Penicillin and the Reconstruction of Japan

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MEDICINA NEI SECOLI ARTE E SCIENZA, 26/2 (2014) 469-484

Journal of History of Medicine

Articoli/Articles

Key words: penicillin - Cold War - Japan - Europe

PENICILLIN AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF JAPAN

DANIELE COZZOLIUniversitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, ES

SUMMARY

PENICILLIN AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF JAPAN

This paper explores postwar American strategies regarding penicillin in Japan. Perceived as both an American gift and a symbol of reconstruction, penicillin played a singular role in Washington’s postwar policies towards Europe and Japan. Washington encouraged US pharmaceutical companies to penetrate Europe but sought to protect intra-European trade. In Japan, however, importing penicillin from the US or establishing private American factories was forbidden. Jackson W. Foster implemented a smaller-scale, military-directed version of the US’s wartime penicillin project. In this paper, it is argued that the MacArthur administration aimed to boost Japanese penicillin production and transfer American industrial culture to Japan. This was initially a major success. However, the Japanese pharmaceutical industry failed to break down barriers to market entry established by first movers and, consequently, was uncompetitive throughout the twentieth century. This paper regards the American penicillin project in Japan as a factor in the weakness of the postwar Japanese pharmaceutical industry.

Penicillin and the reconstruction of Europe and JapanBy the end of the Second World War, it appeared clear to Washington policymakers that the recovery of Europe and Japan was essential to the interests of the US. In order to support their rearmament pro-grammes, Nazi Germany and Japan established a series of bilateral

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agreements that gave them access to raw materials and allowed them to maximise their industrial production systems. Autarkic policies were considered the basis of totalitarianism and nationa-lism. Roosevelt emphasised that freedom could not survive in the US in a world dominated by the Axis powers, as the government would have to control the economy. The view of policymakers in Washington was that postwar Europe and Japan should be orga-nised on the basis of a system of free, multilateral agreements, thus placing them beyond the influence of Soviet totalitarianism1.

Washington policymakers believed that a free, integrated European market would benefit both Europe and the US, and that European political systems and economies should be harmonised with those of the US2. Thus, the US pressed Europe to introduce economic liberalisation measures. As Alan Milward’s reconstruction shows, the European Recovery Program – the so-called Marshall Plan – was the major instrument of such strategic economic and geo-political design3. In Japan, in contrast, the MacArthur administra-tion attempted to perform a great social and economic experiment consisting of reconstructing a whole society in harmony with the American way of life4.Penicillin played a singular role in postwar American strategies due to its multifaceted nature. It was a wonder drug capable of saving millions of lives, one that American troops had brought to postwar Europe and Japan, and could therefore be portrayed as a powerful symbol of the age of peace and prosperity the US was bringing. However, penicillin was also an industrial product, the manufactu-ring of which led to major changes in the pharmaceutical industry. Together with the growth of healthcare systems, wartime research and production projects on antibiotics and other synthetic drugs, such as sulfa and anti-malarial drugs, generated what historians refer to as ‘a therapeutic revolution’5. Between 1932 and 1969, sales of prescription drugs jumped from thirty-two per cent to eighty-three

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per cent of all consumer expenditure on medical drugs6. The pro-duction of such drugs required large investments, the construction of new facilities and the acquisition of marketing services to reach doc-tors and hospitals. Thanks to the revolution originated by penicillin, companies such as Merck, Pfizer and Glaxo were transformed from medium-sized firms to global companies7. This paper examines the particular role that penicillin played in the reconstruction of Japan. The MacArthur administration implemen-ted a military-directed, large-scale penicillin production project ai-med at boosting the manufacturing of antibiotics in Japan. This pa-per argues that the project also aimed to transfer American industrial culture to Japan’s pharmaceutical industry, and evaluates its short and long-term consequences in that regard.Historians have focused on the American penicillin research project8. Robert Bud has provided a crucial insight into the making of peni-cillin worldwide in the postwar years9, as well as into the role the drug played in the UK and in postwar controversies between Britain and the US10. Maki Umemura has described the development of the postwar pharmaceutical industry but has not investigated penicillin’s role in the reconstruction of Japan11. In fact, the only reconstruction of the American large-scale penicillin production project in Japan has been provided by Yukimasa Yagisawa, one of the researchers actually involved therein12.The next section of the paper features a brief reconstruction of the large-scale penicillin project in the US, to show the similarities and differences between it and the large-scale production project carried out in the US during the Second World War. The third section focu-ses on the Japanese penicillin project, highlighting how it differed from the contemporary European penicillin projects. The paper’s fi-nal section consists of a general discussion of the role of penicillin in the US’s postwar strategies in Japan, Austria and Germany, the ex-Axis countries occupied by the Americans.

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The American penicillin projectLarge-scale penicillin production posed many problems, the most significant being that, due to its aerobic nature, penicillin required the medium on which it was fermented to have a large surface13. Pfizer researchers introduced the vertical stirred tank fermenter and submerged fermentation techniques, which made penicillin produc-tion faster and cheaper. Nevertheless, in addition to requiring sub-stantial investments and the expertise of biochemists, engineers and mycologists, establishing large-scale penicillin production was a long and difficult process, which involved numerous problems that often had to be solved on a day-to-day basis. Pharmaceutical companies were reluctant to produce penicillin by fermentation. Doing so meant acquiring expertise in fermentation and designing entire new factories that ran the risk of becoming obsolete in just a few years, as chemists thought they would shortly find a me-thod for producing penicillin by chemical synthesis14. That turned out to be more difficult than expected, however. Consequently, penicillin was still being produced by fermentation in the 1940s and 1950s15. Having failed to attract the interest of the national industry or obtain strong support from the Medical Research Council, Howard Florey turned to the Rockefeller Foundation. Thanks to a grant from the foundation, Florey and his co-worker Norman Heatley travelled to the US. The British started collaborating with the Americans. The American government reached an agreement with the country’s pharmaceutical companies and, at the same time, began negotia-ting an agreement with the British government concerning patents on penicillin and its production. The American project was co-ordinated by the Office for Scientific Research and Development (OSRD). American pharmaceutical companies co-operated in the government-sponsored programme and shared information. A num-ber of government agencies supported pharmaceutical companies at


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different levels. The OSRD’s War Production Board co-ordinated production and allocated resources and raw materials. The Northern Regional Research Laboratory and, subsequently, the Food and Drug Administration worked on refining industrial penicillin pro-duction processes (submerged fermentation technology and penicil-lin strains). The OSRD’s Committee of Medical Research focused on clinical and chemical research and handled civilian requests for penicillin. The Office of Production Research and Development in-volved various universities in research on more productive strains of penicillin and on fermentation, and facilitated the circulation of knowledge amongst the different actors16. Additionally, a number of new factories were financed with public money17, and a project on the chemical synthesis of penicillin was carried out simultaneously18. The final agreement between the UK and the US envisaged the OSRD allocating patents to firms on the basis of their contribution to peni-cillin research19. It is worth noting that the agreement with the British allowed the Truman administration to use it as an instrument of its global postwar policies.

The large-scale penicillin production project in JapanIn 1947, Douglas MacArthur asked Jackson W. Foster, a former pupil of Selman Waksman, to organise and oversee penicillin rese-arch and production in Japan20. The American occupation authorities wanted to quickly improve Japanese civilians’ health conditions in order to avoid social unrest and to contrast the Communists’ influen-ce21. Foster implemented a sort of smaller-scale, military-directed version of the US’s penicillin project. He set up central laboratories to carry out research on fermentation and purification, as well as a pilot plant. He also organised a three-day symposium to instruct researchers and technicians from university and industrial labora-tories22. No patents were disclosed, but the Americans passed on all their technical expertise and scientific knowledge23. The Supreme

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Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP)24 directed the project by issuing licences for penicillin production and allocating resources to companies and laboratories that followed its directions. To protect national production, importing penicillin from the US was strictly forbidden. That was crucial to the success of the whole project, gi-ven that such imports would have covered the country’s needs more quickly and cheaply. It is worth noting that all European state-di-rected penicillin programmes failed, and that one of the reasons for that was that they could not compete with American penicillin, which was cheaper and of better quality. In 1944, the French Ministry of War, in collaboration with the Pasteur Institute and France’s two ma-jor pharmaceutical companies, Rhône-Poulenc and Roussel, decided to set up a state-run penicillin factory. As Jean-Paul Gaudillière and Bernd Gausemeier have reconstructed, the project failed because of tensions between scientists from the Pasteur Institute and military personnel. Military officials thought that production should begin as soon as possible, initially using surface fermentation technology, with facilities to be converted at a later date following the acquisi-tion of submerged fermentation technology. In contrast, the Pasteur Institute microbiologists Federico Nitti and Jacques Trefouël thou-ght that proprietary deep fermentation technology should be obtai-ned, even if it took several months of research25. In the end, the phar-maceutical companies withdrew from the project. Rhône-Poulenc acquired know-how and technology from Merck, and Roussel from Shenley26. The public factory was shut down without having pro-duced any penicillin. State-directed penicillin production was also envisaged in Britain and Italy, but did not cover internal demand27.There was a major difference between the large-scale penicillin production project that Foster implemented in Japan and the one the OSRD had carried out during the war. In Science, the Endless Frontier, Vannevar Bush stressed that the American penicillin project, of which he was head, was not directed by the government:


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Penicillin reached our troops in time to save countless lives because the Government co-ordinated and supported the program of research and deve-lopment on the drug. The development moved from the early laboratory stage to large scale production and use in a fraction of the time it would have taken without such leadership. The search for better anti-malarials, which proceeded at a moderate tempo for many years, has been accelera-ted enormously by Government support during the war. Other examples may be cited in which medical progress has been similarly advanced. In achieving these results, the Government has provided over-all co-ordina-tion and support; it has not dictated how the work should be done within any co-operating institution’28.

In the OSRD-co-ordinated project, pharmaceutical companies play-ed a prominent role in research and development. As Bush empha-sised, the government supported and co-ordinated the project but did not direct it. In contrast, it was Foster who directed the SCAP’s project. The American occupation authorities aimed to enable Japan to autonomously produce penicillin on a large scale as quickly as possible. Waiting for the implementation of submerged fermentation techniques was simply not an option. Thus, the MacArthur admi-nistration implemented surface production initially and submerged fermentation production afterwards. Foster supervised research and production. Postwar Japanese discourse on reconstruction portrayed him as a benefactor of the country. In 1980, Yukimasa Yagisawa de-scribed Foster and his work in Japan in enthusiastic terms:

Next, Foster inspected almost all the penicillin factories located in different districts. His advice was very practical. The batch sheets, requested for presentation to the Welfare Ministry every month, were also very useful for companies. During his five-month stay in Japan, small-scale fermenters started operation in the factories of Banyu and Tokyo Rayon. Foster left Japan on March 25, but his plans and activities were maintained by us29.

Foster’s inspection reports on the Japanese laboratories and factori-es are kept by the National Archives and Records Administration at

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College Park. They make for interesting reading, as they reveal both Foster’s point of view concerning the project and the SCAP’s aims. The SCAP’s large-scale penicillin production project was part of a wider plan to implement American managerial and working culture in Japan30. In one of his reports, Foster claimed that: ‘like almost all Japanese companies, the management of this company does not com-prehend the meaning of organised concerted action’31. Interestingly, he also complained about the Japanese technicians’ lack of initiative:

Judged by American Standards the Japanese technical people are deci-dedly inferior in training, skill and fundamental scientific knowledge and moreover display an amazing lack of initiative and resourcefulness in coping with everyday production problems which would be solved in almost off-hand fashion by an American scientist under the same condition. Basically it seems to be a lack of ability to improvise. It should be stated, however, that where first class advanced technical people would be employed in an Ameri-can factory, the Japanese employ young and inexperienced technical people who simply lack the ability to project the problem and meet its demands32.

Foster’s criticism of the lack of initiative shown by Japanese techni-cians in solving everyday production problems will come as no sur-prise to historians, as the very nature of the SCAP-directed project undermined creativity. Japanese laboratories aiming to develop pro-prietary technology were discouraged from doing so, whereas com-panies and laboratories that implemented technology and know-how provided by the American scientists and engineers met with encou-ragement. In another of his reports, Foster wrote:

This company is in the early laboratory stages and production is negligi-ble. It appears to have a first-class bacteriologist and chemist who have done some good systematic research. Indication of any experimental work on the submerged process was not even contemplated for the near future.The scientific people unfortunately were spending their time trying to develop new processes instead of simply working and applying to their conditions the American methods, proven of value after as much research.


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Recommendations were made for a progress by which the company should be guided, and as well numerous practical improvements in their set-up and operations were offered.Present indications are that this company independently will not make a substantial contribution to the producing program’33.

These documents may seem to be contradictory, in that technicians were criticised for being incapable of showing initiative, while scien-tists were criticised for trying to understand biochemical processes and looking for new solutions instead of applying the American me-thods. However, the documents reveal that Foster understood that a quick technology and know-how transfer process where penicillin was concerned would mean Japanese industrial culture being harmo-nised with that of the US as soon as possible.

Concluding remarksIn the short term, the SCAP’s penicillin project achieved its goals. The production and quality of Japanese penicillin improved dramatically. Monthly production rapidly increased while prices fell34. Compared to the contemporary French state-run project that never produced pe-nicillin, the SCAP’s project was a major triumph. For the MacArthur administration, it was a symbol of the success of American efforts to bring peace and prosperity to Japan. Maki Umemura has argued that the American large-scale penicillin production project was the main reason for the relative strength of the postwar Japanese antibiotics sector35. In the 1950s, Japanese university laboratories synthesised new antibiotics36. In the postwar years, antibiotics became Japan’s main pharmaceutical export, and drugs licensed from Japanese to American firms accounted for twenty per cent of the US antibiotics market in the 1980s37.Nevertheless, the Japanese pharmaceutical industry remained weak in comparison to other sectors of the country’s industry, such as elec-tronics or automobiles, as Japan’s pharmaceutical companies were

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unable to break down the barriers to market entry established by first movers, namely economies of scale and scope which allowed them to quickly drop prices whenever a newcomer tried to enter the mar-ket38. Umemura has argued that the main factors in the failure of the Japanese pharmaceutical industry were weak incentives for companies to invest in R&D, the Japanese medical culture and the government’s protectionist policies. The secondary factors she has identified are dif-ferences in therapeutic demand conditions between Japan and its po-tential export markets, different drug standards, the industrial structure of Japanese pharmaceutical firms, barriers to entrepreneurship among university academics and Japanese entrepreneurs’ lack of initiative in terms of expanding overseas39. An analysis of the SCAP’s penicil-lin production project may help explain the weakness of the postwar Japanese pharmaceutical industry. The Americans aimed to transfer their industrial culture to the Japanese at every level (managers, rese-archers and technicians). The result of any knowledge transfer process is, of course, the product of the aims of the transferring party and the receiving party. The roots of some of the factors listed by Umemura lie in the SCAP’s project. Postwar protectionist policies were a continua-tion of the SCAP’s protectionist policy. Foster was critical of scientists undertaking risky, innovative projects instead of adopting well-known solutions. He also complained about other factors in the industry’s we-akness, such as technicians’ lack of initiative and a too hierarchical ma-nagerial structure. However, the SCAP’s penicillin project was never likely to solve those problems, as the transfer of knowledge and know-how took place at the orders of the occupying authorities rather than being a conscious acquisition by the Japanese. A comparison with the transfer of knowledge and industrial know-how related to penicillin in the other ex-Axis countries occupied by the Americans and the Allies may be instructive. In Austria, Biochemie Gesellschaft became one of the largest producers of penicillin in the postwar years thanks to help from the French occupying authorities, which provided the Austrians


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with penicillin strains40. However, it was Austrian microbiologists and industrial managers who directed the project. Austria, of course, is a much smaller country than Japan. In Germany, the Allies allowed pri-vate companies to organise production. Schering AG had performed research on penicillin during the war, but discontinued it. After the war, Hoechst was the company that, having acquired technology from Merck & Co. Inc., produced penicillin41. Both Biochemie and Hoechst were successful companies in the postwar period. Thus, the main dif-ference between the way in which the occupying authorities acted in Austria, Germany and Japan lies in the fact that the SCAP-directed project also aimed to accelerate the harmonisation of the Japanese in-dustrial culture with that of the US. As Gary Herrigel has pointed out, the consequences of the American occupation of Germany and Japan were similar in a way where the steel industry was concerned. In both cases the Americans aimed to break up a concentration of political and economic powers and to create societies based on counterbalanced powers, a strong middle class, trade unions, market competition and efficient industrial oligopoly. Those policies resulted in the creation of hybrid firms, industrial structures and market strategies which turned out to be more efficient than both their pre-war counterparts and the models the Americans aimed to implement. Nevertheless, the case of the steel industry differs from that of penicillin in that, in the former, the Allies did not insist on the Japanese and Germans adopting a spe-cific technology or industrial practice42. In the case of penicillin, in contrast, the Allies acted differently in each country. As indicated, in Austria and Germany their policy was no different from those they applied in other industrial sectors, whereas in Japan they implemented a large-scale, military-directed penicillin production programme. The German and Japanese pre-war pharmaceutical industries were radical-ly different in size, technological sophistication and industrial orga-nisation, the former being a first mover in the market and the latter a latecomer thereto. Those pre-existing differences and the contrasting

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measures of the occupying authorities led the two countries’ pharma-ceutical industries to develop in different ways.

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND NOTES

General Bibliography

BUSH V., Science, the Endless Frontier: A Report to the President. Washington DC, United States Government Printing Office, 1945.CAPOCCI M., A Chain is gonna come. Building a Penicillin Production Plant in Postwar Italy. Dynamis 2011; 31(2): 343-63. CARTER G., PALMER B., Chemical and Biological Warfare and Defence. In: BUD R., GUMMET P. Cold War, Hot Science. Applied Research in Britain’s Defence Laboratories 1945-1990. London, Science Museum, 1999.COZZOLI D., CAPOCCI M., Making biomedicine in twentieth-century Italy: Domenico Marotta (1886–1974) and the Italian Higher Institute of Health. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2011; 44(4): 549-74.DENNIS M.A., Reconstructing Sociotechnical Order. Vannevar Bush and US Science Policy. In: JASANOFF S. (ed.), States of Knowledge. The Co-Production of Science and the Social Order. London, Routledge, 2004, pp. 225-54.EICHENGREEN B., The European Economy since 1945. Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 2006.GAUDILLIÈRE J-P., GAUSEMEIER B., Molding National Research Systems. Osiris 2005; 20: 180-202.LAX E., The Mold in Dr Florey’s Coat. New York, Henry Holt, 2005.QUIRKE V., Anglo-American relations and the co-production of American hege-mony in pharmaceuticals. In: BONIN H., DE GOEY F. (eds), American Firms in Europe. Geneva, Droz, 2009.RASMUSSEN N., Of ‘Small Men‘, Big Science and Bigger Business: The Second World War and Biomedical Research in the United States. Minerva 2002; 40: 115-46.RASMUSSEN N., The Drug Industry and Clinical Research in Interwar America: Three Types of Physician Collaborator. Bulletin of the History of Medicine 2005; 79: 50-80.SANTESMASES M-J., Antibióticos en la autarquía: banca privada, industria farmacéutica, investigación científica y cultura liberal en España, 1940-1960. Madrid, CSIC, 1999.


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SANTESMASES M-J., Distributing Penicillin. The Clinic, the Hero and Industrial Production in Spain 1943 - 1952. In: QUIRKE V., SLINN J. (eds), Perspectives on Twentieth Century Pharmaceuticals. Oxford, Peter Lang, 2010, pp. 92-117.SANTESMASES M-J., Screening Antibiotics: industrial research by CEPA and Merck in the 1950s. Dynamis 2011; 31(2): 407–29.SWANN J.P., Academic Scien-tists and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Cooperative Research in Twentieth-Cen-tury America. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988.ZACHARY G.P., Endless Frontier. Vannevar Bush Engineer of the American Century. Boston, MIT Press, 1999.

1. LEFFLER M.P., A Preponderance of Power. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1992.

2. HOGAN M.J., The Marshall Plan. America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987; MILWARD A., The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51. London, Routledge, 1984.

3. MILWARD A., ref. note 2; See also HOGAN M.J., ref. note 2; EICHEN-GREEN B., The European Economy since 1945. Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 2006; LUNDESTAD G., ‘Empire’ by Integration. The United States and European Integration. 1945-1997. Oxford, Oxford Uni-versity Press, 1998.

4. See SCHALLER M., The American Occupation of Japan. The Origin of the Cold War in Asia. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985; COHEN R., Remaking Japan. The American Occupation as New Deal. New York, Free Press, 1985; ZEITLIN J., HERRIGEL G. (eds), Americanization and its limits: Reworking US technology and management in postwar Europe and Japan. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000.

5. On the therapeutic revolution and drug regulation in the US, see TEMIN P., Taking Your Medicine: Drug Regulation in the United States. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1980; STARR P., The Social Transformation of American Medicine. New York, Basic Books, 1982; ABRAHAM J., Science, Politics and the Pharmaceutical Industry. Controversy and Bias in Drug Regulation. New York, St. Martin Press, 1995; MARKS H.M., The Progress of Experiment: Science and Therapeutic Reform in the United States, 1900–1990. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997; RASMUSSEN N., The Moral Economy of the Drug Company-Medical Scientist Collaboration in Interwar America. Social Studies of Science 2004; 34(2): 161-85; RAS-MUSSEN N., The Drug Industry and Clinical Research in Interwar America: Three Types of Physician Collaborator. Bulletin of the History of Medicine

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2005; 79: 50-80; CARPENTER D., Regulation and Power. Organizational Image and Pharmaceutical Regulation at the FDA. Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 2010; and TOBBEL D. A., Pills, Power and Policy. Berke-ley, University of California Press, 2012.

6. TEMIN P., ref. note 5.7. See BUD R., Penicillin. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007.8. HARE R., The Birth of Penicillin and the Disarming of Microbes. London,

George Allen and Unwin, 1970; WILSON D., Penicillin in Perspective. Lon-don, Faber & Faber, 1976; PARASCANDOLA J., (ed.) The History of Antibi-otics. A Symposium. Madison, American Institute for the History of Pharmacy, 1980; SWANN J.P., The search for synthetic penicillin during World War II. The British Journal for the History of Science 1983; 16: 154-90; HOBBY G., Penicillin Meeting the Challenge. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1985; NEUSHUL P., Science, Government and the Mass Production of Penicillin. Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 1993; 48: 388; RAS-MUSSEN N., Of ‘Small Men’, Big Science and Bigger Business: The Second World War and Biomedical Research in the United States. Minerva 2002; 40: 115-46; LAX E., The Mold in Dr Florey’s Coat. New York, Henry Holt, 2005; BUD R., ref. note 7.

9. BUD R., ref. note 7; see also HOBBY G., ref. note 8.10. BUD R., Penicillin and the New Elizabethans. The British Journal for the

History of Science 1998; 31: 305-33; BUD R., see note 7; BUD R., Upheaval in the Moral Economy. Patenting, Teamwork and the World War II Experi-ence of Penicillin. History and Technology 2008; 24(2): 173-90.

11. UMEMURA M., The Japanese Pharmaceutical Industry. London, Rout-ledge, 2012.

12. YAGISAWA Y., Early History of Antibiotics in Japan. In: PARASCAN-DOLA J., The History of Antibiotics. A Symposium. Madison, American Insti-tute for the History of Medicine, 1980, pp. 69-90; BUD R., Innovators, deep fermentation and antibiotics: promoting applied science before and after the Second World War. Dynamis 2011; 31(2): 323-41.

13. HOBBY G., see note 8, p. 96. 14. HOBBY G., see note 8; NEUSHUL P., see note 8. 15. It was not until 1959 that Sheehan synthesised penicillin. Fermentation

remained the most efficient method of production, however. See NEUSHUL P., see note 8, p. 384; see also SWANN, ref. note 8.

16. NEUSHUL P., see note 8, p. 388; RASMUSSEN N., see note 8.17. SWANN J.P., see note 8, pp. 167-8.


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18. SWANN J.P., see note 8.19. BUD R., see note 7, pp. 179-80.20. On Jackson W. Foster (1914–1966), see YAGISAWA Y., ref. note 12; and

BUD R., ref. note 12.21. UMEMURA M., see note 11.22. YAGISAWA Y., see note 12.23. YAGISAWA Y., see note 12; BUD R., see note 7; and UMEMURA M., see

note 11. On the American policy in Japan, see SCHALLER M., ref. note 4; and COHEN R., see note 4.

24. The acronym SCAP denoted both Douglas MacArthur and the American occupation administration. In this paper, it is used to refer only to the latter.

25. See GAUDILLIÈRE J-P., GAUSEMEIER B., Molding National Research Systems. Osiris 2005; 20: 180-202.

26. See QUIRKE V., Anglo-American relations and the co-production of Ameri-can hegemony in pharmaceuticals. In: BONIN H., DE GOEY F., American Firms in Europe. Geneva, Droz, 2009; La Pénicilline Roussel, Paris, Labo-ratoires Roussel, 1950.

27. See BUD R., see note 7; COZZOLI D., CAPOCCI M., Making biomedicine in twentieth-century Italy: Domenico Marotta (1886–1974) and the Italian Higher Institute of Health. The British Journal for the History of Science 2011; 44(4): 549-74; and CAPOCCI M., A Chain is gonna come. Building a Penicillin Production Plant in Postwar Italy. Dynamis 2011; 31(2): 343-63.

28. BUSH V., Science, The Endless Frontier: A Report to the President. Wash-ington DC, United States Government Printing Office, 1945, pp. 14-15. On the figure of Vannevar Bush, see ZACHARY G.P., Endless Frontier. Van-nevar Bush, Engineer of the American Century. Boston, MIT Press, 1999; and DENNIS M.A., Reconstructing Sociotechnical Order. Vannevar Bush and US Science Policy. In: JASANOFF S. (ed.), States of Knowledge. The Co-Production of Science and the Social Order. London, Routledge, 2004, pp. 225-54. On Bush’s relationship with the pharmaceutical industry, see SWANN J.P., Academic Scientists and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Coop-erative Research in Twentieth-Century America. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988; and TOBBEL, ref. note 5.

29. See YAGISAWA, see note 12.30. See General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Pub-

lic Health and Welfare Section, Memorandum for record, 17 January 1947, Penicillin visit to Wakampoto Ltd.; and General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Public Health and Welfare Section,

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Memorandum for record, Report of Penicillin Inspection trip 14–19 Dec. 1946, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park (hence-forth NARA).

31. General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Public Health and Welfare Section, Memorandum for record, 17 January 1947, Peni-cillin visit to Wakampoto Ltd., in NARA.

32. General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Public Health and Welfare Section, Memorandum for record, Report of Penicillin Inspection trip 14–19 Dec. 1946, in NARA.

33. General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Pub-lic Health and Welfare Section, Memorandum for record, 30 January 1947, Subject: visit to Rykeu-Eyo (Rykeu Alimentary Medicine Company Inc.) Shimura-chogo-machi, Itabashi-ku, Tokyo, in NARA.

34. YAGISAWA Y., see note 12.35. See UMEMURA M., ref. note 11, p. 33.36. See YAGISAWA Y., ref. note 12.37. See UMEMURA, ref. note 11, p. 33.38. CHANDLER A., Shaping the Industrial Century. Cambridge Ma., Harvard

University Press, 2005.39. See UMEMURA M., ref. note 11.40. BUD R., see note 7, pp. 91-2; KOENIG J., Die Penicillin-V Story: eine

Erfindung aus Tirol als Segen für die Welt. Innsbruck, Haymon Verlag, 1984.41. See GAUDILLIÈRE J. – P., GAUSEMEIER B., see note 25; and SHAMA

G., REINARZ R., Allied Intelligence Reports on Wartime German Penicillin Research and Production. Historical Studies in the Physical and the Bio-logical Sciences 2002; 32(2): 347-67. On the reconstruction of Germany, see DIEFENDORF J., FORHN A. (eds), American Policy and the Reconstruc-tion of Western Germany. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004; and ZEITLIN J., HERRIGEL G., see note 4.

42. HERRIGEL G., American Occupation, Market Order, and Democracy: Reconfiguring the Steel Industry in Japan and Germany after the Second World War. In: ZEITLIN J., HERRIGEL G., see note 4, pp. 340-99.

Correspondence should be addressed to:Daniele Cozzoli, Pompeu Fabra University, Department of Humanities, c/Ramón Trias Fargas, 25/27 08005 Barcelona, Spain. [email protected]

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Penicillin and the Reconstruction of Japan