NIGERIA AND UNITED STATES SECURITY

PARTNERSHIP AND CHALLENGES OF BOKO HARAM

INSURGENCY, 2009 - 2014

ATTU, SAMSON AGBOsamattu@yahoo.com

University of Nigeria, Nsukka

July, 2014

ABSTRACT

The study examined Nigeria and United States military-securitypartnership and the challenges of Boko Haram insurgency.Military-security partnership between both countries has beencordial but restricted. Researchers have divergent opinionabout the extent U.S. should be committed in assisting theNigerian government in countering the insurgency. Due torecent developments in Nigeria-U.S. military-security allianceand the challenges of Boko Haram insurgency, there is need forconstant appraisal; the limited research conducted on thistopic needs regular update. Therefore, the study set out toexamine the changes in Nigeria and U.S. military-securitypartnership and its effects on Boko Haram insurgency. Thisstudy employed pre-test post-test research design andqualitative descriptive method of data analysis. Theintractable conflict theory was the theoretical framework usedto interrogate the issue of discuss. The research discoveredthat Boko Haram insurgency has forced certain unprecedentedchanges to the partnership which led to an accentuation in thelevel of military-security interactions and direct operationsof U.S. Africa Command in Nigeria territory. It also found outthat the changes in the content of U.S. and Nigeria military-security partnership have not been able to curtail thepersistence of Boko Haram insurgency. It was thereforerecommended thatNigerian government should consider the beststrategies and allies, especially in intelligence gathering,that will secure its economic and political interest inAfrica, and win the fight against the insurgency. Militarymight alone cannot be able to successfully eradicate theseemingly intractable terrorism that is ideologically based onreligion. Therefore there is need for subtle de-radicalisationof religious belief and initiate development strategy forbackward regions to discourage violent extremism.

1.1 Background of the Study

Nigeria’s relations with the U.S. despite being decimated

by certain diplomatic disputes can be described to have been

cordial. With the return to civilian rule in 1999, the

partnership between the two countries was further

strengthened. As such the two countries have entered into

various bilateral agreements that cover security partnership,

trade, aid and good governance. Nigeria is a developing nation

and one of the most powerful countries in African in terms of

economy, military, population, landmass and other areas.

Nigeria cherishes her relationship with the world super power:

the support of America in world political arena, access to the

America market and, security aid and other forms of

assistance.

On the other hand, America has political, security and

economic interest in Nigeria. These interests are informed by

the population of blacks Nigeria commands, its strategic role

in Africa, rich market and the possession of sweet oil which

America is mostly in need of. Therefore, threats to Nigeria’s

sovereignty or successful establishment of any terrorist group

is a courting of a destabilised Africa and the interest of

America especially in Nigeria and the West Africa sub-region

will be jeopardise.

After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in

America, the government declared a global war on terrorism.

Little was known that what affected America will become a

direct menace threatening the peace, unity and stability of

the federal republic of Nigeria. Apart from the civil war, no

other catastrophe has befallen the Nigeria nation as deadly as

the scourge of terrorism; among all militant groups that had

risen in Nigeria none has threaten the nation like the Islamic

sect – Boko Haram. A major terrorist threat against Nigeria-US

relationship was staged by the Islamic insurgent group that

has its origin in Nigeria.

Boko Haram which means “Western education is forbidden”,

is a local coinage popularised by the media referring to the

extremist Islamic sect whose official name is Jama’atu Ahlis

Sunna Lidda’awati Wal Jihad which is an Arabic term that means

“People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s

Teachings and Jihad”. In 2002 a young Muslim cleric Ustaz

Mohammed Yusuf, established a religious complex with a mosque

and an Islamic school in Maiduguri, Borno state. This was the

origin of the Islamic sect that became a jihadist and violent

group in 2009. Boko Haram became even more vicious with its

re-emergence in 2010 following a crackdown by Nigeria security

forces in 2009. The group thrives in north eastern part of

Nigeria precisely concentrated in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe

States but its activities spreads into northern and central

Nigeria including the federal capital territory. Boko Haram

perceives western ideas as corrupting the Islamic religious

practices. Consequently, they oppose and speak against such

ideas and people that accepted it.

Nigerian government and security forces have adopted

various strategies in order to quell the insurgency. Boko

Haram has maintained a sustained rise in its sophistication of

attacks which started with the use of bow and arrows, machetes

and the use of motorcycle. It now employs sophisticated

weapons, vehicles, suicide bombing and Improvised Explosive

Device (IED). Its indiscriminate attacks went beyond the

government onto defenceless civilians. As such they are

recognised as an insurgent cum terrorist group.

The group has connections with other international

terrorist groups like al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

and al-Shabaab in Somalia as noted by Frost (2012). The group

was able to carry out a suicide bomb attack against the United

Nations building in Abuja indicating its intention of

attacking other foreign establishments in Nigeria and possibly

beyond when it has such an opportunity. It portrays itself as

a terrorist group with international ambition.

The terrorist group is threat to national and

international community. Onuoha et al (2012) noted that

America has taken the threat of the group with caution due to

its interest in Nigeria. In such a clandestine terrorists

operation there is every cause for much suspicion as to the

sponsorship of the group and its ability to withstand heavy

military confrontation. Such suspicion may warrant the U.S. to

review its security partnership with Nigeria. A weak Nigeria

affected by Boko Haram is to a large extent going to weaken

America’s interest in Africa, as their major periphery nation

in Africa will be incapacitated to serve its needs.

The uniqueness of Boko Haram terrorism on Nigeria and

U.S. relations is that the sect originated and thrives in

Nigeria, a nation that is an ally with the U.S. in the fight

against terrorism. The security partnership between Nigeria

and U.S. has come under strain with the recent development of

Boko Haram insurgency. This has necessitated the research

coupled with the fact that researches in this area are

inadequate and those available do not reflect the current

development of U.S. direct involvement in countering the

insurgency especially in the rescue of the abducted Chibok

school girls. Due to recent developments in Nigeria-U.S.

security alliance and the challenges of Boko Haram insurgency,

there is need for constant appraisal and an update to the

limited research conducted on this topic. Therefore, the study

set out to examine the changes in Nigeria and U.S. security

partnership and its effects on Boko Haram insurgency.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

It was never given much thought that it will come to a

point in the history of Nigeria when suicide bombing and other

terrorist activities will become a front burner in national

discuss. However, with the activities of the radical Islamic

sect Boko Haram, it is manifest that Nigeria is not immune

from terrorist attacks. The persistence of Boko Haram

insurgency has become a source of concern to Nigeria and the

international community. This development has necessitated

research into the origin, activities and effects of the

insurgency that has proved to be an effective threat to the

sovereignty of the Nigerian government and viability of its

military strategies and agreements with other countries. As

time went by the group metamorphosed, proving some earlier

research void of relevance in contemporary time.

Some scholars (Frost, 2012; Walker, 2012) admonished that

America should not interfere in the crisis but provide covert

assistance to Nigerian government. Other scholars like Onuoha

and Ugweze (2014) opined that the U.S. should be fully

committed in countering the insurgency. The Nigerian

government is increasingly in need of assistance as the

insurgency seems insurmountable having effects on its national

and international responsibilities.

Boko Haram has successfully metamorphosed into a

terrorist group. Further lapses in the Nigeria security forces

might make the nation porous especially its airport and oil

region which can lead to direct attack on America and her

interest. This problem was appropriately captured in the

December 2011 report by the U.S. House of Representatives’

Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence:

Unfortunately, the deteriorating securitysituation in Nigeria is a cause forconcern, especially as Boko Haram’sattacks become more sophisticated,coordinated, and deadly. Boko Haram andother terrorist groups such as AQIM—whichis looking to expand its reach acrossAfrica—would likely feel encouraged toexploit a destabilized Nigeria. Moreover,further instability could force Nigeria topull out of various peacekeeping missionsin order to increase manpower at home. IfNigeria were to collapse and become afailed state or descend into civil war, itcould have negative implications for theUnited States and its allies. Subcommitteeon Counterterrorism Intelligence Committeeon Homeland Security House ofRepresentatives, 2011:20).

America has been a major target of most international

terrorist groups especially those with religious undertone

that links them to al-Qaeda network. Frost (2012) noted that

Boko Haram has not hidden its desire for a full link with al-

Qaeda and a penchant to attack America and western interest in

general. Boko Haram has therefore become a major security

concern to Nigeria and invariably her West Africa neighbours

and allies especially America.

America has been cooperating with the Nigeria security

forces within the guidelines of bilateral or multilateral

partnerships, by providing funds and training in other to

improve her professionalism and ability to combat insurgency.

Considering that Boko Haram could thrive in Nigeria despite

their support may warrant the American government and security

forces to relapse on their rigorous pursuit of cordial

relationship with Nigeria. America might decide to reassess

its security partnership with Nigeria to guarantee a better

result in the fight against Boko Haram.

In recent time military troops and planes from America

were accepted to carry out missions in Nigeria homeland.

Nigerian government had never conceded to such security

arrangement. The few researches carried out on this topic did

not reflect the current changes in Boko Haram attacks and U.S.

direct involvement in assisting Nigeria. AFRICOM once rejected

from establishing its base in Nigeria and Africa at large has

sent in personnel and equipments to aid the Nigeria security

forces to tackle the menace of Boko Haram especially the

rescue of the abducted school girls. This is therefore a

relevant contemporary development to be studied.

This research therefore considers the following question as

relevant problem to be investigated:

- Does the change in security partnership between

Nigeria and U.S. curtail Boko Haram insurgency?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

Broadly, the study aims to analyse Nigeria and U.S. security

partnership and Boko Haram insurgency. Specifically; the

objective of the study is to examine the effects of the change

in Nigeria and U.S. security partnership on Boko Haram

insurgency.

1.4 Significance of the Study

Theoretically, this study provides updated information to

scholastic works. There are recent developments in Nigeria and

U.S. security partnership and Boko Haram insurgency that this

study contributes to the few available literatures on the

topic. It can serve as a reference material for scholars who

are interested in accessing U.S. contribution in countering

the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

The practical usefulness of this research is to the

policy makers in Nigeria and America. This study reviews the

efficiency of Nigeria and U.S. security partnership on Boko

Haram insurgency in Nigeria. As such it serves as guide for

policy makers in determining the next line of action, either

to establish a deeper relationship or suspend the strategy

that is being utilised to combat the insurgency. The America

government may find it needful to further reposition its

security assistance to Nigeria for a successful counter

insurgency strategy. This research is relevant as it is a

current phenomenon; it is one of the prioritise issues in

national security discuss and attracts world attention.

1.5 Literature Review

The literature review is carried out on the themes history of

Nigeria and U.S. security partnership, Nigeria’s security

partnership with U.S. and Boko Haram Terrorism. Finally a

conclusion which bears the Summary of gap in the literature

that is of interest to this research.

1.5.1 History of Nigeria and U.S. Security

Partnership

The U.S. security interest in Nigeria and Africa at large

is anchored on two major factors based on its national

interest. The first reason is traced to economic interest

especially in guarantying a steady flow of oil from Africa.

Nigeria is the sixth world largest supplier of crude oil, the

foremost in Africa and its oil is highly valued in the world

market due to its low sulphur content. According to ARSP

(2009) there is link between U.S. national security and its

need for oil. (http://concernedafricascholars.org/african-

security-research-project). In January 1980, U.S. President

Jimmy Carter made a proclamation which became known as the

Carter Doctrine that the U.S. would use any means necessary,

including military force to defend its national interest in

the free flow of Persian Gulf oil. This doctrine was extended

to Africa especially Nigeria as the U.S. security interest in

Nigeria is primarily to secure the Niger Delta region where

most Nigeria oil wells are situated.

Therefore in 1997, U.S. established the Africa Response

Initiative (ACRI) which was credited to have provided security

assistance and increased U.S. military activities in Africa.

In 2004 it was expanded and renamed African Contingency

Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA). Nigeria received

U.S. security assistance through ACOTA. This document portrays

that the US have a security interest in Nigeria, it is however

in securing its national interest. The Boko Haram insurgency

and its development pose challenge to this interest. This has

made some researchers to focus on the insurgency of Boko Haram

and its effects on Nigeria and US relations. Researchers are

also concerned about the response through security partnership

between both nations in countering the insurgency.

The second interest of America in security partnership

with Nigeria is in a bid to counter-terrorism. The aftermath

of the September 11, 2011 terrorist attacks on the U.S.

homeland was a declaration of war against terrorism anywhere

in the world. This led to U.S. increasing its military

presence around the world or partner with security forces of

other sovereign nations especially in regions where global

terrorism sentiments is likely to arise. According to Lesley

in Banks et al (2013) the peace and security of African

continent is increasingly important to the United States

because of its impact on global security and the US national

interest. Apart from the Trans-Sahara counter terrorism

partnership, the role of US in the security of Africa and

Nigeria has increased with the establishment of Africom in

2008.

1.5.2 Nigeria’s Security Partnership with U.S. and Boko Haram

Terrorism

Anyadike (2013) blamed the Boko Haram insurgency on

religious sensitivity, economic dislocation, unethical

political practices and the growing Islamic fundamentalism

around the world. The group has increased its attack against

security forces. Thus, the US volunteered to be of assistance

to Nigeria in tracking down members of the group. He

emphasised that tactics employed by government security

agencies against the sect was brutal and counterproductive.

The research did not give adequate attention to the role the

U.S. is playing and its effects on the insurgency.

Onuoha et al (2012) and Walker (2012) affirmed that it was

the suicide attack on UN headquarters by Boko Haram that

internationalized their struggle. The attack on United Nations

compound is however inconsistent with the normal concern of

the group. The successful attack and the utilization of

Improvised Explosive Device (I.E.D.) demonstrated that Boko

Haram has the ability to strike international establishment

when such opportunity is gotten. It was also a proof that the

group has made tactical advancement and is having foreign

assistance. These developments are a source of concern to

America; as a major ally with Nigeria the group may decide to

direct its attacks against her interest.

Correspondingly, Marchal (2012) and Frost (2012) posited

that there seems to be an ideological agreement between Boko

Haram and al-Qaeda in the global jihadist movement to oppose

western incursion into Islamic practices. Frost (2012) further

stated that in November 2011, based on information about a

potential Boko Haram attack, the U.S. Department of State

issued an alert that all U.S. and Western citizens in Abuja

should avoid hotels and landmarks in the country. In his

February 2012 testimony to Congress, the U.S. Director of

National Intelligence expressed concern that “Boko Haram—

elements of which have engaged with al-Qa’ida in the Islamic

Maghreb (AQIM)—is interested in hitting Western targets, such

as the US Embassy and hotels frequented by Westerners” (cited

in Frost 2012:81). This threat was made after the attack on

United Nations building.

Hence, Heras and Zenn (2013) gave the reasons Boko Haram

should be considered a threat to international security. The

first reason is that the sect has close operational

relationship with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

Secondly, Boko Haram like the foreign groups it is

establishing link with, might carry on with international

attacks of embassy. The third reason is the likely hood of

‘little Boko Haram’ multiplying in the whole region of West

Africa. The reason is that similar conditions that led to the

emergence of Boko Haram exist in Niger, Chad, Mali and

Cameroon.

It is in connection with other groups that threaten

international security that Boko Haram security threat can be

fully appreciated. Boko Haram and the ones that may emerge are

threat to development, secular democracy and western interest.

Heras and Zeras (2013) appreciated the threat posed by Boko

Haram on international peace and security; they however did

not consider the international strategies relevant in dealing

with the security threat.

In view of the foregoing, Copeland (2013) contended that

the persistence in attack is a proof that the Nigerian

security forces have failed in quashing the insurgency. In

December 2012, President Jonathan sought the assistance of

U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) to bolster counterterrorism

efforts targeting Boko Haram. The U.S. Department of Defence

announced plans to dispatch small military teams in 2013 to

train and equip Nigeria security forces. The US, according to

him is in support of a heavy security presence in the region.

The report traced the eruption of Boko Haram as a terrorist

insurgency; the group’s ambitions and capabilities to strike

Western interest. It has no detailed analysis of anti-

terrorism partnership between Nigeria and the US.

Nonetheless, Zenn (2013) was explicit that Boko Haram and

its splinter group Ansaru presented a threat beyond Nigeria;

it can carry out attacks throughout West Africa. The group is

more likely to target U.S. interests and personnel in southern

Nigeria as a step before the U.S. homeland which is a mid-term

to long-term ambition. He outlined ten measures the U.S. can

take to support Nigeria counter-terrorism efforts which

include declaring the sect as Foreign Terrorist Organization

(F.T.O) and provision of counter-insurgency training to

Nigeria security forces.

Interestingly, Ugwueze (2013) posited that military

partnership between Nigeria and the U.S. are in the areas of

security related training and funding. Nigeria has indeed been

having a strong, longstanding and useful relationship with the

U.S. military. In November 2011, it was disclosed that US sent

100 Special Forces for training through the African Coastal

and Boarder Security programme (ACBS) and the Trans-Sahara

Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). The ACBS was designed to

provide training, border maintenance, maritime security and

increase military professionalism. The TSCTP began in 2005 to

prevent the expansion of terrorist groups. In Nigeria, the

training and intelligence support of the programme were

directed against Boko Haram. The U.S. also provided funding to

the Nigerian Army to improve its capabilities. The U.S.

Department of Defence in 2012 gave $2.2 million for the

development of a counterterrorism infantry unit and another

$6.2 million designated to the tactical communications and

interoperability within its counterterrorism unit. He

suggested that the U.S. government should evolve a more

confrontational approach that would send a strong signal to

the sect.

However, Frost (2012) argued that it is a technical

blunder for American troops to enter Nigerian territory. This

will justify Boko Haram ideology and increase sympathy for the

group. He therefore suggested that the U.S. should consider

such measures like developing the Northern region, engage the

Nigeria armed forces in counter-insurgency training and the

sharing of intelligent information as necessary assistance to

aid Nigeria in eradicating the menace of Boko Haram terrorism.

Similarly Onuoha et al (2012) and Ugwueze (2013) lamented

the failure of US not designating Boko Haram as a Foreign

Terrorist Organization (F.T.O.). This would have warranted

full commitment of the US and their security forces in the

eradication of Boko Haram. The war on terrorism has had

adverse effect on U.S. economy. As a result the U.S. no longer

directly engages in the war on terrorism instead they resorted

to partnering with countries. U.S. direct and violent

engagements against terrorism are in countries where

terrorists operate as a hostile regime. However, in June

2012, three Boko Haram members including Abubakar Shekau who

is the leader, Abubakar Adam Kabar and Khalid al-Barnawi were

designated as global terrorists. America has strongly

condemned the terrorist’s acts in Nigeria and has always

offered its assistance in finding out the perpetrators. The

Boko Haram terrorism has necessitated the need to evaluate

areas of cooperation that both countries had committed

themselves to in order to unravel what form the partnership is

taken.

To buttress the point that Boko Haram has got the

attention of America, U.S. House of Representatives was

presented with an official report by the Committee on Homeland

Security (2011). The report studied Boko Haram in relation to

other foreign insurgents which the US intelligence had

undermined but eventually attacked the US territory. Boko

Haram was considered capable of attacking the oil facilities

in the Niger-Delta and airport since there is direct flight

from Lagos to New York. The collapse of Nigeria into a failed

State given its strategic importance in the region is a major

concern for the United States and her allies. The Committee

was skeptical about Nigeria's capacity to combat the

insurgency. They went further to advocate an outreach to the

northern Muslims in provision of aids and other military

assistance to Nigeria for combating terrorism.

Ploch (2013) recognised that Nigeria plays a key role in

peace and stability operations across Africa and the U.S.

provides assistance to enhance its peace keeping capabilities.

Bilateral counterterrorism cooperation between Nigeria and

U.S. has improved in the aftermath of the 2009 airliner

bombing attempt by Abdul Mutallab and the upsurge of threat

from Boko Haram. Nigeria is a participant in the Trans-Sahara

Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) organised by the US

Department of State. TSTCP is an interagency effort that aims

to increase regional counter-terrorism capabilities and

coordination. In recent years, U.S. security assistance has

focused on military professionalization, peacekeeping support

and training, land and maritime border security.

1.5.3 Gaps in Literature

Generally, literature that analysis Nigeria and U.S. security

partnership and the challenges of Boko Haram insurgency tend

to be scanty. Due to her strategic role in the comity of

nations, security in Nigeria is not just a national affair. As

a basic way of securing its interest in Nigeria and West

Africa region, the US has maintained a lasting security

relationship with Nigeria. There is need for more up to date

study on this aspect as Boko Haram insurgency has forced

Nigerian government to seek for foreign assistance resulting

to direct operation of U.S. security forces in Nigeria. This

is a major change in security partnership between Nigeria and

U.S. which researchers have not adequately studied.

2.1 Theoretical Framework

Boko Haram insurgency has served in exposing various

lacunas in the Nigeria political, economic and security

system. The insurgents carried out several bold attacks,

suicide bombings and abductions not sparing the national

capital. Malaise of Boko Haram insurgency seems to

persist even with the application of several strategies

to eradicate it.

The study therefore adopts the intractable conflict

theory in analysing Nigeria and U.S. security

partnerships and the challenges of Boko Haram. The theory

was made popular by Northrup (1989). According to Burgess

and Burgess (2005) Intractable Conflicts are those

conflicts that stubbornly seem to elude resolution even

when the best available techniques are applied (cited in

Onuoha, 2008:311). “Some conflicts become intractable if

there is a vast number of people involved and the issue

at stake appeals to land, religion, ideology and other

issues relevant for the people’s survival”(Onuoha and

Ugwueze, 2014:25).

In the case of Boko Haram insurgency its ideology

span from Islam religious belief. Whatever might have led

to the emergence, violence and demands of the sect, its

driving force is religion other factors are secondary. On

the other hand, Nigeria and the U.S. do not negotiate

with terrorists as a policy and share common interest in

the global war on terrorism which Boko Haram insurgency

is seen as one. Measures adopted against the insurgency

include the heavy military crackdown of the sect in 2009

but it reemerged in 2010. Ever since, Nigeria security

forces have been in constant battle against the sect but

the insurgency spread its reach into many states in north

and central Nigeria including the Federal Capital

Territory (FCT) Abuja.

Full military campaign was initiated in May 13, 2013

with the declaration of state of emergency in Adamawa,

Borno and Yobe. This reduced the spread of the group only

for a time. The US also declared the group as Foreign

Terrorist Organisation (FTO) in November 2013. This means

the US will be involve in countering the insurgency by

freezing its international final transactions,

investigation and halting its international threat.

However, Boko Haram increased its attacks including

suicide attacks and vehicle borne improvised explosive

devices. In recent time, it also added another dimension

to the list of its nefarious acts with the abduction of

over 274 school girls in Chibok, Borno state. This has

sparked international reactions and the direct

involvement of US security personal and equipments in

Nigeria to counter the insurgency

Therefore, this theory posits that the Boko Haram

insurgency cannot be easily wiped out due to its appeal

to religious fanatics. However, it can be managed and in

the long run other strategies can be applied to de-

radicalise the violent belief of religious extremists.

2.2 Hypotheses

This research framed single hypotheses that answer the

research question.

1. The change in U.S. and Nigeria security partnerships

has failed to curtail the persistence of Boko Haram

insurgency.

2.3 Method of Data Collection

This research makes use of qualitative data. As such it

employs the documentary method of data collection in

generating necessary evidence. The data needed pertains to an

outline of Boko Haram attack. This will help to ascertain its

persistence despite changes in Nigeria and U.S. security

partnership. The source of the data was Wikipedia, the free

encyclopaedia available on line at

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko_Haram. Information on changes in

Nigeira U.S. security relations and other relevant data for

this research were gotten from secondary sources including

journals, articles, conference papers, official document and

unpublished work, to authenticate the hypotheses and answer

the research question. This method offers access to records of

past events that permits analyses of the phenomenon under

study, which may be difficult or impossible to obtain through

direct personal contact.

2.4 Method of Data Analysis

The qualitative descriptive method of data analysis was

utilized in making meaning out of the data collected from the

secondary sources. In analysing the data we look at how the

insurgency persisted and spread before and after the recent

changes in Nigeria-US security partnership which involves US

security presence in Nigeria territory. Deductive logical

inference and intractable conflict theory were applied in

analysing the data.

The pre-test post-test research design was employed which

involves a measurement taken before a causal event occurs and

then after the causal occurs. Therefore an initial analysis is

made on Boko Haram insurgency, then the changes in Nigeria and

U.S. security partnership in response to the insurgency and

finally, Boko Haram attacks in recent time. The research

builds on the following format:

O1 = first observation of the dependent variable (challenges of

Boko Haram insurgency from 2009)

X = independent variable (Nigeria and U.S. security

partnership)

O2 = second observation on the dependent variable (recent

challenges of Boko Haram insurgency in 2014).

LOGICAL DATA FRAMEWORK (LDF)

TOPIC: NIGERIA AND U.S. SECURITY PARTNERSHIP AND CHALLENGES OF BOKO

HARAM INSURGENCY, 2009 - 2014

RESEARCHQUESTION

HYPOTHESES MAJORVARIABLES OFTHEHYPOTHESES Independent(X)Dependent(Y)

EMPIRICALINDICATORS OF THEVARIABLES

SOURCES OFDATA

METHOD OFDATACOLLECTION

METHOD OFDATAANALYSIS

Does thechange insecuritypartnershipbetweenNigeria andU.S.curtail thepersistencein BokoHaraminsurgence?

The changein Nigeriaand U.S.securitypartnershiphas failedto curtailthepersistenceof BokoHaraminsurgency.

(X)U.S. andNigeriasecuritypartnership.

(Y)

Persistence

(X)

(1) Aid andtraining toNigeriasecurity forcesto enhancecounterinsurgencystrategiesthrough Nigeriaand U.S. Bi-nationalCommission in2012 and Trans-Sahara Counter-TerrorismPartnership(TSCTP).

(2)U.S. AfricaCommand(AFRICOM)support toNigeriamilitary-security forces

Secondarysources:

-Journal

-Articles

-Conferencepapers

-Officialdocument

-Unpublished work

Documentary method

-Qualitativedescriptiveanalysis

-DeductiveLOGICALinference

-PretestPosttest.

–IntractableConflicttheory

in BokoHaraminsurgency

(Y)

(1)Destruction oflives andproperties

(2) Bombattacks andabduction

Empirical Verification

3.1 Challenges of Boko Haram Insurgency from 2009

Boko Haram from its emergence in 2002 appeared to be

peaceful until it had a clash with the police and attacked

various police stations in 2009. The intervention of the

military led to the death of over 700 people and the extra-

judicial killing of the sect’s leader by Nigeria Police. The

group seemed to have been exterminated until it re-emerged in

2010 under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau with its first

attack carried out in Borno State. Boko Haram has been held

responsible for the killing of over 10,000 people from the

time of its emergence to 2013

(en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko_Haram).

Ever since Boko Haram re-emerged, as indicated in tables

1a and 1b below, it has done harm to Nigeria security forces

and government including all those who out-rightly spoke

against the utilization of violence in pursuing its demands.

As terrorist or insurgent group, its attacks have gone beyond

the government onto defenceless civilians. It has proven to be

a difficult puzzle for the Nigerian government which has

employed various military tactics to counter the insurgency

including the declaration of a state of emergency in Borno,

Yobe and Adamawa on May 14, 2013. While the army claims

victory over the group, it appears that total victory is an

illusion.

Frost (2012) noted that as the group thrived, it

established connections with other international terrorist

groups like al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-

Shabaab in Somalia. The group has sustained a rise in its

sophistication of attacks which started with the use of bow

and arrows, machetes and motorcycles. It now employs

sophisticated weapons, suicide bombing and Improvised

Explosive Devices (IEDs) which became its most preferred

strategy. The group has also signalled its intention of

attacking other foreign establishment in Nigeria and possibly

beyond when it has such an opportunity. On June 16, 2011 as

indicated in Table 1a, it was able to carry out suicide bomb

attacks on headquarters of Nigeria Police Force and August 26,

2011 United Nations building in Abuja killing about 21 and

injuring over 120. (Other attacks are presented in table 1a

and 1b below.) These proved a growing radicalization in the

ideology and sophistication of the sect.

It was the attack on the UN building that

internationalised the sect and attracted concern of the

international community. The Nigerian government before then

had not recognised Boko Haram as a terrorist group that poses

threat to the global community. However, with the persistence

of its brash attacks despite the military efforts to curb the

insurgency, Nigerian government officially declared the group

a terrorist group and conceded to seeking for assistance from

foreign countries. On April 14, 2014 Boko Haram kidnapped

about 274 school girls. This nefarious act was the last stroke

that led to a radical change in Nigeria’s security partnership

with the US. America, leading other countries volunteered to

assist Nigeria in the rescue of the girls and countering the

insurgency.

3.2 Nigeria and U.S. Security Partnership from 1999

There has been cordial security relationship between

Nigeria and U.S. especially with the return to democratic

government in 1999. While the Federal Republic of Nigeria has

never been comfortable with entering into strict defence pact

with any country, it favours a form of security treaty that is

limited to providing aid and training for the armed forces.

All publicised military or defence pact met vehement

opposition from most Nigerians. An example is the Anglo-

Nigerian Defence Pact between Nigeria and Britain which was

terminated in 1963 due to mass protest.

However, Nigeria had a major military pact with the U.S.

signed by President Obasanjo and President Clinton in 2000.

The U.S. is to provide the sum of 3.5 million dollars and a

like sum to be provided by Nigeria in order to sponsor the

execution of the pact. Under the ‘Millennium Action Plan’ as

the pact was called, a private US company, Military

Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) was to train the

Nigerian Army to make it professional: to implement a plan to

install civilian control over military, to redesign the

military three branches, to trim the bloated forces, to devise

a strategy for dealing with the officers who lost their jobs.

Eventually, due to increased opposition the Pact was

prematurely terminated in 2003. Dickson (2013) posited that

the then Chief of Army Staff, Lt Gen Victor Malu and other

Nigerians were not completely comfortable with the arrangement

of the pact. It was seen as a form of foreign intrusion and

domination, expensive and a switch to American weapons system

as against the reliance on North Korean and former Soviet

Union (Russia) arsenal. It was also seen as a unilateral

decision of President Obasanjo.

Consequently, The Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism

Partnership (TSCTP) was evolved in 2005 with Nigeria as one of

the participating country. According to Hussein (2013), it is

an interagency U.S. government initiative involving Chad,

Niger, Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Senegal, Tunisia,

Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Libya and Mali. It was originally

launched in 2002 as Pan-Sahel Initiative but in 2005 the last

five countries were included in the partnership which led to

the change of name. According to U.S. Department of State

(2014), it was designed to enhance regional security sector

capacity to counter violent extremism, improve country and

regional border and customs systems, strengthen financial

controls, and build law enforcement and security sector

capacity. It was also noted that Nigeria participated in a

number of training under the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism

Partnership (TSCTP) such as counter-IED, civil-military

operations training, crisis management and border security

training. Along with other countries, Nigeria has also trained

in combat medical, military intelligence, communications and

logistics training. In November 2011, the U.S. Army Special

Forces Soldiers provided counterinsurgency training to Nigeria

army.

Furthermore, Nigeria received other forms of military

security assistance under various arrangements like the U.S.

and Nigeria Bi-National Commission established in October

2010. Under this platform, as posited by the U.S. Department

of States (2014), various security working group meetings were

held with focus on Boko Haram threat and ways both governments

can collaborate in countering the insurgency. The Bi-national

agreement has a security arrangement to secure Niger Delta.

However it was expanded in 2012 to cover the northern region

as a measure of countering Boko Haram insurgency. The security

wing of the commission was directed by the U.S. Department of

Defence. Security aids and training were provided under Anti-

Terrorism Partnership (ATP) and Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism

Partnership (TSCTP).

The Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP)

was aimed at increasing the security capabilities of

participating countries in an attempt to prevent them from

becoming safe haven for terrorists and to initiate cooperation

between these countries in the fight against terrorism. The

responsibilities of the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism

Partnership (TSCTP) especially security functions have been

absorbed or coordinated by U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)

(www.globalsecurity.org/mil/ops/tscti.html).

Africa Command (AFRICOM) became active as a separate body

on October 1, 2008. The command is to strengthen U.S. security

cooperation with Africa and create opportunities to bolster

the capabilities of America partners in Africa. “The command

will enhance peace and security to the people of Africa and

promotes its common goals of development, health, education,

democracy and economic growth” (Ayokhai and Ogbang, 2013:211).

AFRICOM was originally designed to have its base in

Africa; due to opposition from most African countries its

headquarters is located in Stuttgart, Germany. Nigeria has

stood against establishing an AFRICOM base in Africa

especially around West Africa where it will be a major threat

to its regional power and interest. Nigeria only favours a

form of cooperation that involves training of African troops

and supply of equipment.

(www.afjn.org/focus-campaigns/militarization-us-africa-

policy/133-late-news/403-nigeria-adds-its-voice-to-africom-

opposition.htm)

There was an attempt by the U.S. to severe or limit

security partnership with Nigeria in 2013. After conducting

interviews in 2013 with U.S. Africa Command in Germany and

U.S. Embassy in Abuja, Lesley (2014) asserted that Nigeria is

excluded from future military training and the ability of the

United States to provide security force assistance to the

Nigeria military has become more constrained. The reason being

that there was wide spread allegation of human right abuses by

the Nigeria military personnel in the ‘Joint Task Force

Operation Restore Order in Maiduguri’. The human right abuse

was seen to be ongoing as the military forces tries to quell

the insurgency. However the U.S. policy of not partnering with

military forces that engages in human right abuse was shuffle

in the case of Nigeria. The U.S. officially declared Boko

Haram as Foreign Terrorist Organisation (F.T.O.) on 13

November, 2013.

Eventually, the Nigerian government requested for

assistance from its U.S. counterpart in the fight against Boko

Haram insurgency as mentioned by President Jonathan in a media

chat on 4th May, 2014. U.S. accepted to intervene at the wake

of the abduction of about 274 school girls by Boko Haram on

April 14, 2014. Subsequently, on 14th May, 2014 it was

reported in abujavoice.com that the AFRICOM commander General

David Rodriguez and other intelligence specialist have arrived

Abuja. On 12th may, 2014 it was reported that 16 military

personnel from US AFRICOM joined the search and rescue

operations (IANS. News.biharprabha.com). On May 21, 2014 the

Washington post reported that U.S. has deployed about 80

troops and unmanned aerial vehicles to Chad to assist in the

search of the missing school girls. The U.S. also sends its

drones for surveillance in Borno state of Nigeria and

transferred military equipment to Nigeria in June 2014.

3.3 Recent Challenges of Boko Haram Insurgency in

2014

Despite the security cooperation between Nigeria and

U.S., Boko Haram insurgency has continued unabated especially

in recent time after the abduction of about 274 school girls

by the sect. Three months after their abduction, the Chibok

School girls have not been rescued in spite of the involvement

of AFRICOM drones and intelligence squad. There was a bomb

blast at Maiduguri market on July 1, 2014 in Borno state. On

June 30, 2014 Boko Haram attacked Chibok, the village where

the school girls were abducted, killing about 56 and burnt

down churches.

Threats and attacks on Abuja the federal capital

territory have increased. As indicated in table 2, there were

bomb attacks in Nyaya a town close to the capital territory on

April 14 and May 1, 2014. Vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive

Device (VIED) was also used to attack a mall in Abuja on June

25, 2014. Other areas attacked include the May 20 and 24, 2014

twin bomb blasts in Jos killing about 118 people. Kaduna had a

bomb attack on July 3, 2014 and there was bomb attack at a

medical school in Kano on 23 June, 20. A recent development is

the exportation of the insurgency to southern region of

Nigeria. There was a suspicious Boko Haram suicide bomb attack

in Lagos for the first time on June 25, 2014

(www.osundefender.org/?p=174330). Okey (2014) reported that

about 486 suspected terrorists were intercepted on their way

to Abia state on June 16, 2014, some of whom security agencies

have confirmed to be Boko Haram members.

The tables below are indicators though not exhaustive of

Boko Haram attacks. Tables 1a and 1b indicated that Boko Haram

violent attacks have persisted unabated from the time of its

re-emergence in 2010. Notwithstanding the U.S.

counterterrorism training and aid given to Nigeria military

forces.

Table 1a: showing Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria despite UScounterinsurgency training and aid to Nigeria Militaryforces

Date Time Line of Incidents

7 September 2010 Bauchi prison break

31 December 2010 December 2010 Abuja attack

12 March 2011 Assassinated Muslim Cleric Imam Ibrahim Ahmed Abdullahi for criticizing the violent groups in northeast Nigeria

22 April 2011 Boko Harām frees 14 prisoners during a jailbreak in Yola, Adamawa State

29 May 2011 May 2011 northern Nigeria bombings

16 June 2011 The group claims responsibility for the 2011 Abuja police headquarters bombing

26 June 2011 Bombing attack on a beer garden in Maiduguri, leaving25 dead and 12 injured

10 July 2011 Bombing at the All Christian Fellowship Church in Suleja, Niger State

11 July 2011 The University of Maiduguri temporarily closes down its campus citing security concerns

12 August 2011 Prominent Muslim Cleric Liman Bana is shot dead by Boko Harām.

26 August 2011 2011 Abuja bombing

4 November 2011 2011 Damaturu attacks

25 December 2011 December 2011 Nigeria bombings

5–6 January 2012 January 2012 Nigeria attacks

20 January 2012 January 2012 Kano bombings

28 January 2012 Nigerian army says it killed 11 Boko Harām insurgents

8 February 2012 Boko Harām claims responsibility for a suicide bombing at the army headquarters in Kaduna.

16 February 2012 Another prison break staged in central Nigeria; 119 prisoners are released, one warden killed.

8 March 2012 During a British hostage rescue attempt to free Italian engineer Franco Lamolinara and Briton Christopher McManus, abducted in 2011 by a splinter group Boko Harām, both hostages were killed.

31 May 2012 During a Joint Task Force raid on a Boko Harām den, it was reported that 5 sect members and a German

hostage were killed.

3 June 2012 15 church-goers were killed and several injured in a church bombing in Bauchi state. Boku Harām claimed responsibility through spokesperson Abu Qaqa

Source: Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia(en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko_Haram)

Table 1b (continuation): showing Boko Haram attacks inNigeria despite US counterinsurgency training andaid to Nigeria Military forces

Date Time Line of Incidents

17 June2012

Suicide bombers strike threechurches in Kaduna State. At least50 people were killed.

17 June2012

130 bodies were found in PlateauState. It is presumed they werekilled by Boko Harām terrorists.

18September 2012

Family of four murdered

18September 2012

Murder of six at an outdoor party

19September 2012

Nigerian Military arrests Boko Harāmmilitants, reported death of AbuQaqa

3October2012

Around 25–46 people were massacredin the town of Mubi in Nigeriaduring a night-time raid.

18March2013

2013 Kano Bus bombing: At least 22killed and 65 injured, when asuicide car bomb exploded in Kanobus station.

7 May2013

At least 55 killed and 105 inmatesfreed in coordinated attacks onarmy barracks, a prison and policepost in Bama town.

6 July2013

Yobe State school shooting: 42people, mostly students, were killedin a school attack in northeastNigeria.

29September 2013

College of Agriculture in Gujba: 40male students killed.

14January2014

At least 31 people killed, over 50people injured by suicide bombing inMaiduguri, Borno State.

16February 2014

Izghe massacre: 106 villagers arekilled, 105 of whom were boys andmen.

25February 2014

Federal Government College attack:Fury at military over Yobe deaths.At least 29 teenage boys dead atFederal Government College BuniYadi.

14April2014

2014 Chibok kidnapping: Governmentproperties, including the onlygirls' secondary school, attacked.At least 16 killed or missing andover 234 female students kidnapped.The Boko Harām militants said itwould treat them as slaves as partof the "war booty"

Source: Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia(en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko_Haram)

Table 2: showing results of Boko Haram attacks after the

abduction of school girls despite direct joint efforts by

U.S. security experts, AFRICOM and Nigeria forces

Date Time Line of Incidents

1 May2014

A car bomb exploded killing at least19 people and injured at least 60 inthe same area of Abuja as the Aprilbomb.

5 May2014

2014 Gamburu attack: Boko Harāmattacked the twin towns of Gamboruand Ngala in Borno State, Nigeria.They started shooting in a busymarketplace, set houses on fire, andgunned down anyone who tried toflee. The death toll of the massacrehas been set as high as 336.

13 May2014

Menari, Tsangayari and Garawa: BokoHarām attacked three villages,killing around 60 people in Menari.Vigilantes fought back, killing over200 Boko Harām militants.

18 May2014

Kano: Suicide car bomb kills fivepeople.

20 May2014

Jos: Twin bomb explosions kill 118people.

30 May2014

Assassination of Muslim leaderAlhaji Idrissa Timta the Emir ofGwoza in Borno state.

1 June2014

Mubi bombing: An attack at afootball field in Mubi, Adamawastate kills at least 40 people.

2 June2014

Militants dressed as soldiersslaughtered at least 200 civiliansin three communities in northeasternNigeria's Borno state, in the Gwozalocal government district. Acommunity leader who witnessed theMonday killings had said that local

residents had pleaded for help fromthe military, but it did not arrivein time. It took a few days for wordfrom survivors to reach theprovincial capital of Maiduguri,because the roads are extremelydangerous and phone connections arepoor or nonexistent. The slaughterwas confirmed by both Mohammed AliNdume, a senator representing Bornoand whose hometown is Gwoza, and bya top security official in Maiduguriwho insisted on anonymity.

21 June2014

Bombings and shootings in the Chibokarea resulted in the deaths ofdozens of villagers

28 June2014

Attacks with bombs and gunstargeting churches in a number ofvillages in the country's north-eastleft at least 10 dead

Source: Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia(en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko_Haram)

Table 2 portrays that despite the direct involvement

of U.S. AFRICOM’s security personnel right from May 2014

the challenges of Boko Haram intractably persists and its

reach expanding.

4.1 Conclusion

In conclusion, U.S. and Nigeria security partnership is

undergoing changes that borders on it becoming stronger.

AFRICOM presence is comfortably and acceptably increasing in

Nigeria and Africa due to spread of insurgency. However, it is

explicit that the changes thus far in U.S. and Nigeria

security partnership as typified in the acceptance of U.S.

AFRICOM personnel to aid Nigeria armed forces have not been

able to curtail the persistence of Boko Haram insurgency.

The insurgency remains intractable despite foreign

assistance because its ideology is based on religion as

typified in the burning of churches while attacks are carried

out indiscriminately. All forms of military strategy

including the declaration of a state of emergency in affected

states and U.S. AFRICOM involvement have not been able to

eradicate the menace of Boko Haram. It can be deduced that the

presence of AFRICOM, which is likely to increase with the

spread of attacks, does not guaranty absolute victory over the

insurgency.

4.2 Recommendations

Therefore, it is suggested that Nigerian government

should consider the best strategies and agreements that will

secure its economic and political interest in Africa, and win

the fight against the insurgency. Military might alone even

with foreign assistance cannot be able to win the insurgents

whose struggle is rooted in religious belief. Thus, there is

need for subtle de-radicalisation of religious belief and

initiate development strategy for backward regions like the

northeast.

The Nigeria army had been successful in peace keeping

operations. Therefore if adequately refurbished and motivated,

and the renegades within its rank and other foreign assistance

to Boko Haram are isolated, the Nigeria military can reduce

the insurgency to a manageable extent while devising ways of

completely curbing terrorism in the country. Total victory

over the insurgency requires total involvement of Nigeria

military and citizens rather than much reliance on foreign

aid.

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