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Leibniz on the Efficacy and Economy of Divine Grace [Draft]

Forthcoming in in L. Strickland, J. Weckend, E. Wynckier (eds.), Tercentenary Essays in the Philosophy and Science of G. W. Leibniz, Palgrave, 2016.

Agustín Echavarría� Universidad de Navarra

1. Introduction

The problem of the efficacy and distribution of God’s grace was one of the

main theological issues with which Leibniz dealt throughout his works. In this

respect, regardless of any consideration about Leibniz’s actual and sincere

commitment to the theological doctrines of his time,1 it seems undeniable that he held

no effort back in attempting to solve this question. From his early Confessio

philosophi, Leibniz linked the metaphysical problem of evil with the following

theological concern: if God is fair and the happiness of all his creatures pleases Him,

why is He so unequal with the distribution of his grace? Why doesn’t He make

everyone happy? Why does He condemn so many? If the distinction between the

saved and the condemned is made only by grace, what’s the point of reward and

punishment?2 When dealing with these issues, Leibniz’s main concern was to rule out

any sort of despotism or arbitrariness in God’s actions and to defend Him from the

charge of being the author of sin and damnation. As he states in De libertate

creaturae rationalis, “[...] there must be a reason why God gives the grace required

for salvation to one and not to another, thus permiting the latter to be damned.”3

These issues place Leibniz in continuity with the fundamental questions posed

by the seventeenth century de auxiliis controversies, found in both Catholic and

Protestant theological factions.4 The aim of this paper is to elucidate Leibniz’s

conception of the nature of grace and its different types, in order to determine his

response to the main theological controversies concerning the aids of divine grace. To

this end, in the second section, I will outline the two central controversies regarding

this issue, namely, the controversy about the efficacy of God’s grace and the

controversy about the justice of the divine “economy” in the dispensation of grace, as

they were set out in the theological context of Leibniz’s age. In the third section I will

present Leibniz’s definition and typology of grace. In the fourth and fifth sections I

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will explain Leibniz’s respose to the ‘equal aid problem’ and the ‘economy of grace

problem’, respectively. In the sixth section I will explain how Leibniz reconciles the

universality of God’s sufficient grace with the idea that God’s hardens ome people’s

hearts. Finally, I will conclude that Leibniz systematic response to these problems

based on the metaphysical principles of his philosophy has a hard task in trying to

preserve the gratuity and the efficacy of divine grace, without compromising either

God’s justice or human responsibility for rejecting God’s aids.

2. The Main Theological Controversies Concerning Divine Grace

The principal theological controversies concerning divine grace in the

seventeenth century revolved around two central issues:

a) The first, which concerns the efficacy of God’s grace, could be called the

‘Equal Aid Problem.’ That is, is it possible for an equal measure of divine aid to

produce different effects on different subjects? According to Leibniz, “[…] in this

question consists the whole force of the controversy about auxiliaries.”5 The different

possible answers to this question depend on the different ways of understanding the

concepts of “efficacious” and “sufficient” grace, which could render either God or the

creature itself the ultimate cause of its segregation from the number of the saved.

The main antagonists in this dispute were two Catholic theological factions,

the Molinists and the Bañezians (although similar positions were found among

Evangelical and Reformed theologians, respectively). Luis de Molina and his

followers accepted the idea of a “prevenient grace,” a supernatural aid that moves the

creature to conversion and to perform praiseworthy actions leading to salvation.

Nevertheless, this grace was not absolutely efficacious or irresistible by its own

nature, but only “sufficient” to perform good actions, and it could become efficacious

only by means of the cooperation of the creature’s free will. Thus, one and the same

aid of divine grace could have different effects according to the subject in which it

was received.6 For Molina the outcome of God’s grace is not infallibly guaranteed by

its intrinsic nature; on the contrary, it was determined by the influence of the free will

of the creature. This conception of prevenient grace was supported by Molina’s

metaphysical theory of “simultaneous concurrence,” according to which the free

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action of the creature is the result of the concurrent and mutually dependent

causalities of God and the creature,7 and the theory of “indifferent motion,” according

to which God, as first cause, moves created free will through an indifferent and

unspecified influence, only specified and determined by the secondary cause, that is,

by the influence of the created free will.8 Molina’s conception preserved the creature’s

ultimate responsibility over her own actions, but put in danger the intrinsic efficacy of

God’s grace.

On the other hand, the followers of Domingo Báñez denied that an equal

prevenient grace could produce different effects in different individuals. As Diego

Álvarez, the most prominent Bañezian, states:

[...] it is impossible that, once a completely equal aid of grace is given to two

different men, one converts and the other does not; on the contrary, the one

who converts must have received a greater aid of prevenient grace that was not

received by the one who does not convert.9

For Álvarez, if one man converts, it is due to the fact that he received an “efficacious”

aid, and if he doesn’t, it is because he didn’t receive an “efficacious” aid. Álvarez

admits the existence of “sufficient grace,” but he defined it as a “proximate power,”

de facto insufficient to perform a good action,10 unless it is followed by an intrinsicly

efficacious prevenient grace.11 This conception of God’s prevenient grace was

supported by the metaphysical doctrine of “Physical Predetermination,” according to

which God applies the creature’s will to its action through a “previous,”

“immediate,”and “efficient” influence.12 This position preserved the intrinsic efficacy

of God’s grace, but posed a threat to God’s justice in the distribution of grace.

b) The second dispute regarding divine aids of grace concerns God’s justice in

the distribution of grace, and could be called the ‘Economy Problem.’ It turns on the

question: what is the rationale behind God’s bestowing of the aids of grace? Leibniz

poses the problem as follows: given that God – whether by virtue of his

predetermination, or of His “middle knowledge” – has a perfect knowledge of the

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couterfactuals of freedom, He has an infallible foreknowledge of the way in which a

certain creature would freely act, if certain aids of grace were given to it, whatever the

intrinsic nature or efficacy of the aid may be.13 The question, then, is why God gives

some creatures the internal and external aids that He has foreseen will be fruitful

under certain circumstances, and denies those aids to other creatures.14

Leibniz stresses the sharp differences between the theological positions on this

issue, though he doesn’t explicitly ascribe them to any particular school or confession.

Some – likely the Evangelicals – proposed that, based on the foreseen merits and

demerits, God gives greater aids to those whom He foresees will offer less resistance

to His grace; others – maybe the Molinists – proposed that God gives equal aids to

everyone, in which case the different effects must be attributed to some factor found

in the subject; finally, others – most likely the Reformed, and perhaps some Thomists

– reject the idea that God gives any consideration to the nature of the subject when

bestowing his grace.15

The conflict between the different positions originates in unilaterally stressing

either the gratuitous character of divine grace or the merits and demerits of the

creature. The delicate balance between these two extreme approaches is a key feature

to properly understand Leibniz’s concept and typology of grace.

3. The Definition of Grace and its Different Types According to Leibniz

Leibniz had in general terms a theologically orthodox conception of the role of

divine aids. For him, God always has the first initiative in man’s salvation, since in

the performing of any meritory action our will concurs always “[...] excited by

prevenient grace.”16 Nevertheless, in order to elucidate Leibniz’s position, it is

important to start by clarifying what precisely he understood by the term “grace.”

Leibniz’s definition of grace went through a few yet relevant changes

throughout the course of his life. In line with the theological framework of his age, in

his early works Leibniz reserves the term “grace” for God’s extraordinary or

supernatural intervention in the execution of the good actions of the creature. Hence,

in De possibilitate gratiae divinae (1669-1671?) Leibniz defines “grace” as “[...] the

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extraordinary concurrence of God in order to perform a good action.”17 In the same

sense, in De libertate et gratia (1680-1684?) Leibniz defines “grace” as the active

principle of pious actions,18 where “pious” seems to be understood as praiseworthy

with regard to a supernatural end, i.e., to salvation.

An important change takes place circa 1686, when Leibniz establishes the

complete concept of the substance as the principle according to which God concurs

with the free actions of the creature.19 In his early writings, Leibniz had rejected the

Molinist conception of “simultaneous concurrence,” since he considered that it

undermined God’s universal causality.20 From 1686, Leibniz states that divine

concurrence consists in the actualization of the succesive states of the substance,

virtually contained in the preceeding states and that, ultimately, stems spontaneously

from the ontological constitution of its individual nature. Hence: “[...] the creatable

person, before its creation is decreed, already contains in its complete possible notion

everything that could be said of her in the case she were created and, among other

things, a certain series of graces and free actions.”21 In this sense, Leibniz states in his

Discourse on Metaphysics (1686) that, strictly speaking, nothing is supernatural for

created substances, at least in regard to their individual nature.22 Henceforth, Leibniz

subsumes the treatment of grace under the more general issue of divine concurrence.

This is particularly clear in Leibniz’s commentary on Burnet’s De

praedestinatione (1701-1706), where he states that great part of the controversy

concerning divine aids (de auxiliis) falls under the scope of philosophy and, more

precisely, of natural theology.23 Hence, in that work Leibniz’s definition of “grace”

encompasses every causal influence of God on the exercise of the operative qualities

of the creature:

we understand by the name of divine grace all the benefits from God, and we

find that grace is brought to us both in the natural and ordinary way and in the

extraordinary and miraculous way. For natural goods are no less gifts of God

than spiritual goods are, and the perfection of all things flows from the divine

font.24

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Nevertheless, setting aside the ordinary or extraordinary, natural or

supernatural character of divine grace, the problems raised by the controversies about

efficiency of divine aids remain for Leibniz structurally identical. This can clearly be

seen in the way Leibniz deals with the classical taxonomy of divine grace. Indeed,

since his early witings, Leibniz establishes a sharp distinction between “efficacious

and sufficient grace” and proposes a definition of both kinds of aids that in his

opinion could be endorsed by all the theological parties.25. In De possibilitate gratiae

divinae he defines “efficacious grace” as that kind of aid that “[...] once given,

establishes the action absolutely.”26 On the other hand, “sufficient grace” is that kind

of aid that, “[...] once given, doesn’t establish the action firmly, unless man’s will is

supposed,”27 that is, unless the created will concurs in performing the act.

Given these definitions, Leibniz describes as “false” the extreme position of

those who reject sufficient grace (Dordracens and Jansenist)28 and as “dangerous” the

position of Molinists,29 insofar as it proposes that the good action can be performed

without God’s determining concurrence, i.e. without efficacious grace.30 On the other

hand, Leibniz praises the Thomist position as “true and beneficial,” insofar as it

proposes both kinds of aids (efficacious and sufficient) and rejects the determining

concurrence towards evil.31

From his earliest writings, then, Leibniz constantly holds the distinction

between both kinds of grace, outlining the different effects that they can have

according to their intrinsic nature. Thus Leibniz establishes, in his Discourse on

Metaphysics, that the grace of God has different measures and degrees, and although

it always produces some proportionate effect in the creature, being always sufficient

to preserve men from sin (in the event that their wills cooperate with it), it is not

always sufficient to overcome every inclination, as occurs in the special case of the

absolutely efficacious grace.32

This distinction is further developed in Leibniz’ commentary on Burnet’s De

praedestinatione. Leibniz there rejects Bañez’s claim (common among Calvinists),

that there is only one type of aid, which is perfect, internal, and per se victorious (a

doctrine that flourished after the Council of Trent as a complement to the thesis of

physical predetermination).33 It is noticeable that throughout his works, Leibniz

always took a positive view of the doctrine of physical predetermination, since he

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considered that its denial would imply the denial of God’s primary causality.34 Indeed,

for Leibniz, God is the cause of any perfection or “reality” we find in created

substances, which includes its free actions, and this corresponds to the doctrine of

physical predetermination.35 Nevertheless, Leibniz considers that the

predetermination must be regarded as “inclining,” not as “necesitating,” and that God

doesn’t move the created free will to a determined action through a single infallible

decree.36 For this reason, Leibniz seems to reject the link between physical

pretetermination and the doctrine of the “unique efficacious aid” and, in the above-

mentioned work, he expresses his preference for the traditional doctrine of Augustine

and Aquinas, which admits a great variety of internal and external aids.37

Leibniz admits that in some exceptional cases God gives a victorious,

irresistible, and per se efficacious grace that prevails over all obstacles and

circumstances and overcomes all impediments,38 as in the case of the “grace of

sanctification.”39 Nevertheless, he states that it is neither necessary to admit, nor

possible to prove that every aid has that intrinsically efficacious nature.40 Moreover,

in the cases in which grace reaches its ultimate effect, is doesn’t always obtain it per

se or by virtue of its own nature; rather, some aids become efficacious per accidens,

by virtue of the concurrence of circumstances, even though nothing happens

absolutely by accident regarding divine providence.41

Considering this variety of effects, Leibniz provides a detailed classification of

the different kinds of aids of grace, according to their different intrinsical efficacy.

Thus, we have the “efficacious” or “effectrix” aids on the one hand, and the

“sufficient aids” conditioned to the assent of the will, on the other. The “efficacious

aids,” in turn, are sometimes “infallible per se,” if they have complete efficacy by

their own nature and cannot be impeded by circumstances, and other times they are

“infallible by virtue of the circumstances.”42 These differences in the nature of God’s

aids are crucial in understanding Leibniz’s response to the abovementioned

controversies.

4. Leibniz’s Solution to the ‘Equal Aid Problem’

Indeed, by virtue of the distinction between different types of aids, Leibniz is

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able to give a clear answer to the main question of the de auxiliis controversy,

namely, whether is it possible for an equal measure of divine aid to produce different

effects on different subjects. Leibniz’s answer to this question is clearly affirmative.

Hence, in De libertate et gratia he states: “It can be asked whether or not effective

and non-effective grace are sometimes similar in themselves. In truth they differ only

in the receiving subject. For it can happen that what is effective in one person is

ineffective in another.”43

Now, which are the factors that determine the different effects of grace in

different subjects? An early answer to this question can be found in Lebniz’s early

short text Scientia media (1677). In spite of being an anti-Molinist text – insofar as it

attacks the Molinist grounding of the knowledge of counterfactuals of freedom –

Leibniz therein adopts a Molinist-friendly position regarding the issue of prevenient

grace, by assigning created free will the ultimate determination of grace’s outcome.

There, he poses the following case: let’s assume that Peter is subject to the same

circumstances as Paul, and that they are both given equals aids of grace; let’s also

assume that one of them accepts the grace and the other rejects it; then, it is necessary

to provide a reason for the difference between one and the other, and that reason can

only be taken from “[...] ‘Peterness’ and ‘Paulness’, i.e., from the nature of Paul’s will

and the nature of Peter’s will, and this difference in their two freedoms brings it about

that one chooses this and the other that.”44

The answer seems very simple, since it explains the different effects of grace

in different subjects through the nature of the will of each individual and, ultimately,

through the very nature of the individual substance or “haecceitas.” This also allows

Lebniz to distance himself from the Molinist solution of the problem through the

concept of the “indifferent motion.” Indeed, God, as first cause, is not specified or

determined in his causality by the free will of the existing creature, but only by the

concept of the creature considered as possible: “[…] the first [cause] is determined by

the second [cause] taken ideally, that is, the idea of the second as perceived in the

divine intellect determines the first will. But the second taken actually is determined

by the first, i.e. each takes its own entity from it.”45

Nevertheless, recourse to the determination of the free will of the creature as

contained in the complete concept appears to be an incomplete solution to the

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problem of the equal aid, since it is only suitable for explaining the different effects of

“sufficient grace.” That is why, as has been shown, Leibniz holds, both in his early

and mature works, that only the effect of “sufficient grace” is conditioned by the

concurrence of created will. The complete concept of the creature, however, does not

only include the free determinations of the will, but also the circumstances in which

such actions are performed, and which stem from the reciprocal accommodation with

other substances, in accordance with the laws of the series. Hence, the complete

answer to the ‘equal aid problem’ must also take into consideration the role played by

circumstances.46

In later works, Leibniz clearly states that in some cases the reason why an

equal aid can produce different effects in different subjects is not only the will of the

individual or his nature, but also the circumstances in which the individual is placed.

For instance, in Causa Dei (1710) he affirms that “it may happen, indeed, that the

same measure of grace which does not obtain its effect in one man, because of his

refractoriness or other circumstances, does obtain it in another man.”47

It must be stressed that when Leibniz states in this context that an equal

measure of grace can produce different effects in different subjects by virtue of the

circumstances, he is referring to the special subtype of grace he called “infallible by

virtue of the circumstances.” Indeed, he cannot be referring either to the “infallible

per se” aid or to the “sufficient grace” aid, since the former always has complete

efficacy, while the effect of the latter depends on the cooperation of the will of the

creature. This seems to imply that, when it comes to the effect of grace, the

circumstances can play only a positive role, rendering infallible an intrinsically

efficacious aid which is not infallible per se, but they cannot render determine the

failure of any aid, be it “efficacious” or “sufficient” per se. However, the following

question arises: what is the ultimate reason the circumstances play that favourable

role in one subject and not in another? This question leads directly to the ‘divine

economy problem,’ to which I now turn.

5. God’s Economy in the Dispensation of Grace

Regarding God’s rationale in the dispensation of grace, Leibniz establishes as

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a general principle that He loves all men with “antecedent will,” that is, the will by

which God is inclined towards the production of every good and the removal of every

evil.48 Nevertheless Leibniz rejects the idea that God has the same stance toward all

men in the dispensation of his grace, since it seems contrary to experience.49 He

concedes to the Evangelicals that, at least to some extent, the foreseen resistence of

the creature often contributes something to God’s dispensation of grace, but this is not

the only feature taken into account since He considers simultaneously many other

reasons.50 Leibniz also argues that, in spite of the foreseen resistence of the creature,

God always has the power of softening the hardest hearts, in cases where it is

necessary.51 Hence, as he states in the Discourse on Metaphysics, “[…] in accounting

for the choices which God makes in dispensing his grace, it is not enough to have

recourse to his absolute or conditional foresight into the future actions of men. Just so

it is also a mistake to imagine absolute decrees without any reasonable motive.”52

Leibniz states, however, that it is necessary to admit that God’s “economy” in

bestowing the aids of grace is an inescrutable mystery for the human mind and that,

therefore, no general rule can be established to explain it.53 Leibniz considers that, in

this regard, there is a fundamental agreement among the different theological

positions. Indeed, as he notes, even if one admits as a general rule that God gives

everyone the internal sufficient aids, all theologians admit that it is necessary to

appeal to St. Paul’s báthos (Rm, 11:33), that is, the depth of God’s wisdom, in order to

account for the external aid of circumstances.54 Generally speaking, it is not

appropriate to say that God gives or denies his aids according to the foreseen good use

on the part of a particular creature, or, in other words, “[...] He does not show favor to

a man on the grounds that he is better, or less evil, but because the general division

and better combination of things demands that it be this way.”55

For Leibniz, the plenitude of grace’s effect in a particular individual depends

neither on God’s decree to give some particular efficacious or inefficacious aid nor

exclusively on the power of created will. Rather, it depends on a conjunction of

concurring factors, including the resistance of the created will, the previous states of

the soul, and the internal and external circumstances that help the creature to fix her

attention to the good.56 Now, all those factors are unified and connected in the

complete order of things that God has decided to create:

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[...] those favorable circumstances, by which it sometimes happens that a

measure of grace has different efficacy in different people, do not come from

us, nor are they in our power, but rather they come back to the series of things,

that is, partly in the divine intellect and partly in the divine will. For creatures

are considered by the divine intellect conditionally, in the realm of possibility,

together with the circumstances that would be needed if the creatures were

ordained to exist.57

Hence, since the effect of divine grace depends on the order of things in which it is

inserted, the reason why God decrees to give certain aids of grace must be inferred

from the complete order of things that God has chosen among the possibles.58

Therefore God’s guiding principle for the decrees concerning the bestowing

and distribution of grace must be understood in connection with His first decree

whereby he chooses to create the best possible world. Indeed, for Leibniz, there are no

“absolute decrees” concerning particular things; instead, all the divine decrees are

simultaneous and integrated in the whole series.59 Strictly speaking, there is only one

divine decree which contains all the subsequent decrees, and that concerns the

election of the best possible series of things:

[...] God’s decree consists solely in the resolution he forms, after having

compared all possible worlds, to choose that one which is the best, and bring it

into existence together with all that this world contains, by means of the all-

powerful word Fiat, it is plain to see that this decree changes nothing in the

constitution of things […].60

Since every individual, with his own series of graces and free actions, belongs

to a unique series of compossibles with which he is intrinsically connected,61 and God

does not decree anything in particular without having previously considered the whole

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series of possibles,

[...] the object of the divine decree is not the man, but the whole series of

possibles which constitute this universe, taken simultaneously with its past,

present and future states. And, once this [decree] is established, the particular

decrees concerning the conservation, the aid or the impediment of the single

[action] follow.62

If a given creature is moved by certain aids of grace, this occurs by means of

the same divine decree that establishes the existence of the whole series.63 Hence, the

rationale behind the dispensation and distribution of divine grace is to be found not

just in the individual concept of every possible substance, but in the complete series to

which the individual substance belongs: “[…] it is possible that decrees of grace are

connected in innumerable ways according to certain orders of things, but God chooses

only one of them. Therefore the reason for the decrees of grace or for their concourse

is to be obtained from each possible order of the whole universe.”64

6. The Universality of ‘Sufficient Grace’ and the Hardening of the Heart

Leibniz’s solution to the problem of divine economy seems to be suitable for

preserving the rationality behind God’s distribution of grace, but at the same time

poses an important threat to divine justice. Indeed, if the final outcome of divine grace

in each particular subject depends upon the complete order of the universe that God

has chosen, it seems that some persons are abandoned to sin in advance, as an indirect

consequence of the choice of the best series. As Leibniz himself observes:

[…] the fact that Peter is saved is due to the aids of divine grace, the fact that

Judas is not saved follows from the fact that he did not receive a sufficiently

great amount of grace; at the same time, God does not deny anyone His grace

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through a decree, but He decrees to create someone who, nevertheless, will sin

and despair, because the chosen series could not hold otherwise.65

According to Leibniz, God could overcome the resistence of the human heart

through his internal grace and through the external circumstances but He cannot do it

without distorting the complete order and connection of things.66 However, Leibniz

consistently states that God gives everyone the “sufficient grace” to avoid sin, even if

it doesn’t always achive its ultimate effect in each individual.67 As he states in Causa

Dei: “God’s universal philanthropy, that is, his will to save all men, is evinced by the

divine acts of help themselves, which suffice to all, even the reprobate, nay, are very

frequently granted in abundance, although grace does not triumph in all men.”68

In other words, “sufficient grace” is given to each and every individual in such

a way that nobody is neglected in advance by God’s decree not to give him the aid to

do what is good. If someone sins – and, in the end, is damned – it won’t be because of

the absence of divine aid but because of his own sin: “It should be established for

certain that God gives sufficient grace to all so that no one perishes except by his own

fault.”69 Therefore, no one is abandoned in advance, and no one rejects grace and sins

as a mere result of the circumstances.

On the contrary, as it has been shown, the circumstances can only play a

positive role with regards to the efficacy of grace. Nevertheless, Leibniz also assigns a

decisive role to circumstances in the case of the “hardening of the hearts” of those

who are to be damned: “When hardness [of heart] is assigned by God it should be

understood as arising from external causes and circumstances that the series of things

produces and not from an internal influx of some anti-grace.”70 This doesn’t mean,

however, that some individual can be placed under circumstances in which the effect

of grace is thwarted without any voluntary intervention of the invidivual himself.71 On

the contrary, Leibniz seems to be suggesting that, through the influence of

circumstances, God can permit the hardening of the heart of those who have already

freely rejected His grace at some point in their lives.

In this sense, Leibniz’s affirmation of the universality of sufficient grace must

likely be understood in a “diachronic” sense. In other words, God gives everyone the

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sufficient grace to avoid sin at some point in their lives, but only offers it persistently

to those who don’t reject it: “I believe that God always gives sufficient aid and grace

to those who have good will, that is to say, who do not reject this grace by a fresh

sin.”72 In other words, according to Leibniz the “refusal of grace, or as sacred

Scripture calls it, hardening of the heart,”73 that leads to damnation is always

subsequent to the voluntary rejection of grace at a prior moment in time.

7. Conclusion

I will try now to summarize the main corollaries of the exposed position, and

give some concluding remarks. Although Leibniz expressly alludes to existent

theological positions and tries to reconcile them, trying to save the valuable elements

he finds in each of them, his thought regarding the issue of the efficacy and the

economy of divine grace results in an original proposal. The originality of Leibniz’s

proposal is due to the fact that it is modelled to fit within the fundamental elements of

his metaphysics, such as the complete concept of the individual substance and the

unity and simultaneity of the divine decrees that determine the circumstances in

which the created substances are placed. In this regard, Leibniz’s position is placed in

a delicate balance. On the one hand, his theological position is deliberately moderate,

since it tries to maintain the following propositions, all of which favour God’s

benevolence towards his creatures:

a) God wants every man to be saved, and gives everyone the sufficient grace

to avoid sin, at least at a certain point in their lives;

b) God does not neglect or reject anyone in advance;

c) The circumstances do not play a decisive role in the rejection of grace, but

only in the hardening of the hearts of those who have already freely rejected grace

through their own sins;

d) God’s foreknowledge of creatures’ demerits does not play a decisive role in

His denial of grace, since He can soften the hardest hearts.

On the other hand, Leibniz frames these theological doctrines in a “holistic”

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metaphysical system, in which what really matters is the perfection of the complete

series of things, which requires some individuals to fall from grace, and be placed in

circumstances in which they will be rejected and damned. In this regard – and this is

an issue that falls outside the scope of this paper – the success of Leibniz’s theology

of grace depends to a certain degree on the consistency of Leibniz’s compatibilist

assumptions,74 and the place they leave for a significant role for the free will of the

creature.75

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Philosophy, edited by C. González Ayesta and R. Lázaro, 143-165. Hildesheim-

Zürich-New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 2013.

Echavarría, Agustín. “Leibniz’s Dilemma on Predestination.” In New Essays on

Leibniz’s Theodicy, edited by Larry M. Jorgensen and Samuel Newlands, 172-196.

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praedestinatione et reprobatione Concordia. Oniae: Editionem criticam curavit

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1953.

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Human Freedom.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55/1 (1995): 75–108.

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865-879.

1 One may wonder whether Leibniz actually held any position on theological matters, or whether his theological statements were just attempts to resolve other people’s issues, either for pragmatic reasons or simply to protect himself from an eventual accusation of heterodoxy. Paul Lodge, in the following chapter of this volume, argues for this last position, while I am inclined to think that he actually held and sincerely believed his doctrines. Even if this question goes beyond the scope of this chapter, at least methodologically I will take Leibniz statements on these issues at face value, without expressing judgement on his eventual hidden intentions or motivations. 2 CP 33: “If God is delighted by the happiness of everyone, why did he not make everyone happy? if he loves everyone, how is it that he damns so many? if he is just, how is it that he presents himself as so unfair that from matter that is the same in

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every respect, from the same clay, he brings forth some vessels intended for honor, others intended for disgrace? And how is it that he is not a promoter of sin if, having knowledge of it (though he could have eliminated it from the world), he admitted it or tolerated it? Indeed, how is it that he is not the author of sin, if he created everything in such a manner that sin followed? And what of free choice, when the necessity of sin has been posited, and what of the justice of punishment, when free choice has been taken away? And what of the justice of reward, if grace alone brings it about that some are distinguished from others? Finally, if God is the ultimate ground of things, what do we impute to men and what to devils?” 3 A VI 4, 1590. Where no English translation is available, translations are my own. 4 The most complete account of the controversy within Catholic theology is still the book of Gerardus Schneemann, S. J., Controversiarum de divinae gratiae liberique arbitrii concordia initia et progressus (Freiburg, 1881). 5 A VI 4, 1459. English translation: http://www.leibniz-translations.com/freedomgrace.htm 6 Molina, Concordia, pars II, q. 14, a. 13, disp. 12, 56, § 1: “It can occur that among two [men] who are called by God through an equal internal aid, one converts by his own free will, and the other remains in infidelity.” 7 Molina, Concordia, disp. 26, p. 170, § 15: “[…] when we say that neither God, through his universal concurrence, nor the secondary causes are the complete causes of the effect, but rather partial [causes], this must be understood with regards to the partiality of the cause, as they call it, and not with regards to the partiality of the effect. Indeed, the whole effect comes from God and the secondary causes; but neither from God, nor from the secondary causes as the complete cause, but as a partial cause that at the same time require the concurrence and the influence of the other; just like when two [men] pull a ship, the whole motion comes from each of the movers, but not as the total cause of the motion, even if each of them produces with the other each and every part of the same motion.” 8 Molina, Concordia, disp. 32, p. 200, § 10: “Indeed, since God’s general concurrence is not a concurrence of God in the secondary cause, but in the action of that cause, and it is by its own nature indifferent, so that by virtue of the influence of the secondary cause an action of a certain species rather than other is produced, […] it occurs that the actions of the free will (such as [the actions] of any secondary cause) do not receive being such or such and, therefore, being zealous or vicious from God’s general concurrence, but rather from the free will itself.” 9 Álvarez, De auxiliis, L. III, c. III, 406: “[…] it is not possible that given two men with completely equal aids of grace, one of them converts and the other does not; the one who converts always receives a greater aid of prevenient grace that the one who does not convert did not receive. […] indeed, the one who converts has an efficacious aid, and the one who does not convert does not have the efficacious aid: for if he had it, he would infallibly convert, as saint Thomas teaches in I, 2, question 79.” 10 About this conception of ‘sufficient grace’ Pascal said: “[…] this grace is sufficient without being so.” See Pascal, Provinciales, 29 janvier 1656, 52. 11 Álvarez, De auxiliis, L. III, c. XVII, 509: “[…] by means of the sufficient aid the man can really perform the action, by comparison of which it [the aid] is called sufficient, even though the man would never act, unless God produces the efficacious aid […]”

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12 Álvarez, De auxiliis, Liber III, disp. XXI, 87b: “Not only the internal concurrence, but also the external concurrence, which pre-moves secondary causes to action, cannot be determined by the concurrence of the secondary causes, but God, by means of such concurrence, efficiently applies the secondary causes, and determines them to action.” I explain in detail Alvarez’s position in my paper “Causalidad eficiente de Dios y libertad humana: Leibniz y la metamorfosis de la ‘predeterminación física’.” 13 DPG 9d: “Undoubtedly, it must be conceded that God foresees conditionally how someone would use his free choice, were certain aids afforded; and relying on knowledge of that, along with knowledge of all others, He renders his decisions concerning the division of humanity with respect to salvation.” 14 MPE 143: “Here again we may ask why the divine means of succor—internal or at least external—are diversely granted to diverse persons, triumphing over wickedness in the one and vanquished by it in others”; DPG, 9b: “Quaeritur enim rursus, cur uni prae alio Deus decreverit dare aut dederit auxilia fidei in illis circumstantiis, in quibus effectum salutarem secuturum praevidebat.” 15 MPE 143: “On this point, the doctrines are divided. Some think that God grants greater help to the less evil or at least to those who will resist grace with less obstinacy. Others maintain that the same help is more efficient in the former. Others, on the contrary, do not admit that certain persons are distinguished before God by the privilege of better, or in any case at least less evil, natures.” 16 DPG, 34a. 17 A VI 1, 536. 18 A VI 4, 1459/http://www.leibniz-translations.com/freedomgrace.htm: “Nevertheless it is certain that grace is the first active principle concerning pious actions.” 19 Regarding Leibniz’s conception of God’s concurrence, see Lee, “Leibniz on Divine Concurrence”; McDonough, “Leibniz: Creation and Conservation and Concurrence”; Whipple, “Leibniz on Divine Concurrence,” and Schmaltz, “Moral Evil and Divine Concurrence in the Theodicy.” 20 See the following argument (CP 127): “For let us suppose that God and a person concur in some action; it is necessary that God concur with this very concurrence of the person, and either it will proceed to infinity (nevertheless it will not any the less reduce to the same thing) or it will suffice to say right from the start that God actually produces the action, even if it is the person who acts.” Even though Murray (“Leibniz on Divine Forknowledge of Future Contingents and Human Freedom”, 81) interprets this argument as a global critique to the theory of divine concurrence, I consider more accurate Sleigh’s interpretation (Leibniz & Arnauld, 184-185), according to which the target of the argument is the version of the theory of divine concurrence understood as a sum of causalities. 21 A VI 4, 1593. 22 PPL 313. 23 DPG, 11a: “It is quite true that this controversy pertains for the most part to philosophy or natural theology.” On this regard, Lloyd Strickland has shown the philosophical centrality of Leibniz’s doctrine of the harmony between the kingdoms of nature and grace, especially in relation to the doctrines of the natural immortality of the soul, and the natural distribution of rewards and punishments. See Strickland, “Leibniz’s Harmony between the Kingdoms of Nature and Grace,” forthcoming 2016.

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24 DPG, 27e: It is exactly right to say that all good is uniquely due to divine grace provided that we understand by the name of divine grace all the benefits from God, and we find that grace is brought to us both in the natural and ordinary way and in the extraordinary and miraculous way. For natural goods are no less gifts of God than spiritual goods are, and the perfection of all things flows from the divine font.” 25 A VI 1, 535. 26 A VI 1, 536. 27 A VI 1, 536. 28 A VI 1, 536. 29 A VI 1, 536: “Hîc ut verum fatear, mihi Thomistarum sententia et vera et utilis, Iansenistarum falsa, Molinistarum etiam periculosa.” 30 A VI 1, 536. 31 A VI 1, 536: “dantur et debent dari omnia seu DEI concursus ad bonum nullus, ad malum est determinativus.” 32 PPL 323: “This grace of God, whether ordinary or extraordinary, has its degrees and measures; in itself it is always efficacious in producing a definite proportional effect, and furthermore, it is always sufficient not only to protect us from sin but even to accomplish salvation, provided that man meets it with his own powers. But it is not always sufficient to surmount the inclinations of man, for otherwise he would have nothing more to strive for, and this is reserved solely for the absolutely efficacious grace, which is always victorious, whether through itself or through the congruity of circumstances.” 33 DPG, 16a: “Also, we must be concerned by the novelty of some of these ideas, which arose only after the Council of Trent. I mean the whole doctrine of the necessary predetermination of the foreknowledge of contingents, as well as the opinion concerning some one perfect individual aid, admitted once for all and victorious per se.” 34 CP 127: “If there is no physical predetermination of free acts—if God does not penetrate into the substance of a free act, i.e., if he does not cooperate in every free act—it follows that God is not the first cause of all created entities. And that is actually to remove God from things. Since a free act is a created entity, it must receive its own existence from God.” 35 A VI 4, 1521: “And so it is also necessary for every real thing that exists in a certain ultimate determination of the free substance, to be produced by God; and anything that can reasonably be said about physical predetermination consists in this.”; see also DGP § 56 (c): “When God physically predetermines a man, this should be understood concerning the perfections of the act and as far as he grants reality to the possibilities.” 36 MPE 137: “there are always, in the efficient cause and in the concurring causes, certain preparations which by some are called predeterminations. It must, however, be stated that these determinations are only inclining, not necessitating, so that a certain indifference or contingency always remains intact.” See also H 149. For a more complete account of Leibniz’s conception of phisical predetermination, see my paper “Causalidad eficiente de Dios y libertad humana: Leibniz y la metamorfosis de la ‘predeterminación física’.”

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37 DPG, 16a: “Augustine and Thomas seem to have looked for the efficaciousness of grace for converting man in the concurrence of various internal and external helps which are accommodated by the omniscient author of conversion to the conversion of man and circumstances, so that it might be sure that the effect would follow.” 38 DPG, 34a: “Sometimes grace is victorious per se, in such a way, however, that it would certainly prevail in anyone regardless of impediments and circumstances”; MPE 141: “Moreover, I do not see why grace, in the cases where it attains its full effect, should attain it always by virtue of its own nature, that is, be effective by itself.” 39 DPG, 16a: ““Helps” in this sense should be distinguished from the “grace of sanctification,” which, by the very fact that it is given, is efficacious per se and irresistibly victorious because all the obstacles have been removed.” 40 MPE 141: “Nor do I see any more how, on the basis of reason or revelation, it could be proved that victorious grace is always sufficiently powerful to overcome any resistance, however strong, and the most unfavourable circumstances.” 41 DPG, 9d: “Hence divine aids are not always victorious by the force of their own nature; indeed, they are not always per se efficacious, but often only per accidens, if I am permitted to speak in this manner, that is, they obtain their effect in virtue of the circumstances.” 42 DPG, 4a: “Aids of grace are either efficacious (i.e., effective absolutely) or merely sufficient. Effective aids are such absolutely infallibly, but the considerations of efficacity and infallibility are distinct. Sometimes aids have efficacity per se and in virtue of their own nature. And aids have efficacity that is either complete, so that they cannot be thwarted by contrary circumstances (as they appear to have been in the miraculous conversion of Paul), or sub modo, because they are not in fact impeded by contrary circumstances. By contrast aids have efficacity per accidens (as I would put it), if they derive it from assisting circumstances. Only those that have complete per se efficaciousness have per se infallibility. Other derive their infallibility from the circumstances, which either do not impede, or, in general, assist and thus are per accidens (as I would put it) (not with respect to God, but with respect to the thing). And finally, certain ones are not efficacious, but merely sufficient, for concerning the one who wills, an outcome is lacking where the will fails.” 43 A VI 4, 1459/http://www.leibniz-translations.com/freedomgrace.htm 44 SLT 105. 45 A VI 4, 1458/http://www.leibniz-translations.com/freedomgrace.htm 46 For a more detailed account of the role of circumstances see Rutherford, “Justice and Circumstances: Theodicy as Universal Religion.” 47 MPE 141. 48 G III, 31. For a more detailed account of Leibniz’s original version of God’s antecedent will, see my paper “Leibniz’s Dilemma on Predestination,” 181-184. 49 DPG 27d. 50 DPG 27d. 51 DPG 9d: “And it is even agreed that sometimes an example is provided from which it is evident that God softens the hardest hearts, so that Paul knows from the mercy shown to him that we should despair for no one.”; also DPG, 27d: “God considers many things and in the meantime softens the hardest hearts.”

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52PPL 323. 53 DPG, 9d: “Besides, the economy of divine decrees concerning salvation is such that it cannot be reduced to general rules by us.” 54 DPG, 30a: “In any case, it is evident that the economy or dispensation of the external means of grace involves something mysterious, and from the perspective of reasons to which we have access, something absolute”; also DPG, 9b: “In this case, in the dispensation of the external means of salvation, even the Evangelicals will admit that one must not prescribe general rules to God, and they further admit that one must revert to “the depths of divine wisdom”.” 55 DPG, 9d. 56 H 69: “For the conversion is purely the work of God’s grace, wherein man co-operates only by resisting it; but human resistance is more or less great according to the persons and the occasions. Circumstances also contribute more or less to our attention and to the motions that arise in the soul; and the co-operation of all these things, together with the strength of the impression and the condition of the will, determines the operation of grace, although not rendering it necessary.” 57 DPG, 27c. 58 A VI 4, 1458/http://www.leibniz-translations.com/freedomgrace.htm: “And so the question in turn becomes, what is the reason of a decree for giving grace? Therefore it is in turn to be obtained from a consideration of whatever is left in that possible concept when the decree of grace has been removed. More correctly, however, it is possible that decrees of grace are connected in innumerable ways according to certain orders of things, but God chooses only one of them. Therefore the reason for the decrees of grace or for their concourse is to be obtained from each possible order of the whole universe.” 59 DPG, 2a: “For this reason it can be said in a certain sense that all decrees of God are simultaneous, even in signo rationis, that is, by the order of nature, and they are all so interconnected together that none is detached from consideration of the others. And in this sense there is an end to the dispute concerning the order of decrees since there is a decree concerning the whole series.” 60 H 151; see also MPE 122-23: “Hence to speak rigorously, there is no necessity for a succession of divine decrees, but one may say that there has been one decree of God only, which decree has produced into existence the present series of the universe, all the elements of this series having been considered beforehand and compared with the elements entering into other series.” 61 TI 1, 345: “And, universally, what he wanted to establish and bestow with regards to Adam, is connected with the whole human species, even more, with the whole universe; […].” 62 TI 1, 345. 63 A VI 4, 1458/http://www.leibniz-translations.com/freedomgrace.htm: “It is not sufficient to say that the complete concept of a creature also involves each series of graces. For as divine graces are free and proceed from a decree, a complete concept will also involve divine decrees and their reasons.” 64 A VI 4, 1458/http://www.leibniz-translations.com/freedomgrace.htm. 65 TI 1, 342-43.

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66 H 385-86: “It is true that God could overcome the greatest resistance of the human heart, and indeed he sometimes does so, whether by an inward grace or by the outward circumstances that can greatly influence souls; but he does not always do so. Whence comes this distinction, someone will say, and wherefore does his goodness appear to be so restricted? The truth is that it would not have been in order always to act in an extraordinary way and to derange the connexion of things, as I have observed already in answering the first objection.” 67 For a more detailed account of Leibniz’s commitment to the universality of sufficient grace, see Echavarría, “Leibniz’s Dilemma on Predestination,” 189-193. 68 MPE 141. 69 DPG, 50b. 70 DPG, 53b. 71 On this regard, even though I agree in general terms with the considerations of Don Rutherford about the role of circumstances in damnation and salvation, I think that they are incomplete. The circumstances and the innate inclinations of the creature are not sufficient to determine damnation without an actual sin, since that would imply that God abandons some creatures in advance. On the contrary, “hardening” circumstances must come after an actual sin of the creature. See Rutherford, “Justice and Circumstances,” 82: “The last sentence suggests that a difference in the role that circumstances may play in precluding salvation (or ensuring damnation) and the role they play in facilitating salvation. In the former case, Leibniz implies that circumstances by themselves, in conjunction with an individual innate tendencies of willing, may be sufficient to ensure his downfall.” 72 H 385. 73 CP 75. 74 For different perspectives on Leibniz’s compatibilism, see Sleigh, “Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge”; Murray, “Leibniz on divine foreknowledge of future contingents and human freedom,” and “Spontaneity and Freedom in Leibniz.” 75 I am thankful to Maria Rosa Antognazza Lloyd Strickland, Ignacio Silva, Roberto Casales and Alejandro Pérez for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.