Land Dispute Settlements and Their Breakdown: Credibility, Indivisibilities, and Preferences in Ethno-Territorial Conflicts

1

Land Dispute Settlements and Their Breakdown:

Preferences, Credibility and Indivisibilities in Ethno-Territorial

Conflicts

In bargaining models of internal ethno-territorial conflicts, variation in leadership preferences

has a significant impact on expected conflict outcomes. Relative power has an impact conditional

on leadership preferences. Conflict among cost-conscious narrow nationalists is expected to be

relatively peaceful and episodic—in a manner that is weakly but not perfectly correlated with

variation in relative power. Conflict involving cost-flouting extremists is likely to be protracted,

irrespective of relative power. Conflict involving power-seekers that care only about internal

political effects of conflict may mimic either or both of the other two outcomes. Bargaining

outcomes are further constrained by the relative indivisibility of contested homeland territory. A

resulting four-fold typology of conflicts is then applied to case studies from Russia and the

former Yugoslavia. The case studies illustrate the expected variation in conflict types—including

the conditional effects of relative power differences.

Shale Horowitz

University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

[email protected]

Min Ye

Coastal Carolina University

[email protected]

Presented at the 2010 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association,

Washington, DC.

2

In a typical ethno-territorial internal conflict, a state-backed dominant ethnic group and an

outsider ethnic group dispute the distribution of collective goods, including territory claimed by

each side as all or part of its homeland. What explains whether such conflicts are settled

peacefully? Where there is violence, what determines whether the violence is brief or protracted?

What determines whether settlements involve changes to the status quo distribution of disputed

goods, and what determines the extent and character of these redistributions?

Following Collier and Hoeffler (2004), a large statistical literature has tried to explain

such conflicts in terms of either greed—opportunity for gain—or grievance—desire to rectify

relatively adverse conditions.1 Thus, Fearon and Laitin (2003) claim that capacity to launch

successful rebellions (greed) best explains onset of all types of internal conflict. On the other

hand, Sambanis (2001) argues that ethnic conflict onset is better explained by grievance-related

factors. We believe that this debate may be more productively recast by thinking of greed as

involving relative power, and of grievances in the broader terms of leadership preferences.

This approach has at least two significant advantages. First, it focuses our attention on

leadership decisions that are causally proximate to ethno-territorial conflict outcomes. Structural

conditions such as historical events, mass-level conditions, and political institutions can then be

thought of as operating indirectly through their influence on relative power and leadership

preferences. This seems more likely to yield robust and more readily interpreted effects than

looking at direct effects of such structural conditions. Second, the concepts of power and

preferences map more clearly into a strategic choice framework. Strategic interaction of

leaderships seeking the best outcomes as specified by their preferences, and as constrained by

relative power and by one another’s expected strategy choices, yields a rational explanation of

strategy choices as best responses. Such an approach implies that the effect of variation in power

1 Similarly, Gurr and Moore (1997) distinguish between mobilization and grievance variables.

3

is conditional on variation in leadership preferences. In general, variation in power alone or in

preferences alone would not be expected to be reliable predictors.

Following Cetinyan (2002), Jenne (2006), and much of the recent international conflict

literature,2 we use bargaining models to explain ethno-territorial conflict outcomes—onset,

duration, and settlement. Our approach combines two distinctive characteristics. First, we

conjecture that there is likely to be significant variation, not only in relative power, but also in

leadership preferences.3 We distinguish three main ideal-types of leadership preferences—

narrow nationalists, extreme nationalists, and power-seekers. Narrow nationalists balance the

expected costs of crisis and war against the expected gains from crisis and war. Extreme

nationalists heavily discount expected costs of crisis and war, focusing more exclusively on

expected gains. And power-seekers are concerned with the internal political costs and benefits of

crisis and war, taking the expected costs and gains of crisis into account only through their

indirect political costs and benefits. We find that different leadership preference dyads give rise

to different expected outcomes of ethno-territorial bargaining.

Second, we argue that disputes over homeland territories involve goods that are difficult

to divide in a credible manner. Settlements that attempt to divide disputed homeland territories

are more likely to give rise to future disputes. Settlements that keep all or almost all of the

disputed homeland territory in the hands of either the state or the outsider ethnic group are more

likely to be self-enforcing. This is likely to constrain the possible outcomes of ethno-territorial

conflicts.4

2 E.g., Filson and Werner (2002), Powell (1999), Slantchev (2005), and Wagner (2000).

3 Cetinyan (2002) and Jenne (2006) make the neo-realist assumption that outcomes differ primarily due to power

differences, which in turn are assumed to determine expected costs and benefits of bargaining. 4 For a theoretical discussion of indivisible goods, see Fearon (1995); applications to ethno-national territorial claims

are longstanding, e.g., Gellner (1983) and Kaufmann (1996).

4

Variation in leadership preferences and in the balance of power, together with the

indivisible homeland territory constraint, generates a four-fold typology of ethno-territorial

conflict types. Conflict in narrow nationalist-narrow nationalist dyads is more peaceful, with

significant changes in the balance of power sometimes resulting in rapid redistributions of

disputed goods. We call this power-based, discontinuous peace. Conflict between a narrow

nationalist-led state and an extremist-led outsider group is expected to lead to permanent crisis,

whereas conflict between an extremist-led state and a narrow nationalist-led outsider group is

expected to lead to repressive peace. Finally, conflicts involving a power-seeking leadership are

expected to have a chameleon-like character, oscillating with the internal political winds between

outcomes characteristic of either narrow nationalist dyads or of dyads involving extreme

nationalist leaderships.

Little systematic effort has been made to define and measure variation in leadership

preferences directly. Under these circumstances, large-N statistical testing of hypotheses

generated by the ethno-territorial bargaining models is not feasible. Our empirical strategy is

much less ambitious. We focus on a limited number of post-communist case studies, which

exhibit significant variation in leadership preferences and in the conventional military balance of

power. This allows us to try out a consistent approach to measuring leadership preferences, and

to see whether the case studies generate the kind of variation of outcomes predicted by the

models. The case studies indicate the considerable measurement efforts that are necessary before

large-N testing is possible. Yet both the models and the case studies suggest that, until these

measurement efforts are made, it will be difficult to find robust and easily interpreted statistical

predictors.

Ethno-Territorial Bargaining

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The baseline model is a typical Rubinstein bargaining game (Rubinstein 1982). Suppose

a state government and an internal ethnic group bargain over territory and other collective goods.

The total interests at stake are normalized to 1 in each round of bargaining. The status quo is

written as ��, 1 � ��, where � (0 � � � 1) represents the share of Player 1 (the challenger).

Figure 1 illustrates two rounds of bargaining. The bargaining starts with Player 1’s demand

�, 1 � �. On receiving 1’s offer, Player 2 can either accept it or reject it. If the demand is

accepted, the bargaining is over and �, 1 � � becomes the new status quo. If the demand is

rejected, the bargaining enters the next round. The second round starts with Player 2’s demand

�, 1 � �, which again Player 1 can either accept or reject. Unless an agreement is concluded,

the bargaining process continues. In Figure 1, the shadowed triangle denotes the continuous

offers a bargainer can propose: , � �0, 1 . Once begun by the challenger, the bargaining game

has two possible outcomes. The first is an agreement in round �, (, �), where denotes the

share of Player 1 and � stands for the round in which the agreement is reached (� � 0, 1, 2, …).

The second outcome is a deadlock, denoted by ��, if the bargaining continues permanently.

This means the status quo distribution can only be changed by agreement. In other words,

crisis and its associated fighting and costs cannot directly change the status quo distribution; it

can only change it indirectly, by imposing high enough costs to get a player to agree to a

redistribution as a lesser evil to continued crisis. In ethno-territorial conflicts, this can be thought

of as assuming that the conventional military balance favors the pre-existing state. The outsider

ethnic group can put pressure on the state through low-intensity warfare and other disruptions of

ordinary life, but it does not have the military power to seize and hold its desired territory unless

the state chooses to withdraw its superior conventional forces. In later sections, we consider the

implications of relaxing this assumption.

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Figure 1. A Two-Player Crisis Bargaining Game

The typical nationalist bargainer—which we will call a “narrow nationalist”—maximizes

her share of the collective goods pie, while minimizing her costs in the bargaining process. A

narrow nationalist’s utility payoff to an agreement concluded in round � (, �) is defined as

��, �� ∑ ��

�� ∑ ��

��∞

�� !��" , where ��

� �0 $ �� $ 1� is the fixed discount

factor, and �� and ��

�� denote %’s payoff to the status quo (�) before the bargaining is

concluded and to the agreement () afterward. Note that the superscript marks the bargainer’s

type—& refers to the narrow type. The subscript distinguishes between the two players (1 or 2).

In particular, we define ��!�� '!

�, ��(�� 1 � � � '(

�, �!�� , and �(

�� 1 � ,

where '!� and '(

� are the bargaining costs relative to the value of the disputed collective goods. In

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a crisis, it is reasonable to assume 0 $ '!� $ � and 0 $ '(

� $ 1 � �.5 Therefore, 1’s payoff to

�, �� is defined as

�!��, �� ∑ ��!

�� '!�� ∑ ��!

��∞

�� !��" (1)

And 1’s payoff to the outcome of stalemate �� is

�!�� ∑ ��!

�� '!��∞

��" � ) *+,

! -+, (2)

Accordingly, 2’s payoffs (�(�) to agreement �, �� and stalemate �� are

�(��, �� ∑ ��(

��1 � � � '(�� ∑ ��(

��1 � �∞

�� !��" (3)

�(�� ∑ ��(

��1 � � � '(��∞

��" � ! ) *.,

! -., (4)

In Proposition 1, we describe when and how the status quo can be revised in a bargaining

game involving two narrow nationalist players. Intuitively, there will be an agreed redistribution

of collective goods if and only if two conditions are met for each player. For Player 1, who

initiates the crisis, the proposed redistribution makes the player better off than under the status

quo; and there is no alternative redistribution that will make the player better off, while also

being acceptable to Player 2. Player 2 chooses either to accept Player 1’s offer and end the crisis,

or to continue the crisis and make a counteroffer. The proposed redistribution must make Player

2 better off than under continued bargaining; and Player 2 must not be able to improve upon the

proposed redistribution by refusing and making a different counteroffer.

Proposition 1 Under complete information if and only if '!� / �! -.

,�-+,*.,

! -+, and

'(� / �! -+

,�-.,*+,

! -., , the narrow-narrow nationalist bargaining scenario has a unique

stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) in which the status quo can be

revised. In particular, Player 1 proposes �0, 1 � 0�, and accepts only those

offers / 0; Player 2 proposes �0, 1 � 0�, and accepts only those offers

5 The costs may be thought of as resulting from any combination of crisis-induced factors, including war.

8

1 � / 1 � 0; where 0 � ) -+,-.

,)1*., *.

,-., *+

,-.,1-+

,-.,*+,

! -+,-.

, ; and 0 �

) -+,-.

,) *+,1*+

,-+,1*.

,-+, -+

,-.,*.,

! -+,-.

, . As a consequence, the status quo is revised from

��, 1 � �� to �0, 1 � 0�.

Proof Two lemmas are needed to prove this proposition.

Lemma 1: If both bargainers are motivated to change the status quo, there exists a

unique stationary SPE. According to the SPE, Player 1 always proposes �0, 1 �

0�, accepts any offer such as / 0, and rejects any lower offer with �0, 1 �

0�. Player 2 always proposes �0, 1 � 0�, accepts any offer such as 1 � /

1 � 0, and rejects any lower offer with �0, 1 � 0�. In particular, 0 �

) -+,-.

,)1*., *.

,-., *+

,-.,1-+

,-.,*+,

! -+,-.

, ; and 0 � ) -+,-.

,) *+,1*+

,-+,1*.

,-+, -+

,-.,*.,

! -+,-.

, .

Proof Rubinstein (1982) proved that such a bargaining game has a unique

pair of agreements (0, 1 � 0� and �0, 1 � 0�, which constitute the stationary

SPE. In particular, this pair of agreements should render the opponent indifferent

between acceptance and rejection, which suggests:

! 20

! -., � �1 � � � '(

�� -.,�! 30�

! -., ;

30

! -+, � � � '!

� � -+,20

! -+, .

Solving simultaneously for 0 and 0, these two conditions reduce to

0 � ) -+,-.

,)1*., *.

,-., *+

,-.,1-+

,-.,*+,

! -+,-.

, ; and 0 � ) -+,-.

,) *+,1*+

,-+,1*.

,-+, -+

,-.,*.,

! -+,-.

, .

Lemma 2: The condition for the bargaining equilibrium of Lemma 1 to exist is

'!� / �! -.

,�-+,*.,

! -+, and '(

� / �! -+,�-.

,*+,

! -., .

Proof If Player 1 is better off proposing �0, 1 � 0� than maintaining the

status quo, we need 0 / �. This implies 0 / �, or

) -+,-.

,)1*., *.

,-., *+

,-.,1-+

,-.,*+,

! -+,-.

, / � which is equivalent to '(� / �! -+

,�-.,*+

,

! -., .

Similarly, for Player 2 to be better off proposing (0, 1 � 0�, we need 1 � 0 /

9

1 � � or 1 � ) *+,1*+

,-+, -+

,-.,)1*.

,-+, -+

,-.,*.,

! -+,-.

, / 1 � �, which reduces to '!� /

�! -.,�-+

,*.,

! -+, . 8

On the margin, a narrow nationalist bargainer is more likely to gain from a crisis, and

likely to gain a larger redistribution ending a crisis, as her own costs fall, her rival’s costs rise,

her own discount factor rises, her rival’s discount factor falls, and her initial share � of the

contested pie increases.6 The most important sources of bargaining leverage, which allow the

player initiating the crisis to demand a greater redistribution from the other player, are the two

players’ cost and discount factor parameters.7

Variation in Leadership Preferences

From Proposition 1’s conditions for an equilibrium redistribution and the associated first-

order conditions, we can corroborate well-known intuitions about differences in leadership

preferences—as shown in Table 1. Consider first the concept of extremist leaderships. Such

leaderships are thought to disregard the negative consequences of crisis (including war), as long

as the consequences might advance them toward their maximalist goals. Or to state the point the

other way around, such leaderships are thought of as pursuing their maximalist goals in the short

run regardless of the costs. In terms of the preference parameters in our model, extremists’ costs

converge to zero—negative consequences of crisis (war) are disregarded. Extremists care little

for the costs of crisis (war) relative to the benefits of crisis-ending redistributions.

6 This can be seen by checking the relevant first-order conditions in Proposition 1:

92+0

9-+, �

-.,:! -.

,;�*+,1*.

,�

�! -+,-.

,�.< 0;

92+0

9-., �

:-+, !;�*+

,1*.,�

�! -+,-.

,�.$ 0;

92+0

9*+, � �

-.,:! -+

,;

! -+,-.

, $ 0; 92+

0

9*., �

! -.,

! -+,-.

, < 0; 92+

0

9)+� 1.

7 A standard assumption is that bargainers are only concerned about their own benefits and costs. But it is possible

that some players are concerned not only with their own benefits and costs, but also with those of their rivals. Such

“moderate nationalist” preferences are a special case of the narrow nationalist preferences defined above, where the

cost of crisis bargaining includes an own cost and an opponent’s cost component. There is no space here to define

and solve formally a game between a moderate nationalist Player 1 and a narrow nationalist Player 2. However, it is

clear that Proposition 1 applies directly. Because both 0 and 0 decrease in '!�, other things equal, the effect is that,

where a redistribution does occur, the moderate’s higher bargaining costs give the narrow nationalist leverage to

extract a larger redistribution.

10

[Table 1 about here]

Consider the case where an extremist player, who has no crisis costs, bargains with a

(relative) non-extremist, who incurs significant crisis costs. (See Table 1.) The extremist will not

be willing to make any concessions to end a crisis; and, as a consequence, the non-extremist will

have to make quite large concessions to end the crisis, so as to prevent the extremist from

continuing the crisis to hold out for greater concessions. But this situation renders an equilibrium

redistribution impossible. The non-extremist will have to make such large concessions under the

proposed redistribution that she will be far worse off than if she holds fast to the status quo while

the crisis continues. Formally, the non-extremist’s status quo constraint binds against any

redistribution as the extremist’s costs approach zero.8 The extremist cannot be deterred from

starting a crisis, and is indifferent between the outcomes of an unchanged status quo and a

permanent conflict.

Another intuitively common preference type is that of the power-seeking leader, who

uses crisis or war for diversionary purposes. Such leaders do not care intrinsically about either

costs or benefits of crisis. They only value intrinsic costs and benefits for their indirect effects on

political legitimacy and power. As long as crisis delivers short-term net political benefits—say

by diverting otherwise opposed or indifferent elites and masses from other, more politically

adverse issues—power-seeking leaders will initiate and continue a crisis. As long as this political

situation persists, this is equivalent to assuming that net political costs of crisis are “negative”—

that crisis actually confers a benefit.

Now consider the case where a power-seeker benefiting from crisis bargains with an

ordinary, non-extremist player (Table 1). There are two possible outcomes. Either the crisis

continues in perpetuity; or there is some concession that the ordinary player prefers to ongoing

8 A proof is in the on-line Appendix.

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crisis that will deliver political advantages to the power-seeker that are as great as those of

ongoing crisis. Thus, the outcome depends crucially on how the power-seeker evaluates the

political situation, both in terms of the net political benefits of crisis, and in terms of the net

political benefits of any concessions the other player is willing to make to end the crisis. As

always, the other player’s concessions must not violate her status quo constraint.9

Note that the impact of material conditions affecting crisis costs—including the

conventional military balance of power—is necessarily mediated by leadership preferences.

Discount factors also reflect agent preferences that cannot be reduced entirely to material

conditions. Costs of crisis or war, and their origins in the military balance of power and related

conditions such as geography, are often thought of as hard, objective constraints. This is correct

in the sense that goals must be pursued in the context of material conditions that are given. But

the point is misleading if taken as a conclusion. The same crisis conditions—such as casualties,

economic disruption, higher taxes, greater corruption, and intensified domestic repression—are

viewed differently by different types of leaders. Relative to more moderate leaders, more

extreme leaders view the same crisis conditions as involving lower costs. Under political

conditions suitable for diversionary violence, power-seekers view crisis conditions as net

benefits.10

For bargaining in narrow nationalist dyads (Proposition 1), it is reasonable to assume that

crisis costs are monotonically related to the conventional military balance. Other things equal, as

one side’s power grows relative to the other side’s, its crisis costs fall and the other side’s rise. It

follows that favorable changes in the balance of power make it less likely that the benefitting

player will lose from starting a crisis, and more likely that the benefiting player will gain from

9 Again, see the on-line Appendix for a proof.

10 If we depart from strictly ideal-typical preference types, it is also possible that extremists may find diversionary

violence useful—a means to take or retain political power and, thereby, to better pursue their substantive goals.

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starting a crisis; and if a crisis occurs, a favorable change in the balance of power will increase

the gains or decrease the losses from any crisis redistributions. It is clear that that no such effect

will occur for extremist players; and that such an effect may or may not occur for power-seekers,

depending on the internal political consequences of the crisis. Hence, standard “realist-type”

hypotheses about the benefits of favorable changes in the balance of power only apply

unconditionally in the subsample of narrow nationalist-narrow nationalist dyads.

If we turn from changes in relative power to levels of relative power, “realist-type”

intuitions do not hold even in narrow nationalist-narrow nationalist dyads. Holding the material

or objective costs and gains from crisis equal, it is clear that different narrow nationalist

leaderships may attribute different relative values to them. For example, it is possible that a

narrow nationalist leadership could have an objective power disadvantage, and thus bear higher

objective crisis costs, but have a greater tolerance for such costs relative to the potential gains

compared to her narrow nationalist rivals, such that she would gain at the expense of her rival in

a crisis.

Enforcement: Salami Tactics and Indivisible Collective Goods

The ethno-territorial bargaining model assumes that agreements to end a crisis in exchange for

concessions are automatically enforceable. But suppose they aren’t. In that case, the player that

starts a crisis and benefits from an initial redistribution may—taking the redistribution as a new

starting point—benefit similarly by initiating a second crisis, and a third, and so on. The player

that stands to make further concessions knows this, and therefore will only concede anything if

the expected multiple-crisis, terminal stopping point makes her better off than the status quo.

Here note that the status quo constraints do not depend on the status quo or initial distribution;11

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The initial distribution has an influence only on the baseline or starting point for potential redistributions. See

Proposition 1 and the related first-order condition for �.

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and note that the redistribution is increasing in the initial distribution. Taken together, these

results imply that, where an initial crisis leads to a redistribution, there is no multiple-crisis

stopping point until the crisis-inducing player possesses all of the contested goods. But then

there is no incentive for the other player to make any concessions to begin with.

If agreements to redistribute contested goods in exchange for an end to crisis are not

enforceable, Player 2 has no incentive to deviate from the status quo. What kinds of mechanisms

might make agreements self-enforcing? One potential enforcement mechanism is the nature of

the collective goods being contested. Some of these goods are comparable to the archetypal

dollar or “pie.” Examples include central government tax revenues, or revenues thrown off by

mineral extraction in ethnic outsider group regions. But some contested goods are more

indivisible or “lumpy.” One important example is contested territory claimed as all or part of its

homeland by both the state-backed ethnic group and the outsider ethnic group.

Of course, it is possible to divide contested homeland territory like a dollar. But such an

outcome is unlikely to be a reliable stopping point. Getting a little bit of the land that one regards

as one’s homeland is unlikely to satiate the appetite. It may only provide greater resources to

continue to pursue the rest of the desired land in the future. This seems to be why outcomes of

ethno-territorial conflicts usually lie around one of two extremes: either the state retains

sovereignty over all of the contested land, or, less commonly, the outsider ethnic group gains

independence over all or almost all of the contested land. Around each of these extreme

outcomes, there is bargaining over more continuously divisible goods. On the side of continued

state sovereignty, bargaining involves, not only fiscal revenues and other material benefits, but

also administrative and cultural autonomy issues. On the other extreme of outsider group

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independence, there is bargaining over demarcating the new border, and over the destiny and

conditions of the smaller minorities settled on the “wrong” sides of the new border.

Again, contested territory is not literally indivisible. Rather, there are unlikely to be self-

enforcing stopping points except at the two extremes of bargaining. In a bargaining model, what

is the impact of such indivisible goods as contested territory? The expected effect is to increase

the likelihood of self-enforcing bargains at either extreme. Suppose the state leadership and its

likely successors have the power and will to keep sovereignty over the territory in the face of

whatever costs the outsider group leadership can impose. Somewhat paradoxically, this means

that the state can more easily make concessions short of ceding territory—such as granting

greater revenues and autonomy. This is because the state’s power and will to retain sovereignty

over the contested territory provide a credible stopping point to concessions. Many outsider

group leaderships will conclude that they cannot get more, and therefore that they will have to be

content with what is on offer.

In the formal bargaining model, this idea corresponds to adding an additional constraint

on bargaining outcomes. There is some range of outcomes, say between 0.2 and 0.9, which are

not credible stopping points. If the outsider group starts out with 0.1, the existence of the

indivisible region makes it possible for the state leadership to contemplate ceding 0.1, bringing

the outsider group to 0.2, as a means of ending a costly crisis. As long as the state prefers the

self-enforcing stopping point to the status quo under crisis, such a redistribution would be a

credible equilibrium. If the indivisible region did not exist, then the state, knowing that any such

concession would only elicit new and unacceptably large demands, would refuse to budge from

the status quo.

15

Here we note again that the discussion so far assumes that the status quo can only be

changed by agreement, and not as a direct consequence of fighting. This corresponds to

assuming that the conventional balance of power favors the state. The state may not be able to

enforce peace, but it can at least hold the contested territory in the face of an outsider group

uprising for as long as it is willing to incur the relevant costs. Consider the possibility that an

exogenous shock fundamentally alters the military balance behind the initial status quo

distribution.12

Assume that such an exogenous reversal of the initial military balance allows the

outsider ethnic group to seize all or most of its claimed territory from the state. Then the

bargaining resumes under a new status quo distribution, which lies on the other side of the

indivisibility-constrained region. In the next section, we explore the impact of exogenous

changes in the military balance in the context of indivisible territory and variation in leadership

preferences.

Conflict Types: Status Quos and Their Breakdown as a Function of Leadership

Preferences and the Balance of Power

Table 2 summarizes four major conflict-types, which correspond to the most common leadership

preference dyads. In all cases, suppose that the ex ante conventional military balance favors the

state. To simplify, suppose that this means that the status quo distribution cannot be changed

except by a credible agreement, which depends on preference parameters (crisis costs and

discount factors) and territorial indivisibility constraints. With two narrow nationalist

leaderships, the conflict type can be characterized as discontinuous peace. We expect a power-

based peaceful status quo, which is the result of a previous crisis. The status quo is expected to

lie at the low or high end of the indivisibility-constrained region consistent with preserving the

12

Examples of such exogenous shocks are paralysis of state institutions due to conflicts among state leaders; civil

war among elements of the dominant ethnic group; and loss of a war with an external state.

16

state’s territorial integrity. A sufficiently large exogenous change in the conventional power

balance may alter bargaining leverage so as to shift the status quo from one side of the initial

indivisibility-constrained region to the other (from low to high autonomy, or high to low

autonomy);13

or all the way to the other indivisibility-constrained region (corresponding to

independence for the outsider group).

[Table 2 about here]

With one extremist and one narrow nationalist leadership, the expected conflict type

depends on whether the extremist leadership is on the state or the outsider group side. With a

narrow nationalist state and an extremist outsider group, we expect permanent conflict. The

status quo persists as the state fights the extremists. The extremists ignore the costs, and hope to

help precipitate a balance of power change that will deliver independence. With an extremist

state and a narrow nationalist outsider group, we expect a repressive peace. The state maintains a

low-autonomy status quo using a credible threat to use overwhelming force against any

opposition. The narrow nationalist outsider group leadership prefers to avoid the expected high

costs of fighting, until an exogenous change in the power balance delivers independence at an

acceptably low cost.14

In the case of one power-seeking and one narrow nationalist leadership, all the other

status quos and possible changes can be generated. If the power-seeking leadership’s political

costs of crisis exceed its political benefits, then it may behave like a narrow nationalist leadership

that prefers the peaceful status quo. If the power-seeking leadership’s political benefits exceed its

costs, then it may behave like an extremist leadership; or it may behave like a narrow nationalist

13

We assume that high autonomy is also associated with high state-level policy benefits to the minority, and low

autonomy with low state-level policy benefits. 14

Here we assume that the extremist state is willing to tolerate the continued existence of the outsider group. If this

is not the case, then permanent conflict again becomes the expected outcome for as long as the outsider group

persists on the state’s territory.

17

leadership with enough bargaining leverage to force a favorable redistribution by agreement.

Over time, then, changing political conditions are expected to produce chameleon-like conflict

behavior.15

Of course, leadership or regime changes may alter one or both leadership preferences in a

dyad. This would be expected to transform one type of conflict into another. If one narrow

nationalist leadership replaces another, this is not expected to change the conflict type. Rather, it

is expected to change the thresholds at which exogenous balance of power changes produce the

crisis-and-redistribution episodes that punctuate the peaceful status quo periods.

Illustrations from Russia and Yugoslavia

We now illustrate the different types of conflict by examining cases from Russia and Yugoslavia

during the transition from communism in the early 1990s. (See Table 3.) For Russia, we examine

the two cases of Chechnya and Daghestan. For Yugoslavia, the five potential conflict

relationships considered are Serbia-Kosovo Albanians, Serbia-Slovenia, Serbia-Macedonia,

Serbia-Croatia, Serbia-Bosnian Muslims.16

We make no claim that these cases are randomly

selected. They are used because they exhibit significant variation in the main independent

variables—leadership preferences and the conventional military balance of power—and because

they are recent and well-researched.

Following the logic of the bargaining models as summarized in Table 2, we are interested

in checking whether, in each case, the preference dyads and military balance correctly predict the

conflict type—including onset, duration, and mode of termination of any crisis.17

In reviewing

15

Two extremists, or one extremist and one power-seeker, are expected to produce conflicts like that of one

extremist and one narrow nationalist; and two power-seekers are expected to produce chameleon-like conflicts. 16

We use “Bosnia” instead of “Bosnia and Herzegovina,” and “Russia” instead of “Russian Federation.” 17

Recall that a crisis is defined as any use of force, or credible threat to use force, seeking to change the status quo

between the state and an outsider ethnic group. A credible threat to use force is here taken to include not just a

threat, but also armed forces mobilized to take territory or other collective benefits that, under the status quo, are

controlled by the other side.

18

the examples, we are also interested in noting practical difficulties that seem likely to arise for

large-N statistical testing.

In Table 4, we show the template with the various kinds of information used to measure

leadership preferences, with specifics filled in for the case of Chechnya’s Dzhokar Dudayev.

Here we only attempt a rough three-fold classification of leaders into narrow nationalist, extreme

nationalist, and power-seeking types. The on-line Appendix provides a more detailed discussion

of the different kinds of information used, and of the different ways it might be aggregated into

quantitative measures. The Appendix also includes the filled-out templates for the other

leaderships classified in the case studies below.

[Tables 3 and 4 about here]

Consider first the Russia cases.18

Russia’s Boris Yeltsin and Daghestan’s leaders are

coded as narrow nationalists, and Chechnya’s Dzhokar Dudayev is coded as an extremist.

Yeltsin did not attempt to claim any of the many regions of other Soviet Republics that have

concentrated majorities of ethnic Russians.19

Even prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union,

Yeltsin urged Russia’s autonomous regions to claim the autonomy that was their constitutional

right, but that was denied in practice under Soviet rule. In other words, Yeltsin’s preliminary

offer, in anticipation of ethno-territorial bargaining within a sovereign Russia, was to shift the

status quo from the low-autonomy to the high-autonomy end of the bargaining region consistent

with maintaining Russia’s territorial integrity. This offer was accepted by Daghestan’s leaders,

but rejected by Chechnya’s Dudayev. Dudayev seized power and territorial control in Chechnya

and declared his intent to accept nothing less than independence—and to fight Russia for it if

necessary. In Daghestan, the outcome was an immediate, peaceful shift from low to high

18

See Aron (2000), Colton (2008), Dunlop (1998), and Ware and Kisriev (2009). 19

The seizure of Moldova’s Transnistria region by ethnic Russian leaders was synchronized with the hard-line

communist coup attempt against Mikhail Gorbachev. The coup’s failure brought Yeltsin to power.

19

autonomy. This kind of peaceful shift occurred in all of Russia’s autonomous regions except

Chechnya. In Chechnya, there was war, which continued under Dudayev, and after he was killed

in a Russian missile strike, also under his extremist successors.20

Why was Daghestan the norm and Chechnya the exception? Given Russia’s huge power

advantage and its traditional will to use it where necessary, only an extremist or, possibly, a

secure power-seeking leader, would accept the costs and risks of fighting Russia for

independence.21

The contrast between Daghestan and Chechnya is just as predicted for the two

types of preference-dyad—narrow nationalist-narrow nationalist and extremist minority-narrow

nationalist state—in Table 2. The leaderships of Russia’s other autonomous regions were either

moderates, as in Daghestan, who shrunk from the high expected costs of fighting for

independence; or power-seekers, who acted like moderates because they were afraid of the

political risks and costs of confronting Russia militarily.

If we did not allow for the possibility of preferences other than the narrow nationalist

type, it would be difficult to explain an outcome like Chechnya-Russia. Note also that the

general model of bargaining between narrow nationalists does not have complete predictive

power for a case like Russia-Daghestan. Although it predicts that protracted crisis or war will be

avoided, and that a state (like Russia) with a large power advantage will retain its territorial

integrity, it does not predict whether or not there will be an agreement to move away from the

status quo within the region bounded by the territorial indivisibility constraint. This depends on

the relative costs and discount factors of the moderate leaders. In this case, why, given Russia’s

power advantage, did Yeltsin make such a generous autonomy offer? The literature gives two

20

After Dudayev’s death, power among the Chechens was divided, and more moderate Chechen leaders failed to

contain the violence of the extremists. 21

Despite Dudayev’s remarkable military exploits, Chechnya was decimated, and is unlikely to gain any more

autonomy than Yeltsin offered to begin with.

20

main answers (Aron 2000; Colton 2008; Dunlop 1998). First, Yeltsin was looking for a formula

that would work for all of Russia’s many autonomous regions. The potential linkages between

the different dyads meant that Yeltsin expected higher costs from trying to impose centralized

rule than if there had been only one or two autonomous regions. Second, Yeltsin sought to recruit

Russia’s ethnic minorities to support his internal political struggle against the Duma-based

opposition of neo-communists and ultra-nationalists.

Moving on to Yugoslavia, we consider the cases of Serbia-Slovenia, Serbia-Croatia,

Serbia-Macedonia, Serbia-Bosnian Muslims, and Serbia-Kosovo Albanians.22

While Serbia’s

Slobodan Milošević is classified as a power-seeker, the other leaders are classified as narrow

nationalists—although the Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegović was closer to an extremist

than the others. (For details, see the Appendix.) There were pronounced differences in relative

power. Serbia’s ability to invade and conquer Slovenia was very much in doubt, while Serbia’s

capacity to take territorial control over Kosovo was not. The Serbia-Croatia balance was closer

to Serbia-Slovenia—although Croatia was closer and had large, concentrated Serb minorities.

Serbia could be expected to have an easier time only in the heavily Serb regions. The balances

for Serbia-Macedonia and Serbia-Bosnian Muslims were closer to Serbia-Kosovo Albanians.

The initial offer of Milošević’s Serbia was to reimpose central control over Serbia’s

autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina; and to reimpose central control over the

Yugoslav state, with Serbia and its allies in the collective presidency to assume a dominant

position. Milošević knew that Slovenia’s and Croatia’s leaders would not accept such centralized

rule; and he promised that, if any Republic seceded, he would champion the right of concentrated

Serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia to secede in turn. This meant that Milošević offered to “let

22

We do not consider the cases of Croatia-Bosnian Muslims and Macedonia-Macedonian Albanians. The main

reason is that both potential conflicts were initially avoided by consensus, pending the outcome of the more

threatening conflicts with Serbia and the local Serbs. See the concluding section.

21

go” completely of Slovenia and Macedonia, but, in the event that Croatia and Bosnia seceded,

insisted on taking control over their heavily Serb regions.23

Serbia seized control of hitherto autonomous Kosovo. Slovenia, Croatia, and later,

Bosnia (Muslims and Croats) seceded, as Serbia mobilized its Croatian Serb and Bosnian Serb

allies to take control over their regions of settlement.24

The Croatian and the Bosnian Muslim

leaderships decided to fight for the heavily Serb regions rather than cede them independence; nor

did they offer high autonomy. Macedonia negotiated its independence with Serbia without acting

unilaterally. The Kosovo Albanian leadership declared independence, but adopted a passive

resistance posture instead of fighting Serbia.

There was no violence over Macedonia’s separation, and only light skirmishes for a few

days before Slovenia’s. Between Croatia and Serbia, there was intense fighting for a few months,

followed by a cease-fire that left Serbia and its local Croatian Serb allies in control of Croatia’s

heavily Serb regions. Croatia resumed the war in 1995 and quickly overran the contested regions.

Croatia’s victory was quickly ratified by a lasting peace agreement. For Serbia and the Bosnian

Serbs versus the Bosnian Muslims, there was an intense war that lasted for over four years, and

ended in 1995 with the de facto territorial partition of Bosnia.25

First, compare the cases of Serbia-Slovenia and Serbia-Macedonia.26

Both Republics

could be reasonably confident that Milošević would let them secede. But the contrast between

Slovenia’s unilateral secession—which Slovenia’s leaders openly proclaimed their will to fight

for—and Macedonia’s slow and cautious pursuit of an agreement with Serbia is best explained

23

The Serbian public did not care about Slovenia and Macedonia, since these Republics had no significant

concentrated Serb minorities. Milošević was particularly happy for Slovenia to go, because this promised to give his

bloc a majority on the collective presidency, and hence control over the Yugoslav People’s Army. 24

Both in Croatia and Bosnia, Serb forces also seized regions predominantly populated by Croats and Bosnian

Muslims, to create greater contiguity among the Serb-controlled regions and Serbia proper. 25

For an overview of the Yugoslav wars, see Silber and Little (1996). 26

For Serbia-Slovenia, see Đukić (2001), Gow (2000), Silber and Little (1996), and Thomas (1999). For Serbia-

Macedonia, see Đukić (2001), Silber and Little (1996), and Thomas (1999).

22

by the different military balances. Slovenia’s leaders expected to be able to defeat any efforts to

stop them—whether by Milošević or by traditional communists in the Yugoslav Army—and so

saw no good reason to wait or compromise.

Next, compare the cases of Serbia-Kosovo Albanians, Serbia-Croatia, and Serbia-

Bosnian Muslims.27

With their eyes on Milošević’s apparent ruthlessness and their own military

disadvantage, the Kosovo Albanian leaders—Ibrahim Rugova and the Democratic League—

decided on non-violent resistance. Their calculations were amply confirmed by the ferocity of

Milošević and his local Serb allies in the heavily Serb regions of Croatia and Bosnia.

Once Slovenia seceded, Milošević gained control over the collective presidency and the

Yugoslav People’s Army. Croatia and Bosnia had to choose between submitting to a Serbia-

dominated recentralized Yugoslav state and risking wars for independence. Although both chose

war, Croatia’s Franjo Tudjman was the more cautious. First, Tudjman knew that Milošević

wasn’t interested in the bulk of Croatia, beyond the heavily Serb regions. Hence, independence

for the bulk of Croatia was the minimum expected gain. As for the heavily Serb regions,

Tudjman saw no need to cede them preemptively when Serbia’s ability to take and hold them

was unclear. As soon as Croatia’s maximum capacity to hold territory became clear, after a few

months of fighting, Tudjman readily agreed to a cease-fire—which stopped the bleeding but left

large Croatian territories in Serb hands. He then used the breathing spell to build up Croatia’s

military capacities and await a good opportunity to recover the territorial losses. From 1994, with

the U.S.-brokered Croat-Muslim alliance and the associated military aid, the balance of power

shifted, allowing Tudjman to reconquer the lost territories in 1995.

27

For Serbia-Kosovo Albanians, see Đukić (2001), Malcolm (1998), Perritt (2008), Silber and Little (1996), and

Thomas (1999). For Serbia-Croatia, see Burg and Shoup (1999), Đukić (2001), Silber and Little (1996), Tanner

(2001), and Thomas (1999). For Serbia-Bosnian Muslims, see Burg and Shoup (1999), Đukić (2001), Silber and

Little (1996), Thomas (1999), and Zulfikarpašić (1998).

23

Izetbegović refused to consider either a deal allowing high Serb autonomy within Bosnia,

or a passive resistance strategy like that of the Kosovo Albanians. Yet, compared to Croatia, the

Bosnian Muslims were in an a much more vulnerable situation: they accounted for less than half

of Bosnia’s population; they had concentrated settlement mainly around Bosnia’s central cities,

which were encircled mostly by Serb regions to the east and west, and to a lesser extent by Croat

regions to the north and south; and they had no access to the sea and only an unreliable tactical

ally in Croatia. Izetbegović remained uncompromising even after Milošević’s methods were

showcased in Croatia. Once the war started, Izetbegović would not accept a Croatia-style cease-

fire that would trade a breathing spell for leaving the Bosnian Serbs with their military gains.

The Bosnian Muslim population paid a very high price for Izetbegović’s refusal to compromise

before or during the war. Although the Bosnian Muslims were ultimately rescued by U.S.

military aid and intervention, they ended up with exactly the decentralized state of three

ethnicities that Izetbegović refused to accept before the war.

Croatia’s relative caution is the opposite of what is expected from the different ex ante

military balances. Izetbegović’s less moderate preferences, which he openly proclaimed before

the war started, best explain his will to take on greater risks and costs. At the same time, an

extremist like Dudayev might have continued the war even after 1995—even though the U.S.

and Croatia would not have supported the Bosnian Muslims in such a war. Izetbegović remained

moderate enough to stop short of such a Chechnya-like catastrophe.

What about Milošević’s behavior? Milošević’s behavior is consistent with power-seeking

preferences, in the sense that his ideological turn to a nationalist agenda in the mid-1980s,

emphasizing the cause of the Kosovo, Croatian and Bosnian Serbs, was the key issue that

allowed him to defeat Serbia’s powerful anti-communist nationalist opposition. The filled-out

24

template in the Appendix summarizes evidence of such preferences that is beyond the scope of

how Milošević initiated and terminated the uses of force in Kosovo, Croatia, and Bosnia. In

addition, note that Milošević’s choices do not seem consistent with any particular kind of sincere

nationalist preferences. In particular, Milošević’s choices fit into a pattern of aggressiveness-

followed-by-retreat, or extremism-followed-by-moderation, that damaged Serbia’s national

interests.

The ex ante international diplomatic position was that Yugoslavia could only be

partitioned by peaceful agreement—meaning that Slovenian, Croatian, and Bosnian Muslim

leaders seeking independence would have to be the ones to defy international norms in pursuing

their goals. Milošević could have deployed the Yugoslav People’s Army to heavily Serb regions

of Croatia and Bosnia, and allowed Croatian and Bosnian leaders to be the ones to use violence

first. By initiating the use of terror and ethnic cleansing in the opening stages of the Croatia and

Bosnia wars, Milošević gained little military advantage. But he turned Western public opinion

and leaders against Serbia. The initial international response to the Yugoslav conflicts had been

to impose an arms embargo on all Yugoslavia, which reinforced Serbia’s initial military

advantage. But after Serbia’s war-fighting methods were widely publicized, it was Serbia alone

that was targeted with economic sanctions; and eventually the U.S. intervened to broker and back

the Croat-Muslim alliance, which shifted the military balance. Once the balance shifted in favor

of Croatia and the Bosnian Croats and Muslims, Milošević pragmatically sold out the Bosnian

Croats in exchange for an end to the war and a reduced area of control for the Bosnian Serbs.

What happened to the old Milošević, the nationalist firebrand that would not compromise Serb

interests? Milošević seemed to recognize the new military balance, and feared that military

defeat would threaten his hold on power in Serbia. From 1997, the same scenario unfolded again

25

in Kosovo, as Milošević’s risky but politically convenient over-reaction to Kosovo Albanian

low-intensity warfare28

produced U.S.-led intervention, and was followed by Milošević’s retreat

in the face of such superior force. Overall, the pattern is not one of consistent extreme

nationalism or consistent narrow nationalism, but rather an inconsistent oscillation that sacrificed

long-term nationalist goals for short-term, diversionary political convenience. The resulting

crisis-patterns sometimes look like extremist-led permanent violence until total victory; and

sometimes look like narrow nationalist-led compromise to maximize nationalist gains at lower

cost levels.

The Russia and Yugoslavia cases from the early 1990s illustrate a range of conflict types

over indivisible territory that are generated by variation in leadership preferences, along with

exogenous changes in the balance of conventional military power. Extremist leaderships (such as

Chechnya’s Dudayev), and power-seekers that see political benefits from acting like extremists,

generate permanent crises when leading an outsider ethnic group against a much more powerful,

moderate-led state (such as Yeltsin’s Russia); and generate repressive peaces when leading a

state (such as Milošević’s Serbia) against a much less powerful, narrow nationalist-led outsider

ethnic group (such as Rugova’s Kosovo Albanians). Two narrow nationalist leaderships (such as

those of Yeltsin’s Russia and Daghestan) are likely to live peacefully with the preexisting status

quo—until there is a sufficiently large, destabilizing change in the balance of power to trigger a

brief crisis, which is followed by a shift to a new status quo consistent with the new power

balance. A power-seeker may see political benefits in acting more like an extremist or more like

a narrow or moderate nationalist. Hence either type of outcome may be generated, but it will be

conditional on short-term political calculations rather than on the (generally more stable) power

28

This low-intensity warfare was conducted by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a late-developing extremist

organization distinct from Rugova’s Democratic League.

26

balance. Thus, Milošević initiated vicious wars in Croatia and Bosnia when acting like an

extremist. The short-term political advantages were bought at the expense of international

isolation, which eventually shifted the conventional power balance against Serbia. Faced with

this greater threat, Milošević abruptly turned to acting like a narrow nationalist, making strategic

retreats with the collateral benefits of avoiding military defeats that would have threatened his

hold on political power. Here we see the chameleon-like transformation of one type of conflict

into another, based on short-term calculations of political costs and benefits.

Conclusions

In bargaining models of internal ethno-territorial conflict, different leadership preference dyads,

coupled with indivisible territory and exogenous changes in the balance of power, generate a

typology of conflict types. Bargaining between narrow nationalist leaderships leads to

discontinuous, power-based peace—in which leaderships support the status quo until sufficiently

large changes in the balance of power lead to redistributions of disputed collective goods. By

contrast, extremist outsider group leaderships facing narrow nationalist-led states are expected to

yield permanent crisis; and extremist state leaderships confronting narrow nationalist outsider

group leaders should be associated with repressive peace. Power-seeking leaders are expected to

generate chameleon-like conflicts, as changes in diversionary gains and losses lead to behavior

like that of narrow nationalists or that of extremists. Holding other factors equal, sufficiently

large changes in leadership preferences are expected to transform one type of conflict into

another.

Realist-influenced accounts that focus mainly on variation in the balance of power cannot

easily account for much of the variation in conflict types. At best, such accounts are likely to do

well in explaining variation in outcomes in leadership dyads involving narrow nationalists. Even

27

here, variation in model parameters such as crisis costs and discount factors cannot be reduced

exclusively to changes in the objective military balance of power. With an unchanged balance of

power, different narrow nationalist leaders may give rise to different distributions of disputed

goods; and changes from one narrow nationalist leadership to another may give rise to a crisis

and result in a fresh redistribution. Strict balance of power-oriented accounts do even more

poorly in accounting for the outcomes generated by extremist or power-seeking preference types.

Of course, incorporating leadership preferences is not an alternative to incorporating

power, since preferences trump or override power differences only in cases of extremists, and

sometimes, power-seekers. By pointing out the more limited subset of cases in which the balance

of power is likely to function in its canonical role, an approach emphasizing preferences is likely

to strengthen the empirical case for the importance of power—albeit across a narrower set of

cases.

The case studies analyzed above are no more than illustrative—showing that the variation

in conflict types implied by the theory are observed in at least some cases. Moreover, the case

studies make clear that there are significant barriers to large-N testing. The following barriers are

particularly significant. It is necessary to measure not only relative power, but also leadership

preferences, for large samples. In some cases, this includes multiple leaderships capable of

initiating crisis and war on a given side of a potential conflict—usually the outsider group side.

Moreover, conflict behavior in a given dyad may be conditional on outcomes in other conflict

dyads. Clearly, measuring variation in leadership preferences, in relative power, and in conflict

linkages across large samples promises to be extremely labor-intensive.

Would such a measurement effort be worth it? Consider the long lists of independent

variables used by statistical analysts such as Collier and Hoeffler (2004, 578-9), Fearon and

28

Laitin (2003, 84), and Sambanis (2001, 270). It is common to bewail the lack of robust results

across such studies. We argue that there is a related theoretical problem. Most of the variables

are far back in the causal chain, and are not easily interpreted in terms of either power or

preferences. For example, per capita income is often interpreted in terms of state capacity or

power. But ethnic outsider groups are likely to have per capita incomes correlated with the state

level. So how can information at the state level be a reliable proxy for relative power? Others

have interpreted high per capita income as a proxy for wise governance and more content

outsider ethnic groups. So it may be correlated with more moderate leadership preferences. What

causal mechanisms are to be attributed to a statistically significant per capita income coefficient?

Similar points can be made about institutional variables, such as level of democracy and change

in level of democracy. What about variables that pick up ethno-structural characteristics of

states, such as population composition and spatial settlement patterns? Again, these might be

expected to predict both relative power and leadership preferences. International intervention?

This obviously affects relative power. But particularly on the outsider ethnic group side, it would

also be expected to affect leadership preferences. We conjecture that it will not be clear how to

interpret such variables until they are examined, not only for their direct effect on conflict

outcomes, but also for their indirect impact through more causally proximate relative power and

leadership preferences variables.

Future research should also attempt to refine the bargaining models. For example,

expected changes in the balance of power could be modeled explicitly. Once way to do this

would be to allow status quo distributions to be altered, not just through negotiated agreements,

but also as an explicit outcome of war. Players would have expected probabilities of war-induced

29

changes in the status quo distribution, and would take account of these in their bargaining.

Another refinement would be to allow uncertainty about leadership preferences.

We also note that variation in leadership preferences would be expected to have a similar

impact in other types of conflict—for example, in other types of internal wars and in

international conflicts. Similarly, the concept of indivisible goods and their role in creating more

credible peace agreements may be helpful in explaining the outcomes of these other types of

conflict. For example, some internationally disputed territories may be relatively indivisible, say,

for reasons involving ethnic composition or geography. In ideological civil wars, state power

may be a relatively indivisible disputed good.

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32

Table 1. Preference-Dyads and Crisis Onset, Duration, and Resolution

Preference-Dyad Crisis Onset Crisis Duration Crisis Resolution

Two Narrow

Nationalist

Leaderships

Narrow nationalist

initiates crisis if

relative costs and

discount factors

provide sufficient

bargaining leverage,

and as long as status

quo constraint is not

violated.

Very short. Player with greater

leverage obtains

proportionate transfer.

One Extremist and

One Narrow

Nationalist

Leadership

Extremist cannot be

deterred from

initiating crisis.

Permanent crisis. None: size of transfer

demanded by

extremist always

violates narrow

nationalist’s status

quo constraint.

One Power-Seeking

and One Narrow

Nationalist

Leadership

Assuming that

political benefits

exceed political costs,

power-seeker initiates

crisis.

Depending on size of

net crisis benefits

relative to maximum

transfer acceptable to

narrow nationalist,

crisis either

permanent or very

short.

Either there is no

resolution (where

crisis is permanent),

or power-seeker

obtains transfer

proportionate to

bargaining leverage

(where crisis is very

short).

Notes: Cases of two extremists, and of one extremist and one power-seeker, have the same

characteristics as that of one extremist and one narrow nationalist. With two power-seekers, if

political benefits exceed political costs for both leaderships, then case has the same

characteristics as those with one or two extremists.

33

Table 2. Preference-Dyads and Conflict Types

Preference-Dyad Likely Status Quo Effects of Balance of Power Change Conflict Type

Two Narrow

Nationalist

Leaderships

State preserves territorial integrity, with

status quo likely to be peace with

equilibrium distribution at either extreme

of region bounded by territorial

indivisibility constraint (low or high

autonomy).

Low-autonomy status quo: If balance

shifts to favor state, no change; if balance

shifts to favor minority, size of shift

determines whether there is no change,

change to high autonomy, or change to

independence (other side of indivisibility

constraint).

High-autonomy status quo: If balance

shifts to favor state, size of shift

determines whether low autonomy will

become new status quo; if balance shifts to

favor minority, size of shift determines

whether there is no change, or change to

independence.

Power-based, discontinuous

peace: Status quo persists unless

balance of power changes are

sufficiently large in a destabilizing

direction. Any resulting crisis is

short, and resolved by shifting to a

new status quo.

Extremist

Minority and

Narrow

Nationalist State

Leaderships


status quo likely to be crisis with




autonomy).

If balance shifts in favor of state, or to

limited extent in favor of minority, no

change. If balance shifts strongly enough

in favor of minority, change to

independence.

Permanent crisis: Status quo with

crisis persists until extremist

military victory.

Extremist State

and Narrow

Nationalist

Minority

Leaderships


status quo likely to be peace at low-

autonomy end of region bounded by

territorial indivisibility constraint.

If balance shifts in favor of state, or to

limited extent in favor of minority, no

change. If balance shifts strongly enough

in favor of minority, change to

independence.

Repressive peace: Peaceful status

quo persists unless balance shifts

enough to allow narrow nationalist

military victory.

One Power-

Seeking and One

Narrow

Nationalist

Leadership

State preserves territorial integrity; where

net political benefits of crisis for power-

seeker negative, like case of two narrow

nationalists; where such benefits positive,

status quo likely to be crisis with




autonomy).

Depending on direction and size of power

change and its effects on power-seeker’s

net political benefits of crisis, all changes

discussed for other preference-dyads are

possible.

Chameleon-like conflict: Initiation

and duration of crisis depend on

any changes in power-seeker’s net

political benefits, as well as on

any changes in power. Conflict

dynamics more unstable, because

dependent on domestic politics as

well as on rival’s preferences and

any power changes.

34

Table 3. Illustrations from Russia and Yugoslavia

Preference-Dyad Old Status Quo Preference and Balance of Power

Changes

Conflict Type and Crisis Effects

Two Narrow Nationalist

Leaderships

1. Russia (Yeltsin) and

Daghestani Leaders

1. Soviet Union preserved territorial

integrity, with Russia’s minority regions

having no significant autonomy under

old communist regime.

1. Shift to narrow nationalist

Russian and Daghestani

leaderships, with new power

balance strongly favoring Russia.

1. Peace persisted with shift to

higher autonomy, and no crisis.

Extremist Minority and

Narrow Nationalist State

Leaderships

1. Russia (Yeltsin) and

Chechnya (Dudayev)

1. Soviet Union preserved territorial

integrity, with Russia’s minority regions

having no significant autonomy under

old communist regime.

1. Shift to narrow nationalist

Russian and extremist Chechen

leaderships, with new power

balance still strongly favoring

Russia.

1. Despite high autonomy granted

by new Russia leadership,

permanent crisis.

35

Table 3 (Continued). Illustrations from Russia and Yugoslavia One Power-Seeking and

One Narrow or Moderate

Nationalist Leadership

Old Status Quo Preference and Balance of Power

Changes

Conflict Type and Crisis Effects

1. Serbia (Milošević)

and Slovenia (Demos

coalition)


and Croatia (Tudjman)


and Bosnian Muslims

(Izetbegović)


and Kosovo Albanians

(Rugova and Democratic

League)


and Macedonia (League

of Communists)

1. Yugoslavia preserved territorial

integrity, with Republics and

autonomous provinces having

high autonomy and other regional

minorities having no significant

autonomy, under old communist

regime.

2. Same as 1.

3. Same as 1.

4. Same as 1.

5. Same as 1.

1. Shift to power-seeking Serbian and

narrow nationalist Slovenian

leaderships, with new power balance

favoring Slovenia.


narrow nationalist Croatian


more even; in 1994-95, power balance

shifted in favor of Croatia.


narrow nationalist Bosnian Muslim


favoring Serbia and Bosnian Serbs; in

1994-95, power balance became more

even.


narrow nationalist Kosovo Albanian


strongly favoring Serbia; in 1997,

parallel KLA extremist leadership

emerged; in 1999, power balance

shifted in favor of Kosovo Albanians.


narrow nationalist Macedonian


favoring Serbia.

1. Initial crisis with high autonomy;

followed by peace with independence

for Slovenia.

2. Initial crisis with high autonomy;

followed by cease-fire with

independence for Croatia and de facto

independence for Croatian Serb regions;

in 1994-95, followed by renewed crisis

and absorption of old Croatian Serb

regions into Croatia; followed by peace

with independence for all of Croatia.

3. Initial crisis with high autonomy; in

1995, important Bosnian Serb regions

taken by Croats and Bosnian Muslims;

followed by peace with de facto

independence for Bosnian Serbs.

4. Initial repressive peace with no

autonomy for Kosovo Albanians; in

1997, followed by crisis and, in 1999,

withdrawal of Serbian forces; followed

by peace with de facto independence for

Kosovo Albanians.

5. Initial peace with high autonomy for

Macedonia; followed by peace with

independence for Macedonia.

36

Table 4. Leadership Preferences over Nationalist Goals in Potential Ethno-Territorial Conflicts: Chechnya

Indicator Leadership: Dzhokar Dudayev Moderate vs. Extreme Nationalist Dimension:

1) Direct evidence of the nature and extent of

nationalist goals and the costs accepted in

pursuing them, as indicated by statements and

actions, in the time-period examined. Actions

include: will to initiate violence against the rival

group in given relative power conditions; will to

initiate violence against own-group rivals; concern

for costs imposed on rival group.

In both statements and actions, an uncompromising commitment to a fully independent

Chechnya. Was willing to initiate use of force against Russia despite overwhelmingly

adverse balance of power—and historical precedent of great losses in previous conflicts

with Russia and the USSR. Used force decisively against moderate Chechens and all other

Chechen political challengers. No effort to reassure ethnic Russians. To contrary, pursued

exclusive cultural policies and made little effort to provide physical security to ethnic

Russians—amounting to an informal ethnic cleansing policy. Willing to use any kind of

force—including terrorism—judged helpful in achieving independence goal. Threatened to

use terror in response to Russian use of force to stop independence, and during First

Chechen War did so. 2) Indirect evidence in the time-period examined:

moderation or extremism concerning other

political goals or in personal life.

Power and independence were pursued to the virtual exclusion of other political goals—at

significant economic and social cost to Chechnya.

3) Prior to the time-period examined—particularly

prior to period of rule—direct and indirect

evidence of moderation or extremism.

Little relevant evidence. No record of overt political activity or statements of any kind

during Soviet-era military career.

4) Moderate or extremist characteristics of

promoted or supported fellow leaders. Supported other leaders of stature as long as they were similarly committed to independence

goal. Principled vs. Unprincipled Dimension:

1) Consistency of stated goals; and consistency of

strategies with stated goals. Includes record in

previous time-periods, especially prior to ruling.

From the late Soviet era, consistent support for independence, and use of means to achieve

that goal.

2) Will to take political or personal risks to

achieve stated goals. Includes record prior to

ruling.

Willing to risk power and personal safety to pursue independence goal. Includes personal

involvement in military operations; and Russian assassination attempts that ultimately

succeeded. 3) Evidence of principled beliefs and behavior in

other policy areas and in personal life. Includes

nature and extent of personal and client

corruption. Includes record prior to ruling.

No evidence of unprincipled behavior in personal life or of personal corruption. Tolerated

massive corruption among subordinates as long as these supported his rule and

independence goal.

4) Principled or unprincipled characteristics of

promoted and supported fellow leaders. Support for his rule and goal of independence were key requirements. Corruption and policy

differences on other issues were tolerated.

Categorization: extreme, principled nationalist. Source: Dunlop (1998).

37

Documents

Land Dispute Settlements and Their Breakdown: Credibility, Indivisibilities, and Preferences in Ethno-Territorial Conflicts