Media and democratisation in Gabon: a political analysis

Published in 1996 in Communicatio –This is a draft version. Please refer to the original

Leo Van Audenhove Studies on Media, Information and Telecommunication SMIT

Vrije Universiteit Brussel Pleinlaan 2, 1050 Brussel

België

Abstract

The introduction of the new democratic constitution in Gabon after the National Conference in 1990 opens new possibilities for the creation of independent media. Especially in the area of the press, a lot of new titles appear. Although it could be expected that these titles are primarily affiliated with the opposition, towards the end of 1993 most of the newspapers are financed and controlled either directly by the regime or by former top ranking officials. In this article, we show that there is a strong link between the specific characteristics of the Gabonese media and the basic characteristic of the underlying political system, i. e. that access to political positions leads to access to economic accumulation. The period between 1990 and 1993 is a period of struggle for power between different democratic and non-democratic groups. As these groups are not supported by large segments of the population the fight for media and access to the media is hard, as this is the only way to reach their potential following.

1 Introduction and justification

At the end of the eighties and the beginning of the nineties, a number of African countries proceed to democratic reforms. On the one hand these changes are brought about by several external factors of which the cease of the East-West conflicts and the subsequent process of democratisation in Eastern Europe, is certainly not to be underestimated. On the other hand, a number of internal factors are operating, two of them being the loss of legitimacy of the African authoritarian states and the economic crisis as a breeding ground for the democratic movement on the African continent.

One of the most apparent effects of the democratisation in Africa is the explosive growth of the press. Whereas only very few newspapers were published in most African countries before, almost without exception committed to the regime, dozens of new titles generally appear at the beginning of the nineties. Although these papers are being considered part of a new free press, they are not always as free as one might think. They are part of a specific political system in which different factions fight over state power, always

bearing in mind that access to state power in a Central-African context means access to economic accumulation through corruption. Democratisation in these countries can then be seen as a reintegration of certain elite-factions, previously excluded from power and thus economic accumulation, without a broader majority of society obtaining real participation.

From a case study about Gabon, we try to examine the characteristics of the democratisation process and those of the media. In this process, the political system and the media are very hard to separate. Therefore we analyse them within a much wider range, which includes the media and the political system as well as the economic system. Moreover, we reset the developments in their historical context, since certain characteristics of the former system continue to affect the present, more democratic system.

Although this study treats very little theory as such, it is theoretically founded on a school of thought designated as neo-patrimonialism. This movement, represented in France by authors such as Médard and Bayart, is not based on the obscurantism of the old African studies but on modern concepts coming from anthropology, political science and sociology. Their analyses are particularly centred on internal factors, to be fit in broader universal processes only afterwards.

We ground the empirical part of our study 1) on an extensive study of literature consisting mainly of unpublished theses and doctoral theses from Gabonese students and scholars, 2) on 25 interviews taken at Libreville in August and September 1993, 3) on numerous informal conversations, 4) on elaborate texts and texts of law, all collected on the spot. In many cases it was very difficult to obtain reliable information and to evaluate it. We adopted the principle not to mention any facts without at least two trustworthy corroboration. Since a lot of material has been obtained on an informal basis, we find it very difficult to refer to our sources. For this we ask the reader for his understanding. All information can be consulted at the author’s.

2 The Bongo system: the golden years 1973-1985

2.1 The political system

On August 13th 1960 Gabon becomes officially independent. The country starts with a democratic constitution after the French model, with strong presidential power, although with only one Chamber of Representatives. The democratic structures do not last very long. Like most African countries, Gabon is hardly prepared for independence. Its leaders are more interested in taking over the established authoritarian colonial structures than in drastically reforming them. Leon Mba, the first freely elected president, attempts to restrict the power of parliament as soon as he takes office (Gaulme, 1988:138; N’Sole Bitheghe, 1990:43), without ever realising his dream of a one-party state. His successor Albert Bernard Bongo1, taking office in 1968, makes short work of the parliamentary democracy and transforms Gabon into a single-party state with the Parti Démocratique Gabonais as the one and only party.

Bongo’s regime can be described as a neo-patrimonialistic regime2 which shows a remarkable stability compared to similar African regimes. This neo-patrimonialistic regime is characterised by a strong personification of power based on a political and political-economic clientelistic network. The members of the political network, including prominent members of the government and the party executive are kept in a permanent state of insecurity by a constant threat of dismissal or reappointment. The persons involved hardly oppose this state of affairs, in exchange for huge compensations -even when they don’t hold the position any longer- and the possibilities of corruption. The most important positions of power however, such as the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Finance, are reserved to the closest confidants and relatives of the President. Therefore the separation between private and public domains at very high level is practically non-existent. In the sphere of internal politics, Bongo, as President and Secretary-General holds complete control. The role of Parliament and the Central Committee is mainly symbolic (Barnes, 1992:50). The Parti Démocratique Gabonais founded in the name of the ideology of National Unity, just serves the purpose of lending some legitimacy to Bongo’s personal power. Even so, the personification of power is not

1At the end of 1973 Albert Bernard Bongo has been converted to the Islam and takes

the name of El Hadj Omar Bongo. 2This term is used, for instance, by Médard. The term patrimonialism has originally

been used by Max Weber.

complete. As Bayart points out, all African dictators have to confront balances of power, cultural, social and economic obstacles which restrict their personal projects (Bayart, 1991b:221). Power is always the result of a struggle between competing factions. The trick is to divide the factions in order to rule more easily and to secure support without running risks (Bayart, 1991b:224). Since independence the consecutive Gabonese governments have always taken into account ethnic and regional balances based upon a subjective estimation of the weight of a certain group (Gaulme, 1988:39; Gaulme, 1991:54; Rossatanga-Rignault, 1993c:241). Bongo, himself coming from a small ethnic group, always managed to keep a subtle ethnic balance within the government and the higher civil service. On lower levels the system is controlled by a clientelistic system, based upon ethnicity and provincialism (Rossatanga-Rignault, 1993c:243-244).

A second network is set up by the Clan des Gabonais, with representatives from forestry, oil industry (Elf-Aquitaine), the Gabonese and French business world , French politics and French administration. Bongo, as head of this Clan can count on political and financial support from the Clan itself and from overseas in exchange for import and export licences, monopolies and certain favours (Péan, 1983:21). Together with the Clan, the political elite controls the economic key-sectors and the country’s import and export channels which are important to the accumulation of the economic capital and necessary to maintain the neo-patrimonialistic system. All important activities are liable to substantial advance levies by the regime (Péan, 1983:103-107).

To a great extent, the remarkable stability of the system has its origins in the immense revenues derived from oil the country has at its disposal between 1973 and 1985. During this period oil constitutes 55 to 65% of the national income by itself (Pochon, 1991:3176). The GNP per head of the population ranks among the highest in Sub-Sahara Africa. Even though these revenues are divided unequally and the gap between the few rich and the masses of poor is poignant, a middle-class is formed which we find nowhere else in French speaking Africa (Gaulme, 1988:152).

However, the stability of the system can not be explained merely by economics. As Médard points out, the personification of power and the lack of institutionalisation result in the reigning of the arbitrarian and a trend towards the authoritarian (Médard, 1991c:342). But unlike Mba’s politics and unlike many other African leaders’, Bongo’s politics are moderately authoritarian,3 carrying the motto of national reconciliation. This policy of amnesty and reconciliation is based on a permanent economic redistribution and political co-optation, all this made possible by the growing economic prosperity of the country (Barnes, 1992:48-49). The reintegration of dissidents by way of offering them high administrative positions, is the main characteristic of the Gabonese regime, repressive measures usually being taken only in the last resort. In this, army and police hardly play a part. Bongo’s repressive power is founded on his Garde Présidentielle (GP). Together with the security forces this GP, 1900 men strong and equipped with advanced weapons, constitutes a feared means of power. They regularly proceed to the running in, the torturing or the murdering of opponents (Péan, 1983:155-156).

2.2 The media and the Bongo system

Bearing in mind for the rather sparse population, Gabon has one of the most extensive media systems of central Africa by the end of the eighties. Since its independence, the country can make use of a radio service started in 1959. Shortly after independence the first television station is grounded in 1963. From then on television and radio are administrated by the Radio Télévision Gabonaise (RTG) which in its turn comes under the Minister of Information. Beginning from 1965, great pains are taken to develop the technical structures and to extend the transmission range. A channel is added to radio and television in 1977 and 1978 respectively. In 1986 the first private television station is set up but is taken over after some time by the pay television TV Sat. This pay TV emits its own two commercial channels through coded micro-waves and offers in addition TV 5 Europe, CNN International, the BBC and BoP TV. Besides the media with a national range, there is also the international

3Médard talks about more or less livable regimes, which, according to the author, does

not mean that such regimes are acceptable. For a comment on different types of authoritarian regimes see Médard, 1991c.

radio-transmitter Africa N°1, created in 1981. This semi-commercial station can be received throughout Africa and has 14 million regular listeners. Unlike the audio-visual sector the development of the press is a lot less successful. Not until 1975 does the first newspaper L’Union flow from the printing press. The paper only comes out in the big cities and reaches a circulation of 15.000 to 18.000 copies by the end of the eighties.

Under the Bongo system all media are subordinate to the regime. The control the regime has over the media and the influence it has over them affect a number of areas which are hard to separate and which complement each other. Just like in politics, the different levels merge into one another, from administrative control into repressive control. The following will draw a distinction between the administrative, the neo-patrimonialistic and the dictatorial level.

The first way of influencing appears on the administrative level, through the directors of the institution, who are appointed in accordance with their political commitment (Mbourou, 1978:4). Answering directly to the Minister of Information and to the President, the Directeurs de l’Information and the Ministry do not hesitate to check the journalists’ texts directly and to take action where they think it necessary (Moussirou-Mouyama, 1981:38). Internal circulars indicate which information has to be suppressed or has to be dealt with discreetly (Reteno N’Diaye, 1983:43). More generally, on party level, a commission with the assignment to watch over the tenor of the contents, is added to each service (Sabi-Djaboudi, 1992b:82). Yet for a long time now, this form of censorship is by no means the most important anymore. Since the journalist can’t write anything which doesn’t meet with the approval of his superiors (Mbourou, 1978:36), dissident information is already concealed or suppressed on the lowest level. So, the political control of the contents is exercised mainly through the omnipresent self-censorship (Moussirou-Mouyama, 1981:38; Reteno N’Diaye, 1983:43). Those who do not write what is expected of them are dismissed, transferred to another administration or promoted to positions in which they are less harmful (Koumba, 1992:60). Because of this, the career of the individual is strongly related to his political flexibility. The journalists are well aware of their chances of promotion to

higher administrative and political positions such as press attaché, public relations officer or Conseiller of the President’s entourage (Ekekang, 1985:142). A lot of journalists consider their work for the press, radio or television only as a stepping-stone to the Valhalla of the top-ranking officials.

A second form of influencing is founded on what we could call a patrimonialistic level. The selection of officials is not made only according to their competence but rather to their political adjustment to the regime. This kind of selection exists on all levels, from the granting of scholarships to the appointing of leading officials. As soon as an ordinary journalist has reached an administrative position however, the written and unwritten rules attached to it prevail for him, which proves that the administrative institutionalisation within the media has penetrated quite deeply. Although those rules have a censoring effect indeed, the journalist is not really subject to the arbitrariness of his superior. These rules don’t apply to the top of the different media. As Tudesq states, executive positions within the media are very unstable in most African countries and a number of professionals rotate from one executive post to another (Tudesq, 1992:100). This is also the case within the Gabonese context. As he does in the governmental field, Bongo secures his power within the media by cultivating insecurity and dependence, by creating, eliminating or removing executives and directors. Top-ranking executives can be dismissed from one day to the next, when the president isn’t pleased with them any more, nevertheless, they always stay in the public service (Ndong Ngoua, 1992:96). This way, the Director-General of RTG as well as the Director-General of RTG television are replaced after the National Conference. In 1988 the unfortunate Paul Mbadinga, editor in chief of the state newspaper, is fired after a critical editorial directed to the then Minister of Defence, a close relative of the President’s. Even so, Mbadinga is never stricken from the list of the Fonction Publique (Ndong Ngoua, 1992:96-97). In the summer of 1993 Paul Mbadinga becomes Conseiller of the Prime Minister.

A typical characteristic of neo-patrimonialism is also the permanent integration and co-optation of the opposition into the regime, by offering jobs and bribes. As stated above, this constitutes an important part of the political game in Gabon. This co-option happens constantly within the media. And since the

state media hold a monopoly position until the National Conference of 1990, there is little choice left for the young journalist. The price is high for sticking to the freedom of the press, when it comes to finding a new job (Sabi-Djaboudi, 1992b:18). Even the toughest critics find their way to the system. John Joseph Mbourou as well as Vincent Mavoungou, who both wrote very critical dissertations during their studies in France, have been co-opted by the system since. John Joseph Mbourou is Directeur d’Information with the international radio Africa N°1 and acquits himself fairly well of his task as gate-keeper. Meanwhile, Vincent Mavoungou, even became Conseiller du President. During an interview, Prof. André-Jean Tudesq4 stated, not without a certain cynicism: the more critical Gabonese students are during their student years, the faster they push through to important positions when they return to their country.5 Besides reintegrating them, the political leaders also try to placate the journalists by adding an occasional little bonus to their meagre pay. In the meantime La course aux petites enveloppes6 is sort of institutionalised within the Gabonese press (Sabi-Djaboudi, 1992b:18).

Nevertheless, it turns out that administrative control and co-optation of troublesome elements are not always sufficient. The regime has need of an emergency break which it finds in the use of violence. In Gabon too, journalists have been imprisoned and murdered (Koumba, 1992:60). Thus Samuel Nguema M’Ba, editor in chief of the official newspaper L’Union, François Ondo-Edou, head of the national radio, and Jean-Baptiste Asse Bekale, a radio reporter, are arrested and incarcerated in 1981 (Reed, 1987:31), for broadcasting an interview with the leaders of the country’s opposition group, the Mouvement du Rassemblement National, on the international radio station Africa N°1. The journalists are released in July 1985, after having made their public excuses to the President. They are immediately reintegrated into the public administration (Ndong Ngoua, 1992:97).

4André-Jean Tudesq is professor in media studies and history at the Michel de

Montaigne university in Bordeaux France. He is the author of: Tudesq A.J. (1989) L’Afrique Noire et ses télévisions, Paris: Anthropos INA.

5André-Jean Tudesq conversation on 11/2/1993. 6Expression used by the journalists themselves.

It is quite obvious that this kind of control has considerable impact on the contents of the state media, particularly on the information. Censorship and self-censorship favour the official view and suppress or distort all non-conform elements. Only flattering and positive actions are mentioned. Generally they are all about festivities, presidential audiences, inaugurations, presentations of medals, etc.. Strikes, riots, insurrection, social dissatisfaction, in short anything that could harm the regime, is suppressed, minimised or its subversive nature strongly emphasised (Sabi-Djaboudi, 1992b:79). The personification of the power we see on a political level, also manifests itself in and exploits the media (Mavoungou, 1986:4). The propaganda organised by the single party is concentrated on the person of the President and is intended to credit him with the social accomplishments (Mavoungou, 1986:261). At their inauguration, new structures are presented as personal donations from the President in order to stress his generosity (Mavoungou, 1986:55). In all the media, and particularly on television, the President is the centre of information.

Quite striking is the apparent dysfunctional contents of certain programs, columns or media, from the end of the seventies onwards. Makaya in the official paper L’Union, Les Dossier de la RTG on television and Le Patriote, a periodical edited by the President’s entourage itself, all criticise abuses in the Gabonese society and politics. In the pieces, severe criticism is directed against officials, ministers, and public or bureaucratic abuses. What is more, as a result of certain disclosures and questions asked by the public during a broadcast of Les Dossiers de la RTG a number of ministers have to resign. Although certain authors see this as a manifestation of freedom of the press and of freedom of speech (Zihou Zihou, 1985:85), most of them agree that this freedom is only a deception (Mavoungou, 1986:262-263; Sabi-Djaboudi, 1992:107; Péan, 1983:135). In a Machiavellian game, politicians are sacrificed to the prestige and the credibility of the head of state who is above all criticism, as are his close relatives and his entourage (Sabi-Djaboudi, 1992b:107). The apparent dysfunctional contents serve a double purpose. For one thing they work as a kind of safety valve to content the people, for another thing they reinforce the minister’s dependence with regard to the President.

3 The Democratisation

3.1 The Democratisation and the new political system

The factors which played a part in the democratisation process in Africa are various and their respective importance is difficult to asses.

An important underlying cause for and a catalyst of the Gabonese democratisation movement however is to be found in the financial crisis the country goes through from 1985 onward. That year the tide turns on the world oil market and oil prices are dropping in a spectacular way. Within a short time, Gabon is confronted with the instalments for the billion loans contracted between 1980 and 1985 to finish the megalomaniac railway project Le Transgabonais (Rousseau, 1993:2831-2835). In 1987 the IMF has to intervene and enforces a structural adjustment program (SAP). This is the beginning of a process of increasing control of the public finances and a setback of the civil service salary, which constitute a major cause of growing social dissatisfaction (Bonnet, 1991:23).

The austerity measures of both the IMF and the Bongo government lead to the first strikes among the civil servants in 1988 (Englebert, 1993:359). The President decides that, from now on, economic measures will only be implemented provided they do not undermine social and political instability. By the end of 1989 however, a new strike wave breaks out and spreads to the entire public sector and to the educational sector. At first strikers put forward a list of financial demands (Bonnet, 1991:71). According to H. Bonnet however, the dissatisfaction should not be reduced to mere wage-claims and social demands. At this stage a political dissatisfaction already exists that goes much further (Bonnet, 1991:23).

Even so, at the start, nothing indicates that the strikes will result in the multi-party system. After the granting of the students’ demands, the strike in this sector even comes to a complete stop (Bonnet, 1991:81). Only during the following strikes do a number of intellectuals channel the protest towards democratic demands (Rossatanga-Rignault, 1993b:57). The Mouvement de Redressement National (MORENA) certainly plays an important part in this. Founded in 1981 and long paralysed by internal struggles it resumes its

underground propaganda early 1989 (Englebert, 1933:359) thereby enforcing its demand of a multi-party system.

In February and March 1990, the persistent protest result in important political concession being the creation of a National Conference (NC) whose assignment is to draw op the statutes for a new single party: the Rassemblement Social Démocratique Gabonais (RSDG) which is supposed to unite the PDG and the MORENA. But the MORENA refuses to ratify the NC and RSDG notions and eventually votes for the multi-party system and for the calling of new elections, with maintenance of the presidential office mandate however.

Unlike the National Conferences in other African countries, the Gabonese NC has no sovereign power and can only formulate motions. Although the outcome of the NC is not matched with Bongo’s initial RSDG motions, the regime and especially its President retain most of their power (Bonnet, 1991:163; Kombila-Iboanga, 1991:274). In fact, the Gabonese NC is a compromise between the existing elite group and a political conscious but left out elite, for whom the transition to a political multi-party market is a legitimate means to gain access to the system (Kombila-Iboanga, 1991:274). Bongo’s lasting political power is clearly shown by the elections of September 16th and 23rd, when the PDG wins, whether or not fraudulently, 63 seats out of 120. The remaining seats are divided among a large number of opposition parties. Bongo’s control over key economic sectors, based on connections with the Clan, remains virtually untouched.

In the social sphere, the period between the parliamentary election of 1990 and the presidential election of December 1993, is characterised by the continuation of the social dissatisfaction and the escalation of the economic crisis, of which strikes of all sorts are the expression. On the political level, the opposition as well as President Bongo prepare themselves for the presidential election. Because of his majority in Parliament, Bongo is able to block all too drastic changes. The influence of the opposition on the government’s policy continues to be very limited.

By the end of 1990, the opposition itself consists of more than 38 political parties. The most important opposition parties are the Rassemblement National

des Bûcherons RNB (previously MORENA), the MORENA-Original (branched off the former MORENA) and the Parti Gabonais Progressiste PGP. In addition to these three big opposition fractions, there are numerous small political groups and a number of parties built around one or a few persons, usually former top people of the regime (see table), who try to re-enter the system through democratic elections. As Médard points out, if access to the state is the condition for acquiring wealth in a first phase, in a second phase, and particularly when democratic methods are adopted, wealth becomes a conditio sine qua non for the access to power (Médard, 1991c:346).

One of the parties’ problem seems to be their firm establishment within society. The Gabonese parties are parties who compete for the electorate’s favour from above. There is no question of popular parties supported by large segments of the population. Only the RNB and the MORENA have a larger permanent support among the administrative urban middle class. Still, it is positive in the Gabonese context, that there are no ethnic parties, in the narrow sense of the word. Although the electoral implantation of the parties corresponds largely with the ethnic or regional origin of the political leader, nearly all parties receive votes in other parts of the country (Rossatanga-Rignault, 1993a:118-120). Moreover, the strategies for acquiring the power are based upon ethnic regional alliances and the party officials are selected on a geopolitical basis, even in those parties which officially reject ethnism (Rossatanga-Rignault, 1993c:247). Even though the everyday political debate is mostly all about ethnicity, the parties profess nationalism, multi-ethnism or a certain ideology and not ethnism (Rossatanga-Rignault, 1993a:117).

On December 5th 1993 Omar Bongo wins the presidential elections by 51,18% of the votes while his chief opponent Père Mba Abésolle, obtains a mere 27%. The opposition does not accept the results and accuses President Bongo of fraud. According to Joseph John-Nambo, the explanation of Bongo’s electoral victory is to be found in the period before the elections, when no stone was left unturned to direct the elections (John-Nambo, 1993:133). Thus, the electoral law, voted exclusively by the PDG, does not guarantee a smooth proceeding, the support of the European Community is refused and fraud is deliberately committed in drawing up the register of voters and in distributing the electoral

cards (John-Nambo, 1993:133-139). On the other hand, it should be pointed out that a number of factors are advantageous to the President. For instance, he can count on a solid party organisation, he still has a large following in the isolated inland, and he takes a stand against a shattered opposition. Furthermore, Bongo comes from a small ethnic group, unlike Père Mba Abésolle who belongs to the dominant Fang. This may have turned out in Bongo’s favour with the other ethnic groups (Rousseau, 1993:2823). Whether the elections were fraudulent and particularly whether this has been the key to Bongo’s victory, is still hard to say so many months afterwards. The fact however remains that because of this, the democratisation of Gabon has been postponed indefinitely.

3.2 The constitution and the new institutions regarding the media

The new constitution, voted by the Gabonese Parliament in March 1991, does not result directly from the 1990 National Conference NC, since this has no sovereign power. The NC can only propose amendments to the constitution, as a result of which the final constitution deviates considerably from the NC proposals on several points (Kombila-Iboanga, 1991:278). For example, the NC proposes to assign a permanent character to the institution which has to evaluate and judge the process of democratisation every year. No trace of this stipulation can be found in the final constitution.

In general one can state that the constitution remains rather vague in many places. Unfortunately the basic human rights, including a number of stipulations concerning communication, are defined too generally giving way to broad interpretations. Article 95, regarding the communication illustrates this very well. The article sets up an independent organ, the Conseil National de la Communication that should watch over the application and the observation of several broadly specified regulations (Loi N°3/91, 95). The CNC is empowered to control the expression of the democracy on the entire territory, to control the contents and statutes of the media. Above all the CNC is given preliminary legislative power. The stipulations however are vague, are not further developed and lack all coherence, again allowing several interpretations. On the precise power of the organ, the constitution only states

in Art.102 that an organic law should further regulate the organisation of the CNC (Loi N°3/91, 102). In other words, the constitution sets up a control organ, defines its composition, but does not assign it any real power.

The organic law required in Art. 102, gets through on March 24th 1992, one year after the constitution. This law is drawn up by President Bongo and his government and is ratified by Parliament where the President can count on a majority of votes. The power of the CNC is drastically restricted, as it can only present motions and give advice, which the government can completely disregard, thus leaving the President enough room to pursue his personal policy. Yet it is striking that the President abandons his control over recruitment policy. It so happens that Art.31 stipulates that, in case of a vacancy for an executive position within the public media, the President has to select a candidate from a list of applicants drawn up by the CNC (Loi N° 14/91, 31). By this law the CNC manages to stop a Presidential candidate of being appointed as executive-director of the Centre National du Cinéma (CENACI) substituting the CNC’s candidate, Roland Duboze, a long-time critic of the Bongo-regime.

By the end of March 1992 the CNC is able to start its proceedings. In the course of 1992 the institution already introduces a number of bills7. The general tenor of these bills is very clear: the CNC pursues a democratic, socially aware, structurally changing media policy. The institution wants to make the access to the media easier for all political parties, it wants to bring parliamentary democracy into the media through all kinds of programmes and it wants to start a social debate. Besides these bills, the CNC issues guidelines for the directors of the different media, trying to put these bills into practice. Moreover in 1993 the CNC presents its annual report where the current situation is critically denounced and new policy guidelines are suggested

7 These are: Projet de code de communication, Projet de réglement intérieur, Projet de

loi portant réglementation de la publication et de la diffusion des sondages d’opinion, Projet de décret d’application de la loi N°14/91 du 24 mars 1992, Projet de décision portant établissement de la liste des fréquences en bande II, III, IV et V, Décision portant établissement des cahiers de charges des chaïnes publiques et privées de radio et de télévision et des autres entreprises de communication, Projet de décrest portant organisation et attributin du CNC et des services rattaches.

(CNC, 1993). Not one of the CNC initiatives however, is dealt with or put into practice, neither by the government which did not deal with one suggestion until the presidential elections at the end of 1993, nor by parliament which consists of a majority of presidential followers, nor by the state media which are still under presidential control. The permanent blocking of the Décret d’application which should empower the CNC to at least exercise its control function, deprives the it of all power. What’s more, the President hinders the functioning of the institution by refusing to approve its budget. The CNC depends on government funds which barely amount to half the anticipated budget (CNC, 1993:1).

In the course of 1993 the lack of power of the CNC becomes strikingly obvious. The functioning of the institution is completely paralysed by a mechanism of which one can doubt as to whether its intention was not to sideline the institution from the beginning. The vagueness of the constitution leaves the President and his fraudulently or otherwise elected parliament the possibility to put the CNC entirely out of action.

After the analysis of the new media in Gabon in the next paragraph we will see what the consequences of this mechanism is.

3.3 The new democratic media: distribution, contents and means

The National Conference and the subsequent new constitution produce great changes particularly in the field of the press. The new freedom of the press and the flexible terms of payment of Multipress, the printer of Gabonese newspapers, and of Sogapresse the distributor, allow the creation of a considerable number of new titles. By the summer of 1993 more than 40 different titles have appeared among which only about 15 are published on a regular base. By means of the following table8 we will analyse these papers, their connections with politics, their contents and their characteristics. We distinguish genuine party-newspapers (belonging either to the opposition or to

8 The list of newspapers is almost complete. The list of parties and presidential

candidates is not, but all important parties are mentioned. The data in the table is collected in the summer of 1993.

the regime), newspapers affiliated to the opposition and papers affiliated to the regime.

Almost without exception the papers created after the National Conference are political ones. The fragmentation of the opposition into small parties results in the fragmentation of the efforts in the field of the press. Just about every political formation has its own publication. Newspapers are only distributed in the main cities and 80% of the circulation remain in the capital of Libreville. Most rural areas continue to be completely deprived of the press. With the exception of Le Bûcheron, the major opposition party’s paper, reaching an average circulation of 11.600 copies, most papers merely achieve a circulation of 3.000 copies. Apart from their already limited circulation, between 20 and 50% of every single title remains unsold. Because of this limited circulation, the huge number of unsold copies and the high production costs, nearly all Gabonese papers make losses, particularly the poorly selling party linked papers. As a result most papers heavily draw upon the party and its members for financial support, or as in the case of Gabon Libre, La Voix du Peuple, La Relance en Orety upon presidential candidates or leaders of the regime warming up for the coming elections.

In addition to these papers there are two opposition newspapers, which can not be considered as party papers. La Clé affiliated to the RNB, is started up clandestinely as the first opposition paper in December 1989, three months before the National Conference. It is a rather general publication and is one of the better Gabonese newspapers. Even though La Clé makes an average circulation of 8.200 copies, it is loss-making and has to stop publication between August 1992 and September 1993. In the mean time La Clé is published by the media group Interpresse, which also prints La Griffe, the equivalent in Gabon of the French Le Canard Enchaîné. Although its editors claim to be neutral, they have connections with the PGCI, the party of the paper’s founder J. Okinda, presidential candidate for the PGCI. Interpresse, which publishes both papers, is owned by J. Okinda and J.P. Lemboumba-Lepangou, two ex-ministers of finance and former “cleptocrats” of the Bongo-regime, fallen into disgrace. In their heydays, when holding power, they put aside a personal fortune which enables them, in the democratic environment, to

take a stand against the president. Not only political interests are involved, but personal feuds as well. Lemboumba, who barely escapes an attempted murder ordered by Bongo in 1992, is suspected to play an important part in the financing of the opposition and of the opposition newspapers.

As indicated in the table below, about five titles among which La Relance, Orety and La Voix du Peuple are related in one way or another with the current President. J.B. Assélé, owner and political director of Orety, is Bongo’s son-in-law. With his Convention des Libéraux Réformateurs (CLR) he expresses the ideology of the liberal faction within the former single party PDG. Mayila, who owns La Voix du Peuple, is also an ex-baron of the regime and still maintains friendly relations with Bongo. Mpili and Le Couperet are satirical papers with a “bongoistic” tendency. Their content is insulting and of the lowest kind. They embarrass the members of the opposition by publishing inside information or disclosures of suspicious activities under the one-party regime, which makes it likely that the President and his counter intelligence department are behind these publications. These papers can be seen as the continuation of the dysfunctional communication under the single party regime.

The content of the new Gabonese newspapers diverges strongly and therefore we distinguish three categories: the papers with a more general content, those with a restricted content and the satirical ones. By the papers with a more general content we understand publications which give the reader a general survey of current events or analyse them. This category includes La Clé, Gabon Libre and to a lesser extent Misamu, on the side of the opposition, and Orety on the side of the regime. Although these papers belong to one of the two camps, their content goes beyond the party level as they are more general in scope. This being said however, the main object of the opposition papers remains the defamation and the criticising of the Bongo regime, without ever submitting any solutions. Nevertheless these papers seldom turn to insulting language or insinuations. As these papers appear only once a week, they do not constitute a valuable alternative for the daily state-owned L’Union.

By papers with a restricted content we understand publications whose objective is not to give the reader a general outline of the current events, but to form people’s opinion. We talk about party newspapers or publications centred around certain persons, such as Le Bûcheron, Le Progressiste, La Voix du Peuple and Le Phare, for the opposition, and La Relance, for the regime. Their major characteristic is that they focus their content on the party or the leader of the party. They contain almost exclusively political or politicised9 news about Gabon and almost never deal with international news. Unfortunately, in their denunciation of the regime, they often turn to insults, insinuations, threats, etc.. This can also be said about the satirical papers La Griffe and Le Scorpion, whose trustworthiness is very doubtful.

To pronounce a judgement of the content of the Gabonese press is difficult, just as it is hard to form an opinion about current affairs on the basis of that press. Maybe this says it all. The different articles about one and the same subject give such opposite views that it is impossible to evaluate the information.10 None of the papers presents an overall picture of the actual events in the country. The lack of reliable information, of constructive and alternative analyses is deplorable in the context of the democratisation. However in this context, the nearly total absence of ethnically inspired or ethnically agitating articles is noticeably and promising.

The means the new papers have to their disposal are generally inadequate. The editors only have a restricted number of permanent journalists at their disposal. Most of them fellow party members, sympathisers or unemployed graduates of the most different kinds and of whom very few had a specific schooling in journalism. Several of the more experienced journalists are former collaborators of the national paper L’Union who either lost their jobs in 1986-1987 because of the privatisation of the paper, or who choose the side of the new press for political or economic reasons.11

9 In Gabon, the opposition papers tend to politicise not political news, in the sence that

they blame eveything that goes wrong on the regime. 10 For a similar evluation: Oyane-Allmendinger, M. (1993) Interview. Libreville. 11 Thus we find with La Griffe, La Clé, Le Progressiste, Orety and Gabon Libre

former collaborators of L’Union. Moreover a number of journalists write articles for opposition newspapers under a pseudonym in addition to their regular job.

In addition to the appearing of a number of opposition newspapers, the Rassemblement National des Bûcherons sets up Radio Liberté early 1993. The radio is financed by party members and broadcasts for the first time on March 31st 1993. Although the transmitters are of limited capacity, the radio can be received in the entire capital, which allows about 40% of the population to follow the programmes. In no time Radio Liberté becomes madly popular. The content of the radio resembles the content of the opposition press. Most of the attention is given to national news discrediting the President and his regime. International news is hardly mentioned. Besides in French, the programmes are successively transmitted in several native languages, such as Fang, Punu, Kota, Teke and Nzébi. The rest of the time is filled with information about the party, its planned activities and appeals from party members and interested people. Since a large part of the population is still deprived of postal services, telephone and papers, the radio is a much more powerful weapon for the opposition than the press.

3.4 Permanent influence of the media

The media are influenced by the regime on two levels. In the first place there are the state-owned media over which the government continues to have a controlling influence. In the second place there are the opposition media on which the regime cannot directly exercise its influence but which it tries to influence indirectly or to hinder just the same.

During the period between the National Conference of 1990 and the presidential elections at the end of 1993, influencing the media takes place through the same mechanisms as under the one-party system. Even though the possibility of direct censorship diminishes, self-censorship still is on important explanatory component. Many journalists wonder whether Bongo will actually accept to leave. Most of them are waiting for the outcome of the elections and are as yet prepared to trade the truth for job security and career opportunities (Ndong Ngoua, 1992:98). Working for the opposition press is firmly punished with dismissal or transfer to another service. The repercussions of these mechanisms on the contents remain unchanged. Just as under the one-party regime, the media remain an instrument of excessive attention for the President

and the denial of everything out of line with his policy. The effects of these practices in the new democratic context are clearly shown by the denunciation of the state media in the very critical Rapport d’Activités 1992 of the Conseil National de la Communication (CNC, 1993:11). Although criticism directed against the government seems to increase, the President and his surroundings are kept out of range (Koumba, 1992:29). The CNC does not have the possibilities to cut across these practices, since it has no real power. By not dealing with the CNC motions, the government creates a power vacuum to its own advantage. Although the government has to tolerate the highly critical opposition media, it continues to exercise a strong influence on the much more powerful state media.

Over the opposition newspapers, the regime has no direct influence. It has neither the means of manipulation it employs to influence the state media, nor can it count on the loyalty of its own press. Yet, this does not mean that the regime does not try to influence or to frighten the new opposition media. The editors of the major important opposition newspapers, such as Le Bûcheron, La Griffe, La Clé, Gabon Libre and Misamu all mention intimidation or retaliation by the government. In many cases it is about verbal threats and insults uttered by the President, members of the PDG or by the army (Amoughe, 1993; Ndoutoum Eyi, 1993; IOC, 8, 1993:36). A more often heard practice, fitting in with the “raison d’être” of the regime, is the offering of bribes or well paid positions (Amoughe, 1993; Bitheghe Minko, 1993; Ndoutoum Eyi, 1993). Other more violent methods of intimidation are burglary by force (Amoughe, 1993; Ndoutoum Eyi, 1993) or the beating up or kidnapping of journalists (Amoughe, 1993).

An indirect way of influencing the opposition press is to hinder it financially. Since the government holds an important position on the economic markets, most enterprises refuse to advertise in the opposition newspapers for fear of being denied access to the economic markets. They therefor prefer the state press or Pan-African newspapers or magazines. The majority of the Gabonese press has no publicity receipts at all, and for the papers which do attract advertisement, they constitute a minor source of income. The papers are financed either by the parties or by private persons. Out of the eleven

newspapers which are not directly dependent on the PDG, six are financed by private persons. The financiers of five of those used to be associated with the regime.

This financial dependence and the affiliation with political parties forms an obstacle to the freedom of the journalists, as they constantly have to adjust the contents in accordance with the wishes of the mecenas. In many cases failure to comply with the guidelines -read the political views of the owner- results in dismissal (Koumba, 1992:118). The journalist is reduced to a ghost-writer who frequently works for papers affiliated with the existing regime and opposition papers at the same time. Only La Clé and La Griffe are allowed a fairly large editorial freedom.

During the last six months previous to the presidential elections, Omar Bongo tries to cross the opposition media in a number of less democratic ways. On September 9th 1993, the government uses the allegedly powerlessness of the CNC as an excuse to take action itself. The government takes offence at the fact that not one newspaper of the private press complies with the stipulations of the press law of 1960 nor with the low on Commercial Activities of 1989 which remains valid as long as a new legislation for the communication fails to appear. According to the government, it is the CNC’s responsibility to get these laws obeyed, as specified in Art. 2 of the law on the CNC introduced the previous year by the same government. Referring to this law, the Minister of Communication forbids all private newspapers on September 10th 1993. To calm down the subsequent commotion, the Presidential Ordinance on audio-visual, cinematographic and written communication becomes effective on October 1st (Président de La République, 1993). The intention of this law however is to restrain the opposition newspapers. Art. 5 stipulates -among other things- that the leaders of political parties or political factions can not posses or run a company in the field of communications. On the basis of this sole article the government can suppress half of the private press. Art. 8 and 37 contain complicated registration procedures which can cost the papers months of time and heaps of bribes, since bureaucracy is certainly hostile to them. But most offensive is Art. 43 which specifies that every paper is obliged to submit specimen, signed by the director of each publication, to the prosecutor. It goes

without saying that measures of this kind would lead to preventive censorship in no time. Consequently the opposition turns down the Ordinance and brings the case before the Cour Constitutionelle which decides in favour of the opposition all along the line (Cour Constitutionelle, 1993). On November 6th, opposition papers reappear after having disappeared from the market for two months.

There is no unequivocal answer to the question of what the Presidential Ordinance means for the democratisation process. The contempt for the CNC and its policy proposals is a serious denial of this democratic institution. Furthermore, the obstructing of its policy amounts to delaying the democratisation process. On the other hand, to declare a number of articles of a Presidential Ordinance unconstitutional, is an important exception in an African context. At this stage the omnipotence of the President seems to be politically restrained. He finds himself facing a critical CNC whose policy he can cross but whose members he can not discharge and a Cour Constitutionelle which can take the edges off his dictatorial actions but whose members he can not dismiss either. The result however remains a legislative vacuum which consolidates the existing status quo.

A similar conflict has broken out between the CNC and the Minister of Communication. Although the CNC has granted Radio Liberté a broadcasting licence (CNC, 1993, N°2/93/CNC) the minister contests the CNC’s authority to deliver licences. According to the Minister, the CNC has only a moral qualification and on April 9th 1993 he forbids further transmission. The CNC partly follows the Minister and orders the radio to restrict its programmes to trial broadcasts presenting only music. The Radio however disregards the decision and continues to transmit. Although the government does not interfere officially, most likely it does so through other channels. From the very beginning strong transmitters cause interference with Radio Liberté which makes it very hard to follow the programmes. Transmitters and receivers have to change frequency all the time. On February 22nd 1994, after the presidential elections and the re-election of Omar Bongo, and after several days of general strike called by Radio Liberté, the buildings of the radio are ransacked and the transmitting equipment is blown up during an early morning raid (IOC,

1994:37). Radio, in contrast to the press, apparently turns out to be a too powerful weapon in the hands of the opposition.

4 Conclusion

The pressure for democratic changes at the beginning of 1990 was without any doubt the expression of growing social dissatisfaction. Although the regime gave way to changes, its philosophy was to keep changes as few as possible. The outcome of the National Conference and the subsequent democratisation however were far beyond what it had expected. The period between the National Conference then has to be seen in the light of a destabilised system in which different groups fight over state power. As these groups are not supported by large segments of the population the fight for media and access to the media is hard, as this is the only way to reach their potential following.

Broadly speaking three groups can be distinguished: 1) a democratic group trying to change the existing system, 2) a group consisting of the old elite, headed by the President, trying to hold on to power by turning back the democratisation process, and 3) a group of a politically conscious elite who has been left out of power, and for whom the transition to the multi-party system is a legitimate means to gain access to the system.

The characteristics of the Gabonese media after the National Conference are an expression of the evolution in the political field. At the end of 1993 only few media, such as Radio Liberté, Le Bûcheron, Misamu and Le Progressiste are affiliated with genuine democratic opposition parties. The content of these media is mainly focused on party news, as this is the only channel to reach their following. Due to a limited circulation, high production costs and no or little advertising most of these media are loss-making. Their existence over a longer period therefore becomes questionable.

In contrast to the limited means of the opposition, the President has access to a wide range of media. As Omar Bongo has been able to keep his control over the state media, content has not changed drastically. Although the media has become more critical, the President can still rely on the loyalty of the state

media. His obstruction of the CNC and it’s proposals certainly is a way of securing the status quo in his own interest. Analysing the problems of the CNC one could even wonder if the Constitution, drawn up under the President after the National Conference, doesn’t deliberately leave space for different interpretations. Except for the official media, Bongo and his PDG can rely on different newspapers reflecting their policies.

Apart from the newspapers and the media affiliated with genuine opposition parties, and the media immediately affiliated or influenced by the President a lot of the private newspapers are financed by private persons, all former top ranking officials. The existence of these newspapers can only be understood in the light of the principle that, political power leads to economic accumulation, and as already stated when democratic methods are adopted, wealth becomes a conditio sine qua non for the access to power (Médard, 1991c:346). These people try to become popular, sometimes only among their ethnic group, in order to be elected themselves as President, or to be in a position where they can be co-opted for the sake of political and ethnical stability. The press is thereby seen as in important tool to reach sufficient popularity.

The re-election of Omar Bongo in December 1993, be it fraudulent or democratic, clearly shows his lasting power and his determination to stay. And although newspapers of all kind appear up till today, the destructive raid on Radio Liberté, the only opposition medium with any real impact, shows that the freedom of the press remains inexistent.

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