Psychological Dynamics of Intractable Ethnonational Conflicts

The Israeli-Palestinian Case

Nadim N. Rouhana Daniel Bar-Tal

In this article, the authors use the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an example of ostensibly intractable ethnona- tional conflict and examine the psychological dynamics that contribute to its intractability. They review the unique characteristics of this conflict and the clash of narratives. They argue that some ethnonational conflicts have characteristics that increase their resistance to change and that societies in such conflicts form societal beliefs that, on the one hand, help them cope with the stressful conditions of the conflicts but, on the other hand, perpetuate the conflicts. Finally, they discuss some social psychological contributions to changing societal beliefs as a way of intervening in such conflicts.

C onflicts between and among states that dominated the international scene for decades are gradually being replaced by conflicts between ethnic, reli-

gious, linguistic, and national groups within the s tates-- often termed ethnonational conflicts (Connor, 1994). The conflicts between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, Tamils and Hindus in Sri Lanka, Muslims and Serbs in Bosnia, and Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda are only a few examples of ethnonational conflicts raging around the world. Dealing with these conflicts introduces new challenges to the international system because of the os- tensible intractability of the conflicts; the underestimation of the psychological dynamics that can contribute to their escalation, stalemate, and perpetuation (Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994); and the difficulty of applying traditional efforts to their resolution (Rouhana, 1998). These con- flicts, also termed deep-rooted (Burton, 1987), enduring rivalry (Goertz & Diehl, 1993), or protracted social con- flicts (Azar, 1990), are often transformed into intractable social conflicts (Kriesberg, 1993) that defy traditional negotiation and mediation efforts (Azar, 1990; Burton, 1990).

Although psychological factors contribute to the perpetuation of these conflicts, it should be made clear at the outset that they are neither a psychological epiphe- nomenon nor conflicts generated mainly by psychological factors. These are conflicts over vital tangible resources in which basic human needs such as identity and security become central to the conflicts and their resolution (Bur-

University of Massachusetts at Boston Tel-Aviv University

ton, 1990). These conflicts can be resolved only when both the tangible disputed resources are adequately nego- tiated and the unaddressed human needs that fuel the conflicts are satisfactorily addressed. Yet, because they have psychological bases too, social psychology can and should be able to offer insights into their intractable dy- namics and contribute to designing approaches to their resolution.

The purpose of this article is to examine the charac- teristics and psychological dynamics of some ethnona- tional conflicts--ostensibly intractable conflicts--that increase their resistance to resolution and to explore some social psychological contributions to designing ap- proaches to their resolution. We use the Israeli-Palestin- ian conflict as a case study.

Characteristics of Intractable Conflicts That Increase Their Resistance to Resolution Our analysis in this article is limited to ethnonational conflicts, such as those in Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka, that are less amenable to peaceful conflict-resolution ef- forts. We refer to such conflicts as intractable ethnona- tional conflicts. They share characteristics that differenti- ate them from tractable conflicts, which are more amena- ble to peaceful negotiation (Bar-Tal, 1998; Kriesberg, 1993). The most important characteristics are described below.

Totalih/ Intractable ethnonational conflicts often concern existen- tial and basic needs such as recognition and security, the fulfillment of which is essential for existence and sur- vival. Often, therefore, they are multifaceted, touching on wider aspects of political and cultural life. The conflicts penetrate the societal fabric of both parties and force themselves on individuals and institutions. Leaders, pub-

Nadim N. Rouhana, Graduate Program in Dispute Resolution, Univer- sity of Massachusetts at Boston; Daniel Bar-Tal, School of Education, Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv, Israel.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Nadim N. Rouhana, Graduate Program in Dispute Resolution, Univer- sity of Massachusetts, Boston, MA 02125. Electronic mail may be sent to rouhana@ umbsky.cc.umb.edu.

July 1998 • American Psychologist Copyright 1998 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0003-066X/98/$2.00 Vol. 53, No. 7, 761-770

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lics, and insti tutions--such as educational and cultural sys tems- -become involved in the conflicts. At some stages of the conflicts, even intellectual life and scholarly inquiry become politicized as interest in the other society originates in the motivation to "know your enemy" and inquiries become guided by security needs and considerations.

Protractedness

Intractable ethnonational conflicts last at least a genera- tion, often many generations. Their duration means that both parties develop deep-rooted animosity and preju- dice, that their collective memories are affeCted by con- flict-related events, and that the individuals and societies adapt their lives to the conflicts.

Centrality

The centrality of intractable ethnonational conflicts is reflected in the group members ' preoccupation with the conflicts. Thoughts related to the conflicts are highly ac- cessible and are relevant to various discussions within each society (Bar-Tal, Raviv, & Freund, 1994). The cen- trality of such conflicts is further reflected in their sali- ency on the public agenda. The media and the political and intellectual elites are greatly preoccupied with the conflicts and their developments.

Violence

Intractable ethnonational conflicts usually involve violent events, including full-scale wars, limited military engage- ments, or terrorist attacks. The continual cycle of violence afflicts civilian and military casualties and causes prop- erty destruction and, often, population displacement. The violence and its vividness and saliency in each society are another reason for the conflicts' centrality in public life; they also generate intense animosity that becomes integrated into the socialization processes in each society and through which conflict-related emotions and cogni- tions are transmitted to new generations. Virtually every civilian can be the potential target of a random attack, and mundane daily decisions are affected by the conflicts.

Perception of Irreconcilability Societies embroiled in intractable ethnonationa! conflicts often see them as zero-sum and view their differences as irreconcilable. Each side perceives its own goals as essential for its own survival and, therefore, does not see a place for the concessions regarded by the other side as essential for conflict resolution. The minimum require- ments for one party to reach an agreement are not pro- vided by the other. Societies fail to develop integrative solutions and present them for public discourse.

Overview: The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict as a Clash of Narratives

The dispute between Israelis and Palestinians is a salient example of this type of ethnonational conflict. 1 It origi- nated with the appearance of Zionism around the turn of the previous century as a communal clash between

indigenous Palestinians and Jewish immigrants to Pales- fine. Zionism aimed at the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. However, because on the same land lived Arabs who had their own national identity as Palestinians (Khalidi, 1997; Kimmerling & Migdal, 1993), Zionism and Palestinian nationalism clashed over the ownership of the land, the right for self-determination, and state- hood. The conflict between the Jewish and Palestinian communities escalated as the number of Jewish immi- grants grew and the resistance of the Palesfinians to such immigration and to Zionism increased.

In 1947, after the United Nations (UN) declared the partition o f Palestine into two states, one Arab and one Jewish, the communal clash evolved into a full-blown war. The Palestinians rejected the UN resolution, and the Jewish community proclaimed the establishment of an independent Jewish state in 1948 (the Arab and Jewish communities at the time numbered 1,300,000 and 700,000, respectively). When five Arab states declared war against Israel, the conflict took on a strong regional interstate dimension. Israel, which won the war, expanded its borders beyond those designated by the UN resolution. The rest of Palestine came under Jordanian and Egyptian control, and the vast majority of the Palestinians who lived in the portion of Palestine on which Israel was establ ished--about 80% of Pales t ine--were dispersed, mainly to the neighboring Arab states. The regional com- ponent dominated the conflict until the 1967 war between Israel on the one side and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria on the other, which brought the remainder of Palestine under Israeli control (in addition to Syrian and Egyptian land). Since this war, the Israeli-Palestinian component of the conflict has gradually returned to the fore, focusing on the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the parts of Palestine that Israel occupied in 1967-- the West Bank and Gaza (with East Jerusalem as its capital).

In June 1967, immediately after the war, Israel an- nexed East Jerusalem, declaring the two parts of the city as Israel 's capital and extending the status of residents (but not citizens) to its Arab population. The rest of the West Bank and Gaza remained under occupation, and the population was governed by military rule. Israel also began a process of establishing Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza and around East Jerusalem. The number of Jewish settlers is estimated at 150,000 (Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, 1997). 2 Palestinian resis- tance to the occupation, which began in 1967, peaked in

At the end of 1996, Israel's citizens numbered 5,759,400, 80% of whom were Jewish; the rest were mainly Arabs (Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, 1997). The Arab citizens in Israel mostly call themselves "Palestinians in Israel" (Rouhana, 1997). The Palestinian population in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza is estimated at 2,390,000 (Zureik, 1996).

2 This number was provided by formal Israeli statistics (Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, 1997) and, therefore, does not include residents in the Jewish communities that were established around East Jerusalem and that Israel considers as an integral part of Israel but the Palestinians consider as settlements like all other settlements in the West Bank.

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1987 in a popular uprising that lasted for six years and that Israel failed to suppress with military measures. The Palestinian uprising, the Gulf War in 1991, and the col- lapse of the Soviet Union were among the main catalysts of the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, which brought together representatives of Israel, the Palestinians, and neighboring Arab states to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although this official peace process continued for two years, with the Israeli-Pales- tinian track eventually deadlocked, a secret channel of negotiation in Norway between Israel's Labor govern- ment and the Palestine Liberation Organization led to the "Oslo Agreements," which were signed in Washington, DC, in 1993.

The Oslo Agreements outlined a set of principles that governed an interim period of Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza, to be implemented in stages and to be followed by final status negotiation regarding the most difficult issues of the conflict: the future of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, the status of Jerusalem, the return of Palestinian refugees, and bor- ders between Israel and a future Palestinian entity. Many viewed the Oslo Agreements as a historical breakthrough that could lead to stable peace between Israelis and Pales- tinians. However, with the change of governments in Is- rael in 1996, the peace process slowed down, and the two sides still disagree deeply on how to resolve each of the final status issues. The conflict has persisted, and peace appears as elusive as ever.

The totality and comprehensiveness of social con- flict should be seen in light of the clash of narratives between the two societies. Whether in Northern Ireland, Israel and Palestine, Sri Lanka, or Bosnia, the narratives of the two communities in conflict are in total clash as to the root causes of the conflict, the meaning of the historical developments, and the role played by the in- group and the out-group during the various stages of the conflict. Although the two sides can sometimes agree on historical facts, the clash encompasses the meaning and implications of these facts and extends to names, lan- guage, main actors, causes, and responsibilities. More- over, the narratives include goals, interests, and values that are incompatible and, therefore, fuel the conflict. Thus, for each group, the conflict is represented as a societal cognitive schema with elaborate conflict-related beliefs that are incompatible with those of the other group (Bar-Tal, Kruglanski, & Klar, 1989). The incompatibility underlies the recognition of the relationship between the two groups as conflict. Bar-Tal and Geva (1985), who referred to this incompatibility as "cognitive discrep- ancy," argued that in times of conflict, the opposing sides freeze their incompatible set of beliefs and therefore set obstacles to the possibilities to resolve it peacefully.

As with any intractable ethnonational conflict, the protagonists' versions of the conflict's evolution and causes diverge sharply. Although Palestinians and Israelis agree that Jews from various parts o f the world came to Palestine to establish a Jewish homeland, their narratives diverge sharply on almost every other aspect. According

to the Palestinian narrative, the Jewish settlers occupied the land, and Palestinians were dispossessed and dis- placed. The Palestinian narrative views this influx as an invasion of foreigners who took over the country from Palestinians and in the process pushed out Palestinians, making many of them refugees in the neighboring coun- tries. According to the Zionist narrative, the land was liberated and redeemed in a process of national revival. The Jews gathered their exiles in the land of their forefa- thers to establish their state, which was attacked by hos- tile, nonaccepting Arabs at its birth. As an outcome of Arab aggression and defeat, the Palestinians became refu- gees. Thus, the war between the Arab states and Israel in 1948-1949 is for Israel the "War of Independence," but for Palestinians, it is " the catastrophe" (A1-Nakba). Whereas a central part of the Palestinian narrative focuses on the expulsion of the Palestinians, a central part of the Zionist narrative stresses the Jewish struggle for survival and security; any responsibility for the Palestinian fate is usually denied.

Each national narrative is in a way based on a funda- mental negation of the other's. For the Israelis, to accept the central piece of the Palestinian narrative that Palestine was indeed populated by indigenous people who were gradually and systematically dispossessed and replaced by newcomers means that the Jewish state was born in sin. Thus, the Israeli narrative denies this Palestinian ac- count. For the Palestinians, to accept the central part of the Zionist narrative that the Jews are not to be seen as newcomers but a people returning to their own home- land--albeit after 2,000 years--means that Palestinians were aliens in their own land, a view that they by defini- tion reject. Thus, both Israeli and Palestinian narratives emphasize different aspects of the conflict, provide diver- gent interpretations to the same events, and produce a coherent narrative that supports its own claims and is fully supported by the public.

Unique Characteristics of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict That Make It More Resistant to Resolution

In addition to having all the characteristics described above, the conflict narratives indicate that the Israeli- Palestinian conflict has additional unique characteristics that make it even more resistant to resolution than many other ethnonational conflicts.

Perception of exclusive legitimacy. Historical realities aside, each group perceives itself as the exclu- sively indigenous people on the land. Thus, Palestinians see themselves as the indigenous population; in their eyes, the Jews who began coming to Palestine in large numbers at the turn of the century have no indigenous right to the land. Likewise, the Jewish population see themselves as the indigenous population by virtue of their historical and biblical heritage there. Although when they began to immigrate at the turn of the century they had not actually lived on the land for thousands of years, many believed that the Arabs who inhabited the land did not really have the characteristics of a nation and thus did not have legitimate roots in it.

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This perception and the mutual awareness of its exis- tence have a number of political and psychological conse- quences. The indigenous status gives each group a sense of exclusive entitlement over the land. Such exclusivity leads to the denial of the other in many various ways, eventually resulting in a pattern of mutual denial between the two communities (Kelman, 1978). Thus, despite the changing political realities of the relationship between Israelis and Palestinians, the perception that the other is an illegitimate "invader," at best a tolerated guest, still persists. Mutual awareness of the other's exclusive sense of entitlement is perhaps at the core of the fear that the out-group wants the in-group's places, homes, towns, and indeed homeland, fueling a constant sense of threat.

The perception of exclusive indigenous status makes any agreement burdened by a mutual sense of ultimate concession (Rouhana, 1997). In a possible historical compromise in which Israel withdraws from the West Bank and Gaza, Israelis feel that Israel is making the ultimate concession, giving up its own right in parts of the Land of Israel in order to preserve a Jewish state. The Palestinians feel that they are making the ultimate concession by giving up the major part of Palestine in order to achieve sovereignty on a small part of the land. Thus, an agreement is almost inevitably accompanied by a profound sense of loss that can overshadow its potential gains.

History of victimizotlon. Both groups bring to the conflict a national history of persecution and destruc- tion. In the Jewish case, the unparalleled, protracted his- tory of persecution that peaked with the Holocaust of European Jews produced a siege mentality (Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992) that was brought to bear on the conflict with Palestinians and other Arabs. In the Palestinian case, the history of colonization that peaked in the catastrophe in which their society was dismantled and their homeland lost is considered by many to be second only to physical destruction. Thus, each group brings to the conflict a deep sense of persecution and destruction not always recognized by the other side, which is preoccupied with its own tragic national experience. These particular na- tional histories, especially in the Jewish case, instill a basic sense of lack of security and mistrust of the interna- tional community that only adds to the inherent difficulty of resolving the conflict.

Intermingling and dispersion of notional populolions. Within the immediate conflict area, each group is defined across geographical borders. Israel has a significant minority (20%) of non-Jewish, mainly Pales- tinian, citizens, and Jews continue to settle and expand in the West Bank and Gaza, occupying key tracts of land. Moreover, there are about four million Palestinians out- side the country (Zureik, 1996) whose legitimate home is perceived to be within the country and millions of Jews outside the country that Israel proclaims to be their state according to its Law of Return. Thus, Israel currently defines itself as the state of the Jewish people in Israel and in the Diaspora at the expense of those Palestinians who are currently citizens of Israel and who are posing

challenges to the state's identity by persistently de- manding equality (Rouhana, 1997). Thus, too, a future Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza would likely wish to define itself as the state of the Palestinian people, opening its doors to the Palestinian refugees in other countries, at the expense of Jewish settlers, if they were to remain as citizens of the Palestinian state. With each passing day, solutions based on land division and demo- graphic separation become less feasible, which only ex- acerbates the sense on both sides that the conflict is per- haps irreconcilable.

Double asymmetry. As perceived by the protag- onists and depending on how power is defined (Boulding, 1989), the power relations in the Israeli-Palestinian con- flict are complex. For example, relations between Israel and the Palestinians are characterized by a perceived asymmetry in favor of Israel, which is shared by both Arabs and Jews at least to the extent that Arab-Jewish relations in Israel are considered (Rouhana & Fiske, 1995). However, in terms of the power relations between Israel and the Arab world, the power asymmetry is not as straightforward. Despite Israel's ostensible superiority in the battlefield, the Arab world surpasses Israel in hu- man and material resources and, most importantly, in the capability of enduring a defeat. Thus, for many Israelis, the asymmetry tilts in favor of the Arabs, although these perceptions are dynamically evolving.

The impact of the double power asymmetry on the conflict dynamics in the Israeli-Palestinian conflicv has generally been overlooked, and very little research has been reported on the perception of power, its impact on conflict-resolution activities, or intergroup perceptions (e.g., Rouhana & Fiske, 1995; Rouhana & Korper, 1997; Rouhana, O'Dwyer, & Vast, 1997), despite the increasing evidence of the role that power asymmetry plays in in- tergroup perceptions and discrimination (e.g., Ng, 1982; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1985).

Polih'cizotion of religion. On both sides, religion is becoming increasingly politicized and plays a major role in the intergroup and intragroup conflict dynamics. Until recently, religious differences between Arabs and Jews have played a limited role in the dynamics of the conflict. Although the conflict has so far been defined and perceived by the mainstreams in each society as a national conflict, religious segments in both societies are reframing it in religious terms, adding dimensions of fanaticism to already existing wide gaps. The methods that religious zealots on both sides use, particularly vio- lent acts, receive visibility in the mass media that is dis- proportional to the zealots' real representation in the pop- ulations. These segments anchor their national and terri- torial claims in religious doctrine that considers the country a holy land and views Jerusalem as a sacred city. Consequently, they refuse to consider territorial compromises.

Thus, both the claims of the religious Zionist parties for a Jewish state in the entire Land of Israel and Hamas for an Islamic state in all of Palestine invoke deep reli- gious beliefs to rationalize their political claims. There

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is a danger that for growing segments of the population, the conflict can become a clash of religious doctrines in which the possibility of reconciliation becomes unimag- inable and that can, therefore, lead to an unending contest of religiously motivated wills.

Psychological Dynamics of Intractable Conflicts Coping Mechanisms: Societal Beliefs

Intractable ethnonational conflicts generate conditions of stress, threat, and anxiety and incur such human and material costs (Breznitz, 1983; Lazarus, 1982; Milgram, 1986, 1993) that societies must develop mechanisms for coping with such conflicts. Coping refers to various ways in which people try to successfully meet the demands of a conflict situation (Zeidner & Endler, 1995). In addition to the military, human, and economic resources required to cope with the conflict, each society needs also to de- velop psychological mechanisms that enable protracted confrontation with the opponent and allow adaptation to conflict conditions. Thus, each society promotes patriotic devotion to the country and its people, persistence, endur- ance for physical and psychological stress, readiness for personal sacrifice, unity, solidarity, and courage. The for- mation of these psychological conditions is made possible by a set of societal beliefs that emerges within each soci- ety about the conflict, the self, and the other.

Societal beliefs are defined as society members' shared cognitions on issues that are of concern to society and that contribute to their sense of uniqueness. Their contents refer to society's characteristics and structure and to processes of its development, and they include beliefs about societal goals, self-images, aspirations, norms and values, images of out-groups, and so forth. As shared cognitions acquired in a socialization process in which institutions actively impart the beliefs to the public, they provide a common social prism through which society members view the conflict. Once formed, they become incorporated into an ethos and are reflected in the group's language, stereotypes, images, myths, and collective memories (Bar-Tal, in press). They provide the informational and motivational bases that are of crucial importance for social action as citizens have to believe in certain ideas to bear the stress, costs, and hardship of intractable conflict, to act on behalf of the society, and to fight the enemy. Although not exhaustive, the set outlined below includes the major beliefs discussed in the litera- ture. The first four, which refer to the nature of the conflict and the images of the self and the adversary, are the most important.

Our g o a l s a re iust. These beliefs outline the so- ciety's goals, their crucial importance, and their absolute justness. In the Israeli case, they refer to the goal of establishing a Jewish state in what they consider to be their ancient homeland and the justness of this goal in light of Jewish history, historical connection with land, and the modem revival of Jewish nationalism. In the Palestinian case, these beliefs refer to the goals of estab-

lishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, the return of Palestinian refugees, and the justness of these goals in light of their natural rights as the inhabitants of the land. Both Zionist and Palestinian literature spells out the goals and their roots in universal values of justness.

The opponent has no legitimacy. These beliefs deny the adversary's legitimacy through dehumanization, negative trait characterization, outcasting, use of negative political labels, and negative group comparisons. Thus, the opponent is categorized "into extreme negative social categories which are excluded from human groups that are considered as acting within limits of acceptable norms and/or values" (Bar-Tal, 1989, p. 170). These be- liefs blame the causes of the conflict' s outbreak, its con- tinuation, and the violence on the opponent. They also justify one's own hostile acts (Bar-Tal, 1990; Rieber, 1991).

Mutual delegitimization has been one of the bitter outcomes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although the expressions of these beliefs have varied over time in form and intensity, both groups have developed different types of delegitimizing beliefs and used cultural, educa- tional, and political channels to transmit and perpetuate them (Bar-Tal, 1988).

We con d o no wrong . These beliefs reflect the ethnocentric tendency to attribute positive traits, values, and behaviors to one's own society (Levine & Campbell, 1972; White, 1970). In intractable ethnonational conflict, special effort is taken to propagate, on the one hand, characteristics related to courage, heroism, or endurance and, on the other hand, those related to humaneness, mo- rality, faimess, trustworthiness, and progress. These char- acteristics are presented in sharp contrast to those of the enemy (Bum & Oskamp, 1989; Silverstein & Flamen- baum, 1989) and allow for a clear differentiation between the two parties.

For the Jewish community, Jews have been self- viewed as a "new people," rebom in the Land of Israel (Hofman, 1970), and self-stereotyped as persistent, brave, hardworking, determined, and intelligent. Ethnocentric self-presentation has also been related to the Jewish heri- tage. Jewish religion and traditions have been viewed as the roots of Westem civilization and superior morality (Hazani, 1993). The Jewish people, therefore, have often portrayed themselves as a "light to goyim" (non-Jews).

The self-perception of Palestinians should be ana- lyzed within the context of the power asymmetry in which Palestinians perceive Israel to have the upper hand (Rouhana & Fiske, 1995; Rouhana & Korper, 1996). Thus, the Palestinians' self-image is positive when it comes to moral claims, courage, and sacrifice, but it might be mixed when it comes to progress, success, and achievement. For example, Palestinians might consider themselves to be the most educated people in the Arab world, but when the comparison shifts to Israel, the sense of superiority is not likely to be maintained.

We are the victims. These beliefs concern self- perception and self-presentation as a victim, especially in the context of the intractable conflict. The focus of

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these beliefs is on the harm and atrocities perpetrated by the adversary.

Throughout the conflict, both Israelis and Palestin- ians perceived themselves as the victims of the other side. Beginning with the prestate conflict and in all four major wars, Jews perceived themselves to be victims of Arab aggression. The images of Jews as victims evolved through a long history of victimization that left its mark on the Jewish self-perception and imprinted the Israeli ethos (Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992; Liebman, 1978). During the first 30 years of Israel's existence, Israelis perceived the Arabs' intention to be overwhelmingly focused on the annihilation of their state. For example, the Arab embargo on Israel and terrorist attacks on Israelis were viewed as unequivocal evidence of their victimization. Within this frame of reference, all the four major wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973 and numerous military clashes are perceived as having been fought in self-de- fense. Arab attitudes and behaviors were viewed as an- other direct expression of the world' s hostility, and Arab anti-Zionism, during the intractable conflict, was viewed as a continuation of old anti-Semitism (e.g., Harkabi, 1972).

Palestinians perceive themselves as victims of the Zionist scheme to take over Palestine. For a long time, they referred to Palestine as the "raped homeland" and to Israel as the aggressor who conducted massacres and expulsions against innocent people and who dispossessed people of their lands and destroyed their properties. The continual cross-border attacks in which refugees paid a high price perpetuated the perception of Israel as the aggressor. The Palestinians' perception of victimization was enhanced after 1967, as the West Bank and Gaza were occupied by Israel and Palestinians' resistance to occupation, which peaked with a seven-year civil upris- ing, was met with vigorous military force. The sense of victimization is shared by the various Palestinian commu- nities in refugee camps, under occupation, and in the Palestinian autonomous areas.

The last three societal beliefs refer to social condi- tions that are conducive to mobilization of the material and human resources of society in order to cope with intractable conflict: Societal beliefs of patriotism gener- ate attachment to the country and society by propagating loyalty and sacrifice (Bar-Tal, 1993); societal beliefs of unity refer to the importance of ignoring internal conflicts and disagreements during intractable conflict in order to unite the forces in the face of the external threat (Mosco- vici & Doise, 1994); and, finally, societal beliefs of peace refer to peace as the ultimate desire and to society mem- bers as peace-loving. Such beliefs have the role of inspir- ing hope and optimism, strengthening positive self-image, and contributing to empathic self-presentation to the out- side world.

Although not all individuals or segments of society share these beliefs, the beliefs are widespread as part of each society's shared social and political cognition. But within each society, there are intragroup differences on other political beliefs, such as the most agreeable solution

to the conflict. The intragroup conflicts might become exacerbated as the parties to the conflict get closer to an agreement that some segments on each side oppose. Some functional coalitions in favor of an agreement or against it can develop across the dividing lines. Thus, in the Israeli-Palestinian case, there are sharp intragroup divisions within both Israeli and Palestinian societies. In Israel, the differences between the Labor and Likud Par- ties over the desirable agreements with the Palestinians divide Israeli society. Among Palestinians, the differences between supporters and opposers of the Oslo process threaten the unity of Palestinian society. At the same time, there seems to be a convergence of interests between supporters of the Oslo Agreements across the conflict lines to continue with the peace process. But on the Israeli side, the supporters of the Oslo process have been in opposition since 1996, when a Likud government was elected.

Maintenance of Societal Beliefs

Societal beliefs that emerge in intractable e~hnonational conflicts are maintained by cognitive and motivational processes that allow for biased information processing and that have been broadly reported and reviewed in the literature (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Hewstone, 1990; Rubin et al., 1994; Stephan & Stephan, 1996) and by intergroup identity differentiation resulting from the con- flicts (Brewer & Miller, 1996; Huddy & Vertanin, 1995; Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985; Rouhana, 1993).

Society members seek and process information in selective and biased ways because the stressful and threatening conditions cause increased motivation for clo- sure, which leads to cognitive freezing (Kruglanski, 1989). Under cognitive freezing, society members com- mit themselves to certain beliefs and refrain from criti- cally challenging them (see also Jervis, 1976; Vertzberger, 1990). The freezing has the following cognitive consequences.

Biased selection of in{ormation. Society mem- bers seek information that confirms their beliefs and usu- ally avoid inconsistent information. In this manner, ex- isting beliefs are augmented by the consistent information and are not exposed to challenge as the inconsistent infor- mation is avoided.

Biased interpretation. Individuals in intractable conflict are predisposed to ascribe to information that is consistent with their desired beliefs. Thus, the informa- tion is interpreted as supporting the held beliefs. Simi- larly, behaviors of the in-group and the out-group are interpreted in line with the existing schemas about the self and the enemy.

Biased elaboragon. Society members form new beliefs that are consistent with their already held beliefs. This process reinforces the held beliefs with new ones.

These cognitive processes support the society's be- liefs of conflictive ethos, which focus on the in-group's goals and their justifications and portray a favorable self- image and a diabolical enemy image (Frank, 1967; Stag-

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ner, 1967; White, 1970), and a differentiated in-group and a homogeneous out-group (Brewer & Miller, 1996; Mullen & Hu, 1989; Park, Ryan, & Judd, 1992). The societal beliefs describe for the society the social reality about the conflict, define national identity, and present a sort of ideology. In light of these societal beliefs, the past is reconstructed, the present is interpreted, and a future is planned.

The societal beliefs have an obvious impact on the course of the conflict. On the one hand, b y serving as an epistemic basis, they allow the development of the psychological conditions that enable successful coping with the conflict. On the other hand, they perpetuate ani- mosity and hostility by rationalizing the conflict and de- legitimizing the enemy. In addition, they have important affective implications because they lead to intense con- flict-related emotions such as fear, anger, and even hatred. They therefore contribute to the perpetuation of the con- flict. For example, both the beliefs and the accompanying emotions support the cycles of violence because they provide justification for such acts, and, at the same time, the violent behavior and the reaction of the adversary strengthen these beliefs and the feelings toward the en- emy. In this respect, the societal beliefs constitute the psychological investment that prevents peaceful resolu- tion of the conflict. As long as leaders and publics view the conflict through the lenses of these beliefs, it is hard for them to consider an alternative to the conflict.

Intractable intergroup conflict also has an immediate impact on collective and personal identity. Conflict and identity support each other in a mutual fortification pro- cess (Rouhana, 1997). For each group, group identi ty-- in this case, national identity--gains particular salience, because it is the central component in one's collective identity that differentiates the in-group from the out- group. The mutual acts of violence, exclusion, and ag- gression give this component centrality such that it be- comes the focus of in-group mobilization, thus high- lighting the differentiation between the two groups. Each group identity becomes dominated by a component that is not shared with the other and that is supported by additional symbols and meanings from the group's expe- rience and history, thus accentuating the collective iden- tity and increasing the intergroup differentiation. Personal identity is to some extent derived from one's social iden- tity (Tajfel, 1981; Turner, 1985), but accentuated group identity is likely to have even stronger implications for the personal identity of the in-group members who share the accentuated identity than one might expect under nonconflict situations. Furthermore, although in-group members usually attribute multiple meanings to their own identity, they often fail to differentiate among the various meanings of the out-group's identity.

Social Psychological Contributions to the Resolution of Intractable Ethnonational Conflict The question that arises, then, is how can the vicious cycles that are typical of intractable conflict be broken?

How can the societal beliefs that are confidently held as central, used by society to cope with the conflict, and transmitted to new generations be changed?

There is no doubt that intractable interethnic con- flicts are over tangible interests such as territory, power, and wealth. However, underlying these interests are basic human needs such as identity, security, and recognition (Azar, 1990; Burton, 1987). On the basis of Maslow's (1970) needs hierarchy, various theorists of conflict reso- lution originating in international relations suggested that these basic human needs cannot be negotiated or sup- pressed and that unless these needs are satisfied, the con- flict cannot be resolved (Azar, 1990; Burton, 1990; Mitchell, 1973; Rubenstein, 1990). A settlement that ne- glects to fully address the parties' needs will not bring a permanent, peaceful end to the conflict. Therefore, a genuine resolution has to satisfy the needs of both parties engaged in the intractable ethnonational conflict in a way that is acceptable to the mainstreams of both societies. At the same time, it is obvious that any attempts to peace- fully resolve intractable conflict also have to take into consideration its psychological foundations and use psy- chological principles in the process of its resolution.

Through the years, social psychology has contrib- uted a number of principles and strategies to resolve intergroup conflicts. But, because it is beyond the scope of this article to elaborate on them, only a few examples are given. Thus, Sherif (1967) found that introduction of superordinate goals to opposing parties may lead them to resolve the conflict and combine forces to achieve new goals. Osgood (1962) applied the notion of contingent cooperation to develop the strategy of graduated recipro- cation in tension reduction, which aims to reduce in- tergroup tension through a series of unilateral initiatives designed to reduce tension and supposed to lead to reciprocity.

A number of social psychologists have outlined principles of negotiation that are designed to bring the parties in conflict to discuss their contradictory positions with the apparent aim of peacefully resolving the differ- ences (e.g., Deutsch, 1973; Pruitt & Carnavale, 1993; Rubin & Brown, 1975). In addition, a number of psychol- ogists have discussed the importance of third-party inter- vention, which can fulfill various roles and functions in the effort to reconcile the differences of the adversaries in conflict (e.g., Fisher, 1990; Rubin, 1981).

The present article focuses on the cognitive change that is necessary for conflict resolution. At a minimum, parties in conflict have to change their beliefs about avoiding contact and negotiation with the enemy. But this is only a beginning. Successful resolution of conflict, and especially of intractable ethnonational conflict, re- quires profound changes of beliefs by leaders and negoti- ators, as well as by the society at large in order to support a negotiated agreement. Leaders cannot leave their con- stituencies behind in the process of change; they have to make the necessary effort to change their societies' be- liefs and images.

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Publics ought to change their societal beliefs of con- flictive ethos that help to perpetuate the conflict. The change has to encompass societal beliefs about goals that fuel the conflict, irreconcilability of the conflict, delegi- timization of the opponent, and virile self-image. More- over, peaceful resolution of intractable conflict requires not only a change of conflictive ethos but also the active construction of a new ethos consistent with a peaceful relationship. This ethos should consist of societal beliefs about the utility of a cooperative relationship, mecha- nisms that maintain peaceful relations, a vision of peace, and the necessity of providing the conditions for trustful and empathic relations with yesterday' s enemy. Acquiring an ethos of peace does not necessarily negate all the societal beliefs of conflict, such as patriotism or unity (Bar-Tal, 1998).

The changes described above do not take place over- night. Rather, they progress sluggishly even when leaders intensively propagate them. They may require mobiliza- tion of the political, cultural, and educational institutions. However, without progress on the ground toward an agreement that changes the nature of the intergroup rela- tions and that each side considers meaningful, the change of beliefs that is required to support a final agreement will be hard to achieve. In the Israeli-Palestinian case, decades of violent conflict and propagation of conflictive ethos have greatly hampered the evolution of beliefs that could support a peace process. Without such an evolu- tion, it is difficult to advance the peace process, as is evident from the rifts that followed the Oslo Agreements. In this case, although the handful of elite members who were involved in the secret negotiation and the ensuing agreements seem to have undergone changes sufficient to produce mutual trust, the publics were left behind with their enemy images and conflictual relationships and their ethos of conflict.

National narrative, with its primary political beliefs and sentimental attachments to the national group, also plays a critical role in achieving a resolution. It can be considered a main part of collective identity (Rouhana, 1997), in which case it becomes clear that intractable ethnonational conflicts are often identity conflicts. Thus, even when the two groups can agree on a pragmatic solution to a problem, the agreement might be blocked if it somehow legitimizes the other side' s national narra- t i v e - a n d by implication negates one's own. For exam- ple, when a group of influential Israelis and Palestinians who had been working together for years on how to arrive at jointly acceptable approaches to the problem of Pales- tinian refugees and their right of return seemed to agree on the general shape of a pragmatic solution (which in- cluded the return of a limited number of refugees to Israel proper, the return of others to a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, and compensation for those who did not return), the narratives were still irreconcilable. 3 The Palestinians insisted on the acknowledgment of the right of return of refugees to all of Palestine (including Israel) - -a central component of their national narrative that was completely rejected by the Israelis--even if this

right was not to be fully exercised. Accepting the right of return in principle, the Israeli participants argued, would imply that they accepted responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem, violating a central component of their narrative. Even if the two sides could have agreed on a certain number of refugees to return to Israel, they could not agree on how to present the gesture to their respective publics. Palestinians wanted to consider that the returnees would be practicing their right of return, but Israelis insisted they would only be allowed in what would be portrayed as a unilateral gesture of goodwill. The differ- ence between the two constructions of such an agreement is rooted in divergent national narratives and the basic overriding need to remain true to one's own narrative.

It is not clear how a clash of narratives can be re- solved without a fundamental discussion of the core is- sues related to both parties' identity and national narra- tive. Pragmatic solutions that avoid the central issues can go only so far, as is evident from the turbulent course of the Oslo process.

Producing a vision of peace is extremely difficult in societies embroiled in intractable conflicts whose dy- namics are not conducive to such vision. However, some social psychologically based intervention methods can contribute to initial steps, such as changing beliefs neces- sary for initiating a conflict-resolution process and ex- ploring narratives, at least in small groups. One such intervention method is the interactive problem-solving workshop that has been applied in various intractable conflicts (Azar, 1990; Burton, 1990; Doob & Foltz, 1973; Fisher, 1997; Kelman, 1992; Mitchell, 1973; Rouhana & Kelman, 1994). One way to analyze the workshop pro- cess is in terms of the modifications of the beliefs that participants hold and the introduction of new beliefs that are consistent with a potentially peaceful relationship that can satisfy the basic human needs of both parties.

From 1979 until 1990, Kelman and his colleagues applied a one-shot problem-solving workshop on an al- most annual basis (for a review, see Fisher, 1997). Since 1990, Kelman and Rouhana have been conducting a con- tinuing and sustained unofficial intervention program in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The program is guided by human needs theory and builds on Kelman's (1986, 1992) earlier work. In 1990, Kelman and Rouhana began a continuing workshop in which high-ranking Israelis and Palestinians met regularly in a series of workshops that ended in 1993 (see Kelman, 1992; Rouhana, 1995a; Rouhana & Kelman, 1994). Using the problem-solving workshop as the main intervention tool, the workshop provided a setting for constructive interaction guided by a set of ground rules geared toward facilitating constructive interaction between the participants and inducing joint

3 This example is drawn from the deliberations of the Joint Work- ing Group on Israeli-Palestinian Relations. The group, organized and cochaired by Herbert C. Kelman and Nadim N. Rouhana, has been meeting since 1994 in an effort to produce concept papers on issues that the Oslo Accords failed to address, including the problem of the Palestinian refugees and their right of return. See Kelman (1997) for a description of the rationale and methodology the organizers use.

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problem solving (Burton, 1987; Kelman, 1992; Rouhana, 1995a).

Given the characteristics o f this type of conflict (to- tality, protractedness, centrality, etc.), this approach is particularly suitable to examine one ' s beliefs about the conflict and to develop new beliefs about the other side and its basic human needs. One ' s point o f view is thor- oughly presented in a setting designed to enhance mutual understanding and conducive for acquiring new beliefs that are consistent with peaceful relations between the parties. Indeed, the essence of the method is to have each party present its communi ty ' s human needs and elaborate on concerns and fears that have to be taken into consider- ation if a solution be tween the two societies is to be achieved. During this learning process, participants mod- ify their existing beliefs and possibly acquire new ones. Once the two sets of human needs are presented and understood, participants are encouraged to engage in joint problem solving and think of ways to take the two sets o f needs into consideration. The groups go through a number of phases (Rouhana, 1995a), but once they reach the phase o f joint problem solving, they begin working as one team vis-h-vis a common problem. Going through the phases is t ime-consuming, as participants from groups embroiled in deep-rooted conflict need sustained and facilitated interaction to build the needed trust and to develop the prerequired cognitive empathy to engage in joint problem solving. At this stage, as participants explore joint visions of peace, they acquire new beliefs about peaceful relations between their communities.

In 1994, Kelman and Rouhana began the Joint Work- ing Group on Israeli-Palest inian Relations, which also involves a series o f continuing workshops. Using the same intervention tool, this project aims at producing joint concept papers on issues that the Oslo Agreements left for final status negotiations, such as the future o f Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza and the right o f return of Palestinian refugees (Kelman, 1997). The objective is to produce papers that can, as much as possible, respond to the human needs o f both societies and thus be accepted by both societies. The goal is to disseminate these papers to both publics and to decision makers of both communities,

The design of this work is closely tied to the chang- ing political realities on the ground and the political de- velopments in the official negotiation process. Some hypotheses regarding how this work can contribute to conflict resolution are presented in Kelman (1995). In general, although the potential contribution o f these proj- e c t s - l i k e other conflict-resolution p ro j ec t s - - i s hard to demonstrate and the field obviously has yet to develop methods o f research and evaluation (Rouhana, 1995b), this line of work, nonetheless, offers a promising direc- tion for psychologists interested in social conflict to con- tribute to the development of theory, practice, and re- search methodology.

Successful outcomes of unofficial efforts such as the continuing workshop and the joint working group do not guarantee the transfer of change to the macro level.

The changes on the societal level are more complex and require a methodology that goes beyond intervention at a small-group level. However, the problem-solving work- shop demonstrates that under the proper conditions, con- flict beliefs can be changed, and participants can acquire new beliefs and produce visions of peace that they "ne- gotiate" with their opponents and that they can dissemi- nate and share with their compatriots.

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