IS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FREE MIGRATION POLICIES WITHIN LATIN AMERICA AN INDUCEMENT TO LATIN AMERICAN INTEGRATION?

IS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FREE MIGRATION POLICIES WITHIN LATINAMERICA AN INDUCEMENT TO LATIN AMERICAN INTEGRATION?

Carlos E. Gonzalez Juanes Comprehensive Exam Paper Spring 2014

Carlos E. Gonzalez Juanes

Comprehensive Exam Paper Spring 2014

INTRODUCTION

Latin American countries have aspired to achieve

regional integration almost from the time they became

independent nations. As early as 1815, Bolivar wrote: “It

is a grandiose idea to think of consolidating the New World

into a single nation, united by pacts into a single bond. It

is reasoned that, as these parts have a common origin,

language, customs, and religion, they ought to have a single

government to permit the newly formed states to unite in a

confederation. What a great idea, to mold the new world into

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a great nation1 glued by one and only one great link (quoted

in Bertrand 1951).”

The concept of Latin American integration has been kept

alive for two hundred years but is still a distant reality.

A spate of new organizations organized themselves in the 20th

century to increase the coordination of Latin American

nations; their focus was on matters such as regional

security, trade, and democratic and human development. Their

number and scope increased with the creation of the European

Union in 1992. Several new institutions have since been

created that, at least on paper, foster a union based on the

European experience. These efforts have had variable

success, and have normally limited their scope to a selected

group of countries. Clearly, neither the breadth of

integration nor the geographic coverage achieved by Europe

has worked for Latin America.

1 Bolivar uses the terms nation and confederation as synonymous. The letter is used as an example of an early desire to somehow integrate the newly independent nations of Latin America.

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This paper will identify the critical elements that

promoted integration in Europe but did not operate in Latin

America. Some but not all of those elements were indeed

recreated in Latin America; this paper is focused on those

that were not. We will analyze the feasibility of

substituting for these latter elements with the

implementation of “free migration” policies. We wish to

explore if the implementation of these would advance

integration. We take “free migration policies” to designate

that all Latin American citizens are allowed to travel freely

and establish residence in any country in the region)

To conclude this analysis, we will postulate that the

introduction of free migration policies is a necessary but

not sufficient condition to advance the reality of Latin

American integration. Such policies will initiate this

result, but important additional actions by political elites

will be required to reach the perceived ideal: a Latin

American Union modeled after the European Union.

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Before we begin the analysis, we must define some

concepts:

What Countries Make Up Latin America? - We define Latin

America as comprising the 19 currently independent nations

that were colonies of the former Iberian empires (Spain and

Portugal). These nations shared 300 years of colonial history

and gained independence from their colonial masters in the

19th century. We use this definition since historically all

Latin American countries have a common culture, share

Catholicism as their major religion, and use but two

predominant languages that have common roots. Many agree that

these important factors provide the cohesiveness required to

form a union. Appendix A shows the 19 countries that,

according to this definition, comprise Latin America; it also

shows some of their major characteristics such as population,

area, and surface etc.

The Desired Characteristics of Integration - The model best

followed in pursuit of Latin American integration is that of

the European Union. Considering different integration

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schemes found in the world, only one clearly stands out and

has become “one of the most successful examples of

integration (Mattli 1999: 68).” Its main characteristics are

that it:

1. Allows for the free movement of goods, services,

capital, and people.

2. Preserves the concept of individual nation-states and

nationalities.

3. Includes the voluntary transfer of some sovereign

decisions to a supra-national institution.

THE NATION, THE STATE AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION: TWOTHEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

What is a country? What are the necessary prerequisites

before people will regard themselves as belonging to one

nation? How does a group of countries make the transition to

a regional union? These questions are frequently debated by

scholars in the field of International Relations, where they

offer many theories to explain the concepts of nationhood and

nationalism. Two closely linked schools of thought are

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derived from these theories and especially help us understand

how nations are born and dissolved. One school is termed

National Conscience, and the other Constructivism. They

have been chosen over mainstream theories (i.e. Realism and

Liberalism) because they employ an interpretative

understanding that is more encompassing than the global

vision of International Relations provided by Realists and,

to a lesser extent, Liberals. This does not mean that

Constructivism considers the balance of power among nations

(to use the Realist example) as non-important, only that it

considers it as one among a realm of variables useful in

understanding evolving relationships among nations.

In our analysis here we must first define what we

understand by country, state, and nation. According to

Rosenberg (2014): “A State … is a self-governing political

entity….” The term State can be used interchangeably with

Country. In his opinion, a state by definition must have: 1)

space or territory with internationally recognized

boundaries; 2) economic activity and an organized economy; 3)

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a government providing public services and police power; 4)

sovereignty; and 4) external recognition i.e. it has been

accepted as a state by other countries. He further explains:

“Nations, are culturally homogeneous groups of people, larger

than a single tribe or community, which share a common

language, institutions, religion and historical experience.

When a nation of people have a State or country of their own,

it is called a nation-state.”

National Conscience scholars focus on explaining the

concept of nationality and national identity. They expound

on why a group of people acquires a sense of belonging and

fraternity with their countrymen. The work of National

Conscience scholars helps us understand why the Spanish

American Empire fractured and gave rise to 19 different

countries, each with its own national identity. Further, this

occurred while Brazil, the descendent of the Portuguese

Empire, maintained its unity after independence and became

the largest and most populous country in the sub-continent.

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Anderson (1983) defines the nation as “an imagined

political community – and imagined as both inherently limited

and sovereign” (7). He lists two requirements for the

development of nationalism: 1) a large cultural system that

precedes nationalism – normally a religious community and a

dynastic realm (12-22); and 2) what he calls print capitalism

– “the convergence of capitalism and print technology”2. He

states that this convergence “created the possibility of a

new form of imagined community which, in its basic

morphology, set the stage for the modern nation (46).”

Anderson (1983) explains how the evolution of Spain’s

independent American colonies into different nation-states

resulted from that “each of the new South American republics

had been an administrative unit from the sixteenth to the

eighteenth century (52).” He uses this same principle to

explain the dissolution of some of the first integrated

2 Anderson recognizes that “print capitalism” did not existin Latin America at the time of the wars of independence.He explains this apparent contradiction with the fact thatlanguage in Iberian Colonies was the same as that of theirimperial capitals (Madrid and Lisbon), and was therefore nota determinant in nation building.

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nations, i.e. Gran Colombia (Venezuela, Colombia, and

Ecuador), and the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata

(Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia), In a short time

period these broke–up into their old administrative units

(53). As further support for this view, Anderson (1983)

explains that Creoles3 were the elites that instigated

independence from Spain. Unlike emigrated Peninsulares4 who

could establish an administrative career throughout the

confines of the Spanish Empire, Creoles had their careers

limited to the geographical limits of their regional and

administrative units (58-60).

Anderson (1983:51) also explains why Brazil was able to

remain an integrated territory. He notes that in 1908, the

Portuguese emperor, in flight from Napoleon, immigrated to

Brazil where he stayed for 13 years. When he returned home,

he had his son crowned emperor of Brazil. The country

became independent as an integrated entity and avoided the

3 Ethnic Spaniards born in America.4 People born in Spain.

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fractioning of several states that characterized Spanish-

America.

For Gellner (1983) “The cultural shreds and patches used

by students of nationalism are often arbitrary historical

inventions (56). The similarity between Anderson’s

definition of nations as “imagined political communities”,

and his stated requirements for the development of

nationalism, is not difficult to find. In a particularly

relevant observation, he mentions that the political strength

of Latin Americans (and Arabs and pre-unification Italians

and Germans) suffered from the fragmentation of their

political roots when they became independent states.

Nevertheless, he considers the outcome of “one nation – many

states” as the least troublesome of possible outcomes.

He also argues that the eventual evolvement of the “one

nation – many states” status into a “one nation – one state”

concept will not be easy. The inevitable outcome of partial

or total unification of states into a nation will result in

the loss of political positions: one less president and

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several cabinet positions will be eliminated by each state

that merges into the larger nation. This makes politicians

a formidable obstacle to unification (128-130). This may

also avert the integration of the various Latin American

countries (i.e. the “Latin American nation”) into one state.

However, it would not preclude integration modeled after the

European Union where the concept of individual nation-states

remains viable.

The work of National Conscience scholars is helpful in

understanding the past; i.e., the reasons behind the rupture

of Latin America into 19 different countries. It is also

helpful in understanding the evolution of different “imagined

communities” in each of the newly independent states, i.e.,

where the Creole elites created their own national

mythologies thus giving rise to 20 different nationalities

and nationalisms. To elucidate how and why Latin American

countries could be motivated to form a political union in the

future, we must turn to the work of Constructivist scholars.

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According to Viotti and Kauppi (2010: 276-298)

constructivists generally agree with the following: 1) They

believe state behavior is shaped by elite beliefs, collective

norms and social identities, and thus not only by the

structural conditions of anarchy; 2) Constructivists are

interested in the state as actor, but they do not give

privilege to any particular agent, actor or unit of analysis.

That is, the agents may be nations and/or non state actors

including individuals or groups, and they may also derive

from social movements, and corporations, etc., 3) They view

international structure in terms of a social structure

heavily influenced by ideational factors such as the law,

rules, and societal norms. 4) Constructivists do not see

sovereignty as characteristic of individual states, but

rather claim that it is a shared and socially constructed

institution or normative structure among states. 5) All

constructivists share the idea that normative or ideational

factors are equal or more important than material structures

(population size, weapon systems etc.).

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Among the different trends within Constructivism, one —

Naturalistic Constructivism — seems well suited to use in our

analysis. Represented most prominently by Alexander Wendt,

this school of thought approaches International Relations as

part of the social sciences while emphasizing the structures

of social life; this paradigm focuses on the interaction of

states and the cultures and norms that have been constructed

to guide them (Viotti and Kauppi 2010: 291-294).

Naturalistic constructivism thus allows for the possibility

of “constructing “ a Latin American union by changing the

cultures and norms of the interrelated actors, with free

migration policies being one of the possible variables used

to influence change.

Wendt (1999) argues, “Sovereignty is an intrinsic

property of states, as in being six feet tall; as such it

exists even in the dearth of other states. This property

becomes a “right” only when other states recognize it.

Rights are conferred on actors by others who grant

“permission” to do certain things (280)”. He then

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mentions that “When states recognize the sovereignty of

others as a right, one can then speak of sovereignty not only

as a characteristic of individual states, but as an

institution shared by many states (280).” Applying these

ideas to the concept of regional integration would mean that

member countries have changed their shared expectations of

sovereignty; i.e., they are then willing to cede some of

their sovereignty to a supra-national institution. This has

already happened in the European Union, and would need to

happen for Latin American integration to succeed.

Before we conclude this section we must state that there

is a tight connection between National Conscience and

Constructivism. According to Walicki (1998), Gellner’s theory

of the nation and nationalism – the statement that nations

are products of nationalism and not the converse – “ …

concurs with the current “constructivist” perspective which

claims that nations are not anything real, objective or

indispensable; they are only “constructs,” contingent and

artificial, deliberately created by various elites (611).”

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PAST AND CURRRENT EFFORTS AT LATIN AMERICAN INTEGRATION:

Table 1 shows the multilateral institutions that were

created in Latin America from 1947 to 1980. Of those

presented in the table, five are considered ineffective

precursors for Latin American integration. These are: 1) The

Rio Treaty, which covers only security issues; 2) The

Organization of American States, which is equivalent to a

regional United Nations for the Americas; 3) ALADI, which is

limited to trade issues but falls short of a free trade

agreement or common market (it granted tariff preferences to

only 10% of all goods traded); 4) LAFTA, which is no longer

operative; and 5) The Andean Pact which is also now

inoperative. We will not dwell on these institutions.

The case of the Central American Common Market (CACM)

(shaded in the table) is different. Modeled after the

European Common Market, CACM has successfully increased

intra-CACM trade, as shown in Table 2. Unfortunately,

CACM’s success ceased when the army of El Salvador attacked

Honduras in 1969. Although CACM did not disappear, its

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beneficial effects on trade did. “The proportion of

intra-regional trade out of total trade of CACM countries

represented only 11.9% in 1988, a sharp decline from the

24.2% twenty years earlier (Mattli 1999: 146).” CACM did

experience resurgence in the early 90’s. This

reincarnation will be discussed in the description below of

the new organizations that were created at that time.

Table 1: Latin American multilateral institutions 1947 – 1980

Source: Abstracted by the author from public data.

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Table 2: Summary of CACM Trade Changes (% of totaltrade)

Source: Mattli 1999: 145. Based on International Monetary Fund data.

Table 3 illustrates the multilateral institutions

created in Latin America from 1981 to date. We are here

able to exclude three organizations that are not considered

effective precursors for an EU type of integration. These

are: 1) ALBA, whose stated purpose is to oppose the

continent-wide free trade agreement treaty that was proposed

by the Clinton administration; 2) UNASUR, whose purpose is

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akin to that of a regional organization of the United Nations

promoting development in the Southern cone; and 3) CELAC,

that is modeled after the Organization of American States but

without the participation of the U.S. or Canada.

Remaining are four institutions that may be considered

precursors to an EU type of integration: 1) The Central

American Common Market in its 1990 version; 2) Mercosur; 3)

The Andean Community; and 4) The Alianza del Pacifico or

Pacific Alliance. All of these organizations in one way

or another are derivatives of the European Union. They all

share the goals of eventually allowing the free movements of

goods, services, capital, and people, but none share the

concept of ceding sovereignty to a supra-national institution

(although, with the exception of the Pacific Alliance, all

have created multilateral institutions).

Table 3: Latin American multilateral institutions 1981-2013

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Source: Abstracted by the author from public data.

These four institutions have focused on free trade as

their prime goal. We can thus measure their success by

measuring the level of trade integration (intra-bloc trade)

attained over a number of years. Figures 1, 2, and 3

present the Trade Level of Integration (as measured by the

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Estimated Gravity Model Coefficient) achieved by CACM,

Mercosur, and the Andean Pact respectively.

From the graphs we can see that Mercosur, followed by

the Andean Pact, attained the most successful trade

integration results. CACM actually exhibited a negative

level of integration. The trade integration results of

the Pacific Alliance are not presented since this is a very

new organization where the elimination of tariffs has just

occurred. Nevertheless, most analysts consider that the

chances of success of the latter institution are large given

that the constituent member countries are the most open to

foreign trade in Latin America.

Figure 1: CACM Level of Integration

Source: Croce et.al. 2012. Authors’ regressions. Note: Shaded lines indicate 95% confidence bands.

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Figure 2: Mercosur Level of Integration

Source: Croce et al. 2012. Authors’ regressions. Shaded lines indicate 95% confidence bands;

The above judgments can be supplemented with qualitative

analyses. The Economist (2013) considers the countries of

Mercosur as part of the protectionist wing of Latin America.

With the decline of commodity prices experienced in the past

months, protectionism has increased even among members of the

trade bloc. The countries that established the Pacific

alliance are proponents of free trade and are eager to join

negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership led by the

United States, and thus become part of the potentially

largest trading block in the world.

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Figure 3: Andean Community Level of Integration

Source: Croce et al. 2004. Authors’ regressions. Shaded lines indicate 95% confidence bands.

In the end, both Mercosur and the Pacific alliance are

the two prime organizations able to advance the prospect of

Latin American integration. The CACM is too small to be

of importance at the continental level. The Andean Pact

although larger, has been riddled by policy infighting

between the “protectionists” (Bolivia and Ecuador) and the

“free traders” (Colombia, Peru) within the organization.

Neither of the two organizations have the size nor the

influence of Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance in the

continent.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS LESSONS FORLATIN AMERICA

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The actual beginnings of the current European Union can

be traced back to the treaty that established the European

Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) signed in 1951 by six western

European countries. (Mattli 1999: 68-138). What elements

made European Integration a success? As Mattli (1999) has

said: “The creation of the European Community is not easily

captured by any simple theoretical argument (68).”

Accordingly, scholars offer the following explanations:

Security/geopolitical concerns – Rosato (2012) argues

that the early success of the ECSC and the European Economic

Community (EEC) that followed it was a consequence of the

perceived military threat of the Soviet Union, and this acted

in combination with the need to neutralize the political

threat of a reemerging Germany. This is probably the most

important element that led to the success of the European

Union. Europe was just emerging from World War II, and the

threat of the Cold War had begun. For Realists this was the

most important, if not the only, reason for the foundation of

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the ECSC, an organization designed to maintain control of

coal and steel, the raw materials of warfare.

This “element of success” is clearly absent in the case

of Latin America. As expressed by Dabene (2009), “To begin

with, Latin America being a relatively pacified continent,

the motives to initiate an integration process can hardly be

found in a common will to build peace or prevent war (7).”

Although tensions between Latin America and the United States

have always existed, they are not so deeply nor as widely

held by a majority of people or nations as to trigger a

common defense mechanism. The most unity the tension has

garnered has been in some sub-regions where the concept of

anti-imperialism has been the uniting force of a few

countries, notably those that belong to ALBA.

Economic benefits – Moravcsik (2008) suggests that the

prime determinant for the success of the European Union is

grounded in economics. He says: “The West European economies

were then and are still, extremely interdependent. The

value of trade per capita was many times higher than in non-

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European industrial countries like the U.S. or Japan, making

Europe sensitive to trade fluctuations (18).” Mattli (1999)

mentions the achievement of economic benefits as one of the

necessary conditions for economic success. He states: “…

the potential for economic gains from market exchange within

a region must be significant. If there is little potential

for gain … the process of integration would quickly falter.

However, the potential for gain may grow with the diffusion

of new technologies. Market players will then have an

incentive to lobby for regional institutional arrangements,

and for regional rules, regulations, and policies (42).”

This “element of success” is present in the case of

Latin America. The agreements of regional commercial

integration –CACM, MERCOSUR, etc.– are normally followed by

substantial rates of increase in intra-regional commerce.

Such an increase is a welcome development in a region where

“intra-regional trade accounts for less than 20% of total

Latin American trade, compared to about two thirds in the

European Union (EU), almost 50% in NAFTA and about 40% in

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Asia (Rosales and Herreros 2011: Par 2).” Considerable

economic benefits could accrue from Latin American

integration.

A leading country – Mattli (1999) postulates that the

presence of “a benevolent leading country seeking integration

(42)” is essential to the process since it serves as a focal

point coordinating the issuance of rules, regulations and

policies. “Contested institutional leadership or the absence

of leadership makes coordination problems very difficult to

resolve (42)”. In his opinion, Germany is the country that

has assumed this role in the European Union since the mid -

1970’s. At that time, the country had developed tremendous

economic powers and was rapidly moving to become the third

largest economy in the world (101). Previously, the United

States had taken such a leadership role. Mattli explains

that the “US role as security guarantor was a crucial factor

at the beginning of European integration. The U.S.

presence in Europe contained Germany, giving the French

sufficient confidence in their security to build a bilateral

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relationship with that country. This allowed West European

governments to avoid questions of West European foreign

policy and defense, due to their absorption into the Atlantic

Alliance under American leadership.

Latin American integration processes have normally

lacked the factor of any country grasping for a position of

leadership. Mattli (1999: 140-163) argues that all attempts

at regional integration from 1960 to the late 1980’s failed

in part because there was no country willing to assume the

position of a leader. He finds a similar situation in

MERCOSUR where Brazil, the dominant economy, has been

reluctant to “become the regional leader capable of serving

as institutional focal point and willing to act as regional

paymaster (160).” The only instance where the process of

integration did find such a leader was during the first

decade of the Central American Common Market. The United

States played that role by providing substantial funds,

including increased contributions to Honduras and Nicaragua

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when they complained about deteriorating terms of trade for

their countries (152).

The ideology of integration – Parsons (2002: 47-84)

argues that the Europeans chose the EEC model over competing

models that required less extensive cooperation and weaker

international institutions due to the advocacy – by a small

elite group – of a new ideology of integration. It was his

opinion that this group was based in France, where they were

able to prevail over groups with different ideas. This

“success element”, however, only influenced the form of

integration eventually chosen for the ECSC and EEC –

requiring the relinquishing of some sovereignty from

participating states – not the actual process of integration,

which could have occurred under different forms. It is

therefore not a universal “success element “ for regional

integration.

While there has been no shortage of ideas regarding the

creation of a Latin American Union (Simon Bolivar and Hugo

Chavez are good examples), there has not yet been a group of

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people in a position of power able to influence a country

and/or region in the same way as the French elite were able

to influence the creation of the ECSC and the EEC in the

1950’s. However, the model of integration achieved by the

EU has been lauded by most governments in Latin America and

may substitute for the requirement of an independent ideology

of integration.

The establishment of commitment institutions - Mattli

(1999) names a “weaker” condition needed for successful

integration, i.e., “The provision by an integration treaty

for the establishment of “commitment institutions,” such as

centralized monitoring and third party enforcement (42-43).”

He states that the formal ECSC treaty of 1951 as well as the

subsequent Treaty of Rome, the Single European Act, and the

Maastricht Treaty provided the institutional framework that

gave rise to the European Commission and the European Court

of Justice, which served as “commitment institutions” in the

integration process (100).

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In his studies of Latin American efforts at integration,

Mattli (1999: 139) argues that weak leadership and an absence

of “commitment mechanisms” have derailed several integration

objectives in Latin America.

The existence of a European identity – Pagden (2002)

argues that Europe is the only continent that was able to

develop a collective individual identity dating back for

several centuries. He states: “Only Europeans have

persistently described themselves, usually when faced with

cultures they found indescribably alien, to be not merely

British or German or Spanish but also European … (33).” The

European culture was able to develop into an incipient

European nationalism in the post-war years. According to

Chebel (2002) “European nationalism has borrowed from the

national mystique by defining itself according to the same

criteria as the nation state: historical memory building, a

common identity and culture for all the entities grouped

within the bounds of a given territory, and political

economic objectives destined to ensure general prosperity and

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to defend the global interests of its participants (178).”

While the concept of European nationalism is not universally

held (e.g., the far right in many EU countries is opposed to

it) it cannot be denied that a European identity does exist

in Europe

Latin Americans share many cultural and social

characteristics: a past characterized by 300 years of

colonial dominance by an Iberian power, a predominant

religion (Catholicism), the use of a Romance languages

(Spanish and Portuguese), a similar value system focusing on

the family, similar legal systems derived from the Napoleonic

Code, and similar political systems influenced by the strong

presence of the United States. Despite these similarities

and as expressed by CEPAL’s5 general secretary, “The problem

for Latin America is that the proper strategy to “meld

different nationalisms into a single Latin American

nationalism has not been found (quoted in Dabene 2009: 19).”

A Latin American identity does not exist either. One has

5 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, known as ECLAC, UNECLAC or in Spanish CEPAL

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to travel outside Latin America to find a common identity

(i.e. the Latinos in the U.S. or the slightly derogatory

Sudacas in Spain). A Latin American identity is practically

non-existent in Latin American countries.

As we can see, Latin America currently possesses only

one of the six elements that permitted the success of the

creation of the European Union; this element is the potential

for economic gains. The sub-continent also enjoys a rather

homogeneous Latin American culture. However, cultural

homogeneity has not evolved, as it did in Europe, into a

regional (i.e. Latin American) identity. Thus, if Latin

American integration is ever to succeed, it will require

finding a different path.

The next section will analyze the concept of free

migration and its usefulness in paving the way to Latin

American integration.

FREE MIGRATION AS A MEANS TO LATIN AMERICAN INTEGRATION

Can effective Latin American integration be achieved

without the five missing elements that were present in

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Europe? We can argue that four of the elements, i.e. a

leading country, an ideology of integration, the

establishment of commitment institutions, and, to a lesser

degree, a Latin American identity, can be constructed by a

leading elite in a group of countries deciding that

integration is a desired route to development. However,

the first and most important “element of success”,

security/geopolitical concerns, is not present in the sub-

continent and there is no indication that it will exist in

the foreseeable future.

The need for security in Western Europe after the death

and devastation of two World Wars was a powerful motivator

towards the creation of the ECSC, the EEC and eventually the

EU. Absent the influence of such a powerful motivator,

Latin America must seek some other motivator as a substitute.

The implementation of free migration policies can become the

alternate motivator in Latin America in light of the

following reasons:

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Free migration policies reverse the cause of Latin

American fragmentation: The borders of Latin American

countries were drawn on the administrative units of Spain and

Portugal during the colonial era. That they were drawn this

way is attributed to the fact that Creoles, the elite group

that promoted independence from Spain and Portugal, saw their

careers confined to the administrative units of their birth.

“If peninsular officials could travel the road from Zaragoza

to Cartagena, to Madrid, to Lima, and back again to Madrid,

the “Mexican” or “Chilean” creole typically served only on

the territories of colonial Mexico or Chile: his lateral

movement was as cramped as his vertical ascent (Anderson

1983: 57).”

If the lack of freedom of movement among the different

administrative units of the Spanish empire gave rise to 19

different nation-states, 200 years ago, it follows that

allowing freedom of movement today should be conducive to

integration.

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Allowing free migration among countries is within the

realm of possibilities of the political elites in present day

Latin America: Migration is subject to the laws of the

involved countries, and the laws are subject to modification

by the actions of legislative bodies. Actually, the

implementation of free migration laws might be easier in

these regions given that politicians and others have fostered

the concept of a Latin American brotherhood for many decades.

Both the Pacific Alliance and Mercosur have stated their

intention to allow the free circulation of their citizens.

Both groups as well as the Andean Community have moved to

facilitate the movement of workers and business executives by

establishing express procedures for the issuance of working

visas and elimination of visa requirements for tourists.

However, the major step, implementing free migration

policies, has been left for a future undefined date.

Nevertheless, the fact that it has even been contemplated

leaves no doubt that it is now firmly placed on the agenda of

policymakers.

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The implementation of free migration policies allows for

a fast dissemination of the social benefits of integration:

An integration process is normally associated with economic

benefits due the increase of free trade. Economic benefits,

however, take some time to reach the different levels of

society. They are experienced first by the corporate world

and the economic elites of the countries involved and it

might take years to be felt by the common person, i.e. the

majority of voters in a democracy. Free migration

policies affect the common person first, by allowing him to

change his place of residency as soon as member countries

implement the policies. This happens even when the

majority of persons do not intend to move to another country.

Evidence of this can be found in Eurobarometer surveys

showing that “freedom of movement within the EU-27 is often

seen as the best achievement of the European Union, ranking

above the euro, economic prosperity, or even peace. Yet to

the disappointment of the European Commission, which is

concerned about economic growth and labor flexibility,

36


European citizens have been rather slow in utilizing this

right (Koikkalainen 2011).”

Free Migration Policies may offer alternatives to

immigration to the United States and Spain: Latin America is

a net exporter of migrants. The prime mecca of attraction

for emigrants has been the United States. The U.S. has

become home to approximately 12.0 million Mexicans, of which

approximately 51% are unauthorized. Although the number of

Mexican immigrants has currently fallen to zero (Passel et

al. 2012: par 1), immigration from Central America and South

America has increased to where “the Latin American cohort –

even excluding the Caribbean – comprised the single largest

group of foreign born in the United States and 5.5 percent of

the total U.S. population. … New destination countries in

the OECD – in particular Spain and Japan, and to a lesser

extent Italy – have seen immigration from Latin America

increasing at greater rates than in the United States (Mazza

and Sohnen 2010).”

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It is not a secret that anti-immigrant feelings have

increased substantially in the OECD countries as a result of

the “great recession of 2009”. Both the U.S. and Spain

have stepped up efforts to repatriate its Latin American

immigrants potentially creating social disruptions in the

sending countries. One alternative seldom discussed is

intra-Latin American migration. Table 3 shows the

evolution of migrant stocks in selected Latin American

countries according to the 1990 and 2000 census rounds. They

show that intra-regional migration has been increasing in

several countries. This data has been confirmed by other

sources: “Intraregional migrants in Latin America now exceed

3.5 million, according to the University of Sussex’s Global

Migrant Origin Data Base, which is constructed from data from

the 2000-2001 round of censuses (Mazza and Sohnen 2010).”

This has happened without free migration policies, and with

less negative reactions than immigration to OECD countries.

Implementation of free migration policies in a region can set

in motion the principle of human capitalism, i.e., where

38


workers may go where their skills are needed and which work

to increase the economic benefits of regional integration.

TABLE 3: Evolution of Migrant Stocks in Selected LatinAmerican Countries, 1990 and 2000 census rounds

Source: Mazza and Sohnen 2010.

Free migration will help achieve a Latin American

Identity: The lack of a Latin American identity was

identified as one of the missing “elements of success” that

promoted Europe’s integration. However, this element has

not always been absent in Latin America. Caballero (2007)

mentions that it did exist, at some level, during the wars of

independence. In his opinion, a dual concept existed at

39


that time that identified the “patria grande” as the whole

Latin American territory while “patria chica” referred to the

administrative unit that would eventually become the

independent nation. When independence was achieved and

the elites began to construct an image of the new nation, the

concept of “patria grande” came into disuse. Yet it has

not been completely erased from the collective memory. Just

as intra-regional migration can reverse the causes of Latin

American fragmentation, it can help reconstruct the Latin

American identity of a “patria grande”. In this regard, it is

interesting to note “In 2006, Argentina began a

regularization program for Mercosur citizens called “Patria

Grande”. As of June 2009, 1 million people had signed for

the program (Mazza and Sohnen 2010)”.

Despite the implied benefits that free migration

policies may bring to the integration process in Latin

America, we must remember that its implementation is not

necessarily an easy task. There will undoubtedly be forces

that oppose the idea and which may derail any proposed

40


project. A brief description of the three most likely

potential obstacles follows.

U.S. opposition to free migration: The United States has

exerted a very strong influence in Latin America for at least

the past 100 years. The relationship has been asymmetrical

and, many times, pervasive. The U.S. is either the first or

second trading partner of each Latin American country, and

therefore the U.S. government’s opinion can be enforced with

the threat of commercial sanctions.

Currently the U.S. is not hostile to regional

integration. “<The U.S.’> policy has changed from frank

hostility to CEPAL’s conception of planned integration in the

1950’s, to supporting the creation of free trade areas in the

1960’s, and then to an invitation to join a hemispherical

initiative in the 1990’s, before returning to bilateralism

in the 2000’s (Dabene 2009: 23).” At the same time the

U.S. has been very supportive of European integration, and

its role as security guarantor was critical for the creation

of the ECSC. It is therefore unlikely that the U.S. would

41


oppose a Latin American integration project at present.

However, it is likely to object to the opening of Mexico to

free migration from the South, particularly from Central

America, believing, with some reason, that if Mexico is

opened to Central Americans it will be used as a springboard

to illegally enter the U.S. In the past, the U.S. has not

been hesitant to ask Mexico to require visas from certain

nationalities, and Mexico has normally acquiesced.

However, if Mexico decides it is in its own interest to allow

Latin American free migration, there is not much that the

U.S. government can do, i.e., other than threaten to decrease

the commercial relationship. This is considered an unlikely

event given the importance of the trading relationship

between the two countries. Mexico is currently one of the

world’s largest markets for U.S. goods. Further closing

the border to the legal movement of people is not much of a

threat given the already cumbersome procedures for entry from

Mexico to the United States (Mexicans need a visa to travel

to the U.S., crossing the border from Tijuana to San Isidro

42


takes more than 90 minutes on average. Canadians do not

require a visa to enter the U.S., and the average crossing

time at Niagara Falls is approximately 10 minutes

(Cali2.net)).

It will be very difficult to coordinate the immigration

policies of 19 Latin American countries: This is undoubtedly

true; however, any Latin American integration project does

not have to start with all the composite countries

simultaneously. It can start with as few as two countries,

and will probably begin with the members of one of the

regional trade groups that already exist; i.e. Mercosur, or

the Pacific Alliance (Mercosur has already taken some steps

towards introducing free migration in its zone of influence,

although the process is less developed than in Europe

(Siciliano 2013)). If successful, other countries could

decide to join in, or allow for free migration within their

trade groups. If this idea has traction, the first step

will have been taken towards an imagined Latin American

community. This was certainly the case in the EU; it

43


started the ECSC with just 5 countries and has since grown to

27.

Free migration will increase anti-immigrant feelings

that will derail the integration process: This is certainly

possible, especially if the initial process involves large

migrations from less developed to more developed countries.

However, the situation extant within the two blocs most

likely to initiate the process (Mercosur and the Pacific

Alliance) involves countries with relatively similar levels

of development. As a result, the implementation of free

migration policies within these two groups is not likely to

result in the displacement of large numbers of migrants. But

as the groups enlarge and less developed countries join the

groups, the number of migrants will increase. This

situation would be equivalent to the one Europe faced when

Eastern European countries were admitted into the Union.

Despite fears that an unmanageable number of immigrants would

flow to the West, the situation has rather proceeded in an

orderly fashion, even during the current economic crisis. The

44


anti-immigrant parties have gained ground with the electorate

but they still have not become a major force in national

elections.

The above does not mean that free migration policies

will be adopted as a natural evolutionary process by the

different nations that make up Latin America. The

implementation of free migration policies will require the

leadership of political elites in at least a small group of

countries. However, if this step is taken, it will provide

regional integration processes with a great assurance of

success. As has been stated by the Economic Commission for

Latin America and the Caribbean: “Migration is an

indissoluble, visible and relevant component of all

integration processes, especially when they aim for more than

commercial exchange. Since integration is a potential

instrument for a national development process, and since

mobility is a critical component of these processes,

integration cannot succeed without considering the mobility

of the population (Martinez and Stang 2005:56).”

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CONCLUSION

As well understood in analyses of International

Relations, the current behavior and interaction of nations is

tightly bound to their early history. This is also true in

our analysis here of Latin American integration. We have seen

that the fragmentation of the region had its origin in the

manner that Spanish and Portuguese authorities administered

their American possessions in the 17th and 18th centuries, and

which led to the “construction” of 19 different nation-

states.

Despite their 19th century dissolution, the idea of Latin

American integration has been latent for the past two

centuries, but has picked up steam in the past two decades.

Several institutions were created in the past few decades

that attempted to emulate the achievement of the European

Union. Nevertheless, several success elements that allowed

for its “construction” seem to be absent in Latin America.

While the political elite can recreate some of these missing

elements, the most important one – a geopolitical/security

46


concern – cannot be found in the region and therefore needs

to be substituted by an alternative, and equally powerful

element.

The implementation of free migration policies in the

region is indeed that alternative element that can

successfully foster regional integration. Unlike

security/geopolitical concerns, free migration is within the

reach of political elites. Its implementation will provide

the necessary cohesiveness to the countries experimenting

with new ways of association, and will provide the push

needed to move the integration process forward.

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APPENDIX 1

THE COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA

Source: Abstracted by the author from public data. Note:Contains data on some of the economic and social variablesfound in the Latin American countries as of 2008 and 2009.The variables selected are not intended to constitute a fulleconomic analysis. Rather, these data are presented in anattempt to offer a quick overview of the respectivecountries’ competitive qualifications.

48


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