ISIS AND TAKFIRI

A Term Paper

Presented to

PROF. RENE JOSE PADRO

College of Arts and Social Sciences

Mindanao State University – Iligan Institute of Technology

Iligan City

In Partial fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Course

POL SCI 141 – A3 (Political Behavior, Processes, and Movements)

Second Semester, A.Y. 2014 – 2015

By

ELIKA ER C. BIENES

March 2015

ISIS and Takfiri

Thesis Statement:

The legitimation of ISIS’ killings of Jews, Christians, and Muslims, for their own world

view of peace.

Introduction

The world has witnessed the terror brought by many jihadist groups, killing brutally

men, women, and children. But ISIS on the other hand, turned the tables when

ultraviolence has been its leading theme in achieving their utopia. While it is absurdly

common to hear that jihadists kill people outside the religious opinion of Islam, ISIS took

no excuses of dehumanizing even fellow Muslims that they deem to be infidels and

apostates. This paper points to talk over the origins of ISIS and the extremist ideology

behind their ultraviolence.

There have been many papers written about ISIS, the Islamic State of Iraq and

Syria. Where it comes from, what it wants, what drives its extremist ideology, why it has

overtaken so much of the Middle East, and what the world can and cannot act to stop it.

But, these are all complex and important topics worthy of intensive examination.

Lately, the Islamic State (ISIS) intended to terrorize its enemies when it filmed a

Jordanian pilot being burned alive in a cage and it clearly hoped to weaken the resolve of

the Arab states that have joined the US-led global coalition fighting the jihadi group. But

the sheer brutality of the execution, beamed round the world last week, seems instead to

have galvanized Arab governments and Muslim religious authorities into more strident

opposition to ISIS – expressed in furious condemnation and high profile but limited military

moves (Black, 11 February 2015).

It was a reminder of what may be the most important, most core truth of ISIS.

According to an article by The Christian Post, ISIS' beginnings can be traced to

the Second Gulf War in 2003, when the U.S., along with a small coalition of other nations,

invaded Iraq and toppled Dictator Saddam Hussein.

In an article by Aaron Y. Zelin of the Washington, it supposes:

ISIS initially centered on Iraq and known as the Islamic State of Iraq

(ISI), ISIS added the second S for Syria to its name as that nation's civil war

erupted several years ago. Similarly, drawing their origins from earlier

incarnations of jihadist organizations in the Middle East, ISIS has come to

hold territory in both Syria and Iraq. As Syria continues to be divided by civil

war, ISIS has seized parts of the eastern portion of the country.

Moreover, ISIS gained much attention when it took the major Iraqi

city of Mosul back in June 2014. Part of the conquest included taking control

of the Mosul Dam, the largest dam in the country, raising the threat that ISIS

militants might intentionally flood much of the region.

Furthermore, the British Broadcasting Corporation noted that:

ISIS had major military victories both before and after adopting its

present appellation. Amongst the diverse insurgency fighting coalition

forces and new Iraqi government was the extremist Islamic group al-Qaida

in Iraq.

ISIS has garnered international outrage for its cruel treatment of

religious minorities and fellow Muslims in the territory they reside in Syria

and Iraq. Allegations of varying validity have included reports of

beheadings, massacres of prisoners, and attempts to exterminate Christian

communities. This penchant for violence against diverse groups under their

rule has existed in ISIS' earlier incarnation as al-Qaida in Iraq and led to a

backlash from Iraqi militia groups in 2007.

On the same article by Aaron Y. Zelin of the Washington Institute, it was stated

that on Aug. 14, 2014 United Nations special representatives released a joint statement

calling for the highest level of humanitarian in Iraq because of ISIS.

The ideology and atrocities of ISIS have led to them finding opposition from various

Islamic leaders and groups. In August, the Indonesian government banned support for

ISIS after the Middle Eastern terrorist group attempted to recruit members from the

world's most populous Muslim nation. Not long after Indonesia's action, influential

Egyptian cleric Grand Mufti Shawqi Allam, declared on state news agency MENA that

ISIS "poses a danger to Islam and Muslims" (Gryboski, 2014).

Selecting an example from Jordan, according to Yair Minzili in his paper, in recent

years, the Jordanian region has faced a growing threat to its stability from extreme,

violent, and political Islamic groups. However, unlike other states in the region whose

activity against extreme Islam focuses on the military-terrorist aspects, the Jordanian

regime is devoting a concentrated and ongoing effort aimed to the fight against takfiri-

jihadi Salafiyyah ideology, which it has identified as one of the principal sources of power

and attraction of these groups, and as a main impetus for raising new generations of

terrorists.

While ISIS as an organization behaves strategically and rationally, it is ultimately

just the collection of its thousands of members, and those individual members have

shown again and again to be motivated just not by strategic calculus or religious devotion

or historical nostalgia for an imagined Caliphate of old but by a simple, sadistic desire to

commit murder and to do it gruesomely (Fisher, 2014).

Developing theories that explain terrorism’s rise, maturation and decline is a

rational exercise. Analysts explaining terrorism have resorted to root cause,

psychological, class polarization and organizational dynamics models—all theories based

on logical cause and effect sequences (Gibbs, 2012).

However, these assumptions reflect a Western Liberal Enlightenment or Secularist

bias toward logical explanations for seemingly inexplicable phenomena.

While most modern Islamist ideology rests upon communist and fascist thought

that rejects liberalism and embraces a culture of war, destruction and martyrdom, the

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is different in sentiment and determination. ISIS is

a Muslim brotherhood that kills everyone that will resist in their manner in reaching a pure

utopia of caliphate, restoring vacuous Islam for absorbing foreign influences that deviated

from true Quranic principles.

In a paper on Jordan – A Regime’s Struggle against Takfiri-Jihadi Ideology

presented for the Herzliya Conference, Yair Minzili argues:

The Muslim Brotherhood movement, and its extreme wing in

particular, play a central role in preparing the ground for the internalization

and absorption of the takfiri-Salafiyyah in Jordanian society, especially

among the young generation. Since the growth of the Muslim Brotherhood

movement in Jordan, there have been internal struggles between the

moderate stream that aspires to co-existence and enjoy sound relations

with the regime; and the extremist wing, schooled in the takfir doctrine of

Sayed Qutub, which engages in a sharp political and ideological

confrontation with the regime.

One of the expressions of the Muslim Brotherhood's identification, if

only partial, with the takfir and jihad outlook, can be found in its religious

rulings identifying with the jihad in Iraq and Palestine, and demanding that

Arab leaders raise the flag of jihad. These religious rulings assert that

anyone providing assistance to the occupying forces is committing an act

of treachery and declaring war on Allah and his prophet, which leads to

heresy and abandonment of the community of believers.

The ongoing war in Iraq also contributes to the strengthening of the

Salafi stream in Jordan. The extremist Islamic organizations, led by the al-

Qaeda organization in Iraq, enjoy moral support and admiration among a

considerable public in Jordan and throughout the Arab world, which sees

them as the principal flag bearer in the war against the enemies of Islam.

This war serves as a main catalyst for the leaders of these organizations to

disseminate the idea of jihad throughout the Arab and Muslim world. Their

extremist interpretation requires each Muslim to devote himself to jihad (fard

ayin) at this time, because they portray the fighting in Iraq as a war against

foreigners who captured Muslim land. The intensive propaganda,

conducted by al- Qaeda and its affiliated organizations via the media and

especially on the Internet only reinforces this position. This propaganda

reaches almost every home, and its impact is translated into the formation

of local terrorist organizations, some of which are linked to existing

organizations and some of which are independent (Ibid.).

Nonetheless, since all Islamist terrorists held legitimacy of their violence on the

Islamic jihad, ISIS’ global jihadism was beyond par any terror groups that world has gone

steady.

They seek to create an authentic Islam stripped of foreign liberal influence and

modern jihadists believe they have divine sanction to engage in violence against apostate

regimes. This includes killing all apostates and infidels that hinder the development of a

purified ummah (a community of faithful within Islam). Under such an interpretation, all

manner of barbarism can be justified. Since jihadists believe that Allah has appointed

them to undertake a cleansing of the world and insure the spread of an uncontaminated

Islam, they do not doubt that victory is preordained. Little will deter them from performing

their divine duty. Death is welcomed as an opportunity for martyrdom and slaughter of

Islam’s enemies becomes a moral imperative. Such a world view defies logical reasoning

(Berman, 2003).

The irrational desire to create a purified ideal community frequently leads to

extreme violence that rally opponents and prompt internal divisions among jihadists

(Celso, 2014).

However, it has been noted that the jihadi community has a persistent tendency

toward fracturing and division with multitudes of splinter movements driven by

opportunistic leaders who have their own particularistic vision. All seek to recreate an

unobtainable mythic ideal though divinely inspired violence. Much of this fracturing is a

consequence of divisions within the jihadist community over the role of takfir in religious

armed struggles (Hegghammer, 2009).

In The Islamic State, Elliot Friedland discourses the philosophy behind the Islamic

State:

Traditionally among Sunni Muslims, the idea of takfir was highly

controversial and contested. While some claim that only the learned ulema

or scholars could effectively label one a kafir –— and only after certain

legalistic requirements and then for the purpose of excommunication —

other Muslims completely reject the idea of takfir, claiming only Allah can

know what is in one’s heart.

The Islamic State has short, medium and long term goals. Its short

term goal is to consolidate the areas it already controls and capture more

territory in Syria and Iraq. One of its central tactics it has used to advance

its goals has been to precipitate all out sectarian war in Iraq between Sunnis

and Shiites, which it tries to achieve by massacring civilian populations of

Shiites whenever and wherever it can.

This methodology is used partly due to their view of Shiites as

heretics deserving of death and it is also a tactic aimed at causing reprisal

attacks from Shiite militia groups, thus driving Sunnis into the arms of the

Islamic State.

The Islamic State’s medium term goal is to consolidate and expand

its control of territory in Iraq and Syria and in the next stage to advance into

neighboring Sunni countries. It seems that Saudi Arabia and Jordan will be

the next targets. Both countries have large populations of discontented

young men and both are authoritarian monarchies that emerged from the

Arab Spring relatively unscathed.

Advancing in this way is in keeping with the Islamic State’s current

practical approach of consolidating power in a contiguous territory in order

to build a manageable and defensible state.

The Islamic State, declared by the Islamist group formerly known as

ISIS or ISIL, is the first and so far only attempt to resurrect the governmental

system of the early Muslims in the modern era. A caliphate as a system of

government is considered by believers to be a divinely sanctioned religious

monarchy that invests power in the hands of the caliph, who has the sole

authority to declare jihad and to interpret Islamic texts.

Moreover, the jihadist world view means a lot of beliefs that impel some purposeful

violent action. The association between Islam and Jihadism can be rather complex and

barbed. The centrality of jihad in Islam has inspired much controversy among scholars.

In spite of the fact that jihadism has roots in Islam, it is a conceptually distinct doctrine

recognized by various theorists.

Jihad’s meaning is a source of contention—classical Quranic interpretations view

it as spiritual struggle but also as a defensive religious war. Islamic legal scholar M. Cherif

Bassiouni argues that jihad has been transformed over time into a political doctrine calling

for violent agitation against Muslim apostates and foreign infidels (Chicago Journal of

International Law, 8:1 118-146).

Furthermore, Anthony Celso in his Jihadist Organizational Failure and

Regeneration: The Transcendent Role of Takfiri Violence, he strengthens the discussion

about jihadism:

Historically, jihad has been a collective responsibility undertaken by

state entities in the defense and expansion of Islam. While modern Jihadism

is pronounced in its violent agitation against impious Muslims and

foreigners. It is an ideology that espouses multiple confrontations. While

Jihadism seeks the recreation of the “enlightened rule” of Mohammad and

his four “righteous “successors, it is not purely a Salafist doctrine, and is

influenced by Marxist and fascistic ideas that transport it far from the

classical tenets of Islam. Like the Nazis, jihadists espouse a culture of war

and death.

To add, Jihadism’s propensity for violence knows no bounds and

seeks to eviscerate that which lies in its immediate path. A fact underscored

by the bloody history of Jihadism waged primarily against Muslims.

Jihadism desires the recreation of a mythic idealized past. It’s

emotive and spiritual power is based upon the exaltation of a glorious past,

its castigation of an ignominious present and its promise of a transcendent

future that restores Allah’s sovereignty (Hakimiya) on Earth.

A mutually destructive conflict over who should rule the ummah

prevail unto this day and it is the relentless theme of Islamic history. Given

Islam’s prohibition against murder and especially intra-Muslim violence,

jihadists have searched for religious sanctions for taking Muslim life. This

invites discussion of takfir doctrine and its central role in sanctioning the

killing of co-religionists in jihadist warfare.

In connection with ISIS’ legitimation of its brutality against the infidels and

apostates, they consider their every action as righteous in the name of a greater and pure

Islam. No matter how brutal and how inhumane ISIS is, it seems that violence is out of

their moral realm. This successful implementation of policies to kill, must be more than

takfiri.

While the takfiri ideology they follow gave them reason to think their actions are

pure, it bears all come to a conclusion that ISIS’ extremism against Shiites, Jews, and

Christians are explicitly and implicitly sanctioned massacres.

Sanctioned massacres tend to occur in the context of an overall policy that is

explicitly or implicitly genocidal: designed to destroy all or part of a category of people

defined in ethnic, national, racial, religious or other terms (Hamilton and Kelman, 1973).

Originally, takfiri comes from the ‘Salafi’ school of thought but later on one staunch

group has emerged who has abandoned the spirituality and essence of Islam and merely

follow the rituals of Islam. In fact, Islamic rituals work only with the spiritual strength where

humanity comes first. Thereby, the core assumption of Takfiri is based on ‘brutal

punishment’ against every non-practicing Muslim. They do not consider any state law and

have defined their laws under the concept of ‘Khuwarji’ and legitimate their selves to kill

those Muslims who do not follow Islamic rituals apparently. Eventually, they have started

fighting against Muslims worldwide; have only worked in sullying the image of Islam

(Tellis, 2009).

Furthermore, takfiri is a chronic disease spread out through ‘Khuwarji’ and got

flared up after Israel’s victory in 1967. They made the sectarian issue as Islamic warfare

within the Islam. They brought brutality in the hardcore aspects of Islam and decorated

mere concept of ‘Jihad’ only by ‘Talwar’ (sword) as a mean of success for Muslims.

Takfiris consider sin as a great offense against Islam and killing as the only punishment

(Vietta, 2013).

On the same note, they consider all sins as ‘crime’ and every crime has to have

punishment without consideration of repentance and state of law. Wherein, Islam has

contrition clause even for cardinal sins except ‘shirk’ (polytheism). Wherein shirk is not a

crime in Islam but a great cardinal sin and Allah holds absolute right to punish ‘Mushrik’

in the hereafter. Indeed, Takfiris become dictator of peoples conscious. In fact, Takfriri’s

extreme practices nullify this Quranic verse:

“There is NO enforcement in religion” (Surah Baqra)

As far as Islam is concerned, it cannot be misguided by Takfiri ideology but

believers and non-believers are getting ‘wrong impression’ about Islam by them. They are

creating ‘Fasad-fil-Ardh’ (mischief on land). This concept is known as ‘Fitnah’ (civil strife)

is not new in Islamic history. However, all impartial eminent Islamic scholars have rejected

this doctrine (Knights, 2006).

A second feature of sanctioned massacres is that their targets have not

themselves threatened or engaged in hostile actions toward the perpetrators of violence.

The victims of this class of violence are often defenseless civilians, including old men,

women, and children (Hamilton and Kelman, 1973).

Accordingly, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has declared war on “kafirs.”

According to most observers, this term as ISIS uses it refers to Christians, Yazidi, and

Shia Muslims. But this is far more than a conflict that pits Muslim versus Yazidi or

Christian, or even Sunni vs Shia. To cast this conflict in such simplistic terms fails to grasp

the true nature of ISIS and the ideology that inflames their insurgency (Olomi, 2014).

The violence committed by ISIS, which now styles itself the “Islamic State,” against

Christians and the Yazidi people is atrocious and terrifying. However the violence of this

insurgency is not limited only to those groups, but rather is directed at anyone whom they

deem a kafir. Though some authors translate kafir as “infidel,” it is an insufficient

translation that carries specific historical connotations. The word infidel is derived from

the Latin “infidelis” which translates to “unfaithful” or “without faith.” It was used by

Crusaders against Muslims or Saracens who they believed were Allahless or faithless.

Kafir on the other hand in classical Arabic meant one who was ungrateful (i.e. for Allah’s

bounties or his prophets). That is, the word is closer to “denier” and carries the

connotation of someone who is offered the truth but rejects it, or who perverts it. The

difference is nuanced, but important to understanding the mentality of a group like ISIS

(Ibid.).

There are, of course historical and situational reasons particular groups become

victims of sanctioned massacres, but these do not include their own immediate

harmfulness or violence toward the attackers (Hamilton and Kelman, 1973).

Only while the roots of then ISI have perpetrated from the oppression of Shiites

against Sunnis, ISIS today does not take on any vengeance in their extremism. Purely,

they kill out of hate for what is not like them, nothing else.

Rather, the selection of targets for massacre at a particular time can ultimately be

traced to their relationship to the pursuit of larger policies. Their elimination may be seen

as useful tool of their continued existence is an irritating obstacle in the execution of policy

they hold (Hamilton and Kelman, 1973).

To such an organization, anyone who denies its brand of truth, or who rejects it is

a kafir and this includes other Muslims, including Sunni Muslims. Condemning one’s

putative coreligionists in this way which is the act of labeling someone a kafir (Olomi,

2014).

So what does all of this have to do with ISIS? It is from this background that ISIS

is born. Like their ideological ancestors, they are a takfiri sect who accuse others of being

kafirs and who believe all kafirs should be put to death.

Going back again to its origins, they emerge out of the socio-political context of the

Iraq War and capitalize on the resentment of post-war Iraq. The misguided U.S war has

given new manifestation to an old ideology. Understanding this history and the

relationship between the takfiri with mainstream Islam is important to understanding the

thinking behind ISIS and how to deal with them. Their atrocities against the Yazidi people

and Christians are part of a larger ideology of violence. While often cast in simplistic

terms, the real conflict is a complex struggle between mainstream Islamic religion and a

heretical ideology over who speaks for Islam (Olomi, 2014).

This struggle is the very origin of the takfiri and ISIS is its latest manifestation. Due

to the recent tragic events it is easy to forget that the first and earliest victims of ISIS were

other Muslims. For the takfiri is at war with everyone and anyone who do not share their

specific ideology. Born from an ideology of violence and an ancestry of heretics and

extremists, their declared purpose is to fight anyone in their reach who does not fit into

their ideology. For ISIS, it is them against all the kafirs which include mainstream Muslims

(Ibid.).

Conclusion

Before long, as most news goes into headlines telling stories about ISIS and its

horrors, more and more should the world be educated for a rise of an Islamic State that

is not really Islam. And as more alienated young Muslims are seduced into joining, the

writer asks where this takfiri-driven jihadist movement is running and whether it can

survive and shed its violent character.

But certainly, this reign of terror will come to a conclusion. And while the world

waits for that to happen, only one options is left to consider; to counter-attack ISIS, but

this is expensive and calls for a greater unity of powerful states to close the gates of hell.

Simply, whatever options the world can offer, so long as the ideology of takfiri

prevails, nothing will cease them from terrorizing Iraq, Syria, and the remainder of the

world. Yet, in light of this extremist ideology, we can hope for a moderate Islam

propaganda for an ideological battle against the takfiri-jihad, which would de-legitimize of

ISIS’ killings of Jews, Christians, and Muslims for their own world view of peace.

References

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Knights, M. 2006. Abqaiq Attack Underscores Terrorist Failings and Highlights Growing

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Celso, Anthony. 2014. “Jihadist Organizational Failure and Regeneration: The

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