Muslims Renegotiating Marginality in Contemporary Ethiopia

Muslims Renegotiating Marginality inContemporary Ethiopia

Dereje FeyissaUniversity of BayreuthBruce B. LawrenceDuke University

AbstractEthiopian Muslims have only had access to public space and opportunity for religiousself-definition and collective influence since 1991. During little more than two decades,how have they advanced subjective agency within the political constraints of the currentgovernment, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front or EPRDF? Thisarticle addresses that question by backgrounding the history of Islamic expansion intoEthiopia, tracing Muslim engagement with Christian political elites over several hundredyears, till the latter part of the 21st century. After the deposition of Haile Selasse in 1974,the DERG assumed power and in the name of a socialist agenda, suppressed all religionsfrom 1975–1991. DERG socialism has been replaced by EPRDF pluralism, yet thestructural constraints of the latter have weakened the efforts of Ethiopian Muslims to findtheir rightful place in the public square. Abetted and assisted by overseas immigrantcommunities, in both Western Europe and North America, Ethiopian Muslims continueto contest securitization and marginalization by the state, even as they struggle withregional, national and transnational issues that impact all Muslim identity politics in thesecond decade of the 21st century.

Introduction

Ethiopia is the least understood, and arguably the most important, of the so-calledMuslim minority communities of Africa. Not only does Ethiopia have the thirdlargest Muslim population in the African continent, but according to the 2007

census, Muslims constitute around 34 % of Ethiopia’s 80 million people, second only tothe country’s dominant religious group, Orthodox Christians (43%). Yet Islam has notbeen recognized for its central role in Ethiopia’s socio-political landscape. It had anauspicious beginning thanks to the hospitality that the companions of the prophetMohammed got from a benevolent Christian king (Najashi). The geographical proximityof Ethiopia to Arabia and the flourishing long distance trade between the two, as well asthe disavowal of trade as a dignified vocation by the Christians, also provided acommercial access to Ethiopia’s hinterland that benefited Muslim traders. From early on,

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however, Islam in Ethiopia had to deal with a politically entrenched (Orthodox)Christianity that flourished under the Ethiopian state and helped it succeed. It was apolitical intimacy that lasted over millennia, and although Ethiopia’s secular turn duringthe popular revolution of 1974 ushered in a new era of Islamic revivalism, it was not tillthe 1991 regime change that a modest liberal opening appeared. Modern education andinformation technology expanded, creating new fields of possibility for Islam in Ethiopiaand its global articulation. Notwithstanding these enabling structures, Muslims incontemporary Ethiopia still face difficult constraints. Of special significance are thecaveats put on Muslim organizational and public expressions as well as the securitizationof most Muslims in a highly ideologically charged geo-political context.

This article examines the new opportunity structure and the enduring constraintswithin which the Ethiopian Muslims’ agency is situated. In so doing, however, EthiopianMuslims are not only portrayed as subjects enabled and constrained by changingsocio-political structures but also as agents of history actively engaged in making use ofand expanding new possibilities for themselves. Surmounting durable constraints, theycontest the country’s public space through creative narratives of entitlement. Beside theidentity politics of Muslims in Ethiopia, one must also account for the active involvementof the Ethiopian Muslims diaspora, particularly in western countries where twoorganizations represent Muslim voices. In the USA it is Badr-Ethiopia (Badr) which takesthe lead while in Western Europe it is the Network of Ethiopian Muslims (NEME) thatstand out in defining the transnational politics of the Ethiopian Muslim diaspora.1 Thisarticle draws special attention to the diaspora delegation that these organizations sent toEthiopia in April 2007, not least the document that it produced on prominent Muslimrights that have to be fully implemented.

The discussion that follows is divided into five sections. Section one provides ahistorical excursion into Ethiopia’s first encounter with Islam, followed by its gradualexpansion into the peripheries of the Christian kingdom and its ultimate subjugation bythe Christian political elite. Section two discusses the new fields of possibility for Islamin Ethiopia under the most recent political regimes. Section three analyses the enduringconstraints for Islam in Ethiopia while section four identifies and analyses how Muslimsare building confidence and forging agency to surmount the challenges they face. Thelast section provides an overview of the contours of Muslims identity politics incontemporary Ethiopia.

Islam in Ethiopia: Historical NotesDespite the strong identification of Ethiopia with (Orthodox) Christianity, Islam in

Ethiopia is as old as Islam itself. The history of Islam in Ethiopia dates back to 615 A.Dwhen the companions of the Prophet Mohamed (the sahaba) came to Axum fleeing

1 For more on both groups, see Dereje Feyissa, “The Transnational Politics of the Ethiopian MuslimDiaspora,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 34:5 (2011): 788–817.

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religious persecution by the Quraysh ruling elite in Mecca.2 Amidst this persecution theProphet advised the sahaba to migrate to Axum where they would be protected by arighteous king, widely known in the Arab world as Najashi. Central to Najashi’sreputation is his refusal to take bribe in return for handing over the sahaba to theQurayish. Appreciative of Najashi’s favor, the Prophet is believed to have made thefollowing politically important historic statement in a Hadith regarding Ethiopia: utrukual-habasha ma tarakukum (“Leave the Abyssinians/Ethiopians alone, so long as theyleave you alone”). According to Islamic traditions this is the reason why the earlyconquest was not extended to Ethiopia at a time when all countries in the Red Sea subregion succumbed to the new Islamic political and military power. It is also widelybelieved in the Islamic world and among the Ethiopian Muslims that Najashi not onlyprotected the sahaba but also ultimately embraced Islam.3

Spared conquest, either through design or by default, Islam was neverthelessintroduced to Ethiopia early on through the international trade routes that linkedEthiopia with the Arabian world as well as through the works of indigenous Muslimscholars.4 By the 9th century AD the Shewan Sultanate (the Makhzumite dynasty)emerged at the periphery of the Axumite Christian kingdom in central Ethiopia andstayed in power until the 13th century. The expansion of Islam coincided with the declineof the Axumite kingdom. By the time the Christian kingdom was reconstituted in theform of the so-called Solomonic dynasty in the central highlands in the second half of the13th century, Islam had already become well entrenched in the central and south-easternpart of the country, taking advantage of the flourishing international trade that linked theEthiopian hinterland with the Gulf of Aden. Towards the end of the 13th century, a moreorganized and militant Sultanate of Ifat replaced the Sultanate of Shewa. Subsequently,the 14th and 15th centuries were times of intense political and economic competitionbetween the Solomonic Christian kingdom and the Sultanate of Ifat and other Islamicprincipalities.5

In these protracted hegemonic struggles the Christian kingdom gained the upperhand except for a brief interlude in the 16th century when the balance of power swayedtowards Islam with the emergence of the Sultanate of Adal under its capable leaderAhmed Ibn Ibrahim Al Ghazi, popularly known as Ahmed Gragn. So successful were hiscampaigns against the Christian kingdom that for a period of fourteen years (1529–1543),most of present-day central and northern highlands came under “the aborted Ethiopian

2 J. Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia (London: Frank Cass, 1952); H. Erlich, Ethiopia and Middle East.(Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994).3 See H. Erlich, Ethiopia and the Middle East; but also H. Erlich, Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia: Islam,Christianity and Politics Entwined (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007).4 See Hussein Ahmed, Islam in Nineteenth Century Wollo, Ethiopia: Revival, Reform and Reaction(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2001).5 For full details, see T. Tadesse, Church and State in Ethiopia, 1270–1527 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1972).

Muslims Renegotiating Marginality in Contemporary Ethiopia

283© 2014 Hartford Seminary.

Islamic government”.6 Reacting to long term Christian political domination and assuminga greater religious profile than his predecessors, Ahmed Gragn destroyed many centersof Christian civilization and embarked on forceful conversion of Christians into Islam.7

The involvement of Turks on the side of the Muslims, and the Portuguese on the sideof the Christians, escalated the hegemonic struggle. If the military support Ahmed Gragngot from the Turks was important in altering the power relations, equally crucial, evendecisive, was Portuguese support in restoring the hegemony of the Christian kingdom.In 1543 the combined forces of the Christian kingdom and the Portuguese defeated theforces of Ahmed Gragn and with that Islam decidedly lost its political clout in the affairsof Ethiopia as a whole.

In fact, ever since the mid-16th century, Islam has been viewed as a “national securitythreat” by the country’s political leadership and the dominant Christian population. Inthe predominantly Christian northern highlands, Muslims were banned by law fromowning land or participating in national politics. By default, Muslims have come todominate the economy particularly the international trade since trade, as mentionedabove, was not a dignified vocation for Christians. Ethiopian Muslim traders also enjoyedreligious solidarity with their Arabian Muslim counterparts. The Christian kingdomdominating most of the central and northern highlands while Islam progressively madeheadways in the peripheries of the Christian kingdom particularly in the southern part ofpresent-day Ethiopia. Many communities are said to have adopted Islam as a resistanceideology against the expansion of the Christian kingdom.8

By the 19th century once again various prosperous Islamic kingdoms or states withIslamic orientations emerged outside of the Christian kingdom. Major cases in point arethe revitalized city state of Harar of the east, the five Oromo Gibe states in the southwest,and the Sultanates of Guraghe in the south.9 The northern Muslims (Were Sheikh of theYeju and Mamadoch of Wello) even managed to dominate the Christian polity, thoughtheir ascendancy came at the cost of political and cultural assimilation. Another sectionof northern Muslims (Were Himano of southern Wello) also put up a strong resistanceagainst the revived Christian kingdom.10

The second half of the 19th century marked a renewed struggle for hegemonybetween the Christian kingdom and these Islamic states. The revival of the Christian

6 A. Genene, Casting Gragn: The Aborted Islamic Government of Ethiopia (1529–43) (Addis Ababa:Mega Publishers, 2008), 44.7 J. Abbink, “An Historical-Anthropological Approach to Islam in Ethiopia: Issues of Identity andPolitics,” Journal of African Cultural Studies 11 (2), 1998: 114.8 Abbas Haji, “Aksum in Muslim Historical Traditions.” Journal of Ethiopian Studies. XXIX/2 (1996):47–66; Abbas Haji. “Islam, the Orthodox Church and Oromo Nationalism’.” Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines,42/165 (2002), 99–120; H. Mohammad, The Oromo of Ethiopia: A History 1570–1860 (Trenton: Red SeaPress, 1994).9 Z. Bahru, History of Modern Ethiopia (London: James Currey, 2002), 128.10 Hussein Ahmed, “Co-existence and/or Confrontation: Towards a Reappraisal of Christian-MuslimEncounter in Contemporary Ethiopia”. Journal of Religion in Africa 36/1, (2006): 4–22.



kingdom was initiated by Emperor Tewodros (1855–1869) and Emperor Yohannes(1872–1889). Both vigorously sought to curb the rise of Islamic power in the region.Their collective goal was “to formally proscribe the practice of Islamic religion,endeavoring to enforce mass conversion to Christianity to enhance national unity”.11

The revival of the Christian kingdom was completed with the emergence of thekingdom of Shewa, an offshoot of the Solomonic dynasty in central Ethiopia. Its astuteleader, king Menelik II (1889–1913), managed to create and expand his own politicalspace by exploiting colonial rivalries and the internal divisions among other competingpolitical centers. With a differential access to the fire power of the colonial powers, kingMenelik II subjugated the various polities outside the Christian kingdom including thenewly established Islamic states. By the end of the 19th century the kingdom of Shewawas transformed into an Ethiopian empire with larger Muslim subjects than had been thecase during the Christian kingdom of the medieval period. This historical trajectory hasgiven the impression for the dominant Christian population and their rulers as well assome western observers that there was unbroken continuity of Christian rule over thewhole of present-day Ethiopia. As Markakis noted, “the official myth presented Ethiopiaas a purely Christian state. In a speech before the United States Congress, Haile Selassiedescribed his country as an island of Christianity in a sea of Islam. This myth was widelyaccepted abroad, and was propagated by the first generation of foreign scholars whostudied this country.”12

In other words, a slogan implying dichotomous parties and a defensive identity ofthe prevalent majority substituted for serious historical analysis of Ethiopia’s complexreligious past. If this image had largely defined Ethiopia’s foreign relations with itsMuslim neighbors, it has also justified the sociopolitical marginality of its Muslimpopulation. This recent development has certainly had a bearing on the sense ofalienation that Ethiopian Muslims experience: not compatriots but secondary citizens,they see themselves belonging to an Ethiopian national identity whose parameters werelargely defined by its Christian heritage.

New Possibilities for Islam in Post-imperial EthiopiaThe socio-political reforms brought by the 1974 revolution and the end of the

Christian monarchy partly redressed the marginalization of Ethiopian Muslims. In thenew process of state reformation Church and State parted company and Ethiopia hasbeen a secular state ever since. For the first time in the history of the country religious

11 Abbink, “Hist-Anthro Approach,” 115.12 As Makaris quotation makes clear, this myth underpins Ethiopia’s three thousand years historio-graphical paradigm as a Biblical/Christian nation, which dates back to the 10th B.C, the time from thevisit of the Queen of Sheba to king Solomon and continuing till the constitution of the Ethiopianmonarchy by their son king Menelik. It is also equally clear that it is a constructed myth. See J. Markakis,“Ethnic conflict in pre-federal Ethiopia”. Paper presented at 1st National Conference on Federalism,Conflict and Peacebuilding, May 5–7, 2003, Addis Ababa, p. 3.



freedom was proclaimed and Islam has gained parity with Christianity in politicaldispensation. According to Hussein “although the resurgence of Islam in Ethiopia in the1970s was part of the worldwide revival of Islam, one of the most decisive internal factorsthat contributed to the former was the outbreak of the popular revolution that toppledthe Ethiopian monarchy in 1974 and created favorable conditions for disadvantaged andoppressed communities such as Ethiopian Muslims to demand a radical change in thestate’s policy towards them.”13

At the height of the revolutionary fervor Muslims waged a mammoth demonstrationon 20 April 1974 to bring to the attention of the incoming Derg regime the right issuesof the Muslim community. The demonstrators called for the separation of religion frompolitics; publicly denounced the notion that Ethiopia was an island of Christianitysurrounded and besieged by Islam, and instead declared that Ethiopia was also the homeof the adherents of other faiths, including Islam. As an act of an important historicalconcession the Derg declared religious equality and the three Islamic festivals wereobserved as public holidays for the first time in the history of the country. Subsequently,in 1976 the Ethiopian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (popularly known as Mejlis)was established, though “throughout the period of military rule, it only functioned as ade facto, not de jure, organization.”14

The religious reform of the Derg did not go so far as to redefine the parameters ofEthiopia’s national identity. True to its socialist orientation, the Derg by and largeconsidered religion as “the opium of the masses”. It was also fervently nationalist andthat entailed, among other things, the recycling of old national (Christian) symbols.Ethiopian historiography was left untouched with its “unbroken” three thousand yearhistorical paradigm (to wit, the Solomonic narrative). Ethiopian historiography, in effect,remained populated by Christian heroes whereas the Islamic heritage of the country waslargely silenced.

The Derg and the process of state reformation that it has set in motion, however, didhave inadvertently positive effects on Ethiopian Muslims. By equalizing all religions, theEOC, Protestants, and Muslims all began from the same starting block at the same time inthe post-Derg period, though Muslims have continued to be slowed by historicalbaggage.

The regime change in 1991 brought yet another opportunity to redress the issue ofreligious inequality in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front(EPRDF) came to power as a champion of minority rights. As part of its project ofdeconstructing “imperial” Ethiopia, EPRDF has made connections with variousmarginalized groups, including Muslims. Several articles of the new 1995 constitution

13 Ahmed. “Co-existence”; for further background, also see Abbink “Hist-Anthro Approach,” and T.Ostebo, “The Question of Becoming: Islamic Reform Movement in Contemporary Ethiopia,” Journal ofReligion in Africa 38 (2008): 416–446.14 Ahmed, “Co-existence,” 18.



ushered in a mood of hope. Article 11 ensures separation of State and Religion; that Stateand religion are separate (Art.11.1); there shall be no state religion (Art.11.2), and theState shall not interfere in religious matters and religion shall not interfere in stateaffairs (Art.11.3). Furthermore, Article 27 goes even further, addressing freedom ofreligion, belief and opinion. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscienceand religion (Art. 27.1); at the same time that believers may establish institutions ofreligious education and administration in order to propagate and organize their religion(Art. 27.2). Art. 29 further grants freedom to seek, receive and impart informationand ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the formof art or through any media of one’s choice. Freedom of association (Art. 31) also meantthat Islam in Ethiopia, for the first time, could project a legal organizational expression,while a further provision for travel, guaranteeing freedom of movement within andoutside the country (Art. 32), has enabled Ethiopian Muslims to better connect with theIslamic World through Hajj and Umra as well as other forms of travel to Muslim countries.

Related to these constitutional provisions, the abolition of censorship has madepossible the flourishing of Islamic literature with a massive translation of works by majorglobal Muslim scholars. Religious equality has been expressed in the construction ofmany mosques, though this has provoked in some areas strong Christian reaction.Religious freedom has also brought confidence in practicing the Islamic dress code andfollowing an Islamic life style, while liberalization of the press has also meant theemergence of vibrant Islamic publishing houses.15 These are indeed parts of the processof state reformation in Ethiopia that have fundamentally changed the socio-politicallandscape of the country, and given fresh hope to a broad spectrum of religious groupsincluding Muslims.

Responding to the Muslim rights movement that centers on inclusive citizenship,EPRDF has also made some historical concessions through a greater recognition ofthe Islamic heritage of the country.16 As Hussein noted, “it is a tribute to theopen-mindedness of the present government [EPRDF] . . . (that it) has in the end fulfilledone of the cherished aspirations of Ethiopian Muslims by providing sizeable plots of landand granting permission for the construction of mosques in many parts of the capital.Minarets and glittering domes of newly constructed mosques have further enhanced thevisibility and prominence of Islam in the public sphere.”17 Among the fundamental rightsdenied Muslims for centuries is the right to organize and establish institutions. On thatbasis, the Mejlis was reorganized and a new leadership was elected. Besides, other types

15 Hussein Ahmed, “Islam and Islamic Discourses in Ethiopia (1973–93)”, in New Trends in EthiopianStudies. Papers of the 12th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Harold Marcus and GroverHudson, eds. (Lawrenceville, N.J.: Red Sea Press, 1994), 775–801.16 The Ministry of Culture, for instance, has proposed the Najashi Mosque to the UNESCO as a worldcultural heritage. The Ministry has also designed a project to turn Negash village into an Islamic centreof learning with an Islamic University.17 Ahmed, “Islam and Islamic Discourses;” Ahmed, “Co-existence.”



of Islamic associations proliferated which were not only active locally but had links withtransnational Islamic networks and communicate with the wider Islamic world.18

As such, in post 1991 Ethiopia, “Islam witnessed not only institutional rehabilitationand religious and cultural revival, but also visibility and prominence in the publicsphere.”19

One of the fields of possibility for Islam post 1991 is the new political space createdby ethnic federalism. Among the nine regional states that constitute the FederalDemocratic Republic of Ethiopia, three (Afar, Somali and Harari) are “owned” byMuslims; the largest part of Oromia — the most populous region of the federation — isinhabited by Muslims; Muslims (Berta) are also the majority in the Benishangul-Gumuzregional state, though this has not yet translated into a dominant political status there. Inthe Amhara regional state, Oromia Administrative Zone (Kemisse) and Argoba specialWereda are exclusively populated by Muslims. In the Southern Nations, Nationalities andPeoples Regional State (SNNPR) the Silte Zone and the Alaba special Wereda areexclusively Muslim while the Guraghe Zone is predominantly Muslim. This politicalspace has come about by default, not on design, however, since the Ethiopianconstitution forbids the political expression of religious identity. Thus, the Islamic natureof these regional and local governments is de facto, not de jure. Government intentionsand constitutional theory aside, political practice shows that in these polities Muslimshave effectively exercised political power that enhances the socio-political standing ofIslam. Public expression of Islamic faith and construction of mosques (physical space),for instance, are not contentious issues there in contrast with religiously mixed areas andin the national capital, where both are fiercely contested. The “legality” of polygamy inthe new family law and promoting the Sharia courts’ legal mandate over criminal law inthese regions are also instances of how Islam’s informal political power can be, and hasbeen, translated into influence over government policy.20

Another new structural opportunity is enhanced access to education for EthiopianMuslims. Access to education was very limited for Muslims during the imperial period.This was for two reasons. On the one hand, education was initially very much associatedwith the Orthodox Church or run by western missionaries. Many Muslim families feltuncomfortable sending their children to schools for fear of Christian influence or thenegative impact of “modernity” imparted through schools not aware of, or hostile to,

18 Some of these associations were the Ethiopian Muslim Youth Association (EMYA), the Islamic Da’wa& Knowledge Association and the Ulama Association.19 Ahmed, “Co-existence,” 16.20 The 1995 Constitution (Art.34.5) relegates to religious and customary laws only personal andfamily laws the particulars of which shall be determined by law: “This Constitution shall notpreclude the adjudication of disputes relating to personal and family laws in accordance withreligious or customary laws, with the consent of the parties to the dispute”. The Oromia regionalstate, particularly Arsi and Harar Zones have gone furthest in creating greater legal space for Islamiclaw and sharia courts.



Islamic values and practices. Those who showed interest in modern education often hadto pass as Christians by changing and modifying their names to hide their Islamicidentity. Although Muslim areas still lag behind Christian majority areas in terms of accessto social services, access to education for Muslims in the last three decades hassignificantly improved. Muslims now constitute around 14 per cent of the total studentpopulation.21 Better access to education is currently translated into the capacity to makeuse of new information technologies — audio-visual media and digital devices — thatmakes it possible to network with the Ethiopian Muslims in the diaspora as well as withthe wider Islamic world. Global Islamic media have become very popular amongEthiopian Muslims — from the Qatari-based Al-Jazira to the Iranian based Press TV to theIndian based Peace Satellite TV, all of which are readily available thanks to the affordableArab Sat. The new generation of educated Muslims is keen on enhancing Islam’sstanding in Ethiopia’s religious marketplace. Responding to the globally situatedProtestants’ “contextual evangelization” that targets Muslim areas, Muslim scholars andactivists have produced CDs, DVDs and other forms of audio materials in the ongoingcompetition for “divine truth”. Towards that end they have tapped into the works ofglobal Muslim scholars and missionaries, such as the Indian-based Dr Zakir Naik (viaPeace TV) and Ahmed Deedat whose works are massively translated into Amharic.22 Thisglobalization of the positionality of Ethiopia’s religious groups is significant becauseIslam in Ethiopia has yet to produce a strong national literary tradition.

Enduring ConstraintsIn the previous section we have discussed the new fields of possibilities for Islam in

Ethiopia. In this section we turn to the existing challenges for the attainment of Muslimrights despite the changes in the political structure, social changes and the emergence ofa confident Islamic community. The continuities include two major elements: 1)continued securitization of Islam by the dominant Christian community and theEthiopian government; and 2) caveats put on organizational and public expression of theIslamic faith.

Continued Securitization of Islam in EthiopiaHaving enjoyed the status of a state religion from the 4th century until the 1974

revolution and still constituting a demographic majority with a stronger political clout,

21 Ahmed Jebel, “Ethiopian Muslims: A Community that thinks it is awake while it is in a deep sleep,”2010. unpublished paper.22 A medical doctor by professional training, Dr. Zakir Naik is renowned as a dynamic internationalorator on Islam and Comparative Religion. Dr. Zakir Naik clarifies Islamic viewpoints and clearsmisconceptions about Islam, using the Qur’an, authentic Hadith and other religious Scriptures as abasis, in conjunction with reason, logic and scientific facts. Zakir is considered to be one of the “Top10 Spiritual Gurus of India”. He is also fiercefully polemical in his exchanges with Christiancounterparts.



the Orthodox Church has viewed Islamic revivalism with dismay bordering on alarm. Itparticularly feels threatened by the new historical and physical space Muslims havegained in post 1991 Ethiopia, invoking what Hagai Erlich calls the “Gragn syndrome” i.e.,the presupposition that Islamic revivalism and its political power in medieval Ethiopiathat shook the Christian kingdom to its foundation was a result of the intervention ofMuslim countries (Ottoman Turks) in support of the Ethiopian Muslims. The strategicco-option of Muslims by the Italians during their occupation of Ethiopia (1936–40) andsome Muslims willing cooperation with the Italians to renegotiate their historicmarginality are also often referred to in order to produce “evidence” that EthiopianMuslims are not “reliable citizens”. One form of Christian resistance is discursive;labeling all aspects of Islamic revival in Ethiopia as if it were a manifestation of so-calledglobal Islamic fundamentalism whose “command center” is supposed to be in SaudiArabia. Externalization of Islamic revivalism in Ethiopia has been forcefully argued by anOrthodox Christian diaspora in the following manner:

Lately, there has been a new development in the country [contrary to the country’scommendable history of religious tolerance], which, unless timely measures aretaken to check it, could ultimately be a destabilizing factor in the region. Thisdestabilizing factor, which, next to oil, has become the major export item of SaudiArabia — is called Wahhabism [. . .] Hundreds of mosques have been built inEthiopia in the last seven years with Saudi finance with all the paraphernalia ofmadrassas — supposedly Muslim religious seminaries where students sitcross-legged on the floor to memorize the Koran. But in actual fact, madrassas arebrain washing sessions and jihad factories nurturing potential bin Ladens, wherestudents are taught not to live under “infidels”, and to hate Christians and Jews asa matter of religious duty.23

It is unclear how many resources from global Islamic establishments have actually beenflowing into Ethiopia, and to reduce the complex process of Islamic revivalism to a Saudi“master plan” would be denying the agency of Ethiopian Muslims, and their own desireas well as capacity to be mobilized as a community. Although Saudi investments didfinance the construction of some Ethiopian mosques especially in the early 1990s, manymore mosques were also built by contributions from rich Ethiopian Muslims, particularlymembers of the business community. Statements of concerns such as those listed in theabove quotation are readily uttered by many Orthodox Christians both at home and inthe diaspora; they evidence the anxiety that surrounds the process of repositioningOrthodox Christianity which has confronted the Church within Ethiopia’s changingsocio-political landscape.

Ethiopian governments across political regimes have also tended to link Islamicrevivalism in Ethiopia with external players, as if Muslims were a perennial source of

23 Alem Zelalem, “Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabism and the threat to Ethiopia’s national security:”www.Ethiomedia.com September 2003, accessed on September 29, 2003.



national security threats. The securitization of Islam in Ethiopia was at its height duringthe imperial period when foreign policy making was heavily informed by religiousconsiderations. The ideology of Ethiopia as an Island of Christianity had produced asiege mentality; a country surrounded by belligerent Muslim Arab countries, which werebent on destabilizing the Ethiopian polity for which Ethiopian Muslims would serve as“fifth columnists”. This siege mentality had continued during the Derg period, though itssecularist turn reduced the degree of securitization. There are indications, though, thatthe Derg tended to view Islam and Ethiopian Muslims as a “national security threat”especially in times of conflict with neighboring countries such as the Sudan and Somaliawhich are predominantly Muslims. As Braukemper noted, the “so-called Gragn syn-drome was recalled at occasions when Christian Ethiopia felt threatened by the Muslimsof the Horn of Africa . . . It was used, for instance, during the Ethiopian–Somali war of1978 to unify and mobilize the Christian highlanders against the invasion of enemiesfrom the east.”24

As one of the principal authors of the process of state reformation in Ethiopia, EPRDFitself is at once ambiguous and ambivalent about how to manage the transition.Ethiopia’s transition to secularism and democratization is complicated by geopoliticalconsiderations; the securitization of Islam in Ethiopia seems to have started since themid-1990s. The growth of the Islamic Jihad in Eritrea; the military confrontationsbetween Al-Ittihad — a Somali based Islamic group actively operated in the Ogadenregion — and the Ethiopian government, and the hostility between EPRDF and theNational Islamic Front of Sudan in the mid-1990s — all seem to have brought about achange in EPRDF’s attitude towards Muslims.25 The perfect causus belli was found in theSudanese backed failed attempt to assassinate the Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarek,in Addis Ababa in 1995. Deeming it to be an act of terrorism and a violation of itssovereignty, the government subsequently cracked down on Islamic associations andNGOs with links with the wider Islamic world.

The main geo-political factor that has shaped EPRDF’s policy towards Islam inEthiopia, however, has been the “global war on terrorism”. Although the discourse onIslamic terrorism in Ethiopia already started in the mid-1990s, it is largely a post 9/11phenomenon. Enthusiastically joining Bush’s “coalition of the willing”, the Ethiopiangovernment sought to reposition itself and regain its strategic importance to the USled post-cold war global order26. For their part, western powers have signified thestrategic importance of Ethiopia in what appears to be a new search for the Prester

24 U. Braukämper. Islamic History and Culture in Southern Ethiopia: Collected Essays (Münster,Hamburg & London: Lit Verlag. 2002), 4.25 A. de Waal, ed. Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa (London: Hurst & Company, 2004).26 In post 9/11 the US has established counterterrorism programs in east Africa. The Djibouti basedCombined Joint Task Force — Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) is part of US Africa command. It consists of1,100 US military and civilian personnel. Ethiopia is one of the key actors in this new US securityarchitecture in the region (Radical Islam in East Africa, Rand Project, 2009).



John of the Crusades.27 Adapting and reacting to this global discourse, the Ethiopiangovernment has managed to extract tremendous resources and much needed politicallegitimacy from the west, despite its poor record on human rights and politicalrepression.28 Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia in 2007 on the basis of “immanent andreal danger” from the Somali Islamists (the Union of Islamic Courts) also must besituated within this larger geo-political context. Externalizing Islamic revivalism inEthiopia and labeling it “fundamentalism” has created a rift between EPRDF andEthiopian Muslims, one of its strategic allies. As Hussein noted, “in the Ethiopiansituation, fundamentalism is a misleading concept which distorts, and thus hardlyapplies to, the process of changes in the self-perception of, and assertion of rights by,Ethiopian Muslims. Revivalism is a more proper term to describe the process oftransformation of the status and image of Islam in Ethiopia.”29 In a similar vein,Ostebo has convincingly shown in his in-depth analysis of the dynamics of religiousidentification in contemporary Ethiopia that although Islam does not have a politicalagenda in Ethiopia, the perception that it has informed government policy and needsto be corrected: “An increased number of mosques and higher representation ofMuslims in public life can hardly qualify as evidence for a politicization of Islam inEthiopia. It has not been uncommon, however, to equate Muslim demands of betterrepresentation with a politicization of Islam.”30

Much in line with their western counterparts, various Ethiopian governments havepursued a de-radicalization strategy that highlights intervention in the internal debatewithin the Muslim community. The effort is to promote a de facto endorsement of theso-called moderate Sufi position vis-a-vis the reform movements. In fact, Emperor HailieSelassie appeared a patron of Sufi shrines, evident, for instance, in his visits to prominentSufi shrines in Harar and Bale regions. Similarly, the EPRDF government on the wholetends to favor what it calls hagerbeqel islimina (home-grown Islam) or nebaruislimina(indigenous Islam), euphemisms that refer to the “tolerant” Sufi as opposed to the“foreign” and “militant” Wahhabism (Salafiyya). In a meeting with the youth in AddisAbaba in February 2009 the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi referred to this distinctionand noted the need to protect the hagerbeqel islimina, a distinction which the premierunderlined more emphatically in his April 2012 parliamentary speech clearly securitizingthe fundamentalist thrust within Salafiyya by making a link with Al-Qaeda: “Although notall Salafis are Al-Qaeda, all al-Qaeda are Salafis”.

27 Prester John is the name given to a mythical medieval Christian priest-king of a vast empire in CentralAsia, and later in Ethiopia. Medieval Europe hoped that Prester John might become an ally of theEuropean princes fighting to stop the Muslim advance in Mediterranean areas during the crusades. Infact, the Portuguese support of the Christian kingdom against the army of Ahmed Gragn was areflection of the Europeans search for the Prester John.28 Human Rights Watch reports on Ethiopia. (2007; 2008; 2010).29 Ahmed, “Islam in Ethiopia,” 10630 Ostebo, “The Question of Becoming,” 416–446.



Since 2008, EPRDF has sought to co-opt the “moderate” and Sufi-oriented organi-zations such as the Al-Ahbash; a transnational Islamic organization based in Lebanonand founded by an Ethiopian Sheikh from Harar; Sheikh Abdella al-Harari. In fact, inMarch 2008 Prime Minister Meles Zenawi “agreed to officially invite Sheikh Abdallahal-Harari to return to Ethiopia”,31 a plan which did not materialize because SheikhAbdalla died in the same year. Instead, the Ethiopian government has invited fifteenLebanese Ahbash ulema to provide training in July 2011 to promote what it regards asthe “authentic” Islamic teachings of Sheikh Abdalla for nearly a thousand officials andulema from the federal, regional and local offices of the Mejlis. On the other hand, theEthiopian government has alleged that “Wahhabiya” is moving towards forming anIslamic government and labeled it as an “extremist” organization with a military wingoperating inside Ethiopia.32 This has triggered a heated debate among EthiopianMuslims on the nature of Ethiopia’s secularism. It has threatened Article 27 of theConstitution, which guarantees the separation of state and religious institutions. If theAl-Ahbash phenomenon has helped to cement Muslims solidarity, it has alsore-opened the sectarian divide along the Sufi-Salafi line that was gradually but steadilyhealing. Government intervention in the internal debate among Muslims hasreopened old wounds, throwing many Sufi Sheikhs on the side of the government inan effort to redress atrocities committed by Salafi militants at the height of their powerin the 1990s.

The Caveat Put on Organizational Expression of Islam in EthiopiaThe quest for an autonomous, legitimate and functional national Islamic organi-

zation shapes Muslim identity politics in Ethiopia and in the diaspora. Islam, despiteits antiquity, had found no institutional expression in Ethiopia throughout the imperialperiod.33 The first organizational expression of Islam in Ethiopia dates back to themid-1970s. Linking up with the revolutionary fervor of the period, hundreds ofthousands of Ethiopian Muslims took to the street in Addis Ababa on April 20, 1974claiming religious freedom and equality. The demonstrators also demanded the rightto establish a nationwide organization that would represent Ethiopian Muslims andallow them to run their own affairs as well as to enable them to meaningfullyparticipate in the affairs of the country. Though the Mejlis was formally established in1976, it could not be constituted as legally throughout the period of military rule.34

31 H, Erlich Islam and Christianity in the Horn of Africa: Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan. (Boulder & London:Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), 178.32 Statement by Dr Shiferaw Tekle Mariam, Minister of Federal Affairs during a discussion organized bythe Ministry of Federal Affairs on religion-related issues at the Federal Police Headquarters,September13, 2011.33 Markakis, “Peace-building,” 8734 Ahmed, “Co-existence,” 12.



True to its goal of exercising total control over all aspects of Ethiopian society, theDerg had sought to influence the leadership of the Mejlis to ensure its grip over theMuslim population. In any case, the strong secularist thrust of the Derg would nothave allowed any meaningful organizational presence of Islam in Ethiopia duringtheir rule. The 1995 Constitution, on the other hand, generously provided for religiousfreedom. Taking advantage of the constitutionally enshrined religious andassociational rights, the Mejlis was reorganized; it attained legal recognition, andelected a new leadership. Other types of Islamic associations proliferated as well. Themid-1990s, however, brought government repression of Islamic organizations and thetighter control of the Mejlis. Following the 1995 “Mubarak incident” many Islamicassociations and NGOs were closed down except for the Mejlis. Within the Mejlis itselfa power struggle led to violent conflict between the police and the worshipperswithin the grand Anwar Mosque in Addis Ababa on February 21, 1995. Nine peoplewere killed and 129 people wounded. Ever since, EPRDF has tightly controlled theMejlis leadership, under the pretext of avoiding similar incidents in the future. Yet forthe entire next decade the Mejlis came to be represented by a leadership lackingpopular legitimacy.

One of the leading issues, which the 2007 delegation of Ethiopian Muslims from thediaspora raised to the Prime Minister, was the right to organizational autonomy. Thesame right has been persistently noted in the various diaspora media outlets:

Among the fundamental rights Muslims denied off for centuries is the right toorganize and establish institutions. One of the 13 demands raised during the 1966Muslims demonstration was this basic right. To this date this demand is awaitingproper response. Worse, the sole institution that claims to represent Muslims andoperates in their name has so far proved to rather work against Muslimsthemselves. It is now understood that the so called Islamic affairs councils from thefederal level down to Woreda are serving as extensions of the security service, withthe mission to suppress all forms of right claims by Muslims and to pre-empt anysuch future aspirations35

There are many reasons that have been adduced in support of an autonomous nationalIslamic organization. For one, Muslims seek to overcome ethnic divisions. Such divisionshave long undermined the construction of a pan-Ethiopian Islamic identity. A strongnational Islamic organization could, and hopefully would, succeed in overcomingsectarian divisions within the Muslim community. Muslims’ relative sense of deprivationalso derives from the better organizational status of the Christian groups as well asgovernment complacency and desecuritization of their articulation with global Christianestablishments. All these practices and reflexes, for Orthodox Christians and against

35 Dilemma of Ethiopian Muslims amidst Mounting Right Abuses; Posted on April 20th, 2009 by OJNegash. (http://blog.ethiopianmuslims.net/negashi/?p=353).



Muslims, provide important factors in tipping the balance of power in inter-faithcompetition at the religious marketplace.36

In 2009 popular pressure finally led to a change of the Islamic leadership. The newleadership, however, has largely failed to generate legitimacy or to reconstitute themejlis as a representative and effective institution. The issue of legitimacy, as notedabove, was further complicated since 2011 when the government sought to promotethe “moderate” Ahbash through the Mejlis.37 A new Islamic leadership came to powerin 2012 at the wake of the sustained Muslim protest against what they considerunconstitutional government interferences in religious matters. It remains to be seenwhether the new leadership would fare better than the previous leaderships in gettingpopular legitimacy.

Limits to Public Expression of Islamic Faith in EthiopiaAlthough Islam’s visibility in Ethiopia’s public sphere has significantly increased in

post-1991 Muslims are still claiming a greater physical space for the construction ofMosques commensurate with their demographic size. As Hussein noted, “the construc-tion of almost all the major mosques in Addis Ababa (and those elsewhere in thecountry) was invariably preceded by opposition from the Christian residents andchurches of the areas in which the mosques were intended to be built, and by aprotracted legal battle with the government departments responsible for granting theplots of land, issuing the necessary title deeds and the permission for construction”.38 Infact, many of the recent religious conflicts in various parts of the country are in one wayor the other related to the competitive, conflicting claims over physical space among thevarious religious groups. Ahmed Jebel describes the imbalance in physical space amongthe religious groups as follows:

How many mosques do we have? Allah only knows! Many of our mosques arepint-sized. These mosques are constructed with much hardship though some[Christians] are accusing that the number of mosques has increased. If we considerthe number of churches, Protestants have 12,000 churches and 30,805 preachingsites. The Orthodox Church has 500,000 priests, 40,000 churches and 2,000,000religious students39

36 The 2007 delegation of the Ethiopian Muslims diaspora, for instance, mentioned in the document itissued as talking points with the highest level of the country’s leadership, the use of public offices topromote sectarian religious interest by taking the example of the leadership of the Benishangul-Gumuzregional state. A born-again Christian, the president, Yaregal Ayisheshim, is said to have invited USbased evangelicals to “spread the Gospel” in the region.37 For foreign scholars’ participation in the advocacy of Al-Ahbash, see Bruce Lawrence, “Islam in thePublic Sqaure: Minority Perspectives from Africa and Asia” (Youngstown, Ohio: Youngstown StateUniversity Center for Islamic Studies, 2009): 29–33.38 Ahmed, “Co-existence,” 12.39 Jebel, “Ethiopian Muslims”.



A more contentious issue regarding the competition for physical space among reli-gious groups is the Ethiopian Orthodox Church’s (EOC) monopolistic closure inAxum and other northern towns. So far neither a Mosque nor a Protestant Church isallowed to be built within 18 kms radius in all directions of the town. Attempts bylocal Muslims to build mosques were violently blocked by the EOC with silentcompliance, if not open consent, from the leadership of the Tigray regional state.Referring to the hegemonic position of the EOC in the northern part of the country,the Muslim diaspora delegation has raised the issue of religious pluralism in Axum,declaring that the EOC’s exclusive claim could provoke reactive exclusive claims inareas where Muslims are the majority and cities such as Harar, which are historiccenters of Islamic civilization in Ethiopia. The EOC’s justification, to wit, that “Muslimscould build mosque in Axum only when Christians are allowed to build churches inMecca”, is challenged by Muslims: the multi-ethnic and multi-religious structure ofEthiopia brooks no comparison with monolithic, rigidly Sunni Saudi Arabia. Religiouspluralism in Axum is also defended in reference to the history of Axum: it is also asacred place for Islam in general and Ethiopian Muslims in particular, “the city ofNajashi”.

One must also wonder out loud about the supposed neutrality of Ethiopia’ssecularism. The assertive nature of EPRDF’s secularism has become evident in theMinistry of Education’s 2008 directive that seeks to regulate religious practices ineducational institutions. The objectives and the constitutional bases of the directive wereoutlined as follows:

This directive is made in order to implement Article 90/2 of the Constitution thatstipulates that education shall be provided in a manner that is free from anyreligious influence; political partisanship or cultural prejudices. Besides, one of themain objectives of the educational training policy is to provide secular educationfor all students regardless of their religious affiliation. The objective of this directiveis to ensure that educational institutions will be a place where theteaching-learning process occurs peacefully, and that educational institutions’main objective is to impartially provide the youth with knowledge. Regarding thedress code, all students are obliged to wear school uniforms. Female Muslimstudents could wear hijab that resembles the uniform of the schools they attend butthey are not allowed to wear niqab. Students are also not allowed to practice acommunal worship within educational premises. Unless approved by the admin-istrations it is also not allowed to organize religious events in the schools anduniversities. Boarding schools and universities do not set up separate dining roomson the basis of religion.40

The terms of the debate in the veiling controversy that followed the directive revolvesaround defining the boundaries of Muslim norms, and security implications of wearing

40 Feyissa’s translation from Amharic.



the niqab in educational institutions. The government and the Mejlis leadership arguethat niqab is not compulsory in Islam except for the Hanbali madhhab to which theSalafiyya subscribes. The government has also outlawed niqab in educational institu-tions for two alleged purposes: to ensure public safety while also discouraging fraudduring exams.

Muslims from Subjects to Agents

Political Signification of Integrative NarrativesNarratives, especially sacred narratives, play a crucial role in identity formation.

They can also be invoked and used to legitimize a cause. It was the projection of EOC’sself understanding in reference to sacred narratives (cf. the Solomonic narrative) ontothe Ethiopian state which had long defined the parameters of the Ethiopian nationalidentity. Various religious groups currently contest Orthodox Christians’ historical“ownership” claim of the Ethiopian nation.41 As such, Muslims have been activelyengaged in contesting the parameters of Ethiopian national identity and in renegotiatingtheir “foreignness” as presented by Orthodox Christians and implicit in the thinking ofthe various Ethiopian governments. Many Muslims at home and abroad have focused intheir writing on deconstructing the image of Ethiopia as a Christian island. They havereasoned that such a representation is not only historically unfounded; it also seriouslyundermines the process of state reconstruction and democratization of the Ethiopianpolity. In one of its commentaries, the Network of Ethiopian Muslims in Europe (NEME)has contested the Orthodox Christians’ claim of indignity while asserting Islam’s longpresence in Ethiopia in the following manner:

It is to be noted that the Ethiopian state preceded all the Abrahamic religions. Wellbefore the introduction of Christianity to Ethiopia in the 4th AD the Axumite hadalready built a sophisticated non-Christian civilization. Like Christianity, Islam wasalso introduced to Ethiopia from the Middle East at the same time when it wasbeing established in Saudi Arabia. Any ownership claim of the Ethiopian state andits history is thus not only ahistorical but also poses danger to the peace andsecurity of the country. Instead of engaging in the fruitless debate on first-comer/late-comer we should combat all forms of religious extremism and build ourcommon nation.42

41 For the Protestant counter narratives that depicts Ethiopia as the Land of the Reformation, see DerejeFeyissa,- Integration through conflict: the proliferation of sacred “Great traditions” by Ethiopia’sreligious communities. Paper presented at Honoring Professor Gunther Schlee, Max Planck Institute forSocial Anthropology, June 12, 2011.42 “NEME Statement on the Current Religious Tension in Ethiopia.” Negashi-OJ, 2009. http://blog.ethiopianmuslims.net/negashi/?p=336 2009 (Feyissa’s translation from Amharic) (accessed April12, 2009)



Ahmadin Jabal, an activist and a leading Muslim intellectual in Ethiopia, has forcefullymade a similar argument in his recent book. Deconstructing the EOC’s nativist claim, hehighlights how the Orthodox Church, in its origin and expansion, is also indebted toArab missionaries:

The Arabs had played an important role not only for the expansion of Islam inEthiopia but also for Christianity as well. To cite just two evidences: the person whoconverted the first Ethiopian king to Orthodox Christianity in the 4th century ADwas the Syrian Bishop Frumentius. Similarly, the nine saints who introducedChristianity to the masses in the 5th century were also Syrians.43

Throughout the imperial period Muslims were not referred to as Ethiopian Muslims but“Muslims in Ethiopia”, despite the fact that the foreign element in Ethiopian Islam is veryminimal.44 They have reasoned, rightly, that such representation is not only historicallyunfounded but also seriously undermines the process of state reconstruction anddemocratization of the Ethiopian polity. Their discursive practice — deconstructing theofficial Ethiopian history in order to facilitate an inclusive national reconstruction — isfocused on the Najashi narrative, prestigiously referred to as the “First Hijra”. The comingof the sahaba and the hospitality they received is well established by many scholars.45

Ethiopia stands forth as one of the first countries where Islam was introduced outsideArabia. What is contested is whether the Axumite king embraced Islam or not.46 VariousArabic sources have documented Najashi’s conversion to Islam, yet early scholars ofEthiopian studies have ruled out the possibility of the king’s conversion on the basis of“lack of evidence” as well as degree of plausibility and logical possibility.47 Muslimscholars counter by referring to Arabic sources, which mentioned the existence ofclerical opposition to Najashi’s conversion.48 Recent scholars of Ethiopian studies with aspecialization on Islamic history suggest leaving the issue open-ended instead of takinga definitive position49 Yet some Muslim scholars and activists at home and aborad go sofar as to characterize the scholarly “denial” as but one more effort to re-establish Christianhegemony in Ethiopia.

43 Ahmed Jebel, “Ye Muslimoch Ychiqonana ye Tigil Tarik,” Nejashi publishers, 2011: 87. with Feyissa’stranslation from Amharic.44 Except for a small trickling of Arab missionaries and traders, the vast majority of the Muslims areindigenous people. In fact, with the exception of the western Nilotes in all ethnic groups there areMuslims.45 See several references in Erlich, Ethiopia and Middle East; Tadesse, Church and State in Ethiopia; andTrimingham, Islam in Ethiopia.46 In the Ethiopian Orthodox Church tradition this king has long been recognized as king Armha.47 The argument against Najashi’s conversion is the absence of a major social upheaval of the scale thecountry had witnessed during king Susneyos’s reckless adoption of Catholicism as the state religion inthe 17th century.48 For a comprehensive exposition of the debate over Najashi’s conversion, see Ibrahim Mulushewa,“When our history is narrated”, Addis Neger Newspaper, April 12, 2009.49 See Ahmed, “Co-existence.”



Despite the conflicting accounts surrounding Najashi’s conversion, the firstchapter of Islamic history was closely connected to Aksum, and “for Islam this was avital episode”.50 The special relationship between early Islam and Ethiopia is of twokinds. The first is related to the stronger socio-economic ties between Axum and theArab world before but also during the rise of Islam. This tie had a political expressionin the form of Axum’s occupation and administration of southern Arabia (Yemen) inthe 6th A.D. It was also expressed in the form of the existence of many slaves ofEthiopian origin in the Arab world. ‘Umm Ayman and Bilal bin Rabah, two veryimportant Ethiopian companions of the Prophet Mohammed, are cases in point. ‘UmmAyman was the Prophet’s nurse who looked after him from his birth, throughout hisboyhood and until his marriage.51 Bilal bin Rabah (the slave of a prominent Meccancitizen) was the third convert to Islam after the Prophet’s wife and Abu Bakr. In fact,Bilal became the first mu’adhdhin, the caller for prayer in Islam.52 The second eventthat accrues a prestigious connection between Islam and Axum (Ethiopia) is related tothe coming of the sahaba (earlier discussed). Included among the sahaba who cameto Axum were persons very close to the Prophet such as Uthman bin ‘Affan (his sonin law and the first caliph); Ruqayya (his daughter), Umm Ayman (his nurse) and Jafar(his cousin and the brother of the future Caliph Ali).53

The central act of historicl intimacy between early Islam and Ethiopia is, of course,Najashi’s benevolence towards Islam and the belief in his ultimate conversion. Najashi’sbenevolence is said to have been reciprocated by the Prophet not only in the form of thedeclaration: utruku al-habasha ma tarakukum (“leave the Ethiopians alone as long asthey leave you alone”) but also the Prophet issued Islam’s especial funeral prayer inabsentia (salat al-ghaib) to King Najashi upon his death. As Hussein noted, “EthiopianMuslim tradition has canonized the Aksumite king as a Muslim saint under the honorificname, Ahmad al-Najashi, Ahmad being the name believed to have given to him by theprophet who also offered a special prayer (on his behalf )”.54

Whether myth or reality, the issue of King Najashi’s conversion to Islam is a verystrong tradition among Muslims in general and Ethiopian Muslims in particular. Theexistence of a Mosque at a place called Negash in Wiqiro, Tigray, named after KingNajashi, further underscores the salience of the Najashi narrative in local traditions.

50 Erlich, Ethiopia and Middle East, 5.51 It was said that Mohammed loved “Umm Ayman like a mother and confessed to that in public”.52 Associated with Bilal, the prophet is believed to have said — “who brings an Ethiopian man or anEthiopian woman into his house, brings the blessings of God there”. Cited in Erlich, Ethiopia andMiddle East 9; Ahmed “Co-existence,” 16.53 Najashi is also believed to have betrothed ‘Umm Habib, former wife of ‘Ubaydalla, the sahaba whowas converted to Christianity to the prophet. This act was very important because ‘Umm Habib’s father,Abu Sufian, was a Quraish leader.54 Hussein Ahmed, “Current Trends in Islamic Literature in Ethiopia (1995–96),” paper presented at theFourth International Conference on the History of Ethiopian Art, Trieste (Italy), September 24–27(1996), 59.



It is no wonder, therefore, that the Najashi narrative provides a fertile ground for Muslimsto construct an alternative “Great Tradition” for Ethiopia and a secure basis for their ownnational identity. Contemporary Ethiopian Muslims invoke the Najashi narrative not touse it as part of their struggle for “the political victory” of Islam in Ethiopia,55 but ratherto foreground it as an integrationist rhetoric — to repudiate the charge of theirforeignness.

As part of Ethiopia’s religious landscape, the Najashi narrative serves the purpose ofrepositioning the Ethiopian Muslims vis a vis a national identity. Accordingly, Ethiopia isnot only a special country for Christians (as indicated in the Solomonic narrative) it is alsovital for Muslims in general and Ethiopian Muslims in particular. Construed this way,Islam is indebted to Ethiopia for its very survival. The hospitality and the tolerance thesahaba received in Ethiopia was arguably critical to the survival and expansion of Islam.In this narrative, therefore, the idea of Ethiopia is positively redevised from one of theleast likely corners, ironically by one of its historic minorities. If that is the case, EthiopianMuslims can as easily identify with “Ethiopia the land of the First Hijra” as do EOCmembers with “Ethiopia an island of Christianity”. The double facility of the Najashinarrative, as a religious and nationalist marker, is succinctly depicted in the delegation’sdocument:

Although we do not have a conclusive evidence to claim that Ethiopia is the firstcountry to grant asylum to the persecuted we understand that Najashi could havewell set precedence for the contemporary human right conventions that includeprotection of the vulnerable and the persecuted. What makes Ethiopia unique inthe annals of Islamic history is that the Muslim refugees had lived peacefully withother Ethiopians and this was the basis for the flourishing of Islam in the countryto the level it has reached now. King Asmha’s (Najashi’s) acceptance of Islammakes Ethiopia not only a land of justice and enlightenment but also the firstcountry where Islam got recognition by a head of state56

Commenting on the new representation of Ethiopia propounded from the diaspora, oneof our Muslim interlocutors in Addis Ababa said: “it is for the first time that we EthiopianMuslims started reconciling being Muslim and being Ethiopian. For our forefathersreconciling both sounded (like) a contradiction in terms.”. Tracing the history of Islam toKing Najashi thus helps Ethiopian Muslims to negotiate, and reduce, their “foreignness”;it provides a new foundation myth in reconstructing a national identity.

Juridification of ProtestAlso important in the identity struggles of Ethiopian Muslims is the emergence of

human rights as an international norm. It has led to a new form of protest, which is called

55 As has been suggested in the writings of Haggai Erlich Ethiopia and Middle East, Islam andChristianity, Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia.56 See the diaspora delegation document, p. 9.



juridification (Eckert 2012). Accordingly, various actors have used the language ofhuman rights to reframe older claims and make new ones vis a vis the state or againstneighbors. Ethiopian Muslims have, therefore, found a new reference point to validateclaims or contain pressures from the government as well as the dominant Christianpopulation.

Previously Ethiopian Muslims had used other political strategies. Throughout theimperial period Muslims had sought to protect their community interests and frame theirdemands in a very humble way through traditional forms of lobbying governmentofficials or the Emperor in person. The situation got worse during the Derg period when,despite some measures were taken in the area of religious reform, rights issues weretaboo topic. In post-1991 Ethiopian Muslims have gradually shifted from traditionallobbying of the imperial period to a rights-based approach. Muslim rights have beenreframed in line with the country’s constitution and international human right conven-tions and treaties that serve as the new referents. A more conscious section of the Muslimcommunity, particularly in the western diaspora, takes the human rights language as aglobally recognized legitimizing discourse. They emphatically embrace it in the follow-ing terms:

Comparing previous governments with the current one and saying this is betterthan the previous one does not do any good for the Muslims. What Muslimsdeserve is not something better than what they had earlier but uncompromisedrights like any other citizens. The internal debate whether the current governmentis better or worse is tantamount to shooting at one’s own feet. What is neededrather is to stop the normative debate and be united to press for ouruncompromised rights.57

The rights language also underscores particular practical needs, such as the need and theright to build mosques in Axum. The Network of Ethiopian Muslims in Europe, forinstance, framed this issue in the language of rights as follows:

The Muslims in Aksum are totally refused by the regional and federal governmenttheir basic right to exercise their religion in their own country. These are Ethiopianswho are demanding for a respect of their constitutional right for years. Theresponse they have got so far from the government is “as it is a century-longproblem they shall wait with patience until the right time comes”. The paradox isthe government does nothing for emergence of the “right time”. The “right time”cannot and will never arrive by itself unless through institutional citizen’sinvolvement. Those residents of Aksum, who are against for equal right of theirMuslim countrymen, need to go through such institution and learn about thehistory of Islam in Aksum and told Aksum is equally for the Muslims as for the

57 See Najashi, OJ, 2009.



Christians. They have to be taught respect and tolerance is the key for harmonicco-existence that lead to democratic and prosperous Ethiopia.58

While contesting the secularist directive issued by the Ministry of Education in 2008,Ethiopian Muslims have embraced the language of rights that it provides. Muslimstudents have criticized the directive for conflating secularizing the curriculum (neces-sary) with secularizing students (offensive and unnecessary). They have reasoned thatimposing a secular worldview is in contravention of the religious right enshrined in theConstitution. In the petition they wrote to the office of the Prime Minister, they havementioned that the directive threatens to undermine the gains that Muslims have madein the field of education. They have also reserved the right to define which religiouspractice is central or optional is best left for the believers.59

Appropriating the Language of DevelopmentIn recent years, especially after the contested May 2005 election, EPRDF has changed

the core basis of its political legitimacy, shifting from ethnicity to development.Subsequently it has styled itself as a champion of the developmental state and embarkedon a collision course with the neo-liberalism of western financial institutions anddonors.60 Alert to the tension with western countries and the financial institutionsattached to them, EPRDF has sought to diversify its financial dependence. This istranslated into the emergence of new players on the Ethiopian economic scene,particularly China, India and Turkey. At the same time, EPRDF has sought to tap intoIslamic finance, though this has entailed a more pragmatic shift in its foreign policy. Withthe Ethio-Saudi financial tycoon Sheikh Mohammed Alamudi serving as a catalyst,EPRDF has forged strong economic ties with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countriesthrough what has been dubbed as “land grabbing”, land leased for large scalecommercial agriculture aimed at ensuring food security in these countries. HenceEthiopia’s new political economy has created a novel structure of relevance for Muslims,providing them with a new language to press for their rights and network with the widerIslamic world: the language of development. The diaspora delegation, for instance,proposed to the Prime Minister the economic rewards if Ethiopia joins the Organizationof Islamic Countries (OIC) in a following way:

Given the country’s larger Muslim population as well as the historical intimacybetween Ethiopia and Islam there is no reason why Ethiopia should not be a

58 http://blog.ethiopianmuslims.net/negashi, “Reflection on the 7th Badr International EthiopianMuslims Conference”, Posted on August 2nd, 2007.59 They have defended hijab as an expression of female modesty and as an integral part of the Islamicway of life. The code for modest behavior for believing women is given in the Holy Qur’an, Sura an-Nur(24:31).60 Dereje Feyissa, “Aid negotiation: the uneasy ‘partnership’ between EPRDF and the donors”, Journalof Eastern African Studies November 5/4 (2011): 788–817.



member of the OIC. Islam was introduced to Ethiopia even before it was publiclydeclared in Mecca and seven years before the beginning of the Islamic calendarassociated with the hijra to Medina. In that sense Ethiopia is the first country, whichembraced Islam. Membership to the OIC will enable Ethiopia not only to accrueeconomic and political benefits, which it has forfeited in the past but also to reclaimits glory in Islamic history.61

The economic benefit to which the delegation alluded if Ethiopia joins the OIC is accessto the Islamic Development Bank (IDB).62 The membership of the IDB comprises 56countries and it is contingent on first being a member of the Organization of the IslamicCountries63. Nearly 50% of the OIC are African countries; ranging from predominantlyMuslim countries such as Algeria or Nigeria, to countries with a less sizeable Muslimpopulation such as Uganda (12%) or Mozambique (15%).

Muslim scholars have also increasingly used the language of development to justifythe creation of an Islamic political space. In a paper he gave at the forum on Ethiopia —Vision 2010, a paper entitled “Islam and Development in Ethiopia” (2007), MohamedAhmed Sheriff argued for the creation of an eastern economic block that consists ofEastern Oromiya, Harari, Afar and Somali all part of the historic Sultanates, with a sharedIslamic heritage which could be effectively used to connect Ethiopia with Middle Easternmarkets. Similarly, the need to establish an interest-free Islamic bank in Ethiopia is beingjustified in terms of the economic benefits that this would accrue to the “developmentalstate” by tapping into a huge amount of money currently operating outside of thecountry’s banking system. Preparations are well under way to establish Zemzem, the firstIslamic bank in Ethiopia.

Ethiopia’s increasingly assertive posture in hydro politics and the simmering tensionwith Egypt have also created a new sense of relevance to Ethiopian Muslims in theiridentity politics. Egypt has for long depicted Ethiopia as an anti-Islamic country bent on“starving” millions of Muslims by threatening to dam the waters of the Nile. Ethiopiacontributing more than 85 % of the waters of the Nile Egypt has securitized anydevelopment interventions in the upstream country. In a recent documentary featuredon Aljazeera, Egypt’s religious discourse on Nile politics was made abundantly clear withimages showing Muslims in the Sudan and Egypt suffering from lack of water, as if thereare no Muslims in Ethiopia, who, like their Christian co-citizens, also suffer from water

61 Ethiopian Muslims Diaspora Delegation. 2007. Questions Raised by the Ethiopian Muslims diasporato the Prime Minster Meles Zenawi. Unpublished paper, Addis Ababa.62 IDB is a South-South multilateral development institution, which operates in accordance with theprinciples of Shari’ah (Islamic law) to foster economic development and social progress of its membercountries as well as Muslim communities in non-member countries. In its endeavors to address thestrategic challenges confronting the Muslim world, the IDB’s Vision is to become a world-classdevelopment institution by the year 1440H [2020] inspired by Islamic principles’ ( Jumad Awwal .IslamicDevelopment Bank: Thirty — Five Years in the Service of Development, May 2009. http://adfimi.org/dosyalar/seminerler/128/pdf/23.pdf).63 See http://www.isdb.org/irj/portal/anonymous/idb_membercountries_en.



related problems. While participating enthusiastically in fund raising for the EthiopianGrand Hidase (Renaissance) Dam, Ethiopian Muslims apportion for themselves a newsense of mission in deconstructing Egypt’s religious discourse while advancing thelegitimate right of Ethiopia to make use of Nile waters for their own developmentalpurposes. The June 2010 issue of Be-ir, “the Pen”, one of the influential Muslim monthlyAmharic magazines, featured an article on the subject which severely criticizedAljazeera’s reportage on the issue as if it were a religious row between “Christian”Ethiopia and Muslim Egypt:

Al Jazira prepared a documentary on the Nile issue; highlighting water-hungryEgyptian and Sudanese Muslims and contrasting this with the mega hydro electricdams Ethiopia has recently built. The intended message of the documentary wasto give an impression to a global audience that Christian Ethiopia does not care forthe suffering of Muslims and Arab countries from the lack of water. Even if there isno single Muslim in the country Ethiopia is entitled to its right to use its waterresources for development. Islam is about social justice. The reality on the groundis also far from what was represented by Al Jazira. There are at least 25 millionMuslims in Ethiopia. Probably there are also more poor people in Ethiopia than inthe two countries. Making use of the Nile will go far in reducing poverty andcontributing to the development process. A developed Ethiopia means of courseimproved living conditions for a multitude of Muslims.64

It remains to be seen how much EPRDF’s developmental model of the state leaves spacefor non-state actors such as the private sector and community based organizations in thedevelopment process. At the very least, the adoption of the rhetoric of development byMuslims, both in instrumentalist and patriotic registers, enhances their appeal to thegovernment as a crucial, supportive community, at once religious and patriotic, notforeign but native to the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

ConclusionDuring the past four decades the Ethiopian polity has gone through a rapid process

of socio-political changes. A heightened rights consciousness among the country’smarginalized communities is part and parcel of this process of change. The recognitionpolitics of Ethiopian Muslims has been enabled by the 1974 revolution but also by thecountry’s turn to multiculturalism. Especially crucial has been the adoption of ethnicfederalism as a new model of political order since 1991. Minority groups in Ethiopia arenot, however, merely enabled or constrained by changing political structures. Theyhave, in fact, actually seized new fields of possibility and employed creative strategies ofentitlement.

What has yet to be noted, much less analyzed, is the degree to which Muslims incontemporary Ethiopia are now actively engaged in contesting their age-old

64 See Feyissa’s translation from Amharic to English. Bier/The Pen 1/8, ( June 2010):15.



socio-political marginalization. This paper for the first time has examined five new basesof entitlement in the recognition politics of Ethiopian Muslims. Firstly, they have used anarrative strategy, foregrounding the Najashi narrative that enhances religiously inclu-sive citizenship while at the same time constructing a new “Great Tradition” for Ethiopiaas the land of the first hijra. Secondly, Ethiopian Muslims have gone beyond thetraditional forms of lobbying governments to reframing the issue of religious equality ina globally recognized language, the language of human rights that refers not only to thecountry’s Constitution but also to international human rights conventions and treaties.This, in turn, has the effect of leading to juridification of protest while eschewing thelanguage of violence as advocated by some fringe groups. Thirdly, Muslims incontemporary Ethiopia have begun to present their rights to the government in thelanguage of development. In so doing they seek to affirm, and engage with, EPRDF’snew basis of political legitimacy, i.e. the developmental state. While deconstructing thedeeply rooted siege mentality in Ethiopian foreign policy-making regarding ArabMuslims, Ethiopian Muslims have encouraged EPRDF to diversify its dependence onWestern financial institutions, They urge their political leaders to tap into alternativefinancial resources from neighboring Arab states, while at the same time seeking furtherintegration into the wider Islamic world. Fourthly, Ethiopian Muslims are contestingEPRDF’s assertive secularism that limits religion to the private domain. By bringing tolight the contested nature of secularism and its local variations, they advocate a“Muslim-friendly” secularism, not denying the state or its instruments but relying on themfor religious expression as a citizen right. Last, but not least, there is an incipient form ofpolitical mobilization among Ethiopian Muslims in the context of electoral politics. In thistrajectory, Muslims, along with other religious communities, are playing an increasinglybigger role as voting blocs. Whatever the outcome of these initiatives, they bode well fora redefinition of Ethiopian Muslims both within and beyond the arc of the EPRDF.



Documents

Muslims Renegotiating Marginality in Contemporary Ethiopia