t believed to have a “magical power” in the Afar society. Kupha - An Oromic term which implies the purification of an individual who committed homicide in obscurity.Makaabantu – Afar knowledgeable clan leaders that make significant decision in every social affairs.Mela- Afars’ patrilineal decent system based on a particular clan a person belongs to

Appendix b


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II

CEnTER-PERIPHERY RElATIon In THE ConTEXT oF PoST 1991 ETHNIC POLICY AND RELATIONS: EXPERIENCES

FRoM GAMbEllA BY DAWIT BYAZEN


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CHAPTER 1background of the StudyIntroduction to the People and the Region of Gambella

Gambella is located in Western Ethiopia (see Map 1 below). It covers a total land size of 25,274 km2.The region is about 780km from the national capital, Addis Ababa. According to the 2007 census the population of the region is 306,916.

Gambella is one of Ethiopia’s multi-ethnic regional states and is recognized as such by the Federal Government of Ethiopia. From past to the present, the area suffers from the multilayered occurrence of intergroup conflicts. On the indigenous level understanding the root causes of these conflicts takes us long back to the origin of the region’s history, as there have always been competitions for resources among the people with different livelihood strategies. Since the incorporation of the region into the Ethiopian state, which dates back only to the beginning of the 20th century, competitions between the indigenous elites and the agents of the central government in Addis Ababa have increased. During the 1980s the region showed its full vulnerability as a border region. The civil war in the southern Sudan brought a huge number of refugees, mostly Nuer, Dinka, and Uduk, to the area (Abraham, 2004; Meckuelburg, 2006; Kuriomoto, 2005). The camps established for them by the UNHCR were used as bases by the Southern Peoples ‘Liberation Movement/Army (SPLA/M) as bases (Kurimoto, 1997; James, 2002). Accepted by the Derg government, the SPLA dominated the region. The region was put under strong central control and a considerable number of re-settlers were brought to Gambella in the course of the national resettlement program.

After the fall of the Derg regime, the region obtained its status as a multi ethnic regional state, but despite the introduction of the ethnic federalism in Ethiopia, it has been exposed to inter-group competitions or conflicts. Dominant have been conflicts among the two major indigenous peoples, the Anuwa and the Nuer. And since 2003, these conflicts have appeared in new constellation of opponents, e.g. as a ‘highlander’ vs. Anuwa conflict.

Gambella Peoples’ and Nationalities Regional State (GPNRS) is inhabited by the Anuwa 21.17%, the Nuer 46.65%, the Majangir 4% the Opo 0.32 and


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Komo wit 0.02 (CSA, 2008). These indigenous people live together with a considerable number of people from the highland parts of the country making up around 26% of the population (Ibid). This paper will focus on the Anuwa, the Nuer and the ‘highlanders’.The Map of Gambella Peoples National Regional State

The Study Area

Map 1.The three zones and the eight woredas of post 1991 Gambella.Source:http://www.ocha-eth.org/Maps/downloadables/GAMBELLA.pdf/2006.Context of Post-1991 Ethnic Policy and Relations in Ethiopia


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‘Ethnic’ relations in Ethiopia have been historically related to the process out of which the state itself has evolved. The process has created a vulnerable structure of ‘ethnic’ conflicts (Kidane, 2008: 65). It built “differentiated, autonomous, centralized organization with effective control of territories [that] entailed eliminating or subordinating thousands of semi autonomous authorities.” (Teshale, 1995: 22). The state came about through a dominant use of force, imposition of tribute and a dominating ideology and/or institution (Ibid: 31). The process, therefore, has come to be characterized by less developed nation building efforts and weak consolidation of national citizenship, unequal inter-ethnic relations where the state is perceived to be partial in its relations with different ethnic groups (Kidane, 2008: 67).

Furthermore, efforts made by subsequent regimes to deal with the problems that characterize ethnic relations led to a further radicalization of ethnic politics. For instance, the Derg regime’s centralized rule with notable disregard for identity-based grievance not only failed to clear the center from its pre-1974 connotation of a ‘national oppressor’, but it also aggravated politicization of ethnicity (Clapham, 1994: 34).

As a result, some people assert that the adoption of ethnic-based federal structure in the post-1991Etiopia was a logical outcome of the earlier developments in ethnic relations (Markakis,2004:23; Young, 1999: 328; Anderias, 2004). For some In post-1991 Ethiopia “any viable structure of government must [have] involved a considerable degree of decentralization inevitably accompanied by the extension of ethnic and regional form of political identity.” (Clapham, 1994: 37). Others see it perhaps as the only approach to ensure the unity and survival of the Ethiopian state (Young, 1996: 532; Dent and Asfawossen, 1994) or as a successful device to avoid violent dismemberment of the country, given the military violence and repressions of the past regimes (Turton, 2006: 1-2). The constitutional stipulation of self-determination rights is the major basis up on which newer sets of ethnic relationships have been expected to unfold (Abbink, 1997: 159). According to Anderias, for instance, “Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism has removed ethnic contests from the national political agenda and made the state free for the first time to pursue democratic rule”. (2004: 169). As a result, the endorsement of the principle of self-determination, including the right to secession, is taken as an effort made to ‘neutralize’ the state from its ethnic discontents.

For some practices defy the official claims made and these reflect the motives of the core agent of the change, i.e., TPLF (Merera, 2004: 257). ____________________________________40 This kind of perspective, according to Dereje, has its root from prior understandings taken while initiating the federal option in Ethiopia in which EPRDF considered ethnic based conflicts of the past as operating along ethno-lingustic lines at vertical levels where the state at the top represented particular ethnic groups over others (2006:222) .


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The apparent scaling down of ethnic violence does not imply any real progress for harmonious ethnic relations (Ibid). In fact, Young (1991: 557) claims that groups like the OLF “suspect [that] the new regime represents the continuation of Abyssinian hegemony, this time by Tigrayans [and] regards the developing scheme as a ploy”. From some recent reports one can see ‘ethnic’-based vertical violence that has engaged the central government against the ONLF (ICG, 2009).

An issue that is not so much controversial is, however, the increasing visibility of and “concern over the proliferation of localized conflicts” in post-1991 Ethiopia (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003: 107). These, according to Asnake (204: 54-66), are divided into three major trends: inter ethnic competitions and conflicts in multiple identity regional states, tensions in majority-minority relations and problems relating to delineation of regional boundaries. The causal share of the center in these localized conflicts in post-1991 period has been seen in relation to some competing developments that accompany the evolutions of ‘ethnic’ relation and some tough choices the center has to make in view of its overall understanding of ‘ethnic’ relations in the country.

The first is between practicality and adherence to the rights of self-determination with regard to different ethnic groups in the federation (Asnake, 2004; Merara, 2004; Assefa, 2006). The second is the choice to be made between individual and group rights (Dereje, 2006; Asnake, 2004; Assefa, 2006; Abbink, 1997; Van der Bekken, 2009). The third one is EPRDF’s approach towards ‘territorialization of ethnicity’ . EPRDF’s approach towards ‘territorialization of ethnicity has been challenged by the combined effects of geography, culture, administrative and institutional capacity, political will and level of acceptance by the concerned parties (Assefa, 2006; Van der Bekken, 2009; Ahmed, 2004; Teshome, 2004).

From the conflict dynamics of these localized conflicts emerges a strong case that substantiates increasing importance of horizontal conflict relations in post-1991 Ethiopia. This amounts to claiming that the state or its political center in post-1991 Ethiopia is closer to be labeled as secondary, though it still is a very important actor in violence involving ethnic groups. This remains to be so, however, only if it is assumed that localized conflicts operating at horizontal level remain at that level - at the ‘periphery’ of the center’s concern over ethnic issue in post-1991 Ethiopia._______________________________________ 41 Territorialization of ethnicity under an ethnic federal system assumes that every ethnic group is found inhabiting territorially defined and relatively distinguishable geographical areas (Assefa, 2006:135).


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Statement of the Problem

One very interesting issue that emerges from the above mentioned studies on localized conflicts in post-1991 period is that these horizontal conflicts, to a varying degree, have been common in areas which formed part of historical peripheries in pre-1991 period and multi-ethnic regional states following the federal restructuring such as Gambella. In spite of the claims made about transformed center periphery relations in post-1991 period within the broader context of the federal restructuring, the proliferations of localized conflicts in historical peripheries challenge the institutional platform-the multi-ethnic regional state status-through which the EPRDF government appears to deal with the problem of center-periphery imbalances in historical peripheries. In recognition of these opposing outcomes of the federal restructuring in historical peripheries, studies of conflict and center periphery relations in post-1991 Ethiopia establish that the federal restructuring is demonstrative of the “first ever real effort by the Ethiopian government to integrate its historical peripheries” (Dereje, 2006:211) and, simultaneously, as a process that “served to intensify [pre-existing] inter-ethnic tensions” (Young, 1999:328).

In fact, this could be true. However, this study contends that as far as the relationship between conflict relations with center-periphery dynamics in post-1991 period is concerned, earlier studies gave modest attention to a possible interrelationship between horizontal and vertical conflict relations in post-1991 period of historical peripheries and what this could mean to the notion of center-periphery relations in post-1991. Apparently, this has not been taken as an issue that captures the salient dynamics of post-1991 center periphery relation. To fill this gap, this study seeks to describe patterns of inter-group conflicts in a historical periphery of Gambella and identify trends that help establish center periphery perspective in pre-1991 and post-1991 periods. The broader implications this may have in the context of post-1991 operation of Ethiopia’s ethnic federal experiment will also be identified.

Methodological Issues

Studying the relationship between the dynamics of localized conflicts in historical peripheries with a center-periphery perspective in the context of post-1991 ethnic federal restructuring requires combining a national level political reform process with sub-national or micro level processes. This is true especially when the subject of the study is open to contrasting interpretation between those people who drive the process of political reform at the national level and those who receive it from their local positions (Trovoll, 2003:51).


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The question is why does one need to combine macro and micro political processes? Firstly, the political outcome of government’s public statement, policy papers and proclamations at the local level do not merely reflect the larger political process as formally sanctioned by the national level (Ibid). It is often the case that “outcomes depend on the local details of the interface between government pronouncements, polices, actions and local group dynamics, circumstances, interests and responses” (Vaughan, 2004: 197). Secondly, at micro levels the local context itself is far from a unified category which merits detailed and disaggregated micro analysis. According to Tronvoll (2003:51), this should involve the peoples’ local understanding of government policies which, due to the varying interests and differing power relations at that level, makes their attitude towards and comprehension of the political reform process in a different and often contradictory fashion. An emphasis on the national level could therefore make “studies to focus on constitutional engineering and building of formal political institutions not on the process taking place in the interface between national political system and local implementations” (Aalen, 2008:43). A case-oriented approach is adopted to account for the outcome of changing the local particularities and to see how and why the particularities of the local dynamics intertwine in many complex ways with the national framework of the ethnic federal restructuring. The particularity of the local context is the function of “how the [local] people concerned make sense of what has happened as a result” of the political reform process (Chabal and Daloz, cited in Aalen, 2008: 45). Actor-oriented perspective informed the data collection and analysis procedures of this study as it “offers the prospect of relating local level process, decisions and particularized situations to a wider regional, national and international process concerned ” (Tronvoll, 2003:60).

The specific methods of data collection techniques and data types include interviews with individuals who correspond with the two major patterns of inter-group relations in post-1991 Gambella and inter-indigenous and ‘indigenous’- ‘highlanders’. Data collected during the researcher’s personal observations during his stay in Gambella also constituted the data used in this study. Other relevant secondary sources were also used. More focus has been placed on the perceptional than the factual dimensions of narrations.


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CHAPTER 2Review of Related literatureCenter-Periphery Perspective Worldwide and in Ethiopia: A Review

Center-periphery relations as a process presuppose the existence of vertical relations between two or more entities. This is because the concepts are relational in which “the center constitutes the part of the society in which authority is possessed while the periphery is constituted by the section over which authority is exercised” (Shills, cited in Alemayehu, 2009:21).The relational dynamics can be seen as a “process of integrating …different peoples in the periphery thereby to create a relation of dependence of the periphery on the center and a meaning for the periphery of the center as infused with a ‘metaphysical essence’ ” (Shills cited in Almagor, 1986: 115). Centre- periphery relation in whatever context it occurs refers to a hierarchical arrangement that creates a situation favorable to the centre. This sometimes happens even at the expense of the periphery. Centre-periphery relation is unavoidably conflictual, although the conflict may remain entrenched in the structure or it may take direct forms in response to other conditions. Once entrenched, the center periphery disarticulation in plural societies not only becomes a contest between the center as representative of “ values and beliefs espoused by the ruling elites” (Shills, cited in Alemayehu, 2009:22) which are distinct from the periphery but which become essentially political as there “must be political domination by the center…in plural societies” (Lijphart cited in Alemayehu, 2009:22).

In this context, center-periphery disarticulations go beyond mere incompatibilities over such core issues as denial of basic needs of groups such as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institution and economic participation by the state. The center-periphery relations designate two entities with different realms and values with a “profoundly contested geographies (in terms of physical, cultural or legal boundaries), material resources, histories, identities, mythologies, cosmologies and traditional beliefs and traditions” (Oukumu-Ayla, 2007:203).

The use of center-periphery perspective has had its increasing importance in Ethiopia since the 1980s when anthropologist like Donham and James initiated what Triulizi labeled as ‘Peripheralist School’ based on historical experiences of peoples in southern and southwestern Ethiopia (1984: 359).


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Earlier historical writing was structural where what was dominantly “history was political or diplomatic and since it took place at the center most history of Ethiopia was the history of the center and of institutions” (Ibid). The ‘peripheralists’, in contrast, take a regional approach emphasizing more the historical experience of the ‘periphery’ than that of the center (Menassemay, 2006:8).

In the opinion of proponents of a practical center-periphery perspective in Ethiopia, the concepts ‘center’ and ‘periphery’ are relative where “what was ‘peripheral’ was always relative to a particular level of the hierarchy of power [where those] at the highest level constitute the political center while other areas were peripheral to it” (Donham, 2002: 24). According to them, the arrangement was essentially exploitative-the center that went to the periphery mostly exploited natural resources and inhabitants. It also eventually snatched power from them (Triluzi, 1998; Abbink, 1997; Alula, 1997; Donham 1986; Donham and James, 2002). For detractors, the contention is not over the exploitative nature of center-periphery relation as it is about whether or not such was the case in Ethiopia (Messay, 1999; Mennasemy, 2006). In the context of these differences on center–periphery relations in Ethiopia, this study finds itself in the middle ground positions. Dismissing ‘peripherialist’ methodology as ahistorical is as unacceptable as its counter historical tendencies. It should be seen as a move to support a comprehensive writing of Ethiopian history (Triluzi, 1984: 362).

Historical Peripheries in Ethiopia

During and following the 19th century modern Ethiopian, state formation resulted in sate system with asymmetric positions of different societies in the structure and distribution of political power. The Shoan core stood at the apex of the hierarchical arrangement. However, a broader look at the foundation of these asymmetrical structure and distribution of powe shows a distinctively ‘peripherialized’ people. This perspective helps one to differentiate a peripheral category of peoples in Ethiopia from a category of people that were part of the broader center that occupied lower positions. In the evolution of centre-periphery relations in Ethiopia, the centre, because of historical, geographical, political and economic reasons has constituted the traditional Abyssinian core and some sections of Oromia. This happened mainly after the late 19th century modern state formation. This was the time when the Shoan core stood as a dominant category in the process. In spite of significant variations, Tigray, Eritrea, non-Shoan Amhara and sections of Oromiya formed the broader political and economic structure in imperial


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times where their relatively ‘lower’ positions in the hierarchy to the Shoan core in the 20th century could not make them peripheries as in the same sense as it made, for instance, Gambella, Afar, Somali or Benishangul. There are claims which argue that Oromia’s potential for commercial cultivation facilitated its incorporation into the national and global structure of production and exchange while the regions of the north have been removed from it (Clapham, 1990:407). In this connection, any evaluation of whatever form of challenge to the center from its core constituents such as the challenges from ethnic-based movements in northern areas and in Oromia remain to be a discussion of power configuration within the centre. The movements are not reducible to elite’s relationships. This is because it was not their peripheral status per se but it was their ‘lower’ status within the hierarchy of the center that formed later developments resulting in newer power configurations.

In the evolution of center- periphery relations in Ethiopia, some emphasize political and economic aspects, viewing the relation as a structure in which the center absorbs surplus from the peripheries in the form of exploitation of natural resources. What is fundamental in the relation was an asymmetrical structure of power and its distribution (Donham, 1986). In others’ opinion, the political economic dimension has had an ‘ethnic’ complement (Markakis, 2004; Dereje, 2009). Yet, others emphasize geographical consideration-they argue that relative physical distance from the center’s geographical position is an aspect of paramount importance. Still others tend to consider a ‘psychological’ predisposition as held by a center towards ‘a periphery’ (Young, 1999; Abbink1997; Dereje, 2009). Abbink states that in Ethiopia, ‘periphery’ has a connotation of being ‘a “primitive communalist” society found in the lowest stage of the evolutionary ladder (Abbink1997: 241).

This study is based on the above formulations. It understands center-periphery relations in Ethiopia as a historical process of a hierarchical arrangement of dominantly asymmetric political and economic relations, with geographical and cultural components constituting its defining nature. Each of these ‘components’ work their way together in response to different circumstances and result in giving the dominant characteristics of historical peripheries in Ethiopia. These are, according to Clapham (2002: 16), the degree of physical distance from the geographical center of the state (i.e. Addis Ababa), the level of incorporation into the coercive and economic structures of government and degrees of association with the legitimatizing myth of nationhood as espoused by the center.

Notwithstanding heterogeneities, the category of historical peripheries in Ethiopia in general share significant commonalities. Firstly, they occupy geographically and/or ecologically distinct settings in lowland areas (Donham


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et al, 1986; Triluzi,1994;Donham and James,2002). Secondly, they have suffered from economic marginalization (Clapham,1994) and exploitation (Donham,1986) as a result of the 19th century expansion of the Christian highland Ethiopia (Clapham,1990). Thirdly, they have been geographically remote from the centre. Since the late 19th century, the center revolves around Addis Ababa (Young, 1999; Clapham, 2002). Fourth, peripheries are areas inhibited by different communities that have suffered from the center’s pejorative conceptions (Markakis, 2004; Young, 1999;Clapham,1994; Dereje, 2009). Fifth, with notable exceptions, these areas are known for experiencing less but effective insurgencies that are comparable in intensity to some areas within the centre (Clapham,1990).


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CHAPTER 3data Types and MethodPre-1974 Context of Anuwa-Nuer Relations: Conflictual and Cooperative

The primary data collection for this study takes a historical and comparative perspectives-looking at how the inter-group relations evolved into their post-1991 patterns and discerning the particular impacts of the ‘history’ of inter-group relations on the post-1991 period dynamics.

Given the differing mode of subsistence practiced by the Anuwa and Nuer people, conflict always appeared inevitable between the groups. In Kelly’s opinion, “Nuers socio-economic and cultural system engendered a predisposition to unremitting territorial appropriation… and Nuers’ bride wealth system establishes social requirement for cattle effectively determining the size, compositions and characteristics of Nuer herds” (1985: 220). According to Tewodros, this Nuer’s ‘free ride’ has always been worrying to Anuwa as they practiced a settled life in areas which were the ‘target’ of Nuer’s search for pasture and water (2004: 42). As time passed by, violent clashes began to characterize the area. The “Nuers who, in earlier times used to come from the Sudan and stay only for a short time and return to their country, gradually began to come more frequently. They also wanted to stay longer. This eventually led to the beginning of violence)” (AN, Personal interview, 20/02/10).

Nuer expansions eastward were not without their ‘cooperative’ aspects. As the Nuer got closer to the Anuwas, closer socio-cultural interactions began to take shape between the two groups. For example, inter-marriage and assimilation became frequent which in Johnson’s view “is an integral part of the Nilotic social life” (1986: 153).

Despite the apparent cooperation between the groups, ‘separateness’ and conflict also persist between Anuwa-Nuer. The fact that “Nuers’ movement constantly across different areas with their cattle keeps their ‘boundary’ with Anuwa fluid to the discomfort of the latter” (Tewodros, 2004: 38). However, these conflicts were not beyond the capacity of traditional mechanisms that cut across the differences between them. One such mechanism is referred to as gurtong. (NU, personal interview, 24/02/10).


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However, these early periods of Anuwa-Nuer relations with their conflictual and cooperative aspects were not immune to influences by agencies and/or factors beyond their traditional context. The British colonial presence in the Sudan gave the area a commercial importance. Yet, its stiff political control and jurisdiction dictated heavy taxation and curtailment of the hitherto arbitrary movements across borders (Baharu cited in Bezuneh, 2004: 53; Johnson, 1986: 140). It also enhanced Ethiopian Empire’s interest in the area, a move taken to incorporate the region (Baharu (???), cited in Bezuneh, 2004: 53). The Imperial Ethiopia however had to ‘balance’ its interests with its minimalist approach towards the area using ‘divide’ and ‘conquer’ strategies (Johnson 1986: 153; Tewodros, 2005: 14). This resulted in Gambella’s subsequent relegation into a peripheral category with in the Ethiopian state system.

Although these ‘external’ factors were far from being fully grown, their implications for Anuwa-Nuer relations were describable. Once arbitrary movements were halted, it meant for the Nuers to go deep into the Anuwa hinterland disturbing the ‘traditional’ tolerance. The divide and conquer strategies intensified to a certain extent the violence as one was thought of enjoying a ‘preferential treatment’ over the other. Tewodros mentioned how the imperial authorities in Illubabor province gave arms to the Nuers in the face of a local enemy (Anuwa) who viewed them as invaders (2004: 74).

Changes in Relation-Defining Context: the Derg Period

The Derg regime’s socialist modernization and its resettlement program created a new context in Gambella with profound implications for intergroup relations in Gambella. It also affected the relationship between the Derg itself and the local groups.

The Relations between Anuwa-nuer , derg and SPlA

Some people who examined SPLA-Derg ‘friendship’ from a ‘macro level’ view it as a show case of a tit-for-tat regional politics in the Horn of Africa (Clifor, 1999). Others from median level take the Derg’s support to SPLA by assuming the local people as a unit (Medhene, 2006; Medhene, 2007; James, 2002,). Some informants have views that capture the focus of median level analysis. _________________________________________42A traditional conflict resolution mechanism to bring ‘reconciliation’, beyond retribution, between individuals and groups involving rituals the most important being scarification of cattle and blunting of a spear against stone to symbolize the end of violence (AN, Personal interview,26/02/10; NU, personal interview,24/02/10)43 My informants especially of the indigenous ones did not seem to be ‘remembering’ the imperial center’s ‘preferential treatment’ as my secondary sources.


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This means that among the local people the term ‘SPLA’ carries with it the association ‘theft, harassment, rape, robbery, torture, arrest and killings’ (NU, personal interview, 17/02/10; UN, personal interview, 25/02/10, N.N. official interview, 21/02/10). Other similar views argue that with SPLA came easy access to armaments in Gambella. The informants reported that ‘At first, it was the SPLA that brought firearms to everyone rather cheaply …. having fire arms since then has lost its social value as the SPLA ‘offered’ it to anyone who could pay (Interview with government offical,19/0210).

There are also views that relate the SPLA with ecological hazard on Gambella. Here is an example extracted from the data obtained from one informant: “…they came in huge numbers often beyond the camps’ supporting capacity… the Sudanese and the local people until recently lived together where the former seemed not to know ‘boundaries’ ”(Interview with government official,20/02/10). In fact the SPLA’s presence in Gambella was also associated with increasing ‘importance’ of contraband trade to the extent of attracting people from other parts of Ethiopia. (AB, personal interview, 24/02/10).

Yet, there is a micro level where the single unit i.e. ‘local peoples’ can be disaggregated between Anuwa and Nuers (Kurimoto, 1997). What can be called an Anuwa view appears to see the Derg-SPLA relations as a ‘process’. “Before the Derg liked the Nuer’s, the Sudanese hated the Nuers here as they did the Anuwas. Their killings were ‘indiscriminate’ ” (AN, personal interview 01/03/10; NU, personal interview 25/02/10). In some people’s opinion, although the Nuers also suffered, the suffering was more severe on the Anuwas.in connection with this, one informant is quoted saying: “…how could one compare the plight from SPLA where differentiating who is a Sudanese Nuer from an Ethiopian has never been easy” (AN, personal interview 21/02/10). The ‘injury narration’, according to this view, claimed that the “Nuers who came with the SPLA as refugees were not just refugees. The either came with their cattle or they managed to have them here after wards, pushing the Anuwas further.” (AN, personal interview, 26/02/10).

Views among the Nuers emphasize Nuer’s plight under SPLA as no less different from that of the Anuwas claiming that “not every Nuer is the same”. They argue that SPLA Nuers came to the region as the Ethiopian Nuers fiercest competitors” (NU, personal interview, 22/02/10). The difference between Anuwas’ and Nuers’ victimization under SPLA is also reflected at another level. _____________________________________44 The ‘second small arms proliferation’, has been related to the final days of the Derg regime as soldiers desperately dropped their guns while escaping for their lives (AB, public interview, 20/02/10). Medhane also mentioned how SPLA’s failed disarmament program perpetuates the same in post 1991 period (2007).


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That is, some Anuwas view the whole encounter as part of Derg-SPLA-Nuer conspiracy against the Anuwas. This view emerged after the Derg disregarded SPLA’s mistreatment of Anuwas and the reduction of the Anuwas’s capacity to defend their land from Nuers and/or SPLA invasions (AN, personal interview, 24/02/10).

Derg’s ‘socialist modernization’ and Anuwa-Nuer Relations

Derg’s ‘modernizing zeal’ on the local inhabitants in Gambella was unsuccessful, if not disastrous. In fact, by earlier standards it had brought some changes (Donham, 2002, Dereje 2006; Young, 1999; Markakis 2004). It should be pointed out that what matters is how particularly Derg’s ‘modernization’ impacted on the groups’ respective socio-economic mode of subsistence.

In connection with the mode of subsistence, the issue at stake for Nuers was Derg’s denunciation of Nuer’s ‘pastoralism’ as “backward’. Nuer’s view is appreciative of Derg’s ‘modernization’ as long as Derg encouraged permanent settlement of Nuer families and clans. (NU, personal interview, 24/02/10). Nuer’s notion of permanent settlement refers to a situation in which the Nuer could return to a place after pasturing of whatever useful to him and his cattle out of the God-given nature. In this context, Derg’s insistence on total confinement in certain area was far from a benign offer.. (NU, personal interview, 14/02/10).

To Anuwas, Derg’s ‘modernization’ went against their traditional institutions and practices (Kurimoto, 1997:799). They mentioned how the regime belittled their elders and chiefs in the face of ‘abesha’ rulers, their gunmen and the Nuers who they made close friends (AN, personal interview, 20/02/10).

Derg, ‘highlanders’ and the Anuwa-Nuer Relations

The dominant view, among the ‘abeshas’, Anuwas and Nuers is about the ‘abeshas’ presence in Gambella. Although the coming of the ‘abesha’ to the region is closely connected with the Dreg period’s ‘sefera’ or resettlement program, the first generation of the ‘abeshas’ came along the imperial state into the area. Early relations before and during the Derg periods did not attract particular attention as far as “people to people’, as different from elite-mass, relations are concerned. _____________________________________45 Refers to political decision making positions or powers.


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For instance, Medhene, characterizes those ‘early’ relations as relatively ‘peaceful’ although elite–mass considerations harbored elements of asymmetrical relations tilted in favor of the ‘highlanders’ (2007). For some, the ‘peace’ in those early days was due to the limited sense of threat the ‘abeshas’ brought to the indigenous people. One account is that the ‘abeshas’ were few in number and even these were engaged in activities which were of little interest [for example, trade, farming of a lower scale, etc.) to the indigenous people (AB, personal interview, 22/02/20). This fairly ‘peaceful’ relations started to end “when Mengestu H/Mariam brought many sefaris (re-settlers) into the area”. (UN, personal interview, 24/02/10).

‘Ethicized’ Inter-Group Relations in Post-1991 Gambella: the Regional Context

Inter-group dynamics in relation to the federal restructuring of the country reveals its differential impact on Gambella region by structuring a new set of rules and practices related to groups’ access to political positions and job opportunities. As a matter of necessity and/or principle what may be referred to as ‘political positions’ proper have been privileges of indigenous groups. The region’s “work on enhancing the capacity of the indigenous people not only to assume positions per se but to do so with a technical capacity to fill up to the expectations of their position” (Interview with government official, 15/02/10) is perhaps suggestive of the principle involved.

However, as a matter of ‘functionality’ (this may serve as evidence of the slow pace of indigenization), the ‘Abeshas’ are dominant in the region’s ‘bureaucratic positions’. This may be due to their relative competitive opportunities in terms of their language-Amharic which is the region’s working language, their administrative know-how and experience as well as their level of education (AB, Personal interview, 18/02/10). And also there is general inclination by the indigenous people to seek more appointive political position than the bureaucratic positions (Interview with government official, 26/02/10).

In post-1991 Gambella ‘abeshas’ political status is characterized by lack of political clout. Although the category remains potent with regard to conflict, the formal regional political structure failed to give formal political meaning to the presence of ‘abeshas’ in Gambella. For instance, interview data obtained from government official illustrates this: :”It is for the first time since the 1991 change of government [that] the region’s administrative cabinet passed a decision for ‘abeshas’ to be given a government official,


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15/02/10). For many ‘abeshas’ the ‘political participation’ aspect does not amount to the practical usability because they know “the president is an Anuwa, the Vice president a Nuer and the Secretary is a Majenger” (AB, personal interview, 22/02/10). Among the ‘abeshas’ what is rather ‘political’ appears to be nothing more than ‘security’. For those at ‘expert positions’ security has a meaning of ‘job security’. Those at ‘ordinary’ levels also consider a ‘physical security’ dimensions.

Inter-Indigenous Relations in the post-1991 period The issues of power and resource in shaping Anuwa-Nuer relations in the post-1991 are related to the formal power arrangement. It does not appear to be satisfying to any one of them. The Nuer perspective suggests a disappointment over the ‘incongruence’ between their numerical majority and political power status in Gambella . To Anuwas, this is not taken seriously as they claim they have been “deliberately down sized” (AN, personal interview, 21/02/10). An Anuwa way of counterclaiming Nuers ‘numerical majority’ dashed the whole of the number politics into nonsense . The ‘number politics’ appears to have a wider currency in inter-indigenous relations in post-1991 period. An ‘abesha’ informant’s ‘observation’ is informative here. “What you see in the ‘New land’ and ‘terra seffer’ [separate village of Anuwas and Nuers respectively] is that these people are ‘deliberately’ increasing their number [i.e., reproducing] … you could find nowhere in this town areas as densely populated as these ones” (AB, personal interview, 2902/10).

The ‘abeshas’: a subtle ‘front’ of Anuwa-Nuer conflict

Given the relative pervasiveness, especially at ordinary levels of Anuwa-Nuer ‘polarization’ on some relation defining issues, it is essential to see how all of these take conflict and/or violence manifestations. Recent studies show the relevance of violence between Anuwas and Nuers (Abraham, 2004; Dereje, 2006). My interviewees, however, show a general decline of Anuwa-Nuer killings in recent years-it is of the same magnitude as that of Anuwa-‘abesha’ violence. However, given what was established by earlier studies and by my own inquiry the ‘salient issues’ which in the earlier period and in the post¬-1991 period resulted in violence remain ‘structurally’ intact.

__________________________________________46 “It is unfair that Nuers are given positions less than the presidency while in actual fact they are much greater in population size and given how Anuaks ‘misused’ that positions in recent years’ (NU, personal interview, 16/02/10).48 One of them mentioned of a ‘Nuer manipulation’ and ‘assured’ me that whenever there is a talk about census in Gambella Nuers ‘call up on’ their relatives from the Sudan for whom ‘access’ to a kebelle ID card has never been difficult (NU, personal interview, 17/02/10).


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The elative decline in Anuwa-Nuer violence is nothing more than a temporary détente. The following factors may contribute to that.

Temporary Détente as a Function of ‘Successful Politics’

Leaving the suspicion of abeshas’ aside, official informants praise the region’s ‘initiative’ to give a quota of eleven council seats in Gambella to ‘abeshas’ as a show case of ‘successful politics’ at regional level. The other aspect of ‘political development’ takes on the issue of leadership at political level. Variation notwithstanding, the overall accession among informants about the relative ‘stability’ of the present administration and the ‘president’s reconciliatory ’ tendencies can also add up to narration of ‘successful politics’. Part of ‘successful politics’ is also related to leadership at community reflected in the region’s ‘bottom-up’ peace raising and sustaining efforts such as ‘awareness raising’ meetings (Interview with government official, 26/02/10). I was also told that such meetings are relatively regular (Interview with government official, 24/02/10). They are particularly the activities of the elder’s peace council. These and other public relation activities such as the billboard message: ‘Peace for Gambella’ give credence to my observation that issues of peace, conflict or violence are not mere academic abstractions for ‘ordinary’ people of the region.

However some qualification is due before one can take the activities of the Elders Peace Council as a show case for ‘successful politics’. Contrary to what was officially said about its ‘reconciliatory’ aims the council is taken by the ‘abeshas’ as“ brokering a deal between the federal government and the ‘rebellious’ Anuwas …to bring them back home after paying them 5000-6000 birr and a government job” (AB, personal interview, 27/02/10). This is part of the effort made to appease the Anuwas who, during the course of the 2003 violence, suffered heavily by the mekelakeya (i.e. the defense force) (AB, personal interview, 22/02/10).

Temporary Détente as a Function of the Mekelakeya’s Continued Presence _______________________________________48 The “days the region’s political heavy weights spreading group strife have long gone as the president has reconciliatory tendencies and manages to have some ‘charisma’ over some Anuwas who in earlier period were known for their rigidity and hatred” (NU, personal interview, 24/02/10).49 Established after the 2003 violence out of different individual who ‘wield respect’ among the society and especially among Anuwas who at the final days of the violence went into berha (N.N official interview, 24/02/10) its stated objectives were to ‘reconcile’ those Anuwa ‘rebels’ with ‘their’ people and the administration in ‘traditional ways acceptable to them (Interview with government official, 24/02/10).


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Views regarding how the mekelakeya ( the national defense force) contributes to or sanctions the temporary detente of inter-group violence in Gambella and especially the continued presence of the mekelakeya after 2003 violence are hugely diversified among informants. When asked about the continued presence of the mekelakeya after years of ‘improvement of peace conditions’ in the region, informants at ‘official’ level tended to remain indifferent. However, there appeared a level of ‘consensus’ even among the ‘Abeshas’ and the Nuers at ordinary levels about the overall negative impacts the mekelakeya had on Anuwas. Anuwas’ post-2003 view of the mekelakeya is one of ‘fear’ which, for some, kills Anuwas’ and any other group’s possible intent to go after any group in any magnitude (AB, personal interview, 16/02/10; AB, personal interview, 29/02/10). The ‘Abeshas’ view the presence of mekelakeya as appropriate presence and a practical way of guaranteeing their security. What legal and/or procedural appropriateness justifies the mekelakeya continued stay in the region does not seem to matter much to the ‘Abeshas’. Without articulating what ‘motivated’ the ‘abeshas’ to develop positive attitudes towards the mekelakeya, and by extension to the federal government, some ‘reports’ talk of ‘the crime against humanity by the EPRDF government’ (WW4R,2004; GenocideWatch,2004; Human RightsWatch,2005; AnyuakMedia,2007; AnyuakMedia; 2010;SMNE,2010) and assert ‘a common front’ between the ‘abeshas’ and the EPRDF against the Anuwas.

‘Ethicized’ Inter-Group Relations in Post-1991 Gambella: the National Context

EPRDF’s51 “differentiated institutionalization of ethnic entitlements, rights and privileges” (2006: 251) in Ethiopia via the ethnic-based federal restructuring in post-1991 period merits its treatment as a chief architect of the national context for ’ethicized’ inter-group relations in post 1991 Gambella. This gave rise to differing and often contradictory interpretation of the role of EPRDF in the regional politics of inter-group relations 52 .

On Inter- Indigenous RelationsOn the one hand how Anuwas and Nuers ‘feel’ about the center is related to the existence of formal and recognized channels of center-region relations. For example, the level of ‘autonomy’ most often reflected in the ways officials of Anuwa and Nuers talk about how they do their politics in the region draws a picture of a center that is relatively distant or that appears to get closer on the region’s request. On the other hand, how the groups ‘feel’ about the center is related to their recognition of the potency of EPRDF in determining the outcomes of inter group contestations at the local level, even through


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informal ways. As a result, rather than demanding the center to totally ‘back off’ and leave the arena for them to work out their problems, they want to win its favor by belittling one another in the face of the center. For instance, Anuwas’ “disappointment about their being treated equally with Nuers in spite of the latter’s ‘undefined’ status as Ethiopians or Sudanese can be contrasted with Nuers’ sense of political under representation- positions less than the regional presidency do not fit their population size.

The national ‘arbitrator’ (EPRDF) to which these appeals are forwarded has its own view of what is proper. The appeals often fall short of satisfying both groups.

‘Abesha’- Indigenous RelationsPolitical representation taken after the proportion of groups’ in the region’s council (the legislative body) and the region’s cabinet (the executive body) shows that the ‘abeshas’ have two and no members respectively (Interview with government official, 15/02/10). However, figures in the former case were changed after the May 2010 election. The regional administration decided to reserve eleven seats for “abeshas’ (Ibid). That differentiation is, however, different when the region’s bureaucracy is concerned. ‘Decision-making positions’ are dominantly shared among the indigenous people especially between the Anuwa and the Nuers (Ibid).

In what may be referred to as ‘expert-position’, the ‘abeshas’, compared to the indigenous people, are dominant. Regarding appointive positions, my own observations and the interviews held with the region’s vice-president imply that the region cannot give such positions to the ‘abesha’ when there is sustained pressure for better representation by the indigenous groups. Among ‘abesha’ informants, the idea that decision making positions are reserved for ‘indigenous’ people is of a relatively less concern than the ‘expert-position’. The details of ‘job entitlement’ and related issues of security and insecurity are raised along with this. _____________________________________50In fact these ‘reports’ are hardly ‘independent’ and some of them are explicitly partisan. Nonetheless, their views are worth stating. At one extreme, it shows a rather explicit intention of some groups to radicalize their relationship with the government in their hunt for the support of Anuwas (Snow, 2004; Anyuak Media, 2007; Anyuak Media; 2010; SMNE, 2010) whose unpleasant experience with the mekelakeya in the course of the 2003 violence is not contested. To a lesser extent ‘exposing the bad human right record of the EPRDF government’ has also informed some of the ‘reports’ (HRP,2006;GenocideWatch,2004; WW4R,2004,IHRLC,2007).The need for bringing perpetrators to justice is also another source of some of these ‘reports’ (Human Rights Watch,2005a and b) .Although, its emphasis on the issue of ‘justice’ and assessment of the coercive actions taken are hugely different, the Ethiopian Parliament Investigation Report on ‘Resolution on the Report Submitted by the Gambella Inquiry Commission’(2004), can also be taken as EPRDF’s counter response to the above mentioned ‘reports’. Nonetheless, this thesis considers these controversies about the role of mekelakeya in Gambella in light their contribution to the overall conflict dynamics in post 1991 Gambella.


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Some of them claim to have their positions as recently as the last fifteen years. Perhaps as a result of the expansion of government jobs in Gambella in recent years, several relatively younger employees who came from such far places as Addis Ababa, Bahir Dar, Dilla etc. with diplomas and degrees can be observed in Gambella town . These ‘new’ comers into Gambella are either through formal qualifications and proper recruitment procedures or they came through less formal ways . There are also a different category of ‘new comers’ to Gambella with neither formal qualification nor with ‘recommendation letters’ but out of a sheer and desperate hope of getting a living in Gambella. There are also ‘abeshas’ in the government sector in Gambella, who can be defined as a first or second generation. It is the latter than the former that represenst the category in the government sector. The former makes their presence felt in other ‘private’ sectors such as hotel and petty trading activities.

The differentiated institutionalization of ethnic entitlement appears to be ‘successful enough’ in making ‘acceptable’ to ‘abeshas’ the post-1991 principles or formula of political status in Gambella. The ‘abeshas’ at expert positions and those that are at others show nothing that resembles an explicit contest over the indigenous people’s ‘exclusive ownership’ of cabinet, council or appointive positions. Some in the expert position, however ‘fear’ and are ‘undecided about’ the ‘increasing pressure’ exerted on their jobs by the indigenous people (AB, personal interview, 23/02/10). Others appear to be ‘confused’ and in some instances ‘envious’ over the indigenous people in the government sector due to the access the latter have to huge amount of money that comes from the center (AB, personal interview, 14/02/10).

The most vivid or critical of the ‘abesha’ views regarding the center in their relation with the indigenous people, however, revolves around the issues of violence. Much more than other considerations what appears to have bridged the gap between the center and the ‘abeshas’ in recent years in Gambella is the mekelakeya. What they see in it is that the mekelakeya did not just stop the 2003 violence but it also showed the impossibility of the happening of a similar attempt in the future. Hence, they should stay in Gambella (AB, personal interview, 19/02/10; AB, personal interview, 16/02/10). If the ‘attack’ of mekelakeya on Anuwa meant to ‘abeshas’ that it was ‘protecting’ them and, thereby ‘correcting’ their views of the federal government, then its ‘offer’ of money and jobs to Anuwas afterwards,’ meant the center’s continued appeasement of the indigenous people.

51Adejumboi used the ideas while discussing the problem in the African wide context. 52Studies regarding post 1991 center-region relations in Ethiopia in general and in Gambella in particular established that EPRDF use both formal and informal mechanisms to dominate regional units in Ethiopia (Merera, 2004; Aalen, 2002; Vaughuan, 2003). Regions like Gambella,Afar,Somali and Benishangul, in addition, experience central ‘involvement’ where their ‘special assistance’ status makes it ‘necessary’ and so ‘warrants’ it to their ‘benefits’ (Young, 1999: 345). 53This include the coming of some people into Gambella with “give him or her positions” kind of‘recommendation’ letters (AB, personal interview, 20/02/10) 54I came across no ‘abesha’ informant who claims to seek or knows any one do so regarding these positions.


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CHAPTER 4Conflict Structures and the Center Periphery Dynamics in Gambella: Analyzing the Nexus The pre-1974 Context

A center-periphery relation as a process presupposes an actual existence of vertical relations between two or more entities, making the concepts relational in which “the center constitutes part of the society in which authority is possessed while the periphery is constituted by the section over which authority is exercised” (Shills, cited in Alemayehu, 2009:21)

It is, therefore, from the 19th century incorporation of Gambella into the Ethiopian state that one can trace the genesis of center-periphery dynamics. The latter constituted the “sector [within the Ethiopian state system]… which, for most of the time and in most spheres of actions and beliefs, lies outside of the radius of effectiveness of the center” (Shills cited in Almagor, 1986: 113). In addition, the imperial center vis-a-vis the peoples of Gambella qualify the conceptualization of a center in plural societies as a different “realm of values and beliefs espoused by the ruling elites” (Shills, cited in Alemayehu, 2009:22). Center-periphery relations are not only vertical and asymmetric by definition but they are also conflictual. In fact, in response to other conditions, the conflict relationship may either remain embedded in the structure or take direct forms. It is also possible for the relationship to take both forms. The relations accompany an unavoidable conflictual relationship and, because of this, there “must be political domination by the center…in plural societies” (Lijphart, cited in Alemayehu, 2009:22).

Horizontal inter-group conflicts in Gambella did not start with Gambella’s incorporation into the Ethiopian state. Prior to that, the different groups in Gambella were engaged in localized conflicts that followed their own internal dynamics (Young, 1999; Dereje, 2006). These conflicts somehow were related to the different socio-economic organizations of the Anuwas and the Nuers (Kelly, 1985). These differences have been maintained by the former’s sedentary and the latter’s pastoralist orientations. Despite these differences, closer cultural interactions, prevalence of cross-cultural cooperative mechanisms and closer geographical proximity encouraged peaceful ways of resolving conflicts. Among the first external factors was


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British (in the Sudan) colonialism’s stiff border laws that tried to block free movement between the border people. Other factors include the increase in commercial importance of the area and the penetration by the imperial Ethiopia’s state (Johnson, 1986; Young, 1999).

The initial encounter with the Ethiopian state in particular was characterized by the center’s minimalist approach towards the area. The need to institutionalize its asymmetric and violent structure on the ground did not necessitate its presence. Although the rather essential authority was not contested, it remained wary of bolder expansion with the intention of securing benefits from the mercantile developments (Johnson, 1986; Young, 1999 Tewodros, 2004,). Playing off via the traditional division of the groups through divide and conquer strategies was sufficient (Johnson, 1986; Dereje, 2006; Tewodros, 2004). In fact, the imperial center was mistaken for few missionary centers that sought to offer infrastructural and social services (Dereje 2006; 211). As such, Gambella’s peripheral status during the imperial times was the result of the “difficulties of building transport system to and in such remote and inhospitable area and ultimately because the border land was not considered of great interest to the power holders in Addis Ababa” (Young, 1999: 323). (Emphasis added). Thus, the relation entrenched was a dependent and asymmetric center-periphery structure as “central authority remained limited and there was little, if any effort to develop Gambella” (Ibid).

The center-periphery relation structure entrenched the structure of vertical conflict relation from its inception. For instance, the inhuman practices of slave trade the imperial officials took over from expatriates in Gambella (Young, 1999; Dereje, 2006; Kurimoto, 1997), shows not only the prevalence of an asymmetric vertical structure but it also shows how that structure was essentially violent. However, the issue of an overtly vertical violent relation between the people of Gambella and the center was not as compelling as it was in subsequent periods55. The virtual absence of a direct vertical violence, however, could not dismiss the relevance of a ‘vertical structural violence’, given the presence of certain structural conditions in Gambella throughout the imperial period.

As a consequence of its incorporation into the Ethiopian state, Gambella suffered economic exploitation of some kind (Donham, 2002). It also suffered political exclusion, if not suppression with vivid cultural manifestations (Dereje, 2006).

55 For instance, Kurimoto (1997, 802-803) stated Anuwa cognition of the imperial center as one of ‘old good days’ as compared to “the hostile relation between them and the Derg regime.”


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Economic marginalization in the Ethiopian context has to do with particular areas’ lack of export production (Clapham, 1990). Gambella has never been an exception to this particularly after “its economic significance as supplier of wealth to the center in the form of cattle, ivory and slaves declined” (Kurimoto, 1997; 798). However, Abdussamad urges us to qualify the relative decline as one of a ‘slow death for slavery’ where the imperial state only gave up its direct role of conducting the slave trade. In fact, the imperial state managed to continue securing slaves from Gambella’s western frontier even after it claimed to have abolished slavery from the country in the bid made for membership of the League of Nations in 1920s (1999:445).

The impact of the ’external’ factor in the vertical conflict relations was not absent as “the people of Gambella , […] have been well exposed to the outside world more so than other peripheral people in Ethiopia” (Kurimoto, 1997; 798). What arrested conditions from leading to a possible overt vertical violence during the imperial period were the particular ways of institutionalizing the center-periphery structure and the responses and (or the non-responses) of the people in the periphery. The center’s minimalist intentions- divide and conquer strategies- and practical limitations decidedly preclude it from a bolder stake holder in the routines of the local situation. In Donham’s opinion, the imperial presence in Gambella was one of occasional raids for slaves and cattle which the local inhabitants had earlier experienced amongst themselves (1998:43). Young attributes this to “the late start of modern political movements in Gambella” (Young, 1999). This reflects the absence of a radicalized intelligentsia; the presence, willingness and ability of which proved instrumental, although it did not guarantee success in all cases (Markakis, 2004; Clapham, 1990). This in turn reflects the virtual absence of any modern sector, especially education in Gambella (Markakis, 2004). The beginning of the process of politicization and militarization of ethnicity in Gambella can be traced to the Derg period although rapid growth has been observed in the post-Derg regime (Kurimoto 1997). The structure of center-periphery was also entrenched in Gambella over and above a long standing traditional conflict between Anuwas and Nuers, although the imperial center subjected both groups to its asymmetric, violent and vertical structure.____________________________________56 Before the Italian occupation abolished slave trade in Ethiopia, the imperial state kept on practicing slave trade, which was an integral part of its expansionist drives especially towards its western frontier, indirectly through its agencies that live in closer physical proximity to the border people (Ibid). 57 Similar issue of external exposure, for instance, has played a crucial role in Ethiopia’s center relations with its Somali (Ogaden) periphery (Clapham, 1994).


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The particularities of institutionalizing center-periphery relations in Gambella shaped the persistence of this horizontal inter-group conflict dynamics as parallel and independent conflict dynamics of its own. The center may have tolerated Anuwa-Nuer conflict, with its conflictual and cooperative elements, in ways consistent with its ‘divide’ and ‘conquer’ strategies. The parallel existence of the conflict relation was, therefore, between the dominantly structural vertical violence and the persistently traditional horizontal conflict relation in Gambella. The process of peripherialization effectively determined the dynamics of each of the conflict relations and thwarted their interconnection throughout the imperial times.

Following the coming of the Derg, the interface between the conflict relations and center-periphery dynamics showed change and continuity as the vertical conflict structure emerged from change of the earlier existence at covert and /or latent stages into overt conflict stages. As part of the continuity, inter-group conflicts at the horizontal level remained only if they took covert forms.

The relative saliencies of regional factors accounted for much of what was changed during this time. Anuwa-Nuer conflict dynamics has never been free from cross border implication. The relatively uncontrolled back and forth movement along the border is a revealing assertion (Johnson, 1986; Tewodros, 2004; Medhane, 2006). This, however, is different from the regional context since the 1970s. This is connected with the Horn of Africa’s structural vulnerability that got salience since the 1970s (Medhane, 2007). The regional tit-for-tat politics of mutual intervention that involves mutual support of one country’s opposition movements (this consumed a good part of the last four decades of inter-state relations in the Horn of Africa) was the new regional context (Clifee, 1999).

In the case of Gambella, it came in the form of Ethio-Sudanese relations in which Derg extended support to SPLA (Johnson, 2003: 158). From Derg’s perspective, supporting the SPLA against the Sudan government was nothing more than the effort made in the traditional sense of national or regime security (Bizuneh 2004; Medhene, 2007). To see the impacts of this on Anuwa-Nuer conflict and on the resultant relations with the center, one needs to look into the extent of Derg’s support to SPLA. ____________________________________57Especially in the context after post 1991 period, Anuwas raise the issue of the SPLA encounter in which they blame Nuers as sympathetic to SPLA and joined refugee camps even informally ‘renouncing’ their allegiances to Ethiopia. Nuer’s counter response takes on the form of disassociating SPLA with Jinkaye Nuers who are Ethiopians. For Anuwas this does not make sense in the face of the near impossibility of separating an Ethiopian from a Sudanese Nuer.


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The support can be seen as downplaying the issue of resource. The issue of resource is a contentious issue between the Anuwas and the Nuers. It resulted from the influx of SPLA refugees and the criminal and lawless behavior of SPLA on the local people (Kurimoto, 1997; Meckelburg, 2006). In addition, the SPLA-Derg relations brought in militarization of the region. This was made possible mainly due to the fact that SPLA brought easy access to armaments. This increased the level of distractions and “has greatly impeded inter-group integrations” (Dereje, 2006). The negligence of the Derg regime to halt these difficulties that came along the SPLA meant to the local people Derg’s implicit approval of their continued suffering and helplessness.

Differential ‘Impact Assessment’

The immediate concern of the local people, both Anuwas and Nuers, was the plight brought by the SPLA. To Anuwas, the coming of Nuers with SPLA into ‘their’ land was an additional issue at stake. Together with the refugee influx, this brought the issue of resource competition to the front and broadened the traditional Anuwa-Nuer confrontation. As maintained by some Anuwas and observers alike (Abraham, 2004; Kurimoto, 2005), the coming of the SPLA changed the demographic balance of the region. During the Derg period, the coming of the SPLA to the region contributed to increased polarization between Anuwa-Nuer relations. The full ‘political’ impact of this was, however, felt only after the collapse of the Derg regime. Derg’s non-consideration of local concerns related, for example, to Anuwa’s lack of protection and entitlement further polarized inter-group relations. One of the policies which formed Anuwa’s sense of deprivation in the hands of ‘Derg-Nuer alliance’ was the former’s encouragement of permanent Nuer settlement in Gambella. It was seen as an intended project of displacing Anuwa’s from their land (kurimoto, 1997; kurimoto, 2005; Abrham, 2004; Meckelburg, 2006; ‘friends of Gambella’, 2004).

The ‘Highlanders’ Problem

The other side of these policies goes with the issue of the ‘highlanders’. Since their incorporation into the Ethiopian state, the Anuwas and the Nuers have had contacts with peoples of different cultures from other parts of Ethiopia. The issue of slave raiding in Gambella, which accounts for the stigmatized identity of the border people, forms the pre-Derg place of the ‘highlanders’ in the center-periphery dynamics (Dereje, 2006; Young, 1999; Johnson, 1986; Abdussamad, 1999). During the imperial period, the ‘highlanders’ were taken as ‘personifications’ of the central authority in the


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periphery. In fact “the imperial officials in Gambella lived their lives in a kind of exile, the discomfort of which they tried to compensate for through predatory practices …” (Dereje, 2006: 211). The Derg regime added to the ‘highlanders’ problematic through its “… resettlement project which had the effect of alienating the local people…[as] 600,000 highland farmers from northern, western and southern areas were brought into the project sites which were not located in no man’s land” (Kurimoto,1997; Kurimoto,2005).

This re-settlement program entailed on the prevalent inter-group relation dynamics- the influx of potential resource competitors as ‘helped in’ by the centre and as different from the imperial time’s ‘absentee’ officials, traders and soldiers etc. To Anuwas’, who secure their livelihood through sedentary farming, the coming of farmers meant a direct challenge. The introduction of highland settlers in Gambella also created a potential constraint on the Nuer pastoralists traditional ‘rights’ of movement. The coming of highland peasants during the Derg’s time did not replace the older notion that the ‘highlanders’ represent the ‘cultural/political hegemony’ of the centre in Gambella. In fact, some individuals suggest that asymmetry existed at political, economic and cultural grounds favoring the ‘highlanders’ throughout the imperial and the Derg regimes (Medhene, 2007). The implications of the SPLA-Derg relations and that of the highlanders’ matters - i.e., their impact on demographic anxiety, resource competition and cultural hegemony - can be seen at two levels: inter-group conflicts at horizontal level and center-periphery conflict at vertical level.Issues of the SPLA and the ‘highlanders’ demonstrate the growing crystallization of vertical conflict structure. Allowing a foreign actor (i.e., SPLA) into the local situation without addressing the local fear was not just a cause of problems but the Derg’s presence in the regime itself showed a much more vivid center in the periphery. The Derg’s tacit acceptance of SPLA put the Derg’s loyalty into question.

The ‘highlander’ issue during the Derg time also contributed to the vertical conflict structure. The impact of the ‘highlanders’ presence in the region appears to have influenced both groups, and because of this, it has been subjected to impact assessment between Anuwas and Nuers. For instance, Anuwa consider the ‘highlanders’ as no less a threat than Nuer in relation to resource, political and/or cultural dominance. As is currently held, Anuwas like to talk about how the demographic anxiety brought in by the ‘highlanders’, together with the Nuers, has been fueling Anuwas’ discourse of ethnic extinction (‘friends of Gambella’,2004). Given Anuwas’ claim to represent the core cultural referent in the area, forwarding claims of settlement history and pattern and seniority (Dereje, 2006; Kurimoto, 1997), the perceived or actual cultural threat by the ‘highlander’ was more likely to make sense to them than to the Nuers.


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The increasing crystallization of vertical conflict between the center and the periphery was, therefore, the outcome of Derg’s pursuit of policies that added to the long standing apprehensions of groups. This was evident from such issues as inceptions of ‘modern’ means of organizing violence against the center. Although other factors were important, effects like the role of OLF and TPLF (Medhane, 2007), the role of the Sudan (Kurimoto 1997; Johnson, 2003), the Gambella Peoples Liberation Movement (Anuwa-dominated group to violently oppose the Derg regime in 1979) demonstrate Derg’s pursuit of inappropriate policy. The relation between Nuers, the Derg, SPLA and the ‘highlanders’ formed the core of the movements’ grievances about Anuwa deprivation in Gambella (Kurimoto,1997; Medhene,2007).The failure of GPLM to forge a common front with Nuers against a ‘common enemy’ (Ibid) appears to substantiate the Anuwa’s ‘conspiracy theory’. For instance, GPLM carried out a number of hit and run attacks on Ethiopian police forces and settlement villages in Gambella. It also fought against the SPLA as the latter was an ally of the Derg in oppressing the Anuwa (Kurimoto, 2005;13).

The issues of SPLA, the highlanders and the Derg in general can also be taken as crystallizing, expanding and /or maintaining horizontal conflict relations in the form of ‘highlanders-indigenous’ and Anuwa-Nuer conflicts. However, these did not grow into overt, manifest and/or direct violence during the Derg period. Derg was ‘intolerant’ of any sort of inter-group violence. It used quick and prompt military measures to suppress any sign of violince (Tewodros, 2004; Kurimoto, 1997). In general, such measures were successful enough to suppress localized conflict but they fell short of containing the emergence of vertical conflict relations.

Changes and Continuities: The Derg Period

Localized inter-group conflict relations between Anuwas and Nuers were not the creation of the imperial center or the Derg regime. Vertical conflict relations between a center and peoples or groups of the periphery, however, trace their origins back to the imperial presence in Gambella since the 19th century. As a result looking at the changes and continuities in aspects of ‘peripherilization’ should start with the Derg regime. And as will be seen below, the interface between patterns of localized inter-group conflict and vertical conflicts at the periphery during the Derg time essentially demonstrates Gambella’s continued peripherializaiton.

In fact, during the Derg period there were more significant changes than the changes in the imperial period in some aspects of center-periphery relations. Gambella’s relation with the imperial center had elements of


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economic exploitation. However, the structural predispositions for an economically exploitative relation by the center over Gambella merit qualification. This means that Gambella’a geographical location from the center, absence of exploitable resource in the region, the center’s own limited capacity and willingness, made Gambella to remain as a ‘fringe periphery’, compared to other parts of the country during the imperial period (Donham, 1986). What appears to have existed in Gambella was therefore more of economic marginalization than exploitation.

The Derg regime brought a structural change that amounted to the destruction of the feudal foundations of economic exploitation in the whole country. Economic marginalization, rather than exploitation, significantly impacted inter-group relations and Gambella’s place in the power structure in imperial Ethiopia. Derg’s move to abolish the feudal basis of economic exploitation had little practical implication in Gambella. In addition, its effort to address the issue of economic marginalization of Gambella remained practically insignificant. Economic marginalization, defined as a lack of viable commercial agriculture and lack of export production (Clapham, 1990), qualifies Gambella as an economically marginalized area. The Derg’s efforts related to some economic development aspects in Gambella could not avert the pattern of a limited center in Gambella. This went to the extent that Derg’s “socialism remained with little resounding effect on the people of the region who have kept on with their simple daily life as if nothing has changed” (Young, 1999: 324). Its attempt to commence state-sponsored agricultural development through the inducement of highland farmers into Gambella was not much of a success (Kurimoto, 1997).

Political exclusion as an aspect of center-periphery relations can be seen in relation to what was ‘political’ to the people in Gambella. The coming of the Ethiopian state to the regime for an effective control over the area did not immediately affect the ‘autonomy’ of the local populace especially as compared to the British in ‘their’ Sudan (Johnson, 1986). Young claims that traditional autonomy with all its cultural elements survived the imperial state’s minimalist commercial penetration (1999). During the imperial times, ‘political exclusion’ as an aspect of the center-periphery relations, can be taken as political marginalization. It worked through the virtual absence of the local people in the political ‘structures’ the center brought to the region. The imperial center inherently cannot be expected to introduce an inclusive and less coercive structure. This makes the local people’s exclusion not necessarily the result of their peripheral status. Political marginalization should be seen in terms of how far the political structure was ‘accommodative’ or ‘clientalist’ enough to ease the center’s project of control and strategic interests. The imperial state failed to fully integrate Gambella. This failure was accompanied by the early seeds of the emergence of particularized


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relationships between the center and different groups within the periphery. This had to do with the center’s cooption of group differences, favoring one group over another i.e., Nuers over Anuwas (Johnson, 1986; Tewodros, 2003; Kurimoto, 1997). However, the clear implications of this for the center-periphery disarticulation had to wait for the Derg regime. It can be argued, therefore, that political exclusion as an aspect of peripherialization started as a combined outcome of political marginalization and suppression of the local people. The latter can be seen from the widely known depreciatory conceptions held by the center towards the local inhabitants and their traditional institutions and practices.

Some of the Derg’s moves amounted to the level of ‘integration’ of the periphery by the center. The regime’s socialist orientation showed to the local people the first real presence of a center. The details of the ‘integration’ attempts, however, imply the persistence of center-periphery consideration. Derg unleashed in the first real effort by a center to redress center-periphery imbalances with the expansion of social services and infrastructures (Dereje, 2006; Markakis 2004; Young, 1999; Kurimoto, 1997). At least, formally, political institutions were taken in the sense of enhancing the ‘local empowerment’. For instance, “when a limited form of regional autonomy was introduced … the involvement of the local people in the region’s politics significantly increased… locals ultimately occupying the two key posts of the regional administrator and party secretary (Dereje, 2006: 212).

The regime also attempted to redress the identity problem that often went hand- in-hand with the people’s political marginalization and exclusion. It undertook such practical measures as denouncing ethnic inequality, promotion of the local languages of both Anuwas and Nuers through literacy campaigns (Markakis, 2004). However, the efforts drew a picture of a center that was intolerant of traditional autonomy and cultural elements associated with it. For instance, Derg’s revolutionary measures wanted to go beyond traditional authorities, rules, costumes and practices mainly to result in sense of alienation among the local people (Young 1999; Donham, 2002; Kurimoto, 1997). This gave the political peripherialization of Gambella a new dimension. Whereas these were largely the result of marginalization in the imperial period, they became the results of suppressions during the Derg period.

In general, Gambella remained essentially a peripherialized category. Firstly, these ‘redressing’ measures were practically with limited effects, given the regime’s fast-and-hard way of attempting to realize them. Secondly, the efforts, as discussed in earlier sections, neither avoided a dependent relationship between the center and the people of Gambella


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nor they curbed the conflict structure that came all the way through from the earlier periods. In fact, earlier conflict trends either got intensified or got newer dimensions during the Derg period. Secondly, the regime appeared to undermine its ‘commitment’ to Gambella. It rather gave more disproportional importance to its relation with SPLA than to the local people. Thirdly, it added to the complexity of the old inter-group relations in Gambella. This means that the regime, like its predecessor kept on relying on strategies of inter-group co-option. It also encouraged the coming of a huge number of people from other parts of the country through resettlement program.

Identity problems as particularly related to center-periphery relations in Gambella have had their salience since the coming of the Ethiopian state to the region in the 19th century. The process of incorporation was accompanied by the coming of culturally different group of people with the center. The ‘new comers’ did not only bring a cultural diversity. They also formed different form of dominance at political and/or economic levels. As such, the ‘cultural hegemony’ that they were said to have established gave them an infamous status of ‘representing’ the center’s cultural and/or identity contents. This can be contrasted with the local people on whom the coming of the center accorded an infamous stigmatized status. Derg sought to deal with the challenges. It tried to recognize the local cultural identities and do away with stigmatization and enhance the local people’s cultural identity. Taken by themselves, these were positive reversal developments amounting to strip off the earlier center-periphery relations from their cultural and/or identity problems. However, the regime’s cultural revolution, together with some of the measures it undertook in other areas, undermined its cultural policy.

The latter can be seen in relation to the ‘highlanders’ category. The diversity within the category posed a challenge to consider it as representing a monolithic identity group. More challenging is to consider it as an ethnic group. The category practically appeared to represent a different cultural group. Together with the demographic anxiety, it brought on the local people as ‘helped in’ by the center. The regime relied on the category for running the region’s administration. This created a tendency of associating the center with its ‘representatives’ in Gambella.

In general, Gambella’s continued peripherialization during the Derg period had to do with the regime’s attempt to address center periphery imbalances in Gambella. This had been stretched between lack of specificities in some of the aspects and lack of comprehensiveness in others. The cumulative outcome of this was keeping Gambella in its peripheral position.


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From comparative stand points, the federal restructuring has been taken as transformative with regard to center-periphery relations. To Donham (2002:24), “the very image of center-periphery relations has gone from a hierarchical arrangement of core and peripheries…to a more open series of interactions drawing upon partially shared and intersecting imaginations”. Consequently, the “earlier peripheries become point of access to power with sharp symbolic definitions and [positioned] in the process to draining resources away from the center” (Clapham, 2002:16). In the case of Gambella, this should be taken on relative terms. There are claims that question the federal experiment as an institutional design meant for the purpose of establishing central domination not only over the historical peripheries but also over the country (Mennassemay, 2005). Most often the proponents of this idea give evidence of EPRDF’s centralizing party politics (Aalen2002; Merera, 2004).

Nevertheless, it is possible to find formal institutional propositions and practices in support of the notion of ‘changing center-periphery’ relations. Taken formally, the EPRDF instituted a relatively new political space and institutional design that potentially promotes local empowerment. Discrepancies between rhetoric and practice notwithstanding, Dereje takes (2006: 213), the federal restructuring as “one of the most visible political steps ever taken by the Ethiopian state to integrate its historical minorities”. This is reflected “in the redistribution of administrative power … [in which] well beyond the tenuous imperial cooption of local leaders and the appointment of a few local people to the regional administration during the Derg period, … all administrative posts are occupied by locals [sic indigenous people] (Ibid).

As part of the local empowerment, the EPRDF sought to deal with the cultural element embedded in Gambella’s peripheral status. For the new center, the ‘highlanders’ represented the cultural and/or political hegemony of the pre-1991 centre. Consequently, it sought to capitalize on the issue of some cultural recognition practices by the Derg regime and further give a political significance to the issue of identity and/or culture or ‘ethnicity’ from which the Derg regime refrained (Markakis, 2004: 16). A related assumption of EPRDF’s local empowerment in Gambella was to craft “a new identity, being ‘Gambellian’, which would be shared by the people of Anuwa and Nuer to achieve a peace full coexistence” (Kurimoto, 1997; 813). As a result, the restructuring claimed to have addressed whatever identity or cultural problems the ‘highlanders’ for long have thought to represent (Medhane, 2005). To the good of the indigenous people, these led to promotions of their language (serving as medium of instructions), popular culture (through the printing of folkloric literature), the regaining


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of ethnic pride etc. These are perhaps positive developments in post-1991 Ethiopia. Gambella’s peripheral status in pre-1991 period was a combined outcome of its ‘exploitation’, structural marginalization and neglect by the center that results in its ‘backwardness’ (Dereje, 2006) or ‘under development’ (Young, 1999). In this regard, the changes in post-1991 period have been reflected as there is a: “... tremendous flow of financial resources from the federal government to [the region]… the regional government sectors for construction and state supported development activities, given the level of underdevelopment in Gambell.” (Young, 1990: 328-330).

Undoubtedly, these developments deal with core issues that long characterized Gambella as historical periphery. However, practically Gambella has some challenges ahead before EPRDF government addresses its historically peripheral status as its (EPRDF’s) structural proposition has it. For the government such challenges have been the result of Gambella’s historical legacy of isolation, victimization and under development. This has given post-1991 Gambella a constitutional status of ‘special assistance’ region to compensate for its historical neglect by governments (FDRE, Art. 97 sub Art. 4).

The extent of federal involvement in Gambella has been viewed by the government both as formally sanctioned and functionally successful. The Ministry of Federal Affairs has a responsibility to render ‘special assistance’ to the region. The Ministry views its role to enhance the region’s executive capacities so as to help them fulfill the promises of self-determination and, by extension, the federal structure (ERTA Documentary, 2010). The Ministry connects the region’s sector bureaus with the federal government to render support for the regions to ‘catch up’ by providing ‘technical and expert assistance’ in issues of decentralization, good governance, and development. In addition, it ‘helps’ them device ‘political solutions’ in case they face inter group disagreements and conflicts (Ibid; Alemayehu, 2009). The ‘special assistance’ status, according to the Ministry, should not be viewed as compromising the region’s local autonomy as the constitution gives the region the liberty of not seeking the federal involvement although they are encouraged not to do so (Ibid). In fact, Young claims, “unlike other regional states …officials in Gambella …welcome central government assistance” (1999: 344). According to the Ministry, the relations between ‘special assistance’ regions and the federal government have been duly formal, transparent, effective and generally on good levels (ERTA Documentary, 2010). _________________________________________ 59 Dereje (2006), Medhane (2007) observed the positive implications in Gamblella in a construction boom and in the expansion of social services. 60 The other three special assistance regions are Benishangul, Afar and Somali (Ministry of Federal Affairs)


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The Ministry is optimistic enough that the relation based on special assistance considerations are likely to get unnecessary in four to six years time as the regions are getting executive capacities … (Ibid). However, observers have not been so optimistic about the same issue especially the implicit points embedded in it that give impressions of an exclusively ‘constitution-based and formal center-region relations’. For such observers, EPRDF’s approach has been decidedly pragmatic reflecting its desire to ‘balance’ between the formal decentralization and the actual centralization drives. For instance, EPRDF “recognized that its own emphasis on national self-determination meant that local demands for autonomy could not be convincingly denied ” (Young, 1999: 324) “[that] its considerable injection of central government money to the region [reflects, among other things], its desire to reward its political allies ” (Dereje, 2006: 219). In this connection, the level of central government involvement in the affairs of the region’s administration and politics cannot totally be taken, as the Ministry claims, as having no such desires. Moreover, none of these go to the extent of realizing the promises of the post-1991 structural dispensations in earlier peripheries such as Gambella. Instead,

What seems to be emerging in post 1991 Ethiopia is a two-tier federalism between highland and lowland regions [in which] the former are with greater level of political and economic developments and [as such] are zealous in protecting their autonomy and expanding their administration capacity [while] the latter stand out for their lack of development and historical, political, marginalization and are likely to retain that position for the foreseeable future…only to [jeopardize] EPRDF’s commitments to national self-determination which these states [Gambella included] are not currently capable of fulfilling (Young, 1999: 344-345).

Does this ‘under performance’ by earlier peripheries like Gambella suggest the return of center-periphery relations in post-1991 period? Taken by itself, it does not necessarily so. As such, it may point at the slow pace of ‘deperipherialization’ as envisioned by the EPRDF government. In fact, the historical legacies of Gambella’s isolation, victimization and under development may give the EPRDF the benefit of the doubt. However, when it is seen in connection to the more specific issues of inter-group relations and/or conflict in post-1991 Ethiopia the whole picture emerges to establish the persistence of center-periphery relations in post-1991 Ethiopia. Neither horizontal conflicts between groups nor conflicts involving the center on vertical relations in Gambella are post-1991 creations.

61 In the words of Gambella’s President, federal assistance takes the forms of ‘financial assistance’ and the coming of “experienced support team” into the region (ERTA Documentary, 2010).


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These have persisted fairly consistently throughout the pre-1991 period albeit with different patterns and inter-relationships in response to Gambella’s continued peripherialization. Change of regimes did not avoid these conflict relations but it added complexity and protraction to the ultimate outcome of intractably blending vertical and horizontal conflict relations before the coming of EPRDF. Because the post 1991 ethnic federalism is placed against the backdrop of the existing conflictual relationships, it attracts treatment as conflict transforming step (Asnake, 2004; Vaughun and Tronvoll, 2003). It can also be seen as conflict avoidance mechanisms whenever ‘new’ conflict relationships are feared to occur (Kidane, 2008).

The concept of conflict transformation entails more than reframing of positions and identification of win-win outcomes. It is a “process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very structure of constitution of society that supports the protraction of violent conflicts” (Maill, 2003: 5). It assumes that “the very structure of groups and relationships may be embedded in a pattern of conflictual relationships that extend beyond the particular site of conflicts” (Ibid). If successful, the process might result in benign spirals of relationships. If not, conflicts develop into vicious spirals. In fact, conflicts may broaden (suck in new issues), widen (suck in new actors) and intensify (suck in new victims) (Ibid).

The federal restructuring, which created Gambella as one of the multiple ethnic regional states, created an intuitional design susceptible to a continued inter-group conflicts. It neither brings an end to a vertical conflict structure nor avoids a horizontal conflict structure in Gambella. This can be seen from proliferation of inter-group conflict, lack of sound and acceptable institutional and/or political capacities and/or willingness at the regional and national levels. In fact, the restructuring in Gambella has been accompanied by a process of malignant and vicious spirals of conflict dynamics given the broadening, widening and intensity of the conflict dynamics in terms of issues, actors and victims both at horizontal and vertical conflict levels. EPRDF’s prior assumption about Gambella under a multi ethnic regional format proved weak, if not wrong, seen against the inter-group conflict at horizontal level.

In Gambella, the format did not take the salience of historical inter-group differences. Equally, its attempts to avoid new conflicts in post-1991 period have been marginal and unsuccessful as in pre-1991 period. In post-1991 Gambella, where ethnic federalism was expected to have a particularly strong ideological appeal to the indigenous people, neither the long held discourses of a partial center nor chances of organized rebellion


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movements against the center have become irrelevant. Perhaps to EPRDF’s disappointment, the continuation of such discourses and realities has become so strong that it made its corrective moves to be interpreted as reactive to the least and as pragmatically intended to the best. This reflects the marginal importance given to the conflict history of inter-group relations while crafting Gambella as a multi ethnic region.

Multi ethnic regions in pos-1991 period harbor problems around the issue of who controls administrative units (Vanghun and Tronvoll, 2003; Aalen, 2008; Asnake, 2004). Vaughun and Tronvoll argue that “since allocation of government budget is made on the basis of such administrative units, their terms are a matter of great concern for those seeking control” (2003:107). This has resulted in a concomitant shift of resource related conflicts. The shift has been accompanied by and/or intensified by the process of politicization of ethnicity. Ethnic federalism created a maneuvering space for groups who vie for controlling administrative units often invoking ethnic particularity while forwarding their claims. This has to do with the conflict history of past relations which the groups retrospectively put into use in post-1991 period. Particularly to Gambella, ‘ownership’ of a woreda has a direct bearing on the power and wealth sharing issues (Dereje, 2006). For its implications for the woreda levels, control or dominance over the region at large has never been less concerning either. In “post-1991 … Anuwa-Nuer conflicts focus have been shifting from [the traditional] land related issues into control over the region’s capital and seats in different local government posts” (Medhane, 2007: 21).

The competitions over ‘owning’ a woreda demonstrates, among other things, the difficulty, if not the dysfunctionality of the process before it has institutionalized effective regional administration. For example, Dereje observed that Anuwas live in eight of the nine woredas whereat least one is officially recognized Nuer woreda in which the former are numerically significant (2006). Level of Nuer’s presence in Anuwa woreda is not different either (Tewodros, 2004). As a result, addressing groups’ claim for entitlement on ethnic grounds formally remains difficult, arbitrary and vulnerable to conflicts. Conflicts in these woreda involved high levels of destruction, loss of lives and disturbance of law and order especially from the years 1994 to 2003 (Trist, 2004; Abrham, 2004). Some of the issues in these conflicts include which language to use in schools, who should control particular districts and the distribution of government jobs (Trist, 2004; Dereje, 2006; Abraham, 2004; Meckelburg, 2005). ______________________________________62 This, however, does not equal any claims of understating the traditional conflicts in post 1991 period given the recurrence of the same old resource based conflicts (Abraham, 2004).


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These violence, therefore, demonstrates how the regionalization pattern found it difficult to coalesce the ethnic assertiveness it helped to strengthen with a minimal requirement for functional regional and/or local administrations. This is in turn reveals the marginal importance given to the salience of past Anuwa-Nuer relations by the federal restructuring process. The increasing salience of Anuwa-Nuer conflicts in post-1991 period proves how simplistic the assumptions of EPRDF are to craft “a new identity, being ‘Gambellian’, which would be shared by the people of Anuwa and Nuer to achieve a peaceful coexistence” (Kurimoto, 1997; 813).To the contrary the groups continue to put back some of the contentious issues from their past relations into the post -1991 settings. These have been tailored towards justifying their claims and counter claims. The federal restructuring has done little to go beyond and/or create a particular structure to diminish these from their conflict fueling roles. The restructuring created an opportunity for the groups to use the ‘language of ethnicity’ while articulating their past difference into contemporary usages.

Its implication for Anuwa-Nuer relations has been the continuation of inter-group polarization with an effect of protracting horizontal conflict relations in post 1991 period. In addition, it increased the centrality of the EPRDF government in the horizontal conflicts and gave continued relevance to vertical conflict relations in post-1991 period. What keeps the latter relation of conflict relevant is not only the center’s lack of elaboration on past Anuwa-Nuer relations. The issue of the ‘highlanders’ and the way the post-1991 center sought to deal with it has also contributions. Throughout the Anuwa-Nuer conflict at horizontal level the role of the center has been related to the implications for its ‘differential treatment’. A vertical conflict relation as manifested in Gambella vis-à-vis the center has been related with the ‘highlanders’ whose presence in Gambella was taken as giving an ‘identity content’ to the center-periphery structure. It is within the issue of the ‘highlanders’ that the EPRDF sought to take into account the analysis of a conflict history in Gambella. To the EPRDF, conflicts in pre-1991 period were functions of an asymmetric and/or vertical state-society relations as the former was dominated by few ‘ethnic’ groups over a multitude of others. The regime’s solutions took the form of indigenization of politics in Gambella. It gave what it calls ‘indigenous’ groups a political prominence. In Gambella, the regime considers that the ‘highlanders’ represented the dominating group in Gambella in pre-1991. What followed was “a dramatic reversal of power relations, in which ‘highlanders’… have now assumed a subordinate political position” (Dereje, 2006: 215).

The difficult assumption in this case has to do with the ‘alternative’ of a ‘mother region’ that presupposes various ethno-linguistic groups to be


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neatly territorially defined in order for them to be granted ‘mother region’ or local government (Assefa, 2006; 136) The following perspective captures the theoretical challenges such assumptions encounter in relation to group and/or individual entitlement and relations. Rather than the state providing“ a common bond for the people through the tie of citizenship with equal rights, privileges and obligations, both in percepts and in practice, peoples loyalties [as a result of EPRDF’s] institutionalization of differentiated ethnic entitlement, rights and privileges in [Gambella] are bifurcated” (Adejumboi, 2006:251) . Although it has remained problematic in post_1991 Ethiopia in general Assefa (2006) and Van der Bekken (2009) give empirical difficulties as manifesting in cases like Gambella. For example, a significant number of Ethiopians do not live in places where the majority of the members of their ethnic groups are to be found (Ibid). This created “a danger that dominant ethnic group will consider itself the ‘owner’ of the ‘mother region’ … other citizens of minority ethnic backgrounds or who do not associate themselves with any ethnic group are marginalized economically and politically” (Assefa, 2006:136).

The fact that the ‘highlanders’ have a formal region to be identified with or the fact that they maintain their relations with their ‘kinsmen’ in those regions could make more sense to the ‘highlanders’ who have made their way into Gambella after the coming of the EPRDF than to first and second generations ‘highlanders’. This could not help the restructuring from failing to recognize their de jure existence in Gambella. However, neither indigenization of politics nor the developments related to it throws conflict relations in post-1991 period into irrelevant and/or diminishing category. The EPRDF’s understanding of the ‘highlanders’ in Gambella and its approach captures Adejuomubi’s “reinterpretation of the problem of internal conflicts in Africa from the perspective of citizenship and rights” (2006: 250-251, emphasis added). The EPRDF’s ethnic federalism takes on the institutionalization of ethnic entitlements, rights and privileges (Ibid).

In post-1991 Gambella, the ‘highlanders’ represent the fluidity of the federal experiment. The structural transformation that failed to determine the status of the ‘highlanders’ in the ‘new’ Gambella and the resultant diminishing of them into political insignificance has been critical. Having no equal political status as their ‘indigenous’ counterparts, ‘highlanders’, however, continue to be practically relevant category in post-1991 Gambella. They manage to be dominant numerically and still make their presence ‘felt’ in the regional government sector. This has been related to their relative competitive edge, like professional skills and the advantage of Amharic language over the ‘indigenous’ people’s’ languages. Having no legally and/or politically defined status but ‘enjoying’ relative advantage (imagined or actual) over


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the ‘indigenous’ people is problematic. It fuels groups’ sense of continued relative deprivations especially among those who consider themselves ‘losers’. ‘Highlanders’-Anuwa polarization in particular goes to the extent of covering the ethnic diversity of the former, giving the impression of emerging ‘common identity’ built after a common sense of insecurity.

The ‘highlanders’-Anuwa violence since 2003 and the sustained levels of growing mutual suspensions between the two is a case in point. This has become so critical since the 2003 Anuwa-Nuer conflict has given way to Anuwa-‘highlanders’ violence. The violence led to huge level of central interference. The EPRDF lacks formal channels to deal with the problem of the ‘highlanders’- ‘indigenous’ relations. Because of this, it resorts to using military options to suppress inter-group crisis. In almost all violent clashes, for instance, between Anuwas and the ‘highlanders’, ‘pacification’ measures were taken by the central government with different degrees of destructions (EHRCO, 2003, Alemayehu, 2009). This in effect gives the impression of the central government’s ‘operation against the Anuwas’. Ultimately, the issue of the ‘highlanders’ as representing close personification of a center in Gambella has remained salient in post-1991 period as it did in the earlier periods. The ‘highlanders’ issue not only demonstrates the increasing polarization of inter-group relations and conflict at the horizontal level. It also does the same to the increasing polarization between the EPRDF and the Anuwas. Beyond the issues of success, magnitude and intensity such tendencies can be seen as evident from the political program of GPLM II, an Anuwa dominated militant grouping in post-1991 Gambella. It claims “to protect the Anuwa from the expansion of Nuers, the highlanders and the problem of self administration owing to the interference from EPRDF government (Medhene, 2006: 17-18).

The Nuers appear to get something crucial in the process of the polarization while striving for regional dominance i.e., the widening gap between the EPRDF and the Anuwas. However, this is only to protract Anuwa-Nuer conflict. In addition, the system could not institute goals that cut across the inter-group differences between the Anuwas and the Nuers.

EPRDF and Anuwa-Nuer Conflicts: Contested Citizenship The issue of citizenship as one area of inter-group claims and counters claims of entitlement has been a source of contention between the Anuwas and the Nuers in the context of their infightings over the new resource issues in post-1991 period. Indigenous status which the EPRDF equates with citizenship rights, entitlements and privileges in Gambella has been challenged by the groups’ in post-1991.

To Anuwas, Nuers inflated population figure that theoretically informs EPRDF’s formula of regional power allocations has been a function of ‘SPLA


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Nuers’ who came and never went back. Accordingly, they dismiss Nuers’ claims in post-1991 Gambella for regional domination. The Anuwas also do not accept the Nuers citizenship. To debase the Nuers in post-1991 period, Anuwas exalt their contributions to regime change in post-1991.The EPRDF appeared willing, at least initially, to give credit to this perspective (Dereje, 2006; Medhane, 2005; Kuromoti, 1999). Anuwas’ often have tendencies of associating Nuers with the Derg regime. To Nuers, such claims are unfounded. In fact, this contributed to their resentment against the EPRDF government. This began to become more clear after EPRDF-Anuwa friendship between 1994-2000 periods and Anuwa’s dominant positions in the regional power sharing arrangements. This resulted in the establishment of a Nuer opposition party against a center in the form of Gambella People’s Democratic Unity Party (GPDUP) (Medhene, 2005: Kurimoto, 1997).

Short-lived “Friendship’ between the Anuwas and the EPRDF The major cause for the short-lived friendship between the Anuwas and the EPRDF was the perceived and actual sense of Anuwas’ evaluation of the true intent of the EPRDF in the regional politics. To GPLM, which considers itself as an independent political organisation with aspirations of becoming a dominant regional political force in Gambella, EPRDF’s hegemonic political behaviour appeared to be acceptable (Dereje, 2009:645). In fact, EPRDF went on incorporating Nuers into its regional plan of creating a more friendly regional umbrella organisation (GPDF) through a political amalgamation of Anuwas and Nuers (Young, 1999; Medhane, 2007; Dereje, 2009). The process, however, is far from a total success of the EPRDF regime- it has undesirable outcomes on the local groups. It not only failed to appease the Anuwas but it also led to the purging of some of them from the proposed configuration. This in turn was followed by the establishment of the GPLM II which became the second Anuwa rebel group in the region’s recent political history (Kidane, 2008; Medhane, 2006; Kurimoto, 1997 Meckelburg, 2006). However, it has had the ‘success’ of changing the Nuer opposition group to climb into the regional governing party (Medahne, 2007; Dereje, 2006; Kurimoto, 1997).

The Prospect of oil and an Emerging Trend

The discussions made so far demonstrate how the EPRDF government increasingly finds itself in vertical conflict relations in Gambella. These conflict patterns are primarily seen as emerging from EPRDF’s ill-conceived conceptual and institutional frameworks and the failures of its practical responses to address horizontal inter-group conflicts. However, there are some emerging issues in post-1991 Gambella which, given the above pattern, could reinforce and give a newer dimension to the above mentioned pattern of vertical conflict relation.


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By way of building a scenario, let’s see the issue of oil in post-1991 Gambella. In fact, academic preoccupations so far have been limited to a relatively modest detection of some bargaining leverages it could give to militant groups in Gambella vis-à-vis the central government (Medhane, 2006:19). How it influences the relationship between the local groups and the central government in view of center-periphery relations in post-1991 period has not been given a particular attention. For instance, in a study published as recently as 2009, Dereje did not give a particular attention to the issue in spite of his reflections on how pre-1991 Ethiopian governments’ (especially the Derg regime’s) economic interventions in Gambella reflected a centre-periphery relational mode which, he claims, created a stronger cognition among the indigenous people that the centre has always been predatory (650-652).

The issue of the prospect of oil has been part of the post-1991 local discourse of conflict narrations in Gambella. It has become increasingly a subject with a high potential for ethicized political mobilization. A glimpse at some internet sources demonstrate how some clearly partisan and politically motivated ‘articles’ dwell on the issue. In fact, some of these ‘articles’ give the impression that the oil issue is the concern of the Anuwas. They effectively exclude other groups in Gambella and elsewhere in the country in their ‘analysis’ of ‘Oil Development in Ethiopia’ as ‘A Threat to the Anuak of Gambela’ (Ochalla and Deidre,2001). A further examination of these sources shows that the desire to ethicize and politicize the oil resource is as forceful as the desire to depict it as one of the fault lines between the Anuwas and the EPRDF government. This can be seen from the following extract by Snow (2004) who reduces the intervention of the federal government in Gambella in 2003 to ‘secrete war for oil’. Similar sources also claim that the prospect of oil in Gambella is deemed to be devastating to Anuwas. It gives the central authorities powerful economic incentives to seek control of these resources of ‘Anuwa lands’ where the EPRDF government and it projects of ‘oil development’ are as “ambitious, destructive, secretive and not intended for the benefits of the Anuwa nation… as any of the ‘development’ projects by the Derg regime” (Ochalla and Deidre, 2001).

In fact, this ‘fear of alienation’ constitutes one of the ‘core grievances’ by GPLM II which specifically and directly defines its vertical conflict relation against the center since the discovery of oil in Gambella and the signing of a concession agreement between Gambella Petroleum Corp, a Canadan Oil Company with the Ethiopian government in 2001.(Snow 2004; Sudan Tribune;2006).

In this connection, a possible worst case scenario could be established that the issue of oil has already gone political or at least there are desires to that


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effect. In fact, how critical all of these could become and make way into the already entrenched vertical conflict relation in post-1991 Gambella depends on how far the post-1991 center could decouple the need for realising the otherwise national potentials of economic resources such as oil from two issues: from a sense of already entrenched group ‘alienation’ and\or ‘exploitation’ by a ‘predatory state’ in post-1991 period and from an increasing radicalization of social identity in Gambella. This depends on how far the multiple identities coalesce and emerge into crosscutting ties among citizens in Gambella and between them and the central government. The conflict relations discussed above in post-1991 Gambella, however, demonstrates how far behind the federal restructuring has been in this regard.

In general, the relationships between center-periphery relations with the conflict dynamics in Gambella demonstrate that the post-1991 federal restructuring as conflict transformative device has not been much of a success. It neither brings an end to a vertical conflict relation nor avoids a horizontal conflict structure in Gambella. The attempts made to avoid new conflicts in post-1991 period have been marginal and unsuccessful. In fact, it has created new conflicting frontiers to the preexisting competitions and antagonisms. Gambella’s peripherialization has always had vertical and horizontal conflict relation as its integral part, and failure to address this reflects the challenges ahead of EPRDF government. These have been complicated by a mentality of ‘over achievement’ and ‘wrong compression’ in terms of what EPRDF, in principle and in practice, and as compared to earlier regimes have sought to do for Gambella. Beyond the structural ‘break through’, however, persists the already infamous centralization drives of the pre-1991 period. In post-1991 Ethiopia, the issues of manipulation, strategic cooption and suppression in the relation between the center and the people of Gambella have not been outdated. These failures trace their causations from EPRDF’s pragmatic decisions to craft Gambella as multi ethnic regional state in post-1991 Ethiopia. This reflects the persistence of a peripheral outlook on the part of the center. Regrettably and retrospectively, this establishes that even envisaged as a multi ethnic regional state in 1991 Ethiopia, Gambella was not given a full and detailed inventory of its pre-1991 peripheral status as particularly reflected in the inter-group relations of the three major groups of Anuwa, Nuer and what has now become not-so-easy-to-define ‘highlanders’.


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CHAPTER 5Summary and Conclusion

Center-periphery disarticulation in plural societies often go beyond mere competition or incompatibilities to reflect a profoundly contested cultural, physical or legal boundaries, political and material resources, histories, identities, religious and/or traditional beliefs etc. Inter-group relations and/or conflicts in Gambella in response to the activities of the center have been going through different patterns including their transformation from horizontal level into vertical conflict dynamics. These began with Gambella’s incorporation into Ethiopian’s state system during the imperial period and continued throughout the subsequent regimes of the Derg and EPRDF. The way the issue of vertical conflict relations have become salient in Gambella, thereby giving it a ‘prolonged social conflict’ quality has to do with the nature of Gambella’s relation with the center. This has been reflective of center-periphery relations. The changing patterns of horizontal conflicts in Gambella across regimes and their increasing elevation to vertical conflict relations have been the functions of Gambella’s incorporation into Ethiopia’s state system as a peripheral frontier area and its continued peripheral status thereafter.

During the imperial period, no asymmetric and/or vertical and conflictual relationships were developed in Gambella. No attempts were also made to redress the problems. Derg’s record had been more of a continuity than a change. It failed to reverse the inherently vertical conflict structure that it had inherited from the imperial state. Firstly, its attempts appeared to be captive of wrong comparisons as it considered itself as acting beyond the call of duty. Secondly, it gave little value to the local context subjecting whatever was there before to its revolutionary measures. Third, the regime was not free from the legacies of its predecessor. For instance, economic marginalization of Gambella structurally persisted throughout only to sustaining the phenomena of a ‘minimalist center’. The relation between the Derg regime and SPLA demonstrates the continuation of a ‘buffer zone mentality’ of the imperial period. Peripherialization as related to conflict structures, both horizontal as between or among groups in the periphery and vertical as between the periphery as unit and the center, went through two patterns in the imperial and


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Derg times. During the imperial time center-periphery relations implicated horizontal conflicts as follows. The center had pragmatic-based negligence towards the traditional Anuwa-Nuer conflict, given its minimal impact on what it actually meant to do and needed to do in Gambella. These were coupled with imperial strategic cooption to play off the group differences between Anuwa and Nuer. Given the prevalence of inter-group conflicts even before the coming of the imperial center to Gambella, this pattern resulted in the persistence of the inter-group conflicts with its entire traditional elements although the center’s rather minimalist approach intensified or aggravated it.

During the Derg period the interface between conflict structures and center-periphery relations emerged into two forms. It could not do away with the persistence of the vertical conflict structure bequeathed to it as involving a structural violence. In fact, it evolved into a manifest, overt and direct violence forms as was seen in the emergence of violent opposition movements in Gambella. Although the regime was able to suppress it, the traditional Anuwa-Nuer conflict also remained only getting protracted. During the Derg period the pattern of a relatively independent existence of horizontal and vertical conflict structures became no longer neat as it did in the earlier period. Firstly, the tendency of Anuwa-Nuer polarization in response to the groups’ own evaluations of relative standing vis-à-vis the center, have become stronger since the Derg period. This can be seen from the extent of Anuwas and Nuers differentiated, if not divergent, ‘impact assessments’ of some of the Derg’s misguided practices. Such practices as the SPLA intrusions and the resettlement program have not only been ‘assessed’ as universally impacting Anuwas and Nuers. They have also been ‘assessed’ differently as particularly impacting each group. The differences helped the emergence, sustenance and strengthening of ‘conspiracy theories’ as one group views another as either preferentially treated or as at least beneficiary. In fact, Derg’s failure to address the salience preexisting horizontal conflicts in the periphery created a condition for their increasing association with a vertical conflict relation with the center.

Particularly focusing on the post-1991 period it can be established that the protraction of horizontal inter-group conflicts in post-1991 Gambella survives the federal restructuring in post- 1991 period. This shows the failure of EPRDF’s institutional approach in Gambella as a way of fostering a peaceful inter-group relations.

63 Throughout the imperial times Gambella’s peripherialization did not only demonstrate the prevalence of dependent relations as Shills’s conceptualization implies. Given the above mentioned pattern its peripheral status reflected a connotation embedded in being a periphery as, for instance, claimed by Abbink; “ a periphery [as] a primitive communalist society, at the lowest stage on the evolutionary ladder (1997: 241).


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These failures trace their causations to the persistence of a peripheral outlook by the EPRDF government. The institutional platform was decided upon without giving a full and detailed inventory of its past inter-group relations as particularly reflected in the relations of the three major groups of Anuwa, Nuer and the ‘highlanders’. The process failed to foresee the saliencies of past inter-group relations in their potential to resurface for continued conflict relations in the context of officially recognized ethnic mobilization and politicization in post-1991 period. The protraction of horizontal inter-group conflicts in post-1991 Gambella helps maintain the pre-existing pattern of horizontal inter-group conflicts to elevate into vertical conflict relation. The center’s inability to draw itself as a neutral authority in the face of the different groups in Gambella, actual or perceived, has been aggravated by the persistence of such practices as manipulation, strategic cooption and suppression in the relation between the center and the people of Gambella.

Together with the persistence of inter-group polarization and trepidation, these practices are critical factors that explain the intermingling of the conflict relations in post-1991 Gambella. Given this background, how the EPRDF government can manage to spearhead Gambella’s move away from its historical peripherialization, however, still remains open to questions.

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Theshome, M. (2004). “Conflict of Frontiers between Oromia and Somalia: The Case Study of Moyale”, in First National Conference on Federalism, Conflict and Peace Building, pp. 85-95. Addis Ababa: Federal Affairs and GTZ.

Triulzi, A. (1984). “Center-Periphery Relations in Ethiopian Studies: Reflections


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on Ten Years of Research on Wellega History,” in Proceedings of the 7th Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa: IES, pp. 359-363.

Tirst, T. (2004). First National Conference on Federalism, Conflict and Peace Building: Conflict Mapping in Gambella, May 5-7 2004, Addis Ababa.

Turton, D. (2006). “Introduction.”, In Turton (ed.) Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp 1-31

Van der Bekken, C. (2009). “Ethiopian Constitutions and the Accommodation of Ethnic Diversity: The Limits of the Territorial Approach” Tsegaye, R. (ed) in Issue of Federalism In Ethiopia: Towards an Inventory. Addis Ababa: Faculty of Law, Adds Ababa University Printing Press, pp 217-300.

Vaughan, S. (2003). Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia. Edinburgh: The University of Edinburgh.

_______. (2004). “Responses to Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia’s Southern Region” in Seminar on Ethnic Federalism: The Challenge for Ethiopia, pp 165-181 Addis Ababa: Ras Mekonnen Hail 14-16 April 2004.

_______ & Tronvoll, K. (2003). The Culture of Power in Contemporary Ethiopian Political Life. Edita Sverige: Sida Studies

Young J. (1996) “Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia.” In Review of African- Political Economy, Vol. 23 No. 70. Taylor and Francis Lid , pp. 531-541

_______ (1999). “Along Ethiopia’s Western Frontier: Gambella and Benishangul in Transition.” in the Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 321-346. Cambridge University Press.

Internet Sources

Anyuak Media. (2007) “Ethiopia: The Hidden side of Gambella Politics” by Obang Kello November 21, 2007.F:/Ethionews_112007.htm

Anyuak Media. (2010). Ethiopian Authorities Cover up Attempts of Genocide In Gambella March 30, 2010. F: EthioNews_10_3_30.html

Genocide Watch. (2004). Genocidal massacres of Anuak people in Gambella, Ethiopia in December 2003 Accessed from www.genocidewatch.org


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Human Rights Watch. (2005a). “Ethiopia: Crimes against Humanity in Gambella Region Army Impunity and Official Inaction Fuel Abuses” March 23, 2005.

Human Rights Watch. (2005b). “Targeting the Anuak: Human Rights Violations and Crimes against Humanity in Ethiopia’s Gambella Region” 24 March 2005.

International Human Rights Clinic (2006). “Ethiopia: Military Commits Atrocities against Anuak Civilians; Retaliatory Attacks Also Kill Highlanders in Gambella Region” Human rights Program Harvard Law School, Cambridge, December 13, 2006.

Ochalla, N and D’Entremont, D (2001).”Oil Development in Ethiopia: A Threat to the Anuak of Gambela” in Cultural Survival Quarterly accessed from file:///F:/oil-development-ethiopia-threat-anuak-gambela.htm/2010

SMNE. (2010). “Urgent Press Release on the Dire Situation in Gambella: Security Forces Clamp Down on Gambella as Shootings, Intimidation, Rumours of Large-scale Arrests and More Troops Threaten Region” accessed from http://addisvoice.com/article/ethiopia_accuses_rights_groups.htm.

Snow, K. H. (2004). “State Terror Against Indigenous Peoples in Ethiopia: Another Secrete War for Oil” in World War 4 Report Defending the Fourth World Deconstructing Overseas Contingency Operations accessed from www.servivorsrightinternaltional.org

Sudan Tribune. (2006). “To Whom Does Ethiopia’s Oil Belong” Accessed Thursday, Jul 1st, 2010 07:56 UTC. Cambridge, MA, 02139


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III

Civil War in Somalia and Its Implication to national Security of Kenya, By Patrick Werre Simiyu


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CHAPTER 11. InTRoduCTIon

The crisis in Somalia is a danger to Kenya and the neighboring countries in the Horn of Africa region since the war has a spillover effect that has dangerously threatened to become regional. There is evidence of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan and even Kenya getting involved in the fighting in one way or another.

The issue that this research addressed was the civil war in Somalia as an inherent insecurity in Kenya internally and nationally, and further, regionally and international. Kenya has been affected by the insecurity in Somalia as it had to host the largest number of refugees in the world. The importance of this study was a deliberate attempt to uncover the relationship between radical religious beliefs in Somalia and the security situation in Kenya. This research is useful to both the governments of Kenya and Somalia, the United Nations, regional organizations like IGAD and the East African Community and NGOs among other stakeholders.

The main objective of the research was to find out the main threats to Kenya’s national security posed by the radical Islamic insurgency in Somalia and how these threats would be dealt with without jeopardizing Kenya’s strategic interest in Somalia and the Horn of Africa region.It is important for Kenya to understand the dynamics of civil war in Somalia and that it is potent for the ordinary citizen to appreciate its magnanimity so that when decisions are made they are informed decisions based on research and evidence, and that they get popular support from the populace.

1.1 background to the Problem

This subdivision of Somalia into regions during the scramble for and partition for Africa, regardless of clan and religious considerations lay a strong background for competition thus leading to the current civil conflict.

The decision by the British and Italians to surrender their interests to Kenya and Ethiopia respectively lay the background for nationalism and clan patriotism where the Somalis taken to Kenya and to Ethiopia started


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agitation for secession a united Somalia. This led to Ogaden war and Shifta war in Ethiopia and Kenya respectively.


The civil war in Somalia has negative implications to Kenya‘s national security and strategic interests. There is an inherent insecurity problem caused by the civil war in Somalia. Kenya in particular is faced with proliferation of small arms and light weapons, influx of illegal Somali immigrants/refugees attacks from trans-border armed combatants, threats from terrorism, piracy affecting flow of goods in the port of Mombasa, illegal trade and smuggling of goods into the country, and spread of Islamic fundamentalism or religious extremists. This, for the government of Kenya, poses a security risk that must be addressed soon in order to avert a crisis like the one in Somalia.

There are groups in Somalia which are modeled on the al Qaeda style of operation and they have been blacklisted by some Western-European and American governments as terrorists’ outfits. The growing influence of these insurgence groups with their religious extremism and particularly their threat of spreading Islam through jihad against the neighboring countries to restore the United Greater Somalia has a serious implication for the region. This only means that Kenya and Ethiopia should start preparing for a war against secession.

Kenya is already on the travel alert list of the United States of America (USA) and the United Kingdom (UK) where warnings of possibility of being targeted by terrorists are issued to prospective travelers to this country. This has affected tourists coming to Kenya and reduced earnings from tourism industry thus resulting in a declining economic growth. The condition leads to poverty, illiteracy and disease making the Kenyan Government’s vision of 2030 of transforming the country into an industrialized economy a mirage that is hard to achieve.

Kenya is a home to one of the most concentrated refugee camps in the world named Dadaab which hosts over 300,000 people and the number keeps on growing by the day. The essence of this is strained economic growth and environmental crisis leading to threats to national security of Kenya and the neighboring states. There has been increased armed crime due to easily available weapons. What used to be small skirmishes of cattle rustling is now a more sophisticated warfare among pastoral communities. The magnitude of this problem can be illustrated by the October 12th, 2009 Daily Nation article written by Joy Wanja titled “Give up Illegal Arms, Warns Kibaki”. The president said it was time to


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mob up illegal guns among civilians since the arms are being used by criminals in various parts of the country.

Islamic fundamentalism has found sympathy among Kenyan youths who are volunteering to fight in Somalia in the name of jihad. There is evidence that Islamic fundamentalists are now present in Kenya and this was demonstrated on Friday 15th January, 2010 in Nairobi during demonstrations by Muslim faithful pressing for the release of the controversial Muslim preacher Sheikh Ibrahim Al –Feisal. This was reported in the Sunday Nation of January, 17th, 2010 by Opiyo Dave and Bocha Galgalo in the headline “Riots: Saitoti Blames Al-Shabab Group”.

1.3 Significance of the Study

This research is aimed at uncovering issues underlying the civil conflict in Somalia and relates the impact of these issues to Kenya’s national security. It was an attempt to link Kenya’s increasing insecurity to an outside influence of the extremist Islamic organizations based in Somalia facilitated by foreign organizations including some from Kenya. The findings of this study will be very useful to security apparatus in the country, policy makers and intelligence officials not only in Kenya but also in the Horn of Africa region. Regional organizations like East Africa Community, Inter-Governmental Development Agency (IGAD), and the Pact on Security, Stability and Democracy in the Great Lakes Region, the United Nations Organization (UN) and other stakeholders will benefit from the findings of the research. This research makes an attempt to uncover the impact on Kenya’s national security of Somali pirates’ activities condoned and supported by the extremist Islamic organizations.

The findings of the study would be used to mitigate the impact of the civil war especially the pirate activities on Kenya and to inform the country’s foreign policy towards Somalia. The findings can also be used by other neighboring countries in the Horn of Africa are also members of IGAD like Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Uganda and also by the United Nations Organizations and the African Union.

1.4 Rationale and Justification of the Study

These research findings make an important contribution to the existing knowledge in the discourse peace and security threats occasioned by armed conflicts within the neighboring states and depict that insecurity in the neighborhoods may lead to civil conflicts in the otherwise stable states around the conflicting state. Countries like Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea are more likely to have conflict due to their proximity to the conflicting Somalia than are countries with stable neighborhoods.


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This research thus produces knowledge and gives useful information that can inform future national security policies of the government of Kenya towards Somalia and other countries neighboring Somalia especially the IGAD member states. This is also a contribution towards literature for Peace and Security students, readers as well as the general public.

Piracy being a new and an emerging issue needs to be explored further. This paper will make key recommendations that may inform future policy matters of governments bordering Somalia on how to tackle piracy under the banner of collective security rather than the current interventions. It is necessary for Somalia’s neighbours to come together under IGAD and collectively tackle the problem. International partners should support the local initiatives by IGAD countries rather than work alone duplicating efforts to curb piracy along the Somali coastline and the Gulf of Aden in the Indian Ocean. The many warships from Asia, Europe, America and Africa operating in the Ocean have not been able to stop the piracy menace. Hence a change of tact is urgently called for by the international community and the best way to deal with the problem is to empower the regional countries in the Horn of Africa.

1.5 objectives of the Research 1.5.1 Main objective

The main objective of this study is to examine the main threats to Kenya’s national security posed by the civil war in Somalia and suggest proactive ways of dealing with such threats

1.5.2 Specific objectives

1. To determine the threats to Kenya’s national security posed by the civil war in Somalia 2. To establish the impact of the civil conflict in Somalia on Kenya’s national security 3. To find out if al Shabab is recruiting and training Kenyan youths in order to engage them in terrorist activities

1.6 Research Questions 1.6.1 Main Research Question

How can Kenya identify and proactively deal with the threats to its national security occasioned by the civil war in Somalia?


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1.6.2 Specific Research Questions

1. What are the main threats to Kenya’s national security posed by civil war in Somalia? 2. What is the impact of the civil conflict in Somalia on Kenya’s national security? 3. Is al Shabab recruiting and training Kenyan youths in Somalia to engage them in terrorist activities?

1.7 delimitation

There are many security threats to Kenya posed by Somalia civil war and it is hard to deal with all aspects of the civil war and its implication on Kenya’s national security in one thesis paper like this one. The area of terrorism and secession threat propagated by some Islamic fundamentalists will not be addressed in this research. The reason being the researcher believes that the topics have in the past received adequate attention by other researchers.

1.8 limitation

The main problem for the researcher is the insecurity currently experienced in Somalia. It is almost impossible to visit the country without putting one’s life in danger. There is fighting between rival groups of al Shabab and Hizbul Islam in areas controlled by either of the groups. These therefore make it hard for the researcher to visit Somalia gather data at this point in time.

Communication with the Somali speaking community would not be easy since the researcher does not speak the language. The researcher therefore needed an interpreter whom he hired but who would also be biased. Another limitation was financial constraints in travelling along the border and in the regions of Somalia. Transportation was also a problem since travelling in the region was hampered by lack of public vehicles. The researcher therefore relied on hired transport from Nairobi which is expensive but safe. There was also a challenge of getting accurate information from government officials because security element involved in the entire exercise presented a major challenge to the researcher. This is because security issues are treated by the government of Kenya as classified, confidential or secret material.

The researcher is an employee of the government of Kenya and, therefore, the findings of the research may be biased towards government position. The Somali respondents may not have given accurate and independent information especially those in refugee camps in Kenya.


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CHAPTER 22. ConCEPTuAl/THEoRETICAl FRAMEWoRKS And dEFInITIon oF TERMS2.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the conceptual frameworks applied in the interpretation of data by the researcher. This is based on Edward Azar’s Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) and A Level of Analysis framework advocated by Kenneth Wattz among other writers. The theoretical frameworks used are those advocated by Herald Muller and known as New-Realism, Institutionalism and Democratic Peace theories.

2.2 Conceptual Framework

This research utilized Edward Azar’s theory of Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) in identifying causes of the Somalia conflict and the parties to the conflict. According to Azar the artificial factor in protracted social conflict (PSC) such as persisted in Somalia is that it represents the prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, access to political institutions and political participation” (Azar, 1991:93). The conflict in Somalia is based on competition for the control of the limited resources and political power by the prominent clans in the country that have seen the rising of warlords who are also leaders of the clans.

Azar asserts that the role of the state (as also linkages with other states) is to satisfy or frustrate the basic communal needs, thus preventing or promoting conflict. According to Azar many conflicts currently active in the underdeveloped parts of the world are characterized by blurred demarcation between internal sources and actors. Moreover, there are multiple causes and dynamics reflected in changing actors and targets. Finally, these conflicts do not show clear starting and terminating points” (Azar, 1990:6). The civil conflict in Somalia is an intra-state conflict but with actors within and outside the country. Actors outside Somalia continue to raise funds for the conflict and bring weapons into the country for use in the course of the conflict while at the same time recruit foreign fighters to join the war. This scenario has complicated the war making it gain regional and global dimension.


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Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) framework is suitable for use in investigating the Somali civil conflict which has been protracted for close to two decades, yet the end is not known. The players, actors and their interests keep changing every day with new issues emerging and alliances shifting. Insurgences keep on changing names to suit the changing needs and attract more followers and support from external forces and survive the volatilesecurity situation in Somalia.

The second framework that this research utilized is A Level of Analysis Framework which was suitable in carrying out this research because it provides a five level model comprising two international, global and regional, and one state level model divided into functional sectors and two social levels (conflict party and elite/individual).

It was first systematized by Kenneth Wattz and then used widely by scholars in the analysis of the causes of inter-state wars. It can also be used for analysis of the intra-state wars of the contemporary era. Scholars like Jack S Levy, Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall used this framework.

According to it the regional effects of conflicts are both outwards (spillover, contagion, diffusion) and inwards (influence, interference, intervention) (Lake and Rothchid1997). This enables the linking of the Somalia war to the increased insecurity in Kenya since “internal wars have external effects on the region through the spread of weaponry, economic dislocation, links with terrorism, disruptive floods of refugees, and spillover into regional politics when neighboring states are dragged in or the same people straddled several states. Conversely, regional instability affects the internal politics of states through patterns of clientage, the actions of outside governments, cross-border movement of people and ideas, black market activities, criminal networks and the spread of small arms.

2.3 Theoretical Framework

There are several theories on national security dilemmas promoted by experts in international relations and strategic studies. This research endeavored to utilize the work of Herald Muller who suggested several theories in his article, “Theories of Peace”. Muller has mentioned a list of theories that he considers mainstream in the field of international relations like New-Realism, Institutionalism and Democratic Peace Theories (Muller, 2005).

New-Realism theory focuses, according to Muller, on the structure of power in inter-state relations. This theory has two elements namely the equilibrium of power which refers to mutual threat and the hegemonic system which refers to the ever present threat like the threat of Islamic fundamentalism and the


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growth of clan allegiance in Somalia which poses a national security threat to Kenya.

On the other hand, Institutionalism is based on the assumption that organizations, institutions and regimes “May well serve suitable building blocks of a peaceful order in general as transformative and preventive factor” (Muller, 2005:67). This is not true for all the regimes and, therefore, this theory recognizes and acknowledges that regimes are different and carry out activities differently depending on the people they serve, levels of democratic practice and freedom of their people. This is true for Kenya and Somalia; the two countries are at different levels of democratic governance. While Kenya is a practicing and growing democratic state, the opposite is true of Somalia since it has degenerated to civil strife and anarchy thereby exporting some violence to Kenya and threatening the tranquility and peace that the country has known for close to four decades.

Another theory that is discussed by Muller is the democratic peace theory. Muller argues that “security communities between non-democratic states can never approach the ideal type of security architecture as closely as democracies can” (Muller, 2005:70-71). Buzan (2003) came up with two theories of regional security, complex theory and new regional security complex theory. The difference between the two related theories lies in their focus. While the regional security theory is state centric, the new regional security complex theory is inclusive of the contemporary issues.

According to Buzan, the traditional or old security complex is understood as “a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so inter-linked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another,” (Buzan, 2000). He further argues that the new security complex theory is “a set of units whose major process of securitization, desecuritization or both, are so interrelated that their security problem cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved a part from one another” (Ibid) This approach is more inclusive of various actors other than the state. It sees security as a socially construed phenomenon rather than objective.

2.4 Definition of Terms 2.4.1 national Security

The term “national security” is a normative term used to refer to the state’s national and strategic interest which in the long run is meant to ensure security for the citizenry and their property. The cardinal responsibility of any government in the world is to secure its territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence.


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The assumption here is that due to the ongoing civil conflict in Somalia, Kenya’s security or insecurity is heightened and therefore makes the government spend more money on security arrangement, using funds which should have been utilized elsewhere for development activities and projects.

2.4.2. Islamic Fundamentalism

In this case, terms like Islamic radicalism, fundamentalism, extremism, jihadism and mujahidin are used to refer to those groups operating in Somalia but subscribing to extreme or radical strict application of Islamic sharia laws.“We do not tolerate anything that may corrupt our people…We don’t allow anything that goes against our religion, especially music and sexy videos…We recognized that women need to stay in their homes and take care of their children….Islam does not allow women to go to offices,” official of the al Shabab in Kismayu, Sheikh Hassan Yaqub, was quoted by Reuters in an article published by the Daily Nation (Wednesday, November, 2009:20).

2.4.3 Terrorism

This term will be used in this paper because the presence of fundamentalists in Somalia makes the territory a safe haven for the operation of such groups like al Qaeda and their link organizations. Susan Rice, former US Under Secretary for African affairs in the Clinton administration, aptly captured the reality of Africa’s human security dilemma and its vulnerability to terrorism and insurgency in the following words: “Africa is the world’s soft under belly for global terrorism, an incubator for the foot soldiers of terrorism because of its young, disaffected, unhealthy and uneducated population [who] often have no stake in government or faith in the future, so they harbor an easily exploited discontent with the status quo” (Isike, 2008).

2.4.4 Jihad

It’s a term used to refer to Islamic holy war against infidels but the al Shabab group uses it as a propaganda to blackmail those that are opposed to their position terming them as anti-Muslim though it is al Shabab that is in effect anti-Muslim when their practices and actions are considered. Though they claim to champion Islamic faith, the al Shabab and other insurgence groups like Hizbul Islam are only interested in wrestling power and resources from the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Al Shabab, Hizbul Islam and other insurgent’s war against the Transitional Federal Government is not by any means a holy war but a war of selfish individuals seeking power and influence.


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CHAPTER 33. LITERATuRE REVIEW3.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the main literature on national security, human security and the challenges to the security order of the world and Kenya in particular. This work is based on state centric security approach which advocates for national security being spearheaded by the government whose role is to protect its citizens. The activities of insurgences in Somalia are explored and a proactive action suggested on how to deal with the security threats posed by the groups on Kenya’s national security.

3.2 national Security

The concept of national security has attracted a lot of definitions. As cited in Wing (2000), Lippmann‘s writings on security provide a useful definition of the application of the term to a nation state saying,“a nation has security when it does have to sacrifice its legitimate interest to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war”. On the other hand,Trager and Simonie define national security as “that part of government policy having as its objective the creation of national and international conditions favorable to the protection or extension of vital national values against existing and potential adversaries” (Wing, 2000:10).

Realists link national security with national interest. According to this paradigm, “states put their own interests first, regardless of whether these prioritizations occur at the expense of other states. National security is apparently selfish” (Wing, 2000:10).This view is more traditional “where security tended to be equated with state security and thus viewed only from a state-centric and militaristic point of view with the state as the sole actor” (Booth,1991).

Idealist’s associate the issue of national security with human behavior and they argue that national security discourses should better be understood by examining human behavior and the need for moral actions by the state which endeavors to maximize power that enables nations to maintain deterrence through the readiness to wage war, and when it serves national interests, the waging of war itself. This school of thought is championed by Kenneth Waltz among others.


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The strategic study approach has dominated the national security thinking, with more emphasis being put on the avoidance of war, especially nuclear war whose effect can be very devastating. John Vasquez and Abraham Maslow are some of the champions of this theory. Strategic studies also emphasize the issue of disarmament and war on terrorism as key security concerns in the world today. There is a need to stop the arms race, avoid nuclear war and increase the fight against terrorism in the world, according to this approach.

National security was the reason for countries of the world coming together to form the United Nations Organization (UNO) in 1945. After the Second World War, the countries of the world met and decided that they will never let war devastate the world again as was the case during the First and Second World Wars. The UN was established on the 14th October 1945 by 51 countries committed to preserving peace through international cooperation and collective security. Today, nearly every nation in the world belongs to the UN and membership now totals 189 countries. The UN is guided by a charteran international treaty that sets out basic principles of international relations. The UN has the following 4 purpose:

1. Maintain international peace and security2. Develop friendly relations among nations3. Cooperate in solving international problems and promoting respect for human rights4. Be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations

3.3 Human Security

Human security is the focus for national security discourses currently. “The idea that the objective of national security could be the provision of security for individuals rather than the state has had a significant impact on security theory” (Booth, 1991). This new theory informs a foreign policy that is based on demilitarization of the planet, reversing environmental degradation and ending crimes against humanity since the genocide against the first nation peoples and especially the people of Africa as witnessed during the Rwanda and Burundi genocides.

“New sources of threats to human existence emerged in the last decade of the 20th century. These vulnerabilities pose greater dangers to human existence than inter-state wars, with the result that there has been an increasing need to rethink the concept of security. This rethinking has widened and deepened the concept of national security to include people as referent subjects in security calculus” (Booth, 1991, Buzan, 1991, Peterson 1992, Tickner, 1995).


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The works of Samuel Huntington and Henry Kissinger who advocate for human security as the best way forward, among others, formed part of theoretical framework for this research utilized during data collection and applied in the interpretation and analysis of the data.

Apart from the orthodox, normative description of national security, the notion adopted for this work is unique and different. National security was taken in a holistic sense which included political, social, cultural and economic security of Kenya as well as the human security of Kenyans as individuals forming the state. This is in line with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) “that identifies seven threats to human security in 1994 as follows: community security, economic security, environmental security, food security, health security, personal security and political security” (Isike, 2008:25).

In essence, human security is woven around issues of human emancipation (Booth, 1991: 539), social justice (Peterson,1992), and human dignity and the environment, if they have political outcome (Ayoob, 1995; Kaul, 1995: 314-319) in equating human security with the security of individuals rather than just the security of nations or territory, underscores the primacy of human security in contemporary times, thus “What is needed today is not so much territorial security –the security of the state but human security, the security of the people in their everyday lives, one that is reflected in the lives of our people, not in the weapons of our country” (Isike, 2008:24-26.)

3.4 Africa’s Security Dilemma

There are many overlapping issues subsumed under the heading of national security in Africa, these include but not limited to the relationship between country’s armed forces and the territory it seeks to defend. Most African countries do not make their national security doctrines and calculations public hence making it hard to determine their national and strategic security concerns.

Based on this narrow definition of national security which is reliant on considerations of military defense and regime stability, some African governments even label any political opponents as terrorists even when they are only advocating legal and non-violent action. Some African leaders confuse national security with regime survival or even personal power. According to this thinking therefore, “it can be asserted that the dominant model of national security in Africa is one that is defined by the military and security forces, based on immediate military or physical threats to territorial integrity and regime stability (Bashr, 2003:41).


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African governments practice heavy spending on the military thus diverting resources both financial and human, which could be used for economic and social developments of their countries. This is a misplaced priority since what causes insecurity in Africa is not so much the inter-state rather than intra-state conflict. Poor governance, among others, is the main sources of insecurity in Africa.

The African Union has a doctrine of the right of member statesto intervene or involve in internal affairs of states engaging in gross violation of human rights. This is what is referred to as collective security. The application of collective security doctrine though is problematic since it is not possible to get support for invoking such a clause from the member states.

According to Ambassador Said Djinnit, Peace and Security Council Commissioner of AU, “The African Union (AU)] has adopted, and where needed created, institutions in order to improve its ability to deal with conflicts. Examples include the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the Pan African Parliament (PAP) among others. RECs and International Partnership have also helped in Peace and Security efforts of AU” Juma, Garcia, and Kesslman 2006).

The following are threats to national security in Africa and the Horn of Africa nations including Kenya:

1. Actual and potential external threats of force projection or invasion2. External threats of destabilization and terrorism3. Potential sources of conflict with neighbors such as undemarcated borders, contested natural resource control4. Violent crime and banditry associated with proliferation5. Potential social unrest associated with economic recession6. Ethnic, religious and regional cleavages and the incapacity of governance structures to manage disputes peacefully7. Insufficiently institutionalized constitutional borders8. Weak governance institutions and corruption9. Mass distress migration due to natural and man-made calamities10. HIV/AIDS and its impact on institutional capacities including security services

3.5 Horn of Africa Regional Security dilemma

Abdul Mohammed and Alex de Waal in an article titled Africa’s New Multilateralism: Toward Framework for Regional Peace and Security in the


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Horn, argue that “The Horn of Africa is a prisoner of its geography and history. Some of the strategic concerns of earlier centuries-Egypt’s drive to secure the Nile waters, Ethiopia’s demand for access to the sea- are as real today as they were a hundred years ago or more. Possessing statehood and controlling the machinery of state is still the most important means for securing power and wealth” (Abdul, 2009).

They further argue that borders are still important giving the examples of Ethio-Eritrea border dispute as the best example and other territorial disputes like that of Halaib which is between Egypt and Sudan and Elemi triangle between Kenya and Sudan.

Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has played a key role in mediating in current conflicts like the one in Sudan and now in Somalia. The establishment of the Eastern African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) in collaboration with international partners remains one of the most important achievements by IGAD. East African Community remains an important player in regional security especially in East Africa. Several peace initiatives by the IGAD on the resolution of the Somalia conflict have been organized in Nairobi and Djibouti but little has been achieved in this area. A different line of action should be adopted urgently in order to harmonize all efforts by different stakeholders who have so far been working in isolation. IGAD member countries should stand out and be seen to be speaking with one voice on this matter.

3.6 Al Shabab and Other Radical Groups’ Activities against Kenya

Al Shabab literally means ‘lads’ in Somali language and in Arabic it means the young or also known as ash-Shabab, Hizbul Shabab or ‘the party of the youth’. In its media production the group refers to itself as ‘Harakat al-Shabab al-mujahedeen’ or the movement of the warrior-youth. This group was founded in 2004 and has developed in the wake of the loss of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU).

Dersso in his article titled, The Somalia conflict: implications for peacemaking and peace keeping efforts contends that “following the controversial intervention of Ethiopia to oust the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) forces, the military wing of the UIC known as ‘al Shabab’ opened a successful insurgency attack, leading to one of the bloodiest conflicts witnessed in Somalia since the 1990s. After two years of such fighting that bogged down the Ethiopian army, the Islamist insurgents regained control of most parts of South Central Somalia, including parts of the capital, Mogadishu. The al Shabab forces, leading this insurgent, currently enjoy the military upper hand in most parts of South Central Somalia including Mogadishu” (Dersso, 2009:6).


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Mugumo Munene contends that al Shabab is represented in Kenya and that they are facilitated by helpers living mainly in Mombasa, and Nairobi’s Eastleigh, South B, South C and Komarock estates. He further states that “Last month, Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka, Defense Minister Yusuf Hajji and Internal Security Minister George Saitoti launched a public education campaign programme in which political and religious leaders teamed up to discourage young men from North Eastern Province from being recruited into al Shabab. Kenya has been in terrorism news since August 7th, 1998 when bombers struck in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam killing close to 250 people and injuring 5000.

According to Kelly’s article entitled Kenya Now a Major Base for al Shabab Fighters that appeared in the East African of March 29th - April 4th claims that “many of the fighters from Kenya are recruited through a support network in Nairobi consisting of wealthy clerics-cum-businessmen, linked to a small number of religious centres notorious for their links to radicalism. Leaders of al Shabab and Hizbul Islam, the other main insurgent groups in Somalia travel with relative freedom to and from Nairobi, where they raise funds, engage in recruitment and obtain treatment for wounded fighters. A Nairobi embassy of another country in the Horn of Africa is said to funnel cash on a monthly basis to insurgent forces inside Somalia” (Kelly, 2010b).

A look into how Kenya has increased expenditure on military is a pointer to the insecurity inherent in the country due to threats posed by the civil war in Somalia “a whopping Kshs. 27 billion (USD 348 million) was used to buy combat aircraft, helicopters, grenade launchers and other light arms in a single year, according to the report by a peace studies institute, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which says Kenya came fourth behind South Africa, Angola, and Sudan in a group of 23 East and Southern African countries in the 2008 weapons purchase. South Africa spent Kshs 285.5 billion while Angola used Kshs 184.2 billion” (Wabala, Daily Nation Monday, March 22nd 2010).

The UN register of conventional arms says Kenya spent the following amounts on buying arms between 1999 and 2008. The table below shows a marked increment on expenditure on arms bought by the Kenyan government over a period of ten years.


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Table 1. Kenya’s expenditure on armamaent (1999-2008) ____________________________________________________________ no. Year Amount in Kshs. (billion)

1 1999 6.7 2 2000 17.9 3 2001 21.0 4 2002 22.5 5 2003 22.8 6 2004 22.5 7 2005 23.7 8 2006 23.5 9 2007 26.7 10 2008 27.1 ___________________________________________________________

Source: The researcher, data collected from annual estimates presentation by the Ministry of Finance and military experts (2010)

Note: (1 USD is equivalent to Kshs 80 at the current exchange rate).

An article by Muthangani titled Kenyan Youths Reveal Why They Joined Somalia War in The Standard, Saturday, May 22nd, 2010 says that the youths whom he interviewed confessed to having served the al Shabab and they admitted that they were death machines, trained to kill by Somalia’s al Shabab. They roam the country freely after quietly sneaking back after their quest for fortunes in the lawless country came to naught. This is the story of Kenyans lured to enlist with the terror group, which the US government says is a proxy for Bin Laden’s al Qaeda. Trained in guerilla tactics, the use of deadly weapons, combat skills, endurance and other military drills, the Kenyans pose a security risk to the country. Some have spent up to three years fighting for the rag tag movement in the jungle of Somalia” (Muthangani, 2010:10-11)

Those youths who were enlisted in the al Shabab are not lured due to the ideological attraction of the terror group but only sojourned to the neighboring country in search of riches or money. Al Shabab is believed to have foreign fighters not only from Kenya but also other African countries, the middle east including Afghanistan and Pakistan-and from as far as US and Australia. Most foreign fighters are trainers especially from Pakistan. According to those who served in the al Shabab terror group, they received a monthly salary of Kshs 21,000 which is the equivalent of 262.5 US Dollar but hardly paid and yet no one would raise a finger due to the ruthlessness of the al Shabab leadership.


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In a more recent incident al Shabab members in a two armored vehicle convoy attacked a Kenyan village called Dadajabula in Wajir District and left seven villagers wounded as the police engaged the intruders in a 30-minute fierce gun battle. This happened in the midnight of Wednesday, 26th May, 2010 and was reported in The Standard, on Friday, May 28th, 2010 (page 11) by Adow Jubat and Borniface Ongeri. It was reported that suspected al Shabab militiamen attacked. The Provincial Commissioner for North Eastern province was quoted saying, “the suspect al shabab militia ransacked the village 4 kilometers from the Kenya/Somalia border and indiscriminately fired at the sleeping villagers during the half hour siege. We are investigating whether the militia was targeting the local police post which was close to the raided homes” (Jubat, 2010:11)

Al Shabab which controls large parts of Somalia has on several occasions threatened to attack Kenya for supporting the TFG but Kenya has continuously rubbished the threats saying the gang is no match for her army. According to Abdullahi Jama and Fred Mukinda’s report in the Daily Nation of Friday, 28th May, 2010,“the attack comes four days after the insurgent group al Shabab threatened to attack Kenya for interfering in the affairs of Somalia. The rebel group’s spokesman Sheikh Ali Mohammed Raghe alias Sheikh Ali Dhere made the threats at a pass out parade for new fighters in the Somalia port of Kismayu. He claimed that Kenya was among those opposed to his movements’ jihad (holy war) against the TFG, the jihads are going to crush those elements and move beyond into Kenya because Kenya was a glass house and should not throw stones”(Abdullahi, 2010:10).

3.7 Identified Gaps

There is very limited knowledge among scholars and little literature about the role of al Shabab as a key player in the current Somalia civil conflict which has proved to be highly volatile and dynamic. The actions, activities and pronouncements of this group openly show that they pose a threat to Kenya’s national security but the government of Kenya and its neighbors in the Horn of Africa seem to be oblivious of this danger.


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CHAPTER 44. METHodoloGY4.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces the research methodology used in this study - a qualitative research method in which both in-depth interview and focus group discussions were employed to obtain primary data, and books, journals, magazines and internet to gather secondary data. Both kinds of data were collected, translated, interpreted and presented in a narrative form as a complete thesis work.

4.2 Research Method and design

This research was envisaged to be a qualitative research, involving indepth interviews with government officials, academicians and peace and security analysts and experts. Primary data were collected through interviews, focus group discussions as well as use of the researcher’s experience gained through working in government.

Preference for a qualitative research was premised on the advantage this methodology gives to the user in peace and security research area which required both objectivity and at times subjectivity in the collection, interpretation and analysis of data..

The use of focus group discussion was advantageous because in the groups, divergence of views was witnessed and debate enriched thus capturing a variety of opinion during the collection of data. Different data were collected at once which also reduced the cost of doing research. The exploratory method was used to gather information which made the secondary data used along with the primary ones in gathering evidence and giving answers to the research questions.

4.3 Methods of data Gathering and Instruments

In this study, primary data were gathered personally by the researcher and his research aides through interviews, questionnaire, focus group discussions and the participant’s insight observations. During the interview, the researcher conducted indepth individual interviews and discussions with senior government officials from Kenya and Somalia’s Transitional


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Federal Government, UN officials, NGO and church organizations dealing with refugees’ issues and the communities living along the Kenya–Somalia border.

Secondary data were collected from different sources in the archives. This literature review assisted the researcher in categorizing the issues according to their relevance to the study.

4.4 Study Area description

The study covered Somalia’s border with the Republic of Kenya.. The specific area of study was Nairobi which is the seat of Kenyan government, the border towns of Mandera, Wajir and Ijara which are located in the North Eastern Province of Kenya. In Nairobi, there was a focus group discussion held in the Eastleigh area which is mostly inhabited by the Somali speaking people of Kenya but is suspected to host some illegal immigrants from Somalia. Senior government officials were interviewed in Nairobi while one focus group discussion was carried out in Garissa town which is the Provincial headquarters of the North Eastern Province. Experts were drawn from both Kenyan and Ethiopian higher institutions of learning and other professional bodies working on peace and security areas.

4.5 Selection of Study Subject

The researcher purposefully selected the study subject due to his interest and experience in Kenya’s national security matters. The issue of Somalia civil conflict has dominated Kenya’s press for close to two decades hitherto. Therefore, it has influenced the way the government of Kenya has carried out business of governing the country. The impact of conflict in Somali is an important topic to be explored because Kenya uses a lot of resources in dealing with the effects of the war other than solving the conflict.

4.6 Selection of Research Participants

The researcher’s objectives and questions were adequately addressed through the following participants selected purposefully based on their availability, acceptability, willingness and readiness to participate in this exercise. The participants included:

• Ten (10) Senior Government of Kenya officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Office of the President, Ministry of State for Provincial Administration, Ministry of State for Defense, Commissioner of Police, National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) and Criminal Investigation


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Department (CID). • Two (2) Federal Transitional Government of Somalia’s embassy in Nairobi• Eight (8) Experts on peace and security from regional organizations (University of Nairobi lecturers, Maseno University, Officials of AU, IGAD, East African Community (EAC) and International Conference on Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)• Two (2) Focus group discussions were conveniently selected based on accessibility and knowledge of the topic. Each group discussion composed of ten (10) people that included youth representatives, women leaders and Islamic religious leaders so as to reflect the diversity in society. Thirty percent (30%) of the group were women. One discussion group was held in Nairobi and others were supposed to be held in the border towns of Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Ijara. • Ten (10) Somalis living in Kenya but without considering the legal status of their being in the country (These are groups whose identity could not be revealed due to their own fears and the fear of arrest if they are exposed). Thus, the list of informants would not be attached.

4.7 Sampling Techniques and Sample Size

In selecting key informants, purposive sampling technique was used by the researcher. However, flexibility was considered and utilized in sampling techniques and sample size so as to gain optimal outcome. All major stakeholders were approached for their input in the main research. The process was designed to be as inclusive as possible.

4.8 Method of data Analysis

In order to attain the set research objectives and answer the research questions, the collected data were systematically organized and interpreted. The interviews, answers to the questionnaire, discussions and observations were translated into English and an attempt was made to keep to the original version. The sense of meaningfulness of the themes and patterns was illustrated based on the findings of the research. The data presented in the narrative form with extracts from original texts were used to show the originality of the research findings.

4.9 Verification and Validity The validity of findings of this research and the reliability of the data were ensured through various mechanisms such as:

• Triangulation of data through interviews and documents


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• Submission of draft of interpreted data to informants• Peer reviews • Evaluation

4.10 Reporting and Submission of Findings

The findings were mainly presented in the form of description and sometimes narration. In order to make things clearer and understandable, explanatory approaches were also utilized. This was so especially when dealing with methods or approaches and processes.

The research report would be submitted to the research committee of the Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University after the approval of the supervisor and the advisor. A copy of the report would be given to the Government of Kenya, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, University of Peace and IGAD so as to use it in their future decisions on Somalia.

4.11 Ethical Considerations

The researcher considered and respected the right of interviewees. The researcher did not have any participants without the awareness of their involvement in the research. All those that participated were informed about their rights and their consent was sought. They were informed that they could accept or refuse that their views, ideas and comments be used in the study. Furthermore, the right of privacy of those interviewed was not only guaranteed but also respected and all the collected data were kept with great confidentiality until the research findings were presented and approved. Consent of participants list to be annexed was sought but was not granted, hence the list of participants is not given as an annex and their names are not mentioned in the research.

The views of the participants are presented as such without mentioning their names as requested by the majority of respondents owing to the sensitivity of the matter and the positions they occupy in their organizations and the society.


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CHAPTER 55. RESEARCH FIndInGS 5.1 Introduction

The research findings presented in this chapter are based on the respondents’ answers to the research questions. The data were analysed, interpreted, translated and presented in the form they appear here. The chapter starts by introducing the background and goes on to give the findings based on the data gathered and analyzed as per the conceptual and theoretical frameworks given in Chapter 2.

5.2 background to the Research Findings

Islam plays a much more visible role in Somali society today than prior to the civil war. This heightened Islamic role manifests itself in different ways. However, it must be understood that Somalia has not been a hotbed of Islamism. It has not been a significant source of recruits into al Qaeda, nor has it been the site of major terrorist camps and attacks against western targets. The main Somali radical Islamic movement, al-ittihad, appears to have declined as a formal organization since the mid 1990s giving way to new and emerging groups like al Shabab, Hizbul Islam, Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca and Ras Kamboni. These are groups that are modeled on al Qaeda and propagate radicalism as a way of achieving their goals and aims.

Throughout the past decade, Somalia was principally used by radicals as transshipment point into Kenya, but not as a safe haven. As Dersso writes in the Institute of Security Studies bulletin, “In recent years, however, concerns about Islamic radicalism inside Somalia have grown. Several foreign terrorists have used Somalia as refuge; Somalia Islamic hardliners such as Hassan Dahir Aweys have successfully built a power base using local sharia courts and have publicly declared they will wage jihad on foreign peacekeepers; some Somali business and charities have been accused of collaboration with al Qaeda; and since 2003 a number of assassinations and attempted attacks on international targets inside Somalia have been linked to jihadist cells operating in the country. The public sense of desperation with the daily perils and poverty of protracted state collapse, and resentment at the west’s perceived disinterest in Somalia crisis, combine to provide an ideal breeding ground for rising anti-western sentiments and radical Islamic movements” (Dersso, 2009:142).


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5.3.1. How can Kenya identify and proactively deal with the threats to its national security occasioned by the civil war in Somalia?

The Protracted Social Conflict conceptual framework that is used in analyzing the conflict in Somalia consents that it is not easy to identify the time such conflicts started and predict when they may end. This kind of uncertainty makes the conflict hard to resolve. Many respondents in this research were weary of the uncertainty but they would wish to see an urgent resolution of the conflict. The finding given in this thesis falls within the PSC framework which works well in the Somalia conflict and its impact on Kenya’s national security.

Most respondents want Kenya to be in the forefront in promoting dialogue among the warring parties in Somalia and employ strong diplomatic efforts to end hostilities in Somalia through the UN, AU and IGAD. The PSC conceptual framework advocates mitigation of external interferences in a country’s internal affairs through dialogue and interventions at certain points in the conflict.

The respondents also want countries in the Horn of Africa that have tackled the Somalia war differently and have not had an agreed upon uniform strategy in handling the conflict to harmonize their strategies.

Diplomatic presence between Kenya and Somalia should be seen as an opportunity to engage each other and support the international efforts to restore a functional government in Somalia while keeping at bay those elements that are used to scuttle peace processes in the Republic of Somalia. The majority of those interviewed do not understand why Kenya has not utilized the presence of Somali envoy in Kenya to reach out to the insurgences for a compromise and dialogue. The Kenyan Government should only deal with the TFG and monitor those people within Kenya who assist al Shabab and other insurgence groups in Somalia. The people assisting those illegal outfits should be discouraged and charged for working against the people of Kenya hence promoting insecurity in the country.

Another suggestion put forward by the respondents is that there should be efforts to intensify training of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) police and assist in empowering them by providing both technical and material support in order to tame crime in Somalia and therefore avoid the spillover effect of such crimes to the neighboring countries like Kenya.

The capacity of TFG army must also be boosted through training and logistical support and this can be done by the countries which are more


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affected with the conflict. Kenya and other neighbours should be in the forefront in giving support to the Somalia army other than destabilizing the country by engaging in proxy wars with each other which only accelerate the conflict in Somalia.

Kenya should be in the forefront in giving priority to combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden which has seriously affected the inflow and outflow of goods through the Indian Ocean. This can be done by offering logistical and financial support to the international organizations that are collaborating to fight the vice along the ocean. All stakeholders must harmonize their efforts in curbing the vice and avoid duplication of efforts.

The Kenyan navy should play a more proactive than reactive role in the Indian Ocean; they should be able to escort ships from the Port of Mombasa across the Gulf of Aden instead of waiting at the periphery for other countries to do it for them. It is ironical to have Chinese, American and European presence trying to combat piracy yet Kenya is sitting on the fence. Kenya is the main beneficiary of a calm and peaceful Indian Ocean thus it should work extra hard to secure the water way.

Kenya should give support to the UN and AU peace keeping force in Somalia. Kenya has in the past participated in peace keeping efforts across the globe and has a good reputation in this effort hence should bring this experience close to home and urgently donate peace keepers to Somalia. Ethiopia should also donate troops to AMISOM and not go alone to war with al Shabab.

Efforts should be made to mark and man the porous border between Kenya and Somalia in order to minimize banditry, smuggling and illegal refugees crossing over to Kenya. The 4,000 plus kilometer border left unmarked is a recipe for chaos in future especially over natural resources and grazing ground by the pastoral communities. This is depicted by the quotation from Kelly’s article appeared in the East African (see section 3.6).

This double speak is very dangerous for Kenya’s national security and it has to immediately stop if any meaningful gains are to be made in securing the lives and property of Kenyans. Giving a leeway to insurgences who have sworn they will annex some part of Kenya if they gain power in Somalia is tantamount to giving a sword to an enemy whose aim is to slit your throat open. The Government of Kenya needs to urgently put their house in order so as to avoid a catastrophe waiting to happen due to al Shabab and other insurgents’ activities within and outside the country.


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5.3.2. What are the main threats to Kenya’s national security posed by the civil war in Somalia?

The analysis of how Kenya is affected by the conflict in Somalia can best be summarized using A Level of Analysis conceptual framework which states that “internal wars have external effects on the region through the spread of weaponry, economic dislocation, links with terrorism, disruptive floods of refugees, and spillover into regional politics when neighboring states are dragged in or the same people straddled several states. Conversely, regional instability affects the internal politics of states through patterns of clientage, the actions of outside governments, cross-border movement of people and ideas, black market activities, criminal networks and the spread of small arms. There are also evident sources of regional conflict where river basins extend across state boundaries or where a regional mismatch between state borders and the distribution of people [usually as a result of the perpetuation of former colonial boundaries] lays states open to the destabilizing effects of large-scale population movements” (Gleick, 1995, Gurr, 1993, Gurr and Harff, 1994).

The above being the level of analysis, thus responses by those who were interviewed pointed to terrorism as being Kenya’s nightmare hitherto. This argument is pre-supported by the Level of Analysis framework. As described in section 3.6 of this thesis, Kenya has been in terrorism news since August 7th, 1998 when bombers struck in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam killing close to 250 people and injuring 5000. Later, on November 29th, terrorists struck in Mombasa, this time delivering a truckload of explosives to the Kikambala Paradise Hotel where they left 15 people dead. An attempt to bring down an Israel jetliner which was taking off from Mombasa’s Moi International Airport failed. Several other terrorists’ attempts and plans have been foiled by the intelligence and security operatives within and outside the country by Interpol and the Kenyan security operatives.

The respondents agreed that Islamic fundamentalism has found sympathy among Kenyan youths who are volunteering to get trained in Somalia and crimes. The Government of Kenya should take immediate remedial actions before the threat turns tragic.

There are evidences that Islamic fundamentalists are now present in Kenya. The Nairobi demonstrations by the Muslim faithful held on Friday, 15th January 2010 demanding the release of the controversial Muslim preacher Sheikh Ibrahim Al –Feisal attests to this (See an article by Opiyo Dave and Bocha Galgalo in the Sunday Nation of January 17th, 2010


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In connetion with the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, it is estimated that North Western Kenya alone possesses about 127,519 illegal guns Amutabi, 1999). These weapons have been used by criminals and pastoral communities to increase insecurity in Kenya. Bloody skirmishes have been witnessed in Kenya in the recent past due to the availability of arms.

Human trafficking and hijackings have increased due to the activities of al Shabab and other insurgence groups in Somalia. These groups have identified Kenya as a transit point for human trafficking activities from Somalia other countries. People fleeing the fighting in Somalia are cheated and recruited to go to other countries where they are exploited and abused.

All the respondents agreed that drug trafficking is a problem made worse by the porous border with Somalia which acts as a transit point to Kenyan markets,the government of Kenya is struggling to reckon with this. The stateless Somalia has no control over lawlessness hence illegal trade thrives in such an environment. Compounded with the threat of piracy, drug barons have turned the coastal towns of Mombasa, Malindi, Lamu and Kilifi into drug hubs making the youth become garbage. This has raised alarm bells among religious leaders as well as government officials who have launched campaigns against the menace.

This challenge has made insurance premiums for operating in the Indian Ocean to skyrocket making the cost of doing business very high and risky. International efforts at combating the menace could not bear fruits because the pirates are supported by insurgents in Somalia and it is a lucrative business for the war lords there. According to the respondents to the research questions, they believed that some neighboring countries are also beneficiaries of the dirty money. They point fingers at neighbouring countries that receive the dirty money in a form of investments by the sponsors of piracy.

According to the Kenya economic survey of 2010, it was discovered that a mysterious amount of Kshs 164 Billion was suspected to have been smuggled into Kenya by the Somali pirates leaving the government officials and donors wondering on how such lump sum of cash found its way into the Kenyan economy. The presence of this money only helps to fuel concerns that Kenya may be turning into a money laundering destination by Somali pirates. Reporting in the Daily Nation of Friday, May 21st, 2010, Kisero said, “it is all happening against a back drop of intense speculation that millions of


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dollars in ransom money paid to Somalia–based pirates end up in Kenya” (Kisero, 2001:1)

Respondents contended that Kenya has put herself in a security crisis by accepting to remand arrested suspects of pirates from Somalia awaiting prosecution in Kenyan courts thereby jeorpadizing Kenya’s security. It would be prudent if Kenya liaised with other IGAD member countries to prosecute pirates as a regional concern. The deal between Kenya and European Union to try suspected pirates signed in 2009 only helps to expose Kenya as a close ally of the West and America hence being a likely target of terrorist attack and an enemy of the Somali pirates with their cronies.

Counterfeit goods are sneaked into the country as stated by a newspaper reporter who said,“Today the Kenya-Somalia border is abuzz with trade on illegal firearms, motor vehicles, petroleum products, textile, tyre, satellite dishes, spare parts, electronics, phones and sugar from Somalia. Goods manufactured in Kenya started vanishing in 1993 from the local markets shops and traders switched to cheaper and uncertified goods in Garissa, Wajir, Moyale and Ijara-known as donkey routes, due to donkeys used to sneak the goods into the country” (Jubat and Ongeri 2010a:13).

All respondents interviewed agreed that it was hard to get Kenyan products in counters at the border towns. Somalia’s beach ports and lack of customs have made it an ideal entry port economy for the transit trade of variety of goods both legal and illegal across Somalia and into the neighboring states.

The respondents agreed that influx of refugees to Kenya poses a national security challenge to the Government. Dadaab camp in Kenya hosts over 300,000 refugees and the number keeps growing. This exerts a strained economic growth and environmental crisis threatening the national security of Kenya and the neighboring states.

While some refugees are genuine, others are criminal elements who want to use Kenya as a launching pad to terror activities in the world. Cattle rustling in Somali and the neighboring states of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti are growing phenomena in the region which has spread terror due to the use of deadly weapons illegally acquired from the stateless Somalia. Pastoral communities have armed themselves thus becoming a national security threat in the country and the region as a whole. Some of these arms are also used by insurgences in other countries.

Tribalism and clanism are increasingly becoming a headache for the Horn


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of Africa countries. Kenya has witnessed a number of bloody skirmishes in the recent years including the recent post-election violence in 2007. This saw close to 1000 people dead and thousands displaced adding to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The violence has been attributed to the easy procurement of weapons from Somalia.

The country is polarized between the pastoral and agricultural communities besides, there is the Muslim against Christian divide and the North Eastern against other Kenyans all because of tribalism and propaganda by insurgents in Somalia who seek to utilize such structural divide to widen discontent among citizens of Kenya.

Cyber and internet crime has increased in Kenya and the countries neighboring Somalia due to elements operating in the latter. Terrorists have used the vacuum in Somalia for their illegal activities.

Increased violent crime is also another implication of the insecurity in Somalia for Kenya’s national security. Towns in Kenya have reported increased armed crime and formation of terror groups like Mungiki and Kamjeshi, who go about terrorizing civilians, hijacking people in order to get ransoms and committing other criminal activities. This is also true not only in the cities of Kenya but also towns bordering the stateless Somalia like Wajir, Mandera, Garissa, Ijara and Lamu among others. The increased crime is a consequence of the easy availability or proliferation of small arms and light weapons from Somalia and other conflict zones in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa region despite efforts by the Regional Centre for Elimination of Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA) to combat such weapons.

According to police sources, the country’s security situation worsened in the year 2010 with crime rates rising by 13.8 per cent. The number of crimes reported to law enforcement agencies increased from 63,476 two years ago to 72,255 in 2010 and total number of ammunitions recovered and surrendered increased tremendously from 9,621 to 114, 527 during the same period. This is as a result of the conflict in the neighboring Somalia with its effects spread up to Kenya.

5.3. 3. What is the impact of the civil conflict in Somalia on Kenya’s national security?

All those interviewed agreed that the impact of the Somalia conflict on her neighbors is a spillover that has constituted a grave security threat including the arms flow despite the UN Security Council arms embargo on Somalia. Arms and ammunitions have been shipped freely into Somalia


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throughout the 14-year period of state collapse. Some of those weapons mainly small arms are transported across regional borders and sold, and are held responsible for militarization of local conflicts in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda. Police in Nairobi have long expressed alarm at availability of small arms in Somali-inhabited portions of that city, and they attribute the increase in violence crime to the arms flow from Somalia.

Using A Level of Analysis framework, it is foregone conclusion that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons through the Kenya-Somalia border is responsible for the insecurity problem illustrated in the October 12th, 2009 Daily Nation article by Wanja entitled “Give up illegal arms, warns Kibaki”. The president said it was time to mob up illegal guns among civilians since the arms are being used by criminals for cattle rustling, banditry attacks, armed robberies and hijackings in various parts of the country.

Spillover of communal and factional tensions where clan and factional clashes in Somalia have periodically spread into border areas of neighboring states, resulting in localized instability and population displacement, revenge killings, and deterioration of relations within Somalia communities of Kenya and Ethiopia. Clans attacking other neighboring rival clans are common in the North Eastern province of Kenya. The enormity of the problem is serious due to the use of sophisticated weaponry easily acquired from the stateless Somalia.

There is also the spillover of criminality where armed bandits from Somalia have crossed borders to engage in attacks and theft throughout the region. Insurgences from Somalia are feared by the inhabitants of all the border towns because of their brutal way of dealing with the people they encounter.

Destabilizing refugee flows from Somalia have put a strain on Kenya’s resources and fuelled conflict with the host communities. There was consensus among those interviewed that indeed refugee problem is one of the biggest headaches for Kenyan authorities. The Eastleigh estate of Nairobi is one such place where the Somalis have virtually taken over control of the estate. Almost all business activities are under their control yet it is very hard to determine if these are Kenyan Somalis or Somalis from Somalia. This area has thus degenerated into a nightmare for Kenyan security operatives and intelligence chiefs.

Most respondents argued that there is a partial loss of control by the Kenyan Government of border area with Somalia and this has become a threat to


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Kenya’s national security. The insurgents in Somalia have had a field day in their clandestine activities because they can cross to the Kenyan side of the border without fear since the border is not marked. The insurgence groups have no regard and respect for the international boundaries since according to them the North Eastern province of Kenya is part of the Greater Somalia.

Most respondents attributed contraband and smuggling of products to Kenya as a national security threat. It was generally agreed that most counters in the North Eastern towns have stock of goods only from the war-torn country of Somalia and nothing from Kenya. Most business people interviewed argued that Kenyan goods were expensive compared to the cheap items from Somalia. The ‘donkey goods’ are not taxed and thus are cheaper compared to those from Nairobi and other big towns in the country.

The respondents argued that Kenya is being used as a transshipment point for terrorists and insurgences. Somalia has proved to be an ideal transshipment point for the movement of men, money, and material into the neighboring states. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) at times used Somalia in the same manner in operations against the Ethiopian government, and in 2004 members of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) were arrested in Hargeisa, where they were attempting to transit from Eritrea into the Somali region of Ethiopia. Somalia is generally not hospitable site as a safe haven for foreign terrorists, as foreigners are highly visible in Somalia and because terrorists are vulnerable to the same threats of extortion and lawlessness which plague aid agencies personnel. Nevertheless, in several known instances foreign Islamic terrorists have resided in Somalia for extended periods of time, or have fled to Somalia from Kenya following terrorist attacks there.

The Somali diaspora in Kenya and other neighboring countries should be monitored so as to check their actions because some of them are known to ignite and augment the conflict by fund raising to support the local warlords. The diaspora have also been used to recruit fighters for the insurgences and serve as link persons in purchase and importation of weapons to Somalia despite the UN embargo. The diaspora have also been used to perpetuate the illegal human and drug trafficking from Somalia to the rest of the world.

The respondents pointed out that Somalia is an incubator for epidemics and unchecked communicable diseases. The prolonged collapse of various institutions have combined to render Somalia especially vulnerable


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to undetected outbreaks of dangerous communicable diseases, including new drug-resistant strains of diseases.

5.3.4. Is al Shabab recruiting and training Kenyan youths in Somalia to engage them in terrorist activities?

There is evidence that al Shabab is recruiting innocent Kenyan youths into their military activities, training them in military and terror activities all in the name of religion and in order to beef up their numbers for the war against the Transitional Government of Somalia and Western interest in the region. Most people interviewed are clear that indeed al Shabab and other insurgents recruit young unsuspecting Kenyan youths in their clandestine groups and train them as fighters.

Besides, the insurgences in Somalia are keen on utilizing the clan politics among the Somali people especially those living around the border so as to get sympathy and support across the border and thus recruit innocent Kenyan youths into their rank and file beef up their numbers. The insurgence groups in Somalia are also exploiting the poverty levels in the North Eastern Kenya to attract and recruit youths from Kenya. The youth interest is to get out of poverty hence any promise of employment attracts them but they do not understand fully the implication of joining al Shabab or other insurgence groups operating in the war-torn Somalia. Once trained, the youths are deployed in the field as fighters and others are used for terror activities in the region and the world at large.

In a more recent incident, an official of the Council of Imams of Kenya banned the watching of video and Multi-Choice DSTV channel in Mandera which experts interpreted as al Shabab’s tactic being imported to Kenya. The cleric claimed that the channel was showing programs that were anti-Muslim thus spoiling the youth. Of course these brought an up row from the general public who saw the infringement on their fundamental human right by the self proclaimed cleric forcing the Government to rescind the order but the damage had already been done. The message being sent is loud and clear: al Shabab is slowly gaining and winning the support of some Kenyan Muslims hence radicalism is coming to Kenya from Somalia.

During a demonstration in Nairobi after attending prayer on Friday, the demonstrators were seen waving al Shabab flags in Nairobi prompting the Government to allege the involvement of al Shabab in the demonstrations. That was meant to show that Kenya was against Islam and therefore to spark a religious conflict. Islamic fundamentalists are now present in Kenya and this was demonstrated on 15th January, 2010


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when the Muslim faithful staged a demonstration in Nairobi demanding the release of the controversial Muslim preacher Sheikh Ibrahim Al–Feisal..

On Sunday, 23rd June, 2010, the anti terrorist police in Kenya raided and arrested two people in the coastal town of Mombasa who were suspected to be terrorists, and on further interrogation they were found carrying firearms, a training manual for jihad and several identification cards suspected to be those used by al Shabab insurgents of Somalia. While this is a commendable effort by the law enforcement agents, it is a case of too little too late because, the intelligence services should have known about the two people and barred them from entering the country with weapons for such serious purpose like terrorist activities. Reporting in The Standard, Tuesday, May 25, 2010 Willis Okech and Linah Benyawa in an article titled “Terror suspects deny charges” the two writers reported how Rahim Khan and Samir Khan were arraigned in a Mombasa court for being in possession of lethal weapons which included Italian made pistols, air gun, star gun and bows and arrows.

These three examples are a clear demonstration of the determination of the insurgence in Somalia to penetrate Kenya and further their interests using Kenya as a launching pad as well as a centre for their illegal activities. Kenya must invest heavily in the preventive and pre-emptive policies in order to put in check the activities of the insurgence in Somalia and curb the actions of these groups against Kenya.

With regard to the activities of the insurgence in Kenya, Muller says that the “security communities between non-democratic states can never approach the ideal type of security architecture as closely as democracies can” (Muller, 2005:70-71). This theory can be used to illustrate the frustration of Kenya in handling the infiltration of al Shabab and other insurgence groups in Somalia working against Kenya’s tranquility and peace. Kenya’s security dilemma occasioned by the conflict in Somalia is because the two countries are at different levels of democracy. According to Muller, two democracies cannot be in a conflict. Kenya and Somalia are far much apart in terms of democracy and basic freedoms to their citizens, their human rights records are far much apart hence the insurgence’s belligerence against Kenya and its people.

5.4 Suggested Area for Further Research

Al Shabab is the face of insurgency in Somalia; there are equally very strong groups who portent to fight jihad or holy war against the infidels. Groups like Hizbul Islam, Ras Kamboni among others are known to support


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al Qaeda-like activities and hence represent radicalism which is intolerant and a danger to the neighboring countries. This is an area that needs to be explore further given the dynamic nature of the civil war in Somalia. Many groups keep on emergin with radical leaning but keep on changing names to conceal their true identity. Any further research must bear this fact in mind while carrying out any investigation.


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CHAPTER66. ConCluSIonS And RECoMMEndATIonS 6.1 Introduction

This paper comes up with very interesting findings,it advocates a proactive rather than retroactive approach as the best way forward in dealing with Somalia conflict. No sympathy should be given to the insurgents and their cronies, and no effort should be spared in bringing their efforts to an end. There are several suggested recommendations (See 6.3 below) put forward which if implemented by the relevant authorities would make the effect of Somalia conflicts less severe on Kenya’s national security.

6.2 Conclusion

This research achieved its stated objectives and answered the research questions by identifying and establishing the main threats to Kenya’s national security using the Protracted Social (PSC) conceptual framework and A Level of Analysis conceptual framework which were also integrated with the theoretical frameworks of New-Realism, Institutionalism and the Democratic theories.

Furthermore, economic dislocation due to the continued fighting in Somalia has adversely affected economic growth in Kenya. This compounded with the links with terrorist groups in Somalia, has kept away prospective investors as well as tourists who would have wished to visit Kenya. A Level of Analysis framework attributes such effects of internal conflict on the regional security as negative which is the case for Kenya in the Somalia conflict. It is evident that the disruptive flow of refugees into Kenya from the stateless Somalia and the cross border movement of people, ideas and black market activities are sources of insecurity for Kenya.

The responses to the research questions are all unanimous about the threats to Kenya’s national security organs and agents by the insurgents in the stateless Somalia. It is clear that the crisis in Somalia has very severe ramifications for Kenya. It is not safe for Kenya to bury her head in the sand and expect the best because the threats are real and alive. Kenya faces terror threats every day and an attack from Somalia insurgents is inevitable.


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All indications point to a very bad war if immediate steps are not taken to resolve the conflict. The proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea seems to be getting out of hand in Somalia and regional differences seem to get squared out. International differences seem to be played out in the country, not to mention the testing of new weapons and dumping of toxic waste in the territory. These are dangerous issues that need not be in the neighborhood, hence Kenya, to enjoy peace and sustainable development, has a major role to play to make Somalia a haven of peace and prosperity. Kenya should be in the forefront in promoting dialogue among the warring parties in Somalia and employ strong diplomatic efforts to end hostilities in the country through the UN, AU and IGAD.

However, to achieve maximum results, the various efforts should be harmonized and an agreed upon strategy, under the guidance of IGAD, should be employed. Who should spearhead these efforts if not Kenya?Diplomatic presence between the two countries should be seen as an opportunity to engage each other and support the international efforts to restore a functional government in Somalia while keeping at bay those elements that are used to scuttle peace process.

Efforts in training the Transitional Federal Government police and assisting in empowering them in order to tame crime in Somalia should be intensified. This way, the spillover effect of such crimes to the neighboring countries like Kenya could be avoided. All weapons in the wrong hand should be returned to the police and all other insurgence groups should be disarmed so as to restore law and order in the streets of Mogadishu and other towns in Somalia.

The capacity of TFG army must also be boosted through training and logistical support and this can be done by the countries which are more affected with the conflict.

Priority should be given to combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden which has seriously affected inflow and outflow of goods through the Indian Ocean. This can be done by offering logistical and financial support to the international organizations that are collaborating to fight the vice along the ocean. Besides, the Kenya army can play a key role in the control of piracy and terrorist cells operating in Somalia.

Kenya should give support to the UN and AU peace keeping force in Somalia. Kenya has a good reputation in peace keeping efforts across the


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globe and hence should use this experience to urgently donate peace keepers to Somalia.

6.3 Recommendations

1. It is recommended that Kenyan authorities should play a more active role in getting a quick solution to Somalia conflict by working with other IGAD member states and other international partners including the UN and AU before the conflict becomes regional.

2. Kenya should spearhead a push for an occupational force provided by the United Nations Organization (UNO) under the Security Council Resolution in order to restore a functional government in Somalia for a specified period of time before organizing for grassroots election of civilian government by the people of Somalia. It is, apparent that the AU intervention will not succeed thus what is required is the UN.

An occupational force of over 40,000 strong troops is required to restore peace in Somalia. Mandates of priority should be the disarmament of all the combatants in the country, establishment of an interim government pending a general election that should usher in a new democratic government after conducting security sector reform.

3. The war in Somalia should be kept within Somalia thus all those warlords should be barred from not only living in Kenya but also investing in Kenya, their dirty money should not be allowed to do business in Kenya. Kenya should not entertain any of the warlords to visit, live or even use facilities like hospitals or hotels of any kind in the country. Sympathizers of al Shabab, Hizbul Islam, Ras Kamboni and any other insurgence group should be blacklisted and barred from entering Kenya.

The Somali diaspora in Kenya and other neighboring countries should be monitored so as to check their actions because some of them are known to ignite and augment the conflict by fundraising to support the local warlords.

4. Kenyan youth should be sensitized on the need to co-exist with others and avoid radical religious beliefs that can be used to isolate other sections of the society thus leading to violence and lawlessness. It is clear that poverty and non-employment are costing the lives of our youth. Creating employment for the youth should be a priority of the government in the North Eastern province because despite what leaders say but without employment, the youth will follow whoever gives them some means of


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survival however dangerous the venture may be. Programs like kazi kwa vijana and national youth fund for the youth to take loans and start small business should be encouraged. This will empower them and help them to make the right decisions.

5. Kenya should not recognize the breakaway states of Puntland and Somaliland because this will be a way of encouraging secession by other states and thus Kenya will lack the moral authority to refuse such claims and demands by the Somali community in Kenya. A unitary state will polarize Somalia further and fan more conflict in an already volatile country and this may also fuel tensions not only in Kenya but also in other Horn of Africa states of Ethiopia and Djibouti Republic. Al Shabab’s threat and demand for a unified Somalia including those in the neighboring countries should be fought by all and sentry because this is a call for chaos.

6. The Government of Kenya should avoid all policies that are discriminatory to the minority groups in the country and strive to correct all such anomalies through deliberate affirmative action that targets such groups. This will ensure that discrimination is a thing of the past and assure the minorities that their interests are taken care of and guaranteed through legislation and empowerment..

7. The constitution of Kenya guarantees religious freedom and worship thus religious tolerance should be upheld by both the government and its citizens at all times and religious fundamentalism avoided. All religious organizations should be held responsible for any unbecoming behavior by its followers.

8. Efforts should be made to mark and man the porous border between Kenya and Somalia in order to minimize banditry, smuggling and illegal refugees crossing over to Kenya.

9. The Kenyan navy should play a more proactive other than reactive role in the Indian Ocean; they should be able to escort ships from the port of Mombasa across the Gulf of Aden instead of waiting at the periphery for other countries to do it for them.

10. The Kenyan government must be firm and resilient in order to stop the perception that Kenya is both a beneficiary as well as a loser when it comes to the conflict in Somalia. Deliberate steps must be taken by the Government of Kenya to put an end to al Shabab and other insurgences’ growing influence not only in Somalia but also in Kenya. No part of Kenya


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should experience actions of the insurgence in Somalia since that will mean abdication of a cardinal responsibility by the government of Kenya: the protection of Kenyan people with their property. Time for a decisive action by the Government of Kenya is now and today but not tomorrow or any other time.11. The investigative capacity of the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS), the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Kenya police and the anti-terrorist police must be strengthened so as to be able to proactively detect terrorist threats before they are carried out either in Kenya or even in Somalia. Funding to this important security organs of the Government should be increased so as to be able to carry out the mandate effectively in order to keep at bay any threats to Kenya’s national security within and in the region.

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IV The Quest for Common Ethnic Identity and Self-

Governance in the Southern Regional State Within the Context of Ethiopian Federal System: The Case of The

Gewada-dhobase (Ale) Ethnic Group By: Temesgen Thomas Halabo


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CHAPTER 1Introduction background to the Study

Most of the African countries were trapped by two mutually incompatible colonial legacies in the post-colonial era. The first one was the nation-building project which forged on artificial border without the consent of the people concerned (Ryan, 1995 and Irobi, 2005). The other one was the demand of ethno-nationalist groups for self-determination as the colonial masters amalgamated incompatible and sometimes hostile ethnic groups in one region, or separated one ethnic group into different regions (Markakis, 1994 and Abebe, 2005).

Although Ethiopia had sustained its independence during the colonial period, it had experienced the colonial legacies which occurred in the colonized African countries. The state-building problem the country currently faces are not any less challenging than those faced by most other African countries, which were carved out by colonial rule (Kidane, 2007). The modern Ethiopian state was created through expansionist conquests in the 2nd half of the 19thC by Emperor Menelik II. These territorial expansionist conquests were achieved through taking away the independence of various ethnic groups, a massive alienation of land and suppressing the cultures and languages of the conquered people (Young, 1996; Merera, 2003; Vaughan, 2003 and Kidane, 2007).

Accordingly, the conquests resulted in the birth of an empire under Amhara elite’s ethnic hegemony, political domination, cultural marginalization and economic exploitation of the subjected groups (Merera, 2003 and Yishak, 2008). It is this persistent campaign of conquests that enables one to draw a direct parallelism with European colonialism in the rest of Africa in the views of opponents of these nation-building projects. However, the proponents of this late 19thC nation-building project argue that no great power in history ever built a nation without conquest and use of force. Thus, what Menelik II did was to re-unify territories historic Ethiopia had lost in the past and hence, he was all-time hero without whom present Ethiopia would be inconceivable.


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No matter what ethno-nationalist perspectives towards the interpretation of historical road to modern Ethiopia are, the root of national or ethnic questions in Ethiopia is induced by the way of creation of Ethiopian Empire and the subsequent dynamics of its evolution.

After the demise of the feudal regime in 1974, the Derg took the opportunity of the political vacuum and seized the state power. The Derg was admittedly more open to ethnic questions than its predecessor. It was the first regime to make a formal declaration of equality of all “nationalities” in Ethiopia (Aklilu, 1999). In addition, the regime, for the first time, proclaimed an end to ethnic oppression and recognized equality and the right to self-determination for all nationalities on its PNDR of 1976. The promise, however, was short-lived as ethnic nationalism was conceived as a threat to revolution (Abate, 2004). Thus, the Derg’s solution to the problem of ethnic questions was a military response which ended up in aggravating the problem than solving it.

Following its hard-won victory over the Derg in May 1991, the EPRDF successfully secured the government power and ratification of the transitional period Charter. The aspirations stipulated in the preamble of the Charter include EPRDF’s commitment to establish a new society: a society based on equality, rule of law and the right to self-determination, including secession as a clear departure from its predecessors (FDRE, 1995). Once the new charter paved the way for decentralization, Ethiopia has no longer had a unitary but a federal state since 1995. The new FDRE constitution created a landmark in the history of the country as far as ethnic questions are concerned. This constitution, for the first time, formalized an ethnic-based federal state structure model which gave autonomous right to federated units. This federal arrangement is basically demarcated on the basis of “settlement patterns, identity, language and consent of the people concerned” (Art. 46/2).

The federalization of Ethiopia represents a huge rupture in the country’s political history in that the hitherto marginalized ethnic groups are now entitled to the right to self-determination including secession. It is this rapturous move that made Ethiopia a federal democratic republic consisting of nine federated units (Art.47/1), namely Afar, Amhara, Benishangul, Gambella, Hareri, Oromia, SNNPRS, Somali and Tigray.

The Southern Regional State is one of the nine federated units currently divided into thirteen administrative zones and eight special woredas. It is the most multi-ethnic regional state. It was established after the unilateral amalgamation of the five regional units (kilil 7-11) organized in today’s


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south during transitional period. This amalgamation has provoked political mobilization in the South. The quest for re-establishment of regional status by Sidama and zonal status by Wolayita, inter alia, were prominent cases in point in the South (Aalen, 2008). However, such similar ethnic claims for self-governance have continued to become significant political factors in the region.

This research, therefore, aspires to examine the continuing dynamics of ethnic claims for self-determination and how these ethnic claims have been causing inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts in this Regional State within the context of Ethiopian federal system.


The FDRE constitution has created a positive interrelationship between practicing the right to self-determination and ethnic identity thereby recognizing this right to ethnically defined groups in the country. Therefore, it is justifiable and legitimate for all ethnically defined groups to claim the right to self-determination.

The FDRE constitution in article 39(1) clearly stipulates the right to self-determination up to secession for ethnically defined groups in the country. While declaring this extensive right, the constitution established only nine federated units, a reduced number by five as compared to the transitional period. They were carved on the basis of settlement patterns, language, identity, and consent of the people concerned. However, it remains silent as to why only these federated units are created against the existence of more than eighty ethnic groups in the country. Ethnicity is central in the establishment of federated units and also in recognizing the right to ethnically defined groups to establish their own state. The names of federated units confirm this in that six of the Ethiopian ethnic groups have their own regions and the names of the remaining three regions depicts their multi-ethnic character. Here one can see that the application of ethnic criteria in establishing federated units was used inconsistently.

In this regard, the SNNPRS is a unique development within the Ethiopian federal system. Proclamation no.7/1992 of the transitional period organized five regional units in the areas comprising today’s SNNPRS. ________________________________________________64From the 14 regional units or kilils established by Proclamation no.7/1992 during the transitional period, five of them were organized in the areas comprising today’s SNNPRS. See Chapter Five for detail.


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This administrative order of the transition period in today’s South had created wider space for both larger and smaller ethno-linguistic groups to be able to set up their own self-government at sub-regional level (Aalen, 2008). However, this honeymoon for hitherto marginalized ethnic groups waned when the five regional units were unilaterally merged together into one federated unit-SNNPRS. Considering this, one might ask if there is any historical, geographic and linguistic justification to merge the very diverse ethno-linguistic groups of these regional units into one. Is this unilateral merger jeopardizing the constitutionally entitled rights?

Moreover, the EPRDF’s unilateral merger led to conglomeration of 56 ethnic groups. Later on, several ethnic groups within this state came up with a series of demands for recognition of separate ethnic identities and having an administrative structure (Aklilu, 1999). The calls for re-establishment of regional status by Sidama and for separate administrative autonomy at zonal level from the then multi-ethnic Simen Omo zone by the Wolayita, among others, were prominent cases in point in the South (Aalen, 2008). Is there any institutional mechanism to realize the basic self-governance aspiration of these conglomerated ethnic groups under existing political order in the South?

Thereby, consolidating very diverse ethno-linguistic groups of the former five regional units, the EPRDF regime has created minority-within-minority in the South (Aklilu, 2003 and Aalen, 2008). Given the multi-ethnic nature of SNNPRS, it is expected that there exists a room for the establishment of sub-national levels of administration that are meant for the self-determination of smaller ethnic groups. Currently, there exist only 21 sub-regional units in the region. However, it is quite elemental to ask as to why only these sub- regional units were created against the existence of 56 ethno-linguistic groups. In the SNNPRS, more than 50 ethno-linguistic groups do not have zones or special woredas designated by their own names (Beken, 2008). These ethno-linguistic groups either live in multi-ethnic zones such as Debub Omo or are a minority group in a zone or special woreda dominated and designated by the names of other groups (ibid). Did the emerging ethnic claims in the SNNPRS emanate from the groups’ desire to exercise the right to self-determination without being subsumed under sub-regional units of another group or is it the effect of deliberate manipulation of elite for their own personal fiat? __________________________________________65 Even though the official name is SNNPRS, other names such as South and Southern Regional state are alternatively used. Here we use these names interchangeably throughout the paper.


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Article 39(3) clearly stipulates that each nation, nationality and people has the right to a full measure of self-government thereby establishing their own territorial institutions of self-government and be represented equally at the state and federal level. Article 39(3) of SNNPRS’s constitution recognizes exactly similar right to ethnically defined groups in the region. So far, as mentioned earlier, a few ethnic groups are exercising this right notwithstanding the recurrent demand of some ethnic groups. Communities that have defined themselves along ethnic lines are denied the right to self-rule in the South which creates a difference between the principles and practice that produces anger and discontent (Aalen, 2008). Is the constitutionally recognized right to self-determination fully respected for all ethnically defined groups in the South? Is the government accommodating ethnic claims for self-governance in accordance with the constitutional provisions?

The existing ethnic assertions for self-governance in the South, like that by the Ale, are motivated by the fact that the constitution gives them the right to self-determination. It is justifiable and legitimate for all ethnically defined groups to come up with claims of self-governance as long as they see themselves as fulfilling the criteria that the constitution draws up in Article 39/5 so as to give the status of ethnic group and hence, the right to self-determination. Tsegay (2001) argues that the merging of ethnicity and the right to self-determination encouraged various ethnic groups to assert their ethnic identity. Is an increasing number of ethnic assertions for separate ethnic identity and self-governance at various levels in the South encouraged by merger of ethnicity and exercising the right to self-determination?

Though not entirely uncommon in the pre-1991 period, the resurgence of active sentiment for preserving old identities or reinforcing the assertion of a new ethnic identity has appeared rather vigorously in the post-1991 period (Aklilu, 2003). For instance, the rise of a distinct Silte ethnic identity vis-à-vis the Guragie is essentially inter-linked with the post-1991 experience of ethnic politics (Asnake, 2004). The struggle of the Silte for recognition of distinct ethnic identity was not an end in itself but rather a means for another end i.e. recognition of self-governance right. Is the Gewada-Dhobase quest for common ethnic identity a means for another end or really to reconstruct or reassert their identities that have been suppressed and lost in the past? What are the challenges for attaining their long-standing claim for self-governance since 1995? This is the main local dynamics this study grapples with. ___________________________________________-66Defines nation, nationalities and people as “a group of people who have or share a large measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, beliefs in a common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, and an identifiable contiguous territory”


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Even though a handful empirical ‘top-down’ research have been done in the SNNPRS both by Ethiopian scholars and expatriates on issues of ethnicity, ethnic identity and quest for self-determination, there are still many cases to be addressed at the bottom. In this regard, the revival and development of distinct ethnic identity among the Gewada-Dhobase (Ale) group; the challenges they encountered for gaining official recognition for common ethnic identity; the reasons that made their pressing question ineffective for having self-government and some other related issues have not yet been fully researched. Thus, there exists an evident knowledge gap that ought to be filled through research undertakings. So, by delving itself into the investigation of this unstudied and timely research topic, this research shall endeavor to accomplish that task. Generally, this study will tackle and give answers for the following basic research queries:

1.2.1 Research Questions

1. What are the major determinant factors that shaped the Gewada- Dhobase quest for common ethnic identity? 2. To what extent has the present ethnic-based federal model virtually addressed ethnic claims for self-determination in SNNPRS? 3. What are the challenges and new prospects for peace in the study area provided that the government recognizes the self- governance right for the Ale?

1.3 objectives of the Study 1.3.1 General objective

The main objective of this research is to examine the Gewada-Dhobase quest for common ethnic identity and self-governance within the larger framework of continuing dynamics of ethnic claims for self-determination in multi-ethnic Southern Regional State. 1.3.2 Specific Objectives

The specific objectives of this study are: • To analyze the major determinant factors that shaped the Gewada- Dhobase quest for common ethnic identity. • To examine whether or not the Gewada-Dhobase quest for common ethnic identity is to reassert or reconstruct those identities that have been suppressed or lost in the past. • To explore how far the ethnic federal model and concomitant right


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to self-determination have virtually addressed ethnic claims for self- determination in the SNNPRS. • To investigate the local dynamics that instigates the subsumed ethnic groups to assert their ethnic identity and hence, self-governance. • To examine the challenges and new prospects for sustainable peace in the study area provided that the government recognizes the self-governance right to the Ale ethnic group.

1.4 Significance of the study

By analyzing the Ale demand for recognition of separate ethnic identity and self-governance within the larger framework of continuing dynamics of ethnic claims for self-determination in SNNPRS, the study may have the following significances:

• It may contribute to the understanding of the continuing dynamics of ethnic claims for self-governance in the South. • It may help to understand the extent to which the existing EPRDF policy initiatives such as federal state structure and the right to self-determination have virtually addressed ethnic claims for self-determination in Ethiopia in general and the SNNPRS in particular.• It may provide concrete evidence for policy makers, formal government institutions and other concerned bodies responsible in handling and resolving this and other similar cases in SNNPRS.• Finally, this study may serve as a base for future further research in the area

1.5 Research Methodology 1.5.1 Research design

This research is based on qualitative method approach mainly with peace and security, and to some extent historical orientations. To situate the study in historical context and to draw the contours of the processes that gave rise to ethnic questions in Ethiopia, I made use of a brief historical analysis on the birth of modern Ethiopian state and the root of the current Ethiopian federal system. As one local dynamics was basically addressed within the larger context of continuing ethnic claims for self-determination in the South, this research might be taken as a case study.


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1.5.2 Sampling Techniques

For this research, non-probability sampling techniques, particularly of convenience and judgmental were employed. The convenience sampling uses immediate and available research population participants whereas the judgmental sampling recruits participants on the basis of their capability to give all the necessary data for the study (Cohen et al, 2000).

1.5.3 Methods of data Collection The primary data collection instruments include: interview, focus group discussions, legal documents and official letters. The legal documents include transitional period charter, federal and SNNPRS constitutions and proclamations. The official letters include those letters ethnic groups in the South have written to or received from any concerned government bodies so as to analyze the continuing dynamics of ethnic claims for self-determination in the South in general and of the Ale in particular. This study also makes use of secondary resources, such as books, journals, thesis, dissertation, articles and so forth in order to make the study more comprehensive through looking at diverse scholarly interpretation on the Ethiopian federal system in general and whether or not this system has virtually addressed ethnic claims for self-determination in multi-ethnic Southern Regional State in particular.

1.5.3.1 Interview For this study, two types of interview were employed, namely informal and formal interview by using unstructured guidelines. Interview was conducted with the Ale key informants and elders, informants from Konso and Derashe ethnic groups, local ruling elite of the Konso and Derashe special woredas and Regional government officials after informing them about the purpose of the study and securing their consent. The participants were selected on the basis of their knowledge about the issues concerned, their position as local leaders, as a heads of religious institutions and position in government offices both at local and regional levels.

1.5.3.2 Focus Group discussion (FGd)

The participants for discussions include local leaders, elders and heads of religious institutions for they are likely to have knowledge in relation to the issues concerned. They were selected with the help of field assistants. These discussions contain four groups: two groups from Gewada under KSW and


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the other two from Dhobase under DSW. In these four FGDs, a total of 26 people participated from both sides.

The field assistants were employed in order to facilitate the data collection processes. As Berreman in Asebe (2007) described, the background and the social acceptance of field assistant among the study groups enable the researcher to win the confidence of the groups, to cross to their back-region information and reduce informants’ attempt to conceal their secrets. To this end, assistants were selected in accordance with their familiarity with the community, their knowledge about the geographic sites of the study and the issue under investigation.

Unstructured guideline for interview and FGD was prepared. Based on situations, the guideline prepared in English was translated into native language with the help of the trained field assistant fluent in both Amharic and local language of the community. A tape recorder was also used to record the responses after getting their full consent but they were not willing that their pictures be taken and cited in the text as a reference. This is because the ‘sensitivity’ of the topic itself made them skeptical to expose themselves fully. As a result, the names of the research participants were kept anonymous and in most cases collective names like “informants”, “higher officials”, “elders” and “participants of FGD” were used as alternatives in the paper. By doing so, the researcher has not only kept their names confidential but also tried to protect their security and privacy including those of the interviewed local and regional government officials.

1.5.4 Method of data Analysis and Fieldwork Challenges

This study used concurrent methods of data analysis in which different narratives, perspectives, analytical and conceptual expressions, and theoretical approaches were used within the contextual framework of subsequent chapters. The close linkage between the chapters necessitates the use of going forth and back particularly dealing with Chapters 4 and 5 and almost all chapters rely on the theoretical frameworks and related literature review under Chapter Two of this thesis. To maintain the reliability, credibility and validity of the research, different strategies such as indepth understanding of the study issue, cross-checking the gathered data with other sources and triangulation of the data using thematic analysis were designated.

All along the fieldwork, a multitude of challenges was encountered. The recent memory of the conflict and violence and unimproved inter-ethnic


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relations particularly between the Derashe and the Ale, emotional feelings among the masses due to inability to achieve their long-standing claim since 1995, limited knowledge about the issue itself especially that related with their claim for self-governance and absence of any literature on the study community in general were a few among several practical as well as methodological challenges.

1.6 Organization of the Thesis The study is structured into six chapters. The first chapter sets the background to the study, statement of the problem, research questions, objectives, relevance of the study and research methodology. The second chapter covers the theoretical approaches and review of related literature. Theoretical approaches mainly focus on ethnicity and federalism whereas the review of related literature focuses on the Ethiopian experiences.

The background of the Ale, including their geographic setting, their myth of common origin, a shared historical tradition and others are dealt with under Chapter Three of this thesis. The fourth chapter is relatively broad in content and covers the Gewada-Dhobase quest for common ethnic identity. Specifically, the main themes that are dealt with under this chapter include the historical legacy and its impact, the role of the new ethnic-based federal model in instigating the ethnic consciousness in the South, politiciziation of ethnic identity, and finally the endorsement of the Gewada-Dhobase common ethnic identity as the “Ale”.

Chapter Five focuses on the constitutional protection of ethnic groups and its challenge in the South. Explicitly, it focuses on the impact of creating minority-within-minority in the South, the rising expectation and relative deprivation as a cause for 2008 conflict and violence by the Ale, and finally the challenges and new prospect for peace in the study area. The sixth chapter concludes the main themes of the thesis thereby providing some possible steps forward in a quest for sustainable peace and stability that may contribute to the creation of more harmonious inter-ethnic relations in the Southern Regional State in general and of the study area in particular.


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CHAPTER 2Theoretical Approaches and Review of Related literature

2.1 Theoretical Approaches This sub-topic is dedicated to discussing different approaches on ethnicity, federalism and Federalism as an option for managing ethnic conflicts. The aim of this is to establish theoretical frameworks upon which the Gewada-Dhobase (Ale) quest for common ethnic identity and self-governance is explored and analyzed.

2.1.1 Theoretical Approaches on Ethnicity 2.1.1.1 Primordialist Approach

Primordialists argue that ethnicity is something objectively given. They explain ethnicity based on primordial elements such as kinship, common psychological make up, tradition, history, language, culture, customs and religion and common territorial unity that keep members together as a distinct group. These primordial elements are objectively given and genetically determined. These elements are also used as a marker for group’s self-identification and ascription by others. Hence, primordialists’ understanding of ethnic identity implies that the cultural communalities of ethnic members, which are seen as coherent, easily distinguishable, stable and permanent, are the main characteristics and the reason for the common action of the group.

Primordialists faced criticism coming from a number of sources. The critics argue that these common traits can not be seen as natural, inborn or inherited or determined genetically. According to the critics, there is consensus today that the primordial approach doesn’t capture the essence of ethnic identities, and cannot explain why ethnicity has remained a source of political action in interaction with others. And yet, for the critics, ethnicity is not given but it is a dynamic and flexible phenomenon. They further argue that the primordialists failed to provide an explanation for vulnerability of ethnic identity to change over time. In addition, for the critics, primordialists ignored the material concern of group members and other


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socially constructed ambitions in asserting belongingness to a particular ethnic group (Isajiw, 1992). Finally, in confutation of this approach, several perspectives emerged. Constructivist versus Instrumentalist approaches is briefly in order here.

2.1.1.2 Constructivism Versus Instrumentalism For both approaches, ethnic group is conventionally perceived as sharing common cultural traits, language, religion, history and tradition. The proponents of these approaches argue that ethnicity is not something given but it is a dynamic, flexible, negotiable and socially constructed phenomenon which can be situationally manipulated by members. Nagel (1994) states that ethnicity is something in continuity undergoing re-definitions and re-constructions and always continues in such a manner. In addition, for these approaches, ethnic identity is subjective, situational and relational. Hence, one may be able to understand that a certain group is either part of a hitherto larger group or is one that separated at one time. This group may find its real identity and claim unity in the time to come.

Instrumentalists have underlined that ethnicity is strategically used and is open for manipulation for several ends. Constructivists, however, go beyond this to add that ethnicity is not only a matter of strategy, but must be constructed on the basis of selective interpretation of real cultural experiences of history and tradition, not by any experiences, in order to mobilize for political and other action. They were the first to recognize that ethnicity could be used in political and social competitions. As a reaction to primordialists’ view that claimed that ethnic identities were expression of backward political allegiances that would demise with the modernization of society, instrumentalists argue that the mobilization of ethnic consciousness was a rational response to social and political development. They further state that ethnic groups were “coalitions which have been formed as a part of rational efforts to secure benefits created by the force of modernization.” Ethnic groups are calculating, self-interested collective actors that maximize material values through the vehicle of common identities. While ethnic group members are likely to feel and argue that they act on behalf of their ethnic group because of specific culturally rooted experiences, instrumentalists would discharge this as a result of deliberate manipulation and benefit maximizing strategies.

Constructivists, in contrast to instrumentalists’ use of ethnic identity, may incorporate an analysis of how ethnic relations are being defined and perceived by the people themselves. By focusing on the cultural and historical base for the development of ethnic consciousness instead of


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taking for granted that ethnic groups are created for strategic use, one may be able to understand the subjective experience upon which people act. A fundamental challenge to instrumentalism is that it assumes that it is the individual and profit maximizing preferences of ethnic group members which matter for ethnic political mobilization. When ethnic groups are defined as “calculating, self-interested collective actors, maximizing the material interests through the vehicle of the communal identities”, there is a notion that the individual preferences are automatically and undisputedly aggregated into a common stand for the whole group. Thus, the dominant preferences inevitably become the value of the whole group and ethnic groups are thereby seen as homogenous and cohesive, speaking with one voice (Yeros, 1999).

One of the first academic moves away from primordial definition of ethnicity was the influential anthropological study of ethnic groups and boundaries by Barth (1969), where it was argued that ethnicity is not “the cultural stuff that it encloses”, but it is the aspect of a relationship to others, in the boundary which is constructed towards others. By doing so, he jettisoned culture from the concept of ethnicity. For Barth, ethnic group categorization/distinctiveness is a result of group relation in which the psychological ethnic boundaries are established through mutual perceptions and contrasting identities, but not by means of an objectively distinct culture. Moreover, as ethnic boundary is psychological, ethnic identity could be produced and reproduced within the group interactions. For him, ethnic identity is fluid and situational determined by the purpose it served in a certain context.

However, Barth has later argued that “the issue of cultural content versus boundary, as it was formulated, unintentionally served as mislead”- the intention was not to forward an understanding of ethnicity departed from the study of culture. He pointed out that since “central and culturally valued institutions and activities may be deeply involved in boundary maintenance”; it is deemed necessary to look for culture to understand how boundaries are created.

Today, there is a consensus among scholars that the three divergently contending approaches to ethnicity do not give vivid and convincing working definition of ethnicity. There is a need among scholars to transcend these divergently contending views by attempting to synthesise their views in their effort to define ethnicity. They argue that ethnicity has interrelated objective as well as subjective dimension (Isajiw, 1993:5).

Some argue that the current ethnic issue in Ethiopia is due to EPRDF’s political experiment. This is because in the years following 1991, the government officially


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introduced ethnicity as a fundamental instrument of ‘addressing ethnic questions.’ Aalen (2008) argues that the introduction of a new ethnic based federal system represents a particularly important impetus to the communities’ continuous construction of ethnic identities, since the political system in itself implies that the fluidity and flexibility of ethnic groups should be arrested, through the establishment of fixed and easily distinguishable ethnic units.

The FDRE constitution defines ethnic groups as clearly distinguishable cultural groups akin to primordial definition of ethnicity. Article 39/ 5 defines nation, nationalities and people as: “[…] a group of people who have or share a large measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, beliefs in a common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, and an identifiable contiguous territory” This definition gives the constitutional interpretative body i.e. HoF the right to define from outside, the congregation of people that are entitled to the status as ethnic group and hence, who has the right to self-determination. As indicated, the criteria used are focusing on primordial traits and all these traits are easily identifiable from outside (Tsegay, 2001).

In practice, however, primordial definition of ethnicity in the constitution is encouraging ‘congregation of people’ to claim the status as ethnic group and hence, recognition for the right to self-government. On the other hand, the ruling party is granting the right to self-rule to those who fulfill explicit criteria very inconsistently, all according to the political circumstance and what serves the interest of the party best (Aalen,2001). This inconsistency again produces conflicts and tensions, between the self-ruling ethnic groups and the regional government and competition between different ethnic groups who have gained different administrative statuses (Akililu, 2003). The great contradiction is thus: the primordial definition of ethnic groups in the constitution gives the right to self-government which again motivates another ethnic group to come up with claims for similar. This again produces an effect which is undesired for the ruling party: it seems that not all claims are in their interest and will therefore be denied, a situation which again produces political struggle for constitutionally recognized rights (Aalen, 2008).

To sum, there should be a clear distinction between the politicized ethnicity or ethnicity as an instrument of political manipulation and group’s mobilization and ethnicity as group’s self-identification and categorization in a context of social interaction.


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2.1.2 Federalism

Like most legal concepts, the concept of federalism can mean different things to different people (Alemante, 2003). As a normative concept, it refers to the advocacy of multi-tiered government combining elements of shared rule and regional self-rule (Watts, 2008). It is also defined as a political system which includes a constitutionally entrenched division of powers between a central government and sub-units, such that each level of government has sovereign authority over certain issues (Kymlicka, 2005). For Neumann (2005), federalism is the device to curb the evil use of power by dividing power between two jurisdictions: the federal government and the states. Thus, federalism is the combination of states in which power is shared between two levels of government.

Aalen (2001) argues that the federal system should be based on a pact or a covenant, where each unit freely and voluntarily surrenders some degree of autonomy to the central government. Watts (2005) also argues that federalism combines self-rule for the central government with elements of shared rule through common institutions. Hence, federalism involves shared rule plus self-rule within the frame of common institution. By its self-rule plus shared rule, federalism provides a principle of check and balance by separating power and hence, allows a better representation.

2.1.2.1 Federalism as an Option for Managing Ethnic Conflict in Multi-ethnic State

As many writers have indicated, the federal idea is getting popularity in the world. There are several reasons for this increasing interest in federalism. One of the reasons, as argued by Kymlicka (2005:269), is that federalism provides the most appropriate mechanism for accommodating ethnic diversity. He further states that since federalism is a notoriously flexible system, it can accommodate diversified interests and intensifies democracy. For Alemante (2003:56), even though federal system is inherently fragile, it has the potential for accommodating ethnic diversity and fostering the values embedded in ethnic community.

In the same vein, Elazar (1987) states that federalism, which aims at achieving self-rule and shared rule, greatly attracted multi-ethnic states as a means of managing ethno-linguistic diversity (quoted in Asnake, 2004:53). ____________________________________67 By establishing fixed and easily distinguishable criteria of defining ethnicity, EPRDF’s political system has institutionalized the politics of ethnicity and attempted to arrest the fluidity and flexibility that ethnic identities represent. There is no clear distinction as to who or which ethnic group is a nation and which is a nationalities or a people.


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Federalism seems to provide the closest institutional solution combining shared rule for some commonly shared purposes and self-rule for other purposes of regional interests. Kymlicka (2005:270) argues that even if many federal systems arose for reasons unrelated to ethno-linguistic diversity, federalism is increasingly considered as a solution to the problems of multi-nation states. Thus, to manage inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts in multi-ethnic states, no other medicine could work except federalism. For instance, introduction of ethnic-based federal model in multi-ethnic state of Ethiopia is primarily as a mechanism of conflict resolution (Vaughan, 2003:36) or as a means of maintaining unity and averting disintegration (Aalen, 2001:53).

Even if many scholars increasingly advocate for the use of federalism as a mechanism of handling ethno-linguistic diversity, there are also scholars who reveal their doubts about the use of federal option as device for managing this diversity. Some oppose federal device for fear of fragmentation. Hecter (2000), one of the advocates of federal device, states that federalism increases self-government or it meets the claims for autonomy by concession and hence, the demand for secession or the threat of fragmentation is correspondingly reduced (quoted in Aalen, 2001:19). In stark contrast, Kymlicka (2005) argues that federalism does not prevent secession, rather the presence of regional autonomy in multi-ethnic federal states increases the desire for more autonomy, and this leads to the proliferation of ethno-nationalism which is probably the strongest force against federalism.

However, Horowtiz (1985) presents federalism and its arrangements, as a means of weakening competing ethnic nationalism (as quoted in Asnake, 2004). Some scholars like Kimenyi propose ethnic based federalism as a model of harmonizing ethnic claims (ibid). If federation is ethnically based like in the Ethiopian system, the country is divided into sub-units whose borders are drawn in a way that ensures that various ethnic groups will form a local majority in one or more of the sub-units (Kymlicka, 2006). By controlling their own areas, minorities may feel a sense of security and be enabled to promote their own culture and identity. And yet, in accepting or offering the federal bargain as an instrument of managing ethno-linguistic diversity, emphasis must be given to the manner of approaching federalism as an option. This is because there are no universally accepted principles of federalism to follow. In addition, the operation of the federal system requires an analysis of more than formal


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institutional structures. It requires an analysis of the interaction of societies, structures and processes. Elazer (1994) argues that federalism is congenial to pluralism is too obvious to argue (as quoted in Tsegay, 2001). But the manner of institutionalizing the pluralism constitutionally determines the durability of federal arrangements (ibid). Unlike Kimenyi who proposes ethnic based federal model for multi-ethnic states, for Elazer, multiethnic federal system can succeed only if the basis of state formation is anything other than ethnicity. Alemante (2003), one of skeptical about federal option, argues that federal system is inherently fragile even without adding ethnicity into its mix.

To sum up, theoretical discourse on federalism as well as contending views reviewed here concerning the use of federal option as a device of managing ethno-linguistic diversity, reflect the potential problems of designing the state structures.

2.2 Related Literature: Ethiopian Experiences

2.2.1 ‘Ethnic Questions’ and Ethnic Policy in Ethiopia: The Root to Ethnic Federalism

If most of national or ethnic questions in other African countries are found in the colonial legacy, the historical legacy of ethnic questions in Ethiopia should be attributed to a nation-building project out of diverse ethno-linguistic groups. The historical process of this nation-building that continued up to the second half of the 20thC and the resultant outcomes were the genesis of ethnic nationalism in Ethiopia (Merera, 2003).

To fully grasp the historical process which led to the empire creation and the outcome of those processes in terms of ethnicity and state in current Ethiopia, some vital questions are in order. What was the status of the subjugated peoples in the emerging empire-state? Why and how had this empire creation project left its foot print of ethnic questions or the seeds of future conflict in Ethiopia?

The most brutal and devastating Shewan expansion started in Shewa itself and rapidly expanded to the rest of today’s Ethiopia with motive of exploiting rich resources (Bahru, 1991). ___________________________________________________________68 “Ethnic or national questions” in the Ethiopian context refers to the quests by representatives of ethno¬national groups and political forces and or movements to abolish ethnic domination and oppression, as well as their struggle to promote political right, freedom, equality and respect of identity of the respective ethnic group. It was articulated by ESM and eventually emerged as a political agenda during the 1974 Ethiopian revolution and even since.


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By alienating the land, the prime resource in the annexed areas, by reducing them to servitude, and by imposing on them the Amhara culture, the conquerors planted the seeds of national questions and class antagonism (Gebru, 1996, quoted in Vaughan, 2003). For the conquered areas, the outcome was a dual oppression; national as well as class. Rather than becoming a home for diversified groups, the empire became ‘a prison house of ethnic groups’ (Asebe, 2007). Thus, the conquered ethnic groups were left marginal to the political, social, economic and cultural privileges.

The author of the article entitled ‘The Question of Nationalities in Ethiopia’ by, Wallelegn Mokonnen, a student leader of ESM, which was first organized by the student of the Hailesellasie I university (now AAU) in early 1960s as a protest against the exploitative feudal system, also well ignited a political bombshell to feudal regime by explicitly addressing the “National Questions” and divulging the national oppression to academic and political milieus. The gist of his article read as follows:

Ethiopia is not really one nation. It is made up of a dozen nationalities, with their own language, ways of dressing, history, social organization and territorial entity. And what else is a nation? Is it not made of a people with a particular tongue, particular ways of dressing, a particular history, particular social and economic organization? Then may I conclude that in Ethiopia there is the Oromo nation, the Amhara nation, the Tigre nation, the Wellamo nation, the Adere nation, the Gurage nation, the Sidama nation and, however, much you may not like it the Somali nation (quoted in Vaughan, 2003:136).

This article broke the ice of silence on the nationalities question among Ethiopian students and discredited the century long illusion of the success of the nation-building project of the imperial regime. Thereafter, recognition of the right of “nations and nationalities to self-determination, including secession” to signify ethnic identity, became a driving revolutionary force in the student circles and of the nationalist movements (Merera, 2003; Yishak, 2008 and Young, 1996). This was well explained in the word of one of the student leaders, Tilahun (1970):

If we demand freedom of secession for […] all oppressed and unequal nations without exception we do so not because we favor secession, but only because we stand for free voluntary association and emerging as distinct from forcible association (as cited in Vaughan, 2003:143).


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In conclusion, the nation-building project finally tripled the size of the empire and brought in not less than several dozens of ethnic groups in unequal terms. The process of building ‘ethnocratic rule’ finally became unbearable to various subaltern ethnic groups in the state. This unbearable feudal system led to the 1974 popular revolution that brought an end to the regime. However, the absence of political parties created the political vacuum during the popular revolution and then the military junta took its advantage and seized the political power in Ethiopia.

2.2.1.1 The derg Regime and its Attitude towards the ‘nationalities

The Derg that seized the state power was so eager to distance itself from its predecessor. Under pressure from public expectations for radical change, the Derg adopted a radical “Marxist-Leninist” ideology as a guiding principle of the state and swiftly changed the political landscape of the country (Young, 1996 and Berhanie, 2006). The military junta, there by acknowledging ethnic question, was quick to proclaim equality of all nationalities and cultures in Ethiopia. However, the Derg viewed ethnic problem that rooted in the feudal legacy as cultural issues, and tried to deal with it accordingly.

Moreover, given “Marxist-Leninist” ideological credentials and long-running ideological debates within Ethiopian leftists over the issue of self-determination, the Derg in its 1976 PNDR recognized that every nationality in Ethiopia has the right to self-determination. Article V of section I of the PNDR makes this quite explicit. It, in part, reads as follows:

The right to self-determination of all nationalities will be recognized and dully respected…No nationality will dominate another one since the history, culture, language, and religion of each nationality will have equal recognition in accordance with the spirit of socialism. The unity of Ethiopia’s nationality will be based on the common struggle against feudalism and all the reactionary forces. This united struggle is based on equality, brotherhood and mutual respect. Given Ethiopia’s existing situation, the problem of nationalities can be resolved if each nationality is accorded equal full rights of self-government. This means that each nationality will have its own autonomy to decide on matters concerning its internal affairs. Within its environs, it has the right to determine the contents of its political, social and economic life, use its own language, and elects its own internal organs.


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Ethiopia’s third PDRE constitution of the 1987, in stark contrast to its predecessors except the structure of the state (unitarism), declared the equality of all nationalities (art.2/1) including development and respectability of their languages (art.21/5). However, the Derg intensified the policy of centralization and arbitrary rule just like its predecessor. It had neither the intention to weaken the power of the centre, nor the willingness to allow meaningful participation in the government. Hence, it did not go as far as anointing ethnicity as the most important political agenda of the country (Berhanie, 2006).

Finally, the military junta was almost immediately challenged from many quarters. It was the EPRDF forces that after a long and devastating civil war ousted the Derg in May 1991 and restructured the Ethiopian state on a completely new foundation. Now, let us briefly see a new EPRDF’s experiment to address long-standing ethnic questions in Ethiopia. 2.2.1.2 The Emergence of EPRdF and the Route to Ethnic Federalism In post-cold war era, there was unclear wave of democratization in Africa that shifted state ideology either as a decisive change to respond to demands of ethnic groups for recognition of political autonomy or provided simple lip service as a superficial project to appease westerners (Matlosa, 2004). During this wave of democratization of the states in Africa, the federal formula was a focus for the multi-ethnic states, including Ethiopia as a strategy of accommodating the demands of diverse ethnic groups. One of the crucial steps taken by the EPRDF in re-engineering the Ethiopian political landscape was the adoption of a model of ethnic-based federalism.

To fully grasp the principles of ethnic based federal system and its role in addressing ethnic demands for recognition of their identity and self-governance, some vital questions are in order. To what extent has the present ethnic-based federal formula addressed ethnic demands for recognition of the right to self-determination?

When EPRDF came to power as a new government, the change was not merely of political power; it also ushered an absolutely new perspective into the political landscape of the country by re-engineering the Ethiopian state on an entirely new foundation. EPRDF has adopted, as its ideological bedrock, ethnic-based federal model around Marxist-Leninist principle of the ‘right to self-determination of nations, nationalities and peoples’, including secession as one in a series of approaches to ‘national questions’


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(Vaughan, 2003). A new EPRDF perspective immediately manifested itself in the 1991 Charter.

Interestingly, the TGE Charter puts a high premium on human rights and guarantee of equality. Article 2 of the Charter gives recognition to the right of nations, nationalities and peoples’ to self-determination, including secession. This strong assertion in the Charter demonstrated the commitment of EPRDF to ethnic rights and decentralization of state power. This process of decentralization was further elaborated by Proclamation no.7/1992 for establishing regional self-governments. Accordingly, 14 national regional self-government entities, whose borders were determined based on the settlement structure of nations, nationalities and peoples, were established. Hence, the Charter formalized ethnicity and ethnic politics and endorsed the re-drawing of the country’s political map along ethno-linguistic divisions. The transitional government was disintegrated after the coming into effect of the country’s fourth new EPRDF constitution in 1995.

2.2.1.2.1 The 1995 FDRE Constitution: The Right to Self-determination

After passing through drafting and series of deliberations, the constitution came into force in 1995. The text of the constitution, which gives the ownership to nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia, has established a federal state structure (Art.1). By reducing the number of self-governing regions by five, the constitution enumerates nine states constituting the FDRE in Art.47/1.

In a pluralist society like Ethiopia, the political self-governance is by far the most important aspect of the right to self-determination. Theoretically, it was the Derg’s PNDR of 1976 that introduced the notion of right to self-determination excluding secession for the first time in the legal history of the country. The TGE Charter also recognized the same right as the right of nations, nationalities and peoples. But the most elaborated statement of the same right appeared in Art.39. Since it is this article that is the most relevant as far as ethnic questions is concerned in Ethiopia, I will give it a closer look. Sub-articles 1-3 of Article 39 read as follows:

1. Every nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession.

2. Every nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia has the right to speak, to write and to develop its own language; to express, to develop and to promote its culture, and to preserve its history.


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3. Every nation, nationality, and people in Ethiopia has the right to a full measure of self-government which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the territory that it inhabits and to equitable representation in state and federal governments.

Theoretically, ethnic federalism is expected to address the questions of decentralization of power and resources. This by implication would give autonomous power to the regional states. Practically, however, several inconsistencies and mutually incompatible policies and implementation procedures have prevailed so far even though the admirers have hailed it as an aspect of democratization of the state and even as a model for other multi-ethnic states in Africa (Dereje, 2006; Young, 1996). As indicated in Article 47/1, the current ethnic-based federal model established only nine states as the members of the federation, a reduced number compared to 14 regional states of the transitional period. Only five major ethnic groups (Oromo, Tigray, Amhara, Somali and Afar) have been granted their own ‘mother states’ designated by their own name as a core nationality (Merera, 2003). Only a few major ethnic groups were accorded the regional status even if the sub-national states were organized on the basis of ethno-linguistic criteria (Akililu, 2003).

While constitutionally entitling the right to self-determination including secession for all ethnically defined groups, the EPRDF regime has conflated five regional units of the transitional period into one unit in the South. As a result, 56 diverse ethnic groups of the former five regional units have been lumped together in a single federated unit. The implementation of the federal model on the basis of ethnicity and language brought a number of anomalies. Now, let us see the dynamics of continuing ethnic claims for self-determination in the SNNPRS.

2.2.1.2.2 The dynamics of Continuing Ethnic Claims for Self-determination in the South

Southern Ethiopia is an area which has long been totally marginalized in the feudal regime (Merera, 2003). Aalen (2008) also contends that ethnic groups in the South were completely marginalized to the extent that they were hardly recognized for their existence. The coming of EFRDF in the hitherto socially, economically and politically marginalized and peripheral area (South) of Ethiopia represented both far reaching radical political changes and continuities from the past. Watson (2002) states that the first years after the demise of the Derg were nevertheless described as a honeymoon for the peoples hitherto marginalized ethnic groups in southern Ethiopia. Under the EPRDF regime, ethnic groups of the South have thus come into contact with a new socio-economic and political changes and continuities from the past.


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During the transitional period, claims of all ethnically defined groups for self-determination in the South had been encouraged by the EPRDF’s rhetoric of “liberating the oppressed nationalities” (Vaughan, 2003). This was evidenced by organizing five regional units in the areas comprising today’s SNNPRS during the TGE. They were organized following Proclamation no.7/1992 that established 14 regional units at a national level.

As a result, those ethnically defined groups within these five regional states also gained a status as zones or special woredas. The transitional period administrative organization of the South managed to satisfy the basic self-governance aspirations of hitherto marginalized and peripheral ethnic groups (Aalen, 2008). This honeymoon of the transitional period, however, waned when the five regional units of transitional period were unilaterally conflated into one federated unit-the SNNPRS. In the feudal as well as the Derg era, however, the southern region never was a unified area in economic, cultural or political terms (Abbink, 1998). Thus, there is no any historical, geographic, linguistic and other justification to lump together 56 ethno-linguistic groups in a single federated unit.

The amalgamation of these five regional units into one federated unit has continued to be one of the controversies among politicians and source of grievances against the existing political order in the South today.

When it comes to implementation of self-determination in the South, how dare they group over fifty six nationalities into one region-is it the will of the people, really? If they were consistent, they would have created a northern region too, then. How could Hareri become a region with its small population, when the southern nationalities with its millions have been merged into one? (An interview with one of the government officials, quoted in Aalen, 2008:123).

It is not my intention to go into the details of controversies and grievances related to this political or ethnic re-engineering applied in the South by the government. However, it has been taken as an evidence for inconsistency in the implementation of ethnic federalism. “The amorphous conglomeration of large number of ethnic groups in the South shows the existence of anomalies in implementing the federal formula on the basis of ethnicity and language” (Aklilu, 2003:38). Even if the FDRE constitution has bestowed ethnically defined groups substantive autonomy rights to self-government, ethnic demands for recognition of separate ethnic identity and self-governance have continued to this day in the South. Aalen


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(2008:190) contends:

Due to the EPRDF’s desire to sustain its control of the state, the party has gradually put efforts into administrative integration instead of national self-determination in the South, even if the constitution gives ethnically defined groups a universal right to self-rule. Hence, the EPRDF’s power politics is in itself conflict producing: when communities that have defined themselves along ethnic lines are denied the right to self-rule, it creates a difference between the principles and practice that produce anger and discontent.

Thus, the conflicts over the issues of ethnic identity and the right to self-governance have become significant political factors that posed a test to the government in the South.

The merging of ethnicity and the right to self-determination which is made sacred constitutionally encouraged various ethnic groups to assert their ethnic identity (Tsegay, 2001). In the same vein, Aalen (2008) argues that ethnic groups that did not previously look up on themselves as ethnic entities now came up with such claims due to legally guaranteed rights to establish their own self rule that reflect their identity. This increasing ethnic assertion for separate ethnic identities and self-governances in multi-ethnic states like the SNNPRS are causing violence, inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts (Asnake, 2004). The challenge of ethnic self-assertion, inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts in Ethiopia are related with the creation of minorities-within-minorities in multi-ethnic states (Akililu, 2003). In the SNNPRS where 56 ethnic groups live, only 13 zones and 8 special woredas are created by the government. Beken (2008:23) contends:

Most of the Southern state’s 50+ ethnic groups do not have their own zone/special woreda that provides them, at least in principle, with the opportunity of self-government. These groups either live in a multi-ethnic zone or are a minority group in a zone or special woreda dominated by other groups

In SNNPRS, only a few ethnic groups have made use of the rights to zone or special woreda. Unlike a de-concentrated zone in the Oromiya region, the zones and special woredas in the SNNPRS are ethnically defined but multi-ethnic in nature which is an evidence for creating minorities-within-minorities. Demands for recognition of self-governance by many ethnic groups, namely Oyda, Goffa, Wolayita, Silte, Majangir and Sheka (Vaughan, 2003:192-5), except Sidama (Aalen, 2008) in this regional state are not for regional status but for a zonal or special woreda status that reflects their


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separate ethnic identity and provides, at least in principle, the opportunity of self-government. The current administrative arrangement in the SNNPRS satisfied neither the ethnic groups given their own mother zone nor those lumped into a different zone or special woreda designed by the name of other ethnic groups.

In conclusion, the continuing dynamics of ethnic claims for self-governance are adversely affecting a long period of mutual inter-dependence and co-existence among diverse ethnic groups in the region. It is an evidence for the fact that hitherto marginalized and dominated ethnic groups in the South have not yet been fully empowered. And yet, it is also an evidence for the fact that the communities that have defined themselves along ethnic lines are denied the right to self-rule that creates a difference between the principles promised in the constitution and the practices that produce violence, inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts in the SNNPRS


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CHAPTER 3The Ale Historical and Socio-Economic backgroundIntroduction

According to the current administrative arrangement, the Ale ethnic group is one among the very diverse ethnic groups lumped together and formed the SNNPRS of the federal structure of Ethiopia. The SNNPRS has a population of 15.5 million people who live in an area of 113,539 km sq (CSA, 2007). As the name of the region indicates, a particular feature of its population is its ethnic diversity. The region is the home of fifty six (56) ethnic groups. These ethnic groups are characterized by considerable diversity in religion (ranging from Christianity, Muslim to traditional belief system), language (there are dozens of different languages), culture, socio-economic activities (pastoral nomadism, sedentary agriculture) and traditional governance structures (Abbink, 1998).

The Ale have a total population of 68,600 or 0.09% of the national population, out of which 66, 912 are rural dwellers while 1,688 are urban dwellers. This figure shows that they are one of the minority groups, who under the Ethiopian electoral laws, have automatic representation in the HPR because they do not form a unit large enough for an electoral constituency. In accordance with Art.54/3 of the FDRE constitution, the Ale have one of the 20 seats reserved for minority nationalities and people in the HPR since 1995.

The Ale live in the south-western part of Ethiopia, predominantly in today’s Konso and Derashe administrative special woredas. Geographically, their territory is bordered by the KSW in the south and south east, the DSW in the east, Debub Omo in the west, and GGZ in the north. Despite their administrative division into two units since the feudal regime, they live in a geographically contiguous territory. They have long history of mutual co-existence and interdependence with their neighbors. In the current administrative arrangement of the SNNPRS, the Ale do not have their own administrative unit that reflects their separate identity and that also provides them, at least in principle, with the opportunity for self-government. As a result, they have formed a minority or have been subsumed into two units. The Ale have their own distinct culture, tradition, language, history, contiguous territory and unique socio-economic feature. Although a


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handful of anthropological and other research works have been carried out in the SNNPRS, still many cases remain fully or partially unclear (Abbink, 1998). In this regard, the Ale political history, history of origin, the underlying cultural models, their economic activities, socio-organizational patterns and so forth have not yet been fully covered by academic research.

In this chapter, I will try to analyze briefly the historical backgrounds or a shared historical tradition, a myth of common origin, language, nature of social organization, and customary institution of administration for maintaining peace and security of the Ale community. 3.1 The Ale Myth of Origin: The Group’s Self-ascription The Ale in general and their mythology of origin in particular has not yet gained the attention of scholars. As a result, there exists an evident knowledge gap which ought to be filled through oral information. The myth of origin of the Ale people is somewhat debatable among the group itself. According to the generally accepted mythology of origin, the Ale claim descent from two different groups coming originally from southern and eastern parts of the surrounding territories. The first group led by Oato came from the southern direction, perhaps from south Sudan and settled in a place called Awugaro, the heartland of present Ale occupied territory. And hence, in their mythology, they believe that Oato was their founding father. The second group claims descent from the eastern direction, perhaps from the eastern Borana area of Oromiya.

The Gewada and Dhobase, who were wrongly ‘considered’ as two separate ethnic groups under the Konso and Derashe special woredas respectively, commonly claim descent from the aforementioned two groups. It is not astonishing if they claim common descent because they have strong and original internal and external ethnic boundaries. This is evident when they have common language and a surprising uniformity of customs, a shared system of cultural norms and values, folklores and world views. Thus, the internal and external ethnic boundaries exist for a long period of time among the Gewada-Dhobase (Ale) group living in geographically contiguous but administratively divided territory.

To sum up, the Ale myth of origin indicated that it was from the convergence or intermingling between the two groups coming from different directions that the present day Ale descended from. In addition to the territorial contiguity, and cultural and linguistic homogeneity, there is a shared sense of commonness and solidarity among the Gewada-Dhobase as denoted by the myth of common ancestor. Hence, the analysis of myth of origin


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shows that they have ample historical and ethnographic evidence to suggest that they had a common past and identity as one ethnic group. Even though they have lived in an administratively divided territory since the feudal regime, the Ale have long been conscious of their common ethnic identity.

3.2 The Ale language and Religion

It is important to note that the Ale language, the core of ethnic identity, has not yet gained the light of comprehensive academic study as compared to the other neighboring languages. Language is one of the ethnic identity markers and plays a crucial role in gaining ascription for separate as well as common ethnic identity from the others. The Ale are among the south western peoples of Ethiopia who are grouped into lowland east Cushitic speakers. They have their own dialect called Dabastata. The Ale language has not acquired the opportunity of educational or working language status with the exception of being used as a medium of communication among the study community.

According to the informants, the majority of Ale people are protestant followed by orthodox Christianity, Catholic, Islam and traditional religion. Perhaps this is due to active outside influence by the Norwegian Lutheran Missionary who arrived there in 1954 (Hallpike, 1972:6). Thus, the increase in the number of protestant followers in the area is perhaps a result of large scale evangelization of the local people by this missionary group.

3.3 The Ale Social Organization

Socially, the Ale are organized into extended family, lineages and clans that determine an individual’s social relationships. Like the neighboring Konso and Derashe, the Ale social structure is composed of nine patrilineal clans: Lohako, Amadko, Gersiko, Guliko, Esmako, Sinko or Ospiko, Regako, Aalako and Mahliko.

The traditional administrative organization and social relations among these clans are complicated. Each of the Ale clans has its own independent chieftain called Boģolho. In their social formation, these clans are egalitarian. They also possess geographically contiguous but autonomous territory. In their traditional governance system, the autonomous clan of Boģolho is not subject to any authority in their external relations. ________________________________________________________69Confederation is a system in which several pre-existing polities join together to form a common government or form a union for certain limited purposes but retain most sovereign powers (Watts,2008:8).


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This is because they have no framework of authority which could transcend the autonomy or territories of each clan Boģolho and serve to unit them in a wider nexus of co-operation. Thus, the Ale social organization seems to be a confederation of nine politically independent clans. Despite their autonomy in their respective territories and right of exercising the Boģolho system, each of these components (clans) of the confederation is mutually interdependent in many aspects.

Moreover, my key informants and participants of FGD claimed that the preservation of common ethnic consciousness and solidarity within independent clans is a matter of prime importance. The autonomous clans are well aware of the necessity of conducting rituals together for maintaining harmonious inter-clan relations or inter-clan solidarity, not only for practical reasons but also because they believe that any intra or inter-clan conflicts or disputes would be visited with God’s anger in the form of drought, famine, disease, natural calamities, and so forth. Hence, they perform rituals together to promote peace and security of their people as well as to strengthen ethnic solidarity in their inter-clan relations. In addition to performing rituals together, they never form alliances with non-Ale clans or groups to fight against other Ale clan groups.

3.3.1 The Boģolho System: Basic Element in Maintaining ‘Distinctive’ Group Identity

According to the informants, the Boģolho system is a very comprehensive system of the Ale. The system is centered on the concepts of peace, solidarity and sense of identity as well as religious values, as the clans believe. Briefly investigating the role of this system and the value attached to it by the community is very crucial to understand the commonness of their culture and history.

The Boģolho, whose power is derived from the supernatural, retains office for life. This is apparent by the myth and ideology of the Ale community. When the Boģolho becomes too old and retires, he will be succeeded by his elder son. If there is no son to succeed, his wife will assume power to rule the clan in the name of her lost husband. Each clan’s Boģolho has his own political headquarters or town. The Boģolho delegates power to his deputies to administer people at local levels. At the headquarters, under the Boģolho, are different functionary institutions. These are: Sarko, Ohado, Ganumo and Mangulo. Each of these functionary institutions has a distinct responsibility that is separate from the others. There also exists a very strong authoritative


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bureaucracy. The position of these supportive institutions is not hereditary. From the legal aspect, the Boģolho system has, in the past and present, played primary role in the life of the community. The Boģolho delegates power to his supportive institutions at the headquarters with the aim of enforcing peace and order among the community. Hence, each of them in turn handles a complex but specific set of functions. They are also directly supervised by and held accountable to the Boģolho. For instance, the Ganumo institution is basically responsible for enacting customary laws for administering the people and maintaining peace and order. Executing this law is the mandate of the Sarko. It is responsible for organizing, implementing and enforcing the customary laws. However, they have concurrent power over the issue of settling disputes or conflicts at group as well as clan levels. In short, in maintaining peace and security of the people, they act concomitantly.

3.3.1.1 The Sarko: Decisive in Maintaining Peace and Order

In the Ale traditional system of building peace and order, the Sarko plays the most decisive role through demonstrating strong ability of good leadership and commitment. It has the duty of implementing the customary laws enacted by the Ganumo and the decisions made by the Boģolho. It is not only acting as the executive but also as the judiciary body. However, in the judiciary aspect, both the Sarko and Ganumo have concurrent power. In other words, the Sarko performs its tribunal duties in conjunction with the Ganumo, the spiritual institution.

According to the key informants, disobeying any principle, rule and regulation enacted by the Ganumo would create misfortune upon person(s) or group(s). The intertwound nature of the conflict-regulating institution - the Sarko and Ganumo - developed a kind of fear among the people about the consequence of conflict. Beneath the Ganumo, there are Halio or priests. They are responsible for praying for rain, giving bless for the fertility of crops and livestock productivity. They also have the authority to curse enemies, expel epidemics, pests and disease.

The Sarko plays dual role in process of maintaining peace and order. Firstly, it acts as the security and intelligence forces. As a security force, it has the mandate of intervening and resolving any dispute or conflict before escalation. In addition, the Sarko has the duty to organize, train and command the defense forces. By doing so, the Sarko maintains peace and order and defend the resources of the whole clan members. And yet, the principal purpose of Sarko is to maintain a united strength against outsiders


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and peaceful consensus within the clan. It has also the duty of intelligence. It collects information, takes immediate actions and also brings them to the attention of the Boģolho. Secondly, it has its own tribunal to investigate cases together with the Ganumo and to pass verdict on the wrong-doer in accordance with their customary laws.

In the Ale traditional judicial system, if the cases could not be resolved in the Sarko tribunal, the office of the Boģolho is the highest court of appeal. Inter-clan conflict is usually settled by the combined efforts of the two clan Sarkos. If the cases are not resolved at the level of the two clan Sarkos, they would be settled by the combined efforts of the two clan Boģolhos.

Finally, the Ale have evolved an efficient social organization. The Boģolho system forms a crucial element of the Ale social life. It is perhaps an important element in maintaining the Ale ‘distinctive’ group identity. It is also a very effective institution in enforcing laws and order so as to maintain peace and security of the people. Moreover, in the Ale customary system, the mediation of dispute is held in an open gathering. Below the main court of the clan Boģolho, there is a traditional court of Sarko, which is a tribunal to settle dispute cases in accordance with the customary laws of the people. In their tribunals both the Boģolho and the Sarko would pass verdict on the wrong-doer or the culprit (individual/s or group/s). Their decisions are enforced accordingly. The purpose, duration and intensity of the dispute or conflict determine the nature of the verdict made in the tribunals. In the Ale customary institution, the Sarko not only acts as the judiciary but also as an executor. It is only through the Sarko that one can present any cases to the Boģolho. Hence, the Sarko is responsible to enforce the decisions passed in all the traditional tribunals of the Ale clans.


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CHAPTER 4The Gewada-Dhobase (Ale) Quest for Common Ethnic Identity: Traditional and Historical legacies

Introduction

Based on the findings of the preceding chapter, this one will try to address one of the research questions of this thesis i.e. the major determinant factors that shaped the Gewada-Dhobase quest for common ethnic identity. In an attempt to answer this, I will try to discuss briefly the historical legacy of the feudal system so as to see whether or not it was a significant force that contributed in imposing different identities on the Ale.

The impact of the feudal legacy on the Gewada-Dhobase quest for common ethnic identity is perhaps related with: A. The problem of centralized, bureaucratic and hierarchic feudal administrative system on the Ale society which for long has been characterized by its uncentralized nature; b. The problem it had created by dividing the Ale ethnic group into different administrative units and; C. Wrong external impression it had created through imposing or superimposing different identities on the Ale.

It is therefore worthy to address the historical legacy in Ethiopia that had perhaps shaped the dynamic facet of the Gewada-Dhobase quest for common ethnic identity and self-governance. In addition, this historical legacy will be addressed here as a crucial and integral input for adopting ethnic based federal model by EPRDF in the post 1990s.

4.1 The Historical legacy and its Impact on the Ale Ethnic Identity

The process of territorial expansion had started when Emperor Menelik was the king of Shewa and continued all the ways to the late 1890s. These expansions to the south, south west and south east directions were accompanied by fundamental political, economic and social changes. Following this atrocious conquest, the various groups who had been hitherto maintaining their autonomy lost their status and became part and parcel


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of Menelik II’s polity in an unequal term (Merera, 2003). According to Hallpicke (1972), Konso was conquered and incorporated into the Abyssinian Empire in 1897. Put differently, the Konso and its surrounding ethnic groups like the Ale and Derashe were incorporated into Menelik II’s polity during the last phase of the territorial expansion. This phase was mainly motivated by establishing the boundary delimitation or demarcation with the neighboring colonial powers (Bahru, 1991). In the same vein, as pointed out by Hansamo (1993), the imperial army into Sidama, Konso and Derashe was commanded by Dejazmach Leulseged. The expanding army controlled the area without much resistance.

The centralized administrative system of the feudal regime had divided one ethnic group here and there into different administrative units. This, in turn, exposed different ethnic groups to identity suppression and denial as well as for those who desire enforcing different identities on them (Mekuria,1996). In the post-1941, the reinstalled Hailesellassie regime declared through proclamation no.1/1942 the division of the country into 14 administrative units or teklai gizats. The Gamo Gofa Teklai gizat was one of the 14 with its administrative centre at Arba Minch. Accordingly, the Ale, Konso, Derashe, and other several ethnic groups were administratively disposed into the Gardula Awuraja, which was one of the awurajas in this teklai gizat. According to the informants, the Gardula Awuraja, with its administrative centre at Gidole, was consisting of five woredas, namely Konso, Gumayed, Garasse, Kamba, and Gidole Zuria Woreda.

However, the Ale were administratively divided in their political and social interactions between the Konso and Gidole Zuria Woredas during this regime. Out of a total of 17 Ale-settled kebeles (they still have 17 kebeles at present), three (3) were put under the Konso woreda while fourteen (14) were put under the Gidole Zuria Woreda until the demise of the feudal regime. Even though they have been divided into different administrative units since the feudal regime, the Ale live in a geographically contiguous territory.

To sum up, the feudal administrative system had divided one ethnic group here and there into different units which in turn exposed different ethnic groups to identity crisis. In their social and political interaction, the Ale were divided between two separate administrative units.

4.2 The origin of the Existing different names for the Ale Ethnic Group

To fully grasp whether or not the feudal regime is a noteworthy determinant factors behind the Gewada-Dhobase quest for common ethnic identity,


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some vital questions are in order. Had the feudal regime imposed different identities by dividing the Ale community into different administrative units in the historic past? Or had the Ale administrative division during the feudal era caused their identity suppression and marginalization? Is their quest for common ethnic identity to re-assert or re-construct those identities that have been suppressed and denied in the past? If not, what are the major determinants that shaped their quest for common ethnic identity? The congregated data shows that the Gewada-Dhobase have not lost their common ethnic identity in the past and still in the present except their administrative division. Their demand is not to re-assert or re-construct those identities that have been lost or suppressed in the past. It is the result of imposition of different names on them in the past and their subsequent wrong acceptance as the names of different ethnic groups. Thus, the ethnic group now known as “Ale” was previously referred to by different names such as Gewada, Gobaze/Dhobase, Werize and Worose. These names were not considered externally as different names of the same ethnic group but rather as names of different ethnic groups in south-western Ethiopia until recently.

There are controversies over the genesis behind these different names. For some informants, the feudal regime imposed different identities on them in order to suppress and marginalize their ethnic identity by dividing them into two administrative units. They also further state that these different names for their ethnic group were the result of this regime’s attempt to suppress and deny their ethnic identity. Some other informants are blaming the traditional practice in the area while others are still arguing differently.

During my field stay within the community for the purpose of this study, I have thus found out three major contending views concerning the origin of these different names. A brief discussion of each of the views is in order.

4.2.1 The First Contending View: Attributing Customary Administrative Organization

As discussed in detail in Chapter Three of this thesis, the Ale traditional administrative system is a ‘confederation’ of independent clans separately administered by their respective chieftain called Boģolho. Each clan Boģolho has its own separate administrative territory designated by different names such as Gewada, Gobaze/Dhobase, Werize, and Worose. According to this view, these different names for their ethnic group were basically derived from the territorial identifications of the Ale clans.


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Table 1: The Ale clans, their territorial identifications and respective Boģolhos

The Ale Clan Name Names of Boģolhos Territorial identification

Ospiko Ole Gewada

Mahliko Labilo Gorose

Gersiko Gella Werize

Lohako Dhiko Gobase/Dhobase

Source: Organized by the researcher based on data obtained from the fieldwork

Even if all of the nine Ale clans have their own respective Boģolho and territorial identifications, I have considered here only prominent ones penetrated into by scholarly works and also given legal recognition as the separate nationalities during the Derg regime. Finally, this view holds that the Ale clan-based social organization played adverse role by popularizing their territorial identifications instead of their ethnic identity. It is these place names that were wrongly entered into scholarly works as names of separate ethnic groups

4.2.2 The Second Contending View: Attributing the Historical Legacy

According to this view, it was the centralized, bureaucratic and exploitative administrative system of the feudal regime that had deliberately imposed different identities or names on them to suppress and marginalize their ethnic identity. It also claims that none of these externally imposed names represents their ethnic identity; they are simply place names or their territorial identifications.

However, if we were convinced by this view holding that the genesis for all of these different names was the feudal regime, how could the regime use to call a tiny ethnic community at the time by all of these names? Another impressing question to be asked is, what would be the political significance of imposing different identities (different names) on them for the feudal regime? However, this view couldn’t give us convincing argument behind the reason for imposing different identities. In fact, attempts were made by the feudal regime to assimilate diversified ethno-linguistic groups into the


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then dominant Ethiopian culture and language as one strategy of nation-building (Mekuria, 1996). But the Gewada-Dhobase quest for common ethnic identity has nothing to do with this assimilation policy. Their quest is not to re-assert or re-construct those ethnic identities that have been assimilated or suppressed in the past.

4.2.3 The Third Contending View: Attributing the Traditional Practice in the Area

According to this view, the existing different names were the result of traditional practice in the study areas. In the study area, the local people used to call each other by different names derived from different contexts. This is also made clear in the words of the Derashe and Konso informants.

We (neighboring ethnic groups) used to call each other by different names basically derived from different contexts. For instance, we have been called by the Konso as Ala/Gewada and by the Derash as Alash/Gobase/Dhobase. In the same vein, we also refer to the Konso as Karsi/Takdo and Derashe as Deraytata/Gardula, among others. It is common to find one or more names for one ethnic group. Even if the Konso and Derashe used to call us by different names, they know that we are one ethnic group (Interview with informants, Gewada and Dhobase, January 2010).

This view holds that it was these names by which the neighboring ethnic groups traditionally addressed the Ale were wrongly taken as names of different ethnic groups. Table 2: Overview of different names ethnic groups in the study area used to call each other

Name of Ethnic groups Konso Ale Derashe

Konso -- Ala/Gewada

Ale Takdo/Karsi -- Deraytata/Gardula

Derashe -- Alash/Dhobase/Gobase --

Source: Organized by the researcher based on data obtained from the fieldwork


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To sum up, the first view is more convincing as compared to the second and the third. It was the territorial identifications of the politically independent clans Boģolho that was wrongly accepted as names of separate ethnic groups. In addition, the existing different names are not the result of the recent cock-and-bull story for political or other ends as some informants still perceive. But rather they have been in use for a long time since the feudal regime. Generally, their quest for common ethnic identity is not to re-assert or re-construct those identities they have lost in the past. This is because there is no any identity crisis at the bottom. But rather it is the result of identity politics in play by the local ruling elite so as to marginalize their claim for separate ethnic identity and self-governance by using existing different names as a pretext.

4.3 Misconception among Scholars towards the Ale Ethnic Identity

The territorial identifications of the separately administered Ale clans wrongly penetrated into scholarly works as names of separate ethnic groups. Some scholarly works (if I restrict the case to those written during the feudal regime) produced, for example, by Cerulli, 1956; Hallpike, 1972 and others are evident for the penetration of these names as the names of different ethnic groups into academic and other works.

Cerulli (1956:51), in her “The peoples of the South-Western Ethiopia and its borderland”, had identified various small tribes, perhaps genealogically related to the Konso such as Guawada, Gworadie, Gamole, Majole and Gowaze. She also went to state that the Guawada is one of the small tribes inhabiting the valley of the Dabiena River below Duro, east of the Woito River. As indicated earlier, the Guawada and Gowaze are territorial identifications of the Boģolhos of the Ospiko and Mahliko clans respectively. But Cerulli had mentioned them as names of different “small tribes”. Hallpike (1972:3), in his “The Konso of Ethiopia”, had mentioned the Gauwada as one of the agricultural tribes on the hills overlooking the Woito valley bordering the Konso on the west. He further stated that the Konso have fought many times with the Gauwada, though not apparently with the Ala, an ensete people with whom they seem to have been on good terms (ibid:36-7).

__________________________________________70 Similar scholarly works in the post-1990s includes Watson, 2002; 2009; Mathewos, 2009; Tizazu, 2007 and others


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The two scholarly works are apparent for misconceptions among writers on the Ale ethnic identity. In addition to those names which were already mentioned by Cerulli (1956), Hallpike came up with additional hitherto unknown “tribe’s” name, Ala. As indicated earlier, Ala is a Konsigna word literally meaning “the people living in the Dega area” i.e. the Ale. Moreover, Bender’s lexicostatistic classification of eastern Cushitic speakers is another evidence for misconception among scholars. In his classification of lowland eastern Cushitic sub-groupings, Bender categorized Gobaze, Werize, Worose and Gewada as the Werizoid lowland Cushitic families (quoted in Dawit, 2005). The misunderstanding among scholars on the Ale ethnic identity has perhaps happened due to lack of interest to conduct in-depth study on them. In fact, there are writers (such as Mathewos, 2009 and Tizazu, 2007) who know the Gewada- Dhobase empirically but it could be that they either didn’t give it any attention or that they refrained from treating them as a separate ethnic group.

As a whole, these written materials are evidence for confusion among scholars on the Ale ethnic identity. However, they might have been malleably creating a wrong impression of their ethnic identity, for instance, for those who desire to use the issue instrumentally.

4.4 The PdRE Regime and the Ale Ethnic Identity

As part of translating its public commitment into practical actions, the military junta established a political research bureau known as ISEN in 1983, the first of its kind in the Ethiopian history (Abbink, 1998). It was established with the mandate to study each of the regions of the country, the history, and interaction of the nationalities inhabiting them, the geographic position, and so forth. Based on the language spoken in the country, the ISEN produced a profile of nationalities, their physical location, size of population and other relevant information. Thus, the Derg was the first to officially “recognize”, if only in name, Ethiopian nationalities.

The PDRE Constitution, which is the shortest-lived, contained provisions that provide rules for the division of the country into administrative and autonomous regions. Hence, the administrative map of the country was re-arranged into 24 administrative and five self-governing regions. The Derg by merging some of the woredas together promoted some of them into awuraja status. Accordingly, the number of awurajas increased from 101 to 105 and that of the woredas from 547 to 577 (Markakis, 2004). According to informants and participants of FGD, the Derg introduced minor administrative reform within the former Gamo-Gofa Teklai gizat (Gamo-Gofa Kifle hager herein after). Consequently, the Konso woreda, which was


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one of the five woredas that formed the Gardula Awuraja, promoted from the woreda status to Awuraja level within the same Kifle hager.

As indicated earlier, there were a total of seventy (17) Ale settled kebeles during the feudal regime. However, they were administratively divided into the Konso and Gidole Zuria Woredas. As a result, four kebeles were organized into Konso when it attained a woreda status while 13 of them were put together to make the Gidole zuria woreda. The Derg, however, took away three additional kebeles, namely Gergama, Welango and Gumani from the Gidole Zuria Woreda into the newly established Konso Awuraja. The total of the Ale populated kebeles under Konso had reached seven (Such as Gewada, Turuba, Gargama, Guma, Welango, Lyana and Kerkerete ) while ten (Such as Lelicho, Addis Oltama, Dugulo, Bole Dugulo, Tsemeha, Diginte, Lokite, Gorose, Dalibenagama and Dagamashile) of them remained under Gidole Zuria Woreda during the Derg regime. The Derg thus had continued the feudal legacy of dividing this ethnic group into different administrative units.

As discussed earlier, the Ale had different names which were wrongly considered as names of different ethnic groups by the scholars during the feudal regime. However, the Derg was the first to legally endorse these different names into legal status of nationalities. This is evident when the ISEN profile of the Ethiopian nationalities separately enumerated Gewada, Werize, Gorose and Gobaze as different nationalities.

To sum up, the Derg was the first to officially recognize the territorial identifications of the Ale clan Boģolhos into the legal status of nationalities. Accordingly, the Ale ethnic group, living in a geographically contiguous territory, continued to be referred to by different names as officially endorsed for the first time by the Derg as names of different nationalities.

4.5 The EPRdF Regime and development of Ethnic Consciousness in the South

The existing EPRDF policy initiatives such as ethnic-based federal model, recognizing the right to self-determination, a new modality of political representation and so forth have brought paramount changes and continuities in the socio-economic and political life of the southern ethnic groups. _______________________________________70Ethnic consciousness in this context refers to the state of being awake and aware of ongoing policy initiatives by the existing political system in the country


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By formally institutionalizing ethnicity as a means of addressing a long-standing problem of ethnic questions in the country, these policy initiatives have intensified a process of ethnification. Even though the critics have mounted a range of attack, these policy initiatives are positively contributing in the South by promoting ethnic consciousness that would not lead to disintegration but only equipping them to fight for political equality and against their peripheral position within the framework of Ethiopian identity.

By recognizing the right to self-determination to ethnically defined groups in the country, the post 1990s national political framework has created a positive inter-relationship between ethnic identity and exercising theoretically entitled rights. It is because of this positive correlation that ethno-nationalist feelings mushroomed throughout the country. Issues which hitherto did not have much currency such as local language, culture and one’s own ethnic identity in the post 1991 became the centre of open discussion among individuals at grassroots level and elite in their day to day lives (Merera, 2003). Constitutionally guaranteeing the self-determination right which is implemented on the basis of ethnic based federal model is perhaps encouraging southern ethnic groups to develop ethnic consciousness and also assertiveness towards their ethnic identity.

The all-inclusive and primordial definition of ethnicity in the constitution has led an increasing number of people to claim the status as ethnic group and brought about apparent ethnic mobilization (Aalen, 2008). The post 1990s politicization of ethnicity has thus played the most prominent role in making some ethnic groups in the South like the Ale to (re-) discover themselves for the first time since the incorporation into the larger Abyssinian polities. However, several factors have been hindering comprehensive development of ethnic consciousness and assertiveness in the South until these days.

Why did ethnic consciousness not develop more widely among southerners in the pre-1990s? In fact, it is difficult to answer this complex question. Perhaps this is because southern Ethiopia is an area that has long been totally marginalized and ‘pacified’ in the feudal regime (Merera, 2003). In addition, Aalen (2008) contends that ethnic groups in the south were completely marginalized to the extent that they were hardly recognized for their existence. The pre-1991 political environments were thus not conducive for some of the southern ethnic groups to develop their ethnic self-consciousness.

However, this is not an exceptional phenomenon for the south. Ethnic consciousness in Ethiopia is still developing and changing. It has taken its shape against the national oppression experience which in the later times enabled the subjected peoples to revitalize their ethnic identity,


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historical background and traditional values and also inspired them to emphasis their distinctive ethnic identification (Mekuria, 1996). In addition, the development of consciousness is a long and slow process mediated by national awakening or national consciousness (Mohammed, 1996). Mohammed further states that national consciousness emerges primarily as a result of several factors; the spread of modern education, better communications, improved transformation systems, growth of mass media and the press, higher standards of literacy and the growth of literature and intensive interaction among the people.

Most modern educational establishments in Ethiopia are located in urban centre while most of the populations are rural dwellers in the SNNPRS. From 15,042,531 of the total population, 1, 545,710 are urban dwellers where as 13, 496,821 are rural-based (CSA, 2007). This report shows that 89.7% of the SNNPRS population lives in rural areas where there is less access to modern educational establishment. And yet, the development of ethnic consciousness is impossible without access to modern education. As a whole, ethnic consciousness in the SNNPRS is still developing and taking some definite shape.

4.5.1 Too Late to Develop: the Ale Ethnic Consciousness

The EPRDF seizure of state power and its subsequent policy initiatives have a very profound effect in awakening ethnic self-consciousness and relative political maturity. Instrumentalists argue that the mobilization of ethnic consciousness was a rational response to social and political development. They further state that ethnic groups were “coalitions which have been formed as a part of rational efforts to secure benefits created by the force of modernization”. Thus, the post 1990s EPRDF policy initiatives relatively created a remarkable and crucial environment for the awakening of Ale ethnic self-consciousness.

The empirical observation during the field work has shown that the Ale have completely lacked in the past and still relatively in the present access to modern education, better communications, improved transportation systems and modern education except primary and junior secondary schools. Since the 1990s, several primary and junior secondary schools have been established but not a single secondary and preparatory school exists either in the Gewada area under the KSW or in the Dhobase area under the DSW. The existing secondary and preparatory schools are found in Karat and Gidole, the capital towns of Konso and the Derashe special woredas respectively.


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In addition, my informants have pointed out that their nearest kebele on the side of KSW, for instance, is Gewada but it is approximately 40km far from the capital town, Karat. The CSA (2007) report shows that only 0.01% of the Ale population are urban dwellers. In other words, 99.99% of the Ale populations live in the backward and inaccessible remote rural areas where there is less or no access to modern educational establishment, improved transformation systems and better communications. It is not surprising thus if the Ale take a long time to be mobilized politically as they lacked, and still relatively lack, a crucial environment for the development of ethnic consciousness.

It is important to note that in the rise of consciousness; the educated class plays a very decisive role. However, in the Ale it is hard to find educated elite who can play this role. According to the regional government, this is one of the basic factors to delay the Ale claim for self-governance. It is also a point of justification for local ruling elite to undermine their claim. ). For instance, during NPDC of 1991, the government found only a single diploma teacher, Ghoreje Otayito, from the Gobaze nationality but none from the Gewada. Due to the past political legacy, the TGE was considering the Worose, Werize, Gobaze and Gewada as separate nationalities at the time and hence, they were separately requested to send their representative to the conference. Accordingly, Ghoreje Otayito participated in the conference but later left on his own right by opposing ‘the right to self-determination, including secession’ clause of the Charter.

While recognizing separate ethnic identities of the Konso and the Derashe and hence, giving them the right to a degree of self-government at special woreda levels, the Ale ethnic group were:

A. Externally in ‘ethnic identity crisis’ due to their different names that were wrongly ‘considered’ by the then TGE as the names of different ethnic groups B. Not politically conscious enough. As a result, they had no any educated elite to denounce the externally imposed different identities on them and to claim the self-governance right as one ethnic group.

According to the Ale informants, the government had a plan to separately give the Gewada and Gobaze a woreda status but due to lack of educated elite it finally decided to renounce its plan. In fact, they were separately entitled to establish their own self-government by proclamation no.7/1992 during the TGE. This is also the reason for the continuation of the past political legacy of dividing the Ale ethnic group into Konso and Derashe special woreda administrative units again in the post 1990s. Since


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the Ale ethnic consciousness has begun to appear very late, their claim for self-governance has emerged only after they have made to form a minority in these special woredas administration.

After relative development of their ethnic self-consciousness, the Gewada-Dhobase (Ale) have begun to feel that they are administratively divided, politically dominated and marginalized by the local ruling elite of the Konso and Derashe. This is the immediate causes which awakened their consciousness and undoubtedly stirred them to take steps in 1995 and onwards. Accordingly, their long-standing claim for separate ethnic identity and self-governance is the result of relative development of their ethnic self-consciousness.

4.6 Politicizing Ethnic Identity: A Serious Challenge for the Ale Claim for Self-governance

The Gewada-Dhobase (Ale) quest for common ethnic identity is not the result of decline of internal or absence of external ethnic boundaries. This is because they are not only sharing complete cultural value that identifies or ascribes them as one ethnic group but also live in geographically contiguous territory. Barth (1996) argues that the internal ethnic boundary helps an individual to be identified by others, for instance by neighboring Konso and Derashe, as belonging to one or another ethnic group. Identification by others i.e. external ethnic boundary in turn usually stimulates self-identification.

The absence of educated class appears to have exposed the Ale community to external imposition of different identities on them in the past. In fact, had they had educated elite; they would have been exposed at least to the misconception among scholars and politicians about their ethnic identity. There is ample historic evidence to demonstrate that it is mainly the intelligentsia who take the lead in articulating problems and coordinating activities over larger geographical spaces and longer time spans (Mekuria, 1996:48). Thus, the absence of educated elite appears to have delayed not only the rise of the Ale ethnic consciousness but also exposed their ethnic identity to intentional or unintentional manipulation. Moreover, without ethnic consciousness it is impossible to expect the development of nationalism. And without nationalism, there would be no effective political mobilization (Mohammed, 1996). This is because the educated classes play a very prominent role in the development of consciousness. In addition, they serve as an advance guard of the social process, feeling out or peering into the future and striving for something


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better (ibid). Thus, the key factor for late development of Ale ethnic consciousness and hence, claim for self-governance is the absence of educated class.

Since its birth in 1995, the Gewada-Dhobase (Ale) struggle for realizing separate ethnic identity has faced intense opposition from the Derashe and the Konso ruling elite. In this regard, the external imposition of different identities on them in the past has brought the politicization of their ethnic identity or identity politics in the present so as to marginalize their claim for separate ethnic identity by the local ruling elite. This is because it is giving many external observers, particularly the local ruling elite an impression of the malleability of their ethnic identity for political and other fiat.

The Ale informants and participants of FGD are pointing more at the Derashe elite as a serious obstacle to their cause than the Konso elite. They further state that the Derashe elite have left no stone unturned to undermine their (i.e. Gewada and Dhobase) common ethnic identity to the extent of perpetuating the myth of non-existent identity on them. The Derashe elite have known the fact that they belong to the same ethnic group. But they do not want to recognize this fact as a local government by fearing that it might increase the chance of having their own self-governance unit. This, in turn, might have detrimental impact on their separate special woreda status since 10 kebeles from the total of 26 of their special woreda belong to the Dhobase (Ale).

They further state that for the Derashe elite, maintaining their separate identity at special woreda level can only be possible if they keep attacking their common ethnic identity. This is evidenced by the DSW official’s allegation of Gewada-Dhobase elite as political entrepreneurs or narrow nationalists who are seeking to create and fabricate non-existent common ethnic identity for personal benefits. They also state that the Derashe elite could not give explanations as to why, in their views, the Gewada-Dhobase have no any common ethnic identity or why the common ethnic identity is non-existent. Mohammed (1996) argues that a (re-) construction of an ethnic identity without some recognizable constituents which have at least some roots in the past or are themselves made up of language, history and other related identification is simply inconceivable. Mohammed goes on to state that the construction of ethnic identity at will and out of nothing is plainly untenable. Hence, it would not be logical to maintain that community, like Gewada-Dhobase, can engage in struggle for common ethnic identity and recognition in a historical vacuum for political fiat.


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According to informants, the identity politics has come into being only after they have raised their claim for self-governance. Identity politics came into play when the local ruling elite were questioned the Gewada-Dhobase common ethnic identity as one ethnic group. As a result, their initial struggle for the right they are constitutionally entitled to has turned into a struggle for common ethnic identity. This is because the local ruling elite added identity politics for their own political fiat and delayed their demand until these days.

4.7 Endorsement of the Gewada-dhobase Common Ethnic

Identity as the “Ale”

Until the 2008 violence in the area, we had no direct contact with the people. As a result we had no factual information about their ethnic identity. This was really a mistake we have committed. The information the local ruling elite are providing us also misguided the regional government until we directly met the people. After physical and empirical observation, we have found out that they (the Gewada- Dhobase) are one ethnic group.The problem is only identification by different names for many years. In fact, even if they are identified by different names, they have been electing only one representative for the regional council and HPR since the first national and regional election in 1995 (Interview with the speaker of SNNPRS Nationalities Council, Awassa, 11 February 2010).

In 2008, a conference was organized with the aim of restoring peace and security in the area. The peace conference was held in Gewada and was facilitated by Ato Shiferaw Shigute, the existing president of SNNPRS. In the conference:

The Gewada-Dhobase told the federal and regional officials their justification for common ethnic identity by saying “we are one “stick”; do not divide us!” (Interview with elders, Gewada and Dhobase, 2 December 2009).

The informants further state that after empirical observation in the conference and subsequent empirical study, the regional government was convinced and accepted their justification for claiming common ethnic identity. Accordingly, the regional government approved and endorsed the Gewada-Dhobase common ethnic identity as the “Ale” in 2009.

However, the findings from document analysis shows that the common ethnic identity between the Gewada, Gobase/Dhobase, Werize and Gorose was recognized as the ‘Gewada’ during the transitional period. In 1994, Council of representatives established an ad hoc committee with the mandate of


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identifying minority nationalities expected to get representation in the then constitutional assembly. Based on their population size and geographic contiguity, the ad hoc committee submitted to the council a list of minority nationalities. It was this Ad hoc committee that, for the first time, endorsed their common ethnic identity as ‘Gewada’. Since 1995, the ‘Gewada’ have one seat from among those 20 reserved for the minority nationalities in the HPR. Thus, the existence of their common ethnic identity with a recognizable geographic contiguity has gained recognition since 1994.

The regional and local ruling elite have known the fact that the Gewada-Dhobase have been electing only one representative in all national and regional elections. However, it is quite elemental to ask as to why they had remained silent while they have been electing only one representative in all elections if their common ethnic identity were to be questioned even after the demand for recognition of self-governance. Perhaps the answer24 is that in Ethiopia ethnicity is primordially defined but instrumentally used. Ethnicity is contextually defined in Art.39/5, as a result ethnic groups status in Ethiopia is externally determined based on fixed criteria the government has already set. Thus, the Ale cause since 1995 has been trapped between the government and very strong local ruling elites as to who defines and decides which group deserves the status of ethnic group and hence who has the right to self-determination and who does not.

To sum up, the Ale have experienced a development of ethnic self-consciousness and self-assertion only after the 1990s. In this regard, ethnic based federal model and other related state policies are combined to provide a crucial environment. Different factors have retarded the development of the Ale ethnic consciousness in the past and still in the present. By using the externally imposed different identities as a pretext, the local ruling elite questioned their common ethnic identity as one ethnic group. The regional government has recognized the common ethnic identity of Gewada-Dhobase as the “Ale” since 2009. However, the finding from the document analysis shows that their common ethnic identity has been recognized since 1995 as “Gewada” by the Council of Representative of the Transitional Period. The reasons for Gewada-Dhobase’s pressing question of self-government, the challenges they have been encountering for gaining official recognition, and the consequence of this continued claim will be discussed within a larger framework of claims by some ethnic groups in the South in the following chapter.


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CHAPTER 5Constitutional Protection of Ethnic Groups: The Challenge of the South

Introduction

In chapter four of this thesis, I have discussed the Gewada-Dhobase (Ale) quest for common ethnic identity. The Ale have experienced relatively strong awakening of ethnic self self-consciousness in the post 1990s. Developing and changing ethnic consciousness and self-assertion, however, has finally developed a new feeling i.e. a feeling of being divided, dominated and marginalized under the Konso and Derashe special woredas administration. Their long-standing claim for self-governance has initially taken its shape against this feeling. However, the externally imposed different identities on them in the past are instrumentally used as a pretext by the regional and local ruling elite to falter their claim for self-governance. It is only after their understanding of the identity politics in play that they decided to re-focus their claim first to get recognition for their generic ethnic name instead of two or more names that were wrongly ‘perceived ’ as the names of separate ethnic groups as a means for another end.

The Ale long-standing claim has been repeatedly presented to regional and federal governments since 1995. Instead of being treated in accordance with the constitutional provision, the irony is the response i.e. taking several retaliatory measures including detention and dismissal from jobs by the local ruling elite. As no lasting solution has been given to their demand, the situation escalated when conflict and protracted violence had occurred in 2008. It was only after this violent approach that their issue has gained the attention of both federal and regional governments. In 2009, the regional government endorsed the Gewada-Dhobase common ethnic identity as the “Ale”. However, the recognition of their common ethnic identity has not yet been accompanied by the right to self-government. Their long-standing concern and at times resort to violence have thus not yet achieved its ultimate goal of creating their own separate special woreda level of administration.

Therefore, this chapter will focus on the revival and development of distinct ethnic identity among the Ale group; the reasons that evoked their


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pressing question of self-governance and the main challenges they have encountered in an attempt to attain their long-standing concern since 1995 within the larger framework of continuing dynamics of ethnic claims for self-determination in the South. This would help to understand whether the existing EPRDF policy initiatives such as ethnic based federal model and constitutionally entitling ethnic groups for self-determination have virtually addressed ethnic claims for the right to self-determination in the South. 5.1 Dynamics of Ethnic Claims for Self-determination in the South: The Case of the Ale

During the initial part of the transitional period, ethnic claims had been encouraged by the EPRDF in the South for self-determination by its rhetoric of “liberating the oppressed nationalities” (Vaughan, 2003 and Aalen, 2008). This became apparent when five regional units (kilil 7-11) were organized in the areas comprising today’s SNNPRS by the Proclamation no.7/1992 that established a total of 14 national/regional self-governing regions (kilils). Ethnically defined groups within these five regional units also managed to gain the status of zone or special woreda. For instance, the Gewada and Gobase, the focus of this study, were separately entitled to establish their own self-government under Region (kilil) nine. It appears that the transitional period administrative arrangement fitted well with the government rhetoric of “liberating the oppressed nationalities” of the South (Vaughan, 2003). Thus, the then TGE’s policy initiatives managed to accommodate the basic self-governance aspirations of both larger, which had been administrative units in the past (such as, Sidama) and smaller ethnic groups, which achieved a newly won administrative status, in the South at the time. In stark contrast to Ethiopia’s constitutional engineering, the EPRDF constitution entitled ethnically defined groups the right to self-determination including secession (Art.39/1). While entitling ethnic groups of the South to this right, the EPRDF regime has lumped together 56 ethnic groups into one federated unit from the previous five regional units in 1995. It seems that this unilateral merger is not only contradicting with principles of the new constitution but also equally depriving their right to self-determination they had already accorded.

Due to EPRDF’s desire to sustain its control of state power, the party has gradually put efforts into administrative integration instead of national self- determination in the South, even if the national constitution gives ethnically defined groups a universal right to self-rule (Aalen 2008:190).


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The consolidation of 56 ethnic groups was one of the points of controversy in the South. There are two contending controversies concerning this merger. There are two contending views. Accordingly, some argue that the merger was an initiative which came from the southerners themselves after thorough discussion before it was finally decided while others mention that the merger was the initiative of the central government and hence, the southerners accepted it, but would never have suggested it if EPRDF did not. If the merger were the expression of the expressed consent of 56 ethnic groups, ethnic assertion for separate ethnic identities and self-governance in the SNNPRS would not be a significant political factor that posed a challenge for the government. To dispel the notion of consent, the disintegration of multi-ethnic zones, namely Simen Omo zone into five units and and Kaffa-Sheka zones was enough (see Vaughan, 2006). The pressing ethnic claims for self-governance at different levels and their resort to violence at times thus show that the merger was not the manifestation of their expressed consent.

As a major positive departure from the past, EPRDF regime adopted new policy initiatives such as ethnic-based federal formula and concomitant right to self-determination perhaps to enable ethnic groups to administer themselves by devolving power along ethnic lines. However, many ethnic groups in the South were not considered within these new policy initiatives.

There emerged a number of anomalies in operationalsing the federal formula on the basis of ethnicity and language. In some cases, a number of ethnic groups with sizeable population were not considered within the national federal formula, whereas the Hareri minority group, for example, was accorded the status of a “regional-state”. A large number of ethnic groups were amorphously conglomerated under the “SNNPRS” creating a further anomaly (Aklilu, 2003:38).

Due to the problem either inherent in the model itself or thrown up during its execution, its record has met with a varying degree of success in accommodating ethnic questions for self-governance in the South. As a result, it has faced intense challenges related with emergent and existing ethnic assertions.

To sum up, the government unilaterally consolidated the diverse ethnic groups of previous five regional units into one unit-SNNPRS without establishing institutional mechanism to enable them to realize their right to self-determination. An astonishing fact is not only the merger but also EPRDF’s failure to consider the basic self-governance aspiration of these diverse


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ethnic groups while entitling them the right to self-determination including secession. By consolidating diverse ethnic groups, the government has thus created minority-within-minority which is the main cause for increasing ethnic assertions in southern Ethiopia.

5.1.1 Creating Minority-within-Minority: Main Cause for Assertion of Ethnic Identity

From the territorial administrative arrangement of the SNNPRS, one can observe clear similarities with the national level. Those larger ethnic groups in the region have been given their own “mother zone” or “special woreda ” while other ethnic groups constitute a minority within one of these entities.

Most of the southern state’s 50+ ethnic groups do not have their own zone/special woreda. These groups either live in a multi-ethnic zone or are a minority group in a zone dominated by another group (Beken, 2008:23).

Many ethnic groups were made to form a minority within one of ethnically defined zones or special woredas or made to live together in a multi-ethnic zone or special woreda such as Debub Omo and DSW without establishing institutional mechanism that enables them to realize their socio-economic and political interests. It is not surprising if there is resentment and at times resort to violence and conflicts by some ethnic groups such as Ale, Goffa, Tambaro and Danta against their minority status in a sub-regional unit dominated by other groups. This is because they have felt that their being subsumed would not only undermine their prospect for development but also subject them to domination and marginalization. Thus, by merging together very diverse ethnic groups, the existing ‘territorial approach’ of ethnic-based federal model anomalously created minority-within-minority in SNNPRS.

As a remedy to past injustice and inequality, the EPRDF regime legally guaranteed ethnically defined groups the right to self-determination. This is evident in Art.39 of the FDRE constitution that stipulates the rights of nations, nationalities and peoples in Ethiopia. Article 39/2 guarantees the right a) to speak, to write and to develop once own language; b) to express, to develop and to promote once own culture and c) to preserve once own history. _____________________________________________73 Special woreda has the same political status as the zone, but is used for smaller and territorially strongly concentrated ethnic groups


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Article 39/3 of the Constitution also recognizes the right a) to a full measure of self-government including the right to establish institutions of government in once own territory and b) to equitable representation in states and federal governments. The SNNPRS constitution (in Art.39) is also recognizing the same right to all ethnically defined groups in the region. By doing so, the constitution has created a positive interrelationship between exercising the right to self-determination and ethnic identity.

While the goal of these substantive autonomy rights stated in the constitution is to find solution for ethnic claims of self-governance through legal means, some ethnic groups in the South are still battling with the state peacefully as well as violently for these legally sacred rights. This is because the rights promised for them have not yet been fully implemented.

EPRDF’s power politics is in itself conflict producing: when communities that have defined themselves along ethnic lines are denied the right to self-rule in the South, it creates a difference between the principles and practice that produce anger and discontent (Aalen, 2008:190).

Thus, any observer of the actual reality in SNNPRS agrees that there are serious discrepancies between the promise made in the constitution and the practice on the ground.

The continuing ethnic questions in the South are not only the result of lack of respect for constitutionally fledged rights but also inconsistency in implementing them. The Ale elders argue that they have been deprived of the right to self-government in which their neighboring ethnic groups with whom they had equal political status in the past such as Basketo, Amaro and Burji have been given one. They further argue that these neighboring ethnic groups have gone far politically and economically. This is because they have secured their own special woredas and hence, they have their own budget allocated from the government that can hasten development endeavor in their locality. Besides, they state that they are using their language in education and administration and governing themselves by their own children.

The Ale informants and participants of the FGD further state that the deprivation of the special woredas status has considerably hampered the gratification of their other substantive rights recognized in the constitution.

If our (Ale) right to a full measure of self-government in the territory we inhabit had been respected, we would have gained the chance


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to economically develop our locality, our language, promote our culture, preserve our history and govern ourselves by our own sons and daughters (Interview with elders, Gewada, 4 December 2009).

They further claim that due to reluctance of government to address their long-standing claim, they have fallen in the hands of modern local neftegna i.e. the Derashe and Konso ruling elite who dominated and marginalized them in the pretext that they are uneducated. Thus, the pressing question of Ale is evident from the fact that the hitherto dominated and marginalized ethnic groups in the South do not still have the right to administer themselves. Thus, their long-standing claim is shaped by the feeling that their being subsumed under Konso and Derashe has reduced the prospect for development and subjected them to marginalization.

It seems that there are two contending claims by ethnic groups in the South. The larger ethnic groups who have their own zone or special woreda compare themselves with those ethnic groups who have their own “mother” state at national level and may feel that they are deprived. In this regard, the case of the Sidama and Gamo is evident. On the other hand, those ethnic groups who have not yet been given their own zone or special woreda compare themselves with their neighboring ethnic groups who have zonal or special woredas status and have felt that they are deprived similar rights. Thus, in the southern region ethnic groups of all size perhaps have felt that they are deprived of the constitutionally entitled right to national self-determination or treated in unequal fashion.

However, the regional government argues that most of ethnic questions in the region are not the question of the people but the question of few elites who are seeking personal benefit in the name of the people. Put differently, ethnic mobilization in the region is the effect of “narrow nationalists” or “rent-seekers” who are mobilizing the people to get separate administrative units in the name of the right to self-determination, only as a cover-up for seeking personal benefit.

To sum up, the FDRE constitution has bestowed substantive autonomy rights in all ethnically defined groups as a remedy for past injustice and inequality. Practically, however, the EPRDF policy initiatives have not yet fully addressed ethnic questions for self-governance in the South. The issue of ethnic identity and self-governance is causing inter-ethnic tensions and at times conflict and violence in the region. Subsuming one ethnic group under another is not only changing the pattern of dominance from vertical to horizontal but also breaking a long history of inter-dependence


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and coexistence among ethnic groups. Looking at the case study of the Ale is evident for the existence of this fact. 5.1.2 Rising Expectation and Relative Deprivation: The Major Cause for the 2008 Ale Violence

Relative deprivation is defined as actor’s perception of discrepancy between their value expectation and their value capabilities (Jeong, 2000). Value expectation leads people to believe that they are rightfully entitled to certain things (the right to self-government in the case of the Ale) whereas value capabilities are things they think (the Ale perceives that they are constitutionally entitled) capable of getting and keeping. According to this hypothesis, relative deprivation results from the combined effect of rising expectation and a lack of progress toward that expectation. An intolerable gap between anticipated reality (constitutional entitlement) and the manifest reality (incapability of getting entitlement) serves as a precondition for widespread of conflict and violence (ibid).

The quest for self-governance at special woreda level has been a long-standing concern among the Ale since 1995. It has been repeatedly presented to respective regional and federal governments. However, the demand has remained beyond their reach until today. The Ale informants reported that the regional government accepted and addressed twice similar ethnic claims for self-governance at regional level but has ignored their persistent demand. Following the recognition of distinct Silte ethnic identity and disintegration of multi-ethnic zones such as Simen Omo and Kaffa-Sheka, the number of zones increased from eight to thirteen and special woredas from five to eight in 2000. In addition, a number of new woredas were added within 13 zones at regional level in 2006. While addressing such similar issues, the government has continued to contain the Ale long-standing claim.

As long as the government is not willing to accommodate their demand, it is not astonishing if they doubt the wisdom of theoretical legal entitlement to self-determination. Due to a gap developed between a rising expectations and reality in the course of time, the Ale have developed a sense of frustration-aggression. The reluctance of the government to address their demand has been creating not only a sense of grievances but also feeling of being ignored. The Ale have felt that nothing good is done by the government and hence, they have experienced a sense of status deprivation. They state that their educated sons and daughters find themselves unable to gain admission to posts they believe they are legally entitled to in both special woreda administration.


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During the 2005 national and regional election, the Ale people from both sides were refused to participate in election. In response, the regional government through local ruling elite told them that the government would answer their question of unity and self-government after election. However after the end of the election, the regional government through local ruling elite told them that the government had not made any promise. It was said that their elite (i.e. the Ale elite) had fabricated such promise for their own political benefit. Accordingly, they decided that:

Our children are not political entrepreneurs. They are articulating our questions. We have one spirit, one goal and one heart. This is the strategy you (Konso and Derashe elite) are using to divide us. We know our sons but we don’t know you (particularly the Derashe). You can never administer us and we can administer ourselves by our own traditional administrative system if the government is not willing to respond to our question (Interview with elders, Dhobase, 25 January 2010).

From this quotation one can infer that there is convergence of interests between the people and their elite. The situation was more deteriorated when their elite particularly from the Dhobase side i.e. side of the DSW have been subjected to several retaliatory measures including detention and dismissal from jobs. Thus, the government’s continued containment of their long-standing claim could not bring sign of abating except exacerbating the situation more widely and powerfully up to and including protracted conflict and violence.

5.1.2.1 The Triggering Cause for the Conflict and Violence The triggering factor for the conflict and violence was the allegation of Mossiye inhabited Nallo kebele by the Dhobase (Ale) inhabited Addis oltema kebele for setting on fire of the grassland along the border of the two kebeles. After the burning down of the area, inhabitants of the Addis oltema kebele started to agitate their ethnic members (Dhobase) to stand against the protagonist-Nallo Kebele and retaliate. Accordingly, the initial conflict between the two kebeles in no time turned into group conflict and finally took a form of inter-ethnic nature by involving the Derashe, the bordering Mossiye and the Gewada-Dhobase as the major actors in the conflict.

When the conflict was beyond the control of the regional security force, the federal police was sent to the area. The arrival of the federal police


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changed the pattern of the conflict from inter-ethnic nature to violence. According to the informants, based on the information they had received from the DSW, even though the Derashe ruling elite argue differently, the federal police were told that the Gewada-Dhobase had been armed and supported by the OLF . Based on this preconception, the federal police at the mid of the night forcibly entered into the houses of the Ale community by the pretext of arresting the suspected instigator of the conflict and disarming them. However, the people responded in protest to this federal police action. This resulted in a deadly clash that lasted for a day causing the death and injury of innocent lives of several people and security. Soon what was prescribed by the regional government was to organize a big peace conference that gave birth to the Gewada Peace Conference.

5.1.2.2 The Gewada Peace Conference and its Resolutions

The conference was held on 21 July 2008 in Gewada. It was a big conference in which 30 people from each of 17 Gewada-Dhobase inhabited Kebeles, 55 elders from the Derashe and Konso sides, intellectuals, and concerned regional and federal people participated. The meeting was facilitated by the current president of SNNPRS, Ato Shiferawe Shigute.

In the conference, the Gewada-Dhobase tried to justify the eruption of the violence, claiming common ethnic identity and separate special woreda and others. Among the decisions of the Gewada peace conference, only common ethnic identity issue has been officially addressed but their long-standing concern has remained unaddressed. Consequently, the initial optimism that transpired during the Conference waned and gave way to the tendency of resentment. Conflict cannot be solved by entering oath and clapping hands after conducting a huge conference. Conflict handling is beyond bringing disputant parties together, it needs to address the root causes of the problem and transforming it sustainably (Lederach, 2003).

5.1.2.3 The Post-Conflict and Violence Inter-Ethnic Relations

The post conflict inter-ethnic relationship should be evaluated on the basis of the resolution of the conflict; whether the fundamental causes were resolved or not. _______________________________________________________74 OLF is an armed organization born in 1974 with a major aim of struggle of self-determination for the Oromo nation.


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The key question to be asked here is in what context can conflict be said to have been resolved? Is it when the war ends or when causes of the conflict are resolved?

The 2008 conflict and violence ended as a consequence of the regional government intervention. However, the top-down approach of ‘peace formation’ by the regional government by organizing the peace conference has not yet addressed the root cause of the conflict until today. When the causes of the conflict are resolved, conflict can be transformed sustainably (Fisher, 2000). The top-down ‘peace restoring’ approach of the regional government couldn’t bring lasting solution for 15 years old Ale claim. It is an internally initiated and recognized, properly planned and wisely implemented conflict transformation that could bring intended peace and order by addressing the root cause of the conflict (Jeong, 2000). Imposing peace would not be legitimate unless the root causes of the conflict are resolved.

Another drawback of the top-down ‘peace restoring’ approach was that the indigenous conflict settlement mechanisms were not given any consideration during and after the conference to play their own constructive role thereby finding traditional cure for inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts. According to informants, the disputed parties i.e. the Derashe and the Gewada-Dhobase (Ale) need to be reconciled each other through traditional conflict settlement mechanism but this was not done during and after the conference. As a result, the post conflict inter-ethnic relation has remained unchanged. Similarly, the Derashe informants state that the overall inter-ethnic relation is not peaceful and harmonious. To restore peaceful, harmonious and friendly relations of the past, reconciliation must be done through traditional mechanisms of the two ethnic groups, according to my Derashe informants. Otherwise, they fear that inter-ethnic conflict and violence will relapse once again in the future.

However, commitment on the part of the government to guarantee their legally entitled rights to self-rule at special woreda level, educated people, local elders and religious leaders could no doubt help to revitalize the past harmonious coexistence and strengthen the peaceful relations between the two ethnic groups.

To sum up, creating minority-within-minority in the South instead of national self-determination has not only changed the pattern of dominance perhaps from vertical to horizontal but also broke the long established inter-dependence and coexistence among ethnic groups in the region. This is because subsuming one ethnic group under the other is creating feeling of


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inequality and domination. The case study of the Ale is evidence for this fact in the regional state.

5.2 The Challenges and new Prospects for Peace

Today recognizing the self-governance right for the Ale has become more critical not only to address their long-standing concern, enormous destruction and loss of life, but also to restore a peaceful, harmonious and friendly inter-ethnic relations in the study area. However, the basic question to be asked is what would be the challenge and a new prospect for peace if the government recognizes self-governance at special woreda level for the Ale? In addition, shall recognizing this right for the Ale further deteriorate or create a window of opportunity to restore peaceful and harmonious inter-ethnic relations of the past?

The Ale have faced intense opposition from the local ruling elite since the inception of their demand. However, they are more pointing to the Derashe local ruling elite as a serious challenge for their cause. According to Ale informants, the Derashe elite’s fear that if the Ale secure a separate identity, this will not be a good lesson for the remaining ethnic groups in their special woreda. Consequently, the two ethnic groups’ elite i.e. the Derashe and the Ale are simultaneously animated by two powerful, thoroughly independent, yet distinct and often actually opposed motives. According to informants, the motive of the Derashe elite is marginalizing the Ale cause because they fear that it would have detrimental effect up on their separate status as special woreda within SNNPRS. This is because from 26 total kebeles of DSW 10 of them belong to the Dhobase (Ale).

However, one of the key questions to be asked- ‘should departing Gewada-Dhobase (Ale) from the Konso and the Derashe special woredas administration lead to resource based inter-ethnic conflict in the future?’ The Derashe informants state that the Derashe ethnic group are not sharing boundary with the Dhobase. The Dhobase/Ale are sharing boundary with the Mossiye, one of the five ethno-linguistic groups in the DSW. As far as they are not sharing boundary with the Derashe, resource oriented inter-ethnic conflict between the two ethnic groups is unlikely to happen in the future. Another concern is the nature of the future inter-ethnic relations between the Konso and the Gewada/Ale if the later depart from the former. It is possible to predict their future inter-ethnic relation based on the existing reality. Currently, there are peaceful and harmonious inter-ethnic relations between the elite of the two ethnic groups and the masses at large. This is evident when the Ale informants and participants of FGD were continuously expressing their gratitude to the


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Konso officials and the people for their constructive contribution toward their cause. Thus, recognizing self-governance right at special woreda level will not cause a resource oriented inter-ethnic conflict among ethnic groups.

5.2.1 Ethnic Group Status of the Ale and the Right to Self-determination

The FDRE constitution defines ethnic group as clearly distinguishable cultural groups akin to the primordial definition of ethnicity (Aalen, 2008). Article 39/5 of the constitution defines nation, nationality and people (NNP) as:

“a group of people who have or share a large measure of common culture of similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory”.

Based on the constitutional definition of NNP one can define ethnic groups in Ethiopian context as people with their own common culture or custom, language, identity, psyche, and contiguous territory. This definition gives the interpreters of the Constitution i.e. HoF the right to define from outside, which congregation of people are entitled to the status as ethnic group, and hence who has the right to self-determination. The criteria used are focusing on primordial traits and all traits are expected to be easily identifiable from outside. Additionally, the criteria for establishing “nations, nationalities and peoples” are objectively and externally identifiable, based on fixed characteristics that can be ascribed from outside, without the involvement or self-reflection of members of the ethnic group (Aalen, 2008). Thus, it is sensible and justifiable that the vanguard party, from outside, can grant self-determination to ethnic groups which have fulfilled the criteria that the party has set (ibid). However, one of the key question to be asked is can the Ale fulfill this definition of ethnic group or the fixed criteria the regime has set so as to grant the status of ethnic group and hence, the right to self-determination? From these objectively and externally ascribed criteria, notably hard to make is “the belief in common identity”, “common psychological make up” and “territorial contiguity”.

There exists not only a geographic contiguity in territory that the Gewada-Dhobase (Ale) inhabit but also a sense of an over-arching common ethnic identity that transcended the administrative boundary to include them all. Concerning common psychological make up, cursory analysis of their long-standing claim since 1995 is enough. This is because they have been battling for self-governance rights by one heart, one spirit and one goal. This is also evidence for the absence of divergence between the elite and the people.


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The central argument of this paper is that the Ale can fulfill the fixed criteria the regime has set to grant the status of ethnic group and hence, they can deserve the right to self-determination.

While they are fulfilling these fixed criteria used by the regime, why has the government continued to contain their long-standing claim since 1995? The regional government perceived the Ale issue is as after all not the issue of the people but as the issue of few elite before the 2008 violence. The government’s fear is that if it recognizes the self-governance right for the Ale at special woreda level, this would lead to other nationalities to ask for the same in the study area. Thus, the containment of ethnic claims in the South could actually be presented as a matter of preventing administrative disintegration but not their failure to fulfill the fixed criteria the government use to grant the status of ethnic group and hence, the right to self-determination. Map 3: The Administrative boundary of the Ale

Source: CSA, 2007

To sum up, it is not recognizing the self-rule right that will create a challenge for peace but failure to do so that further deteriorates peaceful and harmonious inter-ethnic relations in the study area. Recognizing the self-governance right for the Ale will create no any challenge but rather brings


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a new prospect for sustainable peace. This is because: A. They are not sharing boundary with the Derashe b. The Konso administration has been playing a positive role towards the Ale cause as a result there is a peaceful and harmonious inter-ethnic relations even if they share boundary C. The bordering Mossiye ethnic group have a peaceful relations with the Dhobase d. The Gewada-Dhobase live in geographically contiguous territory.

The departure of the Ale from these two special woredas administration thus would not lead to resource based inter-ethnic conflict, like the case of Zeise and the Derashe (Tizazu, 2007).

Moreover without any reservation, the Ale can also fulfill all criteria set by the regime to grant self-determination to those ethnic groups who fulfill these criteria. To bring sustainable peace in the study area, the self-determination right must be recognized to the Ale ethnic group in accordance with constitutional provision.


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CHAPTER 6

Conclusion and Recommendations 6.1 Conclusion

This study dealt with the Ale demand for recognition of separate ethnic identity and self-governance in the Ethiopian federal system. In this concluding chapter, I sum up the findings and attempted to draw some overall conclusion of the thesis.

The Finding from the analysis of Gewada-Dhobase (Ale) quest for common ethnic identity showed that they have been divided into two administrative units since the feudal regime. An astonishing fact is not the administrative division but the existence of more than two names that were wrongly ‘considered’ as the names of different ethnic groups. It was during the Derg’s ISEN that these different names were given legal status as the names of different nationalities. The Ale claim for separate ethnic identity and self-governance has been repeatedly presented to concerned government bodies since 1995. With the exception of recognizing the Gewada-Dhobase common ethnic identity as the “Ale”, their long-standing claim has remained unmet. This is because the recognition of their common ethnic identity has not yet been accompanied by the right to self-determination.

As many writers have indicated, the aim of adopting federal model and constitutionally recognizing the right to self-determination for all ethnically defined groups is to address the long-standing ethnic questions of self-governance. My empirical studies from southern Ethiopia, however, display that ethnic questions for self-government have continued to this day in the South. Many ethnic groups are still battling peacefully or violently for the right which is made sacred to them legally. The government’s reluctance to address the ever increasing ethnic demands and their resort to violence has raised a considerable doubt on the practicability of the existing constitutional principles. The experience from the Ale ethnic group in particular has shown that the hitherto marginalized and dominated ethnic groups in south are far from enjoying the fruit of legally guaranteed rights. Thus, any observer of actual reality in SNNPRS agrees that there are serious discrepancies between the principles made in the constitution and the practice on the ground. From the overall conclusions, one can draw that there is a gap in the


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way how the constitutional provisions protect the rights of the Southern ethnic groups. The self-determination right recognized in the constitution is not yet fully implemented in the South and as a result there is continuing dynamics of ethnic questions. The key question to be asked now is, what recommendations should follow?

6.2 Recommendations

In this thesis, the following two policy options are presented as viable solutions.

6.2.1 Reorganizing Southern Regional State

In the feudal as well as the Derg era, diverse ethno-linguistic groups of today’s south were never under a single administration and a unified area in their socio-economic and political history. During its transitional phase, the EPRDF regime had organized five regional units (kilil 7-11) in today’s South by proclamation no.7/1992. Therefore, by taking into account the political, historical, linguistic and geographic contexts in the region, including EPRDF’s administrative arrangement during the transitional period, restructuring SNNPRS in a manner which reflects the essential attributes of the existing ethnic diversity is a point which is worth emphasizing in a more open-minded ways. This restructuring of SNNPRS should be with the objectives of:

A. Virtually ensuring the right to self-determination; b. Bringing administrative convenience and political symmetry; C. Providing diverse ethnic groups with institutional avenues at different levels of decision-making andd. Abating possible threat to peace and security emanating from increasing ethnic assertiveness.

6.2.2 Organizing Additional Zones or Special Woredas

In the SNNPRS, some ethnic groups have been given their own “mother zones” or “special woredas” that reflect their identity. But most of ethnic groups do not have their own separate zones or special woredas designated by their own names. As a result, they either live in a multi-ethnic zone or special woreda or constitute a minority group under those ethnic groups that were given their own zones or special woredas without any institutional mechanisms to enable them realize their basic self-governance aspiration. Due to this creating minority-within-minority, hosting ethnic groups have acquired the status of political majority over the subsumed one/s in the region. As a result, the subsumed ethnic groups feel that they


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are excluded from power or treated in unequal fashion. This is the basic cause for increasing assertion of ethnic identity in the region. Seen from this perspective, the continuing dynamics of ethnic questions in the South suggest how fragile the Ethiopian federal system is even after one and half decade of its experiment.

Therefore, it will be essential to adopt further decentralization even at state level to enable diverse ethnic groups of the region to realize their right to self-determination and hence, for enhancing peaceful coexistence of ethnic groups. There should be strict application of ethnic groups’ right to administer their own affairs within their own defined territory for those ethnic groups who don’t have currently their own zones or special woredas that reflect their separate identities. This will help:

A. To keep these ethnic groups distinct from the majority those dominate the political process at zonal or special woreda levels; b. To bring genuine power sharing among diverse and contending groups and a regional government that is acceptable to all and; C. To avoid horizontal or local level dominance and marginalization and hence localized inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts in the region. These are perhaps the only viable solutions to address increasing ethnic claims for self-governance and its subsequent tensions, violence and conflicts in the region.

Let me end on an optimistic note, in the realm of peace and security dealing with ethnic demand for recognition of ethnic identity and self-government would be important for sustainable peace and security to prevail. Whenever ethnic group demands are securitized, ethnic relations will eventually settle into a stable and peaceful pattern. However, refusing to accommodate ethnic claims through legal means can play into the hands of lack of good governance and broken mutual interdependence and co-existence in the inter-ethnic relations. This is because the feeling of being deprived and excluded by ethnic groups will clearly reinforce inter-ethnic tensions and violence. Thus, to accommodate ethnic claims in multi-ethnic southern region, the federal system should be a continuous and dynamic process rather than static and permanent administrative structures.

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- ሐንሰሞ ሐመላ.(1993). በደቡብ ኢትዮጵያ ወግና ልማድ የድራሼ ሕዝብ ታሪክ፡፡ አዲስ አበባ - ደቡብ ብሔር ብሔረሰቦች እና ሕዝቦች ክልል መንግሥት .(2ዐዐ1). የብሔረሰቦች ፕሮፋይል፤ በብሔረሰቦች ምክር ቤት በባህል፣ ቋንቋ፣ ታሪክና ቅርስ ጥናት ተቋም የተዘጋጀ፡፡ አዋሣ

Acronyms

CSA-Central Statistics Authority DSW - Derashe Special Woreda EPRDF- Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic FrontESM - Ethiopian Students’ Movement FDRE- Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia FGD - Focus Group Discussion HOF- House of Federation HPR - House of People’s RepresentativesISEN - Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities KSW- Konso Special WoredaNPDC - National Peace and Democratic Conference of 1991 OLF - Oromo Liberation Front PDRE - People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia PNDRE - Program of National Democratic and Revolutionary Ethiopia SNNPRS - Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State TGE - Transitional Government of Ethiopia TPLF - Tigrian People’s Liberation Front Glossary

Awuraja- Administrative province/ district made up of woredas Derg- lit. committee in Amharic, the group of military that took power in 1974


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Gabbar- lit. farmers or peasants paying tribute to landlords Kebele-lowest administrative unit Kifle hager- Province during the Derg Kilil- National regional state or federal unit during EPRDF Neftegna-lit. the solider settlers or ‘gun carriers’ during Menelik II Simen and Debub-North and South respectively Teklai gizat- Province during the feudal era Woreda- District or county administration


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V Indeginous Conflict Resolution Mechanisms: The Case

of the Ennor Gurage, by Wubyid Kumel


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CHAPTER 1Introduction

Contrary to the popular view, George Simmel, Karl Marx, Lewis Coser, and John Burton argue that conflict is an intrinsic, inevitable and often creative and constructive process of social life through which our welfare, security, justice and opportunities for personal and social development can be achieved. To them, conflict is a vehicle of social change. Contrary to this, there are countless people who consider conflict as undesirable, destructive and deadly threat to the harmonious existence of societies. This implies how divided we are with regard to the nature of conflicts.

Despite the above variations in perspective, at least we all agree on one thing, i.e. conflict is the reality found in all forms of society that we encounter in our daily lives. So, any attempt of eliminating conflict is unworthy and unwise. In Bohannan’s (1967) words cited in Dejene, (2007), “society is impossible without conflict. But society is worse than impossible without control of conflict”. That is why there are myriads of conflict resolution mechanisms across the globe.

In the Ethiopian context, conflict resolution mechanisms can be broadly classified as indigenous and formal (Alula and Getachew, 2008). Both mechanisms are functional in Ethiopia.

Although, the indigenous one is time-tested and effective in resolving conflicts (Assefa, 2005), Israel (2009) argues that the nation building process, state’s adoption of the formal conflict resolution mechanisms, the spread of formal education, the advent of urbanization and modernity, the increased social mobility of people and various social developments marginalized indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms, and their authority and legitimacy was challenged by these new social forces. Further, they claim that the marginalization of the indigenous mechanisms made the formal mechanism dominant. Such large scale historical, political, economic, social and cultural factors have also impacted on the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms among the Ennor Gurage.

This study attempts to investigate the general values, beliefs, principles,


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procedures, structures, and changes in the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms and their relationship with the formal court system among the Ennor-Gurage of south west Ethiopia.


Every society developed a worldview through which it looks at and interacts with the surrounding reality. A society’s worldview is constructed through the cultural lenses that people develop through years of socialization (Hamdesa, 2000). The Ennor Gurage also developed different institutions to manipulate the day-to-day activities of its members. Among these institutions, conflict resolution mechanisms are employed to resolve conflicts.

There are several researches that studied the social and economic organization of the Gurage people in general and the conflict resolution mechanism in particular. Studies by Alemayehu Neri (1993), Bahru Zewde (2002), Dinberu et al (1995), Gebreyesus Hailemariam (1991), Gidey Degefu (2000), Shack (1966) and various unpublished research theses at Addis Ababa University studied the social, economic, and political organizations of the Gurage people in general and the conflict resolution mechanisms in particular. While producing their classic and modest works, there are some issues the above studies did not address as far as the indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolution are concerned.

Firstly, Gebreyesus (1991), Gidey (2000) and Shack (1966) indicated that the majority of conflicts in Gurage land are resolved through indigenous mechanisms. Basically, the authors are correct in this regard. But they did not explain why the conflicting parties prefer the indigenous mechanisms than the formal mechanisms (courts). They did not tell us how conflict issues are addressed. Even they did not tell us the nature of relationship between the indigenous and the formal mechanisms in resolving conflict.

Secondly, some studies such as those by Bahru (2002) and Abera (2000) focused on the specific dimension of the indigenous conflict resolution mechanism. Both Bahru (2002) and Abera (2000) discussed the customary law which is one element in the general conflict resolution processes. They did not discuss the customary law in relation to different structures of the general indigenous conflict resolution processes. In addition, Gebreyesus (1991) and Shack (1966) discussed conflicts resolved at Yejoka, which is the highest authority of the Gurage indigenous governance system. Most of the time, Yejoka looks into appealed cases and inter-“tribal” conflicts. All the above studies did not cover conflicts which could be resolved at family, village and clan levels. In addition, some of the studies lack in-depth


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analysis of the conflict resolution mechanisms. For example, Yewondwesson (2006) focused merely on describing the ethnographic events of the conflict resolution process. Shack (1963 and 1966) also focused on describing various ritual activities than discussing the actual conflict resolution process. They did not tell us about the meaning that events like rituals and oath have to the negotiators, mediators and litigants. Due to the professional inclination to their academic disciplines, those researchers put the cart before the horse. Rather than investigating the actual conflict resolution, they focused on the elements that intended to reinforce the conflict resolution process. Further, all of the above studies did not incorporate the voice of the disputants with regard to the conflict resolution process. In short, all of the above studies lack depth in their studies of the indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolution and this study is an attempt to fill the gap.

In addition, there is a syndrome of commonality. As Zartman (2000) explains “Africans in African studies programs writing about African subjects implicitly or even explicitly propagate the impression that their subjects have similarities that outweigh their differences, and the whole is merely the repetition of some of its parts” (Zartman,2000:5). Researchers who studied the Gurage people fall under Zartman’s criticism. There is a presumption of taking all Gurages as uniform and the tendency of applying the study of one single section of the Gurage as a representative of the whole Gurage. Shack’s (1966) work that studied the Cheha section of the Gurage is a good example for this stance. To avoid this commonality, the present study focuses on one section of the Gurage, i.e, the Ennor Gurage.

As time passes, societies experience different changes. Abera (2000) explains that with the influence and pressure of the economy and population mobility, the growth of the state, political upheaval and other factors, the realm of law has changed substantially since 1930. This study also examines the changes that indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolution have undergone over time.

1.2 objectives of the Study 1.2.1 General objective

The general objective of the study is to investigate the values, principles, beliefs, processes, procedures, and structures involved in the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms among the Ennor Gurage in south western Ethiopia.

1.2.2 Specific Objectives

The study has the following specific objectives:1. To identify the major indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms in


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the study area.2. To investigate the conflict resolution processes at family, village and clan levels.3. To investigate the rationale behind local people’s preference of indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms vis-à-vis the formal court system.4. To examine the relationship between the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms and the formal court system.5. To analyze the changes that took place in the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms in the study area.

1.3 Research Questions

Based on the specific objectives above, the following are basic research questions of the study.

1 What are the major indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms in the study area?2 What are the conflict resolution processes at family, village and clan levels?3 Who are the local actors involved in the conflict resolution processes at the family, village and clan levels?4 Why do the local people prefer indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms?5 How do the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms and the formal court system work together?6 What are the changes that took place in the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms over time?

1.4 Research Methodology

This study is a qualitative research mainly based on firsthand data gathered during the fieldwork mainly in the rural Ennor land and in Gunchire and Wolkite towns. The following data collection methods were used during the study.

1.4.1. Primary Sources of data 1.4.1.1. Key Informant Interviews

In-depth interviews were made using unstructured questions with selected key informants that included knowledgeable elders and clan leaders who frequently participate in conflict resolution processes, educated members of the Ennor Gurage, and government officials. This helped to collect data


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in relation to types, structures, actors, change and continuity of indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms and their relationship with the formal court system.

Key informants were selected purposefully. A total of 31 people who frequently participate in the conflict resolution processes took part in the interview. Some of these people are representatives of the Ennor “tribe” in Gurage’s higher Shengo at Yejoka, public prosecutors, judges, policemen, educated members and disputants. Both Amharic and Ennoregna languages were used during the interview. The interviews were tape-recorded and notes were also taken.

1.4.1.2. Focus Group discussion

This method was used with two discussant groups each of which consisted of five elders. Information regarding types, structures, actors, changes and continuity of indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms was collected using focus group discussion guide. In addition to this, I conducted spontaneous group discussions during my informal interview at different public places like areke bet (local alcohol vender house) and tella bet (local beer vender house), and during wikiyer (discussions of socio-cultural issues of the society during night times). These unplanned group discussions gave me important insight into the study. This is because during such informal group discussions, the people were actively participating and raising interesting issues that served as an input to the study.

1.4.1.3. observation

Observation was one of the most important methods in the fieldwork. I observed the actual conflict resolution process at a glance. Beyond this, I was able to very closely observe the overall situations and behavior of the people in the study area in their natural settings. I attended various social events like eddir, wikiyer, funeral ceremonies and agricultural activities. These interactions with the society were vital to observe the situation and behavior of the people.

1.4.2. Secondary Sources of data

Secondary sources of data related to the Gurage in general and the Ennor in particular were consulted in order to find out about the people, their history, geography, culture, and socio-economic background and to supplement the primary data. Exploring the changes and continuities also relies on the use of secondary sources of data. In addition, different books, articles and documents related to conflict, conflict resolution, and indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms were reviewed to build the literature and other parts of the study.


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Finally, the data collected from the study area were analyzed by grouping the data into different themes.

1.5 Review of Related literature 1.5.1. Definition of Key Terms and Concepts

There is no one universally agreed upon definition of the term conflict and different scholars and authors define it differently.

Conflict, a Latin word by origin, means ‘to clash or engage in a fight’, a confrontation between one or more parties aspiring towards incompatible or competitive means or ends (Miller, 2005:22). For Fisher, et al (2000)

conflicts happen when people pursue goals which clash. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2005) define conflict broadly using Johan Galtung’s concepts of “Contradiction”(C), “Attitude” (A), and “Behavior” (B). They define it as:

Conflict could be viewed as, a triangle, with Contradiction (C), Attitude (A), and Behavior (B) at its vertices. Here the contradiction refers to the underlying conflict situation, which includes the actual or perceived ‘incompatibility of goals’ between the conflicting parties generated by a mismatch between social values and social structures. “Attitude” includes the parties’ perceptions and misrepresentations of each other and of themselves, and attitudes are often influenced by emotions such as fear, anger, bitterness and hatred. Attitudes include emotive (feeling), cognitive (belief) and conative (will) elements. “Behavior” is the third component. It can include cooperation or coercion, gestures signifying conciliation or hostility. Violent conflict behavior is characterized by threats, coercion and destructive attack (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall.2005 :7-8).

When we summarize the above definitions, conflict could be understood as the ‘pursuit of incompatible goals’ among groups or it is a clash of interests between groups due to differences of values and beliefs.

To summarize, indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolutions are practices derived from the custom, traditions and worldview of society rather than external importation. In this study, indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolution refer to the resolution of conflicts outside the government courts.

Conflict resolution, as Schellenberg (1996) defines, is “any marked reduction in the social conflict”. He indicates that, conflict resolution such


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as environmental change, the influence of third parties, and victory for one party.

Indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolution, as Abera (2003) noted, are made by the people and derive their legitimacy from participation and consensus of the community (cited in Alula and Getachew, 2008:1) and the these mechanisms are long-persistent social practices, rooted in local cultural settings, aiming at resolving conflicts, reducing tension, and rebuilding social relationship (Isak: 1997, cited in Tarekgn, 2008:11).

Scholars such as Bohannan (1967), Gulliver (1979), and Schellenberg (1966) categorized conflict resolution mechanisms into two: the violent and the peaceful. The violent includes war, self-help and duels, whereas the peaceful includes avoidance, burying dispute in the symbolic process, negotiation, mediation, arbitration and adjudication (cited in Dejene, 2007:9).

Schellenberg (1996) claims that force and coercion are among the ways in which conflicts are resolved. This method is the simplest and clearest form of conflict resolution because a resort to force may provide an end to a conflict’s most intense period and may determine who is to have the upper hand in consequent decisions. But force may not provide resolution as well. It may only make it worse.

1.5.2 Perspectives on Sources of Conflict

Identifying sources of conflict is also in contestation. Different scholars proposed different sources of conflicts which range from the individual based explanation up to the structural analysis of conflict sources. For the purpose of this study, the theories are summarized as Internal, Relational and Structural explanation of conflict sources.

Sandole and Merwe (1993) discussed that internal theory locates the sources of conflict mainly within the nature of the individual. For example, Sigmund Freud(1961) viewed human destructiveness as the result of a ’dialectical struggle’ between two opposing forces, one associated with life (Eros) and the other with death (Thanatos), when eros dominates aggression tends to be directed outward (explosion) whereas, when Thanatos dominates, aggression tends to be directed inward (implosion). This energy is always there seeking release internally, if not externally.

Relational theory claims that, since human behavior is affected by social environment and aggression is understood as a function of the interaction between physical mechanism and the stimulation of that mechanism


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(Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, cited in Sandole and Merwe, 1993:6-7). Given the violence is induced by frustration associated with certain situations, an external stimulation releases inherent tendencies of the frustrated agent to attack (Dollard, 1993, cited in Jewong, 2000:67)

Structural explanation, as discussed in Jewong (2000), believes that the sources of conflicts are related with unequal access to political power and cultural marginalization of certain groups. The uneven ability to control events produces asymmetric power relations. Hierarchical social relations are institutionalized in ways that alienate subordinate parties through denial of effective participation. Due to their difference in power status, parties have opposing interests in maintaining the system.

Each theory points out different sources of conflict. The first theory associates sources of conflict with the physical and psychological nature of the individual, the second one takes it as a product of interaction process. The third one claims that the sources are the hierarchical structured relational system.No matter how differently various scholars define conflict or propose its sources, what matters most is that conflict is a social reality that human beings cannot get rid of due to heterogeneity in culture, ideology and attitudes, and scarcity in resource. So, here, the emphasis is on how to manage conflicts and prevent their aftermath and at the same time transform them into promoting social change.


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CHAPTER 2Research Findings2.1 overview of the Gurage and the Study Area

The Gurage who live in the central and south western mountainous plateau of Ethiopia are one of the ethnic groups in the country. They are found between the longitudes of 37: 30’ and 38: 50’E and latitudes of 7:40’ and 8: 45’N (Walelign, 2005). The relative location of the Gurage is West Shewa in the north, East Shewa in the east, Yem Special woreda in the west, Hadiye in the south and Siliti in the south east.

Administratively, the Gurage is one of the thirteen zones and eight special woredas that make up today’s Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State. The Gurage are Semitic language speaking society surrounded by Cushitic language speakers. The language they speak is collectively known as Guragegna. However, within the generic Guragegna, different dialects are spoken. According to Bahru (2002), it is based on these dialects that the three different sub-groups of Gurage are established, namely Northern Gurage (Kistane sometimes Dobi and Moher), Eastern Gurage the Siliti language cluster (Silti, Ulbareg, Innequor, Welene) and West Gurage (Sebat Bet Gurage) (Akelil, Cheha, Ennor, Eza, Geto, Gomare, Inndegagn, Moher, Mesekan and Dobi). In the Eastern Gurage sub-groups, with the exception of Welene, the rest of the Siliti language cluster decided not to be referred to as Gurage particularly following the 2001 public referendum that legitimized the Siliti as one ethnic group (Walelign, 2005).

This study focuses on one of the West Gurage (Sebat Bet Gurage group) i.e. the Ennor. The Woreda Administration Council explains that Ennor is one of the thirteen woredas of today’s Gurage Zone in the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Regional State. The woreda is located in the south western corner of the zone and shares boundary with Yem special woreda in the west, Hadiya Zone in the south west, Enndegagn Woreda and Siliti Zone in the south east, Gumer Woreda in east and Cheha Woreda in north and north east. According to the CSA (2007) census, the total population of the woreda is about 167,745 of which 47.2% are males and 52.7% are females.


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Following the incorporation of the Gurage land into the larger Ethiopian polity under Emperor Menelik II and the expansion of Amharic language as the administrative and working language, according to Dinberu et al (1995), the generic term “Ennemor” came to be collectively applied to refer to people who live in the woreda. However, my informants said the term “Ennemor” does not represent them. The local people rather prefer to call themselves Ennor seb (the people of Ennor). Besides this, the informants underscore that there are also other “tribes” that are different from Ennor in the woreda, namely, Ener and Meger. In this study the term Ennor, which the local people use to call themselves, is used and the study also focuses only on the Ennor Gurage.

Economically, according to the Woreda Administrative Council, the Ennor are engaged in both subsistence agriculture and trade activities. The rural inhabitants are mainly engaged in agricultural activities like cultivation of plants and rearing of cattle. Besides the agricultural activity, the Woreda Council explains that the local people are also subsidizing their livelihood by petty trade. According to my informants, coffee, chat and eucalyptus tree are the main sources of cash for the people. The dominant staple food in the area is enset. It has edible stem and root.

2.2 Conceptualization of Conflict among the Ennor

The Ennor have a saying which goes as “aje ager yarte” meaning ‘The hand amputates the leg’. This proverb reveals the understanding by the Ennor of conflict as an inevitable process. Since the hand of a person amputates his/her own leg, conflict among persons of various interests and values is inevitable and intrinsic. They have different terms like merakse, chakemar and zenga, which represent conflicts with different magnitudes.

Zenga is a very broad concept that embeds various interpretations. Literally, it means affair. The usage of zenga, according to my informants, in conflict implies the incompatibility of interests between individuals or groups. Zenga is a covert conflict which does not manifest itself violently.

Chakemar is a concept equivalent to “dispute” and it arises between groups or individuals who have intimate social relationship due to the day-to-day interaction processes of the members. Informants explain that chakemar occurs frequently and the damage it inflicts is also not severe. For example, quarrel between children in the neighborhood or dispute between spouses is considered as chakemar.


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According to the informants, merakse indicates the escalation of zenga or chakemar between groups or individuals and shows the outbreak of conflict that involves physical combat or termination of talk between the conflicting parties. Merakse refers to violent conflicts that are high in magnitude and have the potential of inflicting injuries on the conflicting parties and thus need third party intervention to resolve.

2.3 The Ennor View of Conflict

The Ennor have two views regarding sources of conflicts. According to my informants, the first one has subjective dimension; meaning the cause of the conflict is related to the problem within the disputants engaged in conflict. In this subjective sense, it is believed that the current conflict is a result of some hidden misdeed or immoral act committed and left unresolved by the conflicting parties or their ancestors. For example, if a person murders someone, it is believed that human life is lost in her/his hand, or that the deceased lost her/his life due to their own or their ancestors’ past misdeed. Thus, the conflicting parties are advised to investigate their and their ancestor’s history and settle the problem according to cultural prescriptions. Otherwise, it is believed that similar misfortunes would continue occuring to them.

The second view, according to informants, has an objective dimension; meaning the actual causes of conflict are looked into. In this view, informants explain, the disputants themselves may violate the rules of the society or commit offences they are directly responsible for. As a result, the offender is expected to justify his/her action with evidences. For example, if neighbors went into conflict due to border issue, they would be adjudicated according to the evidence they provide and this is considered as border conflict.

2.4 Types of Conflict in the Study Area

This study was conducted in a homogenous society i.e. the Ennor. Most of the residents have similar socio-cultural and economic background. Hence, the conflicts discussed below occurr in an intra-“tribe” setting. Conflicts could arise between individuals or groups from the same clan or sub-clan and also between clans. Different types of conflicts arise in the study area with varying frequency. Some are extremely rare like homicide and arson, while others are abundant like resource and money related conflicts.


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My field data collected from informants, the woreda court and police offices in the study area revealed the following as the major types and causes of conflicts: disputes over land holding, removal of border marking stone, destruction of property, arson, blood feuds, quarrel and physical injury, disputes over irrigation of water and grazing land, theft, betrayal among business partners, polygyny and adultery practices, abduction of girls and so on.

As the study area is one of the very densely populated areas, the Woreda Administrative Council estimates that the population density is 260 persons per square km. Land shortage is thus acute. So, land-related conflicts are not only common but also the principal causes for more serious conflicts like homicide, arson, physical injury and vandalism.

In addition, there are also other conflicts with social and cultural dimensions. Informants explain that these include insulting an individual or a specific clan with the intention of defaming their good reputation. The Ennor call such types of offences atem sipware (inflammatory speeches that attack one’s origin). For example, insulting somebody as ozae (originless) is a serious offence and thus liable to penalty.

2.5 Values and Belief Systems

Indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms are credited for their quality of reconciliation, compensating the victim, restoration of peace and legitimacy among the members. Notwithstanding their denial of any role for women, youth and socially outcast groups (like potters, tanners and so on) in the decision-making processes, they continue to enjoy high legitimacy among the members. Contemporary publications such as those by Alula and Getachaw (2008) and Tarkegn and Hannah (2008) also emphasise their significance in resolving conflicts at grassroots levels. This indicates the success of indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms in revealing the truth, providing win-win solutions, and reconciling conflicting parties. In addition, these studies show the legitimacy the systems enjoy. Therefore, discrediting their role at lower levels is not plausible because as Oshaghae (2000:213-214) points out, “resolution of more serious conflicts is impossible without the management of less serious conflicts at the lower levels”.The beliefs, values and procedures the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms involve show the system’s success in maintaining peace and harmony. This section discusses those values, beliefs and procedures the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms involve in the study area.


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Tur

Tur is one of the values that the Ennor Gurage cherished most in their relationship with others and their environment. It involves relationships and manners ranging from the way one treats his/her domestic animals like cat, dog, donkey, etc, to the treatment of people of different class, power and wealth. Tur literally means fortune, but this fortune is not something gained by chance or luck. It is rather believed that tur is achieved on the basis of a person’s and her/his ancestors’ sincere, righteous and good deed. Tur is not confined to the life span of an individual person. It transcends generations and has the potential of manifesting itself in the descendants.

The meaning tur bears is positive like prosperity, health, happiness, many children and cattle, good harvest, and anything one aspires in life. The Ennor express tur saying “tur ge’pwarem and tur wet’awem” meaning one gets tur such as wealth, health, happiness, blessing of children and cattle and anything good that one aspires in life as a consequence of one’s good deeds. This implies that one, on the othr hand, loses tur (fortune) like power, wealth, prestige and the likes as a result of one’s bad deeds.

Due to this, whenever elders sit to look into conflicts, they put themselves in the disputants’ shoes. They take every possible care not to unfairly treat anyone or corrupt decisions so that they and their children would not lose tur. Bad deeds by one, they believe, chase away tur (fortune) from one’s home. The mistreated will also complain to the Almighty to avenge saying, “tur yeherbe’h” meaning ‘Let the Almighty take away all your power and fortune’. This is because of the belief that tur has supernatural protection from Waq (the sky God). Whenever elders abuse their power in the adjudication processes, it is believed that Waq takes away all their power, prestige and punish them for their corruption of justice. Conversely, when they give justice, the disputant says, “tur yeher’h” meaning ‘Let the Almighty compensate you for your good deeds’.

In short, whenever elders resolve conflicts they are cautious not to abuse anq (justice) because the ‘justice’ they abuse today could bring misfortune and misery to their home. In fact, disputants entrust their cases to the elders for they believe that elders have fear of tur. If elders abuse ‘justice’, disputants believe that the Almighty will reimburse them for the anq they lost. Such a belief compels the indigenous conflict resolution mechanism pass a verdict acceptable to the disputants.


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berche and dredeg

Berche is a concept that has the inverse meaning of tur. Berche involves the loss of tur (fortune) following one’s bad deeds. Berche is manifested in the suffering of an individual or her/his family from poverty, diseases, panic, anxiety, absences of children and cattle and various unpleasant things one would try to avoid in life. Suffering from berche is believed to be the result of a misdeed or abuse of tur by one or one’s family.

According to my informants, tur and berche are placed in a diametrically opposite positions. Berche always sits at the door waiting for an opportunity to go in when the tur leaves. Conversely, tur who lives in the house is always tempted to leave. This temptation of tur to leave the house implies that use of power is tempting and needs discipline, determination and commitment on the part of power holders. In any situation, if power is abused, berche awaits at the door to go in. So, if elders corrupt judgment, the spirit of berche would possess and put them and their descendants to suffering from poverty and misfortunes. Such fears of berche enable them to provide anq.

Dredeg is a term used when one encounters unpleasant things. It is used to sympathize the condition of the suffering party. It is something like saying, “I do not like to experience it” or “May Waq (the heavenly God) protect us from such suffering.” Elders, disputants, witnesses, and attorneys frequently use this term during the conflict resolution process. Here, cases are handled putting oneself in the shoes of the disputants. When they say dredge, they assume the pain of the disputants putting themselves in the litigant’s place. This makes them to be sensitive to the pain of others and helps them to provide anq (just decisions).

Berche and dredeg are the Gurage version of Confucius’s golden rule which holds “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.” Therefore, considerations of berche and derdeg in the conflict resolution processes are values that help the indigenous system to provide just decisions.

Teye

Teye is an oath by a suspect and her/her close relatives (Temuri teye). Temuri teye is an oath made by the suspect’s close relatives together. When disputants fail to attest their case by evidences or witnesses, they request the defendant to show her/her innocence through teye or in the occasion when the culprit is unknown, the claimants mention a person that they suspect.


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Then the suspect is requested to admit or refute the case. If she refutes, the elders request her/him to show her/his innocence through teye.

This form of oath is not like that held in the formal court where a plaintiff underscores her/her truthfulness through swear to God. Teye is a very scary soul breaking action-oriented oath. It is intimidating and a thrill oath which involves various ritual activities that all Ennor try to avoid in their life. For Ennor, let alone making teye, calling its name is scary and undesirable.

For instance, teye in suspected arson involves that elders first look for dry land and take the suspect there (the dry land symbolizes termination of fertility) and they dig a hole, lit fire, prepare water, sharp utensils and so on. Then they let the suspect and her/his close relatives to assure their innocence through teye. They ask them to dump the water onto the fire and extinguish it saying, bekizeb, be ane ar beaedehu zeregna ahe yetarete meaning, “May my descendants extinct like this fire if I lie”, then sweep up soil from the hole saying, bekizeb, be an ear beaedehu zeregna wahe atasesim tegegne aeae, meaning, “May my descendants be swept away like this soil if I lie” and so on.

The reason for temuri teye (making the suspect’s close relatives part of teye) is due to the belief that temuri teye is the most serious and soul-breaking thing that all Ennor try to avoid in their life. For this reason, the kinsmen of the suspect exert their best to convince the suspect to admit if s/he is really the perpetrator. In addition, before they make the oath, they make a thorough investigation to check whether the claim was perpetrated by the suspect or not.

On occasions when one is accused on false ground, the claimant pays compensation for his/her false accusation and defamation. In addition, the claimant is obliged to go to public place like markets, religious yards and other places to announce the innocence of the suspect and his/her kinsmen.

The procedure of teye serves as an ingredient for the indigenous conflict resolution mechanism in revealing truth. Since every Ennor fears undergoing teye and makes every attempt to avoid it in life, the likelihood of making oath on false ground is rare. Further, the system’s intention of making teye a collective duty of the suspect’s close relatives helps the indigenous system to reveal the truth through collective act. This is because in an agrarian society a secret may not be hidden from the whole family or relatives or at least from one member of the kinsmen.


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Weg

Weg is both a system and a person that serves as an interpreter and a consultant when anyone happens to be in difficult circumstances. In such occasions, an individual person approaches weg in order to understand the root cause of the incidence or to find out why the victim is suffering from such incidents. Gebreyesus (1991:41) defines weg as,

a person acting like a psychiatrist, except [that] he (weg is male) does not really handle cases connected with mental diseases. He acts like a psychiatrist in that his approach is to find out what misdeeds had been committed generations earlier by the ancestors of a person or persons who appear[ed] before him to get relief from problems which are unique by their nature (Emphasis added).

The person that visits weg could be either claimant or defendant or both. Conflicting parties approach weg in order to find out the causes of their suffering. For example, a slayer can appear before weg in order to ask why someone’s life is lost in his hands. On the other hand, the family of the deceased can also approach weg to find out why their family member lost his life in someone’s hands. As Gebreyesus (1991) describes, it is a self-incriminating action that a guilty conscience makes one to appear before weg in order to get rid of his continued material or spititual suffering. Weg has an association with confession except that it is not done in secret. Therefore, people visit weg either on voluntary basis or on elders’ proposal to understand the root cause of a conflict.

Upon hearing whatever happened to the visitor, the weg interprets the roots of the misfortune and he shows the analogy between previous misdeeds perpetuated by him/her or his/her ancestors and the recent incidence. After finding out the roots of the problem, the weg announces judgment. The weg tells the concerned party what he/she should do to get relief from the current problem and avoid such incidences in the future, and explains to him/her the procedures he/she should undergo to get purified from effects of past misdeeds. His judgment is not appealable; people simply take it for granted.

Informants said that the interpretation provided by weg is not held in secret. The concerned parties rather narrate the tale to the youth in different proverbs, games, stories, music and the like so that they could learn from the incidence and avoid repeating it again.


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So, in the conflict resolution process, before elders announce their judgment, they send the disputants to weg in order to investigate their or the family’s background in relation to the current suffering they are experiencing. Upon the interpretation provided by the weg, disputants consider themselves as part of the problem because they believe that their suffering has its root in misdeeds committed either by themselves or by one of their ancestors, or has occurred as a result of abuse of tur (berche). Consequently, they become submissive to the elders’ judgment. Weg, for the elders, serves as a reference to resolve conflicts.

Gurda

Gurda literally means a covenant or contract entered into by two persons (groups) to solidify trust, friendship, and support between themselves. Once individuals or groups enter into gurda, their agreement means a life time partnership. The contractual agreement is underpinned by different ritual activities and religious notions. Shack (1966) defines gurda as an institutional form of ritual-bond friendship which constitutes a life-long association of reciprocal obligations, reinforced by supernatural sanctions. Gebreyesus (1991) considers gurda as a legal obligation. Of course, it is true that the breach of gurda is punishable by Yejoka or the concerned structure, but in practice it is more of moral obligation than legal. People are bound by gurda not for fear of legal aftermath but rather for fear of ritual illness and evil possessions that may haunt one. Because gurda is entered into by swearing in the name of Waq (God), it is believed that any breach of gurda is penalized by Waq, and the punishments are ritual illnesses which could only be remedied by ritual cures. For this reason, gurda is feared and respected among the local people and those linked by gurda are life time friends.

In the conflict resolution process, the reconciliation is ended after disputants are tied up by gurda. This signifies termination of enmity and onset of friendship that maintains mutual assistance in time of joy and sorrow. After being tied up by gurda, the disputants no more want each other for feud. Even gossips between disputants are considered as the breach of gurda. Gurda enables the indigenous system to restore severed relationships between conflicting parties.

The judgment handed down in the indigenous conflict resolution mechanism is believed to be reinforced by the values of tur, berche and derdeg, and ritually and morally sanctioned procedures of teye, weg and gurda. Deliberation of decisions is conducted with full awareness of the


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ritual consequences, in the form of supernatural penalties imposed by Waq when those entrusted with “justice” misuse it. On the part of the conflicting parties, beliefs in the values make them obedient to elder’s decisions and loyal to the rules for various ritual and moral reasons.

2.6 Major Types of Indigenous Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

As has been said earlier in this study, the Ennor Gurage, like any other society, have their own conflict resolution mechanisms. The Ennor’s conflict resolution mechanism is called kitcha, which they share with the rest of Sebat Bet Gurage. Kitcha is a system of local governance which administers different affairs of the society including conflict. Kitcha literally means ‘rule’ or ‘procedure’.

With regard to its time of establishment, informants and studies like those by Bahru (2002), Dinberu et al (1995), Gebreyesus (1991) claim that it goes as far back as three hundred years. However, Shack (1966) states that kitcha was introduced in the first half of the nineteenth century. Informants in the study area as well claim that the system was founded by Ajamo of the Ennor. However, Bahru (2002) and Yewondwossen (2006) mention the presence of four other individuals in addition to Ajamo of the Ennor.The scenario that shaped the establishment of kitcha was the state of inter-“tribal” war and political instability that had prevailed. This was because of the fact that there was no centralized authority that collectively governed the Sebat Bet Gurage. Walelign (2005) says that a segmentary system with elders’ council at each level of administration was the highest administrative body.

Prior to the legislation of kitcha as a system of conflict resolution and administration guideline, in Shack’s (1966) words, there was neither law nor government in the inter-relationships of the Sebat Bet Gurage. It was this ‘lawlessness’ that forced different “tribes” of the Sebat Bet Gurage to come to consensus for the legislation of kitcha, which controls the social and political environment of the society as a whole. It was legislated by members that formed the confederation of the Sebat Bet Gurage.

Kitcha is the customary law of the whole Sebat Bet Gurage, which dictates the expected behavior of every Sebat Bet Gurage whether they live in Gurage land or elsewhere. It is very broad and serves as a code of conduct, an administrative guideline, a conflict resolution mechanism and many other things. It deals with issues that range from the very simple relationship one should have with her/his domestic animals like cats and dogs to such severe conflicts, like arson, homicide and inter-“tribal” conflicts, and different socio-economic and political issues.


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Discussing each and every detail of the kitcha is equivalent to discussing the day-to-day activities of the Gurage in general or the Ennor in particular, which is beyond the scope of this study. Therefore, in this section, attention is given to the major types of indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms in the study area. They are, Ye Anqit Kitcha, Ye Kiye Kitcha, Ye Jefore Kitcha, Ye Gurda Kitcha, and Ye dem Kitcha.

A. Ye Anqit Kitcha (Family law)

Ye anqit kitcha is one of the conflict resolution mechanisms used by the Ennor to resolve conflicts associated with marriage, divorce and related familial issues. In principle, it is possible to say ye anqit kitcha is a system which protects marriage practices and family institution from crisis and annihilation. One of my informants eloquently expresses this as ‘peaceful divorce is considered as good marriage’. Conflicts arising from mate selection, wedding, abduction, rejection of marriage, marriage between close kins (incest), property sharing between spouses, divorce, bride-wealth and related familial and marriage conflicts are resolved using ye anqit kitcha.

However, in practice ye anqit kitcha is not equally applicable to both sexes. In most instances, ye anqit kitcha is more practical and stronger on women than on men. After all, men are not abided by anqit. For example, ye anqit kitcha entitles men the privilege to divorce his wife irrespective of her consent and gives him the privilege to practice polygyny. But, women do not have such privileges, they are bound by religious curse called ye anqit, not to do what their men counterparts do. This ye anqit is practical on women from the very day of courtship. Ye anqit kitcha favors men by giving them an exclusive right over their wives.

Ye anqit is a ritual-embedded curse meant to maintain a convention entered between a couple. In order to get divorced and even to marry another man after that, a woman needs her husband’s permission and should be granted a release. Without this, nobody is ready to marry her, because she is bound by ye anqit, i.e. it is assumed that she is still in marriage. She can get involved in another marriage only after a consent from her husband to be secured after a divorce ceremony.

Historically, a legendary woman called Yeqaqit Wurdewet, became the first woman to be liberated from ye anqit kitcha. According to oral tradition, Wurdewet organized all women and held a demonstration demanding


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women’s rights of attending elders’ assembly and being allowed to divorce their husbands without the need for the latter’s consent and divorce ceremonies as per the ye anqit kitcha.

Gebreyesus (1991:158) writes, Wurdewet’s eloquent speech at the elders’ assembly as follows:

We, women, your sisters, your mothers and your obedient servants of all time, appear before you today to ask for our rights if we, at all, have any! We, women, are treated as if we were created only for the pleasure of men. You never make us participate in things you are doing or planning. We have no security. If you like us, we are lucky, we live with you, and when you dislike us, we are chased out empty-handed. Therefore, we came here to Yejoka today to beg for some rights even if not the same rights as that of men. It is not to beat our husbands as you do your wives or to scold them. We shall remain obedient to our husbands, continue to wash their feet and cook for them.

Neither are we asking you to test us in the battlefield at this initial stage. This can come eventually. All we are asking you is to give us some minimum rights, like the freedom to come to Yejoka and share our views with you on all problems pertaining to “your country” or, if we could be allowed to say, “our country”. Second, when we feel repressed, we want to be given the freedom to leave our husbands and go without being tied up by the rigid procedures of divorce, which remain based upon rigid customary laws and traditional beliefs - the Anqit. When you divorce us, you just say go because you are not tied up by Anqit. Let us have equal rights, although we cannot tell you to go away from your establishments. But for us, we want to be able to say, “I am going and goodbye”.

Initially, the elders’ assembly was shocked by the challenge presented by the woman. Later, the assembly gave Wurdewet the rights to attend meetings and to choose and to divorce a husband as she wished. Her companions, however, boycotted the parade due to intimidation caused by their husbands.

The good thing is that the recently revised kitcha improved this discriminatory act. Article 9 of Ye Gurage Kitcha (2008) declares, a woman is free from ye anqit after two years if the court approved her divorce or if she informed the case to her husband and his families. The other version of this article is that ye anqit is still practical for the upcoming two years from her divorce. This


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implies that ye anqit kitcha is still discriminatory for women for it still prohibits women’s opportunity of marrying another man of her liking from the very day of her divorce.

In a nutshell, ye anqit kitcha is used to resolve conflicts related to marriage, divorce, property allocation, abduction and even adultery practices at family levels in the study area. Its contribution to the creation of stable and healthy family, which is the fabric of society, is vital.

b. Ye Kiye Kitcha (boundary law)

Kiye is a boundary marking stone that is erected between neighbors and the Jefore (public square or street) (see below). The term kiye has an equivalent meaning of ‘keep’. For the local people, kiye is not merely a boundary stone, but it has also a symbolic meaning. Since kiye keeps the boundary between neighbors, it is believed that the kiye has supernatural protection. Often, the erection of kiye is underpinned by various ritual ceremonies.

Conflicts arising from boundary encroachment, controversies over land ownership and unraveling of boundary stone are resolved based on ye kiye kitcha. Most of the time, boundary conflicts arise on occasions when people inherit, divide, sell, or purchase land. During such times, the contestants or the concerned parties call ye jere dana (a judge who measures land) to measure the land and elders to observe the demarcation process. To ensure the enforcement of the demarcation, bless and curse are delivered in ritual ceremonies. And then the two parties make gurda (covenant) not to infringe each other’s boundary. After such guurda, if one fails to be abided by the agreement or infringes somebody’s boundary, the case is resolved through ye kiye kitcha.

If one is convinced of an encroachment of his/her boundary or the removal of kiye (the boundary stone), s/he presents the case to ye kiye dana that executes the demarcation process. Ye kiye dana, along with the concerned elders and ye jeer dana, starts to investigate the claim according to ye kiye kitcha.

C. Ye Jefore Kitcha (Public Square law)

Jefore is a place that is found between two parallel villages. It is like the modern city’s squares and streets. Jefore belongs to the public, as Gebreyesus (1991: 54) describes. He says, “they are nobody’s because no one claims ownership over them and they are everybody’s because all the people can use them for grazing their cattle freely.” It serves as a corridor for the people


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and cattle, venue for wedding, funeral, religious, and other ceremonies. There is a collective consensus among the public not to plough or fence the Jefore for private uses. All resources found in Jefore belong to the public. Everybody has the duty to keep it clean and its size constant.

Besides Jefore, there is a no man’s land called wad which is accessible to any person who crosses the Ennor-land in their way to markets and various destinations. This is intended to avoid any controversy while one crosses someone’s land. Unlike Jefore, it is impossible to maintain its neatness due to a larger size of the wad.

Conflicts that arise from an attempt of taking some land from the Jefore to add to one’s own, plot, failure to keep its neatness, cutting of bushes from the Jefore, and associated conflicts over the use of Jefore and blockage of wad to deny trafficking of people and cattle are resolved on the basis of ye Jefore kitcha.

d. Ye Gurda Kitcha (Contract law)

Gurda literally means a covenant or contract entered into by two or more people to avoid any confrontation, betrayal and untrustworthiness between individuals or groups. It helps to cooperatively work for collective ends.

Two possible circumstances are there for parties to enter into gurda. Firstly, this is done voluntarily to strengthen the trust between each other. In such cases, the parties do not necessarily have a history of conflict. They do so simply to solidify fidelity or friendship. Secondly, two parties enter into gurda following resolution of conflicts between them. In order to do away with the previous animosity and prevent relapse into conflicts, the disputants are given orders by elders to enter into gurda. This is done to signify the cessation of hostility and the fact that the conflicting parties no longer need each other for feud. Instead, they become a life time friends who support each other in times of joy and sorrow.

Any resolution of conflict through kitcha is finalized after gurda is entered into. A distinguished judge called ye gurda dana (gurda judge) is responsible for the implementation of the process. In front of ye gurda dana, the conflicting parties enter into contract to avoid animosity and further dispute between each other. They confirm that they have agreed to the decision made by the elders regarding the conflict.

If the conflict is a major civil offence like homicide and arson, the gurda


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ceremony is underpinned by different ritual ceremonies as directed by weg. Disputants give their word to the gurda dana to ensure the end of enmity and to begin their peaceful life without any attempt of vengeance in the future.

On occasions of breach of gurda, the case is presented to ye gurda dana who starts to investigate the case using ye gurda kitcha. If ye gurda dana is convinced that there was a breach of contract, he presents the case to the elders’ council or weg for solution.

Gurda is respected and feared due to the belief that an invisible power could punish the party that breaches it. For this reason, it is unlikely to experience such breach of gurda.

E. Ye dem Kitcha (blood Price)

Dem literally means blood but the contextual meaning of the term implies any physical injuries that involve loss of blood. Ye dem kitcha is employed for the resolution of conflicts that involve loss of life, arson, physical injuries like breaking of teeth, damage to the eye and the ear, amputation of different body parts and associated conflicts that present physical damage. In other words, ye dem kitcha resolves conflicts committed against others.

Particularly, if the conflict is homicide, ye dem kitcha handles the case from three different perspectives, namely, mura dem (premeditated murder), medera dem (incidental murder) and ye medera-medera dem (accidental killing). This classification is done for the sake of identifying the context and the cause of the conflict. For this reason, priority is given to investigating the category of ye dem kitcha under which the issue at hand falls.

Mura dem (premediated murder) is a kind of homicide committed consciously and deliberately to kill someone without the knowledge and readiness of the victim. Most of the time, there is a history of conflict between the victim and the slayer. Such a case is resolved by ye mura dem kitcha because it is believed to be a pre-planned and organized act of the slayer committed under absolute unreadiness of the victim even to defend her/himself. Such a type of homicide offence is the most serious conflict that instigates anger among the public. As a result, the resolution involves critical investigation and rigorous procedures. The dem kitcha, on such occasions, considers the offence as mura dem and the slayer is


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expected to pay full blood price for her/his intentional murder.

Medera dem (incidental murder) is a homicide that happens inadvertently. The parties in this case do not have any history of conflict or they may not even know each other. But due to some incidences the parties all of a sudden can go into conflicts that may cause death to one of them. The slayer may even try to rescue the life of the deceased. Such offences are considered as medera dem, a murder that happened inadvertently, and the slayer is expected to pay half of the full blood price (mura dem)

Medera-medera dem (accidental killing) is the third type of homicide related conflict resolution mechanism. In medera-medera dem case, the killing happens accidentally. In a sense, the slayer and the victim do not have any ground that could lead them into conflict, but some unexpected incident can cause death. For example, homicide caused by car accident is a kind of medera-medera dem and the slayer is expected to pay one-fourth of the full blood price (mura dem)

The above discussed indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms are employed to handle conflicts at different structural levels of conflict resolution processes in the Ennor Gurage. The whole processes of conflict resolution at all the structural levels is guided on the basis of the above five kitchas depending on the nature of the conflict.

2.7. Structures of Conflict Resolution

There are different structures established at different levels to implement the five kitchas (discussed earlier) during conflict resolution. Each structure has its own authority and process of conflict resolution. This section discusses these structures and processes among the Ennor Gurage.

Shack (1996) writes that the conflict resolution processes take place at four levels, namely, ye kaye dana (village), ye tib dana (clan), ye gen dana (country) and yejoka. However, the data obtained from the field and the kitcha document (1998 and 2007) and other studies such as those by Yirga (2008) outline five different structures that handle conflicts as: (1) Ye sera dana, (2) Ye mura gegn dana, (3) Ye tib dana, (4) Ye Ennor shengo, and (5) Yejoka shengo. Besides, the structure of weg is also available.

A. Ye Sera Dana (Intra-Village Structure)

Ye sera dana is the lowest structure of conflict resolution in the study area. It has the authority of resolving conflicts between people who live in the same


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locality, who have intimate and close social ties and relationships. This structure predominantly addresses conflicts that occur between members of a village due to their day-to-day interaction. Conflicts addressed at this structure include, minor family affairs, disputes between friends, quarrels between neighborhoods, eddir issues, refusal to payback debt, claim over property ownership, property destruction by cows, goats, chicken and others that come about in the members’ day-to-day interaction. The authority of ye sera dana structure is limited to the village jurisdiction. It assembles frequently to address conflict issues and has no fixed venues to see cases. Conflict issues could be addressed at any convenient place.

Conflict resolvers at this structure are elders of the locality known for their reputation and seniority. In some instances, they could be mutual friends of the disputants. At this structure, elders’ mastery of knowledge of the kitcha is not mandatory to see to the cases. This is because disputants in most cases are from the same village belonging to the same clan and sub-clan who meet frequently, and the the conflicts are usually minor in severity. As a result, elders and intimate friends of the disputants serve as conflict resolvers.

The procedures of presenting cases to ye sera dana structure involve various forms. For instance, an angry party could bring a complaint to the attention of elders or the elders themselves could call the disputants to settle their case if they are convinced that the existence of such conflicts could affect the day-to-day activities of the villagers.

Since the conflict is between intimate parties who have close social network, elders at this structure do not propose a binding decision. They rather facilitate situations that enable the conflicting parties to discuss their differences in order to amicably resolve their conflicts. The Ennor refer to this method as shiko’che (negotiation) or kim’owche (kicking out vengeance). In any case, the right to appeal to the next higher structure is respected.B. Ye Mura Gegne Dana (Inter-Village Structure)

Ye mura gegne dana is the next higher structure to ye sera dana and it addresses conflicts between different villages over matters of common interest like utilization of irrigation canal, grazing land, abduction and similar issues that lead two different villages into conflict. In addition, conflicts between members of different villages are resolved through ye mura gegne structure. In addition, ye mura gegne dana has the authority of seeing cases that are not settled at ye sera dana level. Conflicting parties who appear at this structure belong to different clans and villages.


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As a result, mediators at the mura gegne structure are the sera danas (judges of lower structure) of each village. The sera judges of both villages organize a committee and operate jointly to discuss issues that led the villages or the individuals into conflict. Those sera danas of each village discus the issue at any convenient venue. Their decision is appealable to the next higher structure.

Similar to ye sera dana, there is no fixed venue to address conflicts in mura gegne. Here again, the resolution process is characterized by negotiation. Each party tries to understand the needs of the other and this usally ends in a win-win dcision. The decision made at this level is not final. A dissatisfied party can appeal its case to the next higher structure.

Yirga (2008) calls this second structure as ye sera dana and he made mura gegne as the third structure. But, the filed data, the kitcha documents (1998 and 2007) and a 2009 publication by the Gurage People Self-Help Development Organization are not substantiating Yirga’s assertions. They rather place ye sera dana as the first and lowest structure and mura gegne as the second higher structure of conflict resolution.

C. Ye Tib dana (Intra-Clan Structure)

Ye tib dana is the third structure of conflict resolution in the study area which resolves conflicts that arise between members of the same clan and issues presented to it by other clan members. Conflicts that are not resolved at lower structures are referred to ye tib dana to be seen by the clans’ council. This structure resolves any conflicts, be it homicide or quarrel between friends, which happen between clan members. Unlike ye sera dana and ye mura gegne dana, ye tib dana structure is not limited by location. It addresses issues related to the clan members irrespective of geographical location.

In the tib dana structure, conflict resolvers are clan leaders who have a title of azmach, nigus and are called yegonder nigus, meaning king of gonder (Gonder is a bracelet made from bronze, silver or gold that the clan leaders wear it on their left hand to show their kingship). In addition to clan leaders, elders known for their reputation and mastery of kitcha (Sebat Bet Gurage customary law) take part in the conflict resolution process at this structure. The conflict resolution process in ye tib dana structure takes the form of mediation, locally known as bariquenet. The elders facilitate discussion between conflicting parties. The decision at this structure is not binding and can be appealed to the next higher structure.


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However, in most cases, elders of ye tib dana structure exert maximum effort to settle every conflict, particularly homicide cases under their jurisdiction in order not to expose the issues to other clans. For this reason, the tendency of appealing inter-clan cases to a higher structure is minimal.

In this connection, ye tib dana structure differs from the former two lower structures on the following points. Firstly, the lower two structures resolve minor disputes of the villagers, whereas the tib dana resolves all types of conflicts beyond the village levels but intra its clan jurisdiction. Secondly, the lower structures use village elders where mastery of kitcha knowledge is not as such critical, while ye tib dana structure uses conflict resolvers who have the mastery of kitcha knowledge. Clan leaders are also part of the conflict resolution process.

Although the above variations exist, there are some common features that these three structures share. First, they all do not have fixed venues; they rather assemble at any convenient place. Second, in almost all instances disputants belong to the same clan and sub-clan. Third, the decisions delivered at those three structures are not binding as any dissatisfied party can appeal the case to the next higher structure. Worth remarking, however, is that even though the right to appeal is possible, elders and clan leaders do their best to finish everything through shikoche (negotiation) at their respective jurisdiction.

d. Ye Ennor Shengo (Inter-Clan Structure)

This is the fourth and final structure of conflict resolution as far as indigenous conflict resolutions in the Ennor-land is concerned. Ennor shengo has the authority of resolving conflicts of any kind that may arise between different clans, sub-clans, villages and families of the Ennor. It serves as the last resort of conflict resolution for the Ennor people. It addresses any issue directly appealed to it or cases referred to it by the lower structures.Every clan leader and an expert of kitcha is a conflict resolver at this structure. Unlike the lower three structures, the Ennor shengo has a fixed venue to see cases. The Ennor shengo meets regularly once in a month and at times of need at particular place called Woshe.

Despite the fact that the Ennor shengo is the final structure of conflict resolution within the Ennor-land, decisions at this structure are not binding. Any dissatisfied disputant can take the case to the higher authority as an


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appeal. The dissatisfied party angrily speaks to the Ennor shengo members saying, “Ajoka aber” meaning “let yejoka see or rule”. In this case, the conflict resolution process is held out of the jurisdiction of Ennor.

E. Yejoka Shengo (Inter-tribe Structure)

Yejoka shengo is the final structure of conflict resolution for the Ennor in particular and for the whole Sebat Bet Gurage in general. Yejoka shengo has the authority of legislate new rules and resolve any types of conflict presented and appealed to it by different tribes and clans of Sebat Bet Gurage. It is the highest authority of justice whose verdict cannot be appealed.

Conflict resolvers of Yejoka shengo are representatives of each Sebat Bet tribe and person. They are known for their wisdom and expert knowledge in kitcha (Gurage customary law). The venue for Yejoka shengo meant to see different issues of Sebat Bet Gurage is called Yejoka, a place from which the structure took its name. That is found in Cheha Woreda close to Emdiber town.

At the top of the above five structures is found a system called weg. Actually weg is not a conflict resolution structure. It serves as legal counselor to the structures. Particularly in times of legal deadlock and complex conflict issues, those structures seek the advice of weg.

In addition, weg provides guidance in implementing verdicts delivered by the structures. Parties liable to implement the verdict of the elders visit weg to get advice on the proper procedure of implementing the decision. This is based on a belief that proper implementation through the advice of weg helps to bring a better and peaceful future among the disputants and the wider society. Due to this, those with the duty to implement the decision visit the one and only weg in their area of residence at Getta woreda, in order to build a better future for her/himself and her/his descendants.

The above five structures of conflict resolutions are used to resolve conflicts that arise either at family, village, inter-village, clan, or tribe levels. The lower two structures confined to their respective locality resolve minor disputes that arise in the members’ day-to-day interaction. Ye tib structure addresses conflicts of any type that arise between clan members. Yet another structure, Ennor shengo, resolves conflicts that arise between different clans of the Ennor. Yejoka, which is the higher structure of conflict resolution and the final appellate structure in the study area, addresses conflicts that arise between different tribes of Sebat Bet Gurage as a whole. Its decision is


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binding and unappealable. In addition to those five structures, a structure of weg is available to provide advice in addressing complex conflict issues.

F. Actors Involved in the Indigenous Conflict Resolution Processes

Actors involved in the conflict resolution processes consist of three groups of people. They include the conflicting parties i.e. claimants and defendants who are called merakese, elders that see cases and are known as bariqe, and the crowd at large. The crowd consists of any interested persons or sympathizers of the disputants.

2.8. Conflict Resolvers

Actors involved in the conflict resolution processes as mediators in the study area are predominantly elders (bariqe), religious leaders, clan leaders (azmach, nigus or yegonder nigus), and judges (dana) who are experts in kitcha. Conflict resolvers are believed to be gifted with extraordinary quality of seeing to things, an ability not endowed to the ordinary person. Horowitz (2007) writes that it is crucial for a mediator to be trusted by the parties to a conflict, and in order to achieve that, s/he must be an upright and honorable person who shows will and determination to help the parties. In this regard, conflict resolvers, except clan leaders, in the study area,are selected on the basis of their good reputation, wisdom, exemplary deed, expertise in kitcha knowledge, experiences, patience, commitment, talent in delivering just decisions and other calibers. Because of this they are highly trusted and respected by the wider society. In fact, clan leaders assume chieftainships hereditarily and this is transmitted through the lineage of the senior male.

As a result, such figures are successful in maintaining peace and resolving conflicts. Their calibers provide them with the authority that enables them to control access to resources and social networks that go beyond clan boundaries and generations. In addition, religious leaders are believed to posses supernatural power reinforced by superstitious beliefs.

The elders put their knowledge and skills at the service of the parties on voluntary basis. They do not request payment for their services. Being addressed as baroque (elder) would rather give them psychological and mental satisfaction. Of course, the disputants (most of the time the offenders) voluntarily provide some services to the conflict resolvers at the end of the conflict resolution process. Such services include provision of food and drinks like areke (local liqour), coffee, tella (local beer), and qolo (roasted cereals). If the resolution ends successfully, the litigants organize


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a small party to signal the end of hostility and re-establishment of helathy relationships.

Criteria for choosing elders vary from situation to situation. Contestants choose elders in three different ways. First, both contestants choose common elders whom they think are neutral. Second, they select elders whom they think can favor and defend them well. Third, a neutral party concerned about the conflict can select elders and initiate conflict resolution process (this type is most applicable in lower structure). If they are not happy, the conflicting parties can complain with regard to the neutrality of nominated elders before the actual conflict resolution process begins.

The number of elders to see to the cases depends on the situations. For lower structures of conflict resolution, it could be three to five elders and for the upper structure, it exceeds this. One among the elders is selected as ammsaya (chairperson) to moderate the process and act as a spokesperson.

2.9 Conflicting Parties

Conflicting parties are the key actors in the conflict resolution process because the existence of the system depends on the presence of conflicting parties who bring their cases in search of justice. If conflicting parties were not there, it would not be possible to have the system of indigenous conflict resolution.

Disputants were asked why they prefer the indigenous conflict resolution mechanism vis-à-vis the formal court system. Their preferences to the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms are ascribed to three issues. First, their familiarity with the language, custom, beliefs and procedures of the conflict resolution context makes them to bring their case to the indigenous conflict resolution forum. Disputants are not alien to the indigenous mechanisms in contrast to the formal court system where they face a lot of bureaucratic ups and downs. For instances, one of the informants said, “Here, no paper, no pen, or no application letter is needed.” Mamo (2008) also shares my informant’s viewpoint. He writes that the cost of pursuing a dispute through formal structures begins with buying sheets of paper and getting the case written. The informant’s view shows how strange and alien the formal court procedures are to them. It requires them to begin a case by submitting application and then following each formal procedure which is quite difficult for someone who cannot read and write.

As a result, disputants lean toward the system that uses a language they are familiar with, the people they know, and the procedure and the context


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they understand. Such familiarization is one of the reasons for local people’s persistent preference to indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms.

Secondly, conflicting parties have full trust in the neutrality of conflict resolvers in the indigenous system while they associate the formal court with bribery and corruption. The elders’ good reputation, humble character, truthfulness, sincerity, honesty and self-critical characteristics win the heart of disputants to bring their case before them. There is no fear among disputants that they would face corrupt decision since the elders are entrusted by the society for their delivery of justice.

For this reason, disputants are ready to accept the decision of elders. Almost all of the informants react in a similar fashion regarding decisions made by elders. They say, “What can I do if it is the elders’ judgment because I cannot be out of Gurage.” The informants’ responses imply the legitimacy of the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms.

On the one hand, disputants are ready to accept elders’ decision even if it is against their interests. Despite claimants’ chance of winning the cases if presented at formal court system, they prefer that their case be seen at the indigenous conflict resolution scenes. Here, claimants are ready to lose something because they know elders do not make corrupt decisions. They rather recognize the elders’ attempt of searching for win-win solution that opens door for reconciliation. On the other hand, the claimants also give priority to the interests of the public at the expense of their own. This is because they are aware that the elders’ decision aims at maintaining peace and security of the society. When they say, “I cannot be out of Gurage”, it shows that they give priority to the interest of the public.

Disputants trust the system and their readiness to move away from zero-sum destructive outcomes to constructive outcomes is the unique feature of indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms that increases its legitimacy.

Thirdly, cost and time effective approach of the indigenous conflict resolution mechanism is another source of legitimacy that makes it preferable by the disputants. An informant that went into conflict with his business partner due to refusal of paying back a debt says, “The benefits of appealing to the formal court are fatigue, expenses and appointment.” But as the cases are held in the proximity of the disputants’ residence,. they save time and cost they could incur if they go to the formal court system. In addition, elders provide the service free of charge and the conflict resolution process by itself does not demand costs as formal court systems do, like hiring of


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lawyer. In addition, disputants’ proximity to the context of conflict resolution process enabled them to follow their case while they are at work.

In a nutshell, the disputants’ familiarity with the indigenous system, their trust in the elders, time and cost effectiveness of the system are some of the reasons behind the local people’s persistent preference of the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms to the formal court system.

2.10. Sanctions and decision Enforcing Mechanisms

The commencement of the ritual for reconciliation of conflicting parties does not mark the end of the conflict resolution process. The process could be viewed from two angles: one, as a system that tries to mediate the severed relations of conflicting parties and two, as a system of adjudication where the disputants have to face justice for the damage they inflicted as dictated by kitcha.

Therefore, after the commencement of the ritual ceremony that underpins reconciliation, the offender is expected to pay compensation for the damage s/he inflicted.

There are various mechanisms of imposing sanction on the offenders. These include making them feed the poor and the strangeer, do community work, and give cattle (in previous times) but pay cash now. For example, the kitcha stipulates the following fines depending on the type of damages inflicted on a person.

Homicide offenders are required to pay the highest fines. According to a Gurage Kitcha (2008), a slayer whose case falls under mura dem homicide is fined 30,000 birr as compensation for the deceased family. In the case of medera dem the slayer is expected to pay 15,000 birr. For medera medera dem the kitcha stipulates 7,500 birr for compensation. The kitcha imposes fines that range from 500 to 25,000 birr for offences injuring the teeth, the ear, the eye or different body parts. In addition, an arson case is charged by a fee of 20,000 and offences of property damage like cutting down of coffee plant, eucalyptus tree, chat, enset are fined by a fee ranging from 30 to 5000 birr.

The fines are paid through collective contribution from the offender’s clan. According to my informants, this is done in order to show the clan’s purification from the offence and to underscore that it is also their will to finish the case peacefully.


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To enforce the decisions of kitcha danas, different sanctions are imposed. Actually, failure of compliance with the decision of kitcha danas is rare. On the occasion when one refuses to accept elders’ decision, the system employs different enforcing mechanisms. This includes ridicule, avoidance, denial of favor, ostracism, and curse. These mechanisms are used depending on the severity of the offences. Informants underscore that before the elders resort to these sanctions, they give reasonable time for the offenders’ kinsmen to ensure compliance to their decision. This is because it is believed that the curse could affect the kinsmen of the ‘deviant’. So, the fear of the curse would encourage the kinsmen to put pressure on the ‘transgressor’. If these efforts fail to bear fruit, the elders impose these sanctions on the ‘deviant’.

The most serious sanctions are ostracism and curse. Ostracism is the final resort when compliance becomes nearly impossible. This involves the deviant being excluded from participating in the society’s social life by deterring her/him from receiving any form of societal assistance such as agricultural labor and protection of cattle, avoiding communication, and totally excluding him/her from all sorts of social life. Most of the time, ostracism is accompanied by curse. Therefore, the local people’s fear of exclusion from the social life together with the moral sanctions ensures compliance with expected behaviors.

2.11. Change and Continuity

In this age of globalization, the likelihood of being left untouched by capitalistic expansion, internal and external migration, an ever increasing religious and educational expansion, identity politics, and similar phenomena is hardly possible. Societies across the world have been passing through these processes either voluntarily or through influences by the agents of these social forces.

The Gurage in general and Ennor in particular, like most other Ethiopian societies, have experienced the above social changes. The changes that the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms have undergone can be seen into two ways. First, some of these changes were introduced as a result of influences of external actors without the consent of the indigenous people. Second, others were initiated by the local people themselves for the betterment of the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms.

2.11.1 Changes Imposed by External Actors

Until the incorporation of the Gurage land into the Ethiopian state system, the Gurage had their own administrative and justice system that addressed


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conflicts between themselves and the neighboring Cushitic speaking societies (Bahru, 2002a; Dinberu et al, 1995; Walelign, 2005). However, the pan-Ethiopian nation building process under Emperor Menelik II partially stifled these local initiatives. Subsequently, according to Dinberu et al (1995) and Shack (1963), the ancient Ethiopian religio-legal code, Feteha Negast, meaning the ‘Law of the King,’ was introduced.

Despite the introduction of new justice system, the indigenous conflict resolution mechanism continued to serve side-by-side with the new formal court system. According to Shack (1963), the newly introduced politico-legal institution had the main purpose of maintaining order by checking any possibility of local riot against the new order. Due to this, the indigenous conflict resolution mechanism enjoyed only partial autonomy over concerns which were purely local in resolving conflicts particularly with social, cultural and economic dimensions that attracted relatively minimal interest of the imperial order. Whenever there were conflicts that hamper the general peace and security, their settlement was according to the Law of the King (Feteha Negast) through melkagna (non-Gurage district governor).

However, the partial autonomy of the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms did not stay for long. The Criminal Code of the 1930 and the Proclamation of Administration of Justice of 1942 of the Imperial Regime replaced the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms by the formal court system all over Ethiopia. It denied legal recognition for those indigenous institutions of law and authority (Shack, 1963).

The declarations of these Codes and Proclamations and the abolishment of the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms, however, did not stop their operation in practice. In fact, Shack (1966 and 1963) confirm that the system was not completely crushed out by these codes and proclamation. They continued to serve as conflict resolution mechanisms whenever conflicts arose out of the network of kinship, economic and social rights and duties existing between the Gurage (Shack, 1963 and 1966). Shack emphasizes that the authority of the indigenous institution was incumbent upon all Gurage who claim “tribal” citizenship, even migrants who reside abroad for longer periods (Shack, 1963 and 1966).

These activities indicate the resilience of the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms in spite of the state’s unprecedented effort to stifle its operations. Nevertheless, this resilience did not cope with the influence exerted by the Derg regime. According to my informants and studies by Bahru (2002) and Yirga (2008) in Gurage, and Uthman (2008) in North Wollo,


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the Derg period was the toughest of all in which the indigenous institutions were labeled as oppressive, anti-public interest, and obstructive to the normal functioning of the formal court. As a result, they were forced to operate in semi- clandestine fashion.

Following the new political thesis of self-determination of the people in post-1991 era, according to Bahru (2002), these indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms started to revive and got constitutional recognition. Currently they are working side-by-side with the formal court system (Getachew, 2008).

2.11.2 Changes Initiated by the local People

Since the Gurage are the most mobile people of the country, the tendencies of experiencing changes and exposure to and contact with different cultures are inevitable. The influence of the expansion of education, Christianity, Islam, trade, and urbanization on the operation of the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms was immense.

Like the changes that were externally imposed, there were also some that were initiated by the good will of the local people.

2.11.2.1 documentation and Renewal of Kitcha

The kitcha, as the core element of the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms, has been passing through changes that were initiated by the Gurage people themselves. These changes involve principally two processes: First, the codification of kitcha and second, the legislation of new laws, rules and regulations to make it more compatible with ‘modern’ ways of life.

These change processes were initiated and accomplished by elders who live both in rural and urban areas under the financial and material support of Gurage People’s Self-help Development Organization (the local non-governmental organization). During these documentation and legislation processes, different professionals in various fields (law, economics, development, management, health, administration, sociology, insurance, and others) were involved in the revitalization process and proposed their expert opinion over the content of the improved document. After years of deliberation and investigation, the first edition of the document was published in 1998 under the title of A Gurage Kitcha (Kitcha: The Gurage Customary Law) and this was followed by the publication of the revised edition in 2007 under the same title.


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The written kitcha document consisted of 43 Articles and 16 chapters in the 1998 first publication. The 2007 revised edition consisted of 63 articles and 9 chapters. The document contains a number of codes that dictate the day-to-day activities of the Gurage. This section discusses the general content and the newly introduced rules of the document.

The written kitcha dictates the anticipated behaviors that every Gurage should demonstrate in different areas of life such as marriage and family affairs, mourning codes, economic and social issues, the pattern of home and village construction, the application of indigenous medicines, sports, and art, crime against property, theft, alcohol and substance use, crime against others, homicide, decision-enforcing mechanisms of the kitcha, and hierarchy of authority in the implementation of kitcha, and the fines an offender should pay in the event of violations of the codes.

new Elements in Kitcha

In order to make the kitcha compatible with the ‘modern’ ways of life, different new laws were legislated. One of them was on the area of gender. The document considers gender issues and tries to treat both sexes equally. Especially, in the area of marriage, divorce and property distribution, the kitcha takes some improvement measures which were discriminatory against women in previous times. The new kitcha entitles women to the right of divorce and equal distribution of property with her husband at such times. The kitcha also forbids abduction and imposes fines on adultery. It also prohibits school girls’ engagement in marriage before completion of secondary education. The kitcha also declares that marriage could be accepted if and only if it is based on the consent of the girl. By legislating such new laws, the kitcha has realized gender equality.

Another new element of the kitcha is on the preparation of lavish feasts that do not consider the economic status of the organizer. The kitcha in its new codes prohibits the preparation of expensive feasts and parties at times of mourning and wedding ceremonies. In addition, it prohibits the practice of slaughtering surplus cattle during holidays (particularly during Mesekel and Arefa) in competition with the neighbors. This was to curb its potential of depleting resources and the unhealthy competition among neighbors.

The kitcha also formulated a new code of conduct with regard to the use of alcohol and drugs (especially chewing chat and cigarette smoking). According to the new kitcha, taking alcoholic drnks and chewing chat in vicinity of wedding and mourning places, in assembly of elders, during


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meetings of conflict resolution, and at places of collective work (ploughing, constructing houses, and harvesting enset) are banned. Anyone who drinks areke or chews chat in these occasions is subjected to fines.

The new legislation process pays considerable attention to avoiding the practice of planting chat and eucalyptus trees at the expense of the principal plant of enset. Given the cash value chat and eucalyptus tree, farmers plant them extensively. This challenges the production of enset, which is the staple food of the people and leaves the society vulnerable to food insecurity. For this reason, the kitcha prohibits the planting of these cash trees close to enset and other food crops.

The kitcha also incorporated the pandemic of HIV/AIDS issue in its new laws. It declares that everybody should protect her/himself from the pandemic and it considers any deliberate infection of someone with HIV/AIDS as homicide, and the offender will be sued accordingly. It also declares that pre-marriage HIV test between the would-be-couple is mandatory and that marriage is allowed only after a medical certificate testifying the negative status of both is produced.

In relation to child rights, the kitcha requires every family to send their children to formal school. It prohibits any violence against children and protects them from engaging in any work that jeopardizes their education, health, physical, moral and social developments.

In a nutshell, these are the changes that the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms in the study area have undergone. Elders apply the new rules alongside the previous customary laws in resolving conflicts.

However, not all members of the society welcome these new developments. Some members of the society are critical about the documentation and legislation processes in relation to their outcomes. The leading critics of such developments are the educated members of the society and the experts who work in the government office of justice and security.

The arguments against these new developments are the following. Firstly, they criticize the attempts that have been made to record all the system in the confined written form. According to informants, this documentation process forced the system to lose its customary essence. In addition, the new written kitcha that determines the amount of sanctions to be paid in monetary form for different offences and wrong deeds is also criticized for being retributive than restorative. They argue these new developments


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are deviations from the tradition, where the system uses different living measurements in the context of the social environment. For example, in earlier times, an offender might be requested to pay some amount of cattle as compensation or s/he might be required to feed the poor or strangers who appear in the village. Or he could provide some community services. Informants argue that the system is losing its “pure” indigenous form and becoming “modern” referring to the introduction of new laws in the kitcha.

So, those informants argue that the new developments ban all those customary practices that enabled the system to transcend generations. Further, they claim that these new developments separate the local people from their natural settings that have a symbolic meaning.

Secondly, another argument by the informants is that the system has become bureaucratized. Following these new developments, the system becomes dependent on written rules and regulations and, this in turn weakens the innovation and improvisation power of the system. In addition, it is bureaucratic for its repeated appointments, elders’ hesitation to provide immediate response and their demand for special treatment like provision of areke (local liquor), petty money for tea and coffee and for transportation when their service is needed. Particularly, the elders’ hesitation to provide information was observed by this researcher.

Another criticism regarding the new developments was forwarded by informants who work in the state court and police. They claim that, the new developments, particularly the pre-determination of blood price in the case of homicide encourage some section of the society to develop arrogant behavior. It also provides room for some people to manipulate the pre-determination of fines, especially for blood price and various offences.

Those informants in the state offices substantiate the above claim by referring to a case under due process of law. Two brothers in Karacha kebele cruelly murdered their fellow neighbor following a dispute over land holding. The prosecutor (the informant) confirms that he has an evidence that the slayers were threatening to kill the deceased and pay 30,000 birr for the blood price. Given the fact that the payment of blood price is the collective responsibility of the slayer’s clan members, informants in the formal court system underscore that the pre-determination of blood price is creating problems. Moreover, it encourages some people to take such harsh measures in times of conflict.

In addition to the above case provided by the informant (public prosecutor), on 13th of March 2010, this researcher observed an adjourned assembly


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of conflict resolution process in Woshe where a homicide case was being seen. The family of the deceased refused to be adjudicated by the kitcha claiming that the slayer intentionally inflicted the death with a pre-plan of settling the case through the indigenous system.

The above points are criticisms made by the educated members of the society and experts who work in the formal court system about the implications of the documentation and formulation of new laws in the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms. They argue that these new developments are producing latent effects; opening the door for the manipulation of healthy operation of the system.

2.11.2.2 Relations with Formal Court System

The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (1995) recognizes non-state laws to operate side-by-side with the state apparatus. However, this does not mean that they are totally entitled to entertain every aspect of conflicts. Non-state laws are rather entitled to deal with conflicts related to personal and family disputes. The rest of issues, particularly resolution of criminal cases, are not to be handled by those indigenous institutions. In addition, Article 34(5) of the Federal Democratic Republic Ethiopia Constitution (1995) implies that non-state institutions can run cases if and only if the consent of both conflicting parties is given.

In spite of the above constitutional provision, the field data collected from the study area show that the indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolution have been dealing with all aspects of conflicts ranging from the inter-personal quarrels to homicide. Since this is clearly contrary to the constitutional provision, it creates a lot of conflict between state and indigenous institutions and this makes their relationship in conflict resolution partially problematic. Both cooperation and conflict characterize their relationship.

Cooperative Relations

Since both institutions are sources of peace and security in the study area, it is apparent that their cooperation is inevitable. Both the indigenous institutions and formal court system are working together in certain areas as far as maintenance of peace and conflict resolutions are concerned. Such cooperation is both for mutual benefit at some occasions and for tactical (strategic) reasons at others.

Coopeartion for mutual benefit can be seen when they address issues of family dispute such as divorce, property division and land holding disputes.


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According to informants in formal court, resolutions of such conflicts are virtually left to the indigenous institutions in the study area.

The Federal Constitution (1995) in Article 34(5) and the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region State, Land Administration Proclamation Number 10/2007 provide that indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms are given the authority of resolving conflicts related to personal and family disputes and rural land holdings, respectively, based on the conflicting parties consent. In most instances, as confirmed by informants working in government courts, they refer conflicts related to family and rural land holding to the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms before the formal court addresses the case. Informants in the formal court system explained that the first step before receiving any cases related to family and land holding disputes is check whether or not disputants consulted the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms. When they find out that a case has not been presented to the indigenous system, they send the disputants back to the indigenous institution (to deal with them).

Another area of cooperation between these institutions is related to offenders who completed their prison service years. Even if the plaintiffs are punished by the formal court, it is expected to finalize the case at the indigenous institution reintegration into the society. Especially, if the case is homicide, the slayer is expected to finish the case and be purified the indigenous way. This is done for reconciliation and avoidance of animosity between disputants. This reconciliation and purification processes facilitate the slayer’s total reintegration into the society

In addition to this, the woreda court consults the indigenous institutions before granting pardon or amnesty to the prisoners in order to assess the possibilities of whether or not the prisoners can reintegrate peacefully into the society.

The above scenarios explicitly reveal the presence of division of task between the indigenous and formal court system. The indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms focus on addressing conflicts related to family and land holdings, whereas the formal court has been provided with opportunities to deal with criminal and other related issues that jeopardize public peace. This division of labor at least has two significances. Firstly, the indigenous institutions’ involvement in the resolution of family and land holding disputes has positive contribution to the well being of the society. As far as these indigenous institutions tend to reconcile (than to punish) disputants, they diminish the tendency towards the dissolution of the family institution which is the fabric of society. The probabilities of ensuring


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sustainable peace between the disputants are also high. Secondly, since the capacity of the formal court in providing decisions is limited, the indigenous institutions’ roles in addressing the above area of disputes ease the burden of the formal court that would be wasted in resolving those family and land holding disputes. Hence, formal courts can concentrate on other criminal and related issues.

There are also areas of cooperation between the two institutions undertaken for tactical (strategic) reason. One of the informants in the formal court system illustrated this tactical move saying, “When we are unable to find a clue from the disputants regarding certain criminal offence or when they refuse to speak the truth”, he said, “we refer the disputants to the indigenous institutions to settle their cases.” Since the revelation of the truth is the first aim of indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms, they wait until the disputants reveal the truth. Then the prosecutors or the police arrest the guilty party and resume seeing the case in the formal court. These tactical or strategic moves of the court help them to find out the guilty in the event of a deadlock. In fact, this tactical move of the formal court is exercised without the knowledge of the indigenous institutions.

Another cooperation that is effected for a tactical purpose is when the indigenous institution approaches the formal court system in quest of cooperation. This happens when the former wants recognition for the judgment they made about a criminal case. As they do not have the mandate to see criminal cases, as per the Federal Constitution (1995), informants in the woreda court said, “Elders frequently approach the court and police offices to request for re-authorization so that they could handle criminal cases. They further demand no intervention in cases once resolved by them, soliciting mainly for our recognition of their judgment”. Conflictual Relations

Another area of relationship between the indigenous and the formal court system is characterized by conflict of interests. This is observed in relation to which institution should resolve conflicts that have criminal nature, like homicide, burglary, aggravated robbery, and similar offenses. The conflict is particularly over the legitimacy of indigenous institutions in resolving those kinds of criminal offences. The state institutions claim, referring to the constitution, that resolving criminal cases, particularly those that are threats to public peace, are not the mandates of the indigenous system.

The formal courts blame the indigenous institutions for intervention in the former’s work. They complain that indigenous institutions are creating


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lots of problems in the normal functioning of the courts. They blame the institutions for pressurizing disputants not to take their cases to the formal court, to withdraw their cases, to avoid testifying their cases with evidence if withdrawal is not permitted, and for labeling disputants that appear in the formal court as deviants, and back biting them.

The argument of the formal court is that any criminal offender must be punished by the law for the offences committed. Otherwise, they argue, it sends negative messages to the rest of the society and may encourage others to engage in criminal offences with the intention of resolving conflicts in indigenous ways, if they let them settle criminal cases.

Such conflict of interest is another feature that characterizes the relationship between the two institutions. This could affect public peace and sometimes lead the parties into tensions due to their competition of handling conflicts with criminal nature.

Generally, indigenous and formal court systems of conflict resolution mechanisms have both cooperative and conflictual relationships. Those cooperative and conflictual relationships have their own effects on peace and security of the society. While the former enriches mutual benefits of the society, the latter undermines public peace.

Conclusion

The indigenous conflict resolution mechanism in the Ennor area plays a vital role in maintaining peace and security of the society. It serves as source of justice for the local people and eases the burden of the state apparatus of peace and justice. It helps the local people to improve their productivity by saving their time and costs that would have been incurred in search of justice out of their work place. It also creates sustainable peace among disputants by avoiding animosity and vengeance that would otherwise be a challenge for economic, social, cultural and political development of the society. However, there are some challenges that could jeopardize the roles played by the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms. Firstly, the system’s recent attempt of addressing gender issues seems to be inadequate. Still, Ye anqit kitcha is discriminatory against women. As had been discussed earlier, Ye anqit kitcha prohibits women from getting married until two years following her divorce. In addition, the system has still closed its door to women denying them the right to participate in decision making processes and in considering women’s voice while addressing conflicts and other socio-economic matters of the society. Therefore, these discriminatory practices of the system should be rectified; otherwise, it makes the recent revitalization attempt meaningless and incomplete.


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Secondly, the conflictual relationship between the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms and the formal court system is another point that needs the discussion of both institutions and other stakeholders. Unlike their cooperative relationship, this conflictual relation has the potential of undermining their cooperative tasks that are sources of benefits for the society as a whole. Therefore, these two institutions need to discuss the causes of conflict between them. If not, the society could lose the fruits gained from their relationships.

Thirdly, another area that needs discussion of the two institutions is the recent formal court’s manipulation of indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms. This tactical move of the formal court system has the potential of challenging the indigenous system’s legitimacy. The system also could lose its quality of truth revelation. As a result, these two institutions need to discuss the formal court system’s recent trend.

Fourthly, the recent documentation and renewal processes of the kitcha are important aspects of the system. However, these processes are bringing in unforeseen events like deliberate manipulation of the kitcha by some people. This could invite challenges to the legitimacy of the system. Therefore, reviewing these newly incorporated rules is critical for the healthy operation of the system.

Finally, the indigenous institution needs technical and material support of different stakeholders to empower the system. And I would like to underscore that this study is not exhaustive or conclusive enough with regard to the subject under study. There could be some issues this study fails to address due to time constraints and unforeseen events. So, others need to carry out further studies pertaining to the relationship between the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms and the formal court system, and the new rules the kitcha has incorporated recently.

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