!

!

אוניברסיטת תל אביב

הפקולטה למדעי החברה

החוג למדעי המדינה

!Milestones in the evolution of the current German

Citizenship Law and its Effects on the Integration of

Turkish Immigrants

*

A research for the Master degree

Supervisor: Prof. Yossi hain

*

!May 2009

!Tal Harris, ID 021805478

! !1

!Contents

1. Introduction 1.1 The problem………………………………………………………………………………………….3 1.2 The research question………………………………………………………………………………...4 1.3 The research structure………………………………………………………………………………..5 1.4 The goals of the research and its premises …......................................................................................6 1.5 Methodology and structural notes……………………………………………………………………7

2. Typology and Boundaries of Citizenship 2.1 Basic typology and legal terms……………………………………………………………………....9 2.2 Inside the state, outside the people (Dual Citizenship and Multiculturalism)…...............................12 2.3 The origins of jus sanguinis in Germany…………………………………………………………..23

3. National Identity: its origins and function 3.1 What identity constitutes: time and change…………………………………………….…………..28 3.2 The function of a German homogenized national identity………………………………………....31 3.3 The origin and evolvement of "German blood"…………………………………………………….36 3.4 Beyond the borders of blood are "the others"…………………………………………………...….43

4. Politics and Legislation 4.1 Concise History of immigration of the "others"……………………………………………….…...50 4.2 Typology of immigration policies ……………………………………………...………………….55 4.3 Milestones in the history of Germany's immigration policies (international and national law)...….60 4.4 Overview of the political party system….………………………………………………………....78

5. The Story of Others 5.1 From immigrants to hyphenated Germans…………………………………………………….……87 5.2 The paradoxical profile of the Turkish immigrant……………………………………………….…90 5.3 Patterns of organization and roadblocks on way to integration……………………………..…….91 5.4 Prevalence and effects of Muslim terror in Germany……………………………………………105

6. Naturalization & Integration: Empirical Effects 6.1 Details of the survey………………………………………………………………………………110 6.2 The questions…………………………………………………………………………………...…112 6.3 Analysis of possible results……………………………………………………………………..…114 6.4 The results………………………………………………………………………………...……….116

7. Conclusion and Recommendations………………………………………………………122

8. Bibliography 8.1 Books and articles……………………………………………………………………………...….126 8.2 Internet sites…………………………………………………………………………………….…130 8.3 Other resources.........................................................................................................................…...131

Appendix: Abbreviations and key terms; Full questionnaire (English, German, Turkish)……….132

!2

!1. Introduction

1.1 The problem

Compared with other member states of the EU, Germany holds a large immigrant

population. Citizenship in Germany, on the other hand, has traditionally been much

less permissive than in most of its neighboring countries. While immigrants with a

permanent residence permit enjoy social services almost identical to those enjoyed by

citizens, and even posts in civil service, military, and police force are open to

denizens , inclusion in the nation and its political system has hardly been accessible 1

for anyone not of "German blood".

In the year 2000 the SPD and Grün Party coalition government succeeded in

reforming Germany's 87 years old citizenship law. The reform presented for the first

time in the country's history the possibility to get citizenship by being born on

German soil, without having to be of German descent. The reform also made it easier

to naturalize for almost ten percent of the country's residents, who immigrated

themselves or were born to immigrants – and thus were classified as "foreigners"

from birth by the state.

The reform raised a great public debate, and it is hard to hail the results of the reform

as a success. While the reform was meant to reduce the size of the alienated group of

immigrants in the country by liberalizing the conditions for citizenship, statistics

show a decline in applicants' numbers for German citizenship since 2000 . 2

!3

Soysal (1994) pg. 121-71

The initial and most significant drop in numbers is because Aussiedler since 2000 no longer apply for 2

citizenship and receive it automatically. This is why they are no longer recorded but receive citizenship automatically. See Ludvig (2004) pg. 503

This is a surprising case of policy failure: not only were the official goals of the

reform not reached. It was the opposite that was actually achieved.

!While the state is moving toward a more inclusive model of naturalization and

immigration, social and political developments point in another direction. There is an

ongoing public debate that seeks to "reconfigure the cultural boundaries of the

nation". The reform aggravated the debate about Germany's character: should it

promote a monoculture or rather a multitude of cultures? This debate on the nature of 3

any German identity makes integration of immigrants ever more complex.

It is sometimes suggested that the decline in naturalization rates is because the law

actually imposes "new conditions on individuals seeking naturalization". Such newly

introduced conditions include adequate knowledge of the German language, a

declaration of "loyalty to democratic principles", and the government's rejection of

the possibility of dual citizenship . Furthermore, it is also argued that German 4

citizenship gives only little practical benefits at the cost of the old citizenship . 5

It seems that the cluster of reasons that is suggested by the literature is important, but

is rarely to the point. The reasons given above explain why German citizenship may

generally not be as desirable for immigrants as expected. Eventually they do not

explain the actual decline in naturalizations following the reform.

This work will try to account for the specific failure of the 2000 liberalization of

Germany's citizenship law.

!4

Levy and Weiss (2002) pg. 2723

Nathans (2004) pg. 2504

Thrändhardt (1999) pg. 335

!!1.2 The research question

What are the historical and political causes of the reform in Germany's

citizenship law and its socio-political effects on its Turkish immigrant

population?

Complementary questions:

* How can citizenship and the nation-state be defined, and how are they related?

* Who is included and excluded in the nation-state and why?

* How can naturalization play a role in the process of integration?

!1.3 The research structure

1. Chapter Two provides the conceptual framework for discussing citizenship,

examining the most relevant typologies and boundaries of the concept.

2. An investigation of "citizenship" is incomplete without addressing the "nation-

state". Sometimes the two terms are even used interchangeably . Chapter Three 6

deconstructs the concept of national identity and the case of Germany.

3. Chapter Four analyzes the political processes and legislative history regarding

citizenship, naturalization and immigration in the case of Germany.

4. Chapter Five reviews what has been discussed in the literature on Turkish

immigration to Germany, their communities and their political tendencies.

To be able to assess the effects of the current citizenship law and the attitudes of

Turkish immigrants towards them, examining the history and socio-political

!5

Ludvig (2004) pg. 4996

behavioral patterns of the Turks is important. The examination will be broad, detailing

the Turks' involvement in various aspects of public life and in German native (non-

Turkish) society and culture. This will contribute to the assessment of their general

degree of integration and inclination to naturalize.

5. Chapter Six presents a questionnaire which is based on the previous chapters. The

questions measure the correlation between integration and the perceived desirability

of German citizenship. The questionnaire was completed by twenty one residents of

the city Konstanz who are originally from Turkey.

6. Chapter Seven discusses the preliminary results from the survey, suggests

directions for future research, and concludes the work.

!1.4. The goals of the research and its premise

This research has two major goals: to understand the shift in citizenship policy in

Germany, and to explain the failure of the 2000 reform to encourage more immigrants

to naturalize. This will be done by making the Turkish community in Germany a case

study, as it is: the largest, and perhaps most alienated, migrant group.

!The research assumes the following:

1. Policy changes and integration are connected: this work aims only at assessing the

extent and properties of that connection, but doesn't challenge the premise that there is

a mutually perpetuating process of legislation and social processes in the FRG.

2. The choice to focus on the Turkish community of immigrants concerns a

community that is only partially unique. It is assumed that the effects of federal

!6

policies on the Turkish community can be at least partially projected onto other

migrant groups in the FRG.

3. Although there are large gaps between the different Länder in their implementation

of federal policies , it is assumed that there are enough similarities to formulate a 7

general assessment of immigration, naturalization and citizenship laws for the whole

of Germany.

4. The case of working immigrants and their families can be distinguished from that

of asylum seekers not only legally, but also politically and socially. It is thus assumed

that the legal distinction constitutes also politically and socially distinct reality.

5. The survey measures the most relevant factors affecting integration and the

perceived desirability of German citizenship.

!1.5.1 Methodology

A review of the literature reveals two trends, which this research is based upon. The

first trend assesses Germany's citizenship and naturalization policies, through contents

analysis of its political and legislative history. The second trend qualitatively

examines the views of the immigrants on the policies they are subjected to, through

field-researches in immigrants' communities in Germany. The two trends are rarely

integrated. This work addresses the failure of the 2000 reform in integrating its

immigrant population by a contents analysis of political and legal aspects of

Germany's politics, as well as a direct survey of this population.

The survey is based upon theories from both these trends in the literature. The survey

was constructed so in the future it could be used to sample larger groups of

!7

Ludvig (2004) pg. 5087

immigrants in Germany, and provide quantitative data. Due to the limited scope of

this work, only preliminary results will be provided, based on a small yet

heterogeneous sample.

Finally, this research is based also on an interview conducted with Prof. Hailbronner

from the University of Konstanz, an expert of international and European law, who

has participated in the parliamentary discussions prior to the 2000 reform.

!

1.5.2 Structural and methodical notes

"A migration system" means "examining both ends of the flow [of immigration]": the

immigrant and the political environment which absorbs him/her . By examining the 8

debate around the German citizenship law from both the local political environment

(parties' constitutions and opinions of members) and the immigrants' positions, the

conclusions could encompass successfully the Turkish-German migration system. If

"macro-structures refer to large-scale institutional factors" like legislation, structures

and practices established by the state of receiving immigrants, and "micro-structures

are the informal social networks developed by the migrants themselves to cope with

migration" like xenophobia, racism, family, friendship and community ties, then this

work combines both

!The reader of this work should expect to be able to understand the concepts of

national identity and citizenship in Germany's context, and acquire a critical overview

of the reform of the citizenship law and its effect on the Turkish migrant community.

!8

Castles (2000) pg. 248

The work should thus contribute to the understanding of the broad issue of interaction

between immigration, citizenship, and the nation-state.

!!!!!!!!2. Typology and Boundaries of Citizenship

2.1 Basic typology and legal terms

The literature suggests several important typologies and boundaries for the issue of

citizenship. These derive from historical investigations focused on real needs such as

border control or economic growth, or alternately about the different manifestations of

democracy, communism, fascism and other (and more specific) political ideologies.

Leaving aside the discussion on the driving forces of politics and history in general,

the following suggested framework of the concept of citizenship takes both forces

into account. The chapter continues with an account of the central legal terms, jus

sanguinis and jus soli, which complement the theoretical typology suggested before.

The boundaries of citizenship are explored with regards to dual citizenship and

multiculturalism. While dual citizenship is examined for its high relevance to

Germany's case, multiculturalism has general significance in the discussion of

citizenship, but is found to play a very minor role in the case of Germany. The chapter

!9

ends with some introductory notes about citizenship in Germany, and its contested

boundaries.

A citizen is first and foremost an entity recognized by international law as a part of a

specific state, without regards to his/her social status, civic rights or feeling of

belonging. A more specific notion, but still purely formal, implies a unique set of

rights and duties to the citizen. Citizenship becomes more endowed with "meaning"

when the actions of citizens are justified and even morally judged through the law,

which is no longer the mere result of a casual legislator's will, but an embodiment of

what may be called "the spirit of the nation". This spirit will be expanded upon at a

later stage, but it is sufficient for the typology of citizenship to realize that when

endowed with moral affinities, it is no longer formal but essential as well.

This endowment can sometimes even transcend the incidental action of a legislator,

especially in times of political turbulence or when the leadership is highly contested.

Such was the legislation during the time of the Weimar Republic (along with other

political acts and features of that republic), judged by a growing part of the population

as a betrayal of the nation. A final meaning of citizenship, less intuitive but essential

to a broad understanding, is the idea of the nation that no longer requires the residence

or even the existence of the state . It is a purely informal category of collective 9

identity, which serves social and political functions of a nation or a people, even when

the first no longer constitutes a state. Exiles, refugees and even working immigrants

may be outside the state but remain within their own people or nation. Even when

!10

Caldwell (2008) pg. 41-439

their state is occupied, they may nevertheless continue to share and uphold the same

notion of citizenship.

!Citizenship has two faces. The first originates from the early established liberal

democracies, where citizenship is just one of the rights granted by the welfare state.

The latter is a concept arising from a politicized awareness of ethnic differences

within the state . Citizenship is instrumental - a vessel for some general democratic 10

rights, and also essential – an expression of the demography within the state.

!The legally classification of citizenship is mainly by birth (jus soli), by descent (jus

sanguinis), and by naturalization (including marriage) . To name a few examples, jus 11

soli is common in the USA, Latin American states and France. It simply means that

those who were born in the state are also citizens of the state. Jus Sanguinis is

common in countries including Germany, India, Israel, Japan and Russia. It means

that

a. Those who belong to the national "organic 'ethno-cultural' entity marked by a

common language and culture" are also citizens of the state.

b. "Every person born to non-citizen parents will remain a foreigner unless he or

she naturalizes" . 12

If the first condition of jus sanguinis seems rather opaque and confusing, it is because

it uses terms that are hardly self-explanatory, although decision makers may be

!11

Heater (1999) pg. 210

Blatter (2009) pg. 311

Ludvig (2004) pg. 50212

tempted to use connotative thought and intuition to understand it. Chapter 3 of this

work will analyze and further elaborate on jus sanguinis, being Germany's main

principle of citizenship.

Although theoretically distinct, jus soli and jus sanguinis are combined in most

existing citizenship laws . Birth within borders of the state, as well as being a 13

descendant of a prominent/dominant group, are both addressed at some level by the

legislator and government of the nation state.

!Critics of the jus sanguinis principle claim that it is not based on objective biological

or genealogical relations, but that it is rather an ideology "used to legitimate

identification". It is a narrative strategy for designating a degree of likeness, of

similarity" . Furthermore, it is claimed that being of the national ethnicity does not 14

necessarily correlate with the language skills, religion and ethics of the national

majority. Therefore, the principle of jus sanguinis is not just ideological, but also

defies its own goals of maintaining homogeneity in the state by accepting repatriates

who do not share the national culture . 15

Both jus sanguinis and jus soli are politicizing and legalizing a fundamental similarity,

genealogical and geographical respectively, or an invention of it.

The case of Germany's shift from a jus sanguinis-based citizenship law to one with

elements of jus soli is the subject of further analysis and criticism in the next chapters.

!12

Ibid13

Senders (1999) pg. 17814

Mandel (2008) pg. 214 15

But to approach it with an appropriate understanding of citizenship, I shall further

pause momentarily on the boundaries of the typologies described above.

2.2 Inside the state, outside the people

If a nation is the political mode of existence of a people, then a pure nation state

grants citizenship to all those who reside in it and allows residence only to members

of that particular people and to their offspring. History, however, never experienced

such an ideal-type state, and attempts at achieving such a state have always failed.

Even the Third Reich had to employ foreign workers from Italy, Poland, and

Czechoslovakia to build-up its military industry . Consequently, the nation state (and 16

any other state for that matter) needs to define its border control according to

agreeable criteria.

International law presents such general criteria. It grants everyone the right to exit any

country, and to return to their own country, but it is completely up to the state to

determine the criteria for entrance . However, what international law allows is not 17

always practical. Since no country has the military strength or the moral imperative to

deport all new and old immigrants, there is a fixed "lack of correspondence between

the population of a state and those accorded the rights of citizenship" . This leads to 18

the activation of two parallel and mutually strengthening processes: an imagined

community and a reassessment and phrasing of the citizenship law and policies. The

!13

Kurthen (1997) pg. 6716

See Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: www.un.org/Overview/rights.html. 17

and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR): www.unhcr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm.

Sammartino (2008) pg. 6218

imagined community (imagined, due to the aforementioned lack of correspondence)

shapes the citizenship law and policies, and the latter in turn shapes the first.

While the two principles determine the "natural citizens", most nation states also

phrase regulations and conditions for "natural foreigners" to become citizens, known

as "to naturalize".

Naturalization is usually conditioned by "objective biographical circumstances". The

necessary circumstances, such as "birth in the territory, present or prior residence,

having a citizen parent, or being married to a citizen", are the gateway for an

individual becoming "recognized as a stakeholder" in the nation state. In western

democracies such as Germany, citizenship also grants the individual a claim to

participate in the collective decision-making process . 19

The case of those outside the nation but inside the state marks the boundaries of

citizenship. It is contested in two main frontiers: the debate over the legitimacy of

dual citizenship and multiculturalism/differential citizenship. Both will be addressed

mainly through their relevance to Germany's case.

!2.2.1 Dual Citizenship

Dual citizenship, or the formal belonging to two nations, bestows many additional

rights and duties upon those who are granted it (instrumental citizenship), chiefly the

possibility to freely move between two societies. It also allows a more complex

national identity, arguably richer or self-contradictory (essential citizenship). This

formal overlap of rights, duties and identity does not generally imply a full and

!14

Blatter (2009) pg. 719

simultaneous participation in the legal order and political life of two states, and it is

usually left to the individual to determine to what extent he/she exercises this overlap.

Citizenship for permanent settlers and their children is crucial from both instrumental

and essential aspects. Where immigrants do not want to go give up their previous

nationality, dual citizenship is a possible answer. Over half the world’s states now

recognize some form of dual citizenship or dual nationality , but the issue is still at 20

the heart of the debate on citizenship law in many countries. Most countries which do

allow it, condition it with bilateral agreements, security restrictions, and others. In 21

Germany it played a crucial role in the debate over the suggested reform by the Red-

Green government of 1998 and in its final version adopted a year later . 22

!The 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of

Nationality Laws stated in its preamble that “…it is in the general interest of the

international community to secure that all its members should recognize that every

person should have a nationality and should have one nationality only.” This

conviction was reaffirmed and strengthened in the European Council's 1963

Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military

Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality . 23

Nevertheless, the taboo regarding dual citizenship has admittedly been increasingly

contested in the last years. Understanding the debate around dual citizenship is crucial

not only to mapping out of citizenship and its boundaries, but to the case of Germany

!15

Fritz quoted in Blatter (2009) pg. 1720

Ludvig (2004) pg. 51021

Heater (1999) pg. 10822

Especially Article 1: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Word/043.doc23

specifically. To do so, it shall be examined according to various political schools.

Naturally, the following survey is not complete, but is rather meant to present the

main arguments for and against dual citizenship with their theoretical sources.

!According to liberalism, the government and the state are merely instruments

managed by the citizens to better their lives. We can deduce from it an argument in

favor of dual citizenship. In order to "fulfill the congruence principle which states that

all those who are subject to authoritative rule should have a right of participating in

making these rules…"states should not only tolerate but embrace dual citizenship" . 24

Another liberal argument deduces that dual citizenship is necessary from the general

trend of globalized other human rights. Allowing dual citizenship strengthens the

connection between legal and political rights. It is assumed that since dual citizens

have a stake in two countries, they will also want a say in both. However, the liberal

discourse also disagrees with dual citizenship, as it contradicts the principle of equal

opportunities. If some enjoy the rights and duties of two nations, while others don't,

then they are either superior or underprivileged from the start.

!From a republican point of view, "intensive participation of citizens in the self-

government of political communities is… at least as much a duty as it is a right" . 25

With this duty oriented viewpoint, the republicans actually emphasize the problematic

possibilities inherent in dual nationality:

!16

Blatter (2009) pg. 30, 724

Ibid, pg. 1125

• Dual citizens may use their second passport to escape civic duties. A

republican cannot accept that citizens have the option to avoid conscription in

a time of need, simply by using their second passport;

• Dual nationals may be less politically minded, as their second passport

provides a legal instrument for the all-too-easy option to exit the state ; 26

• In other cases, the exit option may become a way of expressing political

preferences, if to use Hirschman's terminology ; 27

• Finally, the laws of the nation state are not merely procedural, but also

normative. They project and (partly) constitute the essence of the citizen. Dual

nationals are not expected to embrace this property of the law, as they juggle

between two systems of law . 28

!The communitarians, a more radical version of republicans, hold firmly that a nation

provides the individual an identity, but demands in exchange absolute loyalty on his/

her behalf. This political viewpoint stresses out the danger of dual loyalty, defying the

interest of the state. But it also defies the interests of the individual, as it may raise

psychological problems of identity, and hamper the development of a consistent

personal identity of those holding two passports . 29

!

!17

Ibid, pg. 926

Hirschman (1970) 27

Blatter (2009) pg. 1028

Ibid, pg. 14-1529

According to deliberative democracy, the enrichment and improvement of the general

political discourse is a key principle of good democracy. It is thus likely to support

dual citizenship, based on reasons similar to those stated with regards to liberals . 30

!Multiculturalists may be aware of the aforementioned disadvantages of dual

citizenship, but regard them to be a fair "affirmative action which compensate for

their specific disadvantages and dangers", mainly xenophobia . This argument is 31

only relevant, if at all, to persecuted and unrecognized minorities. This viewpoint is

thus brought up only for the theoretical framework of addressing dual citizenship, but

is hardly relevant to Germany's case where most immigrants are entitled since 1965 to

a status of denizens. This is indeed the general case of multiculturalism in Germany,

as will be explained in the next part of this chapter.

Table I presents the arguments in favour of and against dual citizenship:

!Table I

Pro Contra

Fulfills the congruence principle which

states that all those who are subject to

authoritative rule should have the right

of participating in making these rules

(liberalism)

Contradicts the principle of equal

opportunities (liberalism)

!18

Ibid, pg. 2430

Ibid, pg. 2031

!A particularly interesting opposition regarding dual citizenship comes from the

Turkish scholar, Yasemin Soysal. Her opposition stems from the observation that

nowadays "the transnational order defines the rules and organization of the nation

state system". This means that more and more realms which were once under the

exclusive authority of the nation-state are now 'trans-nationalized', and that global-

level norms replace national level norms . 32

Soysal's thesis can rely upon the data from 1996-7, for instance, when only 15 percent

of all foreigners in Germany enjoyed less than the full rights given to a full member

citizen, apart from the right to political participation. This minority was made up of

foreigners residing in Germany only for a limited time, or waiting for a decision on

their asylum applications. Only 3 percent were required to leave the country but had

Strengthens the connection between

legal and political rights (liberalism)

Dual citizens may use their second

passport to escape civic duties

(republicanism)

Enriches and improves the general

political discourse (deliberative

democracy)

Dual nationals may be less politically

minded (republicanism)

Compensates for specific

disadvantages and dangers of

minorities (multiculturalism)

Allows the exit option to become a way of

expressing political preferences

(republicanism)

Dual citizenship defies the interest of the

state, as well as those of the individual

(communitarians)

!19

Soysal (1994) pg. 14532

not yet done so . It may be also that case in the USA, where "many immigrants see 33

little point in becoming citizens because successive laws have steadily reduced the

distinction between citizens and non-citizens in terms of rights" . 34

In 4th century BC Athens "equality involved not only the obvious rights of voting and

holding public office" (also typical of the modern nation-state citizenship), but also 35

meant exclusive civic liberties. These rights are now usually granted nowadays to all

residents of the state, regardless of citizenship. They are protected by international

treaties and national democratic constitutions and laws. Soysal claims that this trend

marks the gradual process of national citizenship becoming obsolete, and presents a

possibly more sustainable transnational citizenship which encompasses human rights.

One may criticize this theory for overlooking the change which occurred from the

eighteenth century, whereby many nations put forth an added value to the concept of

citizenship and made it republican. Doing so, they yielded it to a common origin,

culture, and values. As explained above, for more than two hundred years citizenship

provides an identity no less than it provides rights and duties.

In Germany, it is usually citizenship which mark "the desperate attempt to answer the

question 'Who is a German?'”. It encompasses anything from a republican common

good in the form of democracy, to the opinion that Germany must remain a Christian

country . However, Soysal's model of post national citizenship assumes the gradual 36

formation of an alternative global identity.

!20

Münz (2002) pg. 26-2733

Heater (1999) pg. 8534

Ibid, pg. 8335

Fücks (2002) pg. 7936

But as all typologies, the classical division of citizenship to the instrumental and

essential is obviously not sufficient to address all which is entailed by citizenship. To

state just a two examples, Soysal's model "does not sufficiently account for the

existential anguish caused by persistent legal and bureaucratic hurdles and

procedures" brought upon non-citizens and spared from citizens . 37

Citizenship also grants the hope (at least) to form an allegiance with the higher social

statues, otherwise impossible 38

Of course one should remember that national parties and nation states are still the

most common form of collective political identity, which makes Soysal's model

prophetic or visionary at best.

Finally the multicultural concept of citizenship is to be considered. Global migration

creates a world of intricate identities influenced by both the country of origin and the

country of residence, but also by the constitutive experiences of emigrating and

immigrating. Such developments undermine the nation-state principle of singular and

exclusive membership . Following this observation, one may support Soysal's 39

argument that citizenship is simply no longer important for those coming from so

many different cultures. One may, on the other hand, claim for a differentiated

citizenship as explained in the next part of this chapter.

Soysal's post-national theory received much criticism and seems to fit best outside the

above table I. Her model identifies a transnational process which undermines national

citizenship, and will resurface in the later examination of the effects of the reform in

!21

Mandel (2008) pg. 1537

Diehl and Blohm (2003) pg. 134-13538

Castles (2000) pg. 1239

Germany's citizenship law on the integration and interest in naturalization of its

Turkish community.

!2.2.2 Multiculturalism

Certain scholars are promoting a differentiated model of citizenship , which would 40

meet the different needs of an ethnically, religiously and culturally diverse nation. In

the classic model, citizenship entitles all members of the state with the same set of

rights. This means that if, for instance, dual citizenship is not allowed for one group

of citizens, it must be generally forbidden for all citizens. In the differentiated model,

citizenship grants different rights to meet different needs, and thus dual citizenship

may be forbidden for the majority, but for some it would be allowed. This relatively

new approach, a part of the more general multiculturalism, assumes an ethnicity

"identified through time and space" – that of the majority and the minority groups. 41

Only when assuming that both groups' ethnicities are somewhat fixed, can the

demand for laws tailored for their specific needs be justified. Differential citizenship

recognizes that formal equality of rights does not necessarily lead to equality. It

demands the establishment of mechanisms for group representation and participation,

differential treatment for people with different characteristics, needs and wants . 42

Ethnic minorities are offered "cultural tolerance… rights and institutions, in exchange

for acceptance of basic principles and the rule of law; they are imagined as culturally-

laden social groups, who need to be integrated and individualized by a public sphere

!22

Mandel (2008) pg. 22740

Kymlicka (1995) pg. 85 and Mandel (2008) pg. 22841

Castles (2000) pg. 14442

which offers voice and participation, transforming them from ‘immigrants’, into full

and free citizens".

As multiculturalism does away with "expectations of assimilation and acculturation" 43

of the nation-state's naturalization policies, its challenge becomes clear.

The growing numbers of foreigners in post-war Europe brought with it the expansion

of the discourse of multiculturalism as well. The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, a

report headed by Lord Parekh, promotes a "a new national narrative and set of

policies conveying an understanding that Britain is both a ‘community of citizens’ & a

‘community of communities", as "People have competing attachments to nation,

group, subculture, region, city, town, neighborhood and the wider world. They belong

to a range of different but overlapping communities, real and symbolic, divided on

cultural issues of the day.... Identities, in consequence, are more situational" . 44

Multiculturalism is now a global discourse, as immigrants' unique national identities

are invigorated through the improving technologies of communications, and are

casting a doubt on the classical concept of citizenship.

This doubt is probably quite irrelevant to case of the FRG. The German government

fights xenophobia, guided by its constitution and authoritarian past. While it is true

that the country does have a long history of denying that it became "the world's most

important destination for migrants" with the official government's position that

"Germany is not a country of immigration" , the immigrant population in Germany is 45

!23

Favell quoted in Vertovec (2001) pg. 543

The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, quoted, ibid, pg. 6-744

Eley & Palmowski (2008) pg. 4; Koopmans & Statham (2000) pg. 1; Katzenstein (1987) pg. 218-3945

facing a rather clear road into formal political inclusion since the early nineties and

social inclusion since the mid-sixties.

Kymlicka criticises Germany for refusing to naturalize those who have already

integrated and "live as Germans" . Kymlicka's accusation is thus simply irrelevant to 46

Germany's case and better fits other European countries. France's La Pen, Italy's Lega

Nord, Austria's Freedom Party, and the Netherlands' Pim Fortuyn are all incomparably

more popular than Germany's NDP, whose activists are responsible for more than 100

immigrants' deaths over the last two decades but repeatedly fail at the federal

elections. These extremists are contrasted with the wider demonstrations of 300,000

Germans in 1992 in the capital Berlin, and one million Germans in 1993 in the more

conservative Baden-Württemberg. They demonstrated for solidarity with the

immigrant population and helped to frame the phenomena of xenophobia in Germany

within the realms of the small (but vocal) extreme right wing.

The simple fact that such claims are hardly raised within Germany to begin with puts

a final seal on the alternative of multiculturalism in Germany. There are almost "no

claims by immigrants, using a racial identity in Germany", due to the problematic

usage of race and ethnos as an explicit "policy and discursive category" since its

usage by the National Socialists . When such claims do happen to appear in the 47

literature with regard to Germany, they cannot even be reconciled with the basic claim

of multiculturalism for cultural autonomy, as this too is perceived as a form of misuse

of power by the hegemonic culture . While multiculturalists in Germany still try to 48

!24

Kymlicka (1995) pg. 2346

Koopmans & Statham (2000) pg. 5 and 2547

Kaya (2000), pg. 99-107, quoted in Karakus (2007), pg. 22 48

phrase a cohesive demand, integration is the most likely policy against right wing

extremism, as it is supported not only by government policies, but by the general

public too. Changes in German citizenship are introduced gradually, rather than in the

revolutionary manner called for by multiculturalists. Throughout the last two decades

"a form of jus soli acquisition of the children of migrants born in the country" was

introduced by both CDU/CSU-FDP and SPD-Grün governments.

!The classic notion of citizenship assumes an egalitarian society through equal

citizenship to all members of the nation. This is based upon Rousseau's notion that all

citizens "pledge themselves under the same conditions and must all enjoy the same

rights" . Differentiated citizenship is based upon a realization that equality can 49

actually bring about inequality. Granting minorities the same rights as the majority

may be insufficient, and affirmative action is suggested also in citizenship law.

Ultimately and common to both concepts, is that the principle of equality is a

powerful character of citizenship. They differ in the way this equality should be

attained, and the acceptance of the assumption that there are some who more

"naturally" belong to the state than others.

Germany proves to be quite irrelevant to discourse of multiculturalism, which is

presented here as a part of the general discussion of citizenship. Minorities' needs in

Germany are still addressed by a more traditional notion of citizenship, which sets the

boundaries for the discussion of its case.

!2.3 The origins of jus sanguinis in Germany

!25

Heater (1999) pg. 8349

The principle of citizenship by blood found its expression already in 1842 in a

meeting of the Prussian Staatsrat, or state council: "Who is bound to the King and to

the State with his entire person? Who belongs to the brotherhood of the Prussian

nation?" The answer was "only those whose bodies and property, Blut und Gut,

belong to the state" . The law gradually became more ethno-focal by the end of the 50

19th century, when large quotas of foreigners of German ethnicity requested

repatriation. The King declared in 1896 that Germany has a "responsibility of binding

the larger German empire firmly to the homeland", and making it a "polity of all

Germans, a Civis Germanus Sum" . 51

This is the evolution of a policy that was previously advocated in Prussia, based on

very different grounds. The Prussian bureaucrats wished to allow "all subjects of

German states the right to migrate to any German state that was prepared to accept

them, without payment of a fee (provided only that military service obligations had

been fulfilled)" . The bureaucrats were motivated by macro-economic 52

considerations, to allow the flow of workers in and out of German states, Länder,

according to the market's needs and to precipitate growth.

Prussia's bureaucrats were drawing on policies developed during the Napoleonic

occupation of Prussia in the early 19th century. The French citizenship law of the time

inspired legislation in Germany, only to be changed in France to jus soli on 1889 and

remaining intact in Germany . 53

!26

Nathans (2004) pg. 6050

Ibid, pg. 16951

Ibid, pg. 17052

Gosewinkel (2008) pg. 32-3353

At the time, not only moral commitment of the king or macro-economic interests of

the Prussian bureaucracy made blood a criterion for inclusion in the nation. Prejudices

concerning gender roles played a significant role as well. The Interior Ministry

"insisted that wives share the citizenship of their husbands on the ground [of] the

holiness of the marriage bond". Another prejudice was that those of certain religions

or "races" could not be included in the nation. Even "the most enlightened"

philosophers and civil servants, "generally opposed increasing the number of foreign

Jews permitted to settle in the state" . 54

In conclusion, it seems that although the German citizenship law is described

nowadays by a single headline, namely that it is a manifestation of jus sanguinis, it

stems from a whole cluster of ideas . Some of these ideas were conservative and 55

protectionist, and others plainly discriminatory and racist. Finally, it would appear, the

notion that "one is born a German" does not have to be objectively flawless. Its 56

secure epistemological status is what makes it important in the discourse and debate

over German citizenship.

!With regards to the boundaries of citizenship in Germany, I shall address only the

issue of dual citizenship, as the relevance of multiculturalism had already been

discredited. The liberal viewpoint is inconclusive about dual citizenship and raises

arguments for and against it. In Germany, the liberal political discourse is almost

limited to that of the FDP. Another advocate of dual-citizenship is the more socialist

!27

Nathans (2004) pg. 64, 6854

Fücks (2002) pg. 7755

Mandel (2008) pg. 21556

Green Party. These are a steady political force in Germany, but not a central one. The

republican viewpoint, on the other hand, is shared by both the conservative and social

democratic parties, and presents understandable concerns regarding dual citizenship.

It upholds political participation a very important right, almost a civic duty. Because

of its reluctance to grant dual citizenship, the central parties ensure immigrants the

status of denizens relatively early in the post-war era. From the point of view of the

advocates of dual citizenship, the immigrants' reluctance to give up their original

citizenship should actually indicate that it is based on a developed political standpoint.

This may suggest that the naturalized immigrants may turn out to be politically

involved and active citizens, which could sooth the republican-driven concerns. This

optimistic understanding of the immigrants' status was never confirmed by surveys

conducted in their respective communities. Rather the opposite revealed to be true, as

most of the immigrants interviewed in other works expressed desperation and non-

belief in the political system . The rather prevalent Permanent Residence status is 57

obtained without having to renounce one's original nationality, and thus served as a

substitute for the much less available option of naturalizations. This status also has

been frequently mentioned as a main reason for low naturalization rates in Germany,

as long as it categorically necessitated the renouncement of one’s original

citizenship . 58

Naturalization means the total acceptance of the immigrant into society, into the

nation. Until the reform in the German citizenship law, the only naturalization

possible was that which served the interests of the nation, and not of its members.

!28

For example: Mandel (2008), Karakus (2007), Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) and Soysal (2002) 57

Ludvig (2004) pg. 51158

The potentially harmful symptoms of immigration, such as the polluting the German

race or the desecration of the holy bond of marriage, were to be prevented by this

policy. It strived to save the country from these symptoms becoming everlasting. This

is why the German citizenship law of 1913, which was left almost untouched until the

2000 reform, consciously ignored private interests and made the national concern the

only one to be considered when a foreigner applied for citizenship. As an illustration

serves the case from 1922 of a rejected application of a Jewish doctor married to a

war widow and father in effect to her orphaned children in Thuringia . The private 59

interests of him and his wife were presented to the council of states, and since the

national interest was paramount to such individual's needs, the application was

rejected. Only once he applied again after several years, stressing out his talents as a

doctor and contribution to the general community, did the conservative states

approved his application.

In 2000 the SPD and Grün party managed to reform the old citizenship law with the

consent of the conservative parties. The necessary consent made the changes in the

citizenship law far less bold than what was initially planned, at least by the Grün

Party. Nevertheless, the reform certainly eased the severity of the jus sanguinis

citizenship law, and made naturalization less tied to some almost arbitrarily ruled

"national/social interest".

The analysis of its historical and political causes and its empirical socio-political

effects on the integration and naturalization rates of Turkish immigrants in Germany

is the topic of the next parts of this work.

!29

Sammartino (2008) pg. 5859

!

!30

3. National Identity: its origins and function

3.1 What identity constitutes: time and change

Citizenship based on jus sanguinis is conditioned on being part of the national

"organic 'ethno-cultural' entity marked by a common language and culture". it must be

further clarified, since operational laws and policies stem from this condition, and

affect millions of permanent and temporary residents.

This is the background for this chapter's theme, a deconstruction and analysis of the

murky Gordian knot which connects the operational "citizenship" with the abstract

"organic 'ethno-cultural' entity" or the more general "spirit of the nation". As chapter 2

was devoted to citizenship, this chapter is devoted to national identity. It attempts to

define national identity, explain its relevance to citizenship, and its meaning in the

context of Germany's case.

!Applicable to the German national and ethnic identity is the conceptual framework of

Stuart Hall, which presupposes an identification of citizenship with national identity.

The common sense understanding of identity is that it is "constructed on the back of

recognition of some common origin, or shared characteristics with another person or

group, or with an ideal, and with the natural closure of solidarity and allegiance

established on this foundation" . 60

The specific modern nation-state compares its identity with that of an entity. This

entity has its existence daily reaffirmed either by the people's will (in democratic

societies) or by some ruling elite. With that identity, it completely overlooks the

aforementioned intricacy of any identity, surely a collective one.

!31

Hall (1996) pg. 1-260

The modern state has a spirit; it is born, goes through infancy, maturity and

sometimes also ages and dies. It has a will and interests.

The nation-state is first and foremost particularistic. It embodies a particular nation or

people, joined together by common biographies: either birth in the same place (jus

soli) or to a common descent (jus sanguinis). It is the particular unit in international

affairs, an exclusive condition to allow citizens to "participate in broader humanity" . 61

The nation-state is also the bearer of universal and particularistic principles

simultaneously. It is a bearer of particular and universal values, and provides the

"framework for the realization of these values" . 62

In conclusion, whether historical or meta-historical, whether based on an ideology or

on an ethnos, a national identity is marked by a consistent existence over time. It is

the anthropomorphized bearer of particular and universal values, unchanged by time.

It is therefore only natural that its citizenship law will embody this identity.

!Problems begin with the revaluation of this common sense understanding of identity.

Identity in general, and particularly a collective national one, may not be as fixed and

untimely as suggested above. Identity is in a constant state of reconstruction, coming

into being, and is never complete. Its total merging into an unchanging monolith is a

fantasy and idealization of its more allusive nature. It is never fully embodying that

fantasy - there is always too much or too little of it - "never a perfect fit" in practice.

These words may come out as blasphemy to the nationalist, who holds dear this

idealization and is sometimes even ready to die for it. However, identity can never be

!32

Walker (1993) pg. 15161

Bach (1999) pg. 5862

static, especially that of a collective. It must be constantly dynamic - unless it is dead.

Contrary to the monolithic and untimely identity that the nation state adopts, Freud

already stated in 1921 that "identification is… ambivalent from the very start" . 63

Accordingly, the widespread approach in the literature is supportive of a constructivist

origin of national identities . Nations are constructed, either socially or through the 64

influence of elites and are not originating from some eternally fixed ideology or

ethnos. Cultural identity (as well as any living identity) is not static or frozen in time,

but in a perpetual condition of change . Identities are about using the resources of 65

history, language and culture in the process of becoming rather than being, and reflect

not a return to the roots but a narrativization of these roots. The notion of those who

address the nation anthropomorphically (as if it has interests of its own and goes

through processes as maturing and dying) is that there is a continuity of a national

identity over time. . In the political, social and cultural context, this artificial identity 66

necessitates using the state power to conduct the exclusion of peoples in a constant

fluctuation over the boundaries of the nation-state, by its occupation of others'

territories and the occupation of its territories by foreign nations.

!If the world and its cultures are 'plural', then the 'nation-state' is rarely an appropriate

term, for "few states have ethnically homogeneous populations" . 67

!33

Hall (1996), pg. 3 63

Risse and Engelmann-Martin (2002) pg. 28964

Tomlinson (1991), pg. 7065

Fulbrook (1999) pg. 9-18 66

Anthony Smith quoted in Tomlinson (1991) pg. 73 67

This doesn't necessarily mean that national identities are illusionary or useless. It

does, however, necessitate a more flexible reading of national citizenship laws and

policies, as they reflect (indeed like all other man-made laws) the spirit of its times. If

the nation/nation-state is not untimely or unchanging, and if citizenship laws are the

operational definition of belonging to the nation/nation-state, the citizenship laws

cannot aspire to be time- and change-proof.

Nevertheless, political leaders rarely acknowledge this revision of the national

identity. They rather utilize the common image of that identity, to endow citizenship

laws and naturalization policies with common justifications. When legislators adhere

to naturalistic and organic justifications of these policies about the "spirit of the

nation", they necessitate further investigation. If these are indeed the reasons for

legislation, they must be clarified, so that the compatibility between the motive for

legislation and the act of legislation may be examined.

!3.2 The function of a German homogenized national identity

The German national identity has traditionally been based on the notion of a common

descent and a common ethnicity. Conditions for naturalization consisted mostly of a

demand for assimilation – if one was not ethnically German, one was expected to

become similar to a German.

Therefore, the German national identity encompasses not only an ethnic community,

but one that shares a "historic territory, common myths and historical memoirs, a

mass public culture, a common economy, and common legal rights and duties for all

members" . Although in one sense all of the above ingredients and symbols of the 68

!34

Smith (1971) pg.13-1468

ethnic national identity are subjective, their long term patterning produces a structure

of relations. This structure may provide a framework for the socialization of

successive generations of the residents of historical Germany. Furthermore, it

regulates their interests through myths of ethnic descent and symbols of territory and

community . This structure attempts to homogenize culture, which allows the ruling 69

elites to more easily set (or follow) a "national agenda". We might argue that

"richness, variety and difference are goods in themselves", but under such a veil of

homogeneity, so are "order, uniformity and universality" . 70

!Following from that sense of order is the sense of belonging to a nation. This

represents an attenuated form of "primordial sentiments". It is most evident in

German national identity which was presumably seized most authentically and

passionately by the Volk (people) movement of the 19th century. The movement

provided a pre-modern cultural context, which was based on what Giddens calls 'high

presence availability', that is to say contexts in which relations are based on direct

face-to-face contact with others . It may be considered an imagined contact, because 71

"members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members,

meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their

communion" . Taking the argument even a step further, these are contexts and a 72

concept of common descent, invented through a set of practices normally governed by

overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of rituals of symbolic nature. This invention seeks

!35

Smith (1991) pg. 14.69

Tomlinson (1991) pg. 84.70

In Tomlinson (1991) pg. 84 71

Anderson explain in Tomlinson (1991) pg. 80.72

to demonstrate continuity with the past, based on values and norms of behavior. Such

values and norms are deduced from sheer repetition (which automatically implies

continuity) of an invented common past . The common past allows transcending the 73

inequalities of the present, and helps presenting the nation as an eternally "deep and

horizontal comradeship". Germany's history shows that this fraternity was imagined

or invented in order to unite Germany against foreign threats as the French (early 19th

century), and then for a relatively late nation-building by Bismarck (1870s).

!The political home of nationalism is the right. Historically, liberals and radicals have

been internationalists. Marx's statement 'the workers have no fatherland' epitomizes

that view. Liberal intellectuals have perceived nationalism from the right as

ethnocentric and narrow minded . As both extreme left and right in Germany's recent 74

history mark tabooed political ideologies, it is no wonder therefore that Germany is in

disagreement about its past and not about its future like other countries . While the 75

past is significant in the citizenship policy of every nation, and its aforementioned

play of power, inclusion and exclusion, it is particularly true in Germany's case.

!Volksgeist (spirit of the people) became a characteristic element of the German nation

during German Romanticism in the 19th century , and was considered an objective 76

feature of the pure German ethnicity and culture. Volk nationalism is defined as "state

!36

Hobsbawm in ibid, pg. 91-273

De Sola Pool in ibid, pg. 6874

Dahrendorf (1987) pg. 13775

Deutsch R. (2008) pg. 98.76

centered political rights on the basis of nationhood" , and its rise may be explained 77

with the following:

1. In 1806, the humiliation of the defeat and occupation by the Napoleonic army, had

led to a resistance, led by intellectuals like Heinrich von Kleist and the Grimm

brothers. The resistance required the aggregation of many who had hitherto been

merely subjects to various principalities into a nationally cohesive and proud

citizenry. This need for a turnover of identity necessitated the imagination or

invention of a common ground. The ideo-focal common ground at the time was the

principles of the French revolution, which had captured the hearts of German artists

and intellectuals prior to the Napoleonic occupation. Being obviously imported by the

occupier, the ideo-focal common ground became unavailable. This in turn made the

ethno-focal common ground a default choice for attaining national cohesion . 78

2. The marriage of the nation and the state, the formation of a German nation-state,

emerged in Germany parallel to the accumulation of anti-French sentiments. In 19th

century Germany, the nationalistically driven battle against the Napoleonic

occupation and the spread of principles of democracy were intertwining. The battle

against the French was based upon both the notion of a joint community

(Gemeinschaft) and the latter democratic institutionalization of the state signified by

the more anonymous notion of society (Gesellschaft) . 79

The German Volk national movement reached its peak of popularity several decades

after the second Reich of Bismarck collapsed, with the rise of the National-Socialist

!37

Calhoun (1993) pg. 21677

Kedourie (1993)78

Calhoun (1993) pg. 211-3979

Party. Since then it became somewhat tabooed in the FRG and is hardly a source for

common nationalistic pride . But the notion of common descent is still a major 80

ingredient of the nation's cohesion. The idea of the nation and its symbols are still an

answer for those in search for an identity "uniting the farmer from Germany's rural

northeast and the pensioner from Hamburg, the housewife from Itzehoe in the north

and the artist from Munich in the south, the unemployed man from Bremen and the

stockbroker from Frankfurt . 81

With the fall of the third Reich and the formation of a FRG, the notion of a common

people (Volk) was transformed, rather than eliminated: from being ultimately racist, to

officially rely upon democratic elements. Constitutional patriotism, a cosmopolitical

or at least a pan-European outlook, and the 1950's wirtschaftwunder or economic

miracle of the capitalistic market industry, were the ingredients of the modern German

national identity. The political elites of the FRG have thoroughly Europeanized the

German national identity since the 1950s. Practically, all governments since Adenauer

have supported the integration of Europe: from initiating the Steel and Coal early

agreement, through involvement and support of the Treaty of Rome to that of

Amsterdam in 1997.

The Europeanization of the German national identity originated from the resistance of

exiled political leaders to Hitler and the Nazis within both SPD and CDU.

After 1945 the CDU "embraced European unification as the alternative to the

nationalism of the past", as well as due to its religious vision of a Christian [catholic]

!38

Schmelz-Jacobsen (1987) pg. 107 80

Schnibben, Spiegel, 23.6.200681

Occident" . The pursuit of the pan-European vision of Adenauer was not interrupted 82

by the opposition, as the SPD also embraced the notion of a European Germany . 83

Only such a vision could be formally suggested and be legitimated by the post-war

community of nations. The pan-European vision was, however, a mere disguise for

persisting völkisch tendencies. These tendencies meant that the notion of community

(Gemeinschaft) continued to take precedence over society (Gesellschaft). These were

manifested in: a) Germany's constitutional commitment to all those of German

descent, but in diasporas – especially those who were exiled by the third Reich ; b) 84

the longing for a reunification with the six German states which made up the GDR,

and the celebrations of reunification in Berlin in 1989, accompanied by the chant "We

are the people!" (Wir sind das Volk); c) the hostile attitude towards foreigners erupted

in numerous racist attacks after the 1990 reunification against those of "no German

blood". One may argue that by merely conceptualizing immigrants as "foreigners", a

communal framework of the nation-state was suggested; d) finally, these völkisch

tendencies were still manifested in the articles of the hardly unchanged citizenship

law from 1913 . While the translation of these völkisch tendencies into legislation 85

will be elaborated upon in following chapters, their function should be clear by now.

German national identity was formed as a reaction to a foreign occupation, while

democratic institutions began to emanate at the same time.

!39

Risse and Engelmann-Martin (2002) pg. 29582

Ibid, pg. 29883

While it should be noted that that most Germans considered the conservative governments' policies 84

towards integrating Ausiedlers too luxurious, and only 6% considered it be insufficient: based on statistical data from an Allensbach survey conducted in 1989, quoted in Ardagh (1994) pg. 294

Kurthen (1997) pg. 7285

The German Volk movement had planted seeds that bloomed into the most poisonous

chapter in the German history, the third Reich. The formation of the FRG in 1949

failed to bring Germanness out of Germany: "German Europeaness is still German

Europeaness" and it has not "super-nationalized" or given up on the identity of a

völkisch nation-state , despite alternative narratives which were suggested with. 86

These pan-European elements did not serve to completely root out the notion of Volk,

which still serves as the most cohesive element of the German nation.

!3.3 The origin and evolvement of "German blood"

Although today generally accepted, it is a relatively recent idea that the faculties of

the mind are originating from a physical organ, the brain. Its implications, namely that

certain faculties of the mind are inborn and "cannot be changed through

environmental actors" is just as young as the machine gun, plastic or other 19th 87

century discoveries and inventions. Since the19th century, conservatives alongside

scientists have written of the correlation between "any existing social or cultural

difference" and our neurobiology. This gave rise to the idea that "any expression of

human behavior… must have a cerebral basis" . This happened to include social 88

tendencies and characteristics, and specifically one's ethnic and national identity.

The centerpiece of citizenship was thus considered to be constituted by the brain. To

consider national character being integral to the mind was just as scientific as

eugenics and other theories in biology at the time. Everything at the time was

!40

Risse and Engelmann-Martin (2002) pg. 287-886

Grosse (2008) pg. 186-787

Ibid, pg. 18988

positively scientific – from blood to nationalism. This is a crucial preliminary remark

to understand the historical context of the ethno-based definition of citizenship. In this

context the intelligentsia was writing of a national spirit (Volksgeist) as part of hard

science. Herder, for example, no longer distinguished bodily traits from spiritual ones.

Ancestry was classified by him alongside language, history, moral principles and

social values , which essentially differ being the only real hereditary trait of the 89

identity. Identity was accordingly explained as "a cultural history transposed into

biology; a biology rationalized by the state as the distinction between those who

belong permanently and those who coexist temporarily together" . The belonging to 90

a nation, and consequently to a nation-state, was natal. This legitimated any

protectionist or xenophobic attitudes towards immigrants.

Nationalism is defined as an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining 91

identity, unity, and autonomy of a social group, some of which deem it to constitute

an actual or potential nation. It may be based upon a historical founder, hero or deity,

implying a range of conceptions of the nation either as a biological and genealogical

or as a cultural and ideological phenomenon . When conceptualizing blood ties 92

between the members of the nation as physical, as when they are conceptualized

ideologically, these blood ties are merely supporting the common core of customs,

religion, institutions and language. Both of these comply with the quest "to know who

I am", to discover a true identity based on origins and pedigrees, as a basis for claims

!41

Kurthen (1997) pg. 8889

Sassen (1999) pg. 63 90

Smith (1992) pg.1891

Ibid, pg. 57-892

regarding rights and recognition. This basis of identity may be instrumental to

overcome oppression by a "foreign" or "external" rule . Obviously it is also an 93

instrument to gain power "with some machinery of compulsion strong enough to

make the enforcement of its commands sufficiently probable to aid in the spread of

habits of voluntary compliance with them" . Gellner also stressed a material goal 94

which led to the emergence of nationalism (or at least that the first was supported by

the latter). In his Marxist phrasing, "industrial society strengthens the boundaries

between nations rather than those between classes" . 95

To achieve this unity against outer forces, legitimize the rule and structure of the state

and its economy, these boundaries are obfuscated by being supportive or

representative of the nation. But in its most basic context, the nation-state is not an

instrument, but a natural desired end on a continuum which starts off with the human

anatomy and physiology. The state utilizes a homogenizing effect, as it imposes

‘national’ norms, standards and categories that regulate and constitute civil life, and it

does so as a means to a political and economic end, but also as an embodiment of the

natural order.

From a post-modern point of view, this process of homogenization may actually be

contrasted with nature. Nature's tendency to "favor diversity" rather than uniformity,

becomes clear as "new slang, fashion, gender roles, religious customs, and other

forms of ‘resistance’… emerge where homogenization already seemed to have been

!42

I use quotation marks for the words "foreign" and "external" because Smith refers to national 93

identity as constructed teleologically, that is not as a reflection of an objective reality, but rather as a means to a political goal.

Deutsch K. W. (1953), pg. 2894

Gellner E. (1983), pg. 1295

achieved. Keeping nation–states’ mass polities in line thus requires a constant effort

of weeding out, clipping and carefully tending to the population lawns" . 96

The last paragraph reflects the current approach of scholars, that ethnic identity is

essentially mythical and instrumental. An individual can belong to an ethnic group via

self-identification, by being treated as such by non-group members, or both. National

and ethnic identities can be constructed or determined at birth, but considering the

great mobilization of identities, "constructivism better fits the facts" . 97

!Despite the scientific cloak it wore in its formative era, history hardly shows any

common ethnic traits upon which the German national identity may be based.

In its history there is no single capital, language, clear borders, or political culture . 98

The political identity is completely made up. Since the age of the modern nation state,

Germany has experienced three revolutions, a constitutional monarchy, two

dictatorships – a fascist and a communist one, and two democratic republics. Located

at the centre of Europe, its geography has always threatened its cultural autonomy,

and subjected it to constant waves of immigration, emigration, and wars. In the age of

nationalism this made it very hard to control political and ethnic boundaries, which

constitute a great deal of national culture.

The first and maybe only period when Germany was exclusively populated by what is

mythically and traditionally referred to as "those of German ethnicity", was until 400

AD when northern and eastern tribes settled in central Europe. Tacitus, one of the

!43

Wein, M.J. (2009) pg. 42 96

Moore (2002) 2-397

Dreschner (1987) pg. 13-1898

founding stones of the German myths of "purity" and exceptionalism, wrote in 98

AD: "The Germans… derive their original from no other people; and are nowise

mixed with different nations arriving amongst them… Germany [is] a recent word,

lately bestowed: for that those who first passed the Rhine and expulsed the Gauls, and

are now named Tungrians, were then called Germans: and thus by degrees the name

of a tribe prevailed, not that of the nation; so that by an appellation at first occasioned

by terror and conquest, they afterwards chose to be distinguished, and assuming a

name lately invented were universally called Germans" . The German people had 99

already been conquered by the King of the Franks, Charlemagne and mingled with the

Huns and Goths, before the tenth century AD. It could not be so ethnically pure

already by that time, considering the previous invasions to the area and probable inter-

marriages that took place. Moreover, even when the Germans governed themselves,

and established the First Reich (in 962 when Otto the Great was crowned), with the

military expansions towards the east and the colonization efforts of Slavic tribes, they

naturally assimilated with the occupants. Following was the Viking Swedish

domination of large parts of North Germany which resulted in assimilations with the

occupiers. The thirty years war resulted in huge waves of migration all throughout

Europe, which naturally effected Germany too, but especially Berlin, which had two

thirds of its "German" population annihilated. The edict of Potsdam from 1685

brought to the city many French Huguenots, Lutheran Austrians, and Russian Jews.

The Second Reich first imported seasonal guest-workers from Poland, Italy, and

Russia. Even the Third Reich, as mentioned in chapter 2 of this work, used foreign

labor from Italy, Poland, and Czechoslovakia to build up its military industry. This

!44

Tacitus (1999), 1.2 99

brief review of early times clearly indicates that the idea of German ethnic purity is

quite detached from historical empirical events . An account of more recent history 100

of Germany's demography reveals that through its first fifty years as a FRG, more

than16 million foreign seasonal or gap-filling workers, businessmen and illegal

workers, refugees, tourists with expired visas, and Aussiedlers, passed through and/or

settled in the country . Nevertheless, German politicians refuse to acknowledge or 101

"allow" turning it into an immigration state.

!The contemporary legal discourse explicitly rejects tying Germanness to the racial

idea of blood because of the use of such ties by the Nazi regime, namely in the 102

1935 Nuremberg laws. Nevertheless, the ideas of "German blood", the ethnic and

genealogical construction of contemporary German identity are still highly prevalent -

even in the mainstream political discourse . Recent statements by SPD and CDU/103

CSU local heads of state (Länder), ministers, and parliament members are strikingly

based on a blood-based definition of the state. For example, asylum seekers have been

defined as a "threatening counter race who… had become a question of survival for

Germany"; Germans were considered gradually "hybridized and racially infested" and

an integration policy was accused of a being a fig leaf for "the adulteration and filthy

mishmashing of blood" . This lies in the background of any citizenship, 104

naturalization and active integration policy that was (and may be) adopted by the

!45

Kurthen (1997) pg. 67100

Boehning (1991) pg. 445-8101

Prof. K. Hailbronner in an interview at the University of Konstanz, 10.12.2008102

Mandel (2008) pg. 209-210103

German elected politicians quoted in Linke (1999) pg. 217104

federal and local governments or parliaments in Germany. Germany's "most generous

asylum provisions in the world", social-democratic constitution, and its commitment

to international treaties on foreigners' rights , do not overturn its persistent ethno-105

focal identity.

Indeed these asylum provisions are mostly only underlying and implicit tendencies.

The overall impression is that there can be "no entity which can clearly and

unambiguously be described as the German nation" . Recalling the aforementioned 106

components of Germany's national identity, it appears that there are not many

institutions which one can readily and fully associate with the notion of it as an

ethnically organic nation. Although there is a stable party- and economic system, on

an ideological level the republic is characterized by a longing for Europeanization

parallel to attempts at rehabilitating the wounded particularistic national pride. The

fall of the Third Reich brought down a great deal of the national and cultural cohesion

that had evolved in the 19th century, and even the German language lost something of

its superiority and cohesive quality . German national identity seems to stand upon a 107

frail basis. Both throughout its history and in its modern republican form, the notion

of ethnicity and "German blood" has played the role of disguising prevalent

inconsistencies.

Ethnicity, in Germany's case, is thus more ideological than genealogical. If ideology is

effective, it is because it works on more than one level . Ideology works so well 108

!46

Kurthen (1997) pg. 80-81105

Dahrendorf (1987) pg. 138-9106

Ibid, pg. 140-144107

Hall (1996) pg. 7.108

because, just like a good advertising campaign, we do not really understand its

psychological mechanisms.

The fact that a more objective account of Germany's history lacks a continuum of

most of the components of a national identity did not interrupt the construction of

such a notion. The idea of continuity still plays a significant role in its identity, even if

to a much different (if not lesser) extent. In other words, the turn from an exclusive

nationalistic state to an inclusive republic was not a complete overturn of the

foundations of Germany's self-determination.

!In the aftermath of this examination of "German blood" naturally yields a more

complicated reality. At the time of the Weimar Republic there was a strong debate

about the ingredients of German identity. The right insisted it consists of non-imitable

ethnic elements, while the left revised it as culture- or ideology based. The right

concluded that identity is a substantial unity, a Volk speaking with one voice and one

will, and from that drew that the political activism and freedom of individuals is a

contradiction to democracy, equality and "the collective will" themselves . The left, 109

on the other hand, sought to tone down the strict boundaries of the national identity:

the moderate SPD promoted the Leitkultur approach and the radical but popular KPD

called for the collapse of all national boundaries and for a class-based consciousness.

In conclusion it should thus be emphasized that the discourse was not one-

dimensional, although ethnicity had always been essential to the discourse of national

!47

Schmidt (1928) pg. 51, 84, 223, 243-5109

identity: "ethnic solidarity and radical assimilation existed alongside one another as

competing models for the adjudication of citizenship claims" . 110

!3.4 Beyond the borders of blood are "the others"

Germany officially recognizes four ethnic minorities: the Danes, the Friesians, the

Sinti and Roma, and the Sorbs. The Danish minority, which numbers about 50,000,

lives primarily in the northern state of Schleswig–Holstein. The Friesians live along

the North Sea coast. The approximately 70,000 Sinti and Roma live throughout

Germany. Some 20,000 Lower Sorbs live in the state of Brandenburg, while some

40,000 Upper Sorbs live in the state of Saxony. The Framework Convention for the

Protection of National Minorities has protected these four groups since Germany

ratified the Council of Europe convention in 1997 . These are, however, only the tip 111

of a much larger population considered to be of "no German blood".

Germany’s population includes 7.3 million immigrants, including many refugees from

the developing world. This large group, constituting almost 10 percent of Germany's

total population, is made up of non-integrated "others". They immortalize and

allegedly necessitate the preservation of the nation-state as a "non-immigration

country" and the protection of the "German blood".

Germany largest immigrant group consists of two million Turks. Approximately half

of them were invited as guest workers during the economic boom from the mid-1950s

to the end of 1973, while the rest immigrated utilizing their right to family reunion.

Since 1970 only about 3.2 million foreigners have naturalized, although they were

!48

Sammartino (2008) pg. 59110

111

contributing to the newly suggested national identity of a democratic, free and

capitalistic Germany. They have arrived as foreigners, and so they have remained, at

least until the introduction of the new citizenship law in 2000. Before the new law,

children of foreign parents who were born in Germany (both children and parents)

were still considered "foreigners".

Furthermore, between 1988 and 1993 more than 1.4 mi4llion refugees, many from the

former Soviet Union, sought asylum in Germany, but only 57,000 were granted their

wish, although Germany formally adopted very liberal policies towards refugees.

Although the right to asylum remains intact for legitimate victims of political

persecution, restrictions on the countries of origin and entry introduced in 1993 have

steadily reduced the number of those seeking asylum to a 20-year low of 50,500 in

2003.

The "otherness" became a trait even of those who were considered German by article

116 of the constitution , but hardly carrying any "real German blood" and surely no 112

such culture with them: "Despite the romantic assumption of having common

ancestors, the influx of Aussiedler seeking German citizenship demonstrated that

common ancestors were bound to appear even more foreign than 'real foreigners'.

Their lack of linguistic ability and ignorance of German culture and politics made

them appear more alien than long-term residents who were at least acculturated to

German customs. This realization added further stratification to the commonly

perceived insider-outsider conception. A new social category emerged and Germans

living on the actual territory of the nation-state distinguished themselves from

!49

See in www.constitution.org/cons/germany.txt112

Germans living outside the state, the first self-labeled as "Germans of

stock" (Einheimische or Bundesdeutsche) . 113

!Although a highly constructed concept, the "lack of German blood" attributed to the

immigrant community does not draw solely on the German political tradition, but on

some empirical data as well.

Firstly there is the role of the German language in creating and symbolizing the

national identity. It is the country's predominant language. In addition, four officially

recognized national minorities have their own languages: Danish, North and Sater

Friesian, Romany, and Lower and Upper Sorbian. The European Charter for Regional

or Minority Languages promotes the languages of these four national minorities.

Turkish, the first language of millions of residents is hardly ever taught in schools,

while the struggle of Turkish immigrants and their children with the German language

goes almost unnoticed by the country, which offers them very few options to learn it.

Considering the major role of language, especially in print, to the formation of "the

embryo of the nationally-imagined community" , by distributing shared narratives 114

and stories to millions, the significance of this lack of language skills among the

Turkish population in Germany is clear: those who do not speak the language cannot

share the consciousness of the native speakers. The absence of a common language

thus serves to dichotomize society into a German community and a bundle of foreign

tongued "others".

!

!50

Deutsch R. (2008) pg. 99113

Anderson quoted in Tomlinson (1991) pg. 81114

Secondly, religion too has a role in creating and symbolizing the national identity.

Christianity is the predominant religion in Germany. Religious affiliation is as

follows: Roman Catholics: 34 percent; Protestants: 34 percent; Muslims: 3.7 percent;

and unaffiliated or other, 28.3. The German ‘Office Responsible for Defending the

Constitution’ estimates that out of more than three million Muslims in Germany,

about 30 percent are members of an association perceived as to be Islamic. The

Turkish community is highly divided amongst many associations: with only 26,000

members, the Islamic Community Milli Görüs is the association that has the most

registered members.

Being a clear minority, Islam is disadvantaged in Germany by definition. However,

the role of religion in keeping the Turkish immigrants as the "others" is particularly

strengthened by: (I) the Christian majority in Germany; (II) the linkage made between

Islam and terror; (III) recent historical conflicts with Muslim states; (IV) the German

party-politics; (V) and the waves of racism that occurred in the FRG:

I. The dominant conservative parties, the CDU and its Bavarian sister, the CSU, are

embodying Christian values and hold these values to be as relevant to the nature of

the republic as democratic values. As a frequently governing party, this surely affects

the ability of many Germans to perceive Muslims as part of the community.

II. The global trend of linking Islam to terror is a factor which lessens the chances of

Muslims everywhere in Europe to integrate into the community, and this naturally

influences Germany too. It should be noted that the assessment of the Milli Görüs as

an Islamic terrorist association is challenged by experts . 115

!51

Nobert (2005) pg. 41 and 52115

III. Historical conflicts between Christians and Muslims in the Mediterranean region

are also affecting the level of Islamophobia in Germany: the early 70's recession due

to the 'oil sheiks', the Islamic revolution in Iran, and the USA-Iraq war and Germany's

involvement in the war in Afghanistan.

IV. The issue of immigration and naturalization policies is also reinforced by the

political game of the German right and left parties. Conservatives usually adhere to

the inherent spirit of the nation which is claimed to be endangered by the influx of

immigrants. Leaders of the Left, on the other hand, call for dealing with the facts.

They point out the number of immigrants and their problematic inferior socio-

economic status, believing that the statistics are eventually stronger than any

homogenized vision of the state. When the role of the immigrants becomes so highly

politicized, it is doubtful whether they can simply integrate without becoming a

symbol of an external threat or of the inner identity conflict of Germany.

V. Racism also creates and symbolizes the national identity. Racism "helps to

consolidate the boundaries of democratic polities by defining who does not belong

and can therefore be excluded from universalistic principles" . Advertisements 116

specifying "no foreigners" are still common in the country . 117

The first wave of xenophobia was instigated in the overheating crisis of 1966, which

led to high unemployment, standing in sharp contrast to Germany's "economic

miracle" of one decade before. Chancellor Erhard encouraged the Germans to work

more so the immigrants could be rid of, a neo-fascist party got a seat in several

Länder parliaments and racist jokes appeared in the press.

!52

Castles (2000) pg. 14116

Ibid, pg. 36117

The second wave of racism in the late 70s was targeted mainly at the Turks. Since

explicit formal racist argumentation was tabooed in post Nazi Germany, they were

described instead as a threat to the state's language, religion and democracy . 118

A third wave of racism and even racial crimes followed the reunification with East

Germany. This violent wave was counteracted by hundreds of thousands protesting in

the "light chain" (Lichterkette) demonstrations, in the capital as well as in

conservative areas like Munich and Stuttgart.

This indicates how Germany may be sort of immune to high levels of racism,

recalling its dark past , but the immigrant population has nevertheless not recover 119

from the trauma of being hated and persecuted.

The violence towards the immigrant population since the fall of the Berlin wall,

resulted in more than 130 racism-motivated murders, and more than 17,000 attacks on

immigrants were recorded in 2007 alone . This naturally reinforces the immigrants' 120

"alienation from German society" and makes them increasingly fearful.

Racism cannot obviously be separated from the aforementioned aspects of religion

(enhanced by the parts of the Islamic world's threat to the north-western world),

Islamic terrorism, historical conflicts with Muslim states, and the political party game.

There are possibly more significant empirical factors which constitute the status of

"otherness" to the immigrant population in Germany, and probably more connections

between the four factors listed above: language, religion, party-politics, and racism.

One must also recall the perpetuated idea of "German blood" which remains at least in

!53

Thränhardt (1996) 210-11118

Ibid, pg. 217-20119

Neo-Nazi violence is not targeted at foreigners only: www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/1047928.html120

the background of the entire nation's modern political history. This analysis of the

conceptualization of the immigrants as "others", serves to understand the framework

of citizenship laws and naturalization policies. Furthermore, it is an introduction to

the more detailed account of the Turkish-German community, which is the subject of

the fifth chapter.

!Chapter 2 has presented the framework and boundaries of citizenship. This chapter

has analyzed and deconstructed the content of the underlying terms of citizenship law

and naturalization policies, aiming at clarifying the murky ones, which nevertheless

have very tangible and practical consequences (at least for millions of people who are

not regarded "a part of the nation"). In these two chapters I have discussed the issues

generally, as well as relating them to the case of Germany.

The next chapter is devoted to the case of Germany in its entirety, and details the legal

and political background of the reform in the citizenship law of 2000.

!!!!

!54

4. Politics and Legislation

4.1 Concise History of immigration of the "others"

Immigration is hardly a new phenomenon in the world and specifically not in

Germany. All throughout its history, there were increasing waves of immigration of

laborers to Germany from other European countries . There were 800,000 foreign 121

workers in the German Reich in 1907 and "no less than 7.5 million deportees from

occupied countries were working in Germany by 1944" . The need for foreign labor 122

in the capitalist western nation is, thus, an old one.

Nevertheless, it was rather ignored for the larger part of history. This chapter focuses

on the history of the relationship between Germany and its immigrant population,

from the aspects of politics and legislation. Generally, contemporary Germany is

considered a "middle ground" between countries which have institutionalized their

support of religious pluralism and multiculturalism such as Britain, and countries that

are reluctant to allow state support of much religious and cultural diversity such as

France . Its history of ignoring the issue leads conservatives and skeptics to believe 123

that full liberalization is unlikely. On the other hand, when realizing the major

changes which occurred in the early 1990s since Germany faced up to its immigrant

population, left wing socialists and liberals believe that even greater reforms are not

only likely, but even inevitable.

!

!55

Münz (2002) pg. 21121

Castles (2000) pg. 30 122

Fetzer & Soper (2005) pg. 98123

To better understand specifically the "others", meaning those immigrants who are

hardly ever a part of the community (Gemeinschaft) because of language, religion,

politics and racism, this chapter begins with a concise history of immigration of the

"others".

Although very significant in numbers, immigration from EU countries is of less

political interest since they do not practically need a German citizenship to influence

politics, being entitled to vote and be elected to the European parliament and in local

elections. However, regarding non-Europeans, due officially to their "greater

difficulties in integrating", restrictions were made on their permanent settlement.

!The account given in this chapter focuses on the political game within the

parliamentary and government decisions. After an introduction, it accounts in detail

for the legislative measures and milestones in immigration policy adopted until 2000.

It concludes with an analysis of these measures through the German party system.

Muslims have immigrated to Germany from the Ottoman Empire since the eighteenth

century. The elites determined that the policy towards Muslims was respectful and

diplomatic. "If Turks come to Berlin, mosques must be built for them" said King

Friedrich II after formalizing ties with Sultan Mohammed II of Istanbul in 1740. The

first mosque in Berlin was built in 1925 and even during World War II imams were

trained with the aid of the Nazi regime . It seems that as long as immigration was in 124

small numbers, it did not threaten the cultural and ethnic homogeneity of the German

nation, and it treated immigrants with respect. An important exception was, of course,

!56

Fetzer and Soper (2005) pg. 99124

the Jews, who were consistently perceived as a threat by both the regime and the local

communities. The reasons for this exception cannot be examined within the scope of

this work.

Since 1945 there have been three strong waves of immigration into both countries.

The first was comprised of refugees and those expelled after World War II.

Following the Potsdam convention, German minorities were transferred from

Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania and Yugoslavia. These transfers of almost

ten million Germans, who had been living as ethnic minorities for some thousand

years, made the FRG a country of immigration from its very start. Germany was

committed to the absorption of its descendents, first under the ruling of its occupying

countries (USA, the United Kingdom, France and the USSR) and then by its 1949

constitution. The notion that these German diasporas had any collective rights as

minorities in their host-lands was dismissed by the Western powers and was only

promoted by the USSR in a minor niche of the UN activity . 125

The second wave came following the 1950s economic boom (Wirtschaftwunder). The

"miracle" of rising growth rates in the aftermath of the world war necessitated the

recruitment of a larger work force than was available in the country at the time. This

marked the start of the recruitment of so-called ‘guest-workers’ (Gastarbeiter ) as 126

temporary labor force. Apart from the economic needs of the German market,

account, diplomacy and foreign relations were factors that made Germany open its

gates to foreigners. Treatment of immigrants was influenced by foreign relations even

!57

Inis (1955) pg. 141, 164-7.125

Ausländer and Ausarbeite, were terms formerly used for all immigrants during the Third Reich. 126

They were changed to differentiate the later recruitment of labor, from the forced laboring by the Third Reich's in work camps during the war

in the 19th century, when Tsar Nicholas I asked the Prussian King to permit less

naturalization among exiled Polish revolutionaries, who were in conflict with Russia

in the early 1830's. The 1832 Foreign Office memorandum on the subject required

that newcomers "have fulfilled their obligations to their previous states" , an agenda 127

clearly within the mandate of the Interior Ministry that was shaped by considerations

of the Foreign Office. Similar considerations can be found also more than a century

later, this time promoting immigrants rights rather than restricting them. It is claimed

that "primarily external pressure", rather than a purely economic rationale and

domestic demands for workers, led to the signing of the first recruitment treaties . 128

The first agreement was signed with Italy in 1955. In 1961 Germany began to recruit

Turkish workers and agreements with Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia

soon followed . The initial intention of the government was to recruit workers in the 129

same way that was customary in the late 19th century. Workers were to come for a

season and for no longer than a year, serve the local needs of economic growth and

return to their homelands. This proved to be of little economic rationale, as the skills

of guest-workers were acquired only after several months, and as they gained more

experience their productivity only grew. Pressure from German employers in 1962

and 1963 forced the government to grant longer and longer stay permits . Between 130

1955 and 1973 an estimated number of fourteen million workers from countries of the

Mediterranean basin entered Germany on the basis of bilateral recruitment

agreements. This was done systematically by recruitment offices of the Federal

!58

Nathans (2004) pg. 58-59127

Ibid, pg. 242128

Münz (2002) pg. 23129

Nathans (2004) pg. 242130

Employment Office (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit), provided that the employee had

sufficient skills, good health status, no criminal record, and that the employer could

provide housing for the guest-worker . Most of these workers came, actually, after 131

the recession of 1966-68, and consisted mainly of unskilled women. On 1973 the

Recruitment Stop (Anwerbestopp or Ausländerstopp) was declared. In that year there

were about 2.7 million foreign workers in Germany. Many of them decided to stay.

The background to the recruitment stop were: The recession that followed the oil-

crisis in the early 70's; a decline in industrial employment due to the realization that it

is much "more rational to move the machines to the workers, rather than the workers

to the machines" and thus many factories moved outside Germany to become Multi-

National Corporations; and finally, the industrial production which did remain in

Germany became increasingly automated, culminating in the rapid introduction of

micro-processors in the late 70's. The technological progress coincided with the

virtual stop of contract worker migration to Western Europe in general after 1974. 132

The policy from 1973 was an administrative order banning all further immigration of

workers from non-EEC countries. As the order did not include the forced physical

deportation of any immigrant, its targeted population utilized the recent regulation

from 1965 allowing family reunion and dependants. It turns out that the

Ausländerstopp was actually encouraged Turks to remain in Germany, for they were

afraid they would not be able to go to Germany again . 133

!59

Castles (2000) pg. 70131

Castles (2000) pg. 75.132

Castles (2000) pg. 48.133

In the mid-1970s the Brandt- and Schmidt (SPD) governments offered various

incentives for foreigners to move back to their homelands, such as differentiating the

state support for natives and immigrants by restricting government pensions for

children who actually resided in Germany. In the early 1980s the Kohl government

(CDU/CSU) did the same by offering them housing solutions in Turkey such as

subsidized mortgages. These were the first reactions to the problems that arose after

Germany had recruited "workers", but instead got "human beings" with a whole

cluster of needs and wishes. This late reaction may be seen as a major failure of

strategic planning and policy making, since the possibility of these "foreigners"

settling down in Germany was not realized or prepared for . 134

Contrary to expectations, such policies yielded little success and the number of

foreigners only grew due to family reunions and natural growth. Especially the SPD's

policy of the 1970s had the unintended consequence of "encouraging a second wave

of immigration" and single migrants were transformed to families who "wanted

permanent residence" . 135

The third wave of immigration came after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, as

questions of asylum seekers, refugees, and temporary protection were pushed to the

forefront of the political discourse in Germany . Enhancing the effect were also the 136

succeeding war in Yugoslavia after 1989, and the persecutions of Kurds in Turkey and

northern Iraq resulting in many asylum seekers . 137

!

!60

Fetzer and Soper, 100-1134

Münz (2002) pg. 24, and Fetzer and Soper (2005) pg. 3 135

Münz (2002) pg. 17136

Anil (2005) pg. 457; Ludvig (2004) pg. 502; Münz (2002) pg. 24 137

4.2 Typology of Immigration Policies

Policies concerning immigration can be assessed by quantity and quality.

The first means the way in which the state controls its borders and regulates the

number of immigrants entering its territory. The second means the way it handles the

immigrants which enter its territory: what residence permits, social and political rights

and duties does it present to its immigrant population, and what naturalization process

is available. Both aspects are significant in understanding an immigration policy.

!The aspect of quantity is much simpler than quality. As mentioned earlier on in

chapter 2.2 of this work, a country may choose the way it regulates entrance of non-

citizens into its territory. Accordingly, the aspect of quantity mostly makes use of

border control regulations, which are "expected to satisfy social, economic and

security needs… without violating international treaties and convention… [and] the

public sense of fair treatment of human beings" . Thus the aforementioned 138

Anwerberstopp of 1973 was completely in line with international law, and met the

socio-economic needs of the time of recession and rising unemployment rates.

Policies for controlling immigration quantitatively use measures such as visa

restrictions at borders, and preventive measures as "information campaigns designed

in emigration regions", informing potential migrants of the minimal chances and high

risks involved in entering Germany illegally . 139

!

!61

Brochmann (1999) pg. 1138

Ibid, pg. 12139

The aspect of quality control of immigration regards the adopted policy for handling

non-citizens who have entered (legally or illegally) into the country's territory. It

should be remembered, that once immigrants have made it to the borders, "the

determination of the federal authorities to limit [their] number… is hampered by a

watchful public and a powerful court system" . 140

Once they have already entered the state, there are four ideal ways of handling those

who have migrated . Most western democracies phrase a policy which is somewhere 141

in between these.

1. Segregationism is a policy which excludes from the political community all

migrant newcomers "who do not share the ethno cultural background of the

majority society". At the same time, migrants are not forced to give up their

culture for an ideal of assimilation. This was the attitude towards immigrants

as "guest workers", roughly until the mid-70s, when Turkish immigrants

began settling down as families. When the state of Bavaria gave classes in 142

Turkish and Islamic studies to Turkish children born in Germany until the mid

1970s, it exercised such a segregationist policy.

2. Multiculturalism "gives up ethnicity as the formal basis of citizenship,

allows easier naturalization and advocates dual citizenship. This is the policy

promoted by academics such as Taylor, Kymlica and Shapiro. Although it is

practiced to a certain extent in Australia and Canada, as noted in chapter 2.2.2,

!62

Thränhardt (1999) pg. 43140

Koopmans & Statham (2000) pg. 1-15141

Since its reestablishment in 1949, the CSU were the sole governors of the biggest state in the 142

Federal Republic. Consequently this education policy should not be understood as a case of multiculturalism, where minorities are granted special autonomic rights. While multiculturalism celebrates cultural diversity as a political and even ethical right, segregationism promotes it in order to encourage repatriation of minorities back to their homeland

it has no relevance to Germany and is mainly advocated by scholars such as

Castles and Kaya.

3. Assimilationism maintains ethnicity and certain political-cultural attributes

as the criteria for acquiring a citizenship. Dual citizenship is regarded as a

violation of the assimilative nature of this policy. Furthermore, it is perceived

as a threat by its supporters, since it may lead to the creation "parallel

societies" in the one nation-state. This policy was widely promoted in

Germany since the late 19th century by the SPD in the notion that immigrants

need to accept the terms of Leitkultur in order to naturalize.

4. Universalism aims at transcending the complexity of immigration policies

altogether. This is to be done by phrasing policies that address the countries'

residents' socio-economic status, rather than their native-citizen or foreign-

immigrant status. This is reported to be recently practiced in the

Netherlands , but remains unclear how questions regarding matters which 143

are not socio-economic (such as political rights) are met by this type of

transcendent immigration policy.

In Germany's history, the decision to grant immigrants equal social rights to

those enjoyed by citizens may reflect such a universalistic approach.

These four types of immigration qualitative policies provide a richer overview of

Germany's policies, which are not as monolithic as some of its critics claim. The

claim that the policies are segregationist or exclusionary , like Japan, Switzerland 144

and Belgium, are ignoring its assimilative policies. Claims that it should become more

!63

Koopmans and Statham (2000) pg. 15143

Castles (2000) pg. 140144

multicultural (or at least pluralistic) like the USA and Australia, ignore the

aforementioned universalistic policy.

The need to navigate between these ideal-type policies forces decision makers to

choose between democracy and nationality. Allowing residents to influence their

political condition means that equal rights (including citizenship) are required for all

residents. This obviously contradicts the ethnic nature of the German nation-state.

!The limits of the debate on immigration are dictated by international and

constitutional law. The limits themselves are sometimes also changing, with the

formation of a new regime (the move from the Second Reich to the Weimar Republic,

the Third Reich and the current FRG) and constitutional changes (such as the 2000

reform of the citizenship law). This leads to an intricate history of citizenship and

immigration policies, which reflect considerations of national security, national

economy, demography (e.g.: the age pyramid and population density) and the national

identity (in this context: the social and cultural cohesion).

Summed up, the criteria for choosing a type, or cluster of policies, are:

• The economic aspect: The need for an "industrial reserve army within the

developed capitalist countries" and the strength of labor movement resulting in

a need to give the working class "the consciousness of a labor aristocracy" 145

have made immigrants from poorer countries the most natural members of

such an under-paid and industrial reserve army. The average of employment

growth was 1% per year during the economic boom of the 1950s, while the

growth in the means of production was 6%. Without foreign labor, the market

!64

Castles (2000) pg. 27-28 145

would have been forced into inflation – since competing companies would

have to consistently offer higher wages to recruit workers. This would also

create a "stop-go" economy, soon resulting in a recession . This was the 146

rationale in the development of "a new political economy of migrant and

ethnic minority labor" . Secondary economic effects of immigration include 147

permanent settlement of immigrants, taking away jobs of natives, being used

by employers to force down wages and break worker's strikes, a possible

cause for rising rent prices and overcrowding of the cities ; 148

• Efforts to reduce the demographic gap are an increasingly important aspect in

immigration policy, as Germany had the lowest birth rates in the EU with 8.5

births per 1,000 inhabitants in 2006. By allowing immigration this gap can be

bridged ; 149

• The philosophical notions of multiculturalism, principles of equality and non

discrimination. It isn't obvious, however, that this economic rationale should

lead to granting these foreigners access to political institutions and

naturalization paths . The latter is actually a relatively new phenomenon, 150

linked closely to the evolution of the human rights discourse following World

War II;

• The political, when better integration into Europe requires amending

immigration policies;

!65

Castles (2000) pg. 73-74146

Ibid, pg. 85147

Ibid, pg. 38 148

Harding (15.3.2006), The Guardian: www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/mar/15/germany.lukeharding149

Soysal (1994) pg. 34150

• The social, as when established immigrant communities claim rights and unite

in organizations;

• The legal, when international treaties on immigration are being signed.

The typology of these immigration policies and the examples indicating Germany's

utilization of most of them, necessitate a thorough examination of its history of

legislation. Such an examination serves to understand the background to the 2000

reform in the German citizenship law.

!4.3 Milestones in the history of Germany's immigration policies

Some preliminary remarks are to be made before chronologically addressing the

milestones in the history of immigration policies, which are relevant to it as a whole:

I. The language that is used throughout the historical review refers to working

migrants are as strangers' work (Fremdarbeiter) or guests' work (Gastarbeiter), and

generally as foreigners (Ausländer) rather than simply as immigrants (Einwanderer).

This terminology is used in order to stress the temporary condition and fundamental

"otherness" of the immigrants , reflecting Germany's persistent refusal to officially 151

become a country of immigrants (Einwanderungsland) for the sake of its traditional

character as an ethnic nation-state.

II. "Migrant policy and its implementation differ considerably among the federal

states (Länder), as well as between the states and the federal government".

The tension between the different ways that naturalization and immigration policies

are interpreted by the various federal states, shape the intra-governmental debate

regarding these issues. The differentiation between federal and local governments

!66

Thrändhardt (1996) pg. 198-200151

becomes clear when the federal government calls for reductions of cultural gaps,

equal opportunities in education and on the labour market, and providing vocational

training, while within local governments "different cultural existences are

acknowledged, but are not given an institutional status through which foreigners are

expected to organize" . 152

Furthermore, it is claimed that there is hardly any coordination between the local

ministries of interior affairs and that only international organizations such as the

UNHCR are sometimes used "as an institution for this purpose" . This means that 153

details of both federal and local policies must be taken with a grain of salt, and only

as the components of a rich and not necessarily consistent legal status.

III. Any historical investigation begins with an event or period of particular

significance, which sets the framework for the research. This begins in the year 1842,

when Prussia, the biggest and most influential German kingdom out of the 26

constituent states of the time, formulated its citizenship law based on the principle of

jus sanguinis. With the complete removal of the Napoleonic occupation, the notion of

a German nation was born, as explained in chapter 3. Furthermore, the German

citizenship law was inspired from the French revolution's bureaucrats , and thus 154

earlier accounts of German legal history are insignificant for this research.

IV. The survey of legal development will be mainly through the milestones in German

law, while realizing that international organization like the United Nations, supra-

governmental organizations such as the EU, and even various non-governmental

!67

Soysal (1994) pg. 62152

Thränhardt (1999) pg. 45153

Gosewinkel (2002) pg. 71154

organizations such as the International Labor Organization and numerous Turkey- and

Germany based pressure groups have always been contributing to the shaping of

federal Länder legislation . 155

V. Much legislation and attention had been devoted to refugees, both in international

law and in Germany's constitution and law. Although refugees and working

immigrants are sometimes confused by the general public, the focus of this work - the

causes of Germany's citizenship law and its effects on the (Turkish) immigrant

population – do not concern refugees. Consequently, the following examination does

not address treaties, laws and important articles regarding the quantitative or

qualitative policy towards refugees.

VI. The legislation examined is only of the kind which directly concerns citizenship

and immigration. It should be noted that other laws could certainly also have played a

role in the immigrant's integration and will to naturalize (matters to be examined in

the survey presented in chapter six). The scope of research of this work does not allow

coverage of the secondary effects of allegedly irrelevant laws.

VII. Also deviating from the research's framework are the citizenship laws and related

policies adopted in the East German GDR, none of which were retained after the

reunification in October 1990. Probably future research which is focused on one of

the six Länder which were under Ulbricht's and Honecker's rule for about four

decades, should indeed also survey the GDR's law.

!4.3.1 The International Law

!68

Blanpain (2004) pg. 321155

International law is the result of agreements between two or more countries.

Covenants, treaties and agreements are signed, and of particular importance are those

under United Nations and the European Union. In both, Germany always took part at

the front of cooperation. A second source of international law, customary law, is of

less significance to the issue of immigration, as both the scale and attention this

phenomenon receives are relatively new.

The UN Charter was formulated without considering of the principle questions arising

from the existence of minorities within and between borders, in a world where the

nation-state serves as the smallest measurement unit. 156

The first significant document concerning immigrant's rights which Germany is

signatory to is the 1957 Treaty of Rome, establishing the European Economic

Community. It pledges to foster "free movement of persons within the EU area, but

excludes non-EU citizens" . In 1961, however, Turks were already "considered 157

Europeans", at least in the framework of association with the EEC" . This 158

association was tightened in 1963, when The Association Treaty and Council defined

the special privileges enjoyed by Turkish citizens living inside the EEC. The

association agreements between Turkey and the European Union (the 1963

Association Agreement between the European Community and Turkey and the 1970

additional protocol), resulted in a reduction of the waiting period from five to four

years for acquiring eligibility for an unlimited work permit for Turkish workers in

!69

Inis (1955) pg. 113156

Brochman (1999) pg. 18157

Thränhardt (1999) pg. 31158

Europe. The waiting period for family members of Turkish workers was reduced to

three years. This naturally strengthened Germany's former bilateral agreements . 159

These agreements granted Turks almost the same liberties granted by articles 48, 49,

and 50 of the EEC treaty . These articles assure the rights of workers, mainly that 160

the "freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the community". This

was in accordance with the preamble of the treaty "made clear that freedom of

movement for persons generally was the ultimate goal" . Germany was keen to 161

develop its relations with Turkey as a member of the Council of Europe, NATO's

south-eastern stronghold and an associate with the EEC, as well as because of its

economic growth at the time . 162

!The next milestone in the EU policy regarding immigrants is the1986 Single

European Act or revised Treaty of Rome. Article 8 states that: "the internal market

shall comprise an area without international frontiers in which the free movement of

goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of

this treaty". While several EU member states have interpreted this article as referring

to EU citizens only, the European commission had made it clear that it refers to all

nationals. The economic rationale is that Multi National Companies and Corporations

operating in several EU states should not have their competitiveness be threatened by

an unequal status given to their third-country labor. The opaque phrasing, which

persisted also in article 7a/2 of the 1992 Treaty of European Union, signifies the

!70

Norbert (2005) pg. 49159

Thränhardt (1999) pg. 52160

Nathans (2004) pg. 240161

Thränhardt (1996) pg. 204162

tension between the economic rationale of the supra-national entity and its nation-

states counterparts clinging to sovereignty over their frontiers . The supra-national 163

point of view was and is still mainly promoted by the European Commission. In 1991,

an organization of migrant groups was established, "as part of an initiative to generate

dialogue between migrant communities and Community institutions", and budgeted

by the Commission . 164

The Council of Europe is a body comprising of 47 countries (twenty more than that of

the European Union after its expansion). It promotes a pan-European identity,

democracy, human rights and solutions for the challenges that the continent faces.

Because of its pan-European identity, Germany is a member of the organization. In

1996 the Council adopted the revised European Social Charter . Article 19 reaffirms 165

many rights for immigrants that were by then already ensured by the German law for

more than thirty years.

Similarly, since 1951 Germany is a member of the International Organization for

Migration and since 1990 it is a signatory to the International Convention on the 166

Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers . Although not promoting any policy 167

that is not already existent in Germany, such globally accepted policies may actually

encourage even more permissive legislation in the various German Länder, stemming

from the aspiration to be at the front of Europeanization and international cooperation.

!71

The Single European Act & The Treaty on European Union: 163

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm

Soysal (1994) pg. 114164

The European Social Charter: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/163.htm165

IOM is an "inter-governmental organization in the field of migration that works with governmental, 166

intergovernmental and non-governmental partners": http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-iom/lang/en

The treaty is available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/m_mwctoc.htm/167

This may explain special legislation passed in Saarland allowing immigrants to vote

in local elections, and similar proposals which later came up in Berlin, North-Rhine

Westphalia and even in conservative Baden-Württemberg . 168

!With all of its support of Europeanization, Germany does not follow the principle

without reservations. Most prominently, it refuses to admit Turkey into the European

Union. This objection is partly explained by formal reasons, such as the criteria which

were set for Turkey and were not met. However, some of Germany's opposition to

Turkey's entering the Union stems naturally also from the possibility that its largest

immigrant group will be instantly endowed with many political rights.

In 1997 the Council of Europe decided to rescind its 1963 Convention which called

for restrictions on multiple-nationality . Germany refrains completely from the 169

suggested joint-EU naturalization policy. Mandel is just as skeptic about the

likelihood of such a policy, as is international law experct, Prof. Hailbronner : 170

"The idealism of post-national citizenship might appear somewhat illusory at

present… Citizenship is still inextricably tied to national and state identities, borders,

and powers. Through a suggestive notion, a post-national [imagined identity] may not

suffice for many Turkish German actors who have not yet found a credible hearing in

the halls of Brussels". Nevertheless, bearing in mind the rapid progress in European

and the general international law of the post-war era, it should be recalled that "the

!72

Kurthen (1997) pg. 79168

Castles (2000) pg. 12169

Prof. K. Hailbronner in an interview at the University of Konstanz, 10.12.2008170

future [could] open paths for local civil rights disputes to be resolved within the

bureaucracies of the EU or UN in the name of abstract universal rights" . 171

!International law can only be truly enforced by willing and cooperative states which

adhere to it. Therefore, compliance with the international and European norms

regarding immigration is often "merely supported by international opinion". In the

European context, however, several relevant judicial bodies operate, such as the

European Court for Human Rights . Among rulings of this court are the following, 172

which have led to precedential amendments in the German law:

- Turkish children may reunify with their families until the age of 21 (the German

legislator preferred this to be up to 16);

- Turkish students may stay in Germany to continue working there after they would

have finished their studies, provided they did so while studying there;

- Turkish sailors working on German ships for four years or more are permitted to

work also on land;

- Turkish contract workers may receive a permanent work permit after one year.

!Clearly interfering with its autonomy in legislation in one of the most sensitive issues

of its national identity, the German government does not embrace these rulings with

the same fervor with which it usually advocates international law. Instead it is trying

to prevent these rulings and implements them very slowly . 173

!73

Mandel (2008) pg. 229171

Brochmann (1999) pg. 4172

Thränhardt (1999) pg. 52173

!4.3.2 Legislation within Germany since 1949

Since the 1842 Prussian citizenship , foreigners were increasingly considered to 174

have a "different 'form of life' (Art von Leben)" that made them a threat to one's own

form of life . Protectionist local communities objected to opening their gates to 175

outsiders, who "endangered" its economy by introducing competition into these small

hitherto closed markets. This would have lowered prices for everyone (an effect

desired by the kingdom's bureaucrats), but also wages for the native local workers. In

distant villages the idea of a far-reaching German identity, based on common descent

of all the many principalities which comprised the intellectual product of 'the nation',

was at first not welcomed or even understood. Germans from outside the local

community were considered about as foreign as Poles or Russians were at the time.

The important 1913 law, which remained untouched for almost a century, draws

retrospective criticism that it was the basis of the racist laws of the Third Reich . 176

This interpretation may be supported by legislation of the same spirit in the German

colonies at that time, which forbade mixed-marriages (marriage between German men

and female colonial subjects) and reflected the rising power of the extreme right in

these marginal areas of the German Reich . The conservatives utilized a rhetoric that 177

accused foreigners of stealing jobs and housing from German citizens on their

electoral campaigns, but did not do much to stop that from happening when they came

into power during the 1920s. Actual government money given to foreigners in those

!74

The law based on the French Civil Code: Nathans (2004) pg. 7; Eley & Palmowski (2008) pg. 6174

Nathans (2004) pg. 203175

See in Brubaker (1992) pg. 1, 114, 122, 127-137176

Wildenthal (1997) pg. 263-6177

difficult years, such as the granting of unemployment fees to the newly naturalized,

was not even mentioned in the debate, which focused on identity, rather than real

interests. Xenophobic sentiments further increased when unemployment soared in

1929's Great Depression, and became formal in the notorious Nuremberg Laws.

Germany's constitution, the Basic Law (Grundgezetz), set out to restrict the previous

abuse of human rights by the state through its citizenship laws . 178

Examples of this effort are Articles 3, 16 and 116. The first guarantees that "all men

are equal before the law" and that "no one may be disadvantaged or privileged as a

result of his gender, origin, race, language, home or background, beliefs, or religious

or political views". This, along with Articles 16 and 116, ensures that "no one may be

deprived of his German citizenship. Loss of citizenship may arise only pursuant to a

law, and against the will of the person affected it may arise only if such person does

not thereby become stateless". Finally, it explicitly overturns the definitions of the

former regime: "a German within the meaning of this Basic Law is a person who

possesses German citizenship who has been admitted to the territory of the German

Reich, as it existed on December 31, 1937, as a refugee or expellee of German stock

or as the spouse or descendant of such person…". The constitution also tries to amend

past acts of expulsion: "Former German citizens, who… were deprived of their

citizenship for political, racial or religious reasons, and their descendants, shall be re-

granted German citizenship on application" . 179

!

!75

Nathans (2004) pg. 235178

The German Basic Law: www.constitution.org/cons/germany.txt179

Despite of its liberal provisions, the republic kept the 1913 law intact. In addition to

the persistent underlying notions of völkisch identity, Germany refrained from a new

citizenship law due to the following:

I. Germans were treated as ethnic Germans by the four occupying forces, and thus

adopted the identity suggested from outside;

II. As the governing party, the CDU/CSU, did not accept or even acknowledge the

division of Germany into two countries. The 1913 law served to provide a definition

of German citizenry which transcended the hard political reality. While nationalism

was "utterly discredited" at the post-war period, West Germany was fully and

"officially committed to the reunification of Germans" under Chancellor Adenauer . 180

Overturning Nazi policies, while retaining the 1913 legal definition of a common

descent, was the golden middle-way sought by the founding government.

III. Communist and soviet-led oppression in countries where Germans lived made the

1913 law's provision to grant these people citizenship more humanitarian than racist.

A law which was once ethnically justified at the height of German international power

was upheld based upon "liberal-democratic values" countering the dark regime 181

system of the communist east.

IV. The preserved citizenship policy kept the country's interests above those of the

individual. Naturalization was an "exceptional act which would solely be undertaken

in the interests of the FRG, and not of the applicant" , and thus contributed to the 182

!76

Fulbrook (1999) pg. 183-4.180

Ibid. 181

Green (2001) pg. 7182

sense of a "common good", appropriate for a republic – especially in its formative

years, replete with an extreme economic shortage.

1955-1968: West Germany concluded bilateral agreements for the temporary

employment of workers with Italy (1955), Greece, Spain, Turkey, Portugal and

Yugoslavia (1968). Naturalization was "a final barrier to… permanent settlement" 183

under the clauses of these agreements, and specifically those with Turkey, homeland

of the majority of immigrants.

This threshold was set in 1965. With the arrival and settlement of many immigrants,

the conservative government under Chancellor Erhard adopted the Alien Act

(Ausländergesetz). This act regulated the work and residence options of guest

workers. Formally, the law presented four categories of immigrants:

1) Aufenthaltslaubnis, residence permit; 2) Aufenthaltsberechtigung, extended

residence permit; 3) Aufenthaltsbewilligung, short term residence permit; 4)

Aufenthaltsbefungnis, residence permit for humanitarian/political reasons . This 184

legitimized the country's clear objection to naturalization. The act goes on as follows:

"The Federal Republic of Germany is not a country of immigration; it does not strive

to increase the number of German citizens by way of naturalization... The granting of

German citizenship can only be considered if a public interest in the naturalization

exists... the personal desires and economic interests of the applicant cannot be

decisive" . This act is criticized for being a control measure enabling deportation of 185

immigrants unnecessary by the labor market , cloaked in a liberal series of 186

!77

Nathans (2004) pg. 237183

Kissrow (1998) pg. 6184

Hailbronner and Renner, quoted in Koopmans (1999) pg. 630185

Kaya (2000) pg. 48, quoted in Karakus (2007) pg. 14; Castles (2000) pg. 37 186

individual rights which also restricted the immigrants' options for political

organization.

"Foreigners enjoy all basic rights, except the basic rights of freedom of assembly,

freedom of association, freedom of movement and free choice of occupation, place of

work and place of education, and protection from extradition abroad" . As 187

demonstrated in chapter 4, in light of the patterns and rates of Turkish immigrants in

both intra-communal and general organizations, such extreme criticism cannot be

justified. It may very well represent (or constitute), on the other hand, a state of mind

and attitude of immigrants being excluded, deprived and discriminated.

1973: The Ausländerstopp was an administrative order banning all further

immigration of workers from non-EEC countries in reaction to the recession of this

year. Other measures adopted were increasing the employer-paid recruitment fee from

DM 300 to DM 1000 and prohibiting immigrants from moving to cities where rates of

foreigners exceeded 12% of the population . As already explained, these policies 188

actually motivated immigrants to stay and unite with their families in Germany, an

effect which made the immigrant population double in a little more than a decade.

1975: the Stichtagsregelung (literally the "key date regulation") of Chancellor

Schmidt's center-left government, made child benefits available only to children in

Germany. It also denied a labor permit from second-generation foreigners . 189

This was meant to make immigrants' lives in Germany less worthwhile financially,

and thus encourage their voluntary repatriation. However, this policy too had the

!78

Soysal (1994) pg. 122187

Martin (2002) pg. 10188

Castles, 2000, 59189

opposite effect, as it turned out to encourage many parents to bring their children into

Germany, ensuring both family reunion and the government's financial support.

1976: A recommendation of the Standing Conference of Education Ministers (a

consultative body linking federal and Länder authorities) was accepted, so schools

were to give preparatory classes both in German and in the foreigner's mother tongue.

This was meant on the one hand to help integrate children into German society and on

the other hand to prepare children for their return home. After being tested it was

realized that "the transition from preparatory to normal classes" was rarely

successful, and the policy was abandoned. 190

1977: Germany’s most restrictive policy on naturalization was adopted in the form of

Guidelines on Naturalization (Einbürgerungsrichtlinien) . As the economic 191

difficulties of the last decade were explained in both media and parliaments by the

presence of (especially) Turkish immigrants, "the government sought - without great

success - to induce Turks to return to Turkey". At the same time, it also sought to

facilitate immigration of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe , based on Germany's 192

affiliation with the democratic west, as well as its persisting völkisch identity.

1983: Helmut Kohl's three-term chancellorship began with a campaign using anti-

immigration slogans. Its policy of giving foreigners access to low-interest loans to

build homes in their countries of origin (meant to encourage immigrants' voluntary

repatriation), did not differ really from the failing policies of former left-wing

governments.

!79

Castles (2000) pg. 53190

Green (2001) pg. 7191

Brubaker (1992) pg. 169192

1990-1: In the late 1980s, the Berlin, Hamburg, and Schleswig- Holstein state

governments adopted bills granting the right to vote in local elections to foreigners.

The Federal Constitutional Court ruled this initiative "unconstitutional" in 1990 on the

grounds that the principle of ‘‘popular sovereignty’’ was represented by the people of

the state (Staatvolk) and does not allow aliens to participate in elections . 193

Ironically, only one year later a new federal policy was indeed adopted.

With the recurring need of manual labor following the reunification, it became clear

that a re-evaluation of naturalization policy was necessary. The unclear status of

immigrants, who by then made up about ten percent of the country's population,

encouraged Interior Minister Schäuble to add naturalization provisions to the Alien

Act. Foreigners between 16 and 23 years of age with 8 or more years of residency and

foreigners above the age of 23 with a minimum of 15 years of residency became

eligible to naturalization . Simplified naturalizations were introduced with the 194

foreigners' law in 1991. Art. 85 reduced the required period of residence to apply for

naturalization from fifteen to eight years, and did not demand homogeneity of

citizenship within one family. Art. 86 provided the same for long-term residents after

fifteen years, along with their children and grandchildren" . Finally, the law 195

recognized the right of second-generation immigrants, born in Germany to foreigners,

to acquire German nationality. It also made it easier for the first generation , and 196

!80

Anil (2005) pg. 459193

Ibid, pg. 455194

Ludvig (2004) pg. 507195

Thränhardt (1996) pg. 220196

cancelled the waiting period previously demanded before an immigrant could apply

for a family reunion (restricted to spouse and children) . 197

According to the revision of the Alien Act, an applicant should be granted citizenship

provided that he/she: (1) has lived in Germany for eight years; (2) is between the ages

of 16 and 23; (3) has attended school in Germany for six years; (4) has no serious

criminal record; and (5) gives up his or her former citizenship. By specifying the

conditions for naturalization, the Länder's discretion to grant or deny citizenship

without accountability was reduced. Although the spirit of this legislation was of a

"significant liberalization" , its immediate impact was arguable at best. After the 198

revisions, naturalization increased (from approximately 20,000 naturalizations in

1990 to 83,000 in 1997), but so did the number of foreigners living in Germany (from

5.3 million to 7.3 million). However, later on in 1999, just before the reformed

citizenship law was adopted, the number of naturalizations peaked . 199

1993: Since the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union) was signed, the

German law became evermore closely linked to the EU policies.

For EU citizens, naturalization became dictated by Article 8. Non EU citizens of

German descent retained the right to naturalize (according to Art. 116.1 of the

German basic).

The Asylum Compromise of 1993 should be noted. Following the Maastricht Treaty,

the earlier Schengen agreements of 1985 and 1990, and the rise in asylum seekers, the

left and right parties agreed to change the constitution and restrict the terms of

!81

Soysal (1994) pg. 122197

Nathans (2004) pg. 248198

Ibid, pg. 250199

compliance with refugees' requests to enter Germany. This consisted of sending some

of them back immediately and without a court hearing . All those travelling from 200

other EU member states and other safe third states, were categorically classified as

"free of persecution".

The greater shifts in immigration and naturalization policies occurred two years

before, concerning the non-EU members who were not of German ethnicity, and who

had immigrated to Germany as guest-workers but had stayed. 31% of these immigrant

non-EU citizens were actually born in Germany. Since Germany's law was based

exclusively on the jus sanguinis principle, this population was still not entitled to an

automatic naturalization. This meant that "even if… immigration could be reduced

completely, the number of foreign residents would still increase due to the birth rates

amongst foreigners" . Unchanged, this situation would have led to a growing 201

anomaly. Once this was realized by the government, reforms followed. Due to some

cognitive dissonance, as Germany refused to reckon that the guest-workers and their

families are bound not to leave the country , these reforms were suggested only as 202

temporary measures for five years in the early nineties. A constitutional change was

only adopted later at the turn of the century.

!1998-9: These years mark the political battle over the extent of the reform in the 1913

citizenship law. The Red-Green coalition government of the Social Democrats and

environmentalist Grün Party, led by chancellor Schröder, initiated a new bill of

!82

Münz (2002) pg. 24. 200

Ludvig (2004) pg. 500201

Currently, although it holds the largest immigrant population in the EU, German officials refuse to 202

call Germany an immigration-country.

naturalization that would allow dual citizenship and the principle of jus soli. It was

meant to make citizenship consistent with Germany's democratic values, and to face

up to its new demography, with about ten percent of immigrants. Thereby it meant to

completely overturn the 1913 law.

Constitutional change, as was desired by the elected government, required consent

from both Bundestag (the Federal Parliament) and Budesrat (House of

Representatives of the sixteen Länder). The majority of the left parties in the latter

was lost when the conservative CDU won elections in Hesse. Their campaign was

based upon a petition against the suggested bill of liberalizing the citizenship law. It

gathered 5 million signatures against the acceptance of dual citizenship and the

principle of jus soli, and paved the way for the left wing parties' loss in the Länder

elections.

Having lost its majority, the government was forced to adopt a compromised version

of the bill. The key changes were the removal of general dual citizenship from the

bill, and the introduction - at the behest of the FDP - of simple jus soli, with dual

citizenship until the age of 23. The FDP assumed a pivotal position in the Bundesrat.

For the proposal to be signed into law, the SPD/Grün coalition needed the support of

the FDP. The capitalist and liberalist FDP consented to the reform of the citizenship

law as a way to improve Germany’s image in order to attract highly skilled workers.

When the German government initiated a pilot program in 2000 to ‘‘hire’’ 20,000

highly qualified workers from abroad, but received only about 8000 applicants, the

political elite began to argue that potential highly skilled immigrants were put off by

the country's insistence on preserving its pure ethnic national identity . 203

!83

Ibid, pg. 460203

The Greens fought a rearguard action by attempting to retain dual citizenship also for

the elderly, but when the FDP rejected this, the party was forced to content itself with

the reinstatement of a hardship clause for unemployed naturalization applicants . 204

2000: Since the adoption of the reform, German citizenship is granted to all children

born to foreign residents if one of the parents has had legal residence for at least eight

years, notwithstanding any other nationality they might inherit from their parents. By

the age of 23 such persons will have to opt for one nationality. The required period of

residence after which people are eligible for naturalization has been reduced from ten

to eight years for all applicants. Naturalization became, however, conditioned to the

Leitkultur - "both language skills and the commitment to the German liberal

democratic constitution have to be proven for naturalizations by law as well" . 205

The new law thus granted citizenship to those born to permanent residents. It adopted,

therefore, the principle of jus soli, and incorporated it into the existing jus sanguinis

(the latter is still intact). The compromise with the conservative party, however,

excluded from the citizenship law a real recognition of dual citizenship, as children

born in Germany to foreign parents are allowed to have dual citizenship only until the

age of 23. When they reach that age, however, they must choose which citizenship to

retain. This leads some to claim that in the new law "immigration is still

predominantly framed as detrimental for state and society". 206

!

!84

Greens (2001) pg. 31-2204

Ludvig (2004) pg. 507, 511; for the origins of Leitkultur: Sammartino (2008) pg. 59-61.205

Anil (2005) 454, 463206

With the laws adopted between 1990 and 2000, Germany "gave up one of the

instruments it and predecessor regimes had employed to mold society, an instrument

used for much of this century to promote the ethnic homogeneity of the nation . 207

On the one hand, it is true that with the reform of the citizenship law Germany

rejected "the idea of a nation [based] on ethnic homogeneity" de jura. On the other

hand the strong opposition to the definition of Germany as an immigration country

and to the provision of the law (dual citizenship and jus soli), makes clear that "the

representation of the nation defined by blood ties belongs to the tragic evils of [its]

past" was really only wishful thinking of the left. The parliamentary debate is not 208

settled, and the law reflects a compromise rather than an overall shift in definition of

citizenship.

!In conclusion, foreigners were traditionally excluded from politics in Germany, while

socially they were increasingly included since the formation of the FRG in 1949.

Germany insisted on not being an immigrant country, but surely could neither

practically nor ethically halt the natural growth of its immigrant population. The

option of physical expulsion was rarely used - and only against (former) refugees . 209

Germany is mostly perpetuating and carrying with it the idea of immigrants as a

problem, rather than "solving it" . The means that were available for Germany were 210

!85

Nathans (2004) pg. 269207

Foreign Ministry's statement in 2000, quoted in Mandel (2008) pg. 217208

Regarding the Bosnian refugees, Federal Interior Minister, Schoenbohm, said in 1996: "They 209should go home on a volunteer basis. But if no one is going home, then we have to use force to send them home", CNN (October 16, 1996): www.cnn.com/WORLD/9610/16/germany.bosnia.refugees/index.html?eref=sitesearch

Wein, M. J (2009), pg. 31. 210

limited to "nation-cleansing", meaning the removal of unwanted population groups

"politically or socially but not violently" . Such attempts at nation-cleansing were 211

prevalent at least until the early 1990s in Brandt's, Schmidt's and Kohl's governments.

The 2000 reform in the citizenship law does mark (at least) one clear shift in

immigration policy, by no longer categorically classifying immigrants as foreigners,

and allowing their children citizenship through the principle of jus soli and a limited

option of dual citizenship.

!The final part of this work will examine the perceptions and extent of integration of

Turkish people residing in Germany. This is to penetrate the "cultural contestations of

community on which legal definitions were based" from the broad viewpoint 212

necessary to assess the 2000 reform in the citizenship law.

!4.4 Overview of the Political System

Understanding the German decision making process on immigration requires an

understanding of its political system. Their system has four main characteristics:

aiming at a consensus, an impact of non-governmental actors, its political parties and

federalism. The first has always been central to German politics. Reaching a

consensus may also be read as aiming at cooperation . The second is derived from a 213

strong front of institutionalized labor and capital. Society is mostly organized in

strong workers' unions and founded on an equally strong independent banking system.

!86

Wein, M. J (2009), pg. 43. 211

Eley & Palmowski (2008) pg.14212

Greens (2001) pg. 3213

These are but two central non-governmental forces of many more which influence

decision making. The third is made up of a trio which gradually became a quartet, and

perhaps even a quintet. Until 1998, the FDP, standing for capitalism and liberalization

of the market, joined and shaped policies of all governments headed by either the

conservative CDU or by the SPD (apart from the 1966-9 Grand Coalition of CDU/

CSU-SPD). For three decades, the system has witnessed the rise of the Grün Party,

which formed the government with the SPD after the 1998 elections. Since the

Greens' rise, the FDP became more aligned with the conservative right wing Christian

parties. A fifth party which gains more and more seats in the federal and local

parliaments is the Linke (left), which was officially founded in 2007 and takes on the

role of a Marxist-oriented left, will not be addressed in this work. It has never

participated in federal government, and due to its recent founding it could not evem

have influenced the reform of 2000 from the opposition.

The fourth characteristic indicates the tight connection between federal and local

legislation. The Länder, unlike a mere municipally governing force, have a veto right

through their council (the Bundesrat) over most of the legislation of the German

parliament (the Bundestag). The exercise of that power is urged by the opposition

party and can bring about a standstill in legislation. This risk pushes the political

system into Grand Coalitions , such as the current SPD-CDU/CSU. Baden-214

Württemberg (where a survey of the Turkish immigrant community was conducted

and is included in chapter 6) has a much more conservative interior policy than

!87

Ibid214

Berlin. While the Baden-Württemberg advocates preaching in mosques in German,

Berlin actively recruited and encouraged immigrants to apply for citizenship . 215

!All of these characteristics are manifested in the process of adopting the citizenship

law of 2000: the foreigners' effect on legislation through membership in various non-

governmental organizations (including workers' unions), intra-party debates, the

crucial effects of the Bundesrat after the 1999 elections in Hesse, the compromise

which followed are all embedded in the intricate power-structure of the federal state.

!4.4.1 Overview of the Party System

Of the four characteristics of the German political system, aiming at a consensus,

influence of non-governmental organizations, and the relation between the federal and

the local level are quite self-explanatory. A brief overview on the system's parties and

their immigration policies is necessary, though, to complete the understanding of

citizenship law making in Germany.

The SPD was traditionally more open to immigration and naturalization, and allowed

membership in the party to foreigners since the 19th century. In the early 1930s its

policy remained that "long-term residents of Germany should be given the chance to

become citizens, if they could demonstrate cultural assimilation" and that "a foreigner

who wished to become a German citizen in spite of its military defeat 'has inwardly

become firmly attached to the German state" . With the establishment of the FRG, 216

the party took on immediately a continued role in politics (after its members were

!88

Mandel (2008) pg. 218, 222-3215

Nathans (2004) 205-6216

persecuted and its leaders forced into exile by the National Socialist Party). In

addition to its persisting notion of Leitkultur, its immigration policy was to plan

immigration in advance. This was in order "to balance the demographic gap

developed since the early 70s" . 217

The post-war SPD also established new and firmer borders of quantitative

immigration policy. Chairman Lafontaine stated in 1996 that "endangered asylum

seekers had a greater moral claim to immigrate than ethnic Germans who were no

longer in imminent danger" . Furthermore The Social Democrats proposed to reform 218

the citizenship law according to the jus soli principle in 1985, 1988, 1989, and 1993.

If the bill they drafted in 1993, ‘‘Children’s Citizenship’’ (Kinderstaatsangehörigkeit),

became a law, a child born in Germany would become a German national if one of its

parents was born in Germany and possessed an unlimited residence permit or

entitlement at birth . 219

Although the country's restrictive naturalization policy attracted much criticism from

the left, at times even compared to the National Socialist Ausländer policy, the SPD

seems to have been content to support that policy during all but its final period in

office, when reformation was virtually impossible. The party was even co-responsible

for the 1977 Guidelines on Naturalization . Only when in opposition did the SPD 220

develop "more radical proposals… By the late 1980s, these included dual citizenship

!89

Ibid, pg. 205-6217

Ibid, pg 36218

Anil (2005) pg. 461219

Greens (2001) pg. 8220

and so-called ‘double jus soli’ for immigrants, as well as a right to naturalization after

10 years’ residence" . 221

The FDP is yet another party which already existed prior to the war and returned to

the political game with the formation of the FRG.

The party had traditionally supported pro-immigration policies and even dual

citizenship, considering the macro-economic advantages inherent in a flexible

worker's-market . During the 1980s, the party advocated liberalization of the 222

German citizenship law itself. However, it did not advocate the jus soli principle . 223

For the FDP, exclusion of foreigners from citizenship on the basis of ethnicity and

common descent conflicted with its secular beliefs. The party played an important

role in the compromised version of the new 2000 law. Members supported the

proposed citizenship law in the Bundestag. However, the FDP's objection to dual

citizenship caused the proposal to be rewritten. The FDP’s liberal ideology explains

why it supported birthright citizenship, but not why it objected to the dual citizenship

clause . 224

Since The Grün Party was only once a member of the Federal Government, the

party is not deterred from tolerating even illegal residents and workers in Germany.

The debate around this issue is anyway mainly about its "burden sharing" of asylum

seekers in the EU, which is argued to be too high . 225

!90

Ibid221

Soysal (1994) pg. 206222

Anil (2005) pg. 462223

Ibid, pg. 465224

Ibid, pg. 44225

The Greens first entered federal politics in the 1983 Bundestag election. In 1984 they

proposed a ‘right to settle’ (Niederlassungsrecht), which "would grant immigrants

permanent residence and the right to vote after five years’ residence without the need

to formally naturalize" . In 1989 they drafted a bill introducing the jus soli principle, 226

recognition of dual citizenship, and granting the right to citizenship to every

individual who had resided in Germany for at least 5 years.

In the 1990s a highly publicized campaign was led by party member and elected to

the Berlin state council, Ismail Kosan, a naturalized German from Turkey: "the

campaign gathered one million signatures supporting legalization of dual

nationality… and called the German law anachronistic, a folk relic" . 227

!All the aforementioned parties, at least regarding the topic of citizenship, were

reflecting the ideal of an "ideal state [where] the national community will not be

‘split’ into cultural and political spheres". The Left-wing parties, that stand for anti-

nationalism, but nationalist nevertheless, argued that nationalist ideology should "also

[be] combined in a powerful but illogical way with purely democratic and political

values" . The net result was the compromise in 2000, reflecting the aforementioned 228

cooperative spirit, and due to the inter-party battle on both federal and local levels.

!The CDU/CSU have traditionally held a solid conservative stand, which by the

nineties had become less unified. Dating back to the late 19th century and revamped

!91

Greens (2001) pg. 8-9226

Mandel (2008) 220227

Breuilly, J. (1994), Pg. 109, 111–112228

during the post-First World War decade, Bavaria, Baden and generally the south, held

strict and conservative stands about naturalization. This was contrary to Prussia which

was ruled primarily by the SPD . The Bavarian CSU has traditionally opposed the 229

liberalization of citizenship and immigration policy, and also promoted more racially

oriented naturalization policies . Immigration and naturalization policy were indeed 230

prominent themes in the conservatives' election campaigns. Such was the case in the

federal elections of 1983, when they made the previous SPD led government's alleged

"permissiveness in dealing with foreigners a major issue" , and in the crucial 231

instance of the last Bundesrat elections for Ronald Koch in the state of Hesse.

While the general position of the Right is that of the conservative guardians of

citizenship, it is countered by those accusing it of presenting "major challenges to the

stability of political systems" . The Conservatives were against the introduction of 232

jus soli based citizenship in the 1980s and the party has not changed its official

position since then. Nevertheless, despite coalition discipline, "in a heated internal

debate during 1995/1996, three young CDU Members of Parliament, supported by

most of the party’s liberal wing, argued that simple jus soli should indeed be

introduced to aid the integration of immigrant children, who would otherwise remain

foreigners all their lives". Even at the time of the 1999 parliamentary debates, the

CDU presented a wide range of attitudes towards immigration and naturalization.

Such voices that even supported dual citizenship were heard already in 1992, by the

parliament's president, the mayor of Berlin, and both prominent conservative figures.

!92

Nathans (2004) pg. 201-2229

Gosewinkel, 2002, 72230

Nathans (2004) pg. 244231

Eley and Palmowski (2008) pg. 5232

Such views within the CDU are not adopted, in any case, due to "coalition discipline"

with the CDU's more conservative Bavarian sister, the CSU. For example, Bavarian

Minister-President Stoiber taunted the Greens by suggesting that dual citizenships

threatened the existence of the German state in the same way that the Red Army

Faction terrorists had done in the 1970s and 1980s . 233

The CSU maintains a strict anti-naturalization policy and demands a massive

reduction of foreigners in Germany . Another factor in the final objection of both 234

the conservative Christian and the liberalist FDP specifically to dual citizenship,

concerned that the new voters (created by allowing dual citizenship) would primarily

support the left parties.

The alternative immigration policy that conservatives presented, instead of the left's

dual citizenship and adoption of jus soli, was their own version of the Leitkultur. The

Leitkultur was originally an SPD policy from late 19th century, which was an

alternative to the radical nationalist and ethnic puritans who advocated citizenship –

especially from 1894 - only for those with "German blood". Since then, the entire

political map has become liberalized, and the current conservatives condition

naturalization no longer to have "German blood", but to an adherence to the existing

values of a Social Christian nation: foreigners must "embrace values rooted in

Christianity, the Enlightenment, and humanism" . 235

Regarding their attitude towards Islam and Christianity in Germany, one would be

inclined to agree that the Christian parties have more restrictive immigration policies

!93

Mandel (2008) pg. 220233

Thrändhardt (1999) pg. 34-5; Thrändhart (1996) pg. 212234

Fetzer and Soper (2005) pg. 104235

than the permissive left ones. The situation is more intricate, and actually greatly

varies from one Land to another: "in those Länder where the SPD is in opposition... it

advocates the teaching of Islam in the schools and fights for the rights of the Muslim

community. But where this same party is in power… it doesn't do so. And the

opposite is also true: where the CDU is in opposition… it supports Muslims' political

demands" . Smaller parties present indeed a more consistent attitude. Such is the 236

Green Party which recently elected Turkish Cem Özdemir as their leader , the 237

liberal capitalist-oriented position of the FDP, and the National Democrats who spread

xenophobia and probably even promote physical attacks against foreigners . 238

Carrying with them a more substantial history of political power, the same

consistency cannot be attributed to the big parties, which frequently formulate

immigration and citizenship policies in a rather opportunistic manner.

!This chapter focused on the legal and political background to the case of the

immigrants in Germany, and particularly those marked by "otherness". The

motivation of decision makers in permitting or restricting immigration (and even

more so naturalization) stems from a cluster of reasons, from the economic, through

party politics, to the religious and socio-cultural.

Chapters 2 and 3 provided an analysis of the concept of citizenship and national

identity, and surveyed the elements underlying and implicit in citizenship law and

immigration policy in Germany. This chapter provided the same for the explicit

!94

Ibid, pg. 121 236

See "German Leader, not German Obama": http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7732976.stm237

See: "German Parliament votes for Nazi Ban": http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1061138.stm238

elements of legislation and politics, thus enabling a comprehensive understanding of

the background of the citizenship law reform in 2000 and especially its causes,

particularly with regard to immigrants from non-European countries.

Chapter 5 aims at understanding the effects of the German immigration policies on its

Turkish residents (and naturalized), as well as their role in influencing and shaping it.

To do so it returns to the more implicit level of investigation, as the Turkish

population in Germany is not officially represented by parties or other elected bodies

from which one may deduce their positions.

!!

!95

5. The Story of Others

5.1 From immigrants to hyphenated Germans

It is interesting to note that "A considerable part of the German public still perceives

immigration more as a burden than as an enrichment for the country and is afraid of a

lack of control over immigration", although there is a "shrinking of Germany's

population", a sustainable pension system and a "shortage of highly skilled labor" . 239

Without the 31.3 million immigrants that entered Germany since 1954, its population

would be in decline since the mid-1970s, and it is expected that Germany would

"need a net immigration of 23 million people in the first half of the twenty-first

century in order to stabilize its population size" . Nevertheless, the opposition to 240

turning Germany into an immigration country prevails.

The story of the others, the Turkish immigrants, can therefore not be entailed solely

by macro-economic considerations, but encompasses a recent history and relationship

of (at least) two peoples and the FRG.

!As detailed in chapter 4, the rapid economic growth in 1950's Germany led to a labour

shortage in the workforce. Parallel to that Turkey faced a shortage of foreign currency

which made an emigration agreement with Germany an ideal strategy . The bilateral 241

agreement between the two countries was supposed to redeploy the 19th century

principle of rotating guest or seasonal workers, thereby limiting their interests and

possibilities of becoming permanent residents or citizens. Their principle soon proved

!96

Münz (2002) pg. 16.239

Münz (2002) pg. 30-31.240

Kadioglu (1993) 241

to be undesired, both by the foreign employees and local employers. The first wished

to stay and save money for longer durations than the initially granted one-year work

permit, while the latter resented the need to train new workers on an annual basis. As

these wishes were met in later agreements between the two countries, the stay of

Turks in Germany began gathering an increasing sociological meaning.

The housing-, educational-, social welfare- and religious needs of the immigrant

community became clearer when families were settling down permanently with the

policy of Anwerberstopp . The living conditions of the Turkish communities were 242

steadily poor, as if their stay in Germany after uniting with their families was just as

temporary as before. Their housing, under the responsibility, and frequently also in

the ownership of their employers, led to the workers being a controlled work force, in

poverty and seclusion. Housing was usually in "wooden huts belonging to the

employers and attics in the cities". Furthermore, employers often use their control

over the Turks' accommodation to "force them to act as strike-breakers" . 243

!Regarding education, the general duty for children with foreign citizenship to visit a

school was introduced in 1964 , but the system was hardly prepared to 244

accommodate these children's needs. The children, lacking basic language skills and

coming from poor residential areas, were most usually placed in the 'basic

schools' (Hauptschule). These schools train young students for simple jobs and focus

on practical matters, in contrast to the academically oriented and university targeted

!97

Fetzer and Soper (2005) pg. 102242

Castles (2000) pg. 34-5243

Norbert (2005) pg. 43244

Gymnasium. The fact that these schools became almost the default for the immigrant

children created schooling characterized as "education for bilingual illiteracy" , due 245

to minimal rates of graduation even from this basic school system.

Such inferior services to the foreign population in Germany both in residence and

schooling, drew on the expectation they would all emigrate eventually. This

expectation shaped also the way Germany accommodated Muslim religious needs . 246

Islam is represented by thousands of organizations in Germany, but none of them is

formally recognized by the federal state. Such recognition of a religion (currently

granted to Catholic, Protestant and Jewish organizations) gives it a public corporation

status. Without it, Islam is prevented from becoming "a part of the country's religious

landscape" and makes it harder for Muslims to receive social welfare from their

religious community . The general policy from the 1990's is that special welfare 247

services should be abolished, and that the staff working in public authorities should be

inter-culturally trained instead and that the share of employees with immigrant

background should be increased . 248

!With their settlement and family reunions in Germany, xenophobia began being

targeted at the new Turkish communities. This was particularly strong during the

economic recessions of the mid 1960's and early 70's. Instead of supporters of the

economic miracle, the Turks were increasingly classified as "Muslim intruders" . 249

!98

Ibid, pg. 59245

Fetzer and Soper (2005) pg. 126 246

Ibid, pg. pg. 3247

Norbert (2005) pg. 34248

Kadioglu (1997) pg. 84249

With the SPD led government at the time, the borders for Turkish working

immigration were closed. This led to the rising appeals of the Turkish communities in

Germany (although as individuals and not commonly organized) for family reunions,

and of Turks in Turkey to plead for refuge in Germany . Both of these were 250

possible due to provisions of the German constitution concerning refugee rights, the

1965 law and general European treaties concerning workers' rights.

Until the early 1980s immigrant participation was no issue in Germany. But with the

realization that the recruited workers would not return to their countries of origin, the

issue of integration and participation of the immigrant population entered the public,

political and academic agenda . Until the 1990s, there was no significant decline in 251

the return of immigrants to their homeland. In 1990-1, the introduction of the Mark to

East Germany brought in new purchase power that resulted in a short economic

boom, calling for more immigration (although formally under "family unification")

from Turkey . Between 1998 and 2002 Turkish immigration to Germany and 252

emigration back to Turkey was balanced. Among the existing Turkish migrant

population, more than 90 % possessed a secure residence permit and enjoy a denizen

status . 253

The current situation is characterized by the political target of zero-immigration.

!

!99

Abadan-Unat (2002) pg. 55-56, quoted in Karakus (2007) pg. 10 250

Norbert (2005) pg. 20251

Thränhradt (1996) pg. 214252

Castles (2000) pg. 12-13 253

The life environment of the Turkish immigrants in Germany is usually poor, including

housing conditions and education level. Furthermore, they present a paradoxical

profile in the economy and specifically in the job market.

!5.2 The paradoxical profile of the Turkish immigrant

Employers prefer that immigrants remain at the bottom of the employment scale,

offered the more unstable, low paying and less promising jobs . 254

This results in the Turkish people staying in closed communities of a low socio-

economic rating. The first generation of immigrants was of this kind. As they had a

clear consciousness of immigrants and was not concerned for its social status in

relation to native Germans , it settled in densely populated areas in the peripheries 255

of cities, and usually worked in heavy industries, mines, or construction sites. This

ghetto lifestyle triggered suspicion and stereotypes on a communal level from the

native Germans (accusing the Turks of being the source of high crime rates, for

example), as well as on the national level (reinforcing conservative claims that the

immigrants are foreigners and a threat to the national culture). On the other hand,

there is of course a possible breakthrough for the immigrants. The more language

skills, education and experience that they gather, the more likely they are to integrate

into society and get more jobs from the primary market that is traditionally reserved

for native Germans. Perhaps they even open up their own successful businesses. This

!100

Massey (June 1999) 254

It is estimated that of the first generation of immigrant Turks, about 42% were actually skilled 255

workers, 14% were civil servants or officers, and 15% were merchants, although its majority was occupied in manual labor jobs; cited in Karakus M. (2007) pg. 11. Brochman (1999), pg. 2: "Since the door was closed for labor immigrants in the beginning of the 1970s, the main legal forms of entry have been through the asylum 'door', the humanitarian 'door', or through family reunification

triggers a different type of accusation from the natives, namely that the Turkish

immigrants are robbing real Germans of their jobs.

As far as xenophobia goes, once it is raised, it quickly becomes a general and

categorical hostility towards foreigners. The Turkish communities, treated from the

ethnic point of reference, both on the legal and political level and on the street-level

racism, soon adopted an ethnicity-based self-definition.

!5.3 Patterns of Organization and Roadblocks on way to integration

Life in Germany seems to be a wonderful bargain for an emigrant. The federal and

local government services are making sure that the standard of living of the migrant

population is adequate and assures its social rights. Relatively high wages in the

secondary market of unstable and unskilled manual-labor or heavy industry also make

the country attractive for immigrants. Thirdly, chain migration keeps immigration

levels high. Finally, the courts' decisions have usually been in favor of refugees.

This brings us to the research question: however kind Germany is to them,

immigrants do not very often apply for German citizenship. The low rate of

applications to become a German citizen is not a new phenomenon. As of the early

1990s, about 90% of the immigrants in Germany stated that they do not want to

naturalize . 256

!

!101

Thränhardt (1999) pg. 49)

Hoskins (1991) pg. 37256

Parallel to Shain and Sherman's earlier distinction of two kinds of immigrants'

political activity targeted at a change in their homeland or in their host land , is 257

Ostergaard-Nielsen's distinction of two kinds of immigrant policies . The first kind 258

according to Ostergaard-Nielsen refers to "immigrant politics", which is political

behavior aimed at improving the political, social and economic status of the Turkish

immigrants in the host land. The second kind, "Diaspora politics", is meant to

influence their political status in their homeland. The first kind is particularly

characteristic of the Turkish immigrants' political behavior in 1970's and early 1980's.

The prospect of return to Turkey became temporarily greater once their families got to

Germany, since the cost of living became higher for these immigrants. However, once

children began attending schools, the wish of returning to Turkey diminished . With 259

the settlement of many Turks becoming permanent, their awareness of inner politics

grew accordingly.

The concern for their ability to inherit property in Turkey is considered a major factor

for their unwillingness to give up their original passports , and partly explains their 260

consistent ties with the homeland politics. Although unknown to some Turks, the

possibility to give up the Turkish passport in order to receive a German one and to

receive a "Pink Card" instead, presents an option for those who give up their Turkish

citizenship in order to become naturalized Germans. This card entitles them to inherit

property in Turkey even without being Turkish citizens , and is a part of the Turkish 261

!102

Shain & Sherman (1998) Figure 1 in pg. 336257

Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003) pg. 21258

Castles (2000), pg. 72259

Fetzer and Soper (2008) pg. 101260

Mandel (2008) pg. 226261

government's policy to keep Turkish emigrants connected to their homeland –

sustaining the "Diaspora politics". Turkey "is trying to establish an 'ethnic lobby' and

supports the idea of giving dual nationality to Turkish immigrants in Germany",

hoping to "facilitate chain migration" . 262

!Other than that, there is naturally some correlation between the two kinds, since

strong activism in the host land signals those in power in the homeland, and vice

versa. There is also an evident combination of the host and homeland politics in the

agenda of Turkish organizations in Germany . An example is the battle of Sunni 263

organizations in Germany against the head-scarf ban in Turkey, which is associated

with the battle to bring Germany to acknowledge Islam as official religion. Another

example is the battle of Kurdish refugees and immigrants in Germany to be

recognized as a separate group from the Turkish community can be linked to their

lobbying for the right of that minority to self-determination in Turkey.

The strategies of politically-oriented Turkish organizations in Germany were shaped,

amongst other factors, due to the way the Turkish community was explicitly defined

in German politics. The community was not one of a mere immigrant minority, but,

particularly since the immigrants-focused election campaign of CDU/CSU in 1982,

the community was one of a clearly excluded ethnicity. The ethno-focal basis of

political action by Turkish organizations in Germany is influenced by the ethno-focal

politics of inclusion and exclusion of Germany. The blood principle of German

politics had marginalized and contributed to the ethnicized approach of Turkish

!103

Thränhardt (1999) pg. 54262

Ibid, 22 and 57-60263

immigrants. This leads in turn to the formation of inseparable strategies of

"Immigrant" and "Diaspora" politics.

This mishmash of "Immigrant" and "Diaspora" politics correlates also with the

hyphenated identity of Turkish youth of a second and third generation living and/or

born in Germany. This youth adopted a German and Turkish identity that is hardly

separable. These hyphenated Germans may be culturally and socially well integrated

to the society and partially opposed to their traditional parents . This is in contrast to 264

the way Turkish immigrants were hitherto perceived by both German and Turkish

governments, as workers who primarily identify with Turkey as a homeland and a

permanent and final place of residence. This new hyphenated identity is perpetuated

by and perpetuating a growing rejection by those governments, who gradually began

seeing them as foreigners in both lands. This identity can finally be explained as a

contrast between holistic and syncretic identities. The first implies a need to make a

binary choice of either a German or Turkish national identity, while the second

implies a possible third space between these two identities . The writings of Turkish 265

writers in Germany clearly express the complexities of this hyphenated Germans: "do

they have a true zu Hause, or home? Can one really speak of the Fremde, the strange

or foreign land and the state one is in as a stranger or foreigner? How [to] differentiate

between their Turkish selves and their German selves?" . 266

Currently, Turkey is still making it easy for emigrants to keep their nationality "in

order to foster stronger ethnic lobbies working in their homeland national interests as

!104

Kaya (2005) pg. 220-241264

Ibid, pg. 229265

Veteto-Conrad (1996) pg. 2266

well as to bolster remittances" . This generation of hyphenated Turkish-Germans is 267

characterized by a shift in interest from Turkish to German politics while seeking for

a special recognition in Turkey . 268

In conclusion, Turkish immigrants in Germany have undergone a process from

passive and disinterested guest-workers in the 1950s, to active lobbyists whose

interests were promoted in both the host- and the homeland with an ethnicity based

self-reference (echoing the prevalent identity discourse in Germany), until the present

point, described as a hyphenated generation.

Their active engagement is not predominantly oriented towards neither the country

nor origin or the host land . Another interesting and important point, common to the 269

entire aforementioned process, is that the Turkish immigrants in Germany hardly

organize in the formal federal and/or Länder party system.

!According to a survey conducted in Manheim, the majority of immigrants are not

organized. Rates of membership in organizations among Turkish women are very low.

Only a small potion of immigrants is member in both German and Turkish

associations. This survey as well as a similar one conducted in Berlin, indicate that

the older the immigrants are, the less they participate in associations in general, and in

German ones specifically. Both indicate the same conclusion: the older the

respondents, the lower the participation . 270

!105

Vertovec (2001) pg. 17 267

Karakus (2007) pg. 61268

Norbert (2005) pg. 45. 269

Norbert (2005) pg. 30270

Patterns of organization vary therefore according to gender, types of organizations

according to "Immigrant" and "Diaspora" politics, and age.

!The most important participation area of persons of Turkish origin is religion (29 %).

The following most important areas have to do with the organization of leisure time

(sports 28 %; social gathering 20 %; cultural activities 17 %) or with the immediate

social world (school and kindergarten 14 %; representation of professional interests

11 %). The areas referring to more civic concerns (social concerns, education or youth

groups) make up between 6 and 11 percent of social involvement. Only few

immigrants participate in the areas of health, accident and rescue service or communal

pressure groups, environment or animal protection, economic self-help or justice. This

order of preference corresponds with the order of preference of German citizens –

with the notable exception of the area of religion. While religion takes the first place

among respondents of Turkish immigrants with 29 percent, among German citizens it

takes only the sixth place with 10 % . A third of Turkish immigrants participate (as 271

formal members or informally) in one ore more associations. But only ten percent of

the respondents declared to be actively engaged. The according projection of this

figure indicates that "probably 200,000 Turkish immigrants are actively engaged".

This is less then the average 50% membership rate of German citizens in associations.

Patterns of associating in German civil society circle around sports and trade unions,

while in Turkish foreign working society it circles around religion and culture . 272

!

!106

Ibid271

Norbet (2005) pg. 22-3, 26272

Considering its significance for the Turkish immigrant population, the patterns of

Muslim organization in Germany will be more extensively detailed. Free-exercise of

religion is guaranteed in Article 4 of the Basic Law for freedom of faith, of

conscience and of creed . This is often insufficient to settle the conflicts arising 273

between the local states' law with the demands made by Muslims. The latter concern

issues from "family law, burial regulations, the slaughter of animals, and public

recognition of religious holidays" . This is definitely made worse by a process of 274

secularization in German Christian society that is not paralleled in the Muslim society,

in which two-thirds report worshipping regularly in a mosque and state that "their

religious beliefs are an important part of their identity". The contrast between

constitutional and local law continues as Article 140 of the Basic Law states that:

"The provisions of Articles 136, 137, 138, 139 and 141 of the German Constitution of

August 11, 1919, are an integral part of this Basic Law". The aforementioned articles

rule that while Germany has no state church, the public stature of religious

communities should be recognized. As of 2005, no Muslim group has yet to receive

such recognition in any one of the Länder. This was formally explained by one of the

requirements of Article 140 that was not met by these groups: having insufficient

members, not having existed at least thirty years, not being representative or

democratic… practically, this prevents those Muslim groups from receiving state

support and public money for their respective communities, hospitals and schools . 275

!107

The Basic Law can be found on: http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/docs/german.htm273

Fetzer and Soper (2008) pg. 108-110274

Ibid275

The responsibility over the Turkish guest-working community's religious needs was

left for Turkey to officially take care of, since Germany is "no immigration country".

Attempts were made since 1972 to meet these needs with a separate division of the

official religious affairs office to handle the religious needs of Turks abroad. It was

not sufficiently organized from the start, and the effort of the Turkish government to

"dominate Muslim religious life in Germany ultimately failed", leading to the creation

of "more than two thousand Turkish-Islamic organizations with a membership of half

a million" . 276

Three associations control the majority of mosque organizations: "The National

Vision Organization, the Islamic Cultural Centers, and the Directorate of Religious

Affairs' Turkish Islamic Associations". They are umbrella organizations for most

religious associations, which were founded in the 1970s and 1980s by first generation

immigrants . The immigrants initially gathered informally, but later established 277

formal associations and began to rent rooms for the Mosque services. Today, a vast

number of Mosque associations exists that is partly organized in confederations on

state, federal or even European level. Gradually, the political identity became mixed

with the traditional one. These organizations, moderate as radical, demand "not only

the right to religious life, but also for the political, social, and economic rights of their

members" . 278

Regarding religious education, Article 7 of the Basic Law states that: "Religious

instruction forms part of the ordinary curriculum in state and municipal schools,

!108

Ibid, pg. 103, 120276

Soysal (1994) 109-110277

Ibid, pg. 115278

excepting secular schools. Without prejudice to the state's right of supervision,

religious instruction is given in accordance with the tenets of the religious

communities". However, since no Muslim has yet achieved public corporation status,

"Land school officials do not feel obligated to provide Islamic instruction or to

consult formally with Muslim leaders on the content of any such classes" . The local 279

authorities actually aim most usually at exposing Muslim students to a "version of

Islam that is compatible with liberal democracy". The issue of publicly wearing the

hijab (the Muslim head scarf for women) which was forbidden in France and received

much media coverage , serves as a good example of the different interpretation of 280

the Article 7 of the constitution in various Länder. While the right to wear the hijab is

derived from the right to practice religion, and is respected in Hamburg and

Brandenburg, other states like Baden-Württemberg forbid it as "a violation of the

state's duty to be neutral toward all religions". Courts finally ruled in favor of appeals

to allow wearing the hijab because the principle of "neutrality in of the teacher" was

used as double standard when "for Christians it's okay, but for everyone else it's

not…" . 281

Regarding the right to build appropriate places of worship and mosques for the

Turkish community, there has been a sharp growth from around 700 in 1981, to about

2,400 in 2002. However, just as in the case of education, the ease of establishing a

new mosque depends on the Land. Another example from Stuttgart, Baden-

Württemberg's capital, shows how conservative Länder are likely to mount difficulties

!109

Fetzer and Soper (2005) pg. 112279

Windle (2004) pg. 2, 15280

Fetzer and Soper (2005) pg. 114-116281

on those wishing to publicly practice their Islamic faith. In that and other conservative

Länder, it is also likely to encounter arguments against the Muslim call to prayer

broadcasted by loudspeakers, being a disturbance to public order (while the church

bells are accepted without any public dispute) . 282

Finally and notwithstanding all its exceptions, the rule of Germany's attitude to the

Muslim population is that its "inherited church-state institutions and practices have

structured the political agenda". The most significant obstacle to equality, at least in

that respect, is probably the lack of any state recognized Turkish-German religious

organizations, entailing both a financial and symbolic significance . 283

!Among organizations Turks are associated with, the members of religious associations

have the lowest number of contacts with Germans. Furthermore, particular

engagement in immigrant's religious or ethnic associations is met with great

suspicion . 284

Most notable was the formation of the fundamentalist mosque association founded by

the charismatic leader Kaplan, known as the Caliphate State. In 2004, the Islamic

association “Milli Görüs”, perceived by German authorities to be fundamentalist,

began being observed by the ‘Office responsible for the defending of the

constitution’ (internal intelligence service) . It should be noted, though, that 285

!110

Ibid, pg. 117, 119282

Ibid, pg. 127, 129283

Ibid, pg. 6284

Nobert (2005) pg. 24285

compared to non-members, those who are part of religious associations speak better

German and feel more like Germans . 286

Regarding membership in German native organizations and institutions, "immigrants

are absent or sharply underrepresented in leading positions " 287

!The community's involvement in "Diaspora" and "Immigrant" politics is both indirect

and direct. Indirect involvement includes the transference of money to Turkey.

Transferring money to the families remaining in Turkey was a reason of the

emigration of the first generation of immigrants. Donations to the homeland's

government and non-governmental organizations have increased since the 1980s, both

continuous and specific (for example, following the deadly 1999 earthquake) . The 288

transference of money to Turkey makes the Turks in Germany not only consistently

involved but also a potential pressure group in the homeland.

!Turks' membership in political associations began mainly in the early seventies in

response to the political situation in Turkey and focused on the homeland . In the 289

1970s there were four major organizations in Germany, "replicating the political

grouping in Turkey, itself" . In the 1980's, there was a decline in "Diaspora politics" 290

in favor of "Immigrant politics". Since 1983 there have been attempts at aggregating

the interests of the Turkish community in Germany itself by "umbrella organizations".

!111

Ibid, pg. 49286

Norbert (2005) pg. 49287

Ibid, pg. 39288

Ibid, pg. 41289

Soysal (1994) pg. 202290

These aim at representing smaller professionals, academics, trade-unionists, social

workers, and intellectuals . Some of them are invited to hearings and meetings in the 291

Länder's parliaments, and some are established as pressure groups calling for

recognition of minority rights and legislation that would allow dual-citizenship.

Umbrella organizations with an orientation to German national politics where founded

in the 90's. An example of this development is the foundation of the "Turkish

Community in Germany" in 1995 . 292

!As the political competition becomes tighter in the five-party system that make up the

Bundestag, the 1998 election was decided with a difference of 0.3%, all parties (apart

from extreme right-wing Bavarian CSU, and racist NDP and its partners) allow and

encourage membership of immigrants. The FDP's "Liberal Turkish-German Union",

the "Federation of Turkish Social-Democrats", the Grün Party's "Immigrün" and the

"German Turkish Union". Vural Öger, an example of a Turkish-German politician,

entered Germany in the early 1970s and established a successful travel business. In

the meantime, he became a social-democratic Member of the European Parliament. In

terms of publicity, his colleague Cem Özdemir is more prominent as a Bundestag

member of the Grün Party, and later member of the European parliament and

chairman of the party. He came to Germany as a child and became the most

prominent politician with immigration background in Baden-Württemberg and

Germany in general. Due to his charismatic appearance he has gained wide publicity

as German-Turk or Swabian-Turk. Emine Demirbüken became member of the federal

!112

Ibid, pg. 108291

Norbert (2005) pg. 42 292

executive board for the CDU, and Lale Akgün is a prominent Bundestag member of

the SPD fraction . 293

Party membership is low nevertheless (between 3-4%), and even that is accounted

mostly by membership in homeland-based Turkish parties. Only a similar percentage

of the migrant population would even consider becoming a party member.

In cities like Frankfurt am Main, Stuttgart or Munich, wherein over twenty percent of

the residents is excluded from political representation.

! A majority of Turkish immigrants claim they would have voted for the SPD (had 294

they been citizens), which may be explained by the fact that it was the first German

party and worker's organization open to non-Germans starting from the 19th century.

Similar data of the German Social Economic Panel confirms that the Social-

Democrats enjoy most support also among foreign citizens in general, with 86 % of

Italians and 68 % of Turks and former Yugoslavians . 295

In the last years politicians with immigrant background had taken on higher positions

in the party hierarchy and gained some public attention in most established parties.

Naturalized immigrants represent the German parties as members of the local, state,

federal and European parliaments, although they are still highly underrepresented.

Currently, only five members of the 2002-2005 Federal Parliament are immigrants of

foreign descent.

!113

Norbert (2005) pg. 51 293

Ibid, pg. 32294

Diehl and Blohm (2003) pg. 133295

Turks in Germany also take part quite extensively in various umbrella immigrant

organizations operating in Europe. A notable one is the Council of Associations of

Immigrants in Europe, which aims at realizing the rights of immigrant's communities

stated in the European Convention of Human Rights and the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights, and was involved with the Council of Europe, UNESCO, and the

European Community.

Özcan divides the organizational landscape with reference to their attached political

orientation in left wing and right wing groups. Religious Islamic associations are

generally categorized as right wing groups. Two separate associational landscapes

developed among the Turkish immigrant population, and affirm the aforementioned

claim that in the course of time the focus of interest has shifted from an exclusive

orientation on the homeland to an orientation on the affairs in the host land. This

process has affected the left wing groups more than the right wing ones, which kept a

rather segregating stance towards the native society.

!A final organization form to be reviewed is the Advisory Boards. These are semi-

formal advisory bodies existent in many Länder, recognized de facto if not de jure,

especially since the supreme federal court ruled against granting non-citizens with

voting rights in local elections. They are funded exclusively on a local basis, and most

of their participants are trade union representatives "or individuals chosen by [other]

migrant organizations" . 296

!114

Soysal (1994) pg. 78296

More than half of Turkish respondents in a survey did not even know of their

existence and voting participation for the councils is generally low , which is 297

probably perpetuated by but also perpetuating the councils' lack of real influence.

Nevertheless, of all immigrant groups it is the Turkish community participating in

Advisory Boards. Immigrants from Turkey are even overrepresented in the local

foreigners’ advisory boards.

!On the federal level, however, there is no such consultative participation of

migrants . The federal Commissioner for Foreigners (Ausländerbeauftragte) is 298

formally in charge of speaking out for the immigrants since 1979 . 299

!Trade unions were open for immigrants from the beginning of the recruitment of

foreign workers and represent their interests not only in the economic realm. The

trade union confederation actively lobbies for the rights of immigrants, the protection

of refugees and fair treatment of foreigners. Currently, about 10 % of the 7 million

union members are immigrants.

The worker's unions accepted immigration and founded special consultation and aid

offices for foreigners . Membership rates, however, are dropping among Turkish 300

respondents in the membership: since 1985 they have dropped from 51.4 % to 26.8 %

in 2001 . 301

!115

Norbet (2005) pg. 33297

Soysal (1994) pg. 82298

Thränhardt (1996) pg. 209299

Castles (2000) pg. 40-1300

Norbet (2005) pg. 35301

!5.4 Prevalence and Effects of Muslim Terror in Germany

Formally, German government officials work at facilitating inter-religious and cross-

cultural dialogue. Such was the case of Federal President, Johannes Rau, who would

regularly initiate meetings between various religious leaders. The dialogues were not

just inter-group but also intra-group dialogue. The city of Bremen, for example, has

become a role model to be emulated by others because of its successful inclusion of

all kinds of Muslim, Christian and Jewish organizations in the “Islam week”, during

which representatives from organizations ranging from the Islamist Milli Görüş to

secularized Alevi communities are supposed to "cooperate in order to enter into a

‘dialogue’ with the non-Muslim public."

The activities of organized Islam, however, are frequently observed with particular

suspicion for the fear of Islamic infiltration of the German society. Islam is often

equated with intolerance, suppression of women and totalitarian and fundamentalist

endeavors. Incidents like the 2001 terrorist attack against the World Trade Center, or

the recent killing of a Dutch film director, fuel the debate on immigration and national

identity in Germany with fears of international Islamic terrorism.

In December 2001 new legislation increased not only funds for the police force but

also their powers of investigating and even shutting down suspicious bodies such as

religious organizations which are not conforming to constitutional norms "[the] bright

Bremen public image was stained somewhat when it became known that one of the

regular visitors to one of the inner-city mosques had been detained by the U.S.

military at Guantanamo Bay, charged with ties to the former Taliban regime and the

terrorist Al Qaeda. Nonetheless, in the respected Bremen mosque this sparked an

!116

intra-Muslim debate about the relationship of religion and politics, and more nuanced

newspaper reporting on the diverse views held in Muslim communities and

organizations on this crucial issue" . 302

The first reactions following the 2001 attack in New York also called out to halt the

implementation of the new immigration law because "governing and opposition

parties could not agree on tighter checks upon applicants for citizenship" . 303

This marks the clear generalization of all Muslims, sometimes called Islamophobia 304

regardless of their background: Al-Qaeda Afghanis in New York, a Kurdish refugee

and a Turkish worker are easily equated.

Germany sometimes is, indeed, a target of terrorism because of its participation in

peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan and in police training in Iraq.

For example, in February 1999 a crowd of Kurdish immigrants stormed the Israeli

embassy in Berlin, while protesting the arrest of their leader .305

In another case, years of procedural maneuvers were required before the German

judicial system finally succeeded in deporting an Islamic extremist, the so-called

“Caliph of Cologne,” to Turkey in October 2004. In yet another case, a Syrian-

German terrorist suspect was released from custody in July 2005 after the German

Supreme Court ruled that he could not be extradited to Spain under a European Union

arrest warrant because this step would violate Germany’s Basic Law.

Following al Qaeda’s September 11, 2001, terrorist attack against the United States,

Germans were surprised to learn that the mastermind of the strike and several

!117

Ibid, pg. 11-15302

Faist (2005) pg. 5303

Halevi (2008) pg. 3304

Koopmans and Statham (2000) pg. 2305

accomplices previously had been living in Hamburg. Since then, Germany has been a

reliable partner in the U.S.-led war on terrorism, according to the U.S. Department of

State. German courts have a very high standard of habeas corpus, which has made it

difficult for authorities to convict or deport terrorist suspects. In February 2003, a

Hamburg court convicted Mounir el Motassadeq of aiding and abetting the conspiracy

and sentenced him to the maximum available term of 15 years. However, in March

2004, the German Supreme Court overturned this conviction, which was the first in

the world related to the 9/11 incident, for lack of evidence and remanded the case for

retrial. Finally in August 2005, a Hamburg court re-convicted el Motassadeq and

sentenced him to a seven-year prison term.

More recently in September 2007, Germany authorities arrested three suspects in an

alleged terrorist plot to stage bomb attacks on U.S. citizens at the U.S. military base in

Ramstein and at Frankfurt International Airport. Two of the three individuals were

ethnic German citizens, and the third was a Turkish resident in Germany. The two

ethnic Germans had received training at terrorist camps in Pakistan. The foiled plot

raised fears of homegrown terrorism in Germany involving the recruitment of

Germans by Islamist organizations.

These isolated cases sometimes promote an explanation of integration problems with

their own reluctance to accept Western values and their propensity to retreat to

(violent) ‘parallel societies’. This term suggests that immigrants actively and

deliberately segregate, refuse to acquire basic cultural techniques such as language,

and substance (pluralism, gender equality, etc.). This is used to account for their "high

rates of unemployment" and being chronic "social assistance receivers" . While this 306

!118

Norbert (2005) pg. 16306

claim may hold some truth, its totality makes certain decision makers ignore the part

of the state in perpetuating an integration of these parallel societies and puts the

weight entirely on the immigrants.

Also, a balanced appraisal of immigration and security cannot overlook that

sometimes immigrants themselves are those interested in dismantling terrorist groups.

For example, it was Arab-background immigrants who helped French police to

dismantle the Armed Islamic Group in 1995. Such evidence comes from Turkish

immigrants in Germany as they assist in the containment of the Kurdish PKK . 307

!The organizational patterns of Turks in Germany are not unequivocal: While

membership is relatively low in parties and Advisory Boards (membership and voting

rates) on both federal and local levels, they are high in religious organizations and

other intra-community organizations. Perhaps as long as the Turkish community

remains a "victimized group", at least in its own mind, it is not likely to have an effect

on national and international politics . Instead, it is likely to suffer relatively quietly, 308

a status bound to change once it rids itself of the passive consciousness.

Turkish immigrants, however, do participate more prominently than other minorities

in Germany in formal politics. Their political orientation is usually for SPD, which

may have something to do also with the high rates of membership in workers' unions.

Another important pattern of political participation is still in "Diaspora politics",

meaning in the affairs of the homeland.

!119

Faist (2005) pg. 8-9 307

Moore (2002) pg. 6308

The constitution usually allows civil and communal participation for all residents,

regardless of their ethnicity or citizen/non-citizen status. In practice, there is frequent

exclusion of immigrants from politics, and an unequal treatment of their religious

needs. This is particularly true for Islam – not only a minority's religion, but one that

attracts prejudices and phobias on a European and even global level .309

!For the research purpose of assessing the effect of the 2000 reform of citizenship law,

and explaining the decrease in naturalization rates, the general investigation of this

chapter cannot be sufficient. Because Turkish immigrants in Germany are not

represented by a single or even known number of organizations or representatives, it

cannot be expected to gather sufficient and accurate information on this group, as may

be gathered about German citizens through their voting patterns, and the policies that

their elected representatives promote.

A survey conducted in Baden-Württemberg is the necessary final step for assessing

the effects of the reformed citizenship law.

!

!120

Halevi (2008) pg. 1-2309

!6. Naturalization & Integration: Empirical Effects

6.1 Details of the survey

Implementation of immigrant policy lies in the responsibility of the federal states , 310

which also budget their integration policies. Consequently this work cannot focus on

the effects of the 2000 citizenship law on the FRG as a whole, but rather on one of its

Länder. Future research should definitely use larger samples and conduct the survey

in all Länder, in order to obtain an overall assessment of the effects of the law on the

Turkish immigrant population. A representative survey would have been ideal to

realize the positions of residents from Turkey in Baden-Württemberg, since Turkish

immigrants have no official representation in Germany. The scope of this research

made it impossible to collect a sufficient sample for a quantitative survey.

To measure the effectiveness of the 2000 reform, the correlation between integration

and the perceived desirability of the German citizenship was measured. This is

because it was assumed by the legislator that liberalizing the citizenship law would

enhance integration (while the conservatives claimed the opposite to be true: that only

strict conditions for naturalization would enhance integration). The questionnaire

consists of items that operationalize theories from the relevant literature, and explain

the possible deterrents and positive elements in the 2000 reform. These theories can

be confirmed or dismissed with the suggested questionnaire.

The survey sampled 21 Turkish residents (citizens and non-citizens). The participants

were recruited in several locations: mosque, university, restaurants and other small

businesses. It was distributed both in German and Turkish . 311

!121

Norbert (2005) pg. 19310

See the appendix following chapter 8311

The questionnaires were distributed between 2nd of April and the 2nd of May 2009.

The results from the sample in this research indicate strong trends among the

respondents, but more elaborate ties and correlations should be deduced only from a

larger sample.

Demographic questions (1, 30-35) make the questionnaires available for examining

correlations which are not directly connected to the current research question. Of

these, the only datum that was significant to this work is whether the respondent is a

citizen or a non-citizen, since measuring the correlation between integration and the

desirability of the German citizenship is clearly linked to the respondent's citizenship.

The results of the questionnaire can be generalized to Baden-Württemberg, since

immigration and naturalization policies are within the Länder's authority.

It should be noted that Switzerland is included as an option in many parts of the

questionnaire due to Konstanz's proximity to the border, as it was important not to

include immigrants from Switzerland in an assessment of German policies. In future

use of the questionnaire in other cities, references to Switzerland should thus be

omitted. A clear disadvantage of the questionnaire is that it cannot separate working

immigrants from refugees (Kurds from Turkey), since referring to the refugee status

proved to be embarrassing to respondents in previous versions of the questionnaire.

Perhaps in future use of the questionnaire, this information could be indirectly

obtained, as policies towards working immigrants and refugees are probably different.

!

!122

6.2 The questions

Questions 1 and 29-35 provide standard demographic data:

1. Are you a German citizen? 29. Gender 30. Age 31. What is your education? 32. What is your profession? 33. In which country do you live? 34. Where do your children grow up? 35. Where were your children born? !Items 5-28 consist of statements to which participants indicate their level of

agreement ranging from "completely disagree" to "completely agree".

!Items 2-13 measure integration:

2.1 Are you a member of a trade union? !2.2 If “no”, have you ever been a member in of a trade union, or are you planning to join a trade union? !3.1 Do you think that your children will live in Germany, Turkey, or somewhere else? !3.2 Do you think that your grandchildren will live in Germany, Turkey or somewhere else? !4.1 Do you want your children to later live in Germany, Turkey, or somewhere else? !4.2 Do you want your grandchildren to later live in Germany, Turkey or somewhere else? !5.1 I speak German fluently !5.2 I read German fluently !5.3 German is my language !6. My house and my neighbourhood are a closed German community !7. At my work/ at school, I mostly speak Turkish

!123

!8. I spend my free time in places where there are mostly German speaker !9. I feel at home where my workplace is !10. I feel at home where I raise my children !11. I feel at home in Germany !12. I feel at home where most people have the same religion as I do !13. I feel at home where most people speak my language !!Items 14-28 measure the desirability of naturalization and German citizenship:

14. I would not mind taking to take a government test (citizenship test) about German history and form of government !15. I would not mind to take the language test that the German government requires me to do !16. When I see how Germans treat Islam I have little desire to become a German citizen !17. It is not worth making an effort to become a German citizen because it does not really give me more rights !18. Turkish children that receive German citizenship are better at school !19. It matters to me that I lose rights in Turkey if I become a German citizen !20. I am proud to be a Turkish citizen !21. I am interested in German Länder- and federal politics !22. The application fees for German citizenship are to high !23. It is easy to obtain information about how to apply for German citizenship !24. When I have to deal with bureaucracy in Germany I feel bad !25. For non citizens, bureaucracy in Germany is more complicated !

!124

26. Also as a German citizen, people in Germany will look at me differently because I talk and/or dress differently !27. It is important for me to have the right to vote in Germany !28. It is important for me to be able to travel to other countries as easily as German citizens !6.3 Analysis of the possible results

The results of the survey can reveal one of four possible combinations:

!Option I would suggest that the current decrease in applications for citizenship is

only temporary, and that the overall effect of Germany's interior policy has been

positive.

* It would erode the repeated claims against the current naturalization process, from

those by Castles and Blatter for dual citizenship, to Soper's analysis of insufficient

formal recognition and support of Muslim institutions.

Option I

High degree of integration and

perceived desirability of citizenship

Option II

Low degree of integration and majority of

factors that encourage application for

citizenship

Option III

High degree of integration and majority

of factors that deter from application

for citizenship

Option IV

Low degree of integration and majority of

factors that deter from application for

citizenship

!125

* Politically it would suggest that the Red-Green reforms in naturalization policy

were successful, and that they were a complementary component in promoting

integration.

* Such a result could encourage the current and future governments to further ease the

conditions for German citizenship and advance towards the Left and Free Democrats

parties' policies.

Option II would suggest that although the Turkish immigrants do not feel a part of

German society, citizenship is nevertheless a highly regarded asset.

* It would erode Soysal's claim that citizenship has lost its significance in the post-

world-war democracy, where rights are equally granted to all residents.

If Soysal was correct, it would mean that only those who feel a part of the society

would pursue a German citizenship. This finding would suggest that citizenship is

interpreted by non-integrated immigrants as a means to gain more rights.

* Politically it would mean that the conservative objection to the reforms in

naturalization was well-founded, since accessible citizenship does not enhance

integration.

* Such a result could encourage the current and future governments to promote

integration by broader policies, and that (assuming that citizenship should be granted

only to fully integrated and loyal residents and that it is not some a form of

commodity which enhances integration) naturalization policies should remain strict or

even become stricter.

Option III would suggest one of the following:

!126

It could mean that citizenship is generally desired and perceived as complementary to

the integration process undergone by Turkish immigrants. In that case, the criticism

against various factors in the naturalization process should be further examined.

* It could support various types of opposition to the process: from Blatter and Castles

in the argument for dual citizenship, to Soper's analysis of insufficient formal support

of Muslim institution.

* Politically it would mean that the CSU restraining of the red-green naturalization

reforms in 1999 resulted in an unsuccessful reform in 2000 that essentially maintains

the overly restrictive process required from well-integrated Turkish immigrants.

* Such a result could encourage the current and future governments to make the

process of naturalization more attractive: by marketing it through a public campaign,

getting rid of some red-tape associated with the process, etc.

It could mean, on the other hand, that citizenship is viewed as not highly significant

by immigrants, supporting Soysal's theory.

* Politically it would mean that the conservative opposition to citizenship reforms

was redundant, and even cast doubts on the notion of citizenship in the 21st century

nation-state. Future naturalization policies could, accordingly, be less associated with

national homogeneity.

Option IV would mean one of the following:

It could mean that integration is linked with citizenship, and that since the first isn't

fully realized yet, the latter is not pursued by eligible immigrants.

It could mean, on the other hand, that integration is not linked with citizenship, and

that the latter is simply not perceived as meaningful – not in gaining equal rights to

citizens and/or complementing their residential status with political power.

!127

* The reformed naturalization process would appear to have been prematurely

executed, or even wholly redundant, since its goals were to enhance an integration

which did not take place in the first place.

!6.4 The results

* Question 2: Only three respondents are members of trade unions. This was

surprising, as Nobert's data indicated that worker-unions are the most common form

of organization among residents of Turkish origin. Citizen respondents are more

interested in joining a trade union. This may imply a stronger inclination to integrate

among citizens.

* Questions 3 and 4: Most respondents expect and want both their children and

grandchildren to live in Germany. This tendency is much weaker among non-citizens.

This too may imply a stronger inclination to integrate among citizens, assuming that

an expectation and interest to stay in Germany signifies integration.

* Question 5: Command of the German language is the most consistently mentioned

criterion for integration: has been prevalent in the conditions for naturalization

throughout Germany's history and in the agenda of most of its parties. It also

presented as a central criterion for naturalization by the Ministry of Interior. The

importance of good command of the German language is thus obvious. The results of

question 5 indicate that most respondents feel very comfortable and even identify

with the language.

* Questions 6-8: To integrate means also to live and associate with the native

Germans. The respondents replied that they mostly do not limit their social life to the

Turkish community, both in work/studies and in leisure.

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* Questions 7-13: It was assumed that to be integrated, one must not feel alienated

towards Germany, and that if one sees a home in Germany then he/she is integrated.

The results indicate that at least in their family environment, the respondents feel at

home in Germany. In the workplace there is a smaller prevalence of that feeling. Also

the different majority religion causes respondents to feel less at home in Germany.

Nevertheless, the general trend indicates that the respondents identify with Germany

as their home: only four respondents answered otherwise when asked directly.

* Questions 14 and 15: The language- and knowledge tests to acquire citizenship have

been the source of public ridicule , but also of the failure of many naturalization 312

applications . The test was therefore expected to be a deterrent from applying for 313

German citizenship. The willingness to take the government test (in language and

general knowledge about Germany) does indeed create a lot of antagonism. The

results strengthen the criticism of the test, and encourage a reassessment of it, as it

seems to deter also residents who proved to be well integrated.

* Question 16: Fetzer and Soper claim that the way Islam is treated by the state and

society, namely being unrecognized as a formal religion, is a cause of resentment

among Turkish residents. The survey's results confirm that claim. Recognizing Islam

as a formal religion in Germany (like Catholicism, Protestantism and Judaism ) could

therefore decrease the antagonism of many residents of Turkish origin towards

German citizenry.

* Question 17: Soysal claims that gaining more rights is no longer a motivation for

foreigners to obtain citizenship. Nevertheless, more than half of the respondents feel

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Germany to introduce Controversial New Citizenship Test: http://www.spiegel.de/international/312

germany/0,1518,559021,00.html

in the first three months of 2000 one-fifth failed the language tests: Ludvig (2004) pg. 507-8313

that German citizenship entitles them to more rights. The ones who completely

disagree with that notion are already citizens. Therefore as long as non-citizens

perceive naturalization as a means to get more rights, Soysal's theory may be

dismissed.

* Question 18: Castles claims that non-citizens are categorically discriminated in the

school system. Since sixteen of the respondents feel that children are not benefiting in

school when their parents are citizens, the results do not support this claim. The state

should therefore not link its education policies and system to its naturalization

policies.

* Question 19: Mandel claims that most non-citizens are deterred from naturalization,

because of their fear of losing rights in Turkey . While the respondents with 314

citizenship do not mind losing rights in Turkey, the contrary is true for non-citizens.

The government should campaign to raise awareness of such arrangements as the

Pink Card, which allows giving up the Turkish passport but maintaining crucial rights

in Turkey.

* Question 20: It is assumed that as long as dual-citizenship is not allowed in

Germany, people who are proud of their Turkish citizenship will be deterred from

applying for a German one. Indeed, there is much pride in being a Turkish citizen

among those without Geman citizenship. This means that the demand to give up the

Turkish citizenship and not allowing dual-citizenship is a deterrent from applying for

naturalization, and should be reconsidered.

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Such as losing out on inheritance: see Ludvig (2004) pg. 510-11 314

* Questions 21 and 27: An interest in German local and federal politics may be an

incentive to naturalize. While there is no such tendency for interest in politics, all

respondents with citizenship answered that the right to vote is highly important to

them. The non-citizens did not follow a clear trend. These results can be interpreted as

that implies that the 2000 reform was effective: citizenship correlates with an

enhanced political consciousness, and a democracy undoubtedly needs a politically

involved citizenry.

* Question 22-25: It is assumed that red-tape on the way to knowing about

naturalization, getting government services, and/or a feeling that citizens have it

easier with bureaucracy than non-citizens, can be a deterring or encouraging factor for

naturalization. However, most respondents do not find the application fees too high

(and those who do are mostly citizens already). Generally, both citizen and non citizen

Turks feel that information about how to naturalize is fairly accessible. Not one non-

citizen respondent perceives the bureaucracy in Germany as too complicated or

difficult to deal with. The same applies to how bureaucracy is perceived by citizens as

well as non-citizens. This suggests that neither government bureaucracy nor the fees

involved in naturalization are significant in deterring or encouraging naturalization. 315

It may also mean that the reduction of application fees since the early nineties was an

effective policy. Furthermore, it implies that Germany is effective and fair in its

services to both groups, and to those of no German descent in general.

* Question 26: It is assumed that the 17,000 racist assaults on foreigners only in 2007

are a deterrent from wanting to adopt the German citizenship. 10 out of 12 non-citizen

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Fees of 250 Euros, required to register foreigners' children as Germans, are a possible deterrent: 315

ibid, pg. 508.

respondents indeed perceive citizenship as useless to improve the way they are

viewed by native Germans (due to their "foreign appearance" and/or language). This

means that the government needs to supplement the naturalization policies with more

education for tolerance among the German native population. This is especially true

when considering the ongoing racist assaults on foreigners across the country.

* Question 28: One of the rights that permanent residents without a German passport

do not enjoy is the right to travel abroad freely and easily. Indeed, all respondents but

one state that citizenship is very important for them to travel abroad more easily. This

point is especially important since it does not appear in the available literature. For a

government that wishes to alter the decline in applications for citizenship, it is

recommended to campaign for naturalization by stressing the advantage of easy

travelling.

!!In conclusion of the results:

Regarding integration: it seems that the sample is quite integrated, with a stronger

level of integration among citizens.

Regarding the way citizenship is viewed, it seems that while the bureaucratic services

encourage naturalization, other government policies (such as the citizenship tests or

the treatment of Islam) can frequently deter non-citizens from naturalization. There is

no apparent correlation between the level of integration and the opposition to these

policies, since although many respondents are integrated they are still considering the

German citizenship to be undesirable because of these policies. Finally, Soysal's

theory is unconvincing. Most of those without citizenship do believe that it grants

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more rights than those granted by the permanent residence permit, and an actual

distinct feature of the German passport (the ability to travel abroad) makes it

especially desirable.

The results indicate that specific policies adopted with the 2000 reform are deterring

residents of Turkish origin to apply for the German passport. In order to reverse the

decline in applications, the government should revise those policies.

!!

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7. Conclusion and Recommendations

An early definition of German citizenry refers exclusively to "the adherents to the

states that form the German Empire" . What is it that makes one person more 316

naturally an adherent, but another - say, a Jew, a Pole, a Russian, a Turk or even a

woman - less?

This work has analyzed the historical milestones that led to the current German

citizenship law, and assessed their effectiveness. Germany is a country with a

tradition of highly exclusionary citizenship laws, but that has nevertheless allowed

and encouraged outsiders to enter its territories since its genesis.

To understand this tradition of exclusion, the work started with an analysis and

deconstruction of the basic terms and concepts connected of the relevant discourse.

This was necessary as criticism of the current reformed citizenship law echoed this

tradition only with murky terms, such as "identity", "nation" and "descent" (or

"German blood"), "national-identity" and "Leitkultur". As these terms and concepts

are not only philosophical but also political, their practical function is examined also.

If identity is the essence that goes unchanged through time, then national identity

assumes that such an essence is inherent in the peoples of the world.

The German national identity not only gives meaning to the lives of those who share

it, but it also serves real political and economic needs by aggregating the people in the

case of a national war and to regulate the market.

Immigrants have been a part of the German landscape throughout its entire history.

During the last century, they were used to aid the economy in times of growth, after

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Gosewinkel (2002) pg. 61316

which they would be dispatched. While some of them did settle down and assimilate,

most of them returned willingly to their homelands and families.

Naturalization, or the total acceptance of the immigrant into the nation, was therefore

the exception. After 1945 the need for a more specialized and steady migrant work

force increased, and both employers and employees petitioned the government to

prolong their work and residence permits.

Parallel to the changes in the demands of the economy, the concept of the nation also

significantly altered. After the crimes of the German people in the Second World War,

the nation state could no longer enforce a severely exclusionary policy, and

consequently it granted almost entirely equal rights to immigrants.

This led to the formation of immigrants' communities, such as the Turkish one, which

now makes up almost five percent of the whole population in Germany. Nevertheless,

the shift in the openness of the nation to non-Germans was only partial and remains

today. When Turkish and other immigrants united with their families in Germany, it

was threatening to the spirit of the nation. The German people had to choose between

secluding the immigrants' communities, or to make considerable changes in their

national identity in order to include them. The Germans chose exclusion: an option

that was politically, economically and socially almost costless.

After exclusionary policies had failed and the number of foreigners in the country was

peaking, a policy of inclusion was adopted by the Kohl government, making

naturalization easier. The 2000 change of the citizenship law was meant to reform not

only the law, but to completely alter the national identity: had dual citizenship and jus

soli been granted categorically to residents not of the German ethnos, then the

German nationality would have become obsolete.

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The German party system embraced the agenda for and against permissive

naturalization, and the current law is the result of a compromised left wing vision.

Considering these historical and political causes of the reform in Germany's

citizenship law, its socio-political effects are not surprising.

From an overview of the Turkish community, it is clear that no policy could instantly

overturn the effects of decades of deliberate and consistent exclusionary policies.

The Turkish community was perceived by the public, media and parts of the political

system as a threat to the economy in times of recession, but more profoundly as a

danger to the völkisch tendencies that still prevail in the German nationality. The

racism that is still targeted at them, their poor (German) language skills, the way

Islam is perceived, and their children's "naturally reserved" place in the Hauptschule,

are all factors that prevent integration and enhance alienation. This cannot be

expected to be instantly reversed by any law, let alone by a compromised law that

antagonizes Turks in its own right, and has resulted in a decreasing rate of

naturalizations.

More constructive and specific recommendations to achieve the goal of the legislator

arise from the survey detailed in chapter 6. Since all the respondents turned out to be

quite integrated, it was not possible to measure with the full scope of correlations

between integration and desirability of the German citizenship.

There is a clear trend of strong opposition to certain policies entailed by the law, such

as the citizenship test or the refusal of dual citizenship. If the legislator truly wishes to

move from an exclusionary to an inclusionary citizenship policy, then those who are

integrated should be naturalized rather then deterred by a government test or by

having to give up their Turkish citizenship.

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Citizenship is still perceived by non-citizens as a means to get more rights. This not

only contradicts certain new theories about transnational citizenship, but also can

become a pull factor by the government to attract more non-citizens to naturalize.

With that, it should be noted that the non-citizens respondents are not interested in

naturalization only to get more rights in the country, but also in order to participate in

the democratic process, since they mostly cherish the right to vote and already have

some interest in local and federal policies.

Other changes in policies could promote integration and naturalization in the longer

run, by working to suppress racism and acknowledging Islam as an official religion,

alongside Catholicism, Protestantism, and Judaism.

Finally, the law that was accepted in 2000 misses out on its goal of enhancing

integration by making the nation more inclusionary. Based on a historical analysis and

deconstruction of a vague term such as "integration", it seems that the government has

adopted policies (like the citizenship test) that do not properly measure if applicants

for citizenship are integrated. Consequently many integrated non-citizens were

antagonized about the law and German citizenship in general.

!Future research should: 1) survey the effects of the citizenship law on the Turkish

community in all Länder. The questionnaire designed for and used in this work can

serve as a basis for surveying a larger and more representative sample; 2) investigate

more migrant groups in Germany: since the Turkish group is the biggest, but not the

only ethnic group affected by the 2000 reform.

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If these two recommendations are followed, the preliminary conclusions and

suggestions for policy making of this research can be accepted and hopefully

broadened, and help for their implementation.

!138

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* The Guardian: Harding, L. (15.3.2006). German Birth Rates Falls to Lowest in Europe": http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/mar/15/germany.lukeharding * Full text of the Single European Act (1986) and Treaty on European Union (1992): http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm

!8.3 Other sources * Prof. K. Hailbronner in an interview at the University of Konstanz, 10.12.2008: recording available upon request. * Results of questionnaire distributed amongst twenty residents originally from Turkey: filled out questionnaires available upon request. !

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Appendix Abbreviations and key terms in German Aussiedler: ethnic Germans granted the right to return to Germany, especially from the former USSR. CDU/CSU: Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union Party (conservatives) FDP: The Free Democratic Party (liberals) FRG: Federal Republic of Germany GDR: the former German Democratic Republic Grün Party: the Green Party Länder: The FRG is divided into 16 federal states (lands). Länder is the plural form. Leitkultur ("dominant culture"): naturalization conditioned with a common culture instead of descent. SPD: the Social Democratic Party of Germany !!Questionnaire in English !Dear Participants, !My name is Tal Harris and I am conducting a study about the Turkish community in Konstanz for my master thesis at the University of Konstanz. Please answer the following questions as exact as possible. Some of the questions consist of statements, and we ask you to indicate to which degree you agree with that statement. If no answer expresses exactly what you think, please choose the answer that comes closest to your opinion. Please make a cross in the respective circle. There are no right- or wrong answers, since every person has a right to his/ her own opinions. Of course all results will be handled anonymously. Thank you very much for your time to fill out this questionnaire. We hope that the results will contribute to a better understanding of Turkish life in Germany. !1. Are you a German citizen? o o Yes No !2.1. Are you a member of a trade union? o o Yes No !2.2. If “no”, have you ever been a member in of a trade union, or are you planning to join a trade union? o o Yes No !3.1. Do you think that your children will live in Germany, Turkey, or somewhere else? o o o 1) Germany; 2) Turkey; 3) other !3.2. Do you think that your grandchildren will live in Germany, Turkey or somewhere else? o o o 1) Germany; 2) Turkey; 3) other !4.1. Do you want your children to later live in Germany, Turkey, or somewhere else? o o o 1) Germany; 2) Turkey; 3) other !4.2. Do you want your grandchildren to later live in Germany, Turkey or somewhere else? o o o 1) Germany; 2) Turkey; 3) other !Please answer whether you agree or disagree with the following statements

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!5.1. I speak German fluently o o o o 1) Completely disagree; 2) quite disagree; 3) quite agree; 4) Completely agree !5.2. I read German fluently o o o o 1) Completely disagree; 2) quite disagree; 3) quite agree; 4) Completely agree !5.3. German is my language o o o o 1) Completely disagree; 2) quite disagree; 3) quite agree; 4) Completely agree !6. My house and my neighbourhood are a closed German community o o o o 1) Completely disagree; 2) quite disagree; 3) quite agree; 4) Completely agree !7. At my work/ at school, I mostly speak Turkish o o o o 1) Completely disagree; 2) quite disagree; 3) quite agree; 4) Completely agree !8. I spend my free time in places where there are mostly German speaker o o o o 1) Completely disagree; 2) quite disagree; 3) quite agree; 4) Completely agree !9. I feel at home where my workplace is o o o o 1) Completely disagree; 2) quite disagree; 3) quite agree; 4) Completely agree !10. I feel at home where I raise my children o o o o 1) Completely disagree; 2) quite disagree; 3) quite agree; 4) Completely agree 11. I feel at home in Germany o o o o 1) Completely disagree; 2) quite disagree; 3) quite agree; 4) Completely agree 12. I feel at home where most people have the same religion as I do o o o o 1) Completely disagree; 2) quite disagree; 3) quite agree; 4) Completely agree !13. I feel at home where most people speak my language o o o o 1) Completely disagree; 2) quite disagree; 3) quite agree; 4) Completely agree !!The following 12 statements refer to the process of naturalization in Germany !14. I would not mind taking to take a government test (citizenship test) about German history and form of government o o o o 1) Completely disagree; 2) quite disagree; 3) quite agree; 4) Completely agree !15. I would not mind to take the language test that the German government requires me to do o o o o 1) Completely disagree; 2) quite disagree; 3) quite agree; 4) Completely agree !16. When I see how Germans treat Islam I have little desire to become a German citizen o o o o 1) Completely disagree; 2) quite disagree; 3) quite agree; 4) Completely agree !17. It is not worth making an effort to become a German citizen because it does not really give me more rights

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o o o o 1) Completely disagree; 2) quite disagree; 3) quite agree; 4) Completely agree !18. Turkish children that receive German citizenship are better at school o o o o 1) Completely disagree; 2) quite disagree; 3) quite agree; 4) Completely agree !19. It matters to me that I lose rights in Turkey if I become a German citizen o o o o 1) Completely disagree; 2) quite disagree; 3) quite agree; 4) Completely agree !20. I am proud to be a Turkish citizen o o o o 1) Completely disagree; 2) quite disagree; 3) quite agree; 4) Completely agree; 5) I o am not a Turkish citizen !21. I am interested in German Länder- and federal politics o o o o 1) Completely disagree; 2) quite disagree; 3) quite agree; 4) Completely agree !22. The application fees for German citizenship are to high o o o o 1) Completely disagree; 2) quite disagree; 3) quite agree; 4) Completely agree !23. It is easy to obtain information about how to apply for German citizenship o o o o 1) Completely disagree; 2) quite disagree; 3) quite agree; 4) Completely agree !24. When I have to deal with bureaucracy in Germany I feel bad o o o o 1) Completely disagree; 2) quite disagree; 3) quite agree; 4) Completely agree !25. For non citizens, bureaucracy in Germany is more complicated o o o o 1) Completely disagree; 2) quite disagree; 3) quite agree; 4) Completely agree !26. Also as a German citizen, people in Germany will look at me differently because I talk and/or dress differently o o o o 1) Completely disagree; 2) quite disagree; 3) quite agree; 4) Completely agree !27. It is important for me to have the right to vote in Germany o o o o 1) Completely disagree; 2) quite disagree; 3) quite agree; 4) Completely agree !28. It is important for me to be able to travel to other countries as easily as German citizens o o o o 1) Completely disagree; 2) quite disagree; 3) quite agree; 4) Completely agree !29. Gender o o Male Female !30. Age: ___ !31. What is your education? o o o 1) No education; 2) Basic school; 3) Basic school (Hauptschule) graduate; o o 4) Secondary school level I certificate; 5) Advanced technical college entrance o qualification; 4) Diploma from secondary school qualifying for university admission;

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o 5) University degree 32. What is your profession? o o o o 1) Student; 2) Employee; 3) Currently I am unemployed; 4) Pensioner; 5) Other 33. In which country do you live? o o o o o 1) Germany; 2) Switzerland; 3) Turkey; 4) Other; 5) Currently I am unemployed !34. Where do your children grow up? o o o o o 1) Germany; 2) Switzerland; 3) Turkey; 4) Other; 5) I have no children !35. Where were your children born? o o o o o 1) Germany; 2) Switzerland; 3) Turkey; 4) Other; 5) I have no children !!!Questionnaire in German !Liebe Teilnehmer und Teilnehmerinnen, !mein Name ist Tal Harris und ich führe eine Studie über die türkische Gemeinde in Konstanz im Rahmen meiner Masterarbeit an der Universität Konstanz durch. Bitte beantworten Sie die folgenden Fragen so genau wie möglich. Einige Fragen bestehen aus Aussagen, und wir bitt Falls keine Antw Sie anzugeben, ort genau das ausdrückt, was Sie denken, wählen Sie bitte die Antwort die dies am ehesten ausdrückt. Machen Sie dafür ein Kreuz in dem entsprechenden Kreis. Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten, da jeder Mensch ein Recht auf seine eigenen Anschauungen hat. Selbstverständlich werden alle Ergebnisse vertraulich behandelt. Vielen Dank für Ihre Zeit, diesen Fragebogen auszufüllen. Wir hoffen, dass die Ergebnisse dazu beitragen werden, türkisch Leben in Deutschland besser zu verstehen. !1. Sind Sie deutsche/r Staatsbürger/in? o o Ja Nein !2.1. Sind Sie Mitglied in einer Gewerkschaft? o o Ja Nein !2.2. Falls “nein”, waren Sie jemals Mitglied in einer Gewerkschaft, oder planen Sie, einer Gewerkschaft beizutreten? o o Ja Nein !3.1. Denken Sie, dass Ihre Kinder später in Deutschland, in der Türkei oder woanders leben werden? o o o 1) Deutschland; 2) Türkei; 3) woanders !3.2. Denken Sie, dass Ihre Enkelkinder in Deutschland, in der Türkei oder woanders leben werden? o o o 1) Deutschland; 2) Türkei; 3) woanders !4.1. Möchten Sie, dass Ihre Kinder später in Deutschland, in der Türkei oder woanders leben werden? o o o 1) Deutschland; 2) Türkei; 3) woanders !4.2. Möchten Sie, dass Ihre Enkelkinder in Deutschland, in der Türkei oder woanders leben werden? o o o 1) Deutschland; 2) Türkei; 3) woanders

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!Bitte geben Sie an, ob Sie den folgenden Aussagen zustimmen oder nicht !5.1. Ich spreche fließend deutsch o o o o 1) stimme gar nicht zu; 2) stimme ein wenig zu; 3) stimme zu; 4) stimme völlig zu 5.2. Ich lese fließend deutsch o o o o 1) stimme gar nicht zu; 2) stimme ein wenig zu; 3) stimme zu; 4) stimme völlig zu !5.3. Deutsch ist meine Sprache o o o o 1) stimme gar nicht zu; 2) stimme ein wenig zu; 3) stimme zu; 4) stimme völlig zu !6. Mein Haus und meine Nachbarschaft sind eine geschlossene türkische Gemeinde o o o o 1) stimme gar nicht zu; 2) stimme ein wenig zu; 3) stimme zu; 4) stimme völlig zu !7. Bei der Arbeit/ in der Schule spreche ich meistens türkisch o o o o 1) stimme gar nicht zu; 2) stimme ein wenig zu; 3) stimme zu; 4) stimme völlig zu !8. Ich verbringe meine Freizeit an Orten, wo die meisten Leute deutsch sprechen o o o o 1) stimme gar nicht zu; 2) stimme ein wenig zu; 3) stimme zu; 4) stimme völlig zu !9. Wo ich arbeite, da bin ich zu Hause o o o o 1) stimme gar nicht zu; 2) stimme ein wenig zu; 3) stimme zu; 4) stimme völlig zu !10. Ich fühle mich da zu Hause, wo ich meine Kinder groß ziehe o o o o 1) stimme gar nicht zu; 2) stimme ein wenig zu; 3) stimme zu; 4) stimme völlig zu 11. Ich fühle mich in Deutschland zu Hause o o o o 1) stimme gar nicht zu; 2) stimme ein wenig zu; 3) stimme zu; 4) stimme völlig zu 12. Ich fühle mich da zu Hause, wo die meisten Leute dieselbe Religion haben wie ich o o o o 1) stimme gar nicht zu; 2) stimme ein wenig zu; 3) stimme zu; 4) stimme völlig zu !13. Ich fühle mich da zu Hause, wo die meisten Leute meine Sprache sprechen o o o o 1) stimme gar nicht zu; 2) stimme ein wenig zu; 3) stimme zu; 4) stimme völlig zu !!Die folgenden 12 Aussagen beziehen sich auf die Beantragung der deutschen Staatsbürgerschaft !14. Es würde mir nichts ausmachen, einen Test von der Regierung (Einbürgerungs/ Staatsbürgerschaftstest) über deutsche Geschichte und Staatsform zu machen o o o o 1) stimme gar nicht zu; 2) stimme ein wenig zu; 3) stimme zu; 4) stimme völlig zu !15. Es würde mir nichts ausmachen, den Sprachtest zu machen, den die deutsche Regierung von mir verlangt o o o o 1) stimme gar nicht zu; 2) stimme ein wenig zu; 3) stimme zu; 4) stimme völlig zu !16. Wenn ich sehe, wie Deutsche mit dem Islam umgehen, habe ich weniger Lust, deutscher Staatsbürger zu werden o o o o 1) stimme gar nicht zu; 2) stimme ein wenig zu; 3) stimme zu; 4) stimme völlig zu

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!17. Es hat keinen Sinn, mich anzustrengen, deutscher Staatsbürger zu werden, denn ich bekomme dadurch nicht wirklich mehr Rechte. o o o o 1) stimme gar nicht zu; 2) stimme ein wenig zu; 3) stimme zu; 4) stimme völlig zu !18. Türkische Kinder, die die deutsche Staatsbürgerschaft erhalten, sind besser in der Schule o o o o 1) stimme gar nicht zu; 2) stimme ein wenig zu; 3) stimme zu; 4) stimme völlig zu !19. Es macht mir etwas aus, dass ich in der Türkei Rechte verliere, wenn ich deutscher Staatsbürger werde o o o o 1) stimme gar nicht zu; 2) stimme ein wenig zu; 3) stimme zu; 4) stimme völlig zu !20. Ich bin stolz, türkischer Staatsbürger zu sein o o o o 1) stimme gar nicht zu; 2) stimme ein wenig zu; 3) stimme zu; 4) stimme völlig zu; 5) Ich bin kein türkischer Staatsbürger !21. Ich interessiere mich für deutsche Landes- und Bundespolitik o o o o 1) stimme gar nicht zu; 2) stimme ein wenig zu; 3) stimme zu; 4) stimme völlig zu !22. Die Gebühren für die Beantragung der deutschen Staatsbürgerschaft sind zu hoch o o o o 1) stimme gar nicht zu; 2) stimme ein wenig zu; 3) stimme zu; 4) stimme völlig zu !23. Es ist leicht, Informationen darüber zu erhalten, wie man die deutsche Staatsbürgerschaft beantragen kann o o o o 1) stimme gar nicht zu; 2) stimme ein wenig zu; 3) stimme zu; 4) stimme völlig zu !24. Wenn ich mit der Bürokratie in Deutschland zu haben muss fühle ich mich schlecht o o o o 1) stimme gar nicht zu; 2) stimme ein wenig zu; 3) stimme zu; 4) stimme völlig zu !25. Für nicht-deutsche Staatsbürger ist die Bürokratie in Deutschland komplizierter o o o o 1) stimme gar nicht zu; 2) stimme ein wenig zu; 3) stimme zu; 4) stimme völlig zu !26. Auch wenn ich deutscher Staatsbürger bin, werden die Leute in Deutschland mich schräg anschauen, weil ich anders spreche, und/ oder mich anders anziehe o o o o 1) stimme gar nicht zu; 2) stimme ein wenig zu; 3) stimme zu; 4) stimme völlig zu !27. Es ist wichtig für mich, das Wahlrecht in Deutschland zu haben o o o o 1) stimme gar nicht zu; 2) stimme ein wenig zu; 3) stimme zu; 4) stimme völlig zu !28. Es ist mir wichtig, so leicht wie deutsche Staatsbürger in andere Länder reisen zu können o o o o 1) stimme gar nicht zu; 2) stimme ein wenig zu; 3) stimme zu; 4) stimme völlig zu !!!29. Geschlecht o o Mann Frau !30. Alter: ___ !

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31. Was ist ihr höchster Schulabschluss? o o o 1) Keine; 2) Hauptschulabschluss; 3) Qualifizierter Hauptschulabschluss; o o o o 4) Mittlere Reife; 5) Fachhochschulreife; 4) Abitur; 5) Hochschulabschluss 32. Welchen Beruf haben Sie? o o o 1) Student; 2) Angesteller; 3) derzeit ohne Beruf; 4) Rentner; 5) Sonstiges 33. In welchem Land arbeiten Sie? o o o o o 1) Deutschland; 2) Schweiz; 3) Türkei; 4) Sonstige; 5) derzeit ohne Beruf !34. Wo wachsen Ihre Kinder auf? o o o o o 1) Deutschland; 2) Schweiz; 3) Türkei; 4) Sonstige; 5) ich habe keine Kinder !35. Wo wurden Ihre Kinder geboren? o o o o o 1) Deutschland; 2) Schweiz; 3) Türkei; 4) Sonstige; 5) ich habe keine Kinder !!!Questionnairre in Turkish !1. Alman vatandaşlığınız var mı? o o Evet Hayır !2.1. Her hangi işçi birliğine üye misiniz? o o Evet Hayır !2.2. Her hangi işçi birliğine üye değilseniz, hiç katılmayı düşündünüzmü? o o Evet Hayır !3.1. Çocuklarınızın nerede yaşayacağını düşünüyorsunuz. o o o 1) Almanya; 2) Türkiye; 3) Başka bir ülke !3.2. Torunlarınızı nerede yaşayacagını düşünüyorsunuz? o o o 1) Almanya; 2) Türkiye; 3) Başka bir ülke !4.1. Çocuklarınızın nerede yaşamasını istiyorsunuz? o o o 1) Almanya; 2) Türkiye; 3) Başka bir ülke !4.2. Torunlarınızı nerede yaşamasını istiyorsunuz? o o o 1) Almanya; 2) Türkiye; 3) Başka bir ülke !Aşağıdakilere katılıyormusunuz/katılmıyormusunuz? !5.1. Almancayı akıcı konuşuyorum. o o o o 1) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum; 2) Kısmen katılmıyorum; 3) Kısmen katılıyorum; 4) Kesinlikle katılıyorum !

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Almancayı akıcı bir şekilde okuyorum. o o o o 1) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum; 2) Kısmen katılmıyorum; 3) Kısmen katılıyorum; 4) Kesinlikle katılıyorum !5.2. Almancayı anadilim olarak görüyorum. o o o o 1) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum; 2) Kısmen katılmıyorum; 3) Kısmen katılıyorum; 4) Kesinlikle katılıyorum !6. Evim ve mahallem çevreye kapalı bir Türk topluluğudur. o o o o 1) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum; 2) Kısmen katılmıyorum; 3) Kısmen katılıyorum; 4) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 7. İş yerimde/okulda genellikle Türkçe konuşuyorum. o o o o 1) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum; 2) Kısmen katılmıyorum; 3) Kısmen katılıyorum; 4) Kesinlikle katılıyorum !8. Boş zamanımı genelde Almanca konuşanların bulunduğu yerlerde geçiriyorum. o o o o 1) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum; 2) Kısmen katılmıyorum; 3) Kısmen katılıyorum; 4) Kesinlikle katılıyorum !9. Çalıştığım ülkede evdeymişim gibi hissediyorum (kendimi vatanimda hissediyorum). o o o o 1) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum; 2) Kısmen katılmıyorum; 3) Kısmen katılıyorum; 4) Kesinlikle katılıyorum !10. Çocuklarımı büyütüğüm ülkede evdeymişim gibi hissediyorum (kendimi vatanimda hissediyorum). o o o o 1) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum; 2) Kısmen katılmıyorum; 3) Kısmen katılıyorum; 4) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 11. Almanya´da kendimi evimde hissediyorum. o o o o 1) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum; 2) Kısmen katılmıyorum; 3) Kısmen katılıyorum; 4) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 12. Çoğunluğun benimle aynı dine inanandığı ülkede evdeymişim gibi hissediyorum (kendimi vatanimda hissediyorum). o o o o 1) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum; 2) Kısmen katılmıyorum; 3) Kısmen katılıyorum; 4) Kesinlikle katılıyorum !13. Çoğunluğun benimle aynı dilde konuştuğu ülkede evdeymişim gibi hissediyorum (kendimi vatanimda hissediyorum). o o o o 1) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum; 2) Kısmen katılmıyorum; 3) Kısmen katılıyorum; 4) Kesinlikle katılıyorum !Aşağıdaki 12 cümle Alman vatandaşlığı kazanma süreci ile ilgilidir !14. Alman tarihi ve hükümeti ile ilgili resmi bir teste girmek istemem. o o o o 1) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum; 2) Kısmen katılmıyorum; 3) Kısmen katılıyorum; 4) Kesinlikle katılıyorum 15. Devletin dil sınavına girmek istemem. o o o o 1) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum; 2) Kısmen katılmıyorum; 3) Kısmen katılıyorum; 4) Kesinlikle katılıyorum !

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16. Almanların İslam dinine karşı olan davranışları Alman vatandaşı olmayı daha az cazip kılıyor. o o o o 1) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum; 2) Kısmen katılmıyorum; 3) Kısmen katılıyorum; 4) Kesinlikle katılıyorum !17. Alman vatandaşlığına baş vurmama gerek yok, çünkü benim daha çok hakka sahip olmamı sağlamıyo. o o o o 1) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum; 2) Kısmen katılmıyorum; 3) Kısmen katılıyorum; 4) Kesinlikle katılıyorum !18. Alman vatandaşlığına sahip olan Türk çocukları okulda daha başarılı oluyor. o o o o 1) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum; 2) Kısmen katılmıyorum; 3) Kısmen katılıyorum; 4) Kesinlikle katılıyorum !19. Eğer Alman vatandaşı olursam Türkiye’deki haklarımı kaybedeceğimi düşünüyorum. o o o o 1) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum; 2) Kısmen katılmıyorum; 3) Kısmen katılıyorum; 4) Kesinlikle katılıyorum !20. Türk vatandaşı olmaktan gurur duyuyorum. o o o o 1) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum; 2) Kısmen katılmıyorum; 3) Kısmen katılıyorum; 4) Kesinlikle katılıyorum !21. Alman yerel/federal politikasıyla ilgileniyorum. o o o o 1) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum; 2) Kısmen katılmıyorum; 3) Kısmen katılıyorum; 4) Kesinlikle katılıyorum !22. Alman vatandaşlığı için başvuru ücretleri çok yüksek. o o o o 1) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum; 2) Kısmen katılmıyorum; 3) Kısmen katılıyorum; 4) Kesinlikle katılıyorum !23. Alman vatandaşlığına geaiç bilgilerine erişebilmek çok kolay. o o o o 1) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum; 2) Kısmen katılmıyorum; 3) Kısmen katılıyorum; 4) Kesinlikle katılıyorum !24. Alman bürokrasisiyle uğraşmayı sevmiyorum. o o o o 1) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum; 2) Kısmen katılmıyorum; 3) Kısmen katılıyorum; 4) Kesinlikle katılıyorum !25. Almaya da Bürokras, Alman vafandoşi olmadğin tazhrade daha zor. o o o o 1) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum; 2) Kısmen katılmıyorum; 3) Kısmen katılıyorum; 4) Kesinlikle katılıyorum !26. Alman vatandaşlığına sahip olsam bile, konuşma ve/veya kıyafet tarzım nedeniyle Almanya’daki insanalar bana değişik bakacaklar. o o o o 1) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum; 2) Kısmen katılmıyorum; 3) Kısmen katılıyorum; 4) Kesinlikle katılıyorum !27. Seçme (oy verebilme) hakkı benim için önemlidir. o o o o 1) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum; 2) Kısmen katılmıyorum; 3) Kısmen katılıyorum; 4) Kesinlikle katılıyorum !

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28. Benim için Alman vatandaşları gibi diğer ülkelere vizesiz yolculuk yapmak önemlidir. o o o o 1) Kesinlikle katılmıyorum; 2) Kısmen katılmıyorum; 3) Kısmen katılıyorum; 4) Kesinlikle katılıyorum !29. Cinsiyetiniz: o o Erkek Kadın !30. Yaşınız: ___ !31. En yüksek eğitim diplomanız aşağıdalilerden hangisidir? o o o 1) Eğitimsiz; 2) Hauptschulabschluss; 3) Qualifizierter Hauptschulabschluss; o o o o 4) Mittlere Reife; 5) Fachhochschulreife; 4) Abitur; 5) Hochschulabschluss !32. Çalışma statüsünüz aşağıdakilerden hangisidir? o o o o o 1) Talebe; 2) Işçi; 3) Serbest çalışan; 4) Sosyal yardımların tabisi; 4) Işsiz; o o 5) Emekli; 6) Başka 33. Hangi ülkede çalışıyorsunuz? o o o o o 1) Almanya; 2) Türkiye; 3) İsviçre; 4) Başka ülke; 5)Çalışmıyorum !34. Çocuklarınızı nerede büyütüyorsunuz? o o o o o 1) Almanya; 2) Türkiye; 3) İsviçre; 4) Başka ülke; 4) Çocuklarım yok !35. Çocuklarınızı nerede doğdu? o o o o 1) Almanya; 2) Türkiye; 3) İsviçre; 4) Başka ülke

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