It’s Nakba, Not a Party: Re-Stating the (Continued) Legacy of the Oslo Accords

ASQ 37.2 Produced and distributed by Pluto Journals

“it’S NAKBA, not A PArty”: re-StAtinG tHe (Continued) leGACy oF tHe oSlo ACCordS

Somdeep Sen

Abstract: two decades later, how should we conceptualize the relevance of the oslo Accords today? this article reconstitutes our understanding of the Accords through three parameters and purports that the legacy of the interim Agreement is one that oscillates between what it has failed to achieve with regard to the Palestinian quest for statehood and what it continues to do as a mechanism influencing the “brand” Palestinian politics that can be practiced (uninhibitedly) within the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt). in this way, charting the path for future research, this article concludes that any subsequent studies on Palestinian politics and political behavior would need to account for both what the Accords has not done and what it continues to do.

Keywords: Palestine, oslo Accords, Hamas, resistance, Nakba, liberation

the question is what comes first, building a state or liberation. today we have a government but it’s a government without a state. And this principle is a problem of oslo. For people in Gaza, the normal people, liberation is the most important but what combination should we have? not West Bank, of course. the problem now is that we don’t have a term of reference. neither are we part of the Palestinian Liberation organization and neither are we part of Palestinian Authority.

—Wesam Afifa, director General, Al-resalah Media institution (Hamas-affiliated)1

the oslo Accords were a mistake. in the beginning it was sold as the first step for the Palestinians to create a state. But we can see that it was false hope and painted a rosy picture. they deceived us by giving us false hope. it was a big illusion ... it was not there to create a state but it is there to decrease the cost of the occupation.

—Ghazi Hamad, Hamas deputy Foreign Minister2

To say that the Oslo Accords or the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements have had an emblematic impact on our study of Palestinian politics would be an understatement. A simple word search of “Oslo” through the back issues of the Journal of Palestine Studies, a peer-reviewed publication focused solely on “Palestinian affairs and the Arab-Israeli conflict,”3 lists a myriad of articles that while studying vastly different aspects of the politics

Somdeep Sen, PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark.

ASQ37_2 161 05/05/2015 13:59

162 ArAB StudieS QuArterLY

www.plutojournals.com/asq/

of the “Holy Land” still use the Oslo Accords as a point of reference. But despite embodying an illustrative centrality to academic (and public discourse) on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it may still seem particularly curious that two decades after the official signing of the Oslo Accords, it continues to be held responsible for the crises Palestinian politics faces today. It is true that the year 2013 marked the 20th anniversary of the Oslo Accords and prompted non-profit organizations, think tanks, media outlets, and academics4 to re-emphasize the “missed opportunities” of the post-Oslo period. But back in October 1993, Edward Said had already declared the agreement to be a (tragic) spectacle of Palestinian rights being traded for public recognition by a tired, weary, politically challenged and materially deprived liberation faction.5 Similarly, Mahmoud Darwish6 in “A Non-Linguistic Dispute with Imru’ al-Qays” deemed the Accords a mere euphemism for a “triumphant” Israel and a “diminishing” scope for achieving Palestinian aspirations for a national home.7 Finally, the most spectacular criticism of the Oslo Accords came in the form of the Al-Aqsa Intifada (2000-2005), through which Palestinians insisted, “... this time around, the struggle will continue until Israel both agrees to a genuine peace and actually implements it.”8 Then, with all this already said, how should we understand the relevance of the Oslo Accords to Palestinian politics today?

In order to answer this question, this article reconstitutes our understanding of the Interim Agreement and outlines three critical legacies that inform the status of the Accords in Palestinian politics 20 years after its signing. Accordingly, the first, and the most pertinent, legacy of the Accords remains hinged on its inability to establish a Palestinian state. In light of this, for Palestinian factions, the Oslo Accords is a continuous reminder of the need to persist with the liberation struggle and the logic of resistance. Second, the Oslo Accords (and its failures) brought to prominence Hamas or the Islamic Resistance Movement as an organization that was able to garner immense legitimacy as an oppositional force operating outside the dictates of the Accords. Since its 2006 election victory, the organization could be seen as influenced by the statist logic imbued in the Accords. Nevertheless, before 2006, it pioneered the manner in which the Palestinian resistance could be persisted with outside the framework of Oslo despite the resources available to the Palestinian Authority (PA) for “policing”9 those in opposition to its logic and mandate. And third, the least discussed effect of Oslo is in fact rooted not in what it failed to do but in what it aimed to achieve. Here, this article purports that the Accords created a realm of “official politics” that incentivizes a certain brand of Palestinian liberation factions (that are unarmed and recognize Israel) while dis-incentivizing others. In this way, it continually influences and affects the brand of Palestinian political organizations that are able to operate, uninhibited, within the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt). On the basis of these legacies, one could then assert that the Oslo Accords features prominently in the Palestinian political

ASQ37_2 162 05/05/2015 13:59

re-StAtinG tHe (Continued) LeGACY oF tHe oSLo ACCordS 163


consciousness today not only through its failures but also the continued influence it has on the manner in which Palestinian politics can be conducted. This article then concludes with a postscript characterizing the specific Palestinian political environment that emerges out of such an understanding of the Oslo Accords and the influence it has on our study of Palestinian politics.

oslo and the (Still) elusive Palestinian State

As a prelude to the signing of the Oslo Accords, letters exchanged between Arafat and Rabin set the logic of the agreements that would follow. On September 9, 1993, Arafat, in his communication to Rabin, recognized “the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security,” accepted United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 242 and 338,10 committed himself to the Middle East Peace Process, renounced “the use of terrorism11 and other acts of violence and agreed to assume responsibility over all PLO [Palestinian Liberation Organization] elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators.”12 In response, Rabin wrote that the Government of Israel had “... decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process.”13 Then, following this communication,14 the Oslo Accords or the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo I) was signed. The document declared that it represented an agreement between Palestinians and Israelis

... to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process.

While the agreement subsequently established the PA and a legislative council (Palestinian Legislative Council [PLC]), many wondered how the Interim Agreement would transform itself into a “permanent settlement” without any semblance of agreement on the most divisive issues such as “Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, [and] borders.”15

Despite our lingering premonition that a “brave gamble” in the form of the “first agreement between Jews and Palestinians to end their conflict and share the holy land along the River Jordan” may fall short in its aspirations, few were immune to the euphoria of Oslo. For the undiscerning observer, the Accords symbolized a “blank wall” on which Israelis and Palestinians would chart a new future of the “holy land” that would prioritize “reality” over “romantic longings”16 of two warring nations. The significance of the agreement was not lost to Israelis

ASQ37_2 163 05/05/2015 13:59



and Palestinians either. At the signing, Yitzak Rabin, the Prime Minister of Israel, declared,

We the soldiers who have returned from the battle stained with blood ... we who have fought against you, the Palestinians, we say to you today in a loud and clear voice: “enough of blood and tears! enough!”

In response, Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the PLO, basking in the glory of “recognition,”17 declared “Our two peoples are awaiting today this historic hope, and they want to give peace a real chance.”18 Tragically for Palestinians, two decades after this historic moment, the Interim Agreement has remained and so far failed to institute a “permanent settlement.” In essence, this means that over the years, Rabin’s “peace by installments”19 has proven ineffectual in ensuring the sovereignty of the Palestinian administrative authority, limiting the spread of Israeli settlements, allowing Palestinians access to natural resources and arresting the rapid economic downturn experienced in the Palestinian Territories. Then, with all these facets being foundational to the Palestinian aspiration for a state, the Interim Agreement’s most ostensible failure has been its inability to provide for a viable and territorially inviolable Palestinian state. That said, these failures have persisted alongside the continued prominence of Oslo-mandate institutions (specifically the PA), despite their lack of sovereignty and the recognition of the PLO (by Oslo signatories) as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian populace,20 despite its inability to dismantle the Israeli military infrastructure in

Figure 1 Entrance to a Hamas Summer Camp, Gaza Strip, June 2013 (taken by the author)

ASQ37_2 164 05/05/2015 13:59



the Palestinian territories. In light of this, for Palestinians, the Oslo Accords often serves as a reminder of the persistent occupation of the Palestinian territories and subsequently, the need to continually “fight” the same. This was pointed out to me at the “Welcome Area” of a Hamas summer camp in the Gaza Strip (Fig. 1) where a wooden replica of a gun (placed between a key and the Koran21) was meant to symbolize that “negotiations22 will never work.”23 Ironically, the implication here is that with two decades of ineffectual Interim Agreements in view, the Accords, while meant to be a vanguard of recognized politics (with the absence of an armed struggle), instead has become a cautionary tale of failed “official” and “direct” negotiations and a “point of reference” giving legitimacy to activism outside its framework.

oslo and the “resistance” on its Margins

Since the 2006 PLC elections, several works24 have purported that Hamas was now an organization firmly entrenched on a path of transformation.25 Moreover, its continued commitment to a twofold role (as government and resistance) and, in recent times, a significant decline in military operations (targeting Israel) would seem indicative of an Islamic Resistance wavering between working both within and outside the dictates of the Oslo mandate. Nevertheless, in its early days, it was through the failures of the Oslo Accords that the organization found credence among the Palestinian populace. That said, as it chastised the Interim Agreement as a “reflection of defeatism”26 and the imposition of the will of the strong (Israel) on the weak (Palestine),27 Hamas also pioneered the manner in which al-thawra al-Filistiniya or the Palestinian Revolution could be (successfully) conducted on the margins of the Accords. It did so through two foundational features of its (post-Oslo) political activities:

First, Hamas’s political activism on the margins of Oslo manifested most prominently through its commitment to an armed struggle against Israel, at a time when Arafat had effectively renounced the same. As the Oslo Accords unraveled along with Palestinian hopes for eventual statehood, an armed struggle (as committed to by Hamas) was for many the continued “institutional embodiment”28 of Palestinian aspirations. Through its military engagements with Israel, manifested in “... popular uprisings, mobilization, strikes, ... military attacks against the Israeli army and settlers [and] suicide bombings in the heart of Israeli cities,”29 Hamas was then able to mobilize the Palestinian community in the oPt and render Palestinians a formidable political force.30 Moreover, through its role in the Al-Aqsa Intifada and its military “performance” in subsequent hostilities with Israel, the organization emphasized its, still relevant, popular status as the “... only

ASQ37_2 165 05/05/2015 13:59



organization capable of inflicting costs ... sufficient to persuade Israel to withdraw from Gaza, and perhaps someday from the West Bank as well.”31

Second, the post-Oslo period was marked by an economic downturn, border closures, dwindling per capita incomes, unemployment, illiteracy, and rising rates of child labor, alongside high levels of corruption in the PA.32 Moreover, while Hamas challenged the framework of the Interim Agreement through its armed struggle, its consistent maintenance was continuously challenged by Israeli military, and Fatah-led Palestinian security forces’ targeted campaigns aimed at dismantling the Islamic Resistance’s military infrastructure and maintaining the primacy of the PA-agenda (detailed below). For this reason, Hamas, born out of the destitute life of Palestinian refugee camps and considered receptive33 to the Palestinian socio-economic crises through its experience as the Mujamma,34 maintained a robust separate social wing (established in the early 1990s35) that played an important role in alleviating the economic distress through its educational, medical, and welfare institutions.36 In doing so, it maintained its public profile and legitimacy among a socio-economically emaciated Palestinian populace. In addition, it furthered communitarian values that restored and rejuvenated the Palestinian society in wake of “steady deterioration”37 and allowed it to say, “we are here, we exist and we are organized.”38

In this way, Hamas’s military and social service operations responded to the “needs” of a people under occupation and embodied an opposition to the logic and vocabulary of the Oslo Accords. Subsequently, it was on the basis of this status in the post-Oslo era that the organization’s resonance with Palestinians was tangibly confirmed through significant victories in local professional, labor, and student union elections in the 1990s. Furthermore, as a prelude to the 2006 PLC elections, it secured one-third of the seats in the municipal and legislative elections between 2004 and 2006 and signaled a significant shift in the political power balance in the Palestinian Territories.39 While this is the “story” of Hamas’s rise to the helm of politics, it is also demonstrative of how a successful politics of resistance could be conducted on the margins of the Accords. Ostensibly, a faction’s commitment to an armed struggle would serve as the most palpable symbol of opposition to the Interim Agreement. That said, a military means of contention would not only face repercussions from the vastly superior Israeli armed forces but will have to contend with the “policing” efforts of the security personnel of the PA.40 Then, socio-civilian operations become a key facet of an organization’s operational scope that replenishes not only a socio-economically emaciated population (under occupation) but also a platform for ensuring that the ethos and spirit of resistance remain relevant in the collective Palestinian consciousness.41 Hamas, before 2006, was successful in achieving this goal. But today, as it toys with the prospect of working within the Oslo mandate for reasons elaborated below, the path it forged

ASQ37_2 166 05/05/2015 13:59



and pioneered outside its realm remains as model for resistance on the margins of the Interim Agreement and is seemingly being tread by the likes of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip.

oslo and the Palestinian liberation Faction

So far, we have demonstrated the continued legacy of the Oslo Accords as a result of what it has failed to provide for the Palestinian quest for a state. But a frequently ignored facet of the Interim Agreement is its persistent relevance as a result of the manner in which it influences how Palestinian factions (are allowed to) conduct politics. The most tangible manifestation of this aspect of the Accords is evident in its creation of a realm of official Palestinian politics. At the very outset, entrance into this realm is limited to Palestinian organizations that have publicly renounced an armed struggle and recognized Israel. Subsequently, the faction would be deemed a “legitimate” representative of the Palestinian populace and granted a permanent seat in negotiations with Israel and Western stakeholders. Once a Palestinian faction abides by this pre-condition, it is given the responsibility of governing the Palestinian territories42 and would subsequently have access to the financial resources earmarked for the PA.43 As the PA is responsible for key sectors such as education, culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism,44 the resultant expectation would be that the recognized Palestinian faction, through its entrance into official politics, would be socialized into the reasoning of the state and out of the logic of resistance. Finally, in keeping with the “statist logic”45 of Oslo-mandated official politics and abiding by the image of a Weberian state (and its monopoly over violence), the recognized Palestinian faction would also be responsible for ensuring the primacy of the mandate of the state-like PA (evocative of the logic of “official politics”) through the Palestinian internal security forces.

With the creation of such a realm of official politics where Palestinian factions are expected to engage in more state building and no fighting (with Israel), one could assert that the Oslo framework and logic attempt to reconstitute what it means to be a liberation organization in the Palestinian Territories. In order to achieve this aspiration,46 it incentivizes a brand of Palestinian liberation faction that in return for renouncing an armed struggle and recognizing Israel would be granted international recognition as a representative of Palestinians and a “partner in peace”47 and have the mandate to govern the Palestinian territories with state-like monetary capital and the ability to practice public violence against its detractors. The appeal of this “brand” can be witnessed in the dramatic transformation of the PLO, from being (historically) seeped in the revolutionary ethos to becoming a signatory to the Accords.48 In 1974, Yasser Arafat, as the chairman of the PLO in his speech at the United Nations declared, “Today I have come bearing an olive

ASQ37_2 167 05/05/2015 13:59



branch and a freedom fighter’s gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. I repeat: do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.”49 In this imploration, what is implicit is that the “gun” is central to the revolutionary in a manner reminiscent of Fanon’s assertion that “[n]ational liberation, national reawakening, restoration of the nation to the people or Commonwealth ... decolonization is always a violent event.”50 That is to say, even though “peace” (non-violence) symbolized by the olive branch is a viable alternative for the revolutionary, it can be easily relinquished while the gun would perennially remain. But a little over a decade later, Arafat renounced the armed struggle and effectively deemed it (as practiced by Palestinian factions against Israel) an illegitimate manifestation of Palestinian aspirations toward statehood. One cannot ignore that Arafat’s allowances were a reflection of a tired, weak, and materially challenged liberation faction. Nevertheless, the fact that Fatah decided to renounce a historically foundational feature51 of the Palestinian liberation movement for an agreement that failed to address inalienable facets of the Palestinian claim also demonstrates the pervasive appeal of the Oslo-mandated realm of official politics.

Having incentivized a brand of Palestinian liberation faction, the disincentives imbued in the Oslo-logic are not merely limited to barring (non-complying) Palestinian factions from entering “official politics.” Instead, it renders activism outside its realm a difficult enterprise. This is evident through most of Hamas’s life cycle. While the Islamic Resistance was able to “maintain popular support as the main opposition to Oslo,”52 its operations on the sidelines of the historic (yet failing) Interim Agreement resulted in the organization facing “mass deportations, arrest campaigns, the banning of its publications, and targeted assassinations.”53 As demonstrated earlier, it was its resilient activism on the margins that then ensured the organization’s success in the 2006 PLC elections. But, with this victory, as Hamas maintained its role as a “resistance,” it challenged the foundational logic of Oslo and the delimitations it places in terms of the brand of Palestinian faction it allows into the realm of official politics. That is to say, its victory ensured that the organization would rise to the helm of the PA’s governance structures. But by remaining officially committed to its role as an armed liberation faction, it violated the pre-conditions that, until now, needed to be fulfilled before a Palestinian faction was allowed entrance into the realm of official politics and granted the responsibility of governing Palestinian Territories. In order to then ensure the primacy of the delimitations placed around the realm of Oslo-mandated official politics, what then ensued was the inducement of a “failed state”

... centered on preventing Hamas from governing effectively and on generating

intense public dissatisfaction with its performance ... [hoping] ... it would lead to the

ASQ37_2 168 05/05/2015 13:59



government’s downfall and restoration of Fatah to power, whether through the conduct of new elections or other means.54

Abiding by this strategy and under threat of US sanctions, Fatah refused an offer from Hamas to form a national unity government55 and government workers (loyal to Fatah), including members of security forces, refrained from assisting the newly appointed PA leadership in the everyday functioning of institutions.56 In an offensive against the economy of Palestine, the EU and the USA imposed sanctions and blocked the transfer of funds to the PA. Furthermore, tertiary actors were threatened with prosecution if found dealing with the Palestinian authorities, banks, and business.57 Subsequently, regular battles between Hamas and Fatah cadres in the Gaza Strip became publicly evocative of the struggle between the pervasive logic of (official) Palestinian politics as established through Interim Agreement and the challenge it now faced in the form of Hamas (as the government and resistance). Expectedly then, the February 2007 Mecca Agreement for power sharing between the two warring parties, brokered by Saudi Arabia, failed to de-escalate the crisis on ground.58 Then, as Fatah prepared to launch a coup in order to forcibly remove Hamas from power,59 the resilience of the Oslo-logic and its commitment to ensuring that only a particular “brand” of Palestinian faction is able to operate within its dictates became self-evident.

With Hamas’s complete takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007, one may be encouraged to purport that the organization overcame the logic of the Interim Agreement. But following approximately seven years of an economic and political blockade and three major military campaigns against the Gaza Strip, the disincentives of the Oslo Accords seem to have had a lasting impact on Hamas identity. Indicating this, Ahmed Yousef, former advisor to Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, hinted that the Islamic Resistance was keen on transitioning into the realm of (official) recognition when he said, “Hamas is not the same movement it was when it first came into being. It is much more mature now. Today it pays a lot of attention on politics.”60 Even Hamas, while critical of the Oslo Accords, emphasized,

Since 2006 many things have changed. Before 2006 we have only been in the opposition and resistance. After 2006, we have been part of the PLC and PA. We have agreed to idea of ceasefire. We have been open to the world and more realistic as a movement. Within Hamas there have been changes. We have become more democratic.61

When placed within the mechanism of (dis)incentives imbued in the Oslo-mandate realm of official recognition, it is the strength and vitality of the Oslo-logic that becomes palpably visible in conversations with members of the Islamic Resistance. In terms of what it aimed to achieve, the Interim Agreement is geared at

ASQ37_2 169 05/05/2015 13:59



transforming Palestinian factions into amiable partners in negotiations, concerned with the governing and policing of the Palestinian territories (than militarily engaging with Israel), while posing a minimal military/security to the Jewish state. Then, in addition to its failures, the agreement today can be characterized as an institutional embodiment and framework geared at changing the foundational characteristics and subjective identity of Palestinian liberation factions.

“it’s a Nakba, not a Party”: oslo Accords and the Study of Palestinian Politics

Be it Banksy’s “West Bank Guard” or Naji al-Ali’s “Handala,” artistic expressions of the Palestinian plight frequently traverses the themes of “resilience,” “resistance,” and “remembrance.” But it was a hastily scribbled proclamation, “It’s a Nakba, Not a Party, Idiots,” on a door in Ramallah’s Arafat Square that truly grasped the realities of Palestinian politics today (Fig. 2). The Oslo accords effectively bureaucratized a guerrilla movement62 and ensured, as noted by a former bodyguard of Yasser Arafat, that the Palestinian fighter took off “the fatigues and put on a suit.”63 But in doing so, it instilled all the ostensible symbols of “normalcy” into the Palestinian every day. As the Palestinian “state-in-exile” came home,64 Oslo-mandated institutions such as the PA created a semblance of the manifested Palestinian state that has been aspired to forever since Palestine had been relegated65 to the realm of memory and a time passed. But, as the Interim Agreement ensured that a “party” ensued under the auspices of the “State of Palestine,”66 few are in doubt that in spite of the trappings of normalcy, the real Palestinian state is far from becoming a manifested reality. Behind the façade of the Oslo-induced “party” lies the canvass of a continued catastrophe or Nakba imbued in the economic downturn in the Palestinian Territories, the continued vitality of the Israeli settlement movement, the limited sovereignty accorded to the PA, and the human rights crises that plague the oPt. Then, 20 years later, it is a Palestine that wavers between the “party” and Nakba that informs the legacy the Accords still holds within the Palestinian political landscape and collective consciousness. What the Interim Agreement has not achieved for the Palestinians continues to persist alongside the continued influence it enjoys over how Palestinian factions (can) behave within and on the margins of the Oslo-mandate realm of official politics. It is then this political reality that informs the relevance of the Oslo Accords today.

Having characterized the Accords in the manner detailed above, two subsequent implications surface with regard to the manner in which we study Palestinian politics. First, the Oslo Accords, as a “point of reference,” emerges as more than an agreement that failed. Instead, it embodies a logic of politics that still enjoys an unrelenting influence on Palestinian political behavior. When this article was being

ASQ37_2 170 05/05/2015 13:59



prepared, Hamas and Fatah had agreed, as part of a unity agreement, that 3,000 members of the Palestinian police force would be transferred to the Gaza Strip from the West Bank.67 While seemingly a “historic step” on the path to reconciliation between two most prominent Palestinian organizations, it is particularly interesting that in the midst of a plethora of socio-economic challenges the Gaza Strip faces today, it is the transfer of the PA’s police force that took priority. While a multitude of reasons could be written into this “first step” of compromise between Fatah and Hamas, for the purpose of this article, the most palpable reality that emerges out of it is the prominence of the Oslo-logic. Reconciliation is not symbolized by the easing of the blockade that has engulfed the Gaza Strip since 2007. Instead, the path to “normalization” of relations between Hamas and Fatah is marked by the arrival of the vanguards of the Oslo-mandated official politics. By entering the Gaza Strip, the PA police force subsequently symbolized the insertion of the Oslo-logic into a territory that, under the tutelage of Hamas, has so far embodied a critical challenge to its dictates. Then, with regard to future research on Palestinian politics, few can deny the need to continue studying individual Palestinian political organizations, their ideological orientation, and their specific political priorities. But such a pervasive influence of the Oslo Accords on Palestinian politics, as described above, also demonstrates that Palestinian political organizations are immensely beholden to the political environment that surrounds them. For this reason, studies on Palestinian politics would need to recognize that Palestinian organizations’ individuality and agency frequently contend with, and are

Figure 2 “It’s Nakba Not a Party, Idiots,” Ramallah, West Bank (taken by the author)

ASQ37_2 171 05/05/2015 13:59



challenged by, the “rules of the game” as set forth by the political environment they inhabit in order to truly grasp political realities of the oPt. And second, while this article has focused primarily on the influence of the Oslo Accords on the behavior of Palestinian factions, one would be remiss not to recognize the impact it has on the Palestinian populace. While failures of the Oslo Accords continually affect and influence the economic, political, and social lives of a people under military occupation, the need to be relieved of this detrimental environment (through liberation) also persists alongside the “state-like” realm of official politics within which the Palestinians have been born and socialized. Then, with a people still striving for liberation, what is the impact of the pervasive symbols of normalcy (or “party”), in the form of the state-like activities that shape and order the daily life in the oPt? How have the two decades of a state-like authority affected the manner in which Palestinians visualize the path to liberation? Have the lapses of the Oslo Accords overwhelmed the public perception and rendered it an irrelevant digression on the path to Palestinian statehood? Or, like its influence on Palestinian factions, have the (dis)incentives of the Oslo-logic trickled down into the Palestinian public consciousness as well and somehow largely changed the mind-set of a people aspiring for liberation? The limited scope of this article does not allow us to deliberate these questions further. Nevertheless, what is apparent is the scope for further ethnographic research that considers the influence the Interim Agreement has had on the way a people under occupation think—not only in terms of their individual futures and aspirations but also that of an entire populace.

Acknowledgments

This article is an abridged version of a chapter from my PhD dissertation. I would like to thank the Danish Institute in Damascus and the Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen for funding the fieldwork that resulted in this article. I would also like to thank Dr. Sune Haugbølle and Dr. Ben Rosamond for their insightful comments on earlier versions of this article. Finally, I would like to thank Jehad Abu Salem, Saeed Ismail, Omar Shaban, Bassam Silwady, and Ahmed Sukker for their support during my fieldwork in the Gaza Strip.

notes

1. Author Interview, Gaza Strip, June 2013. (Also cited in: Somdeep Sen, “Bringing Back the Palestinian State: Hamas between Government and Resistance,” Middle East Critique 24:2 (2015).)

2. Author Interview, Gaza Strip, June 2013. (Also cited in: Sen, Somdeep. (2015). Bringing back the Palestinian State: Hamas between Government and Resistance. Middle East Critique 24(2), [Page numbers not yet available].)

ASQ37_2 172 05/05/2015 13:59



3. “About Us,” Journal of Palestine Studies, accessed May 12, 2014, http://www.palestine-studies.org/jps.

4. See: “20 Facts: 20 Years since the Oslo Accords.” Oxfam International (September 13, 2013); Bente Scheller, Rene Wildangel, and Joachin Paul, “20 Years since Oslo: Palestinian Perspectives.” Heinrich Böll Stiftung (December 5, 2013); “Oslo at 20: Unfinished Peace Process.” Al Jazeera America (September 2013); Hassan Jabareen, “20 Years of Oslo: The Green Line’s Challenge to Statehood Project,” Journal of Palestine Studies XLIII:1 (2013), 41-50.

5. Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement: 1949-1993 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 638-662.

6. Darwish resigned from the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s (PLO) Executive Committee following the signing of the Oslo Accords.

7. Mahmoud Darwish, The Adam of Two Edens (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 123. (Also see: Sinan Antoon, “Mahmud Darwish’s Allegorical Critique of Oslo,” Journal of Palestine Studies 31:2 (2002), 66-77).

8. Mouin Rabbani, “Rocks and Rockets: Oslo’s Inevitable Conclusion,” Journal of Palestine Studies 30:3 (2001), 77.

9. The 1993 Declaration of Principles mandated the creation of a Palestinian police force under the auspices of the Palestinian Authority, the institutional mechanism for Palestinians self-gov-ernance. While Article VIII specifically outlined establishment of the police force under the title “public order and security,” its responsibilities were further detailed in the context of different aspects of post-Oslo Palestinian politics in Articles III, VI, XIII, and Annex II.

10. The UN Security Council Resolution 242 was adopted on November 22, 1967, in the wake of the Six Day War and emphasized “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.” In that it affirmed that “just and lasting peace in the Middle East” could only be achieved through Israeli withdrawal of troops from occupied territories and recognition of “the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.” The UN Security Council Resolution 338 was adopted on October 22, 1973, and called for the end of the Yom Kippur War.

11. Read as “the abandonment of an armed struggle against Israel.”12. Arafat vaguely alluded to these principles in his speech at the UN General Assembly (GA)

on December 13, 1988. With the USA unhappy with the equivocal nature of Arafat’s speech, he called a press conference the next day where he specifically accepted the above principles. Arafat’s speech at the UNGA can be accessed from: http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/pal/pal5.htm.

13. “Israel-PLO Recognition: Exchange of Letters between PM Rabin and Chairman Arafat,” The United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL), accessed April 23, 2014, http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/36917473237100E285257028006C0BC5.

14. This could be seen as the logic and framework of the relationship between the PLO and Israel that continues to enjoy primacy today.

15. “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements,” The United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL), accessed April 23, 2014, http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/71DC8C9D96D2F0FF85256117007CB6CA.

16. Meron Benvenisti, Sacred Landscape: The Buried History of the Holy Land since 1948 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), 8.

17. It was the Nakba or “catastrophe” of 1948 that rendered Palestinian a people without a home and relegated Palestine to the pages of history. What then ensued was a period often termed as the “lost years” where the Palestinian cause seized to exist on the landscape of international politics. But, ever since the 1950s with Palestinian student organizations emerging across urban centers of the Middle East, for the Palestinians in exile, the aspiration has been to chart the return of the Palestinian cause as an “issue” of international concern and to transform the “memory” of Palestinian into a tangible and manifested reality. Then, with the path “home” from exile being all but tumultuous, the Oslo Accords was, for some, a climactic juncture as it symbolized the

ASQ37_2 173 05/05/2015 13:59



recognition of Palestinian aspirations as legitimate on the South Lawn of the White House. (For more on the “lost years” to the “road to return” see: Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 178-180).

18. Thomas L. Friedman, “Rabin and Arafat Seal Their Accord as Clinton Applauds ‘Brave Gamble’: Old Warriors Now Face Task of Building Upon Foundation.” The New York Times (September 13, 1993).

19. Avi Shlaim, “The Oslo Accord,” Journal of Palestine Studies 23:3 (1994), 38.20. This effectively left organizations such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad outside the

realm of official politics, despite being representative of a significant section of the Palestinian populace.

21. The key symbolizes the Palestinian “Right of Return” and Holy Koran represents the righteous path to liberation.

22. While this is a criticism of all negotiations, with the Oslo Accords still determining the framework of direct negotiations with Israel, it could be seen as an implicit criticism of the Accords as well.

23. Author Interview with Hamas-appointed Translator (name withheld on request), Gaza Strip, June 2013.

24. See: Are Hovdenak, “Hamas in Transition: The Failure of Sanctions,” Democratization 16:1 (2009), 59-80; Michael Irving Jensen, The Political Ideology of Hamas: A Grassroots Perspective (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 147; Loren D. Lybarger, Identity and Religion in Palestine: The Struggle between Islamism and Secularism in the Occupied Territories (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 3; Khaled Hroub, “A ‘New Hamas’ through Its New Documents,” Journal of Palestine Studies 35:4 (2006), 6-27; Baudouin Long, “The Hamas Agenda: How Has It Changed?” Middle East Policy 17:4 (2010), 131-143.

25. The implicit claim being that Hamas is transitioning into becoming an organization informed primarily by its socio-civilian activities rather than its armed operations.

26. Meir Hatina, “Hamas and the Oslo Accords: Religious Dogma in a Changing Political Reality,” Mediterranean Politics 4:3 (1999), 40.

27. Hatina, “Hamas and the Oslo Accords”, 40.28. Yezid Sayigh, “Armed Struggle and State Formation,” Journal of Palestine Studies 26:4 (1997),

20-21.29. Khaled Hroub, Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide (London: Pluto Press, 2006), 44.30. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, 23.31. Krista E. Wiegand, Bombs and Ballots: Governance by Islamist Terrorist and Guerrilla Groups

(Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2010), 132.32. For an overview see: Sara Roy, “The Crisis Within: The Struggle for Palestinian Society,”

Critique 9:17 (2000), 5-30.33. Hatina, “Hamas and the Oslo Accords”, 39.34. Rooted in the ideology, organizational structure, and operational network of the Palestinian

Muslim Brotherhood (MB), Hamas was the immediate successor to al-Mujamma’ al-Islami or the Islamic Center, established in the Gaza Strip in 1973. Founded by Sheikh Yassin and ten others, it controlled mosques and zakat committees, and used the available financial resources to run a multitude of social service activities including medical facilities. What the MB in general and the Mujamma in particular built on were Arab (nationalist and socialist) failures of 1967 and subsequently the rise of the Islamists in the Middle East. That said, while vehemently criticized by nationalists and leftists in Palestine, at this juncture the Mujamma limited itself to non-violent activities in bid to build a “strong community” capable of facing a brutal Israeli occupation, a logic commonly relayed in Islamist oppositional tactics against colonizers. By 1985, the Mujamma had garnered approximately 2,000 members and was tacitly supported (and legalized in 1978) by Israeli authorities in a bid to create an oppositional front to the PLO authority. It was then at the “breaking point” of the First Intifada that the Mujamma transformed itself into an armed faction in the form of Hamas. (Are Knudsen, “Crescent and Sword: The Hamas Enigma,” Third World

ASQ37_2 174 05/05/2015 13:59



Quarterly 26:8 (2005), 1376; Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 27; Hroub, Hamas, 15).

35. Wiegand, Bombs and Ballots, 127.36. Hamas’ social service operations are broadly categorize as educational (kindergarten, schools,

enriching group activities, summer camps, and universities), medical (clinics and hospitals), religious (mosques and Quran memorizing institutes), and welfare (distributing financial and material aid, especially during economic crises, Muslim holidays, and Ramadan). (Eyal Pascovich, “Social-Civilian Apparatuses of Hamas, Hizballah and Other Activist Islamic Organizations,” Digest of Middle East Studies 21:1 (2012), 130).

37. Sara Roy, Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza: Engaging the Islamist Social Sector (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 15.

38. This quote is also drawn from my conversations with the Hamas-appointed translator who escorted me around a Hamas summer camp. For more on Hamas summer camps and what they symbolize for the Palestinian struggle, see: Somdeep Sen, “Summer Fun, Hamas-Style.” Open Democracy, 12 July 2013, accessed from: http://www.opendemocracy.net/somdeep-sen/summer-fun-hamas-style-0.

39. Tavishi Bhasin and Maia Carter Hallwark, “Hamas as a Political Party: Democratization in the Palestinian Territories,” Terrorism and Political Violence 25:1 (2013), 76; Jeroen Gunning, Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence (London: Hurst & Company, 2007), 144-145.

40. In a US Congressional Research Service report titled “U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority,” Zanotti notes that the Palestinian security forces are often modeled as a national army—“housed in barracks, classified by military rank, and subject to a military style command structure” (Jim Zanotti, “U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority.” Congressional Research Service (January 8, 2010), 13). But with the legal mandate to act like a real army, its function is often limited to policing and maintaining law and order in the Palestinian territories. In practice, this has also meant that the internal security forces have played a key role in eliminating oppositional forces from the areas under their direct control.

41. Socio-civilian operations allow organizations to achieve this goal without extracting the material and human costs frequently associated with military confrontations with Israel and PA security forces.

42. It is important to remember that the mandate to govern through the PA would be determined by the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections.

43. It is important to note that at the time of its signing the financial incentives of the Oslo Accords played a very important role as the PLO faced a significant financial crisis with the dwindling financial assistance from Iraq and the Gulf States during the Gulf crisis and “threatened the neopatrimonial system of control maintained by Arafat” (Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, 656-657). In 2014, the budget of the Palestinian Authority is said to be US$4.2 billion. An income of US$2.7 billion is expected from taxes and fees, while US$1.6 billion is expected in foreign aid.

44. With these responsibilities mandated by Article VI of the 1993 Declaration of Principles, Article VII declared that the PLC (once elected) would establish a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority, and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority.

45. Yossi Shain and Gary Sussman, “From Occupation to State-Building: Palestinian Political Society Meets Palestinian Civil Society,” Government and Opposition 33:3 (1998), 275.

46. And bring Palestinian factions within its dictates.47. Essentially denoting factions with whom Israel is willing to engage in direct negotiations.48. It is important to note that this transformation was not without opposition from within the ranks

of Fatah and the PLO. But despite “spirited resistance,” Arafat was able to garner the approval of the Fatah central committee. From the PLO executive committee, Arafat received only 9 (out of 18) votes in favor of the Accords but “resignations or self-imposed absences of five opponents”

ASQ37_2 175 05/05/2015 13:59



meant that he was able to proceed with the Interim Agreement (Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, 658).

49. Text of Arafat’s speech can be accessed at: http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/cahier/proche-orient/arafat74-en.

50. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963), 1.51. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, 667-670.52. Wendy Kristianasen, “Challenges and Counterchallenges: Hamas’s Response to Oslo,” Journal

of Palestine Studies 28:3 (1999), 19.53. Beverly Milton-Edwards and Alistair Crooke, “Elusive Ingredient: Hamas and the Peace

Process,” Journal of Palestine Studies 33:4 (2004), 41.54. Yezid Sayigh, “Inducing a Failed State in Palestine,” Survival 49:3 (2007), 14.55. Sayigh, “Inducing a Failed State in Palestine,” 16.56. Hovdenak, “Hamas in Transition,” 69.57. Sayigh, “Inducing a Failed State in Palestine,” 17-18.58. Beverly Milton-Edwards, “The Ascendance of Political Islam: Hamas and Consolidation in Gaza

Strip,” Third World Quarterly 49:8 (2008), 1586.59. David Rose, “The Gaza Bombshell.” Vanity Fair (April 2008).60. Author Interview, Gaza City, May 2013.61. Author Interview, Gaza City, June 2013.62. Sayigh, “Armed Struggle and State Formation,” 20-21.63. Author Interview, Copenhagen, October 2012.64. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, 660.65. This was ensured through the establishment of the State of Israel.66. The official declaration of the State of Palestine was penned by Mahmoud Darwish and was

announced by Yasser Arafat on November 15, 1988.67. “Thousands of Palestinian Police Transferring to Gaza.” Haaretz, accessed May 4, 2014, http://

www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.588931.

ASQ37_2 176 05/05/2015 13:59

Copyright of Arab Studies Quarterly is the property of Pluto Journals and its content may notbe copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder'sexpress written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles forindividual use.