Nuclear IndiaThe Emerging Entente between the World's Largest and Strongest Democracies and the Balance of

Power in the 21st CenturySteven K. Lussenburg

Steven LussenburgS1536095

Supervisor: dr. mr. P.C.J.H.M. RusmanUniversity of Groningen

Faculty of LawSection International Relations – Legal Theory

Table of Contents0. Acronyms..........................................................................................................................................31. Introduction......................................................................................................................................4

1.1 Scope and Aim of this Thesis.....................................................................................................41.2 Why study India?.......................................................................................................................51.3 India's Path to the Bomb............................................................................................................5

2. The Indo-USA Treaty on Civil Nuclear Cooperation and Subsequent Events...............................102.1 Towards full nuclear cooperation.............................................................................................102.2 Ratification in the USA............................................................................................................122.3 Status or Sovereignty?.............................................................................................................152.4 Splitting India's nuclear establishment....................................................................................172.5 Treaty with the IAEA...............................................................................................................202.6 The NSG Waiver......................................................................................................................222.7 A Sign of Acceptance? The Indian purchase of Uranium from Australia................................232.8 Under Obama: Membership of the NSG?................................................................................25

3. Motives and Theoretical Framework..............................................................................................283.1 The USA: Natural Allies?........................................................................................................28

3.1.1 Balance of Power in the 21st Century..............................................................................293.1.2 The Rising Dragon...........................................................................................................323.1.3 Nuclear Bombs in the Desert?..........................................................................................34

3.2 India: Recognition and Security..............................................................................................363.2.1 One Among Equals..........................................................................................................363.2.2 A Balance Between Giants...............................................................................................38

3.2.2.1 Deterrence over the Himalayas?...............................................................................383.2.2.2 “He Who Commands the Seas, Has Command of Everything”...............................40

3.2.3 Rivalry on the Subcontinent.............................................................................................423.3 Conclusion...............................................................................................................................43

4. The Indo-USA Nuclear Deal: To Proliferate or Not to Proliferate?...............................................464.1 Towards A World Free of Nuclear Weapons?..........................................................................464.2 A New Approach to Nuclear Non-Proliferation?.....................................................................494.3 Conclusion...............................................................................................................................51

5. Conclusion......................................................................................................................................546. Sources...........................................................................................................................................59

0. Acronyms

AEC: Indian Atomic Energy CommissionBWC: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their DestructionCWC: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their DestructionDAE: Department of Atomic EnergyFBR: Fast Breeder ReactorFMCT: Fissile Material Cut-Off TreatyICBM: Inter Continental Ballistic MissileMCTR: Missile Technology Control RegimeNWS: Nuclear Weapon State; this is a judicial status under the NPT, not a factual statusNNWS: Non-Nuclear Weapon State; this is a judicial status under the NPT, not a factual statusNPCI: Nuclear Power Corporation of India LimitedNPT: Nuclear Non-Proliferation TreatyNSG: Nuclear Supply GroupP5: The 5 permanent members of the UNSC (China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA)PAEC: Pakistani Atomic Energy CommissionPHWR: Pressurized Heavy Water ReactorsPNE: Peaceful Nuclear ExplosionUNGA: General Assembly of the United NationsUNSC: Security Council of the United NationsWGPu: weapons-grade plutoniumWGUr: Weapons-grade uraniumWMD: Weapon of Mass DestructionWWI: The Great WarWWII: The Second World War

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1. Introduction

Non-proliferation has been a hot topic since the start of the nuclear era when nuclear fire devastated the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Now, sixty years later, not only the USA but also the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, France and the United Kingdom formally possess these weapons of mass destruction. Beyond these big five, the Israelis (the world's worst kept public secret), Pakistani and Indians also posses the bomb. Yet when the media reports on non-proliferation, the names of Iran's enrichment programme (although it now seems unlikely the country truly desires a ready nuclear arsenal1) and North-Korea's next nuclear test get all the attention. This is undeserved both from a scientific perspective as well as the urgency of the problems surrounding nuclear weapons as both the problem of nuclear terrorism or the disarmament question we ought to discuss gain little attention.

1.1 Scope and Aim of this Thesis

In this thesis, I will investigate the consequences and events of the Indo-USA nuclear deal of 2005 and whether this deal will have a positive or a negative consequences for the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. In the first chapter, I will analyse the Indo-USA deal itself, the subsequent separation plan of the Indian nuclear infrastructure and the Indo-IAEA treaty. Furthermore, I will analyse the debates on the treaty in the USA and India. I will conclude the first chapter with analysing the debate over the sale of Australian uranium to India and the developments of the Indo-USA relations under the Obama administration. In my second chapter, I will try to create a theoretical framework to fit the Indo-USA deal in, as the initial response of the West was far from positive when India tested its PNE in 1974 and its refusal to join the NPT ever since, as I will discuss further in this introduction. In order to answer this turn in relations, I will first introduce contemporary balance of power theories and analyse the way we should regard the new Indo-USA alliance. Subsequently, I will apply these theories to both the USA and India, mainly vis-à-vis China and the changing power structure in the world, but also in relation towards Iran and Pakistan, two sources of security and non-proliferation concerns for the USA and (although the former to a lesser extend) India. In the final chapter, I will make an attempt to answer the second part of my thesis: what are the consequences of the Indo-USA nuclear deal for the global non-proliferation regime? I will discus several arguments in favour and several against the Indo-USA nuclear deal. In the final section of this chapter, I will sketch my ideas of the future of the global non-proliferation regime and whether this bilateral approach of India will improve the global non-proliferation regime or undermine it.

However, before entering the discussion of the Indo-USA nuclear deal and sketching a time line of the subsequent events, I will shortly introduce the reasons to study the Indian nuclear programme. Finally, I will give a short description of the history of the Indian nuclear programme from the independence of the subcontinent until the final, full-fledged nuclear tests of 1998.

1 New York Times, U.S. Faces a Tricky Task in Assessment of Data on Iran

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1.2 Why study India?

There are several reasons why to study the Indian nuclear programme and more specific the Indo-USA nuclear deal of 2005. First of all, as mentioned before, the subject receives much less attention in the (Western) media than Iran's nuclear programme – which does not seems to pursue nuclear weapons after all – and the North Korean one, which appears to be a desperate cry for international attention. Contrary to these countries, India has a fully fledged programme, the bombs and the means of delivery. Moreover, all of this was achieved outside the global non-proliferation regime. Studying how this was possible and became accepted can teach us valuable lessons. As I will show, geopolitics, both regional2 and global3, and the future world order play a central role in this development. Therefore, this subject is also a interesting insight in the way these developments influence international law. Furthermore, India is working hard to become one of the great powers of the 21st century. This prospect for the future adds extra dynamics to the Indian position as the country (together with China) will desire to rewrite the international rules of Western design. Finally, as George Perkovich points out, India is a unique case in nuclear proliferation field and thus can shed valuable light on the nuclear policy dynamics in other states.4 Understanding the challenges and decisions India faced might give students of international relations insight in the decision making process of developing countries in security environments such as India's.

1.3 India's Path to the Bomb

In this section, I will briefly introduce the Indian path to the nuclear bomb, as it was much different from that of other countries possessing these WMD. My aim here is to provide a short overview of the steps India took, not a comprehensive overview of each decision leading to the Indian bomb. Unlike the great powers of that day – which stood victorious after WWII and rapidly started to develop these new weapons – India was most eager to embrace nuclear energy but not for military purposes.5 Nevertheless, the option was kept open. While the first prime minister Nehru of the now independent India desired to continue to act in the peaceful legacy of Ghandi, he was also enough of a realist statesman to understand the deterrent effects of these new weapons.6 Moreover, the Indian nuclear programme was shrouded in secrecy, to a far larger degree than was to be expected from a purely civilian nuclear programme.7 For the Indian public, atomic energy was a means to satisfy the country's energy troubles and it was received with enthusiasm. With Canadian and USA support, the ANC – under leadership of its founder Homhi Bhabba – began working on two reactors, each able to produce 200MW, and integrating them in the Indian energy network. The Indian plan for nuclear energy, however, was much more ambitious; it called for as much as 1000MW in the second half of the 1960s, which was far beyond the countries reach at that point. Nevertheless, this showed the place nuclear energy played in the minds of Indian policy-makers.8 The debate of using nuclear power for defensive purposes never entirely left India and recommenced with the Atomic Energy Bill of 1962.9 Nevertheless, the country and its policy-makers never made up 2 India borders two other nuclear armed states: China and Pakistan.3 India has the second largest population in the world and is developing rapidly. Moreover, it borders China

which is also set to play a dominant role on the global stage.4 Perkovich, G., India's Nuclear Bomb, 115 Ibid. 136 Abraham, I., The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb, 477 Ibid. 498 Ibid. 969 Ibid. 115

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their minds on the choice in favour of or against nuclear weapons. Many scientists, however, supported a strategic programme and in secret prepared for developing such a programme for the moment the politicians would permit them to do so.10 The decision to pursue nuclear weapons became more apparent in the late 1960s, after the devastating defeat at the hand of the Chinese in 1962 and the display Chinese nuclear prowess as it tested several nuclear weapons.11 However, it was not until 1972 India decided to actually work on this programme and not until 1974 India actually tested its PNE. At this point in time, the Indian government felt it was necessary for India to show the world it was capable of conducting a nuclear explosion.12 India had felt pressure of a conceived Washington-Islamabad-Bejing axes, after India defeated Pakistan in the the 1971 war of Bangladesh independence and especially due to the nuclear armed carrier task-force the USA deployed in the Bay of Bengal to deter India from attacking West Pakistan.13 This USA fleet is still cited to this day as reason why India need nuclear weapons of its own to prevent 'gunboat diplomacy' by other powers.14 Yet the main reason prime minister Ghandi allowed the test was her own position and a weak economy to the point of open talk about military dictatorship or a communist revolution.15 For this explosion materials provided by Canada and other countries for civilian use were used, violating the agreements with these countries.16 The fact that a state which was not part to the NPT could still assemble the necessary materials was a great source of concern for a large number of countries and would lead to the creation of the NSG. This 'export cartel' was created to provide export guidelines for its member states in order to prevent non-members to gain access to nuclear supplies and technologies.

However, thee reason India refused to become party to the NPT was not solely its indecisiveness of whether or not it desired nuclear weapons. A major objection to the NPT in 1965 was its desire to come to a more comprehensive treaty, rather than a treaty freezing the status quo as the NPT would turn out to be, only containing a vague promise to strive for a world free of nuclear weapons. Moreover, India demanded security guarantees and the right to develop PNE, which also were not accepted by the nuclear powers.17 When the NPT was completed in 1968 without addressing the Indian complaints, the country refused to sign in. Outside of the NPT and after conducting a nuclear explosion, India became isolated in atomic affairs. Two years after the PNE, Canada officially terminated nuclear cooperation with India, shortly after the example was followed by the USA. This would proof a major blow to the Indian nuclear programme as the reactors provided by these two countries were major assets to its programme and plutonium extracted from the spent fuel of these facilities was a major source for the plutonium used in the 1974 PNE.18 Combined with the 'nuclear siege'19 of the NSG, it would prove hard for India to acquire to acquire dual use goods and technologies and the nuclear programme stalled. Several factors explain the fact India did not

10 Perkovich, G., India's Nuclear Bomb, 13911 Tellis, A., India's Emerging Nuclear Posture, 1112 Abraham, I., The Making of the Indian Nuclear Bomb, 14213 According to the USA, deterring India was not the only goal of the fleet, it had also the task of keeping an

eye on Soviet troops in China.14 Perkovich, G., India's Nuclear Bomb, 16415 Ibid. 17416 India's claim to conduct merely PNE was slightly more credible than such a claim would be today. The idea

to use nuclear explosions for the construction of harbours and channels was still being explored and seriously considered by multiple states at that point in time.

17 Perkovich, G., India's Nuclear Bomb, 12718 Ibid. 19719 Zuberi, M., The Nuclear Breakthrough

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continue testing nor actively prepared nuclear weapons; mainly domestic problems that were not solved by the PNE which required all the attention of the Indian policy-makers. Moreover, the main driving factor behind nuclear test – the scientists – did not forge an alliance with the military, who could have joined them in promoting the use of atomic energy for defensive purposes. Finally, abandoning the morally inspired policy of the refusal of acquiring nuclear was not light-heartedly abandoned.20 The USA policy vis-à-vis India had also changed with Carter's positive attitude towards the country and his general aversion to nuclear weapons gave the Indian government some breathing space to postpone its decision on going nuclear further, without triggering the still strong anti-colonialism sentiment which was still strong in India.

However, the patience with the Pakistani programme was running thin early in the 1980s and India felt pressurised to build up efficient counter measures to this new threat. Preparations for a second PNE were under way and development of missiles conceivably able to carry nuclear weapons began.21 Tensions between India and Pakistan rose and both prepared to retaliate with a nuclear test would the other commence testing.22 Both the PNE test and air raids on the Pakistani nuclear facilities were considered in 1983, however, the first was abandoned again 24 hours before the actual test. While the Indian air force estimated it could bring down the Pakistani nuclear programme, the casualties would be very high and the military high-command was convinced such an attack would result in a full scale war.23 India would have to learn to live with Pakistan's nuclear programme. The country, however, progressed in both its missile and nuclear programmes and in 1983 India started to produce its own heavy water, needed for the PHWR India intended to build for both energy and plutonium production. Yet even with this progress, the country lacked a coherent policy and decision making process on a strategic nuclear programme. Much of the authority still lied with the prime minister and head of the AEC.

Tensions between India and Pakistan rose over the second half of the 1980s and would explode into a full blown crisis over Kashmir in the spring of 1990. According to several writers this was the first nuclear crisis between the two countries, some of them explain the fact that the conflict did not escalate into a full blown war by the mutual nuclear deterrence which was in place by now.24 Nuclear deterrence was not only created by the possible nuclear weapons, but also the danger of air raids on nuclear facilities. Especially for India such an attack would cause danger due to its use of plutonium (which is more poisonous than uranium) and the proximity to large centres of population.25 The 1990 crisis saw India and Pakistan stumbling towards a war, which was prevented only by USA involvement and the threat of nuclear war. 26 Under the pressure of the threat of war and after the USA intercepted orders for the PAEC to start the production of a nuclear weapon27, the debate in India exploded whether the countries should start to pursue a nuclear deterrent strategy itself. Proponents argued such deterrence was necessary against nuclear armed China (to a degree that they claimed India could not refrain from going nuclear until China destroyed its arsenal)

20 Perkovich, G., India's Nuclear Bomb, 22321 Ibid. 22622 Ibid. 22923 Ibid. 242-24324 Ibid. 30625 Ibid. 24126 Ibid. 310-31227 Ibid. 308

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and Pakistan, while opponents of acquiring nuclear armament feared this would worsen the relations with China and provoke an arms race with Pakistan.28

The 1990s would be dominated by an internal debate in India, the sale of Chinese nuclear reactors by Pakistan and USA non-proliferation initiatives attempting prevent both India and Pakistan from detonating nuclear weapons. Regardless of American attempts, both India and Pakistan slowly acquired means for the production of more advanced ballistic missiles as well as nuclear technologies. In 1992, the NSG applied more sanctions to India in an attempt to stop nuclear proliferation on the subcontinent. To add insult to injury, the Chinese would test a one megaton weapon a mere ten days after the sanctions were announced. India's only relief was the test of the first Agni29 missile, which was entirely designed and constructed domestically.30 In the meantime, scientists continued the preparations for the construction of a nuclear weapon by constructing its non-nuclear components and four guiding principles for a nuclear policy were formulated; never to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the civilian government should always have the final say in using these weapons, India should not engage in an arms race and no single sector (military, bureaucracy or partisan political leaders) should dominate the decision making process.31 According to Perkovich, these four pillars of the nuclear weapon policy illustrate India does not view these WMD as weapons of war but as a deterrent only to be used at last resort.32 Yet even by 1994, the Indian government had not made up its mind on its stance on Indian nuclear weapons and remained under pressure from all sides; the USA and international community, joined by domestic activists, while scientists and hawkish politicians pushed for continued nuclear testing.

Negotiations on the perpetual continuation of the NPT hardened India's stance on it, as it lost a chance to negotiate a new treaty which would acknowledge its concerns which had not changed since the original document was finalised. Pressure on India from abroad to bend its knee and accept the treaty continued to increase while domestic voices against the 'neo-imperialism' and 'neo-colonial' nuclear non-proliferation regime gained strength as well. At some point, India had to make the decision to either go nuclear or accept the the non-proliferation regime, remaining in perpetual limbo would not be an option for long.33 It would take until 1998 before the Indian government finally decided to test several nuclear bombs; proclaiming India a nuclear power. Pakistan's response would be a matter of days until India's rival would test a bomb of its own, turning the subcontinent into a nuclear armed zone.

Perkovich argues there were six (non-security) factors present in India's long journey towards nuclear arms, of which two pushing towards nuclear arms: the normative and national identity interest of becoming a great power, which India argues are associated with these weapons and is often presented by scientists and the strategic enclave. On the other hand Indian politicians wished to uphold the Ghandian tradition of non-violence and show India as morally superior to countries that resort to weapons of deterrence. A second reason mentioned is the lack of a decision making organ to design a national security policy which would allow the military to give its input. The third reason was the lack of an economy capable of supporting a nuclear

28 Ibid. 31429 'Agni' means 'fire' in Hindi30 Perkovich, G., India's Nuclear Bomb, 32831 Ibid. 33032 Ibid. 33133 Ibid. 363

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arsenal, India's resources were to scarce to build up a large arsenal for a long time. Finally, the international pressure kept India long from open proliferation.34

India's path towards the bomb thus was by no means a set path from the onset, it was mainly dominated by individuals in the nuclear establishment and government, the former preparing the bomb and promote India going nuclear while the latter did not rely much on the military for its decision making and did not want to squander its relations with the rest of the world. The final decision to go nuclear was a combination of several factors, including security, prestige and domestic pressure. While NSG sanctions were issued, these were less prominent than after the 1974 PNE. The Clinton administration in the USA already started planning a different attempt to engage India in the global non-proliferation regime as the institutional, multi-lateral approach seemed to lack effect. However, it would not be until the Bush administration in 2005 concluded an agreement with India on civilian nuclear cooperation.

Having provided a short description of India's path to the nuclear bomb, I have already touched upon several aspects I will discuss more in detail; the Indian position outside the NPT, its obsession with the prestige of nuclear weapons but also the the threat of a nuclear armed China to the east and the balance between the two of these. A part of the reluctance of the NSG to impose even sterner sanctions on India can also be found in China and the rise of this country to its central, global position. However, before discussing this question of a balance of power in the Indian-Chinese-USA relation, I will first turn to the details of the Indo-USA nuclear deal of 2005 and the consequences it had on the Indian nuclear infrastructure.

34 Ibid. 452

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2. The Indo-USA Treaty on Civil Nuclear Cooperation and Subsequent Events

On July 18th 2005, President Bush and Prime Minister Singh announced a strategic partnership and their intention to improve cooperation between their two states in a joint statement. The most discussed part of this presentation was the intention of opening trade in space and civil nuclear technologies. The treaty, establishing the groundwork for the civil nuclear cooperation, which followed this joint statement, would be seen as a complete watershed in the relation between the USA and India. For it would mark a significant break with the nuclear policy the USA followed the previous decades.35 Critics in the USA complained that this deal would undermine attempts to prevent states like Iran or North Korea in acquiring nuclear weapons, since it might look like staying outside the NPT was to be rewarded.36 The Indian (Communist) left, on their turn complained the cooperation with the USA would undermine Indian interests and aid President Bush “in his desire to control the world.”37 The BJP, India's main opposition party, claimed that it would relinquish India's right to test new nuclear weapons, even though the treaty does not contain any such provision.38

Nevertheless, the two states agreed and ratified the treaty in which both governments agreed to work together in the field of civil nuclear energy dated on the 1st of August 2007.

In this chapter, I will discuss this treaty and the events that followed its conclusion. First, I will discuss the treaty itself to create a general insight of the text. Second, I will take a look at the debate in the USA whether or not the treaty should be ratified and its impact on the global non-proliferation regime. Next, I will turn to the discussion in India and the domestic praise and critique it received. Having mapped these discussions, I will subsequently discuss three key aspects of the treaty. First, I will turn to India's obligation to split its nuclear establishment into a civil and military part. The former of which will be subjected to safeguarding by the IAEA. Having discussed this split, I will move on to the treaty between India and the IAEA. Subsequently I will turn my attention to the necessary waiver by the NSG for India to commence in the trade of dual-use technology with the NSG member states. As example of the controversy this trade caused in many parts of the world, I will discuss the recent deal India concluded with Australia for the purchase of uranium. Finally, I will discuss the events and changes in policy after President Obama took over, including India's bid to become a member of the NSG and other non-proliferation regimes.

2.1 Towards full nuclear cooperation

Before discussing the effects of the Indo-USA treaty39 and the controversies surrounding it, it is useful to take a look at the provisions of the treaty itself. The treaty does not create a concrete deal stipulating nuclear deals, as it has often been viewed. Rather, it is a broad framework which needs to be filled in in subsequent deals. Nevertheless, it contains several provisions that are worth discussing briefly. In this section, I will discuss several key provisions of the treaty.

35 Washington Post, U.S., India Reach Deal on Nuclear Cooperation36 Ibid.37 Ibid. 338 Rajagopalan R., Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Implications for India and the Global N-Regime, 62 Institute of

Peace and Conflict Studies (2008), 339 Full: Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of India and the Government of the United States

of America Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, signed 1 August 2007

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The interests of the USA in creating the cooperation with India and conclude the treaty discussed here will be discussed in the next chapter. For now, it is sufficient to say that among the reasons of the Bush administration to establish the treaty was the attempt to advance the non-proliferation regime by bilateral means.40 The preamble of the treaty sets this out as one of the goals, by noting the common interest of India and the USA in supporting the IAEA and export controls to prevent proliferation. Other goals mentioned are energy issues and concerns about the environment. The final goal mentioned in the preamble is the desire to create a strategic partnership. Art.2(2) of the treaty sets the areas the treaty applies to, ranging from cooperation in research41 to the supply of equipment for use by the parties or for the benefit of third countries42 to including India in international research for controlled thermonuclear fusion.43 The treaty thus sets a wide scope for cooperation including, but not limited to commerce, joint research and technology transfers. It should be noted art. 2(4) exclude the unsafeguarded nuclear activities of the parties. In other words: the treaty is explicitly not applicable on either state's military nuclear programme. This provision has been criticized often as a de facto recognition of India as a NWS by the USA.44 One of the most important aspects of the treaty was enshrined in art. 4 of the treaty; trade in nuclear supplies. This allows the country to finally obtain uranium and other technologies from abroad. Art. 9 of the treaty stated the peaceful use of any materials or supplies transferred under the treaty; none of the supplied materials can be used for a PNE or for any military purpose. This article is of course essential as the USA is bound by art. 1 NPT not to “assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture, ...” nuclear weapons. Combined with the aforementioned art. 2(4) and art 10 of the treaty, this article lays the foundation for the separation of India's nuclear infrastructure into a civilian and military part. This is one of the core agreements of the treaty. In the words of ambassador Burns even the heart of the treaty. 45 After the IAEA would be granted access to the civilian facilities, its inspectors will carry out inspections to safeguard the facilities and the civil use of the materials acquired from the USA.46

From the creation by Homi Bhabha, India's nuclear programme never made a clear distinction between its civilian and military component. As the first prime minister of India – Nehru – defended the intertwined programme: “I know how difficult it is for a line to be drawn between scientific work for peace and for war.”47 Bhabha subsequently lead the creation of the AEC, which would gain the monopoly on India's nuclear research.48 The Indian nuclear weapon programme started as an offshoot of the general programme of the AEC and its successors.49 Splitting this establishment is thus a significant move for the Indian nuclear establishment. In subsequent documents, India promised to put fourteen out of its twenty two PHWR under safeguard, as well as all future civilian thermal and breeder reactors it would construct.50 However, its present breeder reactors were considered to be still in the R&D

40 Economic Times, Condoleezza Rice Paks a proliferation punch41 Art. 2(2a)42 Art. 2(2g)43 Art. 2(2j); like the ITER Programme, see iter.org44 See for example: The U.S. And India: An Emerging Entente? Hearing Before The Committee on

International Relations, House of Representatives, 1st session, 1945 Ibid. 7246 Art. 5(6c)47 Abraham, I., The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb, 4748 Ibid. chapter 249 Implementation of the India-United States Joint Statement of July 18, 2005: India's Separation Plan, 350 Council for Foreign Relations, US-India Nuclear Deal

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phase and kept outside the IAEA Safeguard. I will discuss the splitting of the civilian and military facilities more in depth in section 1.3.

The final article of importance for this chapter is art. 14: Termination and Cessation of the Cooperation. It was agreed that both parties shall have a right to termination with a one year ahead notice after due consultation of the other party. The most important aspect of this article, however, is sub 4, which constitutes the right of return for all (nuclear) materials, equipment and component provided under the treaty. It has been argued the USA could maintain this provision as a guarantee for India to uphold its unilateral test moratorium.51

With this provision in place, any nuclear test could potentially be much too costly for India as it could lose all materials supplied by the USA. However, from the USA side this is not a declared policy, merely an open option. The USA nevertheless does expect India to continue its moratorium, which it unilateral upholds.52

Having discussed several key provisions of the Indo-USA treaty, I will now move on to mapping several arguments raised in favour or against the treaty. I will start with the discussion in the USA, which is mainly focussed on non-proliferation issues.

2.2 Ratification in the USA

It was noted before that the treaty received strong domestic critique in both countries. In the USA, it was vehemently discussed whether or not the treaty with India would undermine the USA non-proliferation policy of the previous decades and the NPT as a whole. Regardless of fact that the 'nuclear siege'53 on India was lifted, many parties at the (communist) left, including the major opposition party – the BJP – feared India squandered its sovereignty over the nuclear field.54 In this section, I discuss the debate between those arguing in favour of the treaty and those who viewed it as undermining the non-proliferation regime in the USA, in the next section I will map the discussion in India.

In his discussion of the change the deal with India has brought to the USA's non-proliferation policy, Potter describes three major transformations its export policy went through. The first phase was one focussed on keeping nuclear technology secret and out of the hands of other states and was enshrined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. The first transformation occurred in 1954 when the USA started to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy worldwide with its Atoms for Peace programme. When India successfully conducted a PNE in 1974, it would not only lead to a new transformation of the USA export policy, but also made the path clear for the next step in the international non-proliferation regime; the NSG. The final transformation was signalled by the Joint Statement between President Bush and Prime Minister Singh on July 18th 2005.55

The new policy, Potter argues, consists of four assumptions: First, the idea proliferation is inevitable and it is better to manage it, than – in vain – try to prevent it or even attempt at a roll-back. The USA should instead try to sponsor the development of responsible nuclear policies and safeguards for nuclear weapons. The second assumption he distinguishes is the idea that there are good and bad proliferators. Rather than seeing all nuclear weapons as bad,

51 Gupta, A. (coordinator), India-US Nuclear Deal, A Debate, 9652 India Today, US expects India to stick to moratorium on nuclear tests53 Zuberi,M., The Nuclear Breakthrough54 Washington Post, U.S., India Reach Deal on Nuclear Cooperation, 355 Potter W., India and the new look of U.S. Non-proliferation Policy, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No 2,

July 2005, 344

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as most scholars do, he argues the new policy seems to be to accept nuclear armed democracies and allies of the USA. Thus he concludes the “Bush administration is not afraid to distinguish between friends and foes.”56 The third assumption is that bilateral cooperation is more efficient than multilateral mechanisms. The final assumption is that regional issues and economic considerations are more important than global non-proliferation. He argues that the Bush administration apparently viewed its own geopolitical and economic considerations, especially balancing India against China and the billions57 in nuclear trade it would open as trumping non-proliferation.58

Having discussed these four changes in the USA non-proliferation policy, Potter continues to discuss the effects he expects the treaty to erode the NPT and could compromise efforts to strengthen export controls. He raises three arguments why the treaty would erode the NPT.59

First, other states may question the attachment of the USA to the current non-proliferation regime and subsequently start similar exceptions, he notes that – for example – Iran have already pointed out this inconsistency in nuclear exports.60 He wonders how the USA could persuade states like China, Indonesia, Malaysia, etc. to improve their nuclear export controls, or even refrain from exporting while it relaxes its commitments not to do so in the meantime. His second argument why the treaty will undermine the NPT is that several states in the past have given up their nuclear weapons, like South Africa or Ukraine, or their nuclear programmes, such as Brazil and Argentina, in order to join the NPT and the associated trade. Allowing India to engage in this trade without forfeiting its nuclear arms will be resented by these states. Finally, the treaty will frustrate many NNWS with the pace of nuclear disarmament, as the NWS have committed themselves to pursue.61

David Albright, too, argues the deal could be dangerous. He argues that it could pose a risk for the national security of the USA as, he argues, India has a weak export control and Indian companies could become suppliers to the USA's opponents.62 Furthermore, the discovery of the Khan network shows how successful persistent proliferators can be and India's unsafeguarded facilities could be a genuine threat to the non-proliferation regime in this regard. Especially since India has a history of acquiring dual use technologies from foreign producers by similar means.63 Finally, he sees troubles with the separation between India's military and civil facilities, which has been problematic in the five NWSs acknowledged by the NPT as well.64

Oliver Meier questions whether the deal forms the end of the universal non-proliferation regime as we know it. He quotes the Indian Prime Minister Singh that the deal with the USA will not influence the Indian nuclear weapon ('strategic') programme. Meier continues by arguing that, given India's limited domestic supply of uranium65, the privilege to trade in this

56 Ibid. 34557 Times of India, N-Trade: It's a 40 billion Dollar Opportunity58 Potter W.,India and the new look of U.S. Non-proliferation Policy, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No 2,

July 2005, 345-34659 Ibid. 347-34960 Ibid. 35061 art. VI NPT62 Albright, D., Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations Hearing on the US-India

“Global Partnership” and its Impact on Non-Proliferation, 163 Ibid. 2-364 Ibid.65 Estimated at about 112,369 metric tons of uranium. This number ignores the profitability of mining the

uranium. The recoverable amount of unprofitable uranium is around 79,881 metric tons. Tellis, A., Atoms for War?: U.S.-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India's Nuclear Arsenal, 18

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commodity will allow India to free up the majority (or even all) of its domestic resources for its nuclear arms programme.66 He cites sources, claiming that this would allow India sufficient plutonium outside the negotiated safeguards to supply for another 1000 more nuclear weapons.67 An additional concern of his is that the current pro-Western government could be replaced with a more militarist government in the long run, which would not rule out the misuse of civilian technologies and imports.68 Moreover, given the level the Indian civil and military nuclear establishment is interwoven, he fears that the strategic programme will also benefit from technology transfers. All this could cumulate into an arms race between India, China and Pakistan.69 He raises the issue discussed before again, although now specified on Iran. There are strong analogies between the two countries, he argues. Just like India, after it exploded its PNE in 1974, Iran too is under heavy pressure of the international community to cease its nuclear programme. India then persisted in its nuclear ambitions for three decades. He fears that this deal would inspire Iran to persist too, in the hope that in time its programme will be called “open and legitimate” in similar fashion.70 71 On the other hand, an argument in favour that was raised by members of Congress, when the deal with India was discussed, was that India could act as counterweight to, or at least support USA policy against Iran.72

In his report Atoms for War?, Ashley Tellis focuses on the problem discussed above in the context of Meier's paper: will nuclear trade with India free up its domestic resources for its military programme? He starts with a discussion whether or not India would seek the maximal nuclear arsenal it could possibly support. He assumes this is not the case, although there is no way of determining the arsenal India pursues, mainly because it does not know so itself. For it will depend largely on the arsenals desired by Beijing and Islamabad.73 Furthermore, as the Indian programme is not transparent at all, it is hard to determine the Indian supply of WGPu. Nevertheless, there are some numbers available, which allow some approximation of the Indian supplies. Citing numbers estimated by Albright and Ramachandran, Tellis concludes that the Indian government, at the very least, is not in a hurry to expand its arsenal at maximum speed. As the Indian facilities allow for the processing of much more spent full than is used to yield the current estimated 24-40 kg of WGPu, Tellis argues that it is not likely that the Indian government is using all resources within its power to assemble as much weapons-grade fission materials as possible.74 He also out rules the possibility that India tries to amass enriched uranium for the development of uranium235 based fission weapons, as its enrichment facilities are in bad shape and are mostly aimed at producing fuel for the submarine programme.75

Having concluded that India does not seek the maximum nuclear arsenal its resources can support, Tellis moves on to the question whether India's nuclear arsenal is obstructed by a shortage of domestic, natural uranium. He calculates that about fourteen times the amount of

66 Meier, O., The US-India Deal: The End of Universal Non-Proliferation Efforts?, 3567 Ibid. 35-3668 Ibid. 3669 Ibid.70 Ibid. 3871 It can be argued though that the similarities are not as great as Meier suggests, as India is a secular

democracy and Iran has strong theocratic characteristics. He does not discuss this difference though.72 The U.S. And India: An Emerging Entente? Hearing Before The Committee on International Relations,

House of Representatives, 1st session, 1273 Tellis, A., Atoms for War?: U.S.-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India's Nuclear Arsenal, 1174 Ibid. 1475 Ibid. 15

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uranium is used for producing electricity than for the production of nuclear weapons.76 Only when India would dedicate all the PHWRs it has not safeguarded solely to the production of WGPu for their entire lifespan, the demand for uranium would outpace the reasonably assured domestic deposits.77 And this scenario is unlikely as using PHWRs for plutonium production would mean high costs and many complex technical problems (including the high demand such conduct would have on the facilities themselves) for India. Secondly, it would rule out electricity production in these plants, which remains the raison d'etre of the Indian nuclear programme; the ever increasing energy demand of the country would not allow such use of the limited resources the DAE has at its disposal.78 Would India desire to use its PHWRs for the production of WGPu, the most economical way of doing so is merely using a quarter of the core for this. It would be able to do so entirely on its own strength, without relying on the import of foreign uranium.79 Based on his calculations, Tellis concludes that both the maximalist view that India would strive for the largest possible arsenal it could support, as well the minimalist argument that India's domestic supplies are not sufficient for a reasonable arsenal are not valid counter arguments contra the Indo-USA nuclear deal.

In the end, the Senate approved of the deal with India with a large majority of 86 to 13 on October 1st 2008, setting the first step towards civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries.80 Nevertheless, opponents of the deal continued to echo objections of the deal as were discussed above in the subsequent discussions that arose in the next steps of the cooperation between India and the USA. In this section I have mapped the debate in the USA and focussed mainly on the non-proliferation aspects. In the next section, I will map a part of the discussion in India, which was focussed on other aspects; the nuclear establishment, the recognition of India as NWS or Great Power by the USA and India's sovereignty.

2.3 Status or Sovereignty?

The debate in the USA was a debate about the change of a policy of almost thirty years. It was centred on questions of non-proliferation and whether the deal would include India in the Non-Proliferation Regime or it would free up India's meagre domestic uranium resources for nuclear weapons. The debate in India, on the other hand, was focussed on other issues. The proponents pointed at the recognition of India as a Great Power by its future entering in the global non-proliferation regime and billions of nuclear trade it would have access to. The opponents expressed concerns about becoming a junior partner of the USA, the squandering of national sovereignty, but also more general concerns about the nuclear industry as a whole, which is viewed by some as an ineffective and expensive way of creating electricity.

India is one of the fastest growing economies in the world and craves the energy supplies to continue to fuel this growth and lift the millions of poor citizen in the country out of their misery. Nuclear energy has already from India's independence been viewed as a possible solution to this problem, especially with the three-stage fuel circle devised by Bhabha which promised almost unending nuclear power. Nevertheless, India has never managed to achieve the amount of energy generated by nuclear power that Bhabha envisioned.81 Notwithstanding

76 Ibid. 21-2377 Ibid. 2678 Ibid. 28-3179 Ibid. 3180 Washington Post, The US Congress vote database

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this more modest progress than hoped for, many in power in India still view nuclear energy as environment friendly energy which the country craves for.82

Apart from energy concerns, India also desires the recognition as a NWS and to break free from the NPT regime which, as has been discussed, it views as inherently unfair and as a form of neo-colonialism. Permission to trade with other nuclear powers is perceived as an end to the three decades 'nuclear winter.' However, it is also a sign of the status of India, the former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and others in the BJP claimed that India needed nuclear weapons to cement its position as a Great Power. Others, like the current Prime Minister Singh, view the deal as a means to expand the civil nuclear programme without bringing the strategic programme under the pressure of the increasing non-proliferation regime. The separation of the military and civilian programmes is perceived by them as a small sacrifice that allows them to continue their programme of minimal deterrent while the nuclear programme remains credible and can grow much faster due to foreign investments, supplies and technologies.83

The deal, however, has not gone without a strong opposition from multiple sides. The most important attack on the nuclear deal came from the Left. Fearing the USA would gain too much power over India's foreign policy, they characterised the deal as an act of neo-imperialism by the USA. The nuclear deal would be an infringement on India's sovereignty, especially since it would force India to separate its facilities in between the civilian and military facilities, but also it would mean it could no longer conduct nuclear tests as the USA would retain the right of return on the fuel and supplies84 and would not tolerate a breach of India's moratorium.85 Moreover, by fixing the number of facilities which would remain outside IAEA supervision, India would effectively cap it the growth of its strategic arsenal, while its direct neighbours, China and Pakistan, would not do so and thus could build a numerical vastly superior arsenal.86 However, Upendra Kachru argues the Left parties act from prejudice against the USA, not ideology as they do not seem to have any problems of India dealing with other 'imperialistic' countries as France or Germany but also capitalist Russia or Japan. He concludes their opposition is mainly based on short term party-politics and they do not act in the national interest of India.87

Nevertheless, the sovereignty question remained an important argument against the Indo-USA treaty and the perceived problems were connected to the nuclear infrastructure in India itself. According to A. G. Gopalakrishnan, the deal would kill native Indian R&D with the more advanced foreign generators powered with uranium from Australia, Canada or other countries. India, according to him, does not need nuclear trade as it can produce its own thorium based fuel circle88 which would allow it to be fully self-sufficient. In fact, importing nuclear reactors from the USA, France or other countries would take away India's need to develop new and more sophisticated nuclear technologies. Opening India's market for foreign companies would not only kill the indigenous industry and R&D but also make India dependent on the review of the treaty by the USA Congress. A.N. Prasnad, Former Director of 81 Bhabha envisioned about 20,000-25,000 megawatt of nuclear power by 1987. Yet, the country has only

reached the 3,300 megawatt by now. Mian, Z. & Ramana. V., Wrong Ends, Means and Needs U.S. Nuclear Deal with India, 14

82 Gupta, A. (coordinator), India-US Nuclear Deal, A Debate, 8983 Mian, Z. & Ramana, V., Wrong Ends, Means and Needs U.S. Nuclear Deal with India, 1384 Art. 14(4) of the Indo-USA Treaty85 Gupta, A. (coordinator), India-US Nuclear Deal, A Debate, 9686 Ibid. 10387 Kachru, U., The Indo-US Nuclear Deal Debate: What Ideology?88 As designed by Homi Bhabha.

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the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, mentions the liability problems foreign constructed power plants could create when the construction companies walked out, handing over the keys to the NPCI89 The final argument raised in concerning sovereignty and equality of India as a Great Power is that India is still treated as an outcast, not an equal member of the nuclear family. After all, India's access to American technologies and supplies is in the end covered by USA domestic law – the Hyde Act – not by international law, as it would be in the case of a nuclear deal between the USA and China or any other NPT recognised NWS. Another range of arguments were raised in the debate was less concerned with geostrategy and national sovereignty, but with the problem of nuclear energy itself. As noted in footnote 40, the Indian nuclear programme has not developed as fast as Bhabha had assumed it would, nor has India achieved the three-stage fuel circle designed by its founder. Moreover, a number of incidents and the high cost both in the price per megawatt, but also in health of the miners and those around the mines, mills and reactors are cited by those who raise these arguments. The argument is that even after 50 years of heavily government sponsored nuclear industry is still not profitable. The nuclear deal would only prolong the death struggle of an unprofitable and dangerous industry.90

In conclusion, the debate in India was, unlike that in the USA, not focussed on non-proliferation issues, but on domestic issues of status and sovereignty. And, of course, need for energy to support its growing economy. Proponents of the treaty cited India's recognition as nuclear power, without being forced into the discriminatory NPT and access to technologies, money and supplies its nuclear industry needed. With this inflow of technology and investments the nuclear industry could finally be brought to a higher level and the energy cap on the economic growth would easier be improved. Opponents, on the other hand, can be divided in two camps. First those opposing the deal for reasons of national sovereignty, fearing India to become the junior partner of the USA, but also fearing India would become fully dependent on foreign supplies, rather than the domestic nuclear energy circle as designed by Bhabha. The other camp I have discussed opposes nuclear energy as a whole and does not believe it to be a solution to India's energy hunger. The Indo-USA treaty would prolong the struggle of a doomed industry. Having mapped a small, but essential part of the discussion, in both the USA and in India, between the proponents and opponents of the treaty, I will now move on to one of the most celebrated aspects of the treaty by non-proliferation experts; the separation between India's civilian and military nuclear facilities.

2.4 Splitting India's nuclear establishment

The nuclear deal between the USA and India was specifically geared towards nuclear civilian cooperation. And, moreover, the USA was bound by the NPT not to provide means to create nuclear weapons to India. Therefore, (and to satisfy non-proliferation critics) a split between India's civilian and military facilities had to be created before any dual-use goods could be provided. Traditionally, India's nuclear weapons programme has been presented as an 'offshoot' of its general civilian and research programme and is thus embedded in a larger undiscriminating framework.91 Therefore, one of the major obligations of the country was to make a separation between its civilian nuclear facilities and those it deemed necessary for the continuation of its strategic programme. Moreover, this separation was also necessary in order 89 Gupta, A. (coordinator), India-US Nuclear Deal, A Debate, 92-9490 Ibid. 10191 Nuclear Proliferation Assessment, 8

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to classify what facilities would fall under the agreement with IAEA as it agreed to in art. 10 of the Indo-USA treaty. I will discuss this treaty with IAEA in the next section. The separation has been called the: “the primary non-proliferation selling point of the deal, and its purpose is to ensure that outside assistance does not benefit India's nuclear weapons program.”92

Furthermore, it was a conditio sine ne qua non for the USA government to request the Congress to ratify the treaty, as the cooperation between the USA and India should not aid the latter's nuclear weapon programme.93 After all, this would have been a direct violation of the first article of the NPT. Nevertheless even with a separation in place, the deal was not without critics.94 Especially by those who feared the technical know-how would find its way to the strategic programme regardless of the separation. Notwithstanding this objection, it was argued that the more facilities India would put under safeguard (and thus separate into the category of civilian facilities), the more it would be guaranteed to the USA that technology or resources provided would not strengthen India's nuclear military capacities.95

Separating the military from the civilian facilities was not only problematic since they were intertwined, but also because of the shared demand for plutonium. Since India's uranium enrichment facility can produce about 2 kg of WGUr, which is also needed for its submarine and fusion weapon programme. For their simpler fission based weapons, India thus will need to rely on WGPu.96 As was discussed before, India has a limited supply of natural uranium and this was already known from the beginning of its nuclear programme right after its independence. Already in 1956 Bhabha published an ambitious plan for the economic development of India. Harassing the characteristics of different nuclear materials, he devised a plan that would allow India access to almost unlimited nuclear energy. The plan consisted of three stages. The first stage would be to build natural uranium fuelled reactors, with Canadian assistance. These reactors would not only produce electricity, but also plutonium as a by-product. In the second stage, this plutonium would be combined with thorium (a resource India possesses large quantities of), which would produce power and uranium233 as by-product. This uranium233 then, finally, could be burned with thorium. In this final process, more uranium233 would be 'bred' than consumed, allowing for nearly unending nuclear power cycles.97 Another downside for India of the separation was that it was forced to create several parallel facilities. Albright argued shortly after the signing of the treaty that the submarine programme should also fall in the safeguarded category, thus essentially proposing that India should not separate its military and civilian facilities, but its nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon facilities.98 99

On March 2nd 2006, during a visit to India by President Bush, officials of the USA and India agreed on an official separation plan. The plan was set up in a manner that was supposed to be credible, consistent with the 18 July Statement, would not hinder Indian R&D, be cost

92 Kumar, A., Separation of Civilian and Military Nuclear Facilities, 193 ibid.94 New York Times, Bush Urges India to Split Civilian-Military Nuclear Plants95 Squassoni, S., CRS Report for Congress. India's Nuclear Separation Plan: Issues and Views, 1396 Kumar, A., Separation of Civilian and Military Nuclear Facilities, 2-397 Perkovich, G., India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation, 2698 Albright, D. and Basu, S., Separating Indian Military and Civilian Nuclear Facilities, 699 It could, however, be problematic since art. 9 of the Indo-USA treaty specifically calls that none of the

supplies or technologies provided should be used “for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device or for any military purpose” (cursive by author). It thus seems that India is bound not to follow Albright's advice.

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efficient and would be acceptable to the Indian Parliament and public opinion.100 Thus it should not look like India had given in too much to USA demands, which had interest in putting as much facilities as possible on the civilian list, including the two facilities that produced India's WGPu, the Dhruva and CIRUS plants.101 In the agreement with the USA, India promised to put 8 additional PHWRs under safeguard in the period from 2006 to 2014, in addition to the 6 that are already so (of which 2 are still under construction). In total, this would lead to 14 out of the 22 PHWRs being safeguarded. Its FBRs could not be put under safeguard, as they were still in R&D stages.102 The CIRUS reactor was to be shut down in 2010 and several other up-and-down-stream facilities would be marked as civilian and put under safeguard. More importantly, India promised that all new civilian facilities constructed were also to be placed under safeguard, although it retained the sole right to determine what facilities would be considered civilian.103 In return, the USA conveyed its commitment to provide India with a reliable supply of nuclear fuel. Moreover, it confirmed to amend its domestic laws and use its influence in the NSG to allow India access to the international nuclear market. Finally, it promised to aid India in its safeguard negotiations with the IAEA.104

Image 1: the separation plan between the Indian civilian and military nuclear facilities105

100 Squassoni, S., CRS Report for Congress. India's Nuclear Separation Plan: Issues and Views, 16-17101 The latter was built with Canadian assistance, with a pledge to only be used for civilian activities. Canada

had asked the USA to insist that India would honour this pledge. Gopalakrishnan, A., Civilian and Strategic Nuclear Facilities of India

102 And were considered sensitive information by the Indians, which they did not want to become accessible to foreign inspectors

103 Implementation of the India-United States Joint Statement of July 18, 2005: India's Separation Plan, 7104 Ibid. 8-9105 Squassoni, S., CRS Report for Congress. India's Nuclear Separation Plan: Issues and Views, 19

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On the 25th of July 2008, the permanent representative for India by the IAEA send a communication to the secretariat of the organisation, providing a document with the details for its separation plan and with the request to distribute it to the member states to the organisation. In the introduction, India defends its treaty with the USA by referring to its need for energy and the environmental issues of fossil fuels and nuclear power as the answer to these “twin challenges.” India also reaffirmed its intentions of separation and placing its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, while putting itself in the category of “leading countries with advanced nuclear technology such as the United States.”106 Other points of interest it mentions are: it's responsible non-proliferation behaviour; its harmonisation with NSG and the MTCR export controls, notwithstanding that it is member to neither; its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and, more significant, its willingness to work on a FMCT together with the USA.107

Having mounted a large defence against any critique on the Indo-USA treaty, the Indian government moves on to identify to relevant factors for its separation exercise. As relevant factors it names: fuel resource sustainability, technical design, economic viability and a smooth operation of reactors. However, grid connectivity is mentioned as not relevant.108 It then recalls that its nuclear programme is still much smaller than that of other nuclear powers such as the USA, France, the UK, China and Russia and thus the separation process is much more complex than it would be for the aforementioned states. The Indian government concludes the document by providing the list of reactors and other facilities to be placed under safeguard and the USA commitments in return, as ratified by the Indian parliament. Although it contains no factual changes compared to the document agreed upon earlier with the USA, this document is a significant step in India's attempt to gain a reputation of a peaceful nuclear country in the eyes of the international community. I will discuss these intentions more in depth in the second chapter. Before doing so, it is necessary to discuss the treaty this whole separation plan was set up to achieve; the safeguard treaty between India and the IAEA.

2.5 Treaty with the IAEA

The safeguard agreement between the Indian government and the IAEA has often been presented as the non-proliferation trump-card by the proponents of the USA-India treaty. The argument is that India would be able to divert less of its domestic resources to its nuclear weapon programme, even though it would gain access to more nuclear goods in total. More importantly, the safeguard agreement should prevent India from diverting the newly gained technologies and supplies to its nuclear programme. As Squassoni put it: “the safeguards must effectively cover India's civil nuclear fuel cycle and provide strong assurances to supplier states and the IAEA that material and technology provided or created through civil cooperation will not be diverted to the military sphere.”109 This view was also adopted by the Australian government, one of the 35 states represented in the board of governors of the IAEA.110

106 Ibid. 4107 Ibid. 4-5108 The separation is not as much physical as much as it is legal; India does not have to create two separated

energy infrastructures. This is in accordance with art. 1(M) of the Indo-USA treaty, which states that providing power to military facilities is not considered military use. It is interesting nevertheless that the Indian government felt it necessary to mention this.

109 Squassoni, S., CRS Report for Congress. India's Nuclear Separation Plan: Issues and Views, 13110 Australian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, IAEA-India Safeguard Agreement

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Under art. XII (A) of the IAEA Statue, the Agency can apply safeguards to any of its projects or to other arrangements where the Agency is requested to do so by the parties. The purpose of the safeguards is both to assure nuclear (related) goods are not used for military purpose and to make sure the facilities comply with IAEA safety regulations. Under art. XII (A 6), the inspectors have a right to access to all safeguarded materials and the penalty for non-compliance is the suspension or termination of assistance or the withdrawal of any materials provided by the Agency or member states of the IAEA.111 Apart from these “Traditional Measures”, the Board of Governors of the IAEA created so called “Strengthening Measures” which can be either conferred under the existing safeguard agreement or under Additional Protocols. Together, these Strengthening Measures allow the Agency to draw safeguard conclusions. Together with the Traditional Measures, the Strengthening Measures can be integrated in the Integrated Safeguards, in order to reach the optimum combination of safeguard measures for the Agency and the state subjected to the safeguards.112

Before the Indo-USA treaty, several other Indian nuclear facilities had already been placed under IAEA safeguard under several facility specific agreements (66-type agreements).113

The treaty to be discussed here, on the other hand is what the IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei called an 'umbrella agreement.' Rather than having to conclude a treaty for every new facility that was to be put under safeguard, it would automatically provide for every facility India designated as civilian as per the separation plan discussed previously.114

The IAEA-Indian treaty is a modified version of the facility specific agreements, which have been claimed to raise several legal questions. The main problem identified is concerned with the question when India could terminate the IAEA safeguards, especially since the text of the agreement left some space for ambiguities. According to Kimball, McGoldrick and Scheinman, Indian authorities have raised the possibility that the agreement could be broken (and thus safeguarded materials been withdrawn) would the supply of fuel be broken for one reason or another.115 Meier also raises the concern that India offers a very minimalist safeguard plan. As has been discussed in the previous section, only 14 out of the total of 22 PHWRs will be placed under safeguard by the end of 2014. The eight other PHWRs and other facilities such as two heavy water reactors, fast breeder reactors (as it is claimed that these are still in a vulnerable R&D process), processing and enrichment plans will not be safeguarded in the future. The same goes for the two major nuclear research facilities; the Bhabha Research Centre and the Indira Ghandi Centre for Atomic Research.116

Regardless of these concerns, the IAEA-Indian treaty was approved by the Board of Governors of the IAEA in August 2008 and signed by the IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei and Ambassador Saurabh Kumar of India in Vienna on the 2nd of February 2009, opening the path for India to enter negotiate a waiver from the NSG to enter into the nuclear market, supported by the USA.

111 Art. XII (A 7) IAEA Statue112 IAEA, Our Work113 ElBaradei, M., Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors114 Ibid.115 Arms Control Association, IAEA-Indian Nuclear Safeguards Agreement: A Critical Analysis116 Meier, O., The US-India Deal: The End of Universal Non-Proliferation Efforts?, International Politics and

Society / Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 4/2006, p 33

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2.6 The NSG Waiver

Even with the deals between India and the USA and IAEA in place and the separation of the Indian civilian and strategic nuclear programmes under way, India's access to the international market for civilian nuclear resources and technologies was still not secure. The last hindrance it had to take was obtaining a waiver from the NSG, an informal organisation which had been created after the Indian PNE test at Pokhran in 1974. The successful PNE by India showed the world that the NPT would not be sufficient to prevent proliferation by states set on acquiring military nuclear capability. Realising this, several energetic members of Congress started to press to USA's non-proliferation policy in a new direction and in 1975, the USA started to rally other leading industrial states to create a list of goods that were to be put under a closer export regime. In April of 1975, this would result in a secret meeting in London where the NSG was created under leadership of Henry Kissinger. This 'non-proliferation cartel' created extensive lists of goods usable for the production of fissile materials and thus closed the loopholes India had abused. This regime would prove to be a fairly efficient addition to the NPT.117 The NSG currently has 46 member states and its plenary meeting takes decisions by consensus. Having concluded its treaty with the IAEA, India needed to obtain a waiver from the organisation it had inadvertently helped to create and thus would have to convince more than just a majority of the member states to obtain the much desired access to the international nuclear market. Following its intention to live up to the treaty and subsequent agreements with India, the USA announced its intention to support the NSG waiver for India to commence in international nuclear trade.118 Russia was eager to announce its support for the waiver too. Although it has a long history as partner of India119 both political and as supplier of various nuclear resources and technologies, including a reactor120, its influence in India had been slipping over the past years as the latter veers more towards the USA. The announcement was combined with a full PR offensive as Putin visited India and prepared several nuclear deals.121

The conclusion of the waiver would see many other countries like France122, South Korea123

or Australia, which I will discuss as example in the next section, conclude deals with India too.On September 6 2008, the member states of the NSG unanimously accepted the waiver for India to leave its nuclear isolation. Although several governments, such as the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland had tried to create some conditions for India (such as an automatic termination of the waiver, would India resume testing nuclear weapons), USA lobbying and pressure eventually guaranteed a nearly unconditional concession. The only conditions attached for India was that it should make a unilateral statement stating India's commitment to non-proliferation and negotiating an additional protocol with the IAEA. Notwithstanding this pressure, several states, such as Ireland and Japan, did put forth the statement that they would consider any agreements terminated would India resume nuclear testing. The waiver, in practice does not give India unlimited access to new technologies as

117 Perkovich, G., India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation, 191118 The Tribune India, US firmly backs NSG clean waiver to India119 Especially in its former incarnation of the Soviet Union120 Perkovich, G., India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation, 187121 The Times of India, Putin vows to help India get NSG waiver122 The Financial Express, France assures India on NSG waiver123 BBC, South Korea and India sign nuclear deal

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the existing guidelines of the NSG ask the member states to exercise restraint when exporting enrichment and reprocessing technologies.124

The debate surrounding previous steps of the India-USA agreement returned once more at this phase. The controversy was whether admitting India access to the global nuclear market would undermine global non-proliferation efforts, or strengthen them by tying India more thoroughly into the system and demanding concessions it otherwise would never have given. The NSG cited the previous concessions as the India-IAEA deal and Separation Plan as examples of its commitment to non-proliferation. Other facts it celebrates are India's adoption of NSG export standards and its moratorium on nuclear testing.125 I will discuss these arguments more in depth later when discussing the consequences for the non-proliferation regime, for now it is sufficient to mention them. With the NSG waiver secured, India finally gained access to the much desired nuclear technologies and supplies. Having left its nuclear pariah status behind, India now could set the next step in its bid for increased influence and more status as nuclear armed Great Power. Before I will discuss these steps in section 2.8, I will first map the debate as it raged in Australia over the sale of uranium to India.

2.7 A Sign of Acceptance? The Indian purchase of Uranium from Australia

In this section I will discuss the debate in Australia, following the Indian bid to purchase uranium from it briefly to illustrate the debate in other Western states than the USA. I have decided to discuss this country as it contains about 40% of the world's known uranium reserves and the debate on trade in this commodity with India has been heated. I will discuss several pro- and con-arguments and conclude this section with an analysis of Rory Medcalf. On the fourth of December 2011, the national conference of Labor in Sydney endorsed the plans of the government to revoke the ban on selling uranium to India with a small majority of 206 to 185. The arguments used were similar to those in the debate in the USA. Those in favour pointed at the improvement of relations with India, as the world largest democracy and Great Power in the rise. Moreover, the Australian minister of defence Stephen Smith argued the Indo-USA deal has “changed the nature of the discussion about exports of uranium”126

Furthermore, he argued this deal would reward India for the improvements it has made in its non-proliferation efforts. What might be more of a concern from the point of view of non-proliferation experts, is his statement the international community has come to accept India will not sign the NPT.127 The problem with this statement could be that Pakistan's bid to buy uranium as well128 could be accepted now being a party to the NPT is no longer a requirement. This might be worrisome as the clear cut criterion to what states Australia is willing to sell uranium has been undermined. Even though, new criterions could be developed, they are likely to be less clear. Regardless of the fact Australia views India as having a much better non-proliferation record and is thus unique as non-NPT state.129 I will return to this issue of sliding slopes in the third chapter. Returning to the discussion in the Labor convention, other reasons cited for the export of uranium were the economic gain for Australia and the paradox of selling uranium to China,

124 Arms Control Association, NSG, Cngress Approves Nuclear Trade with India125 NSG Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation With India126 DNA, Decision on Uranium Sale to India Significant: Australian Defence Minister127 Ibid.128 Times of India, Why Sell Uranium to only India, Pakistan asks Australia129 The Vancouver Sun, India uranium sales 'unique': Australi

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but not to India. Especially since the former has a much more tarnished reputation concerning the transfer of nuclear materials and technologies. Finally, the Australian minister of foreign affairs, Kevin Rudd, was quoted pondering a “trilateral 'joint security pact' with India and the US.”130 Opponents not only pointed at the non-proliferation risks, similar to those in the USA, but also to the risk of nuclear waste and disaster like struck in Japan earlier in 2011.131 The pro-arguments thus are mainly economic (both in job creation and the amount of tax the exporting industry would pay) and strategic-political in nature, while the con-arguments are mostly concerned with legal issues. After all, Australia is committed not to supply “source or special fissionable material or equipment” to any NNWS, unless it has sufficient safeguards in place. As was discussed before, India has agreed to put some part of its nuclear infrastructure under safeguard, but refuses a comprehensive safeguard.132 Moreover, a deal between India and Australia could also be interpreted as the legitimisation of the Indian nuclear arsenal. Other issues raised by opponents of lifting the export ban cite non-proliferation, as not everyone is convinced of India's trustworthiness in the security of its WGPu or other sensitive supplies.133 But also the fear of a nuclear arms race in Asia134 and the environment were raised as issues. Against most of these objections, Rory Medcalf, a former non-proliferation diplomat, raised a few interesting notions in the Sydney Herald Daily, I wish to conclude this section with. First of all, he argues the NPT should not be conceived as holy as it often is. Regardless of its merits, he points out it is a “messy Cold War deal involving an ethical double standard.”135 India, given its peaceful nature fell outside of this regime. When it later made the decision to test its weapons, it could not be allowed as a NWS under the treaty. And when it did so with a no first use policy, minimum deterrent and mainly aimed at being free of Chinese coercion. He does recall this does not mean that the non-proliferation aspect of the sale should be ignored. Having reminded his readers of this, Medcalf continues to debunk what he conceives as the three main counter arguments. The first argument is the concern that the uranium will not be used for civilian purpose exclusively. However, he points out, the Australian government will not conclude a safeguard agreement weaker than the ones it has concluded with Russia or China, thus the uranium will be kept under close watch and cannot easily be diverted from its legitimate goals. Moreover, the deal will most likely be terminated would India test another nuclear weapon. Secondly, the argument supplying more uranium would free up domestic Indian supplies for nuclear weapons. He agrees with Tellis, whom I have already discussed earlier in this chapter, that this is unlikely. It takes less uranium to make bombs than to power a country; would India require the largest arsenal possible, it would have already done so. Moreover, would this argument be taken seriously, other energy commodities – like natural gas or coal or solar-power knowledge – should be blocked to India as well, since they would free up the demand for domestic uranium as power source too. He finally discusses the critique that selling uranium to India would encourage other countries. However, countries like Iran, North Korea and Pakistan have pursued nuclear weapons for a long time, regardless of how the international community, let alone Australia, treats India. Medcalf concludes with the notion that India might be a flawed giant, but one the

130 Economic Times, Acknowledging India's business and geostrategic importance, Australia agrees to sell uranium

131 The Hindu, Australia's ruling party favours uranium sale to India132 Arms Control Association, Nonproliferation Organization Blasts Australian Government Move to Sell

Uranium to India133 Sidney Morning Herald, India scores poorly in nuclear security ratings134 ICAN Australia, Open Letter Opposing the Sale of Uranium to India135 Sidney Morning Herald, India scores poorly in nuclear security ratings

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international community will need to address many issues. Treating it as a pariah is no longer sustainable.136

Having mapped a part of the Australian debate over selling uranium to India, I will now move back to the USA and discuss the recent developments under the Obama administration. In the next section, I will discuss the attitude of the new president's administration towards India and the near future as India increases its ambitions as global player and desires to join several organisations, for which it now finally has the USA backing.

2.8 Under Obama: Membership of the NSG?

Having secured its access to the international nuclear market and engaging in trade with at least 9 different countries137, India had finally obtained its status as a more or less equal (one of the main reasons why it never joined the NPT was that it considered the treaty discriminatory138) it had sought. With this access to the global nuclear market secure, India and the USA prepared to include India more thoroughly into the global nuclear regime by supporting its membership to several international organisations concerned with non-proliferation. However, under Obama the USA relationship with India also deterred for two reasons. I will first discuss this (temporary) setback in relations as perceived by Siddharth Srivastava and then focus on the Indian bid for membership of the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group, the MTCR and the NSG.139

Obama did not only inherit two wars in the Middle-East from his predecessor, but also an economically challenged country. In this, Srivastava sees two reasons why the relations between the USA and India deterred early under Obama's administration.140 First, the focus of the new administration moved back from setting up India as counterbalance to the emerging (super)power of China (which I will discuss in the next chapter) to combating the Jihadi terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the aid the USA government granted to Islamabad. Both because of the size of the sum (1.5 billion USD) and the clause specifying it could not be used to support in attacks into surrounding country's territory, rather than into Indian territory as the act originally stated.141 This was especially worrisome for India as they perceive Pakistan as the “epicentre of terrorism”142 and New Delhi is concerned this money may be used to support terrorists or separatists against it. The second reason for the strains in the USA-Indian relations under Obama Srivastava perceives was the bad economic shape of the USA and internal, terrorism related, problems of India which the USA warned travellers against. Furthermore, he cites Obama's remarks about reforming the tax code to stimulate the domestic economy and make outsourcing jobs less

136 Ibid.137 BBC, South Korea and India sign nuclear deal138 Perkovich, G., India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation, 441139 The Wassenaar Arrangement is a control regime for the trade in conventional arms and duel use goods and

technologies, the Australia Group is an informal group trying to harmonise the export regulations for goods and technologies associated with chemical and biological weapons. The MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) is a treaty attempting prevent the spread of missiles and other unmanned delivery vehicles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction. The NSG has been explained above. I will return to India's bid to join these different regimes in the next chapter.

140 Srivastava, S., U.S.-India Relations Strained under Obama141 Express India, US Cong panel triples aid to Pak, deletes India reference142 Alan Kronstadt, U.S.-India Bilateral Agreements in 2005, 14

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attractive for companies. These remarks have been viewed “widely as anti-India.”143

Nevertheless, he accepts that the USA and India will remain cooperating closely on defence and nuclear cooperation, despite Obama's call for a nuclear weapon free world, his “grumbles” about the NPT and CTBT144 and the implied reference to those states remaining outside the treaty. He concludes with the remark that India and the USA continue their partnership, although it differs from the one started under the Bush-administration.145

Although Srivastava raises valid points, the USA support for India to join the before mentioned organisations does not seem to indicate a cool-down in the relationship between the two countries, nor a change of policy. The USA indicated it believes India was a most responsible partner in non-proliferation and export control practices and had both the capacity and will to contribute substantially to the global objectives in non-proliferation.146

However, there are also those who have raised issues about India joining the NSG. Yogesh Joshi points out that India joining the NSG would create another exception in the non-proliferation regime, just like the earlier deals between the USA and India, which allowed the latter to engage in nuclear trade, while it would carry on with its nuclear weapon programme. According to Joshi, India has two reasons to join the NSG. First, India would have a hard time getting access to new enrichment and reprocessing technologies, which it requires for its fast-breeder reactor programme, when the new NSG guidelines on the transfer of these technologies enter into force. Second, it would allow India to assimilate further into the international nuclear order and thus bringing it closer to the status as equal of the NWS as recognised by the NPT. Against this, he offers three concerns. First, he raises the old argument of the breach of trust of the NNWS. If they would see the possibility of getting away with nuclearisation, he fears this would eventually undermine the NPT regime as a whole. Second, this exceptional position of India might give the two other de facto NWS, Israel and Pakistan, the desire for a similar treatment. Thus rewarding states who decided to remain outside the NPT. Especially China already raised the issue that would India be admitted, the rules of admission as a whole might need to be revised. Third, the issue of disarmament. India has, regardless of the concessions it made so far147 it has not given any explicit guarantees about disarmament.148

Regardless of these concerns, India has received the support of several of the most important NSG members for becoming a member of this organisation.149 Moreover, the recent year, the cooperation between the USA and India only has increased including the state visit by President Obama and the strategic dialogue in July between the Indian minister of foreign affairs, Shri S.M. Krishna, and secretary of state Hillary Clinton. Improvements in the relations can also be seen in the recent easing of export restrictions of high-technology goods to India, especially goods related to space and defence programmes.150 In fact, the Obama administration intends to remove Indian defence and space related entities from its Entity List by removing India as a whole from the list as a 'country of concern.'151 In conclusion, it seems 143 Srivastava,S., U.S.-India Relations Strained under Obama144 Ibid.145 Ibid.146 United States Communication - “Food for Thought” Paper on Indian NSG Membership147 It considering joining the FMCT and its indefinitely extended unilateral moratorium on testing. See

Srivastava , S., U.S.-India Relations Strained under Obama148 Joshi, Y., India's NSG Bid Raises Nonproliferation Concerns149 The Hindu, India building campaign for membership of multilateral export control regimes150 Reuters, US eases some hightech export curbs on India151 Albright, D., Brannan, P. and Stricker, A., Keeping U.S. Dual-Use Goods out of India's Nuclear Weapons

Program, 2

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the Indo-USA cooperation in nuclear affairs only will increase in the foreseeable future, even though cooperation in other areas might change. Nevertheless, the USA and India need each other for many different reasons and the nuclear cooperation seems to be here to stay if not increase.

In this chapter I have discussed the development from the announcement of the former USA President Bush and Prime Minister Singh to open nuclear trade between the USA and India via the debates that raged in both countries and the additional treaties specifying the split between India's strategic and civilian programmes to its bid to become included in the global non-proliferation regimes by intending to join the NSG, the MTCR, Wassenaar Agreement and Australia group. In the next chapter, I will attempt to create a theoretical framework and map the intentions and the political and geostrategical goals of both India and the USA for this intensified cooperation.

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3. Motives and Theoretical Framework

Having mapped the debates, treaties and other events following the Indo-USA treaty in the previous chapter, I will now continue with the discussion of the geostrategic aims of both India and the USA and attempt to provide a theoretical framework to explain why the USA decided to lift the ban on trading with India after a 'nuclear siege' of 30 years. But also why India moved away from its traditional non-alignment position and anti-balance of power posture it adopted right after its independence. First, I will discuss the USA's interests in a strategic partnership with India. Secondly, I will discuss India's path to become a great power of the 21st century and it's security concerns vis-à-vis its nuclear armed neighbours.

3.1 The USA: Natural Allies?

Several reasons have been cited for the USA to change its standing policy of three decades towards India. Among them India being the world's largest democracy, the previous non-proliferation policy having failed as India has succeeded in building a nuclear arsenal and to reward its good non-proliferation behaviour vis-à-vis other states by strong export controls. Other reasons are India's current rise to great power status. Some even go as far as claiming the country deserves these weapons as a major civilisation, one of the largest countries in the world and a major power of the 21st century.152 Most importantly, however, for the USA is India as a counter balance to the rapid growing China and to use its friendly relations with Iran as a lever to influence the Iranian nuclear policy which starts to become a major headache for USA policy makers. In this section, I will discuss the reasons for the USA to move away from its traditional policy towards India, which:

Remained stuck in the same nonproliferation straitjacket that had doomed all efforts at bilateral rapprochement since the initial Indian nuclear test in 1974, with successive administrations in Washington taking the view that India was an inextricable part of the problem of proliferation because its nuclear capability and the existence of that capability outside various global regimes made it an obstacle to U.S. nonproliferation efforts internation-ally.153

Tellis gives three reasons which made it possible for the USA to adept its policy towards India to the current geopolitical circumstances. First, the USA came to the realisation it is unlikely India's strategic programme will be abandoned in the near future. Combined with the changing attitudes towards China and Pakistan, the Indian programme almost seemed sympathetic from the perspective of USA policy makers. Secondly, the focus shifted away from nuclear weapons arms control to a new competition between great powers and the USA decided the Indian programme would not form a threat to USA interests as the programme is mainly a deterrent to China. The final paradigm shift Tellis notices is the new idea the dual use goods possessed by India's public and private sector are far more dangerous than a formal programme would they fall into the hands of hostile regimes or non-state actors; the Indian export thus needed to more tightly controlled.154 As discussed in the previous chapter, getting Indian radioactive and nuclear sources more tightly under international control was one of the main counterarguments used to counter non-proliferation criticism on the Indo-USA deal.

152 Gupta, A., (coordinator), India-US Nuclear Deal, A Debate, 100153 Tellis, A., India as a New Global Power, 5154 Ibid., 7

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In this section, I will discuss two development forcing the USA to change the policy it maintained towards India for almost three decades: the rise of China and the Iranian nuclear programme. However, before turning to these countries, I will discuss several contemporary balance of power doctrines. With this discussion I will make an assessment whether such a theory can offer a theoretical framework for the new Indo-USA relation. After I have established this framework, I will analyse the Sino-Indian-USA triangle first from the USA's point of view. After that I will discuss the role India can play in the conflict between the USA and Iran over the latter's nuclear programme. Following this, I will turn to the Indian point of view in the second session. First, I will analyse the Indian desire to be recognised as a great power of the 21st century. Secondly, I will turn to the Sino-Indian relations and security issues from the Indian perspective. Finally, I will turn to India's other nuclear armed neighbour: Pakistan and assess the influence of the Indo-USA deal on this relationship.

3.1.1 Balance of Power in the 21st Century

A discussion of the balance of power is important for my argument here for two reasons. First, creating a balance against China in Asia is arguably the real objective for the USA pursued in its interaction with India and appears one of the central pillars in its change of the policy of the past three decades towards the latter. The second reason follows from this; as I am trying to make an assessment of the impact of the Indo-USA treaty of 2005 on the non-proliferation regime, it is necessarily to discuss whether or not the USA desires a strong, nuclear armed India as a balance against China. Even though the deal does not directly influence the Indian strategic programme, knowledge provided through the Indo-USA deal might trickle down and it does legitimize the Indian programme. Moreover, a stronger, wealthier India could pour more resources into acquiring nuclear weapons.

Before discussing the notion of the USA using India as a counterweight against China in Asia, I will first introduce this idea of a balance of power and discuss several contemporary approaches to this doctrine. In the second part of this section I will turn to the question why the sole remaining superpower of the Cold War would need to consider balancing with India against China. The traditional balance of power doctrine often seems to become less and less relevant as the behaviour of states, non-state actors and individuals seems to alter the paradigm in which states traditional followed their objectives of power politics. This point of view is mainly endorsed by those who maintain that between the forces of globalisation and several forms of institutionalism there is not much space any more for this traditional mode of state-driven international relations. Moreover, the dominant position the USA has maintained globally over the past decades indicates to be a disincentive for other states to balance against this hegemon. The debate is thus between those maintaining growing global social forces have overtaken balance of power theories, while realists argue these doctrines still govern the behaviour of states and even that balancing against the USA by other states is bound to happen in the future.155

According to T.V. Paul, Stephen Walt modifies the traditional balance of power theory inasmuch as states do not balance against other states, but they balance against (perceived) threats. Thus, the fact the West -and other powers- are not actively balancing against the USA

155 T.V. Paul, Introduction: The Enduring Axioms of Balance of Power Theory and Their Contemporary Relevance, 1-2

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could be explained as them not seeing the USA as a threat to their interests.156 Furthermore, Paul distinguishes two types of balancing: hard versus soft balancing. Hard balancing is the traditional way of balancing by creating open military alliances to balance against another alliance or state, or to prevent the rise of another state. According to him, this kind of balancing is occurring in many of the conflict ridden areas of the world as the Middle East or (South-)East Asia, where the rivalry between states continues to exist. Soft balancing, on the other hand, is tacit and non-offensive coalition building in order to neutralise a rising or perceived threatening power. It is a kind of balancing aimed at the future, where a state might form a future threat to the security or national interest of a state. Examples Paul mentions here are the Eastern European states cooperating with the USA and NATO against Russia or, relevant for my project here, the USA and India cooperating against China. In essence, soft balancing is short timed and preventive in nature.157 In this approach, the USA is not entering into a long-term military alliance with India, but merely providing it with the means to stand up against China and then move on with other projects. While Paul does not elaborate on this, it would seem unlikely the USA would leave India behind as soon as it deems the latter able to stand up vis-à-vis China. Implied security guarantees or declaration of friendship. Nevertheless, India will most likely be considered a less high priority when it will be able to stand up against China on its own. Seyom Brown distinguishes another way of acting rather than hard and soft balancing; which has become more and more common: 'balking' or 'asymmetrical balancing.' Balking is not acting in accordance with geostrategic or commercial goals in some fields, to show a third party such as the citizens or other countries that a certain state is not afraid of a certain power (at this point in time, most likely the USA).158 Having discussed these three types of behaviour (hard balancing, soft balancing and balking), I will now turn to the question why the USA would seek to balance against another power in the first place.

According to Brown, the USA finds itself more and in a polyarchic world, rather than the unipolar world of the '90s. The field of actors is increasing and does not only encompass states any more, but also all kinds of non-state actors. Where alliances once were clear, they now divergent on different topics and their members assemble on different topics with different friends. Allies in defence issues disagree on the Middle-East problems, while allies in environmental issues such as India and China may have very different views on human right records, etc. Brown states this is not the traditional anarchic state system, but something completely new system; a new state system in which shifting alliances between states and non-state entities will form and be dissolved again. This new system is far less predictable than the traditional one, as states are no longer the only entities and non-state actors pursue an agenda of their own.159

Brown suggests four different ways the USA could respond to the new polyanarchic environment, since acting like the world is still unipolar is no longer viable. The first approach is a 'Pax Americana with teeth'; a neo-conservative and neo-Wilsonian policy of interventions to stabilize and democratize the world. This seems to be close to continuing to act like the world is still unipolar, or at least like the USA is still the primary force on the globe. The downside Brown notes are the exhaustive costs of such a policy and the resentment it might generate around the world. The second possible policy is what Brown calls 'traditional Realism'; the USA ought to 156 Ibid. 8157 Ibid. 14158 Seyom Brown, Adapting to the Evolving Polyarchy, 130.159 Ibid. 128-129

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adopt a patient foreign policy and deal selectively with challenges when they arrive. Under this policy, the USA would prefer bargaining over ordering other countries around, although still backed up by an indisputable military superiority. The downside, however, of such an approach is what the USA should do is a very short list, compared to what it should not do to tame the chaos of the polyanarchic system; it thus lacks vision and ambition to challenge global problems like terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction or global warming. The third option is returning to the pre-WWI policy of isolationism. This neo-isolationism would answer to the crowning unrest over the blood and treasury cost of the neo-conservative wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the anti-Americanism around the world. The USA would no longer seek to transform the world to its own image, but to cut off as many connections with the outer world and the USA should create as many barriers between itself and the rest as possible. The downside of this approach is clear though: the USA is fully integrated in the world economy and a full isolation would not be a very sensible policy. Nevertheless isolationist elements in society and the legislator could seriously constrain 'too internationalist' policies. The final alternative Brown proposes is 'high Realism.' Under this doctrine, the USA would give primacy to its own national interests, yet unlike traditional Realism, it would accept the importance of non-material components of power and the importance of international institutions. High Realism is higher in the sense that it offers more of a vision for the world and has as basic assumption that what is good for the world is good for the USA. This is more than merely idealistic; a world in which there is less poverty will sprang less unstable societies (breeding grounds for terrorists and (religious) fundamentalists) and more markets for USA consumer goods. Interventions are acceptable as long as they serve this goal as long as they are constructive and serve the basic interests of the USA. This vision thus lies somewhere between the renewed Pax Americana idea and traditional Realism.160

The Indo-USA cooperation seems to fit this last approach from this approach. Not only does the USA adopt a position of soft-balancing against China by strengthening India, it also incorporates India into more strict export regime and puts at least a part of its nuclear infrastructure under IAEA safeguards. Thus we can both see 'low' geopolitical interest and the 'high' interest of strengthening international cooperation and the non-proliferation regime.

Before moving on to the two targets of Indo-USA soft-balancing, there is another point of the nature of alliance I will discuss first. Scholars of international relations are no different than other (social) disciplines inasmuch as they disagree and harbour many different notions of some of the core terms. In casu the idea of what an alliance is. In this section, I will briefly follow the coverage of Antonio Henrique Lucena Silva and Augusto Wagner Menezes Teixeira Júnior make on the distinction between alliance, entente and alignment.161 They plead for a narrow definition of alliance, in order not to confuse it with the term 'alignment.' An alignment is according to them an amiable relation between two or more countries and may only cover some topics. Alliances are, however, more formal and made explicit by an agreement or treaty and serve a described goal (such as defending the member's territorial integrity). An alliance is thus a subset of alignment. Finally, an entente is another subset of alignment. According to Lucena Silva and Menezes Teixeira, an entente is an alignment which is broader yet also shorter in scope than an alliance. They cite Robert Kann who says an entente is “a flexible agreement of cooperation between two foreign powers.”162 Ententes 160 Ibid. 132-136161 Lucena Silva, Antonio Henrique; Teixeira Jr., Augusto Wagner, Forging Alliances: Mapping the Balance of

Power between India and China, 3162 Ibid.5

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are thus in scope not as well defined or explicit as alliances are and the nature of the cooperation is different. The word 'entente' seems an odd choice given the association of the word with WWI. Nevertheless, there have been numerous alliances carrying which carried the name entente. However, entente cannot be considered merely a synonym to the word alliance; the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English defines 'entente' as “a situation in which two countries have friendly relations with each other.” The Triple Entente of WWI was not randomly named to distinguish it from the Triple Alliance. It goes beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the origins of this cooperation in detail. Sufficient is to note it was a cooperation between states which had many conflicting interests, yet they were united in their interest in soft balancing against Imperial Germany.163 A similar situation might evolve in East Asia in the 21st century. Combined with the fact the USA Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives too seems to have classified the Indo-USA cooperation as 'entente'164, I would argue the word entente is rightly chosen here as it is less comprehensive than a full-scale alliance. In the case of India and the USA, it seems they are pursuing an entente, rather than an alliance. Although there is a formal treaty between the two, it does not set out a explicit goal of the cooperation. Moreover, if we argue from a balance of power point of view, the treaty itself is not an agreement to create a balance against China or to pressurise Iran. Instead it is aimed at cooperation in the civilian nuclear field yet it may have these underlying, not explicit, motives. On the other hand, we can also not speak of an alignment, as both powers have agreed to cooperation and formalised this agreement. The Indo-USA treaty is in its nature a framework agreement with an open ending, from the point of view discussed here thus an archetype entente.

In conclusion, balance of power doctrine can be used to analyse the behaviour of states and the establishment of alliances between them. Especially in an attempt to explain the reversal of policy as the USA's towards India, such a theory could be useful for a better understanding. The cooperation between the USA and India seems to be an attempt by the USA to soft-balance against China. Finally, I have argued the cooperation between the USA and India can be classified as entente, rather than an alliance as it is a looser way of cooperation. Using this theoretical framework, in the next section I will discuss the USA creating a balance between India and China and thereafter the USA using its improved relation with India as instrument to influence India's policy vis-à-vis Iran.

3.1.2 The Rising Dragon

With the exception of George Friedman in The Next 100 Years, the previous decade165 saw the common assumption among political scientists and policy makers that the 21st century would be the Asian century166, moreover, that it would be the Chinese century.167 If we can assume the balance of power theories I have discussed above as still applicable to the current

163 See for more details Taylor, A., The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1914164 The U.S. And India: An Emerging Entente? Hearing Before The Committee on International Relations,

House of Representatives, 1st session165 It now seems to become more and more the common assumption that no power will be the leading power, but

that a “Polyarchic” system will evolve. Nevertheless, Asia will be the location of three of the great powers, all in proximity to each other.

166 For example: Ladwig, W., India and the Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific, 118167 See for example: Jaques, M., When China Rules the World

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international environment, it can only be expected of the USA to balance against China, not to destroy the country but to maintain the status quo as much as possible by containing the country and its sphere of influence. India is the perfect (and only) candidate for this, as it is the other power of comparable size on the rise in Asia168 and has the 1962 war still clearly in mind. Yet the country cannot match the People's Republic in either economic sense, nor in military power on its own. Nevertheless, India is closing the gap with its recent test of the Agni V missile169, which finally Beijing and other major Chinese coastal cities in the range of nuclear warheads. India thus has entered the exclusive club of states possessing missiles with this range.170171 Support by the USA in these achievements is of course not clear, but its aid in getting India aboard of several export regimes cannot hinder the next step in India's missile programme. Moreover, the fact that India is not condemned by the USA or even considered a threat by NATO172 seems to be more than clear indication of the USA's intentions with regard to India as the Agni V weapon is clearly designed to close the missile gap between the two Asian giants which China opened by stationing nuclear armed missiles in Tibet,173 which I will discuss more in detail in section 3.2.2.1.

In my introduction to this thesis, I have already discussed many forms of cooperation between India and the USA. Important here to recall are the 2003 and 2007 naval exercises conducted by India and the USA, joined in 2007 by Japan, Australia and Singapore and condemned by China as an encirclement of China by an 'axis-of-democracy.'174 In response to the growing Chinese naval activities, the USA is thus showing its strength in the Indian Ocean and seeks new allies to offset its relative decline in strength. Once more, it thus can be concluded the USA is using regional powers to (soft) balance against the growing Chinese assertiveness and naval strength. Of all the regional powers, India is the only one which could ever hope to match China in naval strength, it can thus be expected the USA will seek more cooperation with India in naval affairs in the future.

Finally, the USA has vowed to “help India to become a major world power in the 21st

century.”175 This does not only include enhancing its military and economic capacities, but also its global standing. As we have seen (and I will discuss also from the Indian point of view later), voices have been raised in support of an Indian seat in the UNSC. If we follow Tellis' assumption that a reorganisation of the UNSC will happen sooner or later, India's permanent membership will have very few disadvantages for the USA and its goals. Would the USA opt for a strategy of neglect vis-à-vis the UN, which it views as too cumbersome and byzantine, the support for India's claim would not cost it anything. On the other hand, would the USA allow the UN as leading institute in international relations India could be a useful ally in the UNSC as fellow democracy, but also as a non-Western power the support of which could raise

168 1.3 billion people v 1.2 billion, although a GNP (PPP) of $11,290 billion v $4,46 billion and a military expenditure of 4,3% v 2,5% (source: CIA World Fact Book)

169 Washington Post, India Tests Missile Capable of Reaching Beijing170 Times of India, Agni-V launch: India demonstrates ICBM capability; China reacts cautiously, says India not

rival171 The Times of India called the Agni V an ICBM with its range of proximately 5000 km while the

Encyclopedia Britannica defines a ICBM as a ballistic missile with a range of more than 5600 km. The Angi V would thus 'merely' be an IRBM.

172 Washington Post, India Tests Missile Capable of Reaching Beijing173 Bhasin, H., The Big Three, 66174 Ibid. 35175 Ibid. 36

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the legitimacy for USA sponsored resolutions.176 Regardless of when this reform of the UNSC will happen, the support for India's claim shows the USA sees India on many levels as a partner in important issues, such as Pakistan, trade policy, Iran and climate change.177

India itself, however, does not perceive its relationships with the USA and China as a zero-sum game. It asses its relationship with China based on the latter's relation with Pakistan and the other states on the sub-continent and is less interested to act as a rival of China.178

Moreover, as both India and China enjoy an unmatched growth, trade volume between the two will only increase and the relations between the two seems to warm up and bilateral trade between the two countries stands at at least $50 billion a year and will most likely only increase in the future179, even though many Indians still the surprise attack by China in 1962 clearly in mind.

Emmot provides several recommendations for USA foreign policy makers to prepare for the future. The first and most important one is for the USA to seek to aid India in as many ways as possible. A strong India, he argues, will mitigate the fear of a strong China. However, this should only be done by conventional and economic means. With regard to the nuclear field India should be kept in line.180 If the USA truly wishes to create a balance with India, it will have to show India its intentions and overcome the suspicion of the Indian Left that it seeks to dominate the country. Aid is necessary, but India should be viewed as an equal if the USA needs its friendship as a counterweight to the strength of the emerging China. However, some fear the USA preparing India as counterweight to China will do little more than increase the tensions between the USA and China, but also between India and Pakistan, the latter which will be used and supported by China to balance against India.181 In their view, balancing will only lead to conflict and maybe even war. Balance of power doctrine unfortunately cannot answer this question as it has both been cited as the source of war and the preserver of peace.182 In the end, it will be up to Indian, Chinese, USA and Pakistani policy-makers to seek good relations and prosperity for all. However, the USA as the still dominant power carries extra responsibility in casu, as a paranoid stance towards China and seeking to bar its entry of the world stage as a great power will be most counterproductive for all sides involved. If it decides to follows Emmot's recommendations and constrain itself in its attempts to increase India's capabilities, a balance of power between India, China and the USA could allow other countries in Asia to overcome their fear of Chinese power and promote peace and stability in (south-)east Asia.

3.1.3 Nuclear Bombs in the Desert?

The question of Iran was quickly raised in the USA Congress when the agreement between President Bush and Prime-Minister Singh was announced; especially the relations between New Delhi and Tehran and the lack of Indian concern with a possible Iranian nuclear weapon.183 Regardless of the fact that the view is shared even by the Mossad that Iran does

176 Ibid. 30177 New York Times, Countering China, Obama Backs India for U.N. Council178 Raghavan, Charting an India-U.S. Nuclear Relationship, 6179 Ladwig, W., India and the Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific, 115180 Emmot, B., Rivals: How the Struggle between China, India and Japan will shape our next Decade, 258-259181 Mian, Z. & Ramana, V., Wrong Ends, Means and Needs U.S. Nuclear Deal with India, 12182 Barash, P. & Webel, C., Peace and Conflict Studies, 320-324183 The U.S. And India: An Emerging Entente? Hearing Before The Committee on International Relations,

House of Representatives, 1st session, 9

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not truly pursues a nuclear bomb184, it cannot be ruled out it seeks a similar position India held for a long time, the position of Tellis' alternative IV, 'Recessed Deterrent'185. Or even a force-in-being: “a deterrent consisting of available, but dispersed, components that are capable of being constituted into usable weapon systems during a supreme emergency.”186 Concerned by this possibility of a force-in-being or driven by other, domestic issues, many uphold that India should join the USA, IAEA and other Western countries in their attempt to coerce Iran in abandoning its enrichment programme. Doing so, they forget that India is a democracy as well with its own legitimate interests and a parliament which controls the government. India has several reasons to pursue good relations with Iran. For the sake of my argument I will ignore the possibility good relations with Iran is used as a balking strategy by India. First of all, there are the domestic issues, which more often than not dominate the foreign policy of a state. India, being an economy on the rise has a massive appetite for the energy and fuel provided by Iran. In February 2012 – in spite of Western sanctions against Iran – India has even stepped up its ties with Iran, increasing its oil imports, but also invested in Iranian infrastructure improving access to the energy supplies of Central-Asia.187 Although it later reduced it again under USA pressure.188 A second important domestic reason for India to refrain from alienating Iran is its large Shiite minority, which is sufficient in size to be considered an important voting bloc. Finally, there are also strategic reasons for India to maintain close ties with Iran. Furthermore, during the Indo-Pakistan war in 1971, Pakistan parked its air force in Iran, which is something India wants to avoid from happening again. Finally, Iran borders not only on Pakistan, but also on Afghanistan, two countries India has a momentous strategic interest in and is thus unwilling to squander the current good relations, even for the civilian nuclear cooperation with the USA.189 The USA will have to accept there is a limit to what extent India is willing to ally itself and that the country lives in a different geopolitical reality than the USA. On the other hand, India will need to learn that it cannot have its cake and eat it, maintaining close connections with both Iran and the USA might become difficult would the conflict between those two countries escalate further. On the other hand, would both eventually be willing to seek improvement of relations, India could become a peace broker for the two countries.

Where the goal of the USA policy towards India in regard to China can be described in terms of balancing, it seems unlikely the USA attempts to use India to balance against Iran. While it does improve its relations with India in an effort to influence the latter to put pressure on Iran there is less need to balance as Iran hardly forms a physical threat to the USA or its interests. While the USA might attempt to form an entente with India against Iran, the discrepancy between the power of both is of such magnitude that any form of balance between the USA and Iran is out of the question. Having provided a theoretical framework of the balance of power doctrine and assessed how the USA's change of policy fits within, I will now turn to India and its search for security vis-à-vis China and it desire to be recognised as a major world power.

184 New York Times, U.S. Faces a Tricky Task in Assessment of Data on Iran185 Possessing the resources and knowledge to assemble a nuclear weapon within months; Tellis, A., Toward a

'force-in-being': the logic, structure, and utility of India's emerging nuclear posture, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 25, No 4, 62

186 Ibid.187 The Times of India, Unfazed by US Sanctions, India to Step up Ties with Iran188 BBC, India to cut Iran oil imports by 11% amid US pressure189 Bhasin, H., The Big Three, 37

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3.2 India: Recognition and Security

In the previous chapter, I have shown the difference between the debate in India and in the USA. Whereas in the latter it was dominated by geopolitical and non-proliferation concerns, in the former the debate was focused on sovereignty and prestige. Notwithstanding this debate, India has of course its own geopolitical concerns, which differ from those of the USA. This often leads to confusion and frustration in the latter. In this section, I will first discuss one of the main desires of India; to be considered a great power, equal to the other great powers of the 21st century: the USA, EU, Russia, Japan and China. Second, I will discuss the balance of power between India and its fellow giant and competitor in Asia: China and analyse the Sino-Indian relationship. I will focus my discussion on two aspects here, missile capability and naval power, especially in the Indian Ocean. Finally, following the discussion of India and China, I will discuss the relations between India and its arch nemesis on the subcontinent: Pakistan.

3.2.1 One Among Equals

India's emergence as a decisive player in the bilateral relations between the USA and China has been called one of the geopolitical landmarks of the previous decade.190 The diplomatic moves employed by India to achieve this position do not only entail the Indo-USA nuclear deal of 2005, but also the Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity China and India concluded on the 11th of April, 2005. The main goal of this aim of this deal was to end the border conflict over Aksai-Chin which has existed since the Sino-Indian war of 1962, which I will later discuss in more detail. Equally important for the treaty is the mutual desire to enter into a more cooperative relationship and to increase trade and economic ties. Both agreements seek to increase India's international standing to a similar one as China. As Subrahmanyam has argued, the Indo-USA treaty of 2005 underlined the potential of India to become the sixth major world power in a global balance of power system in the 21st century.191 However, he does not see the balance of power of the coming century as a military struggle which will be won by nuclear bombs and missile technology, but by economic and innovative power. In order to achieve this, India needs more to rise as a giant of the 21st century than economic prowess and to retain its current growth for the coming decades. It also needs access to sophisticated technology and investments in infrastructure which is paramount to maintaining this position. The first steps for this have been taken by the Indian access to USA civil nuclear technology and investors as energy is one of the bottle necks India is currently facing hindering its economic growth. In this light, we can also perceive the Indian wish to ascend to several non-proliferation and export control regimes as well as a desire to be part of the political leadership of these regimes as well as a desire to access to the dual use goods and technologies. Membership does not only bring the prestige and image of an India taking up the responsibility of a great power, it also grants access to goods otherwise hard to obtain.

As was discussed before, the Indo-USA treaty of 2005 can be viewed as a de facto legitimization of the Indian nuclear weapons programme and it was claimed this would bring India to the rank of Great Power in the eyes of the USA.192 Indian policy makers will not have missed this, nor will they have missed the coincidence between the NWS under the NPT and 190 Wolfe, A.,Bendersky, Y., Bordonara, F., India, China, the U.S. and the Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean191 The other five being the USA, the EU, China, Japan and Russia. Subrahmanyam, K., Wanted, Leaders With

Vision192 Rajagopalan R., Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Implications for India and the Global N-Regime, 95

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the Permanent Members of the UNSC. India has long aspired to obtain these positions and the lacking thereof has been experienced as humiliating, especially since it refused to go nuclear in first instance, until it viewed geopolitical circumstances as forcing it do so and even then with great reluctance and with 'merely' a PNE, unlike the NWS which all tested several full-fledged nuclear weapons.193 Given the way the status of being a NWS and being one of the permanent members of the UNSC are intertwined, it seems logical India would push for both. And indeed the country has pleaded for such a seat. Not only because of its nuclear weapons but because of its successful democracy of huge diversity and sizeable population and the fact the country is a charter member of the United Nations, has participated in a great number of international institutions and participated often in peacekeeping operations in sometimes very challenging environments ever since the foundation of the UN.194 Moreover, the country got the USA into backing it to obtain the permanent seat, although such a move will require a treaty reform and the USA noted it seeks a more thorough reform of the UN. Yet such a reform will be hard to achieve as China, Pakistan and others will most likely see their interests being threatened. Tellis argues the USA have good reasons for doing so; as the country will take its place among the world's top five economies as it overtakes Japan, Germany and other European economies in the coming decades. The question is thus whether India is an equal great power with its de facto legal nuclear arsenal. At the very least it has showed determination, but also reliability as far as non-proliferation is concerned. Contrary to other states, India never sought to spread nuclear weapons and has voluntarily maintained a strong export regime. Nevertheless, India will still be seen as an outcast of the nuclear club as it cannot obtain the status of de jure NWS without breaking the NPT open, as any change to the definition of NWS would open the floodgates for other states seeking such a position. This would, however, open a Box of Pandora as no clear distinction would be possible again as could be made in 1968 as there would be no way to exclude other -unwanted- powers from obtaining the NWS status at the same time as India. A new document thus seems as unlikely as an amended version of the NPT, at least until some form of nuclear disarmament can be agreed upon. Nevertheless, India has shown a much more mature and balanced position than the other non-signature states in separating its nuclear establishment and allowing the IAEA to inspect its civilian facilities, like the de jure NWS do as well. Moreover, it maintains a unilateral moratorium, as discussed in the previous chapter.

In conclusion, India's support for the deal can thus for a major part be explained due to the de facto recognition it sought; the great power status attached to a legal nuclear arsenal195 status it intended to obtain and the permanent seat in the UNSC which seems to be associated with it strongly desired by India. as I have discussed in this section. However, equality and status are not the only incentive for India's strategic programme. There are also its nuclear armed neighbours, one often seen as the incarnation of the economic rise of Asia, the other the Indian arch nemesis straight on from the independence of the subcontinent from the British Empire. In the following two sections, I will discuss the troublesome relations of India with its major neighbours and the explosive, nuclear triangle they form.

193 Abraham, I., The Making of the Indian Nuclear Bomb, 142194 Tellis, A., India as a New Global Power, 28195 Contrary to illegal or at least unrecognised nuclear weapons stockpiles, which seems to be more and more

some form of criminal act in modern international relations

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3.2.2 A Balance Between Giants

In section 3.1, I have discussed the global balance of power from the point of view of the USA. As China is on the rise and the USA sees this as a potential threat, it will seek allies to cancel the Chinese changing of the status quo and keep a check on it. India is the perfect counter for this, as I have discussed. However, India has traditionally not been very interested in maintaining a balance of power. Already at its independence in 1947, the first Indian Prime Minister Nehru believed alliances and counter-alliances were the underlying cause of war. India thus already from its conception tried to remain unaligned in the rapid developing Cold War around the world.196

Nevertheless, as I discussed in the previous chapter in the section on the uranium trade deal between Australia and India, India does seek – at the very least – independence from China and to carve out its own sphere of influence in South Asia. Indian interest thus seems to be changing from non-alignment to a proactive role, especially now China seems to be on an unstoppable march forward.197

Moreover, USA policy makers will have to take into account that India is a parliamentary democracy in its own right and has an independent view on its own security and interests, which I will discuss in this section. Unlike the USA, the global balance of power is not (yet) a major concern for Indian policy makers. India has since the incident of the American ships in the Gulf of Bengal not been truly threatened by USA arms, Russia has been a major ally and various great powers from other regions are not a threat. However, it is concerned with the balance of power in South Asia as China grows more vigorous. In this section I will discuss the increase of Indian cooperation with other South (-East) Asian countries which it has engaged in in an effort to balance against the increasing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean and South Chinese Sea. But also in the increasing missile capability India has been developing over the past few years. I will first discuss the missile gap existing between India and China as this has played a major role in the Indian security view. China is not only an NWS under the NPT, its main cities are located far away on the coast, while the Indian cities located in northern India lay under the range of the nuclear armed warheads in Tibet. Only recently, with the recent test of the Agni V missile198, India has managed to close this gap. Following this discussion, I will move on to the other major area where confrontation may lay in the future; the Indian Ocean and the South Chinese Sea.

3.2.2.1 Deterrence over the Himalayas?

The Sino-Indian conflict emerged right after India's independence over the status of Tibet. Even though India was in no position to oppose the annexation of the Himalayas theocracy by China, it did voice a strong opinion about it. The conflict, leading to the Sino-Indian war of 1962, started over the desert plateau of Aksai Chin. The Indians had never assumed China would challenge the control of this desolated piece of land thus the occupying forces were weak and ill equipped. When the Chinese mounted their offensive, it came as a complete surprise to New Delhi. The war would be over quick, with the Chinese occupying a large territory, but not as much as they could have taken even with the international aid India would quickly start to receive. To make matters worse for India, China quickly settled some of its border issues with Pakistan a year later by ceding parts of the territory it occupied in 1962, 196 Raju Thomas, “The South Asian Security Balance in a Western Dominated World”, 312. In: Ibid. 305-333197 Although there are several remarks that can be made in this regard, mainly Friedman's arguments in The Next

100 Years. Discussing this will, however, go beyond the scope of this thesis.198 Washington Post, India Tests Missile Capable of Reaching Beijing

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which India claims as well. The war quickly showed the world who was the superior power in Asia and gave China a comfortably defensible border with India running through the world's highest mountain ranges.199 Worse from the Indian perspective, the Chinese proceeded with deploying nuclear armed warheads on the Tibetan highlands, thus having the major cities of India's north within range, while the large Chinese cities as Beijing would remain safe from any Indian retaliation.200 Only now with the successful test of the Agni V missile, can India mount a credible deterrent against China. In compliance with its 'no first use' policy, the Agni V missile uses solid fuel and can be fired from mobile launching pads, making it a weapon suited for retaliation.201 China's response was lacklustre, or at least downplaying the Indian achievement. The Indians claimed to be on par with the Chinese. “We are located in one of the most complex and adversarial WMD environments in the world, by virtue of our geography” and “If you are in a hostile environment, power respects power” according to retired Commodore C. Uday Bhaskar.202 The Chinese on the other hand pointed out the Chinese nuclear capability is stronger and reliable but also downplaying the Indian achievement, emphasising out that New Delhi had no chance of catching up with China.203

Recalling to Paul's discussion of the balance of power, it seems clear India is balancing against China, which it still perceives as a threat, regardless of the economic initiatives both are deploying in order to try to improve relations. The annexation of Tibet by China had created a missile gap which has been insurmountable for India for a long time. The war of 1962 made the Indian position even less defensible with the Chinese occupying even more high ground and creating a highway through this territory to connect Tibet with the rest of China.204 It is of course impossible to say whether the Chinese are right with their assumption India will not be able to keep up with them. However, it remains to be seen whether India needs to. There are no useful parallels in history as both the Anglo-German dreadnought race in the first decade of the twentieth century as well as the USA-Soviet nuclear weapon race cannot give us indications how this arms race might develop. The first one occurred in a different era but more importantly also in another type of arms. India does not need the same number of missiles as China has. Being able to reach the major cities in the coastal areas is sufficient as deterrent. On the other hand, the Cold War is also not a useful comparison as the countries are both developing, not (yet) full-fledged superpowers. Neither has the resources to spare to invest as massively in its armaments as the USA and Soviet Union could. It seems likely that more or less a balance has been achieved between India and China across the Himalayas which can only be overcome by a sudden increase in technology from the other side able to counter the missiles deployed. Thus, India and China are not as much involved in an arms race like the USA and Soviet Union were during the cold war, but each strives to acquire a 'Strategic Insurance Policy' vis-à-vis the other.205

Finally, the question arises about the influence of the Indo-USA cooperation on the Indo-Chinese missile gap. Most of the Agni V programme was developed indigenous. Nevertheless 199 Emmot, B., Rivals: How the Struggle between China, India and Japan will shape our next Decade, 225-227200 Bhasin, H., The Big Three, 66.

Bhasin concludes that if his sources are correct, about three quarters of the Chinese nuclear capable medium and intermediate ranged missiles are aimed at India from this position. See ibid. note 14.

201 Washington Post, India Tests Missile Capable of Reaching Beijing202 As cited in ibid.203 Times of India, Agni-V launch: India demonstrates ICBM capability; China reacts cautiously, says India not

rival, 2204 Emmot, B., Rivals: How the Struggle between China, India and Japan will shape our next Decade, 225-227205 Ibid. 256

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as I discussed already in the previous chapter, India has also made a bid to join the MTCR which the USA supports. Cooperation with the USA could thus improve the Indian missile arsenal by admitting the country to markets the Chinese do not have access to.206 Unlike the USA, India is openly engaging in hard balancing against China. Still disturbed by the war of 1962, it seeks to close the missile gap by all means necessary and thus achieve security.

Having discussed the Indo-Chinese struggle over the Himalayas and the missile gap which followed the Chinese occupation of the highlands, I will now turn to the other major area of competition between the two rising powers of Asia and investigate whether or not the same strategy of hard balancing can be seen on the waves of the Chinese Sea and Indian Ocean.

3.2.2.2 “He Who Commands the Seas, Has Command of Everything”207

In an increasingly globalised world, sea lines of communication and transport of goods and energy are more important than ever. Maritime trade is the lifeline for many countries, especially for those which are bordered by inhospitable terrain on most sides, like India and China. However, the seas are more than the guarantees of economic prosperity; they are the means for countries to project their power far beyond their borders. And controlling them is also a major source of prestige, ever since the German-British dreadnought building race prior to WWI.208 It is thus no wonder countries on the rise will invest in mighty fleets to protect their trade and show the world their technological prowess. This goes for both China and India, which have recently joined the exclusive club of countries possessing aircraft carriers.209 Moreover, India invested over $8.13 billion in Project Seabird, which consists of building a new naval base, air force station, a naval armament depot and several missile silos.210 This project seems to be India's step in the struggle with China and Pakistan over access to the energy supplies of the Middle East, but also as a counterweight to the Sino-Pakistani cooperation in the Arabic Sea and Western parts of the Indian Ocean.211

With the fall of the Soviet Union, India lost its main supplier of arms and subsidized oil and a major trading partner. On the other side, the disappearance of ideology from international relations, freed the country to start to associate itself with countries previously associating with the Western block. The policy launched by the Indian Prime-Minister Rao, 'Look East', would start form a major shift in the Indian foreign policy. Not only in an economic sense, but also in a strategic sense, this new policy would transform India and put it on its current path. Over the past two decades, India has increased its ties with ASEAN countries and the annual trade between the two has risen sharply over the past years. For India, the ASEAN countries are a welcome trade partner in the region, but also an area where it can exercise its influence. For the ASEAN countries on the other hand, India is a welcome change to a region which has been dominated by China and Japan for a long time.212 Interaction between the AEAN and 206 As China is not a member to the MCTR, although it does indirectly support it. Moreover, China is a sponsor

to the less comprehensive Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation of 2004207 Proverb by Themistocles (c. 528-462 BC), the creator of the ancient Athenian naval power. Cicero, Ad

Atticum, X, 8, as obtained from Barlett, J., Familiar Quotation, 14th Edition 208 Taylor, A., The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1914, Chapter XX209 India launched an indigenous build aircraft carrier in December 2011 (The Hindu, Navy Floats out First

Indigenous Air Craft Carrier), while China plans to launch its first two carriers in 2015 (globalsecurity.org, Aircraft Carrier Project)

210 Wolfe, A.,Bendersky, Y., Bordonara, F., India, China, the U.S. and the Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean211 Bhasin, H., The Big Three, 64212 Ladwig, W., India and the Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific, 112

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India has also stepped up in other areas, mainly naval cooperation. Since 1991, India has increasingly held naval exercises with countries such as Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. Not only to show it's capability and train cooperation, but also to 'show the flag' in the South Chinese Sea, an area exclusively claimed by China. A final objective of the Indians is to have naval presence near the Street of Malacca; the narrow street separating the Indian Ocean from the South Chinese Sea, one of the most crucial sea lanes in the world.213

Phase two of the Look East policy consisted of expanding the cooperation beyond the ASEAN countries and extend it to countries like Australia, Cambodia, South Korea and Japan. This move was underscored by Washington and its strong encouragement for India to take this role upon itself.214 Amongst others, the Indian and South-Korean navies entered into joint naval manoeuvres in 2000, 2004 and 2006. And in an exercise with the USA, Australia and Japan in 2007.215 With Japan, the Indians even went further in entering defence ties. After all, both countries have a strong interest in limiting the Chinese influence in (South-)East Asia and unlike most other countries in the region, India does not hold grudges from the past versus the Japanese. India thus seems to be linking up with other (quasi) democratic powers in the South Chinese Sea and Indian Ocean, which is not inasmuch aimed against China, but driven by China's success, according to Emmot. As he formulates it: “The main problem of Asia is fear and suspicion about China. It is not likely to go away.”216 India seems to recognise this and is more than willing to step up and offer an alternative to the countries in the Indian Ocean and Pacific region which they gratefully accept.China has of course not been sitting idle as I have already discussed, the country also grows more vigorous and more interested in protecting its interests and encircling India by the so called “String of Pearls” of naval bases among the Indian Ocean. Not only in the form of the aforementioned cooperation with Pakistan, but also setting up naval bases on the Coco islands with permission of Myanmar217, near India's sole integrated Strategic Joint Army-Navy-Air Force Headquarters of FORTRAN which oversees the Indian units guarding the before discussed Street of Malacca.218 Both China and India thus seem to try to increase their influence and set up cooperation with surrounding countries. Although China is generally stronger present on the seas and has a longer history of setting up naval bases around the South Chinese Sea and Indian Ocean, India enjoys the support of the USA and Japan in this regard. Moreover, the country can posse itself as a not authoritarian alternative to South-East Asia which has been living in the shadows of China for long. India is thus clearly in attempting to hard balance against China, the above discussed Project Seabird and desire for aircraft carriers and its submarine programme219 are sufficient witness of this. Moreover, it tries to create ententes and alliances to withstand the Chinese power. The Chinese on the other hand seem to be more engaged in soft balancing. They attempts seems to be more aimed at maintaining the status quo, which is not surprising as they enjoy the advantage. Recent events in Myanmar, however, could upset this balance if a democratic, more pro-India polity would arise, rather than the military junta which has enjoyed support of China.220

213 Ibid.214 The Hindu, Looking East: Phase Two215 Bhasin, H., The Big Three, 67216 Emmot, B., Rivals: How the Struggle between China, India and Japan will shape our next Decade, 257217 Indo-Myanmar relations were always hindered by the military coup and India's desire to see democracy

returned, while China was willing to support the military junta. Bhasin, H., The Big Three, 65218 Ibid.219 Yogesh Joshi, Leased Sub Key to India's Naval Modernization220 Which would be a logical consequence of a more democratic India, assuming Michael Doyle was correct

about the way (liberal) democracies tend to band together.

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The role of the USA seems to be less determinated by the Indo-USA nuclear cooperation, but following from the general interest of the Bush regime to engage in an entente with India to soft balance against China. The fear of the USA for China seems to be much less existentialistic than the fear many Asian countries have, now it is on its rise again. Indian policy towards China is thus in this regard fundamentally different than the USA policy, although they coincide for the time being.

3.2.3 Rivalry on the Subcontinent

Having discussed the relations between India and its giant neighbour, China, it's time to turn west and look at India's adversary on the subcontinent, with which the relations have been even rockier than with China. Already since the independence of the subcontinent for the British Empire after WWII, India and Pakistan have been each other's arch-nemesis. Having fought three wars over control of Jammu and Kashmir221 and one over the independence of Bangladesh there is much bad blood between the countries. Although India has seven times Pakistan's population, four times its territory, six times its GDP and a higher annual growth, Pakistan has managed to remain a significant number two on the subcontinent for decades, although with considerable military support of the USA.222 However, since this aid was suspended in the last decade of the previous century this status has been more and more dilapidated. Even though the support has been increased again significantly since the war in Afghanistan, it is not clear Pakistan can catch up with India any more. As its relative decline vis-à-vis India increased, the country sought sanctuary in nuclear weapons. Its leadership even went as far as proclaiming that “If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own. We have no other choice.”223 With the defeat of Pakistan in the war of 1971 where the country suffered a significant military defeat, as well as half its population (the secession of the newly formed state of Bangladesh) and its strategic location surrounding India, Pakistan saw little choice but to 'go nuclear' to counter India's massive conventional supremacy.224 Moreover, the Indian PNE of 1974 provided an additional simulative for the country to seek nuclear deterrent against India. It goes beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the origin of the Pakistani programme, it is sufficient to state that by means of an underground network that has yet to see its equal and has been at least as much a challenge to global non-proliferation efforts as the Indian programme has been, the Pakistani got hold of technologies and goods to acquire the bomb of their own. Finally, on the 28 th of May 1998, a few days after the Indian test, the Pakistani tested five nuclear bombs, turning Pakistan in the world's 7th nuclear power and first Islamic one.

Buzan and Waever note the Indian response to the Pakistani test was strikingly similar to the Chinese reaction to the Indian test. In both cases, the stronger power was 'concerned', yet refused to be provoked.225 With the recent increasing gap between the military potency of the two countries, the story has not changed. India is slowly moving towards a global theatre, while Pakistan remains within the sub-regional theatre and focuses all its attention on

221 At the outset of independence, the princely states on the Indian subcontinent got to choose to join either Pakistan or India. The (Hindu) ruler of (dominantly Islamic) Kashmir hoped a divide-and-conquer strategy could improve his gains. However, when Pakistani forces invaded his territory, he opted to join India, leading to the 1947 Indo-Pakistani War. This war was followed by a war in 1965 and the Kargil Conflict in 1999.

222 Buzan,B. & Waever, O., Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, 116223 Nuclear Weapon Archive, Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Programme224 Ibid.225 Buzan,B. & Waever, O., Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, 118

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deterring India. This has become especially clear with the most recent missile tests of the two countries. While India tested its Agni V missile, Pakistan felt forced to respond in kind and test a missile as well. Yet, it on the outset of its test admitted it was not in response to India nor did it show a similar technological capacity and tested a missile with a 750-1000 km range. Combined with Pakistan's internal problems which cause a slow decent into failed state status226 and the fact that India hardly views Pakistan as a threat anymore.227 Even its nuclear capacity makes Pakistan hardly more than an irritation for Indian policy makers.228 In conclusion, India seems to have moved to a grander league of international relations than Pakistan and has left the latter far behind in military capabilities. While Pakistan could still be a viable proxy for China, it seems unlikely India allows it to influence the Indian policy making processes. Pakistan has been in the range of Indian missiles for a long time and India has been superior in most conventional aspects as well to feel safe. While the country had concerns of Pakistan acquiring F16 aeroplanes from the USA, this seems to have been more driven by politics than out of a genuine security concern. It seems thus safe to conclude the Indian entente with the USA is not aimed at Pakistan, nor that it seeks to maintain balance against the country since it has outgrown any form of balance itself by both its conventional, but also by nuclear capacity.

3.3 Conclusion

In this chapter I have discussed the reasons for the USA and India to abandon their standing policies of decades. After the Indian PNE explosion, the USA established a 'nuclear embargo' against India, while India was wary of balance of power thinking from its inception. Yet both parties decided to change their policies in 2005.

Balance of power theory remains a viable way of analysing foreign policy if the modification of balancing against threats, rather than against every state which appears stronger is accepted. Moreover, there are three ways of balancing against third states. First, there is the hard balancing, which is the creation of a balance against another state in the hope to overpower them. The second way of balancing is soft balancing which is aimed at maintaining the status quo and preventing another power from rising, rather than overpowering them. The final balancing strategy is balking. This strategy entails mostly showing defiance against a stronger power in order to gain support from the rest of the world. The reason why the USA would need to balance against other powers at all is the change in global power distribution and the larger share other powers start to claim. As we leave the unipolar world of the '90s behind us and move more and more to a polyarchic world, the USA cannot continue its former policy. Four options remain according to Brown: the Pax Americana with teeth, traditional Realism, neo-isolationism and high Realism. Of these four, the Indo-USA deal of 2005 seems to most resemble the latest option. Furthermore, I have argued the Indo-USA cooperation can be better classified as a entente, rather than an alliance as it seems an open framework for further cooperation, rather than a full-fledged military alliance like NATO.India is the most likely choice for the USA to balance against China given its size, population and proximity to China. However, India lags largely behind in GDP and military expenditure as well as its nuclear programme which has been under grand pressure for a long time. 226 Already notable and feared for by Buzan and Waever in 2003. Ibid, 116227 At least as far as its military capacity is concerned, India does still suffer from Islamist and separatist groups

in Jammu and Kashmir operating from the Pakistani side of the Line of Control.228 Ibid. 125

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Civilian (nuclear) and military cooperation with the USA could aid India to become a stronger military power, allowing it to become a stronger deterrent against China. The USA would view this as favourable as China would spent more resources on maintaining its superiority against India, rather than increasing its overall strength vis-à-vis the USA. Another reason for the USA to improve its relations towards India is the problem of the Iranian nuclear programme. As India maintains good relations with Iran, friendlier relations with the USA could either move India to take some distance from Iran, or to use its influence to pressurise Iran. However, in doing so, USA policy makers should keep in mind India is a democracy as well and in a vastly different geopolitical area. While for the USA Afghanistan and (daily) Jihadi terrorism are far away, for India this is a concern, as well as energy security and a substantive Muslim minority which forms a vote block which can not easily be ignored by Indian officials.

India, on the other hand is largely motivated by two key policies; security and prestige. India seeks to be recognised as a major great power with the global influence and responsibility associated with it. However, great power in the 21st century will not only be determinated by missiles and nuclear bombs, but also by economic prowess and flexibility. Access to several high-end goods protected by dual-use product controlling export regimes is mandatory for this, which is a second reason for India to seek membership of these regimes as well. The second main reason for India to seek an entente with the USA is it major neighbour of China. Since the war of 1962, China has occupied the comfortable high ground and presumably stationed a large number of nuclear armed warheads here. While the missile gap created hereby has been resolved recently with the test of the Agni V missile, enabling India to reach the major coastal cities of China. Nevertheless China will remain India's major opponent as they compete over influence over South-East Asia. Besides missile technology, both compete also over who will rule the waves of the Indian Ocean and the South Chinese Sea. India has entered ententes with several countries in South(-East) Asia for which the Indian presence forms a welcome alternative to China and Japan. It has participated in large scale naval exercises with a great number of countries in the region (including Japan) and the USA.

In conclusion, the USA seeks to create a soft balance against China, by involving India in international organisations and military cooperation in a great number of areas, as well as trying to aid it economically. The entente it thus creates will occupy China in the west and create something like a balance of power in Asia. India, on the other hand seems to be trying to create a hard balance against China by both its missile and naval development as well as reaching out to other regional powers. Unlike the USA, India does not seek to contain or minimise China's outreach, but it seeks to create a hard balance by overcoming the Chinese threat from the Tibetan highlands and the string of pearls the Chinese have created around the Indian Ocean. The Indo-USA treaty of 2005 does not play a major role in the Sino-Indian relationship. While investments from the USA and uranium supplies are important for India, the overall entente, not specifically nuclear cooperation seems important. Not withstanding the nuclear trade naval cooperation and USA support form membership of international export regimes are the major gains for India. For the balance of power, the nuclear legitimisation is thus of secondary importance. However, for India, it's prestige is of paramount importance as it feels it should have an equal standing as China in the international community. From this perspective, the de facto legitimation of its nuclear arsenal is thus only the first step.

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Having established a theoretical framework, explaining the reasons for both states to enter the Indo-USA treaty, I will now move on to my third chapter and attempt to make answer the central question of my thesis: whether the treaty will improve the international non-proliferation regime, or undermine it.

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4. The Indo-USA Nuclear Deal: To Proliferate or Not to Proliferate?

Having discussed the Indo-USA Nuclear Deal and subsequent events in the first and the motivating factors for both countries to conclude this agreement in the second chapter, I will now attempt to answer the second part of my thesis: will this deal strengthen or weaken the global non-proliferation regime? In this chapter I will first assess several arguments in favour of the deal. In the second section, I will formulate my own thoughts and attempt to formulate an answer to my thesis.

4.1 Towards A World Free of Nuclear Weapons?

In section 2.2 I have already discussed some writers in the USA pleading in favour or against the Indo-USA Nuclear Deal. In this section, I will recap some of these critiques raised and assess them in the light of thesis of this chapter. Potter raised three arguments why the Indo-USA Nuclear Deal will undermine the NPT. First, he argues other states may argue for a similar exception to commence trade with the USA and other Western states in nuclear goods which would normally be forbidden for them.229 However, as I have shown in the previous chapter, India has a unique position in the world as a major power of the 21 st century and an important ally in Asia for the USA. While other states could plea for a similar treatment, it is unlikely this would happen. First of all, states like Iran – who are desperately trying to convince the world they do not pursue nuclear weapons – would not want to cite India as precedent in order to keep this defence of abhorring military use of nuclear technology credible.230 While the People's Republic of Korea abandoned the NPT and does not seek access to USA nuclear goods at all. If this programme can be stopped at all, it is through diplomacy and incentives, the NPT will play a little to no part in this.231

Secondly, the USA might simply refuse such a deal with other states232 and bite the bullet of favouritism or cite India's unique position and its efforts in creating a credible export regime. As far as third states' export regimes are concerned, in order to acquire the benefits it gains now, India had to increase its export controls as well. The argument countries as China, Indonesia or Malaysia could also lower their export regimes is not convincing as all goods India acquires under this deal will be subject to IAEA inspections. The overall USA export control does not diminish and global export controls improve.

The second reason Potter mentions is unfairness vis-à-vis states which relinquished their nuclear weapon programmes in order to gain access to nuclear trade and joined the NPT. Curiously enough, Ashton Carter ignores this groups of states in his testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the USA Senate, although he does discuss those states faithfully upholding the NPT. He admits that political outfall might be the worst with these states. The group of states upholding the NPT consists of these states that relinquished their programmes, but also states that have no intention whatsoever to acquire nuclear weapons, or abandoned it already before their programmes became serious and the nuclear taboo emerged.233 As far as those states that relinquished their arsenals are concerned; they did not

229 Potter W.,India and the new look of U.S. Non-proliferation Policy, Nonproliferation Review, 350230 Carter, A., Assessing the India Deal, 5231 Ibid.232 As the USA has made it in the past already clear it would not accept this reasoning. See Levi, M. &

Ferguson, C. U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Strategy for Moving Forward, 5233 Countries as Switzerland, Sweden or Australia. I will discuss this nuclear taboo more in depth in the next

section.

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do so merely to achieve nuclear trade, it was part of a larger domestic change. South-Africa, Brazil and Argentina gave up their programmes when they turned on a path toward civilian ruled democracies, rather than (military) dictatorships and Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine merely inherited their stockpiles from the USSR. These weapons were in both cases associated with the previous regimes and giving them up was as much part of the changing regime as to gain good standing with the West.

The third issue raised by Potter is the issue of nuclear disarmament. Legalising the de facto arsenal of India will be considered a step back from global nuclear disarmament. However, he overlooks two things. First the reality of nuclear weapons in South East Asia; as long as China has its missiles stationed on the Himalayas-highlands of Tibet India will not relinquish its arsenal. Furthermore, the military government in Pakistan desperately needs its stockpiles to retain some legitimacy and to maintain (the idea of) deterrent against India. These stockpiles exist and as long as no steps are taken, they will continue to exist. While there is now a de facto legitimacy of the Indian arsenal this reality is not altered only recognised. Moreover, what the deal does is forcing India to make a separation in its nuclear infrastructure and thus bringing a large part of it under IAEA safeguards. Secondly, with the deal India commits to enter into negotiating a FMCT234 in good faith. I am of the opinion this deal will bring India closer into the global non-proliferation regime. I will discuss this more in depth in the next section.

The argument the Indo-USA treaty can lead to a nuclear arms race in South East Asia does not to take into account that Pakistan tested its nuclear weapons in response to India's testing. Pakistan might resort to “eating grass and leaves” yet it has shown its losing the technological race vis-à-vis India by testing only a small missile after the successful test of India's Agni V missile. While Pakistani aid to Iran and North-Korea is nonetheless a ICBM proliferation risk, this bears limited consequences for the security environment in South East Asia. India has left the Pakistani league long ago and while India and China are in fierce competition, a nuclear arms race seems unlikely. China has talked the Indian nuclear programme down already several times, entering an arms race would make this earlier response seem less credible. After all, both seek merely to deter each other and create a security policy against the other. In section 3.2.2.1 I have shown this mutual deterrence has already been reached by India on its own. Only a significant breakthrough in missile defence could upset this balance, the Indo-USA deal will have little impact.

Faustin Ntoubandi argues there are three relevant articles of the NPT in regard to the Indo-USA nuclear deal. Firstly, art. I, the prohibition of aiding any NNWS in achieving a nuclear weapon. This question is purely factual. The two reasons Ntoubandi cites here are the fact that India's strategic programme remains outside the IAEA safeguards, knowledge and materials transferred from the USA might end up here. The tickling down of knowledge might be unavoidable, but materials provided will be safeguarded by the IAEA. Moreover, he fears the deal will free up domestic Indian uranium supplies for the weapons programme. However, as I have already discussed in section 2.2 and 2.7, the argument importing uranium from abroad will increase the amount of uranium poured into the weapons programme is not convincing. As Tellis argued, it could already have devoted much more to its weapons programme than it already had and Medcalf argued the same argument could be raised for the sale of every

234 Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, 4

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energy source to India. Thus, whether or not the USA will violate art. I NPT will depend fully on the safeguards employed by the USA, India and the IAEA.235

The second article Ntoubandi is concerned with is art. IV(1) NPT, which is what he calls the raison d'être of the NPT: only the NNWS that have ratified the treaty can benefit from nuclear trade. He argues the USA does at the very least violate the spirit of this article. However, he foregoes the separation between the civilian and military parts of the Indian nuclear programme and again fears a tickle down of technology and knowledge to the military programme as he recalls India has before abused technologies and materials supplied under a civilian agreement for military purposes. However, this ignores the main parts of the Indo-USA Nuclear Deal; the IAEA safeguards and separation of the civilian and military installations. While this does sound convincing, he does overemphasise the importance of art. IV(1), after all, the article tells states that they are allowed to do what is not prohibited by art. I and II NPT.236

Finally, he turns to the interpretation of art. III at the 1995 and 2000 NPT review conferences, where it was decided non-NPT parties should not be eligible to the same degree of assistance NPT parties would be and internationally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons and full-scope safeguards would be a pre-request.237 Even with the separation between its civilian and strategic facilities, India is still free to pursue nuclear weapons. In principle, there is no arguing against Ntoubandi here, however, the USA has violated the interpretation of the treaty agreed at the Review Conference, not the letter of the treaty. Moreover, no state have condemned this, rather many showed eagerness to engage in trade with India themselves. It can thus successfully be argued that the general interpretation of the treaty has shifted. Furthermore, as I will argue in the next section, this is an improvement over the situation prior to 2005 and there is at least an effective carrot and stick would India decided to renounce its moratorium, where sanctions previously proved to be in vain.238

In the end, Ntoubandi does admit with the deal concluded in 2005 and ratified by the USA Congress in 2008, it is too early to determine the effects of the treaty on the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.239

Jim Green and Sara Franzoni are also of the opinion the Indo-USA treaty undermines the fundamental principle of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime not to engage in trade in nuclear and dual use goods with states outside this regime and the NPT in general. Moreover, they argue the deal is unreconcilable with UNSC resolution 1172, which calls India and Pakistan to halt their production of military grade fissile materials. While the Indo-USA treaty ought to be interpreted as a de facto legitimisation of the Indian again the critique misses the IAEA safeguards. The treaty stipulates that India will not use resources provided for military purposes, thus this criticism is invalid.240 If anything, the Indo-USA Nuclear Deal will make sure a large part of the Indian nuclear infrastructure will not be used for weapons grade materials. Moreover, they argue the Indo-USA deal does little to prevent India from testing another nuclear weapon. However, as I will argue in the next section, they underestimate the importance of the Indian demand for energy.

235 Ntoubandi, F., Reflections on the USA-India Atomic Energy Cooperation, 280236 Ibid.237 Ibid. 280-281238 This moratorium was not agreed in the treaty itself, but in a political message attached to it.239 Ibid. 278240 Green, J. & Franzoni, S., Uranium, India and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime, 3

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Finally, the sale of uranium to India by Australia is according to Green and Franzoni a violation to the South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty.241 Under art. 4(a(i)) of this treaty Australia is committed not to provide any “source or special fissionable material or equipment” to parties without the safeguards set out in art. III(1) NPT. However, they again ignore the separation between the Indian civilian and military programme. For the article desires safeguards on all the peaceful activities within the state. While the reasoning of Green and Franzoni is defensible from the spirit of the NPT, I would argue this is not necessarily the only interpretation. After all, the uranium provided by Australia would only be used for peaceful activities, under the watchful eye of the IAEA. Moreover, the Australian government will not sit idly by in case India recommences testing nuclear weapons, thus this create another reason for India to keep up its moratorium.

4.2 A New Approach to Nuclear Non-Proliferation?

Recalling Medcalf's view that the NPT is a “messy Cold War deal involving an ethical double standard”242 – which I am inclined to agree to – the move away from the NPT might not even be such a bad development. While the treaty is a non-proliferation and not a disarmament treaty like the BWC and CWC, it is clearly a product of the Cold War and rewards the victors of WWII with the right to possess nuclear weapons. Although the NPT has prevented many states from going nuclear and its success in this regard cannot be stressed enough, there are a several practical problems with it. First of all, it is inherently discriminatory, dividing the world in nuclear haves and have nots. India already objected to this from the beginning, arguing this was a form of neo-colonialism.243 Moreover, the club of nuclear haves are the same states which claimed victory after WWII and took up the permanent seats in the UNSC. It is hard to defend the French and British right of retaining nuclear weapons, while a country with ten times their combined population does not have the right to possess such weapons.244 Especially since India only commenced its weapon programme after the disastrous war against China in 1962 and thus showed restraint where the P5 immediately sought to acquire these WMD. Furthermore, while the NPT demands the NWS to work towards dismantling their arsenals245, there have been talks of renewing the arsenals of the NWS. While this is not an argument abolish the NPT, it should not be considered taboo to work around it.246 After all, the NPT is a tool, not a means in itself.

Although the NPT has prevented many states from going nuclear, it possibly receives more credit than it truly deserves. Nina Tammenwald argues the non-use and undesirability of nuclear weapons does not only come from the legal obligations of the NPT, but that there is also a taboo on the use of nuclear weapons. While several states – as Sweden, Switzerland and Australia – started nuclear arms programmes after the first discovery since it seemed like the next step in weapon technology, they abandoned these programmes fairly quickly and no-one follows the line of thought of 'just another weapon in the arsenal' anymore.247 She shows 241 Treaty of Rarotonga242 Sidney Morning Herald, India scores poorly in nuclear security ratings243 Abraham, I., The Making of the Indian Nuclear Bomb, 139244 France has 65 million people, Britain 63 million, while India has over 1.2 billion people. Numbers retrieved

from CIA World Factbook245 Art. VI NPT246 Many authors consider the NPT the very corner stone of the global non-proliferation regime and refuse to

think of ways of achieving this goal outside of it. See for example Green, J. & Franzoni, S., Uranium, India and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime, 6

247 Tannenwald, N., The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use, 435

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how the reluctance to even consider the use nuclear weapons grew during Korea and then Vietnam Wars. This taboo evolved to such a point that the willingness to use of these WMD during the First Gulf War was virtually non-existent. Moreover, only a few countries live with the fear of nuclear weapons, most others do not expect nuclear armed states to use them at all. Striving to obtain nuclear weapons thus seems to be an exception, not a rule for most states. Those that pursue these weapons are more often driven by regional security concerns, prestige or internal political pressure, not just because they can.248 Even in states where the taboo might not be as strong as in the West, the taboo is still playing a role if only in an instrumental sense.249 It thus can be maintained those which do pursue these weapons of mass destruction do so for very specific strategic reasons. As discussed in the previous chapter, India sought mainly defence and deterrence against the China which overpowered it in conventional means in 1962 and proceeded with exploiting its geostrategical advantage by stationing medium ranged, nuclear-armed missiles in Tibet. The same argument can be made for Pakistan, which went nuclear facing the increasing Indian conventional supremacy and internal struggle, seeking deterrent and a 'rally around the flag.'250 North Korea uses its nuclear programme both as deterrent to the countries surrounding it, but also in a desperate bit to maintain the world's attention. Again the conclusion is that while the NPT is important, it should not be considered the only solution to nuclear proliferation problems.

Finally, the NPT has no solution to deal with India, Pakistan, Israel and North-Korea. Sanctions can be imposed, but circumnavigated by either turning into a technological autarky (which is the path India took) or by illicit means (such as North-Korea or Pakistan have done). Of these two ways, only the second can be combated and many initiatives have been created to do so.251 India is part of many of these, as a country with a major nuclear infrastructure this is necessary for these initiatives to succeed. Especially since the threat of nuclear terrorism has become apparent in the years after the attacks of 11 September 2001. Securing nuclear materials is of the utmost importance, as the threat of a terrorist used nuclear bomb looms. The benefits of India's cooperation in this area outweighs the de facto legitimisation of the Indian nuclear arsenal. This does not mean every technological autarky should be allowed to develop nuclear capabilities. However, in the case of India the sacrifice is small relative what was achieved by separating the Indian nuclear infrastructure and bringing the country into the NSG export regime. Moreover, this way of obtaining India has withstood a nuclear siege of over thirty years without giving up its desire to obtain nuclear weapons. Sanctions have been imposed, but these have grown more and more irrelevant and contradictory since India is on the rise to become a great power and is more and more intertwined in the global governance, peace and security and economic systems. It cannot be the case that a country will be awarded if it maintains its nuclear programme long enough. However, I would argue awarding a country for its stubbornness is not the case as far as India is concerned. With the deals following the Indo-USA treaty, India is more thoroughly entangled into the global non-proliferation regime than ever before. A large share of its facilities will be under safeguard by the IAEA and its export regime will be even tighter controlled. Finally, there is little doubt that USA would allow the provided goods and materials to remain in India once the latter would recommence nuclear testing. Where previous sanctions failed because India had too little to lose, it now has a huge stack in uranium, other goods and investments from the USA, France, the Republic of 248 Levi, M. & Ferguson, C., U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Strategy for Moving Forward, 13249 Tannenwald, N., The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use, 464250 Russett, B., Starr, H., Kinsella, D., World Politics: The Menu for Choice, 154251 Such as the NPI, the Megaport Initiative, CPPNM, ICSANT, GICNT, etc.

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Korea, Australia and many others. Losing this assets would mean losing an important part of the civil nuclear infrastructure – as USA provided uranium and other supplies are recalled – and thus power the country so much craves. In a democratic country as India, this will be political suicide.

4.3 Conclusion

In this chapter I have made an assessment of the Indo-USA Nuclear Deal and its impact on the global non-proliferation regime. Potter's arguments were already discussed in the first chapter as part of the general debate raging in the USA. In this chapter I have addressed them more in depth as his arguments bring up a various number of issues more often raised in the literature. His first argument is that other states, with a worse proliferation history252, will seek similar exceptions and access to USA goods and technologies as well. For the two states most people would fear to obtain a nuclear arsenal are Iran and North-Korea. However, the first desperately tries to convince the world it does not seek nuclear weapons. Citing India as a precedent would ruin every chance Iran has to convince the world of the 'innocence' of its nuclear programme. North-Korea, on the other hand, would never seek the aid of the USA and if its nuclear programme can be stopped at all, this will be through diplomacy in which the NPT will play little or no part. The second argument of Potter is that the Indo-USA treaty may create jealousy in those states that sacrificed their nuclear programme by joining the NPT and benefit from the associated trade in civilian goods and technology. However, in this argument he overlooks the internal dynamics of these countries. Abandoning their nuclear weapon programmes was not something happening out of the blue, but was associated with the transfer of power from a military to a civilian government or the newly gained independence from the USSR. Thirdly, Potter argues this deal is a step away from global nuclear disarmament. However, he ignores the fact these weapons will not disappear from South East Asia without a structural change in the geopolitical reality. A de facto recognition of the Indian arsenal will not bring the world a step further away from nuclear disarmament and it will bring it closer with India committed to negotiate a FMCT in good faith.

Furthermore, the argument is often raised that the Indo-USA treaty will lead to an arms race in South East Asia. However, those making this argument vastly overstate the Pakistani position. India has outgrown Pakistan by a large margin and apart from the Jammu and Kashmir problematic, Pakistan is hardly a concern of Indian policy-makers any more, regardless of its nuclear capability. China, on the other hand, matters for India, but an arms race seems unlikely. The missile gap between India and China has been resolved by India by the domestically developed and successfully testing the Agni V missile, which finally enables it to reach the Chinese coastal cities. The Indo-USA deal hardly matters in this regard. While India's accession to the MTCR might give the country access to materials and technology to improve its arsenal, it seems unlikely that either of the two states will be able to overpower the other by nuclear means, until a significant breakthrough in missile defence is reached that could upset the balance.

Ntoubandi argues the USA violates the NPT on three grounds with the Indo-USA deal. First of all, it violates the corner stone of the treaty; art. I. However, this is pure factual. As long as the USA is watchful and the IAEA is not hindered in its work this is simply not true. 252 Even though India's is not untarnished at all. See for example Green, J. & Franzoni, S., Uranium, India and

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime, 7

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Secondly, he argues art. IV(1) NPT is violated. However, he vastly overemphasises this article as it merely states states are allowed to do what is not prohibited under the treaty. He recalls the situation of over forty years ago. Moreover, he ignores the separation of India's nuclear establishment and safeguard agreement with the IAEA. While knowledge might tickle down, goods and technology are safeguarded by the IAEA. Finally, he argues the USA violates the interpretation of art. III NPT as agreed upon at the Review Conferences in 1995 and 2000. While he has a point here, it is at most a violation of an interpretation. And the general interpretation seems to have shifted, as illustrated by the eagerness with which other states entered in nuclear trade with India.

Green and Frazoni have two main concerns with the Indo-USA Nuclear Deal. First, they argue it contrary to UNSC Resolution 1172. However, as has been pointed out before, the newly acquired goods will be under IAEA safeguards and not be able to be used for the production of nuclear weapons. Secondly, they argued the sale of uranium by Australia is illegal under the Treaty of Rarotonga. However, this criticism again does not take into account the IAEA safeguards or the separation between the Indian military and civilian establishment. Moreover, it gives India another incentive not to resume nuclear testing as the Australian government would not stand idle would this happen.

Finally, I have argued the NPT ought not to be considered as holy as many seem to do. First of all, it is a discriminatory treaty, a 'nuclear apartheid' as the Indian government called it.253 Especially as the former great powers of France and the United Kingdom possess these weapons, while one of the great powers of the 21st century is denied them. Moreover, the destruction of existing stockpiles is called for in the NPT, but has been ignored so far by most of the NWS. Furthermore, the NPT receives a lot of credit which might not be deserved. Tammenwald argues a normative taboo has emerged not to use nuclear weapons or not to acquire them in the first place. The only states possessing these WMD are states driven by special circumstances, most states do not even consider them in their policy making. My final critique on the NPT is that it cannot deal with states as India, Pakistan and North-Korea. Sanctions can be imposed but circumnavigated by either turning into a nuclear autarky or by illicit means. Only the second of these ways can effectively be combated and India is an important partner to many of these initiatives. Its aid in these initiatives is more important than the de facto recognition of its arsenal. Especially given the threat of a nuclear terrorist attack. Combined with the taboo on using nuclear weapons by states, this seems a fair trade-off. Moreover, sanctions have proven to be ineffective against India's nuclear programme. Especially since its contribution to global peace and security as a great power cannot be ignored in other aspects. Entangling India in the global nuclear trade seems to be a far more effective means to prevent the country from returning to nuclear testing as it has a large part of its civilian nuclear power sources to lose. It must not be oversighted India is a democracy and its government is thus accountable. It seems likely it will not get away with squandering the so much desired electricity over nuclear weapons.

In conclusion, I would argue the Indo-USA Nuclear Deal cannot be regarded as purely a non-proliferation tool. It entails too many other aspects, mostly creating a balance of power in Asia by allowing India to profit from a global market and thus increase its growth by aiding it to fulfil its unsatisfiable hunger for energy. Nevertheless, it does improve global nuclear non-proliferation for several reasons outlined in this chapter, mostly because it ties India closely to

253 Ntoubandi, F., Reflextions on the USA-India Atomic Energy Cooperation, 287

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the global trade community. This makes the country depended on resources from abroad and forcing it to separate its nuclear infrastructure, reducing the nuclear capacity it could in theory use to produce nuclear weapons. However, more importantly is the significant part of the Indian infrastructure which is now under safeguards. The USA seems in this regard to have chosen for Brown's high Realism. Energy is the most pressing need of India and the central justification of its nuclear programme. In the end, I do think the Indo-USA Nuclear Treaty has improved the global non-proliferation regime or at the very least not harmed it. As a major country and great power of the coming decades it has been brought more or less in line with the current non-proliferation regime. While outside the NPT, India is now tied to many countries who would frown upon the testing of nuclear weapons, its export control regime is brought into line with these countries as well, reducing the risk of nuclear materials falling into terrorist hands and India agreed to help the USA to aid it in concluding a FMCT. NPT hard-liners might insist on the need for India to join the NPT as well, however, with a FMCT in place the NPT would be more or less irrelevant especially for India.254 Given the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the need for a global disarmament, I would argue that nuclear non-proliferation is one of the few fields where the ends do justify the means. India is a unique case as I have showed in the previous chapter with unique geopolitical circumstances, which demands a specially tailored solution. The NPT was the best the world could get during the Cold War, I am of the opinion the Indo-USA Nuclear Deal is the best the world can get in the current polyarchic world. It might be a small step, but a small step in the direction of a world free of nuclear weapons.

254 Chandrasekharan, S., FMCT and INDIA - the need to determine the 'x' factor

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5. Conclusion

In this thesis, I have answered a twofold question: “What were events following the Indo-USA Nuclear Deal of 2005 and what will the consequences be for the global nuclear non-proliferation regime?” My first chapter was devoted to the first part of my thesis. In this chapter I analysed the treaty and seven events which are important to understand the implications and consequence of the treaty. Especially the debates in the USA and in India on whether the parliament or congress should ratify the treaty or not are important for analysing the second and third chapter of my thesis. The debate in the USA was mainly concerned with the changing policy of the Bush administration, India's access to uranium, nuclear non-proliferation and the fear of spreading nuclear weapons, while the Indian debate was mostly focussed on the question of independence, prestige and security vis-à-vis China.

One of the major focusses of the deal was the separation of India's nuclear infrastructure. Given the slow path towards the bomb – as sketched in my introduction – and the relative small size of the nuclear establishment, India's strategic and civilian nuclear infrastructure were deeply interwoven and knowledge, technologies and materials were freely exchanged. This exchange made the India's PNE test of 1974 possible as the plutonium used in casu was extracted from reactors built by the USA and Canada for civilian energy production. The Indo-USA Nuclear Deal finally made such violation of agreements impossible as it demands India to designate which facilities will be considered civilian and which ones will be used for strategic purposes. This agreement was necessary for the USA in order not to violate the NPT and convince Congress to ratify the treaty. This separation would be enforced by the IAEA. The Indian government drafted an umbrella agreement with the IAEA, allowing it access to its civilian facilities. This agreement would be automatically extended to every facility India would designate as civilian (this choice remaining the state's prerogative). Under this agreement, India opened the majority of its PHWRs up to the IAEA and supplies provided under the Indo-USA treaty will be considered as civilian as well.

With the USA on its side, India could finally make a bit to join the nuclear cartel which inception it had provoked by the 1974 PNE. The USA lobby the group for an unconditional waiver to allow India to engage in trade with the other members of the group. Other members such as Russia and France immediately expressed their support seeing opportunities to for their companies to expand their markets although other states such as The Netherlands, New Zealand and Switzerland expressed concerns, yet in the end the waiver was unanimously adopted. The NSG waiver was followed by a strong inflow of uranium, reactors and other dual-use goods into India as France, Russia, South-Korea and Australia signed trade agreements with the country, assuring it with the goods it desired. Especially Australia was eager to sell uranium to India, although this would result in a large debate between proponents and opponents of the sale.

The Indo-USA Nuclear Deal was concluded under the Bush administration, however, Obama inherited the work in progress, the entente formed with India and a rising China. In first instance, Obama was less in Bush's “Axis of Democracy” and focussed on the two wars in the Middle-East and the economic downturn. Nevertheless, the USA under Obama did not relinquish its entente with India, it remained a supporter for India's admission to the NSG and several other non-proliferation and export regimes and after an initial recession in the relation, both countries started a new rapprochement. With this time line described, I turned to

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explaining why the USA made this 180 degree turn in its policy towards India in my second chapter. This chapter I have assessed why the USA changed its attempts to stop India from going nuclear and attempted to convince the country to join the NPT regime to de facto recognised India as NWS after 2005 by analysing the changing geopolitical reality both countries find themselves in. I have approached this from a balance of power perspective. Tellis has offered three answers to the question why the USA would change its policy from discouragement to acceptance; first the USA realised India would not abandon it's strategic programme, second India's strategic programme was the lesser evil compared to the Chinese and Pakistani and third the export of dual use goods by India was considered much more dangerous than its strategic programme; India was recognised as more useful as a partner than as a danger for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Moreover, India was considered to be a valuable ally vis-à-vis the rising power of China and as influence on Iran. In its attempt to balance against China, the USA seems to pursue a strategy of soft balancing, instead of hard balancing. The latter is an act of balancing in order to over power the other country, while soft balancing is the act of maintain the status quo. The policy towards China seems to be aimed at dividing the Chinese attention between Pacific Asia and the (south)west. The USA's policy seems to be to aid India politically and economically to allow it to create a stronger deterrence vis-à-vis China and compete with it for influence in the Indian Ocean and South Chinese Sea. But also by aiding it in achieving more influence in international decision making organs such as the UNSC, NSG, Australia Group, MTCR and others.

With China on the rise, the global balance of power has started to irresistibly shift towards East Asia. Balance of power theory has often been declared no longer accurate as no power have balanced against the USA during its heydays. According to Paul's citation of Walt, states do not balance against a hegemon for no reason, only when they perceive this hegemon as a threat to their interests. The reluctance to balance against the USA thus lies with a successful USA diplomacy and foreign policy. Nevertheless, the world is changing rapidly under the forces of globalisation and a once unipolar world is now shifting to a “polyanarchic” one and the once indomitable position of the USA is not as sure as it was a mere decade ago. Four possible responses to this challenged position have been suggested: continuing the current path regardless of the costs, Traditional Realism which would imply scaling down the global ambitions of the USA to a more traditional level, neo-isolationism which would isolate the USA as far as possible from the rest of the world and finally High Realism in which the USA would combine its interests as dictated by traditional realism, but tempered with a vision for what is good for the world as a whole. The cooperation with India seems to fit the last approach the best, as the USA both follows its own interest of balancing India against China but also advocate the world's interest of nuclear non-proliferation (although this is also in the USA's interest). Apart from improving India's position in relation to China, the question of Iran also played a major role in the decision of the USA to get involved with India in multiple fields, most prominently the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. Contrary to the USA, India has a positive and friendly relation with Iran, which the latter hoped to exploit in its policy to contain Iran and role back its nuclear programme. While it was an important incentive for the USA, it cannot be described in terms of balancing as the USA is capable of overpowering Iran easily in both conventional sense as in WMD sense. The Indo-USA entente is in regard to Iran a tactical choice, not a strategic axis which illustrate the changing in the geopolitical landscape for the coming decades.

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Contrary to the USA, India is less concerned with the geopolitical developments and more with its prestige and security vis-à-vis China. As I have already discussed in my introduction to this thesis, a major concern of India has always been to be regarded as a major world player due to its large population and role as home to a major world civilisation. Thus, one of the reasons the country refused to sign the NPT was that it considered the treaty which positioned the USA, Soviet Union, the UK, France and China as the only states which could legally possess nuclear weapons as inherently discriminatory and neo-colonial or neo-imperialistic. Acquiring nuclear weapons to show India was a country equal to the other nuclear powers was a major motivational factor for certain elements within the country such as the scientific community. With the Indo-USA Nuclear Deal, the Indian nuclear arsenal was at least de facto legalised and the 'nuclear siege' on India lifted. Many in India considered this a major achievement of the country to be recognised as a great power of the 21st century. Like the USA, India seeks to use its entente with the USA to allow it to soft balance itself against China, however, it does not calculate on a global scale like the USA does, it's attention is mainly on South-East Asia, the Indian Ocean and the South Chinese Sea. It has domestically developed the Agni V missile, which finally gave it an equal nuclear deterrence with China. The latter which has exploited its advantage of the highlands of Tibet and the proximity of the main Indian centres of population in northern India by stationing medium ranged missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons there. India was helpless against this deterrence until it could develop weapons able to strike at the Chinese heartland at the coasts. The USA has not aided India directly in achieving this deterrence, yet USA sponsored accession to the MTCR could aid it developing more sophisticated missiles. Nevertheless it seems unlikely India and China will engage in a missiles and missile defence arms race, given the huge burdens such an arms race will create for their scant resources. Competition between the Asian giants is more fierce in the Indian Ocean and South Chinese Sea given the importance of these waters for resources and trade and transport lines. Both China and India seek to dominate these seas and try to project their power there in as many ways as possible. China has been active in creating its 'String of Pearls' around India by placing naval bases all over the Indian Ocean and enter into cooperation with Pakistan. India has countered this with the multi-billion Project Seabird and close cooperation with ASEAN, Australia, Japan and the USA. Apart from the Indo-USA Nuclear Deal, the entente is most notably in this field where the USA and India – according to China – attempt to encircle the latter by an axis of democracies with the (pseudo) democratic states of South Asia.

Like the USA, India also faces a 'lesser' problem; Pakistan. Of the two states, India is by far the largest, most populous and wealthy, yet Pakistan has been able to hold its own against its neighbour. In order to do so, it has relied heavily on USA support. Nevertheless, in the four wars the countries fought in the first forty years of their existence, India has shown its superior conventional strength. Regardless of USA conventional support and Chinese nuclear support (and suspected illicit transfer of missile technology via North-Korea) India is surging ahead of its rival as Pakistan remains tangled in its domestic conflicts and its economy which refuses to take off keep the country down. This was illustrated by the Pakistani response to the test of the Agni V missile (a much smaller short range missile was tested), Pakistan can no longer keep up with India's development. India has evolved to the league of great powers over the last decade, while Pakistan cannot aspire more than the role of a second rank power which is only a viable proxy against India for China. The Indo-USA entente is in this regard not necessary for India, it has defeated Pakistan before and the Islamic state is hardly a concern

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anymore for Indian policy-makers.255 The entente is thus much more a geostrategical cooperation, aimed at soft balancing against the rising dragon, than an attempt to secure India's dominance on the subcontinent even further.

With this theoretical framework established, I have moved to the second part of my thesis in my third chapter: “what will the consequences be for the global nuclear non-proliferation regime?” Several arguments why the Indo-USA deal would undermine the global non-proliferation regime have been discussed, the common problems these arguments raise is that it will seem unfair towards other states as they did not receive a similar deal but committed themselves to the NPT. The flaw in this argument, however, is the assumption every state desires nuclear weapons, but only a stronger incentive can keep them from pursuing them. However, this is not the case, many states have abandoned their weapons as soon as the full consequences of the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the nuclear taboo started to emerge to the global consciousness. Only under very specific circumstances will a state seek to acquire these weapons. The second set of arguments I have discussed argue the de facto legitimacy of the Indian strategic programme and nuclear arsenal has had a negative impact on the non-proliferation regime, as it would undermine or even violate the NPT. However, as I have shown, these arguments too are not convincing as they ignore the separation that has been made in the Indian nuclear programme. Nevertheless the separation, it is possible a future Indian government would violate these agreements, however, it is up to the USA, IAEA and other governments to keep the safeguards on the Indian civilian programme at a sufficient level to prevent this. The Indo-USA nuclear deal is thus not a violation of the NTP, but it could lead to one, yet it is to soon to assume this will happen.

The final conclusion of my thesis is thus that the Indo-USA Nuclear Deal actually has positive effects on the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. The NPT has rightly be called the corner stone of the non-proliferation regime, yet it cannot be expected to be the sole basis of it. It must be acknowledged states will only under very specific circumstances seek these WMD and the NPT has created several loopholes one of which – China's status as NWS – forces India to stay outside the treaty. As long as the People's Republic has its missiles stationed on the Tibetan highlands it seems unlikely India will relinquish its arsenal, rather will it seek to create a sufficient deterrence to avoid another war like the 1962 war, but this time under a nuclear cover especially now China is ascending as a global player. Thus, the Indian nuclear arsenal (and consequently the Pakistani one) will not be dismantled any time soon. The NPT cannot deal with this fact as it uses a date as demarcation of which state is a NWS or NNWS, changing this date will make the treaty void as it could be changed at any time again to fit another state in. My argument is thus that the NPT should not be changed, but another solution outside the NPT should be created to fit in the atomic anomaly that India is in. The Indo-USA Nuclear Deal attempts this by bringing a large part of the Indian nuclear infrastructure under IAEA safeguards. After all, the Indian strategic programme exists by the grace of its energy programme. Without this, the strategic programme could never be justified vis-à-vis a population of whom a large part still lives in poverty. In a democracy as India this is a factor that ought not to be overlooked. With the Indo-USA deal, the majority of Indian uranium and dual use goods are secured and its export controls are improved to meet the NSG requirements. Moreover, India has been bound to other states. Where the country used to be a 255 Missile technology proliferation and Pakistani nuclear weapons falling into rogue hands are more worrisome

to India than Pakistan's nuclear of conventional capabilities for India.

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technological autarky, many reactors and other goods will be constructed and shipped by foreign countries. This will prevent the Indian government from testing another nuclear weapon as clauses to recall uranium and other goods will be invoked most likely in such a case. While this is not as legally binding as a formal treaty, de facto India's hands are now tied. After all, the country is a democracy and circumstances the population would be willing to abandon their recently gained nuclear energy in favour for nuclear tests seem unlikely at the moment. Moreover, as India has pledged to aid in negotiating a CTBT in good faith, it seems this deal will be the best the world could get in order to prevent an arms race or more nuclear tests in the South East Asian security triangle. The global nuclear non-proliferation regime seems to have improved by a small step.

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