Oran Doyle, Elusive Quarries: A Failure of Regulation (2011) 34 DULJ 180

2011] �

Dublin University Law Journal

2 0 1 1 ♦ Volume 34

in as soc iat ion with the Law School , Trin i ty Col lege , Dublin

elusiVe Quarries: a Failure oF regulation

OranDOyle*

I. IntroductIon

Quarr�esareeconom�cally �mportant.Part�cularly (butnotonly) �n t�mesofeconom�cgrowth,there�saneedfortherawmater�alsprov�dedbyquarr�esfortheconstruct�on�ndustry.However,quarr�es–depend�ngonthe�rscaleandlocation – can cause significant environmental impacts. It is therefore necessary to control quarry�ng act�v�t�es �n order to ensure env�ronmental protect�on.1Quarr�es have been the subject of regulat�on under the local Government(Plann�ngandDevelopment)acts1963-1999andthePlann�ngandDevelopmentacts2000-2010.yetquarr�eshaveprovedres�stanttothetypeofregulat�onprov�dedunderthoseacts.Thecentralargumentofth�sart�cle�sthat�t�st�metostartafreshanddevelopanewschemefortheregulat�onofquarr�es.Thepurposeofth�sart�cle�snottoprov�deacomprehens�veaccountofthelawrelat�ngtoquarr�es.Severalofthe�ssuesaddressed�nth�sart�clecouldeachprov�demater�alforanart�cleofgreaterlengththanth�sone.2rather,th�sart�clehas threea�ms.F�rst, �t seeks todrawtogetherd�fferentaspectsofplann�nglaw�nsofarastheyapplytoquarr�es.Th�sw�llprov�deastructuralaccountofthe compl�cated �nterlock�ng mechan�sms of quarry regulat�on. Second, theart�cleoffersananalys�sandcr�t�queof thecomplex�tyof th�s �nterlock�ngsystemofregulat�on.Whenonelooksatthecoresubstant�veelementsoftheregulat�onofquarr�es,�tqu�cklybecomesapparentthattheO�reachtasandthecourtshavecreatedasystemoflabyr�nth�necomplex�tythatdoesnotservethe�nterestsofe�therquarryoperatorsortheenv�ronment.Th�rd,theart�cleoffers

* Fellow, Trinity College, Dublin. I am grateful to David Kenny and Brendan Slattery for �ns�ghtswh�chass�sted�nthepreparat�onofth�sart�cle.

1. For an account of these compet�ng concerns, seeDepartment of theenv�ronment,Her�tageandlocalGovernment,Quarries and Ancillary Activities: Guidelines for Planning Authorities (Stationery Office, 2004).

2. readersshouldreferthemselvestothetwoexcellenttextbooks�nth�sarea:yvonneScannell,Environmental and Land Use Law(ThomsonroundHall,2006)andGarrettS�mons, Planning and Development Law (2nd ed, Thomson Round Hall, 2007). In add�t�on,thevolumesoftheIrish Planning and Environmental Law Journalconta�nmanyart�clesprov�d�ngdeta�ledanalys�soflegaldevelopments.reference�smadebelow to a number of specific articles.

2011] Elusive Quarries: A Failure of Regulation 181

aproposalforreformwh�ch,�t�scontended,couldprov�deafars�mplersystemof regulation that would benefit both the environment and, through its certainty, quarryoperatorsthemselves.

II. the dIffIcultIes In regulatIng QuarrIes

ii.a Pre-existing quarries

Section 24 of the Local Government (Planning and Development) Act 1963 �mposedanobl�gat�on,enforceablebycr�m�nalsanct�on, toobta�nplann�ngperm�ss�on �n respect of any development of land, be�ng ne�ther exempteddevelopmentnor development commenced before the appointed day.Sect�on3oftheactprov�dedthatdevelopmentmeant“thecarry�ngoutofanyworkson,�n,orunderlandorthemak�ngofanymater�alchange�ntheuseofanystructures or other land.” Section 2 of the Act defined “works” to include “any act oroperat�onofconstruct�on,excavat�on,demol�t�on,extens�on,alterat�on,repa�rorrenewal.”Therewasnoobl�gat�ontoobta�nplann�ngperm�ss�on�nrespectofdevelopmentthatcommencedbeforethe“appo�ntedday.”Theappo�nteddaywas 1 October 1964.3Th�s“appo�ntedday”except�onwasnecessarytoensurethe constitutionality of section 24. It would have contravened Article 15.5 to renderapersonl�abletocr�m�nalsanct�onfornothav�ngobta�nedplann�ngperm�ss�onfordevelopmentthatcommenced�nthepast.even�ftherewerenocr�m�nalsanct�on,however,�tm�ghtalsohavecontravenedthepropertyr�ghtsprotected by Article 40.3.2° and 43 of the Constitution to require a person to obta�n plann�ng perm�ss�on �n order to complete works that had alreadycommenced, at least �f no compensat�on were prov�ded.Th�s const�tut�onalargument is explored in greater detail in section III.A.

For present purposes, it suffices to note that something like this concern underpinned section 24 of the 1963 Act as well as subsequent judicial �nterpretat�on of that prov�s�on.4 It ensured that there was no obligation to obta�nplann�ngperm�ss�on�nrespectofmater�alchangesofuseorworksthat“commenced” prior to 1 October 1964. The non-application of the Act to works and material changes of use commenced before 1 October 1964 is largely of historic interest. Most developments commenced before 1 October 1964 were completed shortly after 1 October 1964. However, quarries are a special case. Quarr�escanonlybedevelopment�ftheyaree�theramater�alchangeofuseorthecarry�ngoutofworks.However,g�venthenatureofquarr�es,�t�sposs�ble

3. SI 211/1964 Local Government (Planning and Development) Act, 1963 (Appointed Day) Order 1964.

4. The exclusion provided by section 24 of the 1963 Act has been taken to be reproduced in the Planning and Development Act 2000, through its definition of “unauthorised development.”SeeRoadstone Holdings Ltd v An Bord Pleanála [2008] IEHC 210.

182 Dublin University Law Journal [Vol 34

that works commenced before 1 October 1964 could still be carried out many yearslaterandthereforecouldst�llbe�mmunefromanyobl�gat�ontoobta�nplann�ngperm�ss�on.

TheSupremeCourtaddressedth�squest�on�nWaterford County Council v John A Wood Ltd.5 On 1 October 1964, the respondent’s predecessor in title was engaged�nthequarry�ngofl�mestoneoncerta�nlandsownedbyaMrlooby.Therespondent later tookover theseoperat�ons �n1969andextended theminto adjoining lands leased from Mr Looby. In 1986, the respondent purchased more lands from a Mr Doyle and commenced quarrying there in 1995. Prior toth�spo�nt,theDoylelandshadbeenusedforpurelyagr�culturalpurposes.TheDoyleandloobylandswereadjacent,althoughseparatedbyabo�thrín.Theappl�cantcommencedenforcementproceed�ngsbutwasrefusedrel�ef�ntheC�rcu�tCourt.Theappl�cantthenappealedtotheH�ghCourtwh�chstatedacasefortheSupremeCourt:

Whetherthequarry�ngoperat�onsbe�ngcarr�edoutbytherespondentontheDoylelands�sdevelopmentrequ�r�ngplann�ngperm�ss�on?

Murphy J, with whom the other members of the Court agreed, first rejected twoextremev�ewsputforwardbytheappl�cantandrespondent.Herejectedtheargument,basedonthedictum oflordDenn�ngMr�nThomas David Ltd v Penybont RDC,thateveryshovelfulwasam�n�ngoperat�onconst�tut�ngamater�alchangeofusewh�chrequ�redplann�ngperm�ss�on.6Suchanapproachwouldsetatnought thestatutoryallowance tocompleteworkscommencedbefore the appointed day. On the other hand, he reasoned that section 24 did notestabl�shageneralr�ghttocont�nuequarry�ng,suchastoallowaquarryoperatorextractaseamofrocktocomplet�on.

Thesect�onmerelyperm�tsthecont�nuat�ontocomplet�onofthepart�cularworks commenced before the appointed day at an identified location. In myv�ewtheanswertothequest�onposedbythelearnedjudgeoftheH�ghCourtrequ�restheexam�nat�onofalloftheestabl�shedfactstoascerta�nwhatwasorm�ghtreasonablyhavebeenant�c�patedattherelevantdateas having been involved in the works then taking place. It is clear that in somecasespart�cularfactorsmaybeofdec�s�ve�mportancewhereas�nothersthosefactorsmaybeofl�ttleornoconsequence.�

MurphyJthencons�deredmanyfactors�nclud�ngtheextentofthel�mestoneseam,theextentoftheor�g�nallandhold�ngandthepresenceofthebo�thrín.In the context of that case, he considered the original landholding of the

5. [1999] 1 IR 556.6. [1972] 1 WLR 1526, at 1531.7. [1999] 1 IR 556, at 562.


Respondent’s predecessor in title to be the most relevant factor, concluding that“theproper�nference�sthatthequarry�ngworksontheDoylelandsweread�st�nctoperat�onorattheveryleastad�fferentphasefromtheworkswh�chwerebe�ngcarr�edonwhentheactof1963came�ntooperat�on.”Theworkswerenotthecont�nuat�onoftheor�g�nalquarry�ngoperat�onsandtherefored�dnotfallw�th�ntheexclus�onorexempt�ngprov�s�ons.MurphyJalsocommentedobiterthat�nh�sv�ewplann�ngperm�ss�onwouldhavebeenrequ�redfortheworksontheextendedloobylandsaswell.

Theactualconclus�onoftheSupremeCourtwasqu�terestr�ct�ve,hold�ngthat�tcouldnothavebeenthereasonableant�c�pat�onofMrloobythatthequarry�ngwouldexpand�ntoaseparateparcelofh�slandsst�llless�ntolandsthat he did not own in 1964. However, the approach of the Court rendered the question of whether quarrying works require planning permission a difficult factual question much dependent on context and inferences. In the context of enforcementproceed�ngs,wheretheonusl�esontheappl�cant(orprosecutor)toestabl�shthatdevelopmenthasoccurredaftertheappo�ntedday,�tmayoftenbe difficult to establish what was reasonably anticipated by the parties nearly 50 years ago.

as�sapparentfromtheaboveanalys�s,the�nteract�onbetweentheexclus�onfor works commenced before 1964 and the existence of a material change of use is complex. In Roadstone Provinces Ltdv An Bord Pleanála,F�nlayGeogheganJ quashed a declaration of the Board to the effect that there had been a material changeofuse�ntheoperat�onofaquarry.8 In that case, the quarry’s operations had extended considerably but the Board had made no finding that there had beenachangeofuse.accord�ngly,therewasnobas�sforassess�ngwhethertheadditional operations were material. Before there can be a “material” change ofuse,theremustbea“changeofuse.”Th�squest�onmustbedec�dedw�thoutregard to any quest�on of plann�ng mater�al�ty.Th�s �s cons�stent w�th theapproachoftheSupremeCourt�nWaterford County Council v John A Wood Ltd, cons�dered above. Mere extens�on of a quarry �nto ne�ghbour�ng landcannotconst�tuteamater�alchangeofuse(eventhoughtheuseofthelandschange)asthatcoulddepr�veanoperatorofther�ghttocompleteworksthathadcommenced prior to the appointed day. In such cases, the question is whether theworksnowbe�ngundertakenwerereasonablyant�c�patedbytheoperatoron 1 October 1964. If not, development has occurred post 1964 and planning permission is required. If so, development has not occurred post 1964 and no plann�ngperm�ss�on�srequ�red,subjecttotheconceptsofabandonmentofuseand intensification of use, considered immediately below.

8. [2008] IEHC 210.


ii.B abandonment of use

The courts have developed the doctr�ne of abandonment of use to addresss�tuat�ons�nwh�chadevelopmentceasesandthenrecommences.9 In Westmeath County Council v Quirke & Sons, Budd J included the physical condition of thelandasoneofthefactorstobetaken�ntoaccount�ndeterm�n�ngwhethertherehadbeenanabandonmentofuse.10 In deciding whether there had been abandonmentoftheuseoflandsforextract�onandl�mestoneproduct�on,heposedtheapparentlyobject�vetestofwhetherareasonablemanlook�ngattheconvertedcattleshedorfarmsuppl�esstore�nthed�sused-look�ngquarrywouldhaveconcludedthattheusehadbeenabandoned.

Th�sabandonmenttestmustbetakentooverlaythereasonableant�c�pat�ontestofJohn A Wood Ltd.apersoncouldnotbesa�dtobecomplet�ngworksthat were reasonably anticipated in 1964 if the use had been abandoned in the interim. As such, the abandonment test is a significant judicial intervention des�gnedtobr�ngquarr�es(andotherdevelopments)backw�th�ntheschemeofplann�ngcontrol,therebyreduc�ngthescopeofexclus�oneffect�velyprov�dedbysection 24 of the 1963 Act. However, as with the basic interpretation of section 24 offered in John A Wood Ltd,th�saga�nturnsontheobject�veassessmentof�ntent�onsheldbypeopleposs�blymanyyearsprev�ously.accord�ngly,boththeexclusion provided by section 24 and the effective limitation of that exclusion provided by the abandonment test raise difficult factual questions that have little to do with planning. This makes the tests difficult to apply, reducing legal certa�ntyand�ncreas�ngtransact�oncosts.

II.C Intensification of use

An intensification of the use of land for a particular purpose can amount to a material change of use. The concept of intensification of use was outlined by Keane J in Butler v Dublin Corporation �nthefollow�ngterms:

Although the expression ‘intensification of use’ is not to be found in our plann�ng code or �ts engl�sh equ�valent, the leg�slatures �n bothjur�sd�ct�onsmusthaveenv�sagedthatapart�cularusecouldbesoaltered�ncharacterbythevolumeofact�v�t�esoroperat�onsbe�ngcarr�edonthattheor�g�nalusemustberegardedashav�ngbeenmater�allychanged.Oneman digging up stones in a field and carrying them away in a wheelbarrow for a few hours each week may be succeeded by fleets of bulldozers, J.C.B.s and lorries extracting and carrying away huge volumes of rock fromthesames�te.11

9. SeeDublin County Council v Tallaght Block Company Ltd [1982] ILRM 535.10. 23May1996(HC).11. [1999] 1 IR 565.


The kernel of intensification is that more of the same use can be taken to amount to a change of use, and such a change of use can be material. In Galway County Council v Lackagh Rock Limited, Barron J emphasised that an increased or intensified use per se doesnotamounttoamater�alchangeofuse;�tmustalsobeestablished that the intensification gave rise to fresh planning considerations:

The importance of this principle lies not so much in the intensification of useof�tself,but�nthefactthatsuchusemay�mposeburdensonthelocalauthor�tyorotherw�se�nfr�nge�namater�allyd�fferentmannerupontheproperplann�ngforthearea.12

Barron J held that there had been no material change of use as, despite an intensification of use, there was no evidence that there were no different matters thattheplann�ngauthor�tywouldtake�ntoaccount�ncons�der�nganappl�cat�onforplann�ngperm�ss�on:

Thequest�ontobeanswered�swhetherornottheactualuse�samater�allydifferent use from that on the appointed day. In neither case has an appl�cat�onbeensubm�ttedforaperm�ss�on.Totestwhetherornottheusesaremater�allyd�fferent,�tseemstome,thatwhatshouldbelookedatarethematterswh�chtheplann�ngauthor�tywouldtake�ntoaccount�ntheeventofaplann�ngappl�cat�onbe�ngmadee�therfortheuseonthe appointed day or for the present use. If these matters are materially d�fferent,thenthenatureoftheusemustequallybemater�allyd�fferent.S�ncenoev�dencehasbeenadducedto�nd�catethattheappl�cantwouldhave taken any d�fferent matters �nto cons�derat�on �n determ�n�ng anappl�cat�onforplann�ngperm�ss�onmadenowratherthanontheappo�ntedday, I accept the respondent’s contention that there has been no material changeofuse.13

However,�nMonaghan County Council v Brogan, Keane J distinguished this approach:

Whetherornot �t �s somater�almustbedeterm�nedby thecourtasamatterof fact and theabsenceof anyev�denceas to thev�ewsof theplanning authority on the matter is not crucial. It would be strange if it wereotherw�se,s�nceapersonotherthantheplann�ngauthor�tycanset�nmot�onthemach�neryunders.2�andthere�snoth�ng�ntheword�ngof the section to suggest that his right to do so may be stultified simply becausetheplann�ngauthor�tyhavetakenav�ew,wh�chmayormaynot

12. [1985] IR 120, at 127.13. [1985] IR 120, at 127-8.


be in law correct, that no material change in use is involved. I do not think it is necessarily the case that Barron J. was indicating a different view of the law in the passage on which Mr. Bradley relied so strongly, but if he were doing so, I would with respect differ from him.…

In summary, it may well be that at the time the matter comes before the courtunders.2�theremayappeartobenoreasonsofaplann�ngnaturewh�chwouldleadtoanadversedec�s�on�ntheeventoftherespondentsapplying for permission. But that does not absolve the respondents from thenecess�tyofobta�n�ngplann�ngperm�ss�on�ftherehasbeen�ntruthamater�alchange�ntheuseoftheland.14

Morerecently,�nMichael Cronin (Readymix) Ltd v An Bord PleanálaryanJ took an approach that seems stricter than that of Keane J in quashing a declaration by an Bord Pleanála, pursuant to section 5 of the 2000 Act, to the effect that development had occurred by way of intensification amounting to material change of use. In assessing whether a change of use was material, Ryan J concluded that the Board (and its inspector) had taken into account irrelevant cons�derat�ons:

Theproblem�sthatthe�nspectorthenwentontotake�ntoaccountmattersthat�nmyv�ewwere�rrelevanttothe�ssueorthatwerespeculat�veorconfus�ngand thecomb�nat�onof these �nappropr�ateconclus�onsandobservat�onsw�ththeearl�er,leg�t�mateonescontam�natedtheprocessand rendered it invalid. Let me be more specific. The visual impact of thedevelopmentwhenv�ewedfromsurround�nglands�sofquest�onablerelevance�nth�scasetothe�ssueofmater�alchangeofuse;thefactthatnaturalregenerat�onofthes�tecouldhaveoccurred�ftheareawasnotsurfaced�swholly�rrelevant–�tmayberelevanttootheraspectsoftheplanning process but I simply cannot see how that matter can affect a dec�s�onastowhethertherehasbeenamater�alchangeofuse.Thenextsentence in the inspector’s reasoning deals with changes in surface water flows with “possible” resulting impacts on geology and hydrogeology. Thehardsurface“wouldalsom�l�tateaga�nstthedevelopmentofahab�tatwh�ch would potent�ally be of ecolog�cal �mportance”.Th�s �ncludesnomorethanposs�ble�mpactsandchangesthatm�ghtpotent�allybeofecolog�cal �mportance.Th�s �snot the languageor the th�nk�ng that �sexpectedofanexpertmak�nganassessmentforthepurposeofreport�ngto a statutory body such as the respondent. The inspector’s conclusion couldhavestoodon�tsownbutwasfatallyunderm�nedanddevaluedbythe�nclus�onofthese�rrelevantmatters,someofthemonlyonabas�sof

14. [1987] IR 333, at 338-9.

2011] Elusive Quarries: A Failure of Regulation 18�

possible or potential impacts. The inspector’s conclusion on this question astomater�alchangeofusemustalsobe�nval�dated.15

In summary, therefore, although it is settled law that intensification of use must bemater�al �norder toconst�tutedevelopment,andthatmater�al�tymustbeassessedbyreferencetoproperplann�ngandsusta�nabledevelopment,�trema�nsunclear quite what the threshold of materiality is. Keane J’s approach in Broganmayhavesuggestedaperm�ss�vestandard,allow�ngtheplann�ng�mpl�cat�onsto be ventilated in the context of an application for planning permission. In contrast, Ryan J’s approach in Michael Cronin (Readymix) Ltdsuggeststhatah�ghlevelofcerta�ntyaboutl�kelyplann�ng�mpl�cat�ons�snecessarybeforetheycanbecons�deredmater�al.

As with the concept of abandonment, the concept of intensification of use effectively reduces the scope of the exclusion provided by section 24 of the 1963 Act. The completion of quarry works reasonably anticipated in 1964 may requ�replann�ngperm�ss�onwherethemethodofquarry�ngchangessuchthatthere is an intensification of use amounting to a material change of use. The mater�alchangeofuseheredoesnotder�vefromachange�ntheuseofthelandthat has become the quarry (as that would deprive the pre-1964 exclusion of all mean�ng),butratherfromthefactthattheent�requarry�ngoperat�ononalltheland�samater�alchangefromwhathadbeenoccurr�ngprev�ously.However,thescopeofth�sl�m�tat�onontheexclus�onrema�nsunclearg�vend�fferencesin judicial emphasis on how certain and significant the implications of a change mustbe�norderforthechangetocountasmater�al.Th�saga�nreduceslegalcerta�ntyand�ncreasestransact�oncosts.

II.D The EU dimension: Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)

Article 2 of Council Directive 85/337/EEC as amended (the EIA Directive) requ�resMemberStatestoadoptallmeasuresnecessarytoensurethat,beforeconsent is given, projects likely to have significant effects on the environment byv�rtue inter alia, of their nature, size or location are made subject to an assessmentw�th regard to the�r effects.16Th�sdoesnot, on �ts face, �mposean obl�gat�on to subject projects to consent procedures but rather to ensurethat where projects are subject to consent procedures, an EIA is undertaken.1�Article 4 of the Directive establishes two types of project: those that are subject

15. [2009] IEHC 533, at [37].16. This Directive is amended by Council Directive 97/11/EC, Directive 2003/35/EC, and

Directive 2009/31/EC.1�. Although see the judgment of the ECJ in Case C-66/06 Commission v Ireland,hold�ng

that Ireland had failed properly to transpose the terms of the Directive by exempting certa�ncategor�esofdevelopmentfromtheobl�gat�ontoobta�nplann�ngperm�ss�on,even though they might have significant effects on the environment.


to mandatory EIA (Annex I) and those that Member States decide to subject to EIA based on their nature, size and location (Annex II). In respect of Annex II projects, Member States may determine thresholds or criteria for EIA generically or on a case-by-case basis. However, in Case C-392/1996 Commission v Ireland,theCourtofJust�ceheldthat�twas�tnotopentoMemberStatestoestabl�shthresholds solely by reference to the size of the development – their nature and locat�onarealsorelevant.

Quarries where the surface area of the site exceeds 25 hectares are subject to mandatory EIA, pursuant to Annex I to the Directive. Quarries are also covered by Annex II. Accordingly, development consents for quarries must include EIA where the quarry is likely to have a significant effect on the environment by virtue of its size, nature or location. Ireland responded to Case C-392/1996 by establishing thresholds for all Annex II projects above which EIA would be mandatory but also by requ�r�ng plann�ng author�t�es to undertake case-by-casescreen�ngdec�s�onsastowhetherpart�cularprojectswouldbel�kelyto have significant effects on the environment by reason of their nature, size orlocat�on.18 Schedule 5 of the Planning and Development Regulations 2001 requires EIA in respect of applications for permission for the extraction of stone,gravel,sandorclay,wheretheareaofextract�onwouldbegreaterthanfive hectares. However, in respect of sub-threshold applications, regulation 103 requires planning authorities (and the Board on appeal) to require an EIA if they consider that the quarry would be likely to have a significant impact on the environment. Regulation 103(2) requires that this issue must be specifically cons�dered�nrespectofquarr�eslocatedonor�ncerta�ns�tesprotectedunderEuropean and/or national law. Schedule 7 of the Regulations lists a wide range ofcr�ter�a,byreferencetothecharacter�st�csoftheproposeddevelopment,thelocat�onof thedevelopmentandthecharacter�st�csof thepotent�al �mpacts,which must be considered by the planning authority and the Board in deciding whether an EIA is required. The significance of this is that while all quarries the size of which is greater than five hectares require an EIA, prior to any plann�ngperm�ss�onbe�nggranted,there�sastand�ngposs�b�l�tythatanyquarry– irrespective of its size – could require an EIA before it can be granted planning permission. This is not to say that all such quarries will require an EIA – there aregu�del�nesthathelpdeterm�newhetheraquarryshouldbecons�deredaslikely to have significant effects on the environment. Rather, it is simply that, in respect of every quarry, one must question whether it does require an EIA. This turns on potentially difficult factual evaluations, thus adding a further level oflegaluncerta�nty.

18. Planning and Development Act 2000, section 176 (as amended) and SI 600/2001 Plann�ngandDevelopmentregulat�ons2001,regulat�on103.


II.E Legislative intervention: section 261 of the Planning and Development Act 2000

Sect�on261ofthe2000actestabl�shedanewreg�meforthecontrolofquarr�esthatwerealready�nex�stencewhenthePlann�ngandDevelopmentact2000came�ntoeffect.Thesect�onappl�edtotwocategor�esofquarr�es:(a)thosewh�chrece�vedaplann�ngperm�ss�onunderthelocalGovernment(Plann�ngand Development) Acts more than 5 years before the coming into operation of section 261 (28 April 2004); and (b) those which did not receive such planning perm�ss�onbutwh�chwere �noperat�ononor after sect�on261comes �ntoforce. This latter category included both pre-1964 quarries which may not have requ�redplann�ngperm�ss�onandquarr�es�llegallyoperat�ngw�thoutplann�ngpermission. By 27 April 2005, the owner or operator of any of these quarries wasunderanobl�gat�ontoprov�decerta�n�nformat�onrelat�ngtotheoperat�onofthequarrytotheplann�ngauthor�ty.Theplann�ngauthor�tywasthenunderanobl�gat�ontoenterthequarryontheplann�ngreg�sterundersect�on�oftheactw�th�ncerta�nt�mel�m�ts.The�nformat�ontobeprov�dedbytheoperatorincluded information on the hours of operation, the level of traffic generated, the levelofdustandno�segenerated,etc.asthesearethetouchstonesofmater�al�tyfor the intensification of use doctrine, it was thought that the information submitted in 2005 would provide a useful benchmark against which to assess the materiality of an intensification of use in the future. However, as 2005 markedthehe�ghtoftheconstruct�onboom(andthereforethebus�estt�meforthe use of quarries), it is unlikely that the 2005 figures will be exceeded for a number of decades. Its use as a benchmark for the materiality of intensification �sthereforesomewhatd�m�n�shed.

Where a pre-1964 quarry has an “extracted area” of greater than five hectares or�ss�tuatedonas�tewh�chhasaspec�alenv�ronmentalorw�ldl�fedes�gnat�on,and its continued operation will be likely to have significant effects on the env�ronment,sect�on261(�)�mposesontheplann�ngauthor�tyanobl�gat�ontorequ�retheowneroroperatortomakeanappl�cat�onforplann�ngperm�ss�onandsubm�tanenv�ronmental�mpactstatement.Th�sprov�s�onfurtherreducesthe scope of the exclusion originally provided by section 24 of the 1963 Act by subjecting pre-1964 quarries which ought to be subject to EIA to the requirement to obtain planning permission. The criteria here broadly reflect the criteria for when a planning application for a quarry must be accompanied by an EIA.

Section 261(6) authorises a planning authority, following public notification of the registration and following a consultation process with the owner/operator ofthequarry,to�mpose,restateormod�fycond�t�onsontheoperat�onofthequarry. Section 261(9) allows an owner or operator to appeal to An Bord Pleanála the planning authority’s decision to impose, restate, add to or modify cond�t�ons.

In M&F Quirke and Sons Ltd v An Bord Pleanála,theH�ghCourtcons�dered


the jurisdiction of planning authorities and An Bord Pleanála to impose cond�t�onspursuanttosect�on261(6)�nthreetestcases,wh�ch�ncluded(a)acond�t�onrestr�ct�ngblast�ng,(b)acond�t�onrestr�ct�ngdepth,(c)acond�t�onrestr�ct�ngsurfaceextent,(d)acond�t�onrestr�ct�ngthenumberofyearsforwh�chthequarrycouldoperate.19 In respect of (b), (c) and (d), the quarry could not operate beyond a certain depth, area or time without first applying for a grant ofplann�ngperm�ss�on.Unlessthequarryenteredma�nstreamplann�ngcontrol�nth�sway,thecond�t�onsenv�sagedthatquarry�ngwouldceaseatapart�cularpo�nt�nt�me.Theappl�cantsallegedthatth�swentbeyondthescopeofsect�on261(6)as�td�dnotrelatetoacond�t�onon the operation of the quarry. O’Neill J rejectedth�sargumenthold�ngthatthepower�nsect�on261(6)�ncludedapowerto�mposecond�t�onssuchasthese.Thesamerangeofplann�ngcond�t�onsthatwere open to a planning authority in a planning application under section 24 was opentoaplann�ngauthor�tyundersect�on261.Themerefactthatanoperatorm�ghthavetomakeanappl�cat�onforplann�ngperm�ss�on�nc�rcumstances�nwh�ch�twouldnotprev�ouslyhavehadtodosod�dnotaffectthelegal�tyofthecond�t�ons.

The owner of a quarry that commenced operation post-1964, which was unequ�vocallysubjecttotherequ�rementtoobta�nplann�ngperm�ss�onbuthadnotdoneso,wasunderanobl�gat�ontoreg�sterherquarryundersect�on261.However,theplann�ngauthor�tyd�dnothaveanypowerto�mposecond�t�onson such a quarry under sect�on 261(6), or �ndeed to requ�re �t to subm�t aplann�ngappl�cat�onpursuanttosect�on261(�).20Thepowers�nsect�on261(6)to�mposecond�t�onsarel�m�tedtoquarr�eswh�chcommencedoperat�onspr�orto 1 October 1964 and to quarries which received planning permission. Galligan has observed that this posed difficulties for planning authorities:

Duetothesheervolumesofquarr�esbe�ngreg�steredatthesamet�me,manyplann�ngauthor�t�eswouldhavefound�tpract�cally�mposs�bletoascerta�n�neachcasewhetherthequarr�eshadprev�ouslybeenabandonedor had intensified to such an extent beyond the level of use on October 1, 1964 that they had become unauthorised. Instead of initiating enforcement proceed�ngs,�tcanbesurm�sedthat�nmanycasesplann�ngauthor�t�ess�mplydec�dedto�mposecond�t�onsontheoperat�onofsuchquarr�es.21

19. [2009] IEHC 426.20. In some cases, planning authorities have subjected such quarries to the provisions of

sect�ons261(6)or(�).Thequarryoperatorssubsequentlyarguedthatth�samountedtoan�mpl�c�tdeterm�nat�onthatthequarrywasnotunauthor�sed,adeterm�nat�onthatcould not (by reason of section 50 of the Act) be challenged in subsequent proceedings before a planning authority, An Bord Pleanála or the courts. This argument has been rejected�nanumberofcases.See,for�nstance,Pierson v Keegan Quarries Ltd [2009]IEHC 550 and Frank Harrington ltd v An Bord Pleanála23november2010(HC).

21. Eamon Galligan, “The Impact of Section 261 Registration on Existing Use Rights of Pre-1964 Quarries” (2008) 15 IPELJ18,at18.


However,th�sobservat�on�sbasedonan�ncorrectassumpt�onthatcond�t�onscouldnotbe�mposedonunauthor�sedquarr�es.aquarry“wh�chcommencedoperation before 1 October 1964” (the phrase in section 261(6)) is not necessarily lawful. If it exceeded the scope of what was reasonably anticipated on 1 October 1964 or materially intensified its use, then it is unlawful. As a quarry that commenced prior to 1 October 1964, it could be the subject of conditions undersect�on261;asaquarrythathadundergoneunauthor�seddevelopmentsince 1964, it could be the subject of enforcement action, subject to time limits.22accord�ngly,enforcementproceed�ngsm�ghtbeopeneventhoughcond�t�onscouldbe�mposedundersect�on261(6).23

Theproblemshere stem from the fa�lure to recogn�se that aquarry �s ageographical place within which various acts of development can occur. If the �ntent�onoftheleg�slatorwastoexcludeunlawfulquarrydevelopmentfromthescopeofsect�on261–leav�ng�topentonormalenforcementproceed�ngs–then�tappearsthattheleg�slatord�dnotunderstandthepotent�ald�fferencebetween a quarry that commenced operation prior to 1 October 1964 and a quarry that�slawful.as�sapparentfromJohn A Wood Ltdaquarrythatcommencedpre-1964 is not necessarily lawful. Only that portion of the quarry that consists ofdevelopmentcarr�edout�ncomplet�onofworksreasonablyant�c�pated�n1964 is lawful. Those parts of the quarry that consist of development carried outbeyondthatscopeareunlawful.Severaldevelopmentsmayoccurw�th�nonequarryover�tsl�fet�me,someofwh�chm�ghthavecommencedpr�orto1October 1964, others of which might not. The mistake was to use the phrase “a quarry that commenced operation prior to 1 October 1964” where the intention was to capture “a development that commenced prior to 1 October 1964”. As w�llbeseenbelow,thesamem�stake–�fthat�swhat�t�s–hasbeenrepeated�nthePlann�ngandDevelopment(amendment)act2010.

Sect�on261of the2000act thusa�med toprov�defurther regulat�onofquarr�esthatm�ghtnotadequatelyberegulated.However,�twasframed�naway that both reflected a confused understanding of the basic legal concepts andthathasproducedfurtherconfus�on�npract�ce.although�tsucceeded�n

22. On the other hand, a quarry that had been abandoned could not properly be sa�dto have commenced operation prior to 1 October 1964. In that situation, there is a d�chotomy between the ava�lab�l�ty of enforcement proceed�ngs and the power to�mposecond�t�ons.

23. In some cases, quarry operators have subsequently argued that the imposition of cond�t�ons was prem�sed on an assumpt�on that the quarry was not unauthor�sedand therefore amounted to an �mpl�c�t determ�nat�on that thequarrywas lawful, adetermination that could not (by reason of section 50 of the Act) be challenged in subsequent proceedings before a planning authority, An Bord Pleanála or the courts. Th�sargumenthasbeenrejected�nanumberofcases.See,for�nstance,Pierson v Keegan Quarries Ltd [2009] IEHC 550 and Frank Harrington Ltd v An Bord Pleanála23november2010(HC).


acerta�nextent�n�mprov�ngenv�ronmentalcontrols,�thasaddedyetfurthercomplex�tytotheschemeofregulat�onundertheacts.

II.F Retention permission and the EIA Directive

In Case C-215/06 Commission v Ireland,theeuropeanCourtofJust�ceheldthatthefac�l�tyundersect�on32(1)(b)ofthe2000acttoapplyforretent�onperm�ss�on of unauthor�sed development was �n breach of the requ�rementunder the EIA Directive for competent authorities to conduct an EIA in respect ofcerta�ntypesofprojectspr�ortogrant�ngdevelopmentconsent.TheCourtreasonedasfollows:

57 While Community law cannot preclude the applicable national rules from allowing, in certain cases, the regularization of operations or measures wh�chareunlawful�nthel�ghtofCommun�tylaw,suchaposs�b�l�tyshouldbesubjecttothecond�t�onsthat�tdoesnotofferthepersonsconcernedtheopportun�tytoc�rcumventtheCommun�tyrulesortod�spensew�thapply�ngthem,andthat�tshouldrema�ntheexcept�on.

58 A system of regularization, such as that in force in Ireland, may havetheeffectofencourag�ngdeveloperstoforgoascerta�n�ngwhetherintended projects satisfy the criteria of Article 2(1) of Directive 85/337 asamended,andconsequently,nottoundertaketheact�onrequ�redforidentification of the effects of those projects on the environment and for their prior assessment. The first recital of the preamble to Directive 85/337 however states that it is necessary for the competent authority to takeeffectsontheenv�ronment�ntoaccountattheearl�estposs�blestage�nallthetechn�calplann�nganddec�s�on-mak�ngprocesses,theobject�vebe�ngtopreventthecreat�onofpollut�onornu�sancesatsourceratherthan subsequently trying to counteract their effects.…

61 It follows from the foregoing that, by giving to retention permission, wh�chcanbe�ssuedevenwherenoexcept�onalc�rcumstancesareproved,thesameeffectsasthoseattachedtoaplann�ngperm�ss�onpreced�ngthecarry�ngoutofworksanddevelopment,when,pursuanttoart�cles2(1)and 4(1) and (2) of Directive 85/337 as amended, projects for which an environmental impact assessment is required must be identified and then – beforethegrantofdevelopmentconsentand,therefore,necessar�lybeforetheyarecarr�edout–mustbesubjecttoanappl�cat�onfordevelopmentconsent and to such an assessment, Ireland has failed to comply with the requ�rementsofthatd�rect�ve.

As is apparent from the analysis of the Irish case law above, there can be cons�derable confus�on over whether quarr�es must apply for plann�ngperm�ss�on.Th�s depends on contestable �nferences from facts relat�ng to


what was reasonably anticipated on 1 October 1964, whether there was an �ntent�ontoabandonthedevelopment,andwhethertherehasbeenamater�alchange of use by intensification of use. In those circumstances, the facility to applyforretent�onperm�ss�onwasan�mportantfall-backpos�t�onforquarryoperators should they find that the planning authority (or ultimately the courts) took a d�fferent v�ew as to whether the development was lawful. Unlawfuldevelopmentcouldberemed�edbyanappl�cat�onforretent�onperm�ss�onandthe development could then continue much as before. It seems likely that some quarryoperators,atleast,tookadvantageofth�sleg�slat�vereg�metoundertakequarry�ngoperat�onsofdub�ouslegal�tyandlaterapplyforretent�onperm�ss�onif necessary. At a stroke, the judgment of the ECJ in Case C-215/06 removed th�sfac�l�ty.althoughtheeCJnotedtheposs�b�l�tyofexcept�onalc�rcumstances�nsomecases,theeffectof�tsjudgmentwastorendertheretent�onperm�ss�onprov�s�onsoftheact�nappl�cable.ThePlann�ngandDevelopment(amendment)act2010(cons�deredbelow)seekstoaddressth�slacunabyprov�d�ngamorenuanced scheme of retention permission where EIA is at issue. However, these prov�s�onsoftheacthavenotyetbeencommencedandthelacunarema�ns.Pend�ngcommencementof theact,appl�cat�onsfor retent�onperm�ss�on �nrespect of EIA development can no longer be considered. Unlawful development rema�nsunlawful.

II.G Legislative intervention: the Planning and Development (Amendment) Act 2010

ThePlann�ngandDevelopment(amendment)act2010�ntroducesanumberof changes to bring Irish law into line with the judgment of the ECJ in Case C-215/06 Commission v Ireland.Sect�on23(c)ofthe2010actamendssect�on34(12) of the 2000 Act, obliging planning authorities to refuse to consider appl�cat�ons for retent�on perm�ss�on where the development would haverequired either an EIA, a determination as to whether an EIA was required, or anappropr�ateassessmentpursuanttotheHab�tatsD�rect�ve.24

Sections 47 and 48 of the 2010 Act amend sections 157 and 160 of the 2000acttoprov�dethatdevelopmentcons�st�ngoftheoperat�onofaquarryortheextract�onofpeatcarr�edoutnotmorethansevenyearspr�ortothedateonwh�chthesect�oncomes�ntooperat�onmaybethesubjectofenforcementproceed�ngsatanyt�me.Th�sappears�ntendedtoensurethatquarr�esthatalready

24. Council Directive 92/43/EEC. Article 6(3) of this Directive requires an appropriate assessment of plans or projects likely to have a significant effect on certain nature conservat�on s�tes protected under the D�rect�ve.The O�reachtas clearly took the(correct) view that the rationale of the ECJ’s judgment in Case C-215/06 applies in this contextalso.However,asart�cle6(3)alsorequ�resascreen�ngofprojectstodeterm�newhetheranappropr�ateassessment�snecessary,�t�sunclearwhyth�sposs�b�l�tywasnotcoveredbysect�on261aalso.


have the benefit of the seven year immunity from enforcement do not lose that �mmun�ty.However,�nrespectofallotherquarr�es,not�mel�m�tw�llapplytosuch enforcement. It is significant that the section recognises “operation of the quarry”asthedevelopmenttowh�chthet�mel�m�tdoesnotapply.Th�ssuggests,although�t �snotent�relyclear, that t�merunsnot fromthecommencementoftheworksbutfromanyt�meatwh�chtheworksoccurred.Th�s�sd�fferentfrom the standard approach under sections 157 and 160 where, when the developmenthasnoplann�ngperm�ss�on,t�merunsfromthecommencementof the development. If this interpretation is correct, it rather reduces the value ofthe�mmun�tyapparently�ntendedforquarr�esoperat�ngsevenyearspr�ortothedateonwh�chthesect�oncame�ntooperat�on.assuchquarr�escouldwellbe�noperat�onlessthansevenyearsbeforethesect�oncomes�ntooperat�on,eventhoughtheymayhavecommencedoperat�ondecadesago,thentheyarel�abletoenforcementunderthenewsect�onseventhoughtheywouldhavebeen�mmunefromenforcementundertheoldsect�ons.

Section 74 of the 2010 Act makes a number of amendments to the section 261controlsystem.Theseprov�de that �tw�llbeunauthor�seddevelopment(a)tooperateaquarry�nbreachofcond�t�ons�mposedundersect�on261(6),(b)tocont�nuetooperateaquarryw�thoutapply�ngforplann�ngperm�ss�on�frequ�redtodosoundersect�on261(�),(c)tocont�nuetooperateaquarry�frefusedplann�ngperm�ss�onpursuanttoasect�on261(�)appl�cat�on,and(d)tooperateaquarry�nbreachofcond�t�onsattachedtoaperm�ss�ongrantedafter a section 261(7) application. Oddly, section 74(e) deleted the definition of “quarry”fromsect�on261(13).Th�sappearstohavebeenam�stakeandw�llneed to be rectified before the provisions of the Act relating to quarries can be commenced.

Section 75 of the 2010 Act introduces a new section 261A into the 2000 Act. Underth�ssect�on,aplann�ngauthor�tymustundertakearev�ewofallquarr�esin its administrative area and decide in respect of each quarry whether an EIA, a determination as to whether an EIA was required, or an appropriate assessment pursuanttotheHab�tatsD�rect�veshouldhavebeenundertakenbutwasnot.There are procedures for public participation in respect of this decision. In respect ofeachquarry,sect�on261a(2)requ�restheplann�ngauthor�tytodec�de(a)whetherdevelopmentwascarr�edoutafter1February1990wh�chwouldhaverequired (but did not have) an EIA or a determination as to whether an EIA was requ�redand(b)whetherdevelopmentwascarr�edoutafter26February199�wh�chwouldhaverequ�red(butd�dnothave)anappropr�ateassessmentundertheHab�tatsD�rect�ve.25 In respect of all such quarries, the planning authority mustthendec�de�ntowh�choftwocategor�esthedevelopmentfalls.Quarr�es

25. These are the dates on which the EIA Directive and the Habitats Directive respectively were transposed into Irish law. It is arguable, however, that section 261A should have fixed on the date on which transposition should have occurred. In respect of each D�rect�ve,th�swasafewyearsbeforetranspos�t�onactuallyoccurred.


that commenced prior to 1 October 1964 or that received planning permission andthatcompl�edw�ththereg�strat�onrequ�rementsundersect�on261areperm�ttedto apply to An Bord Pleanála for substitute consent.26 Conversely plann�ngauthorities must issue an enforcement notice under section 154 requiring the cessation of any quarry that commenced operation on or after 1 October 1964 orthatd�dnotcomplyw�ththereg�strat�onrequ�rementsundersect�on261ofthe2000act.2�Th�sappears�ntendedtocapturead�st�nct�onbetweenlawfulandunlawfulquarr�es.Ofcourse,asnotedabove,�tfollowsfromWaterford County Council v John A Wood Ltdthataquarrythatcommencedoperat�onbefore 1 October 1964 may be unauthorised if it has gone beyond what was reasonably anticipated on that date. It is also possible that a quarry commenced before 1 October 1964 may have unlawfully intensified its use without seeking plann�ngperm�ss�on.Whytheseclassesofunlawfuloperatorsshouldga�nthebenefit of an automatic right to seek substituted consent while other unlawful operatorsarecondemnedtoanenforcementnot�ce�sunclear.

These provisions are both superseded by section 261A(5), which provides that where development took place after 3 July 2008 (the date of the eCJdec�s�on),thequarryw�llbesubjecttoanenforcementnot�cedesp�tethefactthat it commenced operation before 1 October 1964 or with the benefit of a plann�ngperm�ss�on.Th�sensuresthatthes�tuat�oncannotar�se�nfuturewhereoperators avoid the need for an EIA prior to the authorisation of the development. anyoperatorwhocommencedquarry�ngaftertheeCJjudgmentw�llneverbeabletogetasubst�tuteconsent.Sect�on261a(6)allowsquarryoperatorsandpeople who participated in the public consultation process to apply to An Bord Pleanála for a review of any of the planning authority’s determinations about thenature,dateorlawfulnessofthedevelopment.

Thesubst�tuteconsentprocedure�sprov�dedbyPartXaofthe2000act,asinserted by section 57 of the 2000 Act.28anappl�cat�onforsubst�tuteconsentmust be accompanied by a remedial EIS and/or a remedial Natura 2000 impact statement,asappropr�ate.There�sprov�s�onforpubl�cpart�c�pat�onandtheplann�ngauthor�tymustprov�dea reporton thedevelopment.Sect�on1��Jempowers the Board, when considering the application, to issue a draft direction totheappl�cantd�rect�nghertoceasetheoperat�onofthequarry.Theappl�canthas an entitlement to make submissions or observations, after which the Board may confirm, vary or withdraw the draft direction. Section 177K empowers the Board to grant substitute consent for the development, with or without conditions, or to refuse substitute consent. Section 177K does not set a test which mustbemetbeforesubst�tuteconsentcanbegranted,but�nsteadl�stsanumberof matters to which the Board must have regard in deciding whether to grant

26. Sect�on261a(3).2�. Section 261A(4).28. Foracomprehens�veanalys�softh�sprocedure,seen�allHandy,“Subst�tuteConsent:

the New Form of Retention Permission for EIA Development” (2011) 18 IPELJ 15.


subst�tuteconsent,pr�nc�pallytheproperplann�ngandsusta�nabledevelopmentof the area and the significant effects on the environment or “European sites” thathaveoccurredorthatcouldoccurasaresultofthedevelopmenthav�ngbeen carried out. Unusually, section 177L grants the Board an enforcement funct�on,allow�ng�tto�ssued�rect�onstoceaseact�v�t�esorundertakeremed�almeasures.

If a quarry is not directed to apply for substitute consent, but is instead the subject of an enforcement not�ce, the operator has three opt�ons. F�rst,thequarrycanceaseoperat�onspermanently.Second,thequarrycancomplyw�ththeenforcementnot�ceandthenapplyforord�nary,prospect�veplann�ngperm�ss�on.29 Third, the quarry can apply to the Board for leave to seek substitute consent.Th�s�sastandardprocedurethatdevelopments(otherthanquarr�es)that should have undertaken EIA, but did not, must go through if they are to regularise their status. Under section 177D, the Board may grant leave for an appl�cat�onforsubst�tuteconsentwherethereareexcept�onalc�rcumstances.Theseturnlargelyonthebona fidesoftheappl�cant,whetherthedevelopmentprejudiced the objectives of the EIA Directive or the Habitats Directive and whetherregular�sat�onofthedevelopmentwouldnowprejud�cetheobject�vesof the EIA Directive or the Habitats Directive.

The decision of the ECJ in Case C-215/06 raised a number of difficult issues. It cast a whole range of development into a state of illegality which could not, on theex�st�nglaw,beremed�ed.TheCourtmadesomeallowanceforth�sproblem,not�ngthatCommun�tylawcouldnotprecludenat�onallawfromallow�ng,�ncerta�ncases,theregular�sat�onofoperat�onsormeasureswh�chwereunlawful�n the l�ghtofCommun�ty law.However, theCourtemphas�sed that suchaposs�b�l�tyshouldbesubjecttothecond�t�onsthat�td�dnotofferthepersonsconcernedtheopportun�tytoc�rcumventtheCommun�tyrulesortod�spensew�thapply�ngthem,andthat�tshouldrema�ntheexcept�on.30Sect�on261aandtheconnectedsubst�tuteconsentprocedure�nPartXaareanattemptonthepartof Ireland to provide such an exceptional system. Nevertheless, there are several groundsforconcernaboutwhetherth�sattempthasbeensuccessful.

F�rst,�t�sunclearwhyquarr�esshouldbetreatedd�fferentlyfromallotherclassesofdevelopment.Certa�nclassesofquarryaregener�callyallowedtoapply for substituted consent without showing exceptional circumstances. It �squest�onablewhether th�s �scons�stentw�th thev�ewof theeCJthatanyregularisation process should remain an exception. Section 261A(5) does �mportantlyensurethatth�sprocesscannotbeused�nthefuture.However,�t�sunclear why operators of unlawful quarries (whether by reason of intensification or expansion beyond what was reasonably anticipated in 1964) should be allowed

29. However, if the application site included the existing quarry this might be classified as,�nsubstance,aretent�onperm�ss�onthatcouldnotbecons�dered.

30. Case C-215/05 Commission v Ireland, at [57].


to avail themselves automatically of substitute consent. It could be argued that unclear lawswere the reasonwhysomequarryoperators found themselvesin legal difficulties and that allowance should be made for this. However, to makeagener�callowanceforallquarryoperators,�ncontrad�st�nct�ontootherdevelopers, on this basis does not seems consistent with the tenor of the ECJ’s judgment in Case C-215/06. It cannot be assumed that unclear laws were the problem in all instances. Second, the way in which section 261A fixes on the dates on which the EIA Directive and Habitats Directive were transposed, rather thanthedatesbywh�chtheyshouldhavebeentransposed,ra�sesfurtherdoubtsaboutthecompat�b�l�tyofthesect�onw�theUlaw.Th�rd,thefactthatPartXaallowssubst�tutedconsent tobegrantedfordevelopment thathasadverselyaffectedthe�ntegr�tyofeuropeans�tes(orwoulddoso�nthefuture)�salsoproblematic. Under section 177K(2)(d), the Board, in deciding whether to grant a substitute consent, is required only to have regard to the significant effects ontheenv�ronment,oronaeuropeans�te,wh�chhaveoccurredorwh�chareoccurr�ngorcouldreasonablybeexpectedtooccurbecausethedevelopmentconcernedwascarr�edout.Th�scannotamount toadequatetranspos�t�onofart�cle6(3)oftheHab�tatsD�rect�ve,wh�chrequ�resthatanauthor�sat�oncanonlybegrantedwheretherewouldnotbeanadverseeffectonthehab�tats�teunless the specific exceptions in Article 6(4) apply. Fourth, section 261A is except�onallycompl�cated.31 It incorporates all of the concepts that have proved soproblemat�ctodate�ntheregulat�onofquarr�es:reasonableant�c�pat�on,abandonment, intensification. Section 261A introduces further complication by attributing a far greater significance to the commencement of a quarry prior to 1 October 1964 than was the case in the general regulation of development, albeit thatth�sapproachwasalsotaken�nsect�on261ofthe2000act.Th�sappearstobebasedontheleg�slatorm�stakenlybel�ev�ngthataquarrythatcommencedoperations prior to 1 October 1964 is necessarily lawful. As explained above, quarries that commenced prior to 1 October 1964 may be lawful but they may notbe:d�screteactsofdevelopmentw�th�nsuchquarr�eswouldnotbelawfulif they went beyond what was reasonably anticipated on 1 October 1964, or �ftherewasabandonment,or�ftherewasamater�alchangeofusebywayofintensification. If the Act had instead focused on development that occurred after 1 October 1964, this would have aligned itself with the existing concepts of reasonable anticipation, abandonment and intensification. Its failure to do so is puzzling and again appears to reflect a misunderstanding on the part of the leg�slat�vedraftersofthecorelegalconcepts.

Thecomplex�tyofthesect�onsandthedoubtoverthe�rcompat�b�l�tyw�thEU law combine to produce a situation where planning authorities and An Bord Pleanála will have to make hugely complicated factual assessments, by reference

31. Handycommentsthatthe�nteroperab�l�tybetweensect�on261aandPartXam�ghtbe described as cumbersome. Handy, note 28, at 25.


tolegalconceptsthatarebe�ngused�ncons�stently,allthet�meknow�ngthatthewhole process may be found to be in breach of EU law. This will provide a field dayforbothplann�ngconsultantsandlawyers.Whether�t�s�ntheleg�t�mate�nterestsofquarryoperatorsorbestservestheneedsofenv�ronmentalprotect�on�stobeser�ouslydoubted.

III. reasons for the dIffIcultIes wIth regulatIng QuarrIes

Quarries have proven difficult to regulate for two reasons. First, the issue has beenhauntedbyaconst�tut�onalconcernovertheleg�t�macyofrestr�ct�ngorabol�sh�ngex�st�nguser�ghts.Second,theconceptsemployedbythePlann�ngactss�nce1963haveprovens�ngularly �nappropr�ate forencompass�ng thefactual reality of quarrying. In this Part of the Article, I shall address each of these reasons. I shall argue that whatever constitutional concerns may have appl�ed�n1963,�t�sperm�ss�bletorestr�ctorabol�shex�st�nguser�ghtsandthattheconceptualmorasscanonlybeavo�dedthroughamovetoanewformof regulat�on.although these two concerns are separate, the responses areinterconnected. I argue in section IV that we should respond to the conceptual problemsby�ntroduc�nganewreg�mefortheregulat�onofquarr�es.However,�npract�calterms,�tseemsmostunl�kelythattheO�reachtaswouldenactsuchanewreg�me�fcompensat�onhadtobeprov�dedtoquarryoperatorsforanydeterioration in their position as a result of the change. If it is the case, therefore, that quarryoperatorshave a const�tut�onal r�ght tobe compensated for anyl�m�tat�ononaputat�ver�ghttocompletequarry�ngworksreasonablyant�c�patedon 1 October 1964, then the likelihood is that we will be forced to muddle on with the existing system of regulation. Both the constitutional concerns and conceptualproblemsmustthereforebekept�nm�ndatthesamet�me.

III.A Constitutional concerns over the abrogation of existing use rights

The reason why section 24 of the Local Government (Planning and Development)act1963d�dnot requ�replann�ngperm�ss�on tobeobta�nedfor works commenced prior to 1 October 1964 was to ensure compliance with Articles 15.5, 40.3 and 43 of the Constitution. Article 15.5 provides that the O�reachtasshallnotdeclareacts tobe�nfr�ngementsof thelawwh�chwerenotsoatdateofthe�rcomm�ss�on.Clearlyth�sprov�s�onwouldnotproh�b�talawmak�ng�tunlawfultocompleteworksaftertheenactmentofthatlaw.Thecruc�alquest�onthen�swhetherthefactthatapersonwasexerc�s�ngar�ghtto quarry on lands prior to 1 October 1964 means that it would be prima facieunconstitutional to restrict that person’s right to quarry nearly 50 years later. Therearethreereasonstobel�evethatth�s�snotthecase.

F�rst,theestabl�shmentofwhatlawsconst�tuteaprima facie restr�ct�onon


pr�vateproperty�sfraughtw�thuncerta�ntybecauseoursenseofwhatconst�tutesprivate property rights is in the first instance very much determined by laws. For�nstance,no-onema�nta�nsthatpr�vatepropertyr�ghtsent�tleonetocausea nuisance to others. But why is the law on nuisance not considered to be a restr�ct�ononpr�vateproperty?Presumablybecausethelawsrelat�ngtonu�sancearesoentrenchedthattheyareseenasanaspectofwhatpr�vateproperty�srather than a restriction on an extant and broader notion of private property. In the almost 50 years since the first enactment of planning controls, it is arguable thatthecourtshavemovedfromapos�t�onwheretheyseeplann�ngcontrolsas restr�ct�ngpr�vateproperty r�ghts toapos�t�onwhere theysee �nd�v�dualauthor�sat�onsundertheplann�ngcodeasenhanc�ngpropertyr�ghts.Th�ssh�ftcan be seen most clearly by contrasting the judgment of Kenny J in Central Dublin Development Association Ltd v Attorney GeneralandthejudgmentoftheSupremeCourt�nre Article 26 and Part V of the Planning and Development Bill 1999. In Central Dublin, Kenny J upheld the constitutionality of the obligation toobta�nplann�ngperm�ss�on�nthefollow�ngterms:

[Article 43.2.1°] does not require that the exercise of the rights of propertymust�nallcasesberegulatedbythepr�nc�plesofsoc�aljust�ce.It recognises that the exercise of these rights ought to be regulated by these pr�nc�ples and that the State accordingly may delimit (which I th�nkmeansrestr�ct)bylawtheexerc�seofthesa�dr�ghtsw�thav�ewtoreconciling it with the exigencies of the common good. If there is to be plann�ngofdevelopment,someonemustdec�dewhetherneworalteredbuildings are to be allowed in a specified place and whether land should bereta�nedasanunbu�lt space.Theverynatureof townandreg�onalplann�ngrequ�resrestr�ct�on�nthesensethatbu�ld�ng�napart�cularareamaynotbeappropr�ateorthattheproposedbu�ld�ngsarenotsu�tableorthatbu�ld�ngsmaynotbeusedforsomepurposes.Townandreg�onalplann�ng�sanattempttoreconc�letheexerc�seofpropertyr�ghtsw�ththe demands of the common good and Part IV defends and vindicates as far as is practicable the rights of the citizens and is not an unjust attack onthe�rpropertyr�ghts.32

Kenny J conceived of the grant of planning permission as restricting, albeit legitimately, the right of a person to use her property as she saw fit. In contrast, �nthePlanning and Development Bill case, the Court focused on the benefits thataccruetopropertyownersfromthesystemofplann�ngcontrol:

Plann�ngleg�slat�onofthenaturenowundercons�derat�on�sofgeneralappl�cat�onandhasbeenafeatureofourlawevers�ncetheenactment

32. (1975) 109 ILTR 69, at 90.


of the Town and Regional Planning Act, 1934, although it did not take �ts modern, comprehens�ve form unt�l the enactment of theact of1963.everypersonwhoacqu�resor�nher�tslandtakes�tsubjecttoanyrestr�ct�ons wh�ch the general law of plann�ng �mposes on the use ofthe property in the public interest. Inevitably, the fact that permission forapart�culartypeofdevelopmentmaynotbeava�lableforthelandw�ll, �ncerta�nc�rcumstances,deprec�ate thevalue�n theopenmarketof that land. Conversely, where the person obta�ns a perm�ss�on for apart�culardevelopmentthevalueoftheland�ntheopenmarketmaybeenhanced.33

It is possible to read this passage in a restrictive fashion as relating not to the restr�ct�onofpropertyr�ghts,per se,butrathertothecalculat�onofcompensat�on:compensat�onatlessthanmarketvalue�sperm�ss�blewheremarketvalue�s�tselftheproductoftheplann�ngcodeandtherestr�ct�ons�tplacesonothers.Donal O’Donnell, writing before his appointment to the Supreme Court, has madeth�sargument.34 However, even this interpretation of the Court’s position depends�nsomewayonthenormal�sat�onofplann�ngrestr�ct�onsaspartofwhat�sconst�tut�onallyprotectedproperty,as�ttakestheschemeofrestr�ct�onsas reducing the extent of the property right which must be compensated. In effect,�t�sonlythepropertyr�ghttouseforagr�culturethatrece�vesprotect�on–there�stakentobean�nbu�ltrestr�ct�onontheusestowh�chlandcanbeput.O’Donnell himself detected a shift in the constitutional understanding based ontheabsenceofanychallengetothev�rtualremovalof theent�tlementtocompensat�on�ntroducedbythelocalGovernment(Plann�ngandDevelopment)(amendment)act1990:

It is, perhaps, dangerous to read too much into the absence of any subsequentconst�tut�onalchallenge,butonecons�derat�onmayhavebeenthat it was increasingly difficult to argue that there was some inherent r�ghtprotectedbytheConst�tut�ontodeveloplandandextractfrom�tanypart�cularvalue.35

If this is a correct understanding of the law, it follows that there is no right to completeallquarry�ngworksthatwerereasonablyant�c�patedon1October1964.

Second, a number of cases specifically suggest that there is no constitutional right to continue using land for the same purpose. In Hanrahan Farms Ltd

33. [2000] 2 IR 321, at 353. 34. Donal O’Donnell, “Property Rights in the Irish Constitution” in Eoin Carolan and Oran

Doyleeds,The Irish Constitution: Governance and Values (Round Hall, 2008) 412, at 425.

35. Ibid, at 426.


v Environmental Protection Agency, Smyth J rejected a challenge to theconst�tut�onal�ty of sect�on 83 of the env�ronmental Protect�onagencyact1992.36Sect�on82ofthatactrequ�redapersontohaveal�cence�nordertooperateap�ggery;sect�on83dealtw�th thebas�sforgrant�ng l�cences.Theappl�canthadprev�ouslyoperatedthep�ggerybutwasawardedal�cencesubjecttoacond�t�onthat�treducethenumberofstock�nthep�ggery�nordertocontrolem�ss�onsfromthep�ggery.SmythJupheldtheval�d�tyofthecond�t�onsandthe const�tut�onal�ty of the sect�ons of theact, on the bas�s that they wereclearly justified by the exigencies of the common good and did not constitute a d�sproport�onaterestr�ct�onofthepropertyr�ghtsoftheappl�cants.Subsequently,�nM&F Quirke and Sons Ltd v An Bord Pleanála,cons�der�ngachallengetoconditions imposed by An Bord Pleanála on the operation of quarries under section 261(6) of the 2000 Act, O’Neill J offered the following analysis:

[T]he first two cases involve existing use rights predating the 1stOctober,1964, and in the third case stemming from a planning permission granted in 1983. Inevitably, over the years, changes will have taken place in the landsquarr�ed, �n thesurround�ngareaand�nsc�enceandtechnology.anyargumenttotheeffectthatbecauseaquarrywasbe�ngoperated�nacerta�nwayoverfortyyearsago,that�tshouldcont�nue�nthesamemannermustbeuntenable.Forexample,�ntheth�rdsetofproceed�ngsseveralofthecond�t�ons�mposedtreatofmattersthatcouldnothavebeenaddressed in 1983 when planning permission was first granted for example, the fact that the nearby River Blackwater was designated as a special area ofconservat�on�nthe1990s.Overtheyearsthearea�nwh�chaquarryis located may change significantly, so that the effects of the quarrying operat�onsonthesurround�ngareamaybeveryd�fferenttotheeffects�n1964. Developments in environmental science may now make apparent environmental damage from quarrying which was not known in 1964. apartfromstatutoryprov�s�on,thelawofnu�sancehaslongrecogn�sedthat act�v�ty carr�edouton landmaybe restra�nedwhere that act�v�tycauses deleter�ous effects to escape wh�ch cause damage to adjo�n�ngproperty. It could never be said that there was an unrestricted right to use propertyforanyact�v�ty,�nclud�ngquarry�ng,regardlessoftheeffectsthatact�v�tyhadontheenjoymentofotherpersonsofthe�rl�ves,healthandpropert�es.Manyact�v�t�esareregulatedandrestr�cted�navar�etyofstatutory codes in the interest of the common good. I see no difference in pr�nc�pleor�nsubstancebetweenthesestatutoryregulatoryreg�mesandthe type of regulation provided for in s.261(6). In all cases the activity

36. [2006] 1 ILRM 275.


restr�ctedbystatutewouldhavebeenunregulatedorunrestr�ctedbeforetheenactmentofthattypeofleg�slat�on.3�

Th�swouldsuggestthattherearec�rcumstances�nwh�ch�tmaybeperm�ss�bleforleg�slat�ontoabrogateex�st�nguser�ghts.However,�tshouldbenotedthatO’Neill J considered that were planning permission later to be refused for such aquarryandnocompensat�ongranted,thatm�ghtra�seaquest�onastowhetheracond�t�on�mposedpursuanttosect�on261(6)couldbr�ngaboutacessat�onofquarrying. As O’Neill J was not required to decide that point, it remains open for argument�nalatercase.nevertheless,Hanrahan Farmsand(arguably)M&F Quirke are consistent with O’Donnell’s sense that there may be no constitutional r�ghttodeveloplandandextractvaluefrom�t.

Th�rd,even�fthere�saconst�tut�onalr�ghttocompletequarry�ngworksthat were reasonably anticipated on 1 October 1964, which right led to the enactment of section 24(2) and informed its subsequent interpretation, it is quest�onable whether any quarr�es st�ll �n operat�on really are complet�ngwhat was reasonably anticipated nearly 50 years ago. Could anyone in 1964 reasonablyhaveant�c�patedtheamountofquarry�ngnecessarytosupporttheconstruction industry between 1995 and 2007? Although it can be difficult to prove�npart�cularenforcementproceed�ngsthatanextens�onofquarry�ngwasnot reasonably anticipated in 1964 (a difficulty that is increased by the absence ofrel�ablew�tnesses),regardcansurelybehadtothecommonsensereal�tythat little, if any, of current quarrying can reasonably have been anticipated 50 yearsago.

Forallofthesereasons,�t�sprobablyconst�tut�onallyperm�ss�bletorequ�replann�ng perm�ss�on for all future quarry operat�ons and for there to be noent�tlementtocompensat�onwhereplann�ngperm�ss�on�srefused.W�thmoreconfidence, it is suggested that it is possible to enact legislation that alters theonusofproofandmethodsforcalculat�onofcompensat�on�namannerthat reflects the unlikely and highly attenuated form of any property right to work out a pre-1964 quarry. Such an approach would leave open a possibility of compensat�on, thereby protect�ng the leg�slat�on aga�nst a const�tut�onalchallenge, wh�le �mpos�ng an onus on the quarry operator to establ�sh thepre-1964 use and that there was an actual loss of income, in accordance with thecompensat�onpr�nc�plesla�ddownbytheSupremeCourt�nre Part V of the Planning and Development Bill 1999.Theacceptanceofe�therof theseconst�tut�onalpos�t�ons�scruc�altothefeas�b�l�tyofadopt�nganalternat�veapproachtotheregulat�onofquarr�es.Otherw�se, the�ntroduct�onofanewreg�mewouldg�ver�setoacompensat�onent�tlementthat�sunl�kelytoappealtotheO�reachtas.

3�. [2009] IEHC 426, at [7.16].


III.B The conceptual morass

asnotedattheoutset,thePlann�ngactsregulatedevelopmentand�dent�fytwotypesofdevelopment:thecarry�ngoutofworksandmater�alchangeofuse.eachofthesecategor�esofactsrefersmostobv�ouslytoarelat�velyd�screteact�onorsetofact�ons.Theparad�gmofworks�sprobablywhereonebu�ld�ng(ahouse,say)�sdemol�shedandreplacedw�thanotherbu�ld�ngofthesametype(thus,nochangeofuse).Th�s�nvolvesthecarry�ngoutofworks,butthere�s aclear start-po�nt andend-po�nt to theworks �nvolved.Theparad�gmofmater�alchangeofuse�sprobablywhereonebu�ld�ng(ahouse,say)�schangedto another use (an office, say). Again, there is a discrete act of development: themater�alchangeofusebutnoworks.Thedevelopment�snottheusebutthemater�alchangefromoneusetoanother.agrantofplann�ngperm�ss�ondoesnot,str�ctlyspeak�ng,author�seause.What�sauthor�sed�sthechangefromoneusetoanother.Ofcourse,�npract�cethecarry�ngoutofworksandamater�alchangeofusemayoftenoverlap.

Quarrying does not fall neatly into either of these categories. It is really an amalgam of works and use. It uses the land for ongoing works which, uniquely, havetheeffectofeat�ngupthelandonwh�chtheworkstakeplace,w�ththeresult that the zone of works is ever-increasing, whether downwards or outwards. Thecarry�ngoutofworkschangestheland�tselfanda fortiori changestheuseof the land. It is the attempt to misplace quarries within the Acts’ conceptual categor�esofworksandmater�alchangeofusethathasproducedanomalousresults and rendered quarries subject to uncertain regulatory control. The first anomalous result is the most significant. The exclusion from the Acts’ remit of works that commenced prior to 1 October 1964 makes perfect sense in respect ofd�screteworks thathavea complet�ondate,but l�ttle sense �n respectofpotent�allyendlessworksthatmayneverbecompleted.

Th�sleadstothesecondanomalousresult:theapparentlymater�alchange�ntheuseofthelandfromagr�culturaltoquarry�ngcannotberecogn�sedassuch,becausetodosom�ght�nfr�ngeonther�ghtofquarryoperators,undertheacts,tocarryoutthe�rworkstocomplet�on.Were�tnotforthestatutoryexcept�onforworkscommencedpr�ortotheappo�ntedday,thecourtscouldhavetakentheoppos�teapproachandtreatedallactsofquarry�ngasamater�alchangeofuseof the land. However, this is also a less than ideal fit for other reasons. It leaves openthequest�onastowhethereveryshovelfulmater�allychangestheuseoftheland�ntheshovel(fromlandtorawmater�al)orwhether�t�sthesurfaceexpans�onofthequarrythatchangestheuseoftheland(fromagr�culturaltoquarry). If one opts for the former characterisation, it would seem to follow that eachshovelfulconst�tutesad�screteactofdevelopmentthatrequ�resplann�ngpermission – such an approach is not practically feasible. If one opts for the latterapproach,�tappearstofollowthatdownwardextract�on(potent�allythemostenv�ronmentallydamag�ngofall)doesnotconst�tutedevelopmentatall.


aboveall,themater�alchangeofuseconceptfa�lstoaccountfortheway�nwh�chquarry�ng�sanongo�ngoperat�on.

Th�sconceptualmorass�swhatledtheSupremeCourt�nWaterford County Council v John A Woodtoestabl�shatestforthecomplet�onofworkswh�chfocusedsoheav�lyontheobject�velyascerta�nedstateofm�ndofthequarryoperator in 1964. However, where the burden of proof is on the party seeking to establ�sh that there has been unauthor�sed development and where therearefewerandfewerpeoplew�thaclearrecollect�onofquarry�ngact�v�t�es�n1964, it has become very difficult to establish what was happening in 1964, let alonewhethercurrentworkshaveexceededwhatwasreasonablyant�c�pated�n1964. This all contributes to legal uncertainty on the core question of whether development�slawfulornot.Thejud�c�allydevelopeddoctr�nes–abandonmentof use and intensification of use – are both attempts to bring within the system of plann�ngcontrolact�v�t�esthatm�ghtfallouts�de�tonaccountoftheexcept�onforworksandusesongo�ngontheappo�ntedday.although�ntendedto�mproveenv�ronmentalregulat�on,thesedoctr�nesturnonyetmorecontestedfactualquestions (intention to abandon, materiality of intensification), thereby creating yet more layers of complex�ty and legal uncerta�nty.The jud�c�al doctr�nesweregraftedontotheleg�slat�onandnowfurtherleg�slat�on–sect�on261ofthe2000actandthemanyprov�s�ons�ntroducedbythe2010act–havebeengraftedontothejud�c�aldoctr�nesbut�nawaythatdoesnotfullyunderstandthosedoctr�nes.Th�saddsyetmored�mens�onsofcomplex�ty,�ncons�stencyanduncerta�nty.

In the past, this lack of legal certainty has been of most advantage to quarry operatorsandmostdetr�mentaltothe�nterestsofenv�ronmentalprotect�on.Thesheer difficulty of establishing whether a quarry was lawful or not, combined w�ththefac�l�tytoapplyforretent�onperm�ss�on,created�ncent�vesforquarryoperatorsnottoworryaboutthelawfulstatusofthe�rquarr�es.Thejudgmentof the European Court of Justice in Case C-215/06 has reversed this calculus. nowquarryoperatorswhomay�ngoodfa�thhavem�sjudgedthelawfulnessoftheir quarrying operations find themselves shut out from applying for retention perm�ss�onandsubject,atbest,tothenewsubst�tuteconsentprocedure,wh�ch�tselfmaytransp�retobe�nbreachofeUlaw.

Thecoresuggest�onofth�sart�cle�sthatafreshstart�srequ�red.Themessthat�stheregulat�onofquarr�esw�llnotbesolvedsolongasthe�ssuesareframed�ntermsofthecorecategor�esofdevelopmentunderthePlann�ngacts:thecarry�ngoutofworksandmater�alchangeofuse.

IV. ProPosal for reform

Thefa�lureofregulat�on�nrespectofquarr�es�sattr�butabletotwocauses:aconst�tut�onalconcernoverex�st�nguser�ghtsandtheconceptualmorasscaused


byshoehorn�ngquarr�es�ntothecategor�esofdevelopmentregulatedbytheplanning code. I have argued that the constitutional concern is, at best, attenuated andthattheconceptualmorasscanonlybeavo�dedthroughafreshstart.Quarr�esshouldbe regulated througha systemofongo�ng l�cens�ngunderwh�challquarr�esrequ�rel�cencestocont�nuetooperate.Quarry�ng�sanongo�ngact�v�tyand�sthereforebetterregulated�nanongo�ngwayratherthanthroughthenormalsystemofplann�ngcontrolw�th�tsconceptualcategor�esofd�screteworksandchangesofuse.Th�songo�ngact�v�tyrequ�resanongo�ngrelat�onsh�pbetweentheregulatorandthequarryoperatorforaslongasthequarry�ngcont�nues.al�cens�ngsystemwouldallowforthefollow�ngfeatures:automat�crev�ewoftheactivity at the expiry of the licence (a period of five years might be appropriate); ongo�ngsuperv�s�onof thequarry�ngact�v�ty throughpowersof �nspect�on;apower to rev�ewormod�fy l�cenceswhere c�rcumstances change (eg, thed�scoveryofanewprotectedhab�tat).asquarry�ng�samatteroflanduse,albe�tone with significant environmental concerns, it would be appropriate for planning authorities to have responsibility for licensing, with a right of appeal to An Bord Pleanála. Licences could take account of the intermittent nature of quarrying by requiring a simple notification to the planning authority when quarrying activity commencesandceases.De minimiscr�ter�acouldbeestabl�shedtoallowsomeminor quarrying activity to avoid the full rigours of the licensing regime. In this regard, a system of registration and certification similar to that which applies in respectofsomewastefac�l�t�esundertheWasteManagement(Fac�l�tyPerm�tand Registration) Regulations 2007-2008 might be appropriate. In the case of largequarr�es,wh�chm�ghtbesubjectto�ntegratedpollut�onprevent�onandcontrol licensing (IPPC) by the EPA, the IPPC licence should be sufficient to author�seallaspectsofthequarry.Dupl�cat�onofregulatoryreg�messhouldbeavo�dedwhereatallposs�ble.

allquarr�esshouldbecomesubjecttoth�sreg�me,�rrespect�veofwhetherthey might have been in operation prior to 1964 or have a planning permission. However,�twouldbeappropr�atetoprov�dealead-�nt�mesothatquarr�esw�thaplann�ngperm�ss�oncouldcont�nuetooperatew�thout�mmed�atelyseek�nga licence. If the standard length of a licence is to be five years, it would be appropriate to allow existing permitted quarries to operate for a further five yearsonfootofthe�rperm�ss�onbeforerequ�r�ngal�cence.Th�swouldbothavoid the administrative difficulties posed by a deluge of applications and allow quarryoperatorsaleg�t�mateopportun�tytoplanthe�rbus�nessaffa�rs.

For the reasons advanced above, I do not believe that there is a constitutionally protected right to continue to operate pre-1964 quarries. However, it might wellbeappropr�ate to take steps to �nsulate thenew l�cens�ng reg�me fromconst�tut�onal challenge �nsofar as �s poss�ble.Th�s could best be ach�evedby introducing a residual compensation scheme. If a quarry operator who is refusedal�cencecandemonstratethatthecurrentquarryfallsw�th�nwhatwasreasonably anticipated on 1 October 1964, the quarry operator would be entitled


tocompensat�on.Cruc�ally,th�ssh�ftstheburdenontothequarryoperatortoestabl�shtheex�st�nguser�ghts.Th�sapproach�ssomewhats�m�lartothattakenby section 48 of the Planning and Development (Strategic Infrastructure) Act 2006,wh�ch�nsertsanewrule1��ntosect�on2oftheacqu�s�t�onofland(assessmentofCompensat�on)act1919.rule1�prov�desthatthevalueofanylandly�ngmorethan10mbelowthesurfaceshallbetakentoben�lunless�t�sshowntobeofgreatervaluebythecla�mant.Th�sapproach�sfa�r,g�venthe�mprobab�l�tythatanysuchlandwouldhaveaneconom�cvalue.S�m�larlyw�thquarr�es,plac�ngtheonusofproofontheoperatorwouldbewarrantedg�venthesheer�mprobab�l�tythatanycurrentlyoperat�ngquarryfellw�th�nwhatwasreasonably anticipated nearly 50 years ago.38Totheextentthatfad�ngmemor�esmake it difficult to establish this one way or the other, this necessarily attenuates anypropertyr�ght�nvolved:whyshouldonehaveapropertyr�ghttocompletesomething that no-one can remember starting? It is therefore appropriate for quarryoperators–ratherthanenv�ronmentalprotect�on–tosufferfromtheevidential difficulties.

The next question is the measure of the compensation. In this regard, a soph�st�cated approach to the assessment of market value should be taken,s�m�lartothe�nterpretat�onofthePlanning and Development Bill caseofferedby O’Donnell. A quarry owner should not be compensated by reference to the currentmarket valueof thequarrybecause thatmarket value �s hugely�ncreasedbyreasonof thefact thatquarr�esgenerallyrequ�reauthor�sat�on,thereby reducing the supply of quarry material and increasing the profitability of authorised quarries. It would be fundamentally unjust for a quarry operator to receive compensation for a restriction that is artificially inflated on account ofthatveryschemeofrestr�ct�ons.assuch,thequarryoperatorshouldonlybecompensatedfor theest�matedvalueof thequarrymater�al �f therewereal�m�tlesssupplyofotherquarr�es.asw�thrule1�forcompensat�onoftheacqu�s�t�onofland,th�sshouldbetakentoben�lunlessthequarryoperatorcanestabl�shotherw�se.althoughthere�ssometh�ngunappeal�ngaboutallow�ngatheoret�calr�ghttocompensat�onwh�lesubject�ng�ttosomanyrestr�ct�ons,th�smaybethenecessarypr�cetopaytosecurethe�ntroduct�onofanew,moreappropr�ateschemeofquarryregulat�on.

Th�snewapproachtotheregulat�onofquarr�eshasthrees�gnaladvantagesoverthecurrentleg�slat�vemess.F�rst,byavo�d�ngtheconceptualmorassoftheexisting legislation, it would greatly increase legal certainty. This would benefit quarryoperatorsbyreduc�ngthetransact�oncostsofseek�ngtooperatequarr�es.Second,thenewschemewouldleadtocoherenceofenv�ronmentalprotect�onand fa�rness �n themarketbyensur�ng that allquarr�esare regulated to the

38. Wh�lesuchlandm�ghthavevalueduetom�neralr�ghtsortheuseofvo�dsforstor�ngcarbon, such value would not be reduced by reason of a prohibition on quarrying. In anyevent,�twouldrema�nopentothequarryoperator�nanypart�cularcasetoestabl�shthattherewasareduct�on�nvalueattr�butabletoaproh�b�t�ononquarry�ng.


samestandards.Th�rd,thenewschemewouldautomat�callyensurecompl�ancewith the judgment of the ECJ in Case C-115/06 insofar as it relates to quarries. Unl�kesect�on261a,however,thenewschemewouldensurecompl�ance�nawaythatwouldallowmostquarryoperatorstocont�nuetooperate,prov�dedthatallconcernsoverenv�ronmental�mpactscanbeaddressed.Forallofthesereasons,suchaschemewouldprov�deafarpreferablewayofresolv�ngthecompet�ng�nterestsoftheeconom�cnecess�tyofquarr�esandtheenv�ronmentalnecess�tyofproperregulat�on.

Documents

Oran Doyle, Elusive Quarries: A Failure of Regulation (2011) 34 DULJ 180