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The Safavid Synthesis: From Qizilbash Islam to Imamite Shi'ism Author(s): Kathryn Babayan Source: Iranian Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1/4, Religion and Society in Islamic Iran during the

Pre-Modern Era (1994), pp. 135-161Published by: on behalf of Taylor & Francis, Ltd. International Society for Iranian StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4310890Accessed: 11-04-2015 22:20 UTC

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Iranian Studies, volume 27, numbers 1-4, 1994

Kathryn Babayan

The Safavid Synthesis: From Qizilbash Islam to Imamite Shiism*

The Safavids evolved from a Sufi order (1301) into a messianic movement (1447) before they finally established their imperium with world-conquering aspirations (1501). Isma'il, the first pir (spiritual guide) of the Safavid order to assume the political role of shah, claimed to be the reincarnation of a host of prophets and kingly heroes from Iran's cultural past. "Prostrate thyself! Pander not to Satan! Adam has put on new clothes, God has come," writes Isma'il in his poetry (Divan), composed as he, together with his adepts, the Qizilbash (Redheads), conquered Iran and Iraq (1501-13).' In an attempt to add temporal power to the existing spiritual dominion of the Safavids, the Qizilbash reportedly entered the battlefield unarmed, believing that Isma'il's miraculous powers would shield them.2 They are said to have devoured men alive in submission and devotion to their Godhead. This article attempts to capture some of the beliefs embedded in such intense expressions of Qizilbash loyalty to shed light on the spiritual and political landscapes in which Isma'il wielded power.

Beyond his personal charisma, Isma'il's descent from the mystic Shaykh Safi al- Din (d. 1334) had infused him with an aura of saintliness that, in early modern Islam, was intimately associated with Sufi culture. Just as some Shi'i ghulat

*This article is based on research conducted for my dissertation, "The Waning of the Qizilbash: The Temporal and the Spiritual in Seventeenth Century Iran" (Princeton University, June 1993), from which I have drawn. The article is dedicated to the memory of Martin B. Dickson.

1. For the Divian of Isma'il, whose pen name was Khata'i, see II Canzoniere di Shah Isma-'ii, ed. Tourkhan Gandjei (Naples, 1959); Vladimir Minorsky, "The Poetry of Shah Isma'il I," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 10 (1942): 1006-53; Sadeddin Nuzhet Ergun, Hatayi Divani: Shah Isma'il Safevi edebi hayatti ve nefesleri (Istanbul,1956); Wheeler Thackston, "The Divan of Khata'i: Pictures for the poetry of Shah Isma'il," Asian Art (Fall 1988): 37-63. 2. Vladimir Minorsky, the "father" of Safavid historiography, quotes an anonymous

Venetian merchant who was in Tabriz in 1518: "This Sophy is loved and reverenced by his people as a God and especially by his soldiers, many of whom enter into battle without armor, expecting their master Ishmael to watch over them in fight" (Introduction to Tadhkirat al-mulak [Cambridge, 1943], 13). Hans Roemer quotes a Qizilbash battle cry without citing a source: "My spiritual leader and master, for whom I sacrifice myself (Qurban oldigim piruim murshidim)" (Cambridge History of Iran, ed. Peter Jackson and Lawrence Lockhart [Cambridge, 1986], 6:214).



136 Babayan

had viewed the Imams as scions of Muhammad's divinity, the Qizilbash saw Isma'il as the godly heir to the spiritual throne of the Safavid order.3 In the Anatolian environment in which Isma'il's grandfather, Junayd (d. 1460), had altered the nature of the order, the Safavid idiom had crystallized around myths and symbols derived from Sufi, 'Alid, ghulat and Turco-Mongol cultures.4 From the days of the rebellion of Baba Ishaq (1240) and Shaykh Bedreddin (1416), the messianism implied in ghuluww had been the motivating force behind many social and political uprisings in Anatolia, Iraq, and Syria. A unique cosmological feature of the ghulat was their rejection of the concept of resurrection (ma'acd). For the ghulat the human being died only to be reincarnated (tanasukh), returning to this world in a different form. Beliefs that revelation never ceased, that Muhammad was not the seal of the prophets, and that souls of old prophets could transmigrate into different human beings at any given time were alluring platforms aspiring revolutionaries came to embrace. Indeed, in Anatolia Junayd is said to have turned into a Sufiesque ghli. There he played on 'Alid loyalties, claimed divinity and attracted a large Turkoman following to his mission.5 The centrality of spiritual power rooted in Sufism and the belief in the transmission of charisma through descendants of a particular family added a form of legitimacy to Turkoman culture that gives the Safavids their special flavor. These ingredi- ents distinctively shaped the Safavid mode of Persianate culture.

As sovereign of eastern (Timurid) and western (Turkoman) Iran, Shaykh Isma'il took on the royal Iranian title of "shah." Shortly after the success of his revolution he concocted a Husayni (Musavi) genealogy for the Safavids and declared Imamite Shi'ism the religion of his realms. This spiritual guide, who in his poetry claimed to be the manifestation of God, Adam in new clothes, and the essence of 'Ali, turned to Perso-Semitic traditions of monarchy and to sharl'a-

3. Ghuluww (n.) is derived from the Arabic root "gh-l-w," literally, "to exceed the proper boundary." Hence, it would be more appropriate to render ghall (pl. ghulat) as "exaggerator" than "extremist." The use of the term is problematic. Ghuluww has been attributed pejoratively to individuals with extreme or unorthodox views on the nature of intercessors between man and God. For the Shi'a it is the apotheosis of the Imams, the immaculate descendants of Muhammad through his daughter Fatima. For the Sunnis it is the elevation of a saintly man (wall), a dervish, or a shaykh to a God- head. The term has also been applied rather loosely in different historical contexts to a variety of dissenters. My use of the term is an effort to make it more specific for the historian of Islam-

dom. Martin Dickson emphasized both the continuity of ghulat movements throughout Islamic history and their distinct nature, which was nurtured by religious systems-Christian heresies such as gnosticism, Zoroastrian heresies such as Mazdak- ism, Manichaeism, and Zurvanism, in addition to mainstream Zoroastrianism-that were alive in Sasanian Iran before the advent of Islam. 4. The term 'Alid is used here to denote all those who regarded descent in the male

line from 'Ali, not primarily from Fatima, as legitimate. For those who gave prece- dence to the whole family of 'Ali, any descendant of Abu Talib could become a leader. 5. See, for example, Fazlullah b. Ruzbihan Khunji's description of Sultan Junayd and

Haydar in his Thrikh-i 'alam-ara-yi Amini, ed. John Woods (London: Royal Asiatic Society, forthcoming), 259-309 (ff. 132a-158a).



The Safavid Synthesis 137

imposed stability to govern his imperium. Isma'il's public allegiance to the Imamite faith points to an awareness that to unify and centralize his domains it would be imperative to alter the nature of Safavid legitimacy and to forge a uni- form religion: heterodoxies like his own had to be contained. Isma'il's imperial proclamation echoed signs of a retreat from the religious and political landscape that had given meaning and form to the spiritual, the social, and the political relationship between the Safavids and their Qizilbash disciple-warriors. After all, as shah of Iran, Isma'il would have an Iranian elite to contend with if he desired to make use of their administrative expertise and consolidate power locally.

The erosion of Qizilbash Islam was gradual; a long and bloody struggle involv- ing two civil wars (930-42/1524-36 and 984-98/1576-90) had to be waged before the Safavids became true shahs, for they were politically dependent on the Qizilbash. And finally, it was with the adoption and integration of the ghulam (slave) system that the Safavids felt secure enough politically in their new role as shah. Only then did Imamism, colored by its Safavid experience, take hold as the hegemonic religion of the Iranian realms. The exotic beliefs of the Qizilbash are examined in this article at a crucial junction in Safavid history, during the Isfahan phase of rule (post-1590) when the betrayal of the Qizilbash was beginning to become an institutional reality.6 From the inception of Safavid rule tensions arose and persisted between the contradictory functions of pir and shah and the conflicting natures of Qizilbash Islam and Imamism. This redefinition of Qizilbash Islam permeated all levels of Safavid culture, manifesting itself in court politics, messianic revolts, the formation of vernacular traditions through hadith and storytelling, and the forms of sociability connected with the courtly assemblies (majalis) and coffeehouses of Safavid Iran. This paper will limit itself to the analysis of a single event, the messianic Nuqtavi rebellion (1002/1593) that attempted to eradicate Safavid rule during the reign of the absolutist Shah 'Abbas I (995-1038/1587-1629). This episode in Safavid history encapsulates the cultural repercussions of the erosion of Qizilbash Islam. One may see the language of rebellion against Safavid absolutism as embedding elements of the spiritual and political landscape of the Qizilbash. Moreover, the official Safavid response and justification for its suppression illuminates the new paradigms of authority the Safavids came to embrace as they transformed themselves into a sedentary empire. Their imperial language of power and their new rationale for control reflects the novel balance the Safavid house had effected with the Iranian landed elite, the Imamite ulama, and the ghulams.

6. The date 998-99/1590 has been chosen as the inauguration of the Isfahan phase of Safavid rule for several reasons. It marks the end of the second civil war (984- 98/1576-90) when 'Abbas I finally consolidated power and weakened the Qizilbash. The death of Ya'qub Khan Dhu'l-Qadr (998/1590), signaling the victory of 'Abbas over the rebellious Qizilbash, inspired the contemporary Afushta Natanzi to write a history of the reign of the Safavid shah entitled Naqdwat al-dtharfi dhikr al-akhyar (ed. I. Ishraqi [Tehran, 1350 Sh./1971]). It also marks the approximate date on which Isfahan was conceived as a capital city (1000/1591-92). See Robert McChesney, "Four sources on Shah 'Abbas's Building of Isfahan," Muqarnas 5 (1980): 105.



138 Babayan

The Structure of Power and Loyalty in the Classical Age

During the revolutionary phase (1447-1501), the Qizilbash, composed mainly of Turkoman converts to the Safavid cause, had organized themselves militarily into oymaqs (a Mongol term loosely translated as "tribe"). Members of particular tribes and localities in Anatolia and Syria had converted to Qizilbash Islam; no tribe, however, had converted en masse. Qizilbash ideology created the structure around which individuals coalesced into a single group, like the Shamlu, Ustajlu, or Tekelu. An ideology then entered into the dynamics of a set of Turco-Mongol kinship ties in the process of reformulation. In the imperial era (907-1135/1501-1722), however, the Safavids attempted to contain the revolutionary fervor that had won them temporal power. An individual could no longer convert to Qizilbash Islam; to be a Qizilbash an individual had to have been born into the oymazqs that had originally aligned themselves with the Safavid house.7 Now blood ties were solidifying the spiritual bonds that had formerly brought the oymaqs together and Qizilbash Islam was to be channeled to Ottoman Anato- lia for export only.

Although the internal organization of the oymaqs remains to be studied, some general points can be made concerning their nature. The modern historian need not conjure up an image of dissonance to understand the spiritual and political dualism embedded in the Qizilbash system. Both Sufi and steppe concepts of authority, for example, were harmonious in the local context of internal tribal stratification. Spiritually all members of the Safavid order were equal as disciples (murids). Only their master and his deputies (khalifa), selected from each clan, were their superiors in matters esoteric. Similarly, according.to steppe political theory, each member of a clan was considered an equal among equals (par inter pares). The khan, theoretically the oldest collateral member, represented the entire clan. In the classical age of Safavid rule (1501-90), the main oyma-qs had at least two delegates appointed by the court, a khan, sultan or bek, and a khalifa who represented them in the imperial arena politically as well as spiritually. The concept of equality lay at the core of both steppe and Sufi systems. Of course, ultimate power to appoint, demote, or execute resided in Isma'il, for he was the perfect guide (murshid-i ka-mil), the god-shah in whose name, and in ritual submission to whom, the Qizilbash continued to devour enemies alive. Subsequent Safavid shahs, however, would have to earn the total obedience of the Qizilbash that Isma'il, the conquering messiah, enjoyed spontaneously.

It still remains for Safavid historiography to explore the levels of interplay between spiritual rank and political status as well as the interaction between the horizontal and hierarchical, the local and imperial, concepts of authority in the

7. Martin Dickson, "Shah Tahmasb and the Uzbeks (The Duel for Khurasan with 'Ubayd Khan, 930-46/1524-40)" (unpublished diss., Princeton University, 1958), 8 (hereafter "Duel").




classical age. It is clear, nevertheless, that spiritual authority translated itself into political power for more individuals than just the shah. Loyalty to the Safavid house and to its visionary cause won the Qizilbash a monopoly over positions at court, in the provinces, and in the military. During the classical age these arenas became the near exclusive preserves of the Qizilbash. The charmed circle who surrounded the infant Isma'il during his days of refuge in Gilan (1494-99) received special rewards. Those handful of devoted Qizilbash who had served Isma'il's father, Sultan Haydar (d. 1480), and had protected and trained Isma'il and his brothers-those whom Jean Aubin terms the "Sufis of Lahi- jan"-initially received the most esteemed and politically influential posts at court and in the battlefield.8 Proximity, trust and the type of loyalty developed between a spiritual master and his disciple were the basic components that went into the shaping of these choice imperial posts. They came to define the role such functionaries would enjoy at the Safavid court. The creation of these posts institutionalized the intimacy that had developed through the language of secrecy Isma'il shared with his revolutionary apostles. The titles of three Lahijan Sufi loyalists, Dada, Lala, and Khalifa, reflect the mixture of Turco-Mongol and Sufi forms of authority embedded in the Safavid revolutionary power structure.9 Isma'il's childhood preceptors in matters profane (and perhaps spiritual), Lala Bek (Husayn Bek Shamlu) and Dada Bek (Abdal Bek), received the most important imperial military functions, those of amiir al-umara' and qfirchi-bashi, re- spectively.10 Isma'il's spiritual mentor, Khalifa Bek (Khadim Bek Talishi), had the task of administering justice at court and in the battlefield as the divan-

8. See Aubin's excellent study on the Lahijan Sufis in his "R6volution chiite et con- servatisme: Les Soufis de Lahejan, 1500-14" (Etudes Safavides II), Moyen Orient & Ocean Indien 1 (1984): 2-9. Aubin, however, assumes that the Ross Anonymous is an early source, though evidence-both art historical and literary-indicates that it was most probably committed to writing in the middle of the seventeenth century. For a study on the dating of the Ross Anonymous see A. H. Morton, "The Date and Attribution of the Ross Anonymous: Notes on a Persian History of Sh-ah Ismd'il I," in Charles Melville, ed., Pembroke Papers 1 (Cambridge, 1990), 179-212. Morton makes use of the author's annotations to the British Library manuscript of the Ross Anonymous and proposes the 1680s as the time of its composition. 9. The cognomen dada (Turkish dede) is more nuanced than lala (mentor) or khalifa

(spiritual deputy). In the early Ottoman context of Turkoman frontier culture, dada was used synonymously with the appellation bdba, designating the spiritual leader of a group of dervishes or of a tribe. By the middle of the sixteenth century the term seems to have lost its spiritual associations in Iran, for it is used synonymously with lala to designate preceptors of Safavid princesses. The fact that both Lala Bek and Dada Bek received purely military posts, while Khalifa Bek was also awarded the post of khalifat al-khulafd', is indicative of the evolution the term was undergoing in the sedentary phase of Safavid rule. I would like to thank Cemal Kafadar for his insights into the use of the term dede in Ottoman frontier culture.

10. Lala Bek was chief of all the military forces of the combined oymdqs (amir al- umara'). He also received the honorary title of Vakil, the temporal lieutenant of the shah, symbolizing the degree of trust that Isma'il had reposed in him. Dada Bek was named chief of the 3,000 elite royal guards (quirchi-b6shi) culled from all oyma-qs.



140 Babayan

begi. II After all, Isma'il was establishing a just utopia, and despite his public allegiance to Imamite Shi'ism, initially it was the Qizilbash who would enforce law and order. Moreover, upon the conquest of Baghdad and the Shi'i holy shrines in 1508, this same Khalifa Bek was awarded a new imperial title, that of chief spiritual deputy of the realms (khalifat al-khulafa'), along with the gover- norship of Baghdad. For the Qizilbash, political and spiritual authority were intimately intertwined.'2 By 1508, even though Isma'il had linked himself with the "orthodox" lineage of the twelve Imams and had toured the Shi'i shrine cities with the prominent Imamite cleric Shaykh 'Ali Karaki (al-Muhaqqiq al-Thani, d. 1534), it was the Qizilbash who captured Baghdad and the khalifat al-khulafa' who would govern and protect it. So long as the Qizilbash maintained their political sway, the religious dyarchy that the Safavids had created with their profes- sion of Imamism would exist in a state of conflict. Isma'il and his successor, Tahmasb (1524-76), attempted to subdue the religiosity of the Qizilbash, but these attempts were sporadic and lacked the real power of systematic enforcement.13 Qizilbash Islam would maintain its hegemony for nearly a century and the Safavids would have to play up their revolutionary character.

For seven years, the "Sufis of Lahijan" enjoyed political eminence. But the Qizilbash aspired to administer the Safavid domains collectively, and another pressure group, composed of local Iranian notables, shared in that aspiration. Turco-Mongol concepts of corporate sovereignty defined the political relationship between the Qizilbash and their Safavid pir-shah. While it is true that the Qizilbash were disciples of their Safavid Godhead, they did expect to share in the governing of the newly conquered domains. The dynamics between these two

11. The dtvdn-begi, also referred to as the amir-i divdn, adjudicated matters of common law ('urf). According to the Tadhkirat al-muluik, 50-51, he sat four days a week, jointly with the Sadr, in the kishlk-khdna. "There, directed by the Sadr, he interro- gated (bdz-khwcst) those guilty of the four capital crimes, namely, murder, rape, blinding, and breaking of teeth." He also executed shar'i decisions, maintained order in the city, and had control over provincial tribunals. Twice a week he sat in his house and heard civil cases of common law.

12. The khalifat al-khulafd' was the deputy of Sufi affairs, acting on behalf of the shah and appointing his representatives in the provinces-all of whom were chosen from among the Qizilbash. See Minorsky, Tadhkirat al-muluk, 12. The degeneration of this post at the end of Shah 'Abbas I's reign is indicative of the changes going on in this period. See the list of civil officials at the death of 'Abbas I where no mention is made of a khalifat al-khulafd' (Iskandar Bek Munshi Turkman, Tdrikh-i 'alam-dra-yi 'Abbdsi, 2 vols. [Tehran, 1350 Sh./1971], 2:1084-93). The office survived into the reign of Shah Sultan Husayn, but its function seemed to have been transformed, for not only was it bestowed on a sayyid-in the classical age it was awarded to the Qizilbash only-it entailed the enforcement of purely shar'l matters. See Shah Sultan Husayn's farmdn for the appointment of a khalifat al-khulafd' in Rasul Ja'farian, Din va siydsat dar dawrah-yi Safaviyyah (Qum, 1370 Sh./1991), 426.

13. The religious history of sixteenth-century Safavid Iran remains to be studied more precisely. The current debate among Arjomand, Newman, and Stewart revolving around the role of the Imamite ulama in early Safavid history is a positive sign in this direction.




interrelated hierarchies, one spiritual and the other political, distinctively shaped the structure of power and loyalty in Safavid Iran. Shortly after the conquest of Baghdad, a coalition of Qizilbash led by the Ustajlu clan, in collaboration with the newly conquered Iranian notables and Amir Najm Lahiji, another long-time confidant of the shah, asserted their political role and checked the hegemony of the "Sufis of Lahijan."14 A more equitable balance of power was struck among the Qizilbash. Yet, throughout these inter-clan power struggles, Qizilbash loyalty toward Isma'il remained unwavering. In fact, although Isma'il had retreated from public life to a life of pleasurable hunting and wine, the Qizilbash continued to "dutifully obey the writ of his commands" until his death and "no one of any eminence entertains the slightest thought of opposition."'5

In accordance with steppe tradition, Isma'il parceled out his domains among the oymdqs and later sent his sons as governors to their appanages. These Safavid princes were assigned a Qizilbash tutor (lalalatabak), directly linking the fate of a princeling with a single oymdq. Through such a practice of land distribution the Qizilbash became partners in the Safavid corporation, each receiving an appanage referred to as tuyu1 for their oymaq, as well as a dynastic member (female or male) with whom to participate politically in the system. Although Tahmasb continued to appoint Safavid princes as titular governors, sending out first his royal brothers, Sam (d. 1567), Bahram (d. 1549) and Alqas Mirza (d. 1550), he was forced to rethink the notion of corporate sovereignty, for the Qizilbash were in open revolt the first twelve years of his reign (1524-36), using him and his brother, Sam Mirza, as rallying points around which to achieve advantageous positions.16 The belief that charisma was transmitted to all collateral members of the Safavid house allowed the Qizilbash to unite around different members of the Safavid family to express their political aspirations. Their loyalty lay with the Safavid house and at times, as in the case of Shah Tahmasb's daughter Pari Khan Khanum (b. 955/1548), with one of its female members. The Safavid candidate would have to fight for sole representation of the family, all of whose members were qualified to rule. Here Turco-Mongol concepts of corporate sovereignty colored succession politics within the Safavid house. It would be the Safavid shah's military prowess and political sagacity that would win him total obedience. Indeed, Shah Tahmasb had to quash the first civil war before, in his own words, he "became king in fact" (padisha-h ba haqlqat).'7 Only then could he begin to solidify the Imamite religious institutions and elaborate on the

14. Aubin, "Revolution chiite," 1-40. 15. Ghiyath al-Din Khwandamir, Habib al-siyar, ed. Jalal al-Din Huma'i, 4 vols.

(Tehran, 1333 Sh./1954), 4:602, as cited in Dickson, "Duel," 14. 16. For the role of Husayn Khan Shamlu in the "grand sedition" (1531-34), the at-

tempted poisoning of Shah Tahmasb in order to replace him with the more pliant seventeen-year-old prince Sam Mirza, see Dickson, "Duel," 265-95.

17. Shah Tahmasb, Tadhkira-yi Shdh Tahmasb (Berlin, 1343/1923), 14, as cited in Dickson, "Duel," 96.



142 Babayan

new language of power that would award him supreme authority as the shadow of God on earth.'8

It was Tahmasb's grandson, 'Abbas I (r. 1587-1629), who finally dismantled the appanage system and reduced the power of the Qizilbash. He ended the second civil war (1576-90) that had erupted upon Tahmasb's death, removing the rebellious Afshar and Dhu'l-Qadr clans from their appanages in Fars and Kerman. He named a ghuldm, Allah Verdi Khan, as governor of Fars (1595) and set him up with an administration of 300 ghulams. In consolidating power, 'Abbas made use of the ghulams Tahmasb had begun to train as palace page boys.'9 'Abbas, however, increased their number and thoroughly introduced them into the central and provincial administration.20 The Qizilbash lost their privilege to receive appanages along with their lala-ships, a key element in their bid for equal participation in Safavid politics. At this stage of centralization, which is here referred to as the Isfahan phase of Safavid rule (1590-1722), the Safavids had altered the political and religious landscape of the Qizilbash. Shah 'Abbas's reforms had far- reaching social implications, particularly for the Qizilbash who were used to being regarded with special honor and respect. For many Qizilbash it meant not only that they no longer enjoyed special political and economic privileges, but also that many of the oyma-qs were now governed by the ghulatms who had been named governors of provinces in which they lived.2' The entire tribal structure of the Qizilbash had been affected by Shah 'Abbas's centralizing reforms. The Qizilbash khan/bek who guaranteed the political and economic interests of the tribe was rendered impotent once he was officially replaced by a ghulahm to whose authority he had to be subservient. The local power of the Qizilbash amir was

18. See Said Amir Arjomand, The Shadow of God on Earth and the Hidden Imam (Chicago, 1984), 105-22.

19. Forty thousand ghulams had been incorporated into Shah Tahmasb's court in 961/1533-34. Sharaf Khan Bitlisi, a Kurdish prince who was a ghulam at Tahmasb's court, writes (in 1596): "From the age of nine to twelve, from 1551-54, 1 was a page at the inner palace. For it was the Shah's policy to educate the sons of illustrious families along with the princes of the realm . . ." (Martin Dickson and Stuart Cary Welch, The Houghton Sha-hnameh, 2 vols. [Cambridge, 1981], 2:242a, n. 30). This statement by Bitlisi indicates that during the reign of Tahmasb (1524-76) a system of palace schools existed wherein children from prominent families were educated. This system must then have been expanded and institutionalized under 'Abbas in order to accommodate a larget number of ghulams. 20. After Shah 'Abbas I's Georgian campaign in 1025/1616-17-during which ap-

proximately 330,000 slaves were reportedly captured-he began to utilize them thoroughly in the administration of the briru-n and the andarutn (Iskandar Bek, 'Alam-drd-yi 'Abba-si 2:900-901). 21. Ibid., 1088. In Iskandar Bek's words, "Since some of the oymaqs did not pos-

sess qualified candidates to take on high posts once their Qizilbash amirs and governors had died, a ghulam was appointed, due to his justice, skill, bravery, and self-sacrifice, to the rank of amtr of that clan (ii), army (qushu-n va lashkar) and to the gover- norship (hukuimat) of that region (ulkac)." Twenty-one ghuldms held such positions at the death of 'Abbas I.




thus undermined, creating fissures in the intricate web of tribal and Sufi alle- giances and loyalties that had enhanced Qizilbash solidarity.

Centralization, in the Safavid context, was tantamount to breaking the spiritual and political power of the Qizilbash. It attempted to alter the tribal structure of the oymaqs that had facilitated Qizilbash resistance to the Safavid will to rule in- dependently and served to weaken Qizilbash Islam, inasmuch as such beliefs had originally bound each oymaq together. As we have seen, although Shah Isma'il had played on the ghuldt spirit of the Qizilbash to establish his empire, once in power he sought the support of the Imamite ulama to counter Qizilbash Islam. But the Qizilbash were too powerful; the Imamite ulama would have to cater to their flavor of Islam, and not all of them would agree to do so.22 The spirit of Shah Isma'il I's rise to power shaped the way in which some Imamite scholars initially legitimized Safavid rule. Isma'il's forged Husayni/Musavi pedigree had allowed them to place his messianic claims within an Imamite framework making use of the paradigm of the awaited Mahdi. It had been common among Islamic scholars and aspiring reformers to relate hadith on the occultation (ghayba) to political uprisings, and vice versa.23 Less common, however, had been the attempt to ascribe Imamite legitimacy to a government on grounds that its rule was indeed that just order (dawlat-i haqq) that the Mahdi was to establish at the end of time.24 Some prominent Safavid ulama related hadith paralleling the advent of the Mahdi with the rise to power of Shah Isma'il. These hadith had customarily been employed only when discussing eschatological and apocalyptic events relating to his advent.25 Initially, then, Imamite clerics implied that the legitimacy of Safavid rule rested on a Mahdist rather than a religio-legal

22. Andrew Newman, "The Myth of the Clerical Migration to Safavid Iran," Die Welt des Islams 33 (1993). Also see Devin Stewart's article, "Notes on the Migration of 'Amili Scholars to Safavid Iran," Journal of Near Eastern Studies (forthcoming), where he maps out the current historiographical points of contention among Ja'far al- Muhajir, Newman, Arjomand, and himself on the issue of 'Amili migration to Safavid Iran. 23. For the Bab's later use of hadtth in his khuruj see Abbas Amanat, Resurrection

and Renewal: The Making of the Bdbii Movement, 1844-50 (Ithaca, 1989), 193-7. On Islamic scholars who linked the apocalyptic circumstances of the guhuir recorded in hadith literature to political upheavals see ibid., 89-93. 24. Sayyid Ahmad Husayni, ed., Fihrist-i nuskhahd-yi khattl-yi kitabkhanah-yi

'umimtf-yi ha'.rat-i a-yatulldh al-'uzmd Najafi Mar'ashl, 20 vols. (Qum, n.d.), 4:154- 5, MS 1381. This anonymous work, dedicated to Shah Tahmasb in 974/1566-67, is a commentary on the hadtth discussing the just order that shall be established at the end of time. It attempts to draw parallels between the order evoked in this hadith and that of the Safavids. It has been noted by Sayyid Husayn Mudarrisi Tabataba'i that some Safavid scholars considered Safavid rule the dawlat-i haqq-the utopia-like order that the Mahdi is to establish in Imamite eschatology (Husayn Mudarrisi Tabataba'i, Zamin darfiqh-i Islacmt, 2 vols. [Tehran, 1362 Sh./1983], 2:222, fn. 84).

25. See, for example, the various monographs on ghayba in Aqa Buzurg, al-Dharl'a ila tasanif al-shl-'a, 25 vols. (Tehran and Najaf, 1355-98/1936-78), 16:74-85.



144 Babayan

(shar'0) basis.26 Some mujtahids (jurisconsults), such as Shaykh 'Ali Karaki, however, attempted to break with this. Karaki issued afatwa (injunction) allow- ing the cursing of Abu Muslim, the God-like hero of the Qizilbash, and wrote one of the earliest polemics against the Sufiesque ghuldt.27 Yet the Qizilbash retained their hegemony at court, in the provinces, and in the military, and Shah Isma'il had to make allowance for their ghuluww, for his Qizilbash disciples would not be satisfied with Isma'il's role as, say, the representative of the Mahdi-a role Karaki would have deemed suitable for the shah.28 Only a century later, once the absolutist Shah 'Abbas I was able to dilute the power of the Qizilbash, did the shari'a-minded attack on Abu Muslim and Sufis gain momen- tum, producing a body of disputations that gave birth to one of the major intellectual debates in Safavid Iran.29 That these disputations flourished toward the end of 'Abbas I's reign rather than upon the inception of Safavid imperial rule is testimony to the concomitant waning of both Qizilbash spirituality and political might.

Shaykh 'Ali Karaki's ban on storytellers who recited the epic-romance of Abu Muslim (Abui Muslimnama) represents an initial attempt by the Imamite ulama, sanctioned by their Safavid patrons, to publicly suppress Qizilbash beliefs. That Abu Muslim was the first target of the sharl'a-minded attack sheds light on the nature of Qizilbash Islam and on the practical problems the ulama encountered in their attempts to convert the Turco-Iranian population of Safavid Iran to their version of Imamism. The Abui Muslimna-ma recounts the heroic feats and ex- ploits of its protagonist, Abu Muslim (d. 755), the religious warrior who was

26. As in Arba'in 'uqab, written for Shah Tahmasb (930-84/1524-76). See Danishpazhuh's description in Fihrist-i nuskhaha-yi kitabkhdnah-yi danishgah-i Tihran, 18 vols. (Tehran, 1340 Sh./1961), 3:1069, MS 1116. Also see Aqa Buzurg, Dhari'a 1:419. 27. Shaykh 'Ali Karaki, Mata 'in al-mujrimiyya fi radd al-slifiyya, probably written

in 1526; Karaki'sfatwa is preserved by his student, Muhammad b. Ishaq b. Muham- mad Hamavi, in his work written in 938/1531 and entitled Ants al-mu'minin (ed. Mir Hashim Muhaddith [Tehran, 1363 Sh./1984]). 28. The ghuluww of the Qizilbash, the vitality of Sufism as a socio-religious force,

and the respect philosophy enjoyed among Iranian intellectuals had also minimized the effect of early attacks by sharl'a-minded ulama, such as Karaki, on Abu Muslim. 29. Three polemics written against Abu Muslim and the Sufis have survived from the

reign of Shah Tahmasb (1524-76). There appears to have been a lull until the end of the reign of Shah 'Abbas I (1629), when a reinterpretation of the Abu Muslim legends emerged among the Imamite religious community in Isfahan. This attempt to redefine Abu Muslim's role in the 'Abbasid revolution from a strictly orthodox Imamite per- spective ignited one of the major debates in seventeenth-century Safavid intellectual history. These debates found articulation in a body of literature called refutations (radd). Sayyid Ahmad 'Alavi wrote his Iha-r al-haqq in 1043/1633-34 in defense of Mir Lawhi's critique of Abu Muslim, elaborated in his Tarjuma-yi Abut Muslim. 'Alavi's son, Sayyid 'Abd al-Hasib, noted on the back of an extant manuscript of Ighar al-haqq in 1063/1653 that some ulama came to Mir Lawhi's aid and wrote treatises on Abu Muslim in support of Mir Lawhi's refutation in order to quell the anger of the "masses." Another contemporary 'dlim listed seventeen treatises against Abu Muslim. For a list of these disputations see Aqa Buzurg, Dhari'a 4:150-51.




instrumental in the overthrow of the Umayyads (661-750) and the establishment of the 'Abbasids. Veneration for 'Ali and vengeance for the martyrdom of Husayn are manifest themes throughout this epic. After Abu Muslim's death, some of his followers (Abu Muslimiyya), in true ghulat fashion, denied that he was dead and claimed that he was in hiding and would soon return (raj'a) to establish justice on earth. During the ghulat-inspired phase of the Safavid movement (1447-1501), the Safavids had attempted to draw parallels between their movement and the historical memory of Abu Muslim's da'wa (mission), preserved in the Abu Muslimnama and first committed to writing at the turn of the eleventh century.30 Evidence indicates that Isma'il and his father Haydar (d. 1488) or grandfather Junayd utilized the Abu Muslimnama as a tool to incite the Turkoman of Anatolia-those tribesmen who would convert to Qizilbash Islam and take up arms to fight for their beliefs.3' Both Persian and Turkish versions of the Abu Muslimndma, dating from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, invoke genealogies of early ghulat groups-Kaysaniyya offshoots.32 Associations between Abu Muslim and the Safavids are also documented in the Junaydndma, the epic revolving around Junayd, Isma'il's grandfather. The Junaydnama and the Abu Muslimnama both fall within the category of religious/heroic epics. In the legendary realm of the Junaydnama, Junayd was a descendant of Abu Talib,

30. Most of the extant manuscripts of the Abut Muslimnamas name Abu Tahir Tusi or Tarsusi, a storyteller (qissakhwa-n) at the court of Sultan Mahmud Ghaznavi (d. 421/1030), as their source.

31. According to 'Abd al-Husayn Zarrinkub-who, unfortunately, does not cite his source-storytellers referred to as "Sufis of Ardabil" would recite stories about Muhammad b. Hanafiyya and Abu Muslim to draw parallels between the nature of Abu Muslim's da'wa and the aims of the Safavid revolutionaries. See 'A.-H. Zarrinkub, Dunbala-yi justuju-yi tasawwuf dar Iran (Tehran, 1366 Sh./1987), 228-9, also quoted by Ja'farian, Din va siyasat, 235 and idem, "Rfiyarui'i-yi faqihan va sfifiyan dar 'asr-i Safaviyya," Kayhan-i andisha 33 (1369 Sh./1990). 32. The Kaysaniyya, a collective designation used by heresiographers to denote all

sects that evolved out of Mukhtar's movement (685-87), upheld the divine candidacy of Muhammad b. Hanafiyya (d. 700/81) due to his descent from Ali b. Abu Talib. However, it was the position that the Kaysaniyya ascribed to Muhammad b. Hanafiyya that made them distinctly ghulat: to them he was a messiah who continued the succession of revelation after Muhammad. For the Kaysaniyya, Muhammad was no different from Adam, Jesus, or Muhammad b. Hanafiyya. See W. Madelung, Ency- clopedia of Islam, 2nd ed., "KAYSANIYYA." For her study of the Abu Muslim legend entitled Abu Muslim, le porte-hache de Kho-

rasan dans la tradition epique turco-iranienne (Paris, 1962), Irene Melikoff consulted the following manuscripts of the Abui Muslimndma: Bibliotheque Nationale de Paris, ancien fond turc,-nos. 57-60 (copied in 998/1590), no. 321 (end of sixteenth century) and no. 344 (19 Muharram 905/26 Aug. 1499); BNP, supplement persan, nos. 842, 842 bis, 843-4 (sixteenth century); Belediye Kitabhanesi, B.14 (sixteenth century). A printed version of the Tehran University manuscript, edited by Iqbal Yaghma'i, as well as the Majlis Library manuscript, summarized by Muhammad Ja'far Mahjub in his article, "Dastanha-yi 'amiyana-yi Farsi," Majalla-yi sukhan 10: 167- 74, 283-91, 380-86, have been consulted by the author. Both date from the late Timurid period.



146 Babayan

whose grandson was Abu Muslim. At the end of the Junaydna-ma the reader is referred to the Abui Muslimnama to follow the story of his descendants.33 This is not to say that the Safavids were a continuation of the Kaysaniyya ghulact, but that Sultan Junayd or Sultan Haydar used Kaysaniyya and Abu Muslimiyya lin- eages to bolster their legitimacy-an indication of the nature of the novel turn the Safavid order had taken in its revolutionary phase. Just as Isma'il referred to himself in his poetry as Firaydun, Rustam, Alexander, Jesus, and the son of 'Ali, in oral culture Safavid adepts might very well have regarded him as the incarnation of Abu Muslim.

The Abui Muslimnama, a product of the cultures of Anatolia and Iran, was a medium through which 'Alid ghuluww was preserved in oral tradition by way of storytelling. In the imperial phase these stories were strong reminders of the spirit of Qizilbash Islam and of the Safavids' former identification with Abu Muslim. Once the Imamite Shi'i identity of the Safavid domains had been adopted, Shah Isma'il's genealogy was altered (1508)-hence the new rendition of the .SaJvat al-safa, officially revised under Isma'il's successor, Shah Tahmasb (1524-76).34 Shah Isma'il's choice of an "orthodoYC' Husayni/Musavi lineage allowed him to maintain the 'Alid loyalties associated with Abu Muslim's cause. It permitted him as well to separate himself, at least genealogically, from the ghuldt. The newly concocted Safavid ancestral tree revealed no trace of Abu Muslim or of Muhammad b. Hanafiyya; instead, the Musavi link was emphasized. The Musavi connection was not alien to the Safavid audience who saw Abu Muslim as a religious hero; for some versions of the Abut Muslimnama de- picted Abu Muslim and Imam Muhammad al-Baqir as sharing the same divine lineage. These associations shed light on a question that has often puzzled Safavid historians: Why did Isma'il adopt a Husayni/Musavi genealogy?35 Since

33. A copy of the Junaydnama exists in the Sulaymaniya Library in Istanbul, Fatih 4354. The manuscript was copied in Rabi' I 969/November 1562. The compiler notes that the Junaydnama was translated from the Persian in 924/1518 (cited by Melikoff, Abuz Muslim, 79). A second copy (Blochet [1932-33] 11 19 [Supplement 636]) was entitled Kissa-i Seyyid Cuneyd ve Reside-i 'Arab. Ahmet Karamustafa has identified the translator as Vahdi, a learned Sufi most probably of the Khalvatiyya or the Zayniyya order. See Karamustafa's critical edition and analysis of Vahidi's Menakib-i hvoca-i cihan ve netice-i can (Cambridge, 1993), 43-7. 34. Zeki Velidi Togan, "Sur l'origine des Safavides," Melanges Massignon III

(Damascus, 1959): 346-8. Togan makes use of three manuscripts of the SafWat al- safd, two pre-Safavid (Leiden MS 2639 dated 890/1485, Ayasofya MS 3099 dated 896/1491) and one Safavid (Ayasofya MS 2123 dated 914/1508) to demonstrate that a tampering with Safavid genealogy takes place whereby the Safavids are transformed from descendants of the Prophet, without further elaborations, into Husayni/Musavis. He demonstrates that the Husayni/Musavi incorporation into the Safwat al-safd (1508) occurred before Mir Abu'l-Fath al-Husayni's rescension commissioned by Shah Tahmasb in 940/1533. The Futu-hat-i shahi (927/1520-21) by Sadr al-Din Sul- tan Ibrahim Amini Haravi (Vaziri Library, Yazd, Ms 5774), is the first chronicle from the Safavid period to include a Husayni/Musavi genealogy for Shah Isma'il. 35. Historians such as Roger Savory have understood the Safavid espousal of

Imamism as a choice dictated by international considerations. Savory argues that




some Qizilbash and Tajiks revered the Imams, such as Muhammad al-Baqir and Ja'far al-Sadiq, and saw them as partners in the spiritual lineage of the Kaysaniyya and the Muslimiyya, initially this pronouncement must have not come as a shock. Shi'ism had entered the culture of the Kaysaniyya ghulaht through the 'Alid cause. Once the ulama banned the recitation of the Abu Mus- limnama and issuedfatwds sanctioning the cursing of Abu Muslim, however, it became clear that the sharl-'a-minded ulama's version of Imamism was quite different from that of Qizilbash Islam. Tensions between the ghuluww of the Qizilbash and the orthodoxy of the sharl'a-minded erupted. The new Safavid political theology would have appealed to the Imamites and to the crypto-Sunnis for whom the advent of the Mahdi was part of their eschatological beliefs. But what about messianic yeamings that remained unfulfilled for those disillusioned Qizilbash whose ancestors had taken up arms to help Isma'il establish a utopia on earth? And what of those Sufis who, in their longing for communion with the Truth, desired to collapse eschatology?

The Erosion of Qizilbash Islam and Its Cultural Repercussions

For fourteen years (984-98/1576-90) following the death of Shah Tahmasb, fac- tions of Qizilbash oymacqs in alliance with Tajik administrators at court orchestrated their power struggles around members of the Safavid family. 'Abbas I emerged triumphant out of this civil war that had seen the execution of his pa- ternal uncle Isma'il 11 (1577) and his mother Mahd 'Ulya (1581), both victims of the Qizilbash desire to participate collectively in the imperial system. 'Abbas crushed the second civil war, reorganized the military, and massacred his Qizil- bash opponents at court. As he began to seize the reigns of power, some of the Qizilbash abandoned the Safavid house and embraced a new leader, the spiritual master of the Nuqtavi movement. It had been common in the classical age for the Qizilbash to revolt in an attempt to secure a more advantageous political role for themselves. Yet their aspirations were consistently formulated around a Safavid candidate, male or female. Loyalty to the Safavid family had been absolute, and for some Qizilbash to now embrace a Nuqtavi pir who aspired to take on temporal power was a spiritual expression of political rebellion. As some Qizilbash were being denied access to their traditional channels of livelihood, locally as well as at court, they were led to, or perhaps chose to, renounce their devotion for their Safavid pfr. This Nuqtavi uprising, at the outset of 'Abbas I's reign, cleared the path for a heavier reliance on sharl-'a-minded ulama.

Shi'ism was adopted by the Safavids in opposition to their Ottoman Sunni neigh- bors. This reading, however, suffers on a number of counts. Its interpretation is not only blurred by historical anachronisms, it also fails to give credence to the internal dynamics of the Safavid revolutionary movement. In short, it ascribes little value to Qizilbash Islam, regarding the Qizilbash as a purely political force. Said Arjomand has attempted to revise this interpretation, taking into account internal political real- ities. He sees the adoption of Imamism as a choice determined by considerations of state. The religious nature of the Safavid movement that led to the choice of Imamism as the religion of their imperium, however, is neglected in these interpretations.



148 Babayan

The Nuqtavis seem to be the first recorded Sufiesque-ghulat movement since the Safavid revolution to have enjoyed a wide following among the Qizilbash, in particular among prominent dignitaries at court (arkan-i dawlat).36 As the Safavids betrayed the Qizilbash, some revolted against them in a language that preserved elements forged by the spiritual landscape of Qizilbash Islam, a language that portrayed the intimate interplay between the spiritual and the temporal in Safavid Iran. Those among the Qizilbash who embraced Nuqtavi beliefs aimed to reinstitute Sufi and steppe paradigms of authority that had originally given meaning to the relationship between the Qizilbash and their Safavid mas- ters.

Mahmud Pisikhani (d. 1427), a native of Gilan, founded the Nuqtavi movement after having broken off from his Hurufi pir Fazlullah Astarabadi (d. 1394). Although the two shared the belief that history was cyclical and revelation con- tinuous, Pisikhani believed that the final cycle when all of humanity would attain Truth belonged to the Iranians. Nuqtavi cosmology divided sixteen thousand years in the history of mankind into two cycles of eight thousand years each, the first dominated by Arabs, to be followed by an era of Iranian rule. Each cycle was to bring forth a succession of eight Arab and eight Iranian prophets.37 Ac- cording to the Nuqtavis, "the cycle of the 'ajam (Iranians) will prevail. . . the religion of Muhammad is abrogated (mansCkh); now the religion is the religion of Mahmud."38 The belief in reincarnation (tana-sukh) and in the possible incarnation of all or part of the divine in certain men (hulil) had allowed for some ghuldt, like the Mubayyada who rose in Transoxiana twenty years after Abu Muslim's death, to claim that Abu Muslim was the incarnation of a succession of prophets from Adam through Moses and Jesus to Muhammad. Some ghulat, like the Parsis (Parsiydn),39 remnants of the Khurramite followers of Babak (d. 837), traced their spiritual lineage back to the ancient kings of Iran, beginning with Jamshid, whom they recognized as the first rightful Imam. The Parsis believed that the prophetic chain had been passed from the Kayanids to the Arabs (Muhammad, 'Ali, and Muhammad b. Hanafiyya), then to the 'Abbasid Ibrahim b. Muhammad, and finally back to the Iranians with Abu Muslim. Although Abu Muslim's "heroic effort to break the Arab domination and restore justice" had failed, his grandson Gawhar "would complete his work and restore the Iranian

36. Natanzi, Naqawat al-athar, 516. Sadiq Kiya, Nuq!aviyan ya Pisikhaniyan (Tehran, n.d), 23, quoting from a contemporary source, Muhsin Fani's Dabistan al- madhahib (2 vols. [Tehran, 1362 Sh./1983], 1:273-8). Iskandar Bek, 'Alam-drd-yi 'Abbasi 1:476, mentions the name of another Qizilbash who was killed: Budaq Bek Din Oghlu Ustajlu. Fani mentions that Husayn Khan Shamlu was found crying at the rawzat al-shuhada' (Muharram 1002) and Shah 'Abbas I asked him why a man from Sham was crying for Husayn. Shamlu responded: "I am not crying for Husayn; some of our good young men have also been killed" (Dabistdn 1: 277). 37. Ibid., 275. 38. Ibid., 276; also quoted in Kiya, Nuqpaviyan, 22. 39. Not to be confused with their Zoroastrian namesakes in India.




religion and the dominance of the mahdi."'40 The content of the Parsis' rhetoric portrays the kind of syncretic process in effect between Islamic and Iranian cultural systems in the twelfth century. Their claims were expressed from within the Islamic tradition. They made use of Islamic vocabulary and characters such as Muhammad, 'Ali, and the Imams. Initially they joined the Isma'ilis. The 'Alid cause had provided some ghuldt with a forum for articulating their opposition. One can see how the lines between ghuluww and Shi'ism became blurred in this period. Because of the oppositional stance of both the Shi'is and the ghulat, the 'Alid cause came to be the rallying point around which both groups united. Once a weaver named Budayl manifested himself from among the Parsis and claimed to be the reincarnation of Salman the Persian, he applied the princi- ple of hulul, claiming to be God, and abrogated the shari'a, openly breaking with Islam. For some Persianate mahdis "Islam was just a brief interval in the religious tradition of Iran."41 This intermingling of Islamic and Persianate belief systems permeates the content of the Nuqtavi message as well. While the Nuq- tavis saw the sun as their qibla (direction of prayer), Mahmud Pisikhani claimed to be a combined incarnation of Muhammad and 'Ali-a more complete form of Muhammad.42 The Nuqtavis evoked the rhetoric of Iranian tradition and of the ever-presence, in Iranian religious movements, of the option of returning to a time before Arabs, even before Islam. The degree to which this rhetoric refers to real "pre-Islamic" survivals remains to be explored.43

Sufis played a significant role in Nuqtavi cosmological notions of such endings and beginnings of time. Mahmud Pisikhani taught that the individual should live his life as an ascetic dervish, abstaining from all material desires except food. Such an individual was in the process of spiritual growth and could ulti- mately attain the rank of Allah.44 Pisikhani writes:

The turn of the final praiseworthy rinds [Sufis] has arrived; What the Arabs taunted the Iranians with has passed.45

Sufism and the institution of the takiya were arenas in which the Nuqtavi movement crystallized in Safavid Iran. Towards the middle of the sixteenth century Darvish Khusraw, the future pir of the Nuqtavis, was born into a poor family from the district of Darb-i Kush in Qazvin. Refusing to follow in the

40. W. Madelung, Religious Trends in Early Islamic Iran (Albany, 1988), 9-12. The term mahdt (in the lower case) is used here to refer to the concept of a generic messiah. 41. Ibid, 11. 42. Fani, Dabistdn 1:273-4, 276. 43. We may be dealing here, rather, with a case similar to that of medieval and early

modem Russia, where a prevailing "dual model" made the present always a function of an abandoned, yet potentially ever-present, past. I would like to thank Peter Brown for having articulated this point. See J. M. Lotman, The Semiotics of Russian Cul- tural History (Ithaca, 1985), 30-66. 44. Fani, Dabistan 1:275. 45. Ibid., 276.



150 Babayan

traditional footsteps of his ancestors, who had engaged in the occupation of digging wells and irrigation canals (qamshi), he chose the path of an ascetic and "donned the clothes of the qalandars and dervishes."46 While he traveled from place to place in search of himself, he came across some Nuqtavis, whose doctrines he found attractive. He spent time with them and learned their ways (shiva) and teachings. Upon his return to Qazvin, during the reign of Shah Tah- masb, he began living beside a mosque.47 There he attracted a group of dervishes and, in the pejorative language of the chronicler Iskandar Bek Munshi, opened a "stall of theosophy" (dukkan-i ma'rifat).48 Iskandar Bek remarks that this dervish was well known for his ability to mingle with all types of people.49 His charisma and sociability aside, the environment seemed ripe for seekers of Darvish Khusraw's path, for his fame grew to such an extent that the ulama became wary of his popularity. Along with the market inspector (muhtasib), who was probably an 'alim, they denied Darvish Khusraw's teachings and forbade him to linger around the mosque.

Despite the threats from the ulama and the muhtasib, Darvish Khusraw continued to reside by the mosque and attract the people of Qazvin to his company. The ulama must have voiced their complaints to Shah Tahmasb, who then summoned Darvish Khusraw and questioned him about his state (ahwal).50 Once the dervish communicated the ordinances of Islam and the principles of the Imamite faith to the shah, we are told, all accusations were rebutted. Since the shah could not detect any outward deviation from the shari'a, the dervish was exonerated. But the shah also heeded the demands of the ulama and ordered that the dervish no longer "set up shop" by the mosque and that he refrain from at- tracting "half-witted folk" (kuitch khirada-n-i 'avacmm). At this point Shah Tahmasb did not perceive Darvish Khusraw as a political threat, or he would have executed him. This allows us to speculate that until the last quarter of the sixteenth century, the Nuqtavis had not yet infiltrated the ranks of the Qizilbash, or at least that Shah Tahmasb was not aware of such infiltration.51 Moreover, it tells us that the dervish cult was not yet officially the target of attacks, as it would be a century later.52 Darvish Khusraw had been judged by his outward ad-

46. Iskandar Bek, 'Alam-ara-yi 'Abbasi 1:473. 47. He must have returned to Qazvin after it had been made the official capital in

1555. 48. Iskandar Bek, 'Alam-adra-yi 'Abbasi 1:473. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid. 51. Note that Tahmasb did, however, blind the poet Abu'l-Qasim Amiri, a high-rank-

ing Nuqtavi, in 973/1565. He also carried out a large-scale purge in Kashan in 981/1573-74. See B. S. Amoretti, "Religion in the Timurid and Safavid Periods" in Peter Jackson and Lawrence Lockhart, eds., Cambridge History of Iran (Cambridge, 1986), 6:645. 52. Although Said Arjomand argues that the Safavid attack on Sufis and Sunnis be-

gan with the inception of Shah Ismai'l's rule and that the Naqshbandis were the first order to be "ferociously suppressed" (Shadow of God, 109-21), Dina Le Gall demonstrates that some Naqshbandi shaykhs like Sun'ullah Kuzakunani, the founder of the Naqshbandi takiya in Tabriz, lived there unharmed up to the turn of the seventeenth




herence to the sharii'a and his conformity to its prescribed norms. The Imamite ulama, in this period, were attempting to enforce proper shar'i behavior.53 Darvish Khusraw's semblance of outer conformity seems to have been adequate for the shah. For the ulama, however, the fact that Darvish Khusraw had oper- ated alongside a mosque, the domain reserved for the propagation of Imamite rituals, was perceived as threatening. Some ulama had already begun distinguish- ing between the often interchangeable paths of shart'at and tariqat. The attrac- tion of followers to an alternative quest for God, presented by the dervish, jeop- ardized the endeavors of the ulama to convert the masses to sharl'a-minded Imamism. Darvish Khusraw was aware that, in order to survive, he needed to conform outwardly to the norms established by the Imamite theologians. "In order to allay their suspicions, he [Darvish Khusraw] began to visit the ulama, studied jurisprudence (fiqh), and attended the Friday prayers at the Masjid-i Jami'. Nobody had any business with him any longer."54

The popularity of the Nuqtavis spread among the people of Qazvin (Turk va Tdjik) during the decade of the second civil war (984-98/1576-90), between the death of Shah Tahmasb and the accession of Shah 'Abbas I. After Shah Tah- masb's death Darvish Khusraw, as was his wont, built a lodge (nishiman) adja- cent to the mosque located by his house. There, Turks and Tajiks from near and far flocked to his takiya.5 He engaged in assemblies (majalis) with people from every walk of life, spiritual proclivity rather than social rank being the de- termining factor.56 We are told that until Shah 'Abbas I ascended the throne, he and his disciples spent some years in that lodge preparing enough food for their subsistence and living free from trouble and disturbance.57 According to Afushta Natanzi, at this stage in the growth of Darvish Khusraw's movement it did not appear as though he acted contrary to the shari'a. It was not until the number of his disciples had grown to such an extent that he enjoyed real influence among the people that he was officially perceived as diverging from the prescribed rituals (dadb) of the shari'a. It was only then that the Safavid house (dudmdn) developed a real interest in Darvish Khusraw. His fame is said to have grown so great that his lodge could no longer contain his followers, and the denizens of that district (mahalla) helped Darvish Khusraw build a bigger takiya.58 News of Darvish Khusraw's popularity must have reached Shah 'Abbas, who paid him a

century. See Dina Le Gall, "The Ottoman Naqshbandiyya in the pre-Mujaddidi Phase: A Study in Islamic Religious Culture and its Transmission" (unpublished diss., Princeton University, 1989), 22-31. Studies on particular Sufi tartqats in their local Safavid contexts need to be conducted before any further generalizations are made. 53. See Sayyid Husayn Mudarrisi Tabataba'i, An Introduction to Shi'i Law (London,

1984), 50. 54. Iskandar Bek, 'Alam-dra-yi 'Abbdsi 1:474. 55. Ibid.; Natanzi, Naqdwat al-dthdr, 515. 56. Natanzi, Naqawat al-dthar, 515-16. 57. Iskandar Bek, 'Alam-dra-yi 'Abbasi 1:474. 58. According to Natanzi, Naqdwat al-athdr, 517, around 200 disciples would con-

gregate daily in his takiya. See also Iskandar Bek, 'Alam-dra-yi 'Abbdsi 1:474.



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visit.59 In time, they developed a close companionship (suhbat).60 The chronicler makes it clear that, subsequently, the shah frequented Darvish Khusraw's takiya and inquired about his disciples (arbdb-i suluk) only to become acquainted with the dervish's ways. The shah pretended to act as an adept and engaged in the rituals of the takiya, offering Darvish Khusraw cash and goods. It is said that following the shah's example, many amzrs and high functionaries also vis- ited him. The dervish charmed them "with his eloquence" and they, too, became his disciples and, out of devotion and respect, offered him gifts of value such as inlaid daggers.6'

Darvish Khusraw continued to practice prudence, however, and remained firm in his determination not to utter any word against the sharz'a so that he would not lose his takiya.62 In his discussions with the shah he delineated the way of at- taining the knowledge of God in accordance with dervish practice.63 But the truth was soon disclosed. A dervish who enjoyed high standing in his companionship with Darvish Khusraw divulged the true nature of his doctrines. Ustad Yusufi Tarkishduz had been invested with the special spiritual rank of vice-re- gency (niyibat) and trusteeship (amanat) by his pEr.64 A native of Khurasan, Tarkishduz was a master quiver-maker. The shah, who held the art of quiver making in high regard, commissioned Tarkishduz to make him some quivers. Every time Tarkishduz came to deliver his wares at court, the two would engage in conversations. We are told that the shah spoke with him to obtain privileged information. Tarkishduz, thinking that the shah had actually been converted to Nuqtavism, trusted his friendly gestures and divulged their secret beliefs in confidence.65 A special relationship must have developed between the two for Tarkishduz to have disclosed the secrets of the Nuqtavis. He must have felt that 'Abbas would understand their claims and that their secrets, shared by a spiritually select circle of disciples, would be safe with the shah. Although the chronicles claimed that Shah 'Abbas played the role of a disciple to discover the Nuq- tavis' true beliefs, Muhsin Fani, writing in the mid-seventeenth century in India, stated that an exiled Nuqtavi "trustee" (amEn) had told him that in fact the Nuqta- vis regarded the shah as a "full trustee."66 As we shall see, the way in which

59. Iskandar Bek, loc. cit., states that 'Abbas, while casually strolling through the streets of Qazvin, which he would often do to get acquainted with different groups of people, chanced upon Darvish Khusraw's takiya. Natanzi's version is slightly different: the shah, who knew of Darvish Khusraw, was walking in the street one day when Darvish Khusraw ran out and lured him into his takiya with his "smooth talk (charb zabaini)" (Naqawat al-dthar, 516). 60. Iskandar Bek, 'Alam-ara-yi 'Abbasi 1:474. 61. Natanzi, Naqawat al-athar, 516. 62. Iskandar Bek, 'Alam-acra-yi 'Abbasi 1:474. 63. Ibid. 64. Ibid.; Natanzi, Naqawat al-dthar, 517. 65. Natanzi, Naqa-wat al-a-thar, 517. 66. Fani, Dabista-n 1:277: "Va ham az amini shanida ka Shcah 'Abbas amin-i ka-mil

buid."




'Abbas came to deal with the cabalistic predictions of the Nuqtavis points to his enchantment with their doctrines.

The development of an intimate camaraderie between Shah 'Abbas and Tarkish- duz sheds light on two channels through which bonds of loyalty could be nurtured between the "high" and the "low," the spiritual and the temporal, the courtly and the local elements in Safavid culture. The takiya was one arena in which, say, a shoemaker could engage in and share a language of secrecy with a Sufi pir as well as with a high-ranking court dignitary. The arts and the culti- vated relationship between an artist and his royal patron represented a second medium through which Yusufi communicated in private with the shah. A fel- lowship of trust and confidence must have developed there. Tarkishduz's art of quiver making had awarded him special access to the shah, an example of the ties that could be forged between artists and their royal patrons at the Safavid court. To cite an earlier example, two painters, 'Ali Asghar and 'Abd al-'Aziz, had ab- ducted Shah Tahmasb's favorite page boy and, to facilitate their escape, had forged the shah's seal.67 The access these two painters had to an adored page at court and to the shah's seal illustrates their proximity to and participation in the most private aspects of Shah Tahmasb's life at court. Moreover, the association formed between Tarkishduz and 'Abbas may have been similar to that which existed among Isma'il and his Sufis of Lahijan-Lala Bek, Dada Bek, and Khalifa Bek.

Tarkishduz is said to have disclosed the Nuqtavi forecast that upon the advent of Muharram 1002/1593, one of the Nuqtavi darvishes who had attained unity with God would convert his rank of spiritual monarchy (saltanat-i ma'navi) into that of formal sovereignt5y (pa-dishah--yi suri).68 A category of religious men seem to have combined aspects of Sufism together with ghuluww. Some Sufiesque ghuldt began their mystical quests as Sufis, traversed the various stages of spirituality and, in an attempt to convert that spiritual rank into one of this-worldly (suri) sovereignty, turned into ghulat. The Safavid movement had undergone one such transformation. Shaykh Safi al-Din (d. 1334) was the pir of a conven- tional Sufi order. Once Shaykh Junayd claimed to be God and his Safavid disciples took up arms to help conquer his formal dominion, their ghulat nature became apparent. Both Junayd and Haydar, his son, were martyred in the course of actualizing their missions. Junayd's grandson Isma'il, however, succeeded in

67. Qazi Ahmad Qummi, Gulistan-i hunar, ed. Ahmad Suhayli Khwansari (Tehran, 1352 Sh./1973), 140-41; Sadiqi Bek, Majma' al-khawass, ed. 'Abd al-Rasul Khayyampur (Tabriz 1327 Sh./1948), 154-5. Royal patronage in the Safavid era remains to be studied. Martin Dickson and Cary Welch's magnum opus, The Houghton Shachnatmeh, represents a singular attempt to capture the styles and personalities of fifteen painters who collaborated together with their royal patron, Shah Tahmasb, in the creation of the Houghton Shahndmeh. Nomi Hagar, a student of Dickson, has pursued in her forthcoming dissertation a study of the identity of court painters as a group and their associations with Safavid royal patrons of the sixteenth century. 68. Natanzi, Naqawat al-a-thair, 521.



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adding the rank of temporal rule to the already existent Safavid dominion of spiritual sovereignty and thus established the Safavid imperium. The existence of Sufiesque ghulat illustrates that a cluster of ghulat beliefs, albeit expressed in a variety of languages and drawing on a diverse vocabulary, survived into the seventeenth century. It is not surprising then that both Sufism and ghuluww were viewed as potential threats by the Safavids during their Isfahan phase of rule, and as heretical in the eyes of the sharl-'a-minded ulama. In the religious literature of this period, particularly the refutations (ruduid) against Abu Muslim and Sufis, their doctrines are viewed as innovations (bida't) and the Sufiesque ghuldt as heretics (mulhid, kafir), for they were Sufis who had moved away from their belief in Islam.

"Once their heresy (ilhad) became clear to the shari'a-propagating shah, it was necessary to eliminate this group for shar'i purposes," say the chroniclers, who used religio-legal reasons and emphasized Darvish Khusraw's atheism and disbelief to justify the suppression of the Nuqtavis.69 However, once we are made aware of the nature of Tarkishduz's "big claims" (da'viha-yi buzurg) and of his "corrupt ideas" ('aqida-yifdsid), it becomes clear that it was also for political reasons that the shah eliminated the Nuqtavis.70 When introducing Darvish Khusraw's Nuqtavi movement, the contemporary Afushta Natanzi provides in- sight into the way in which these movements were officially viewed at court. He cites the examples of Mani, Mazdak, and Hasan Sabbah, who shared in common the elements of disbelief, claims to prophethood and divinity, and a cor- rupting influence on the populace. Natanzi argues that throughout the ages these people have been referred to by different names; in the Islamic era they were called heretics (malahida; sing. mulhid).7' Although these "Satanic" figures rose against the political establishment, they were denounced for religious heresy. The choice of the term "heretics" to describe these groups is determined by the religious dimension of their doctrines. The political aspect of opposition is implicit in the term and in the examples Natanzi provides to define the ghulait. For the ghuldt, a dichotomous line between religion and politics did not exist. Shah Isma'il was simultaneously the spiritual guide of the Safavid tariqat and the shah of Iran. The Qizilbash were disciples of Isma'il, their pir/god, as well as his governors and generals. So long as ghuluww was alive in the empire, religious groups with political aspirations would continue to manifest themselves.72

In suppressing the Nuqtavis Shah 'Abbas I came to divorce religion from politics, relying on the sharl-'a-minded ulama in this process, for they provided him with a forum for attacking ghuluww. Their support also provided him with the legitimacy through which he could become an absolute shah-in the political

69. Iskandar Bek, 'Alam-drd-yi 'Abbasi 1:474. 70. Ibid. 71. Natanzi, Naqawat al-athar, 514. 72. Darvish Riza (d. Dhu'l-Hijja 1040/July 1631), a Qizilbash (Afshar) who had

served in the Safavid provincial administration, claimed to be the awaited Mahdi and rose against the Safavid order two years after Shah Safi's accession.




sense of the word. The public image 'Abbas was cultivating reflects his attempts to separate temporal from spiritual rule. The shah's presence as a disciple at Darvish Khusraw's takiya shows how far the monarch had moved away from his inherited image. Publicly, 'Abbas was not emphasizing his legitimacy as pir of the Qizilbash. Although the chroniclers continued to refer to the shah as the perfect guide (murshid-i kamil) and to the Qizilbash as Sufis, they did so sentimentally and piously. In the Isfahan phase of Safavid rule these titles were ceremonial, retaining perhaps only the element of obedience to one's spiritual guide that was required of a disciple. Yet, 'Abbas was still captivated by things esoteric, or he would not have been so drawn to the Nuqtavis, nor so well ac- cepted in Darvish Khusraw's circles. According to the Nuqtavis, the approaching Muslim millennium would witness the usurpation of power and assumption of the rank of padishah by one of their disciples.73 What had convinced Shah 'Abbas of their heretical nature (ilha-d) was not mere disrespect for the precepts of Shi'ism but their intention to overthrow him. In his role as propagator of Imamism, Shah 'Abbas was certainly concerned with the Nuqtavis' disdain for the faith. But what induced their suppression was the Nuqtavis' desire to extend their spiritual power into the temporal domain. The chronicles insist that it was foremost out of religious concerns that the Nuqtavis were eliminated. The "imaginary din and dawlat" of the ghulat were one, and could only be attained on earth. Shari'a-minded Imamism, however, allowed for their separation into two distinct realms on earth, relegating their reunion to the end of Time and the advent of the Mahdi.

We are told that Shah 'Abbas's decision to eliminate Darvish Khusraw's movement was also influenced by his official court astrologer's reading of the stars: according to the Nuqtavi forecast, the conrjunction of Saturn and Jupiter portended the fall of the Safavids. Mawlana Jalal al-Din Muhammad Munajjim Yazdi announced that "the reading of the stars and the verses of the Qur' an pointed to the execution of an important individual from those related (mansu-ba-n) to the sun, who were the temporal rulers (sultans) in particular."74 He concluded that up- heaval might take place in Iran. In addition, he saw that the conjunction of the two unlucky planets fell into the first house (tarbl') of the shah's horoscope, and that the rising star was in the perigee (hazir) of decline and calamity. Yazdi then suggested that the shah abdicate for the three days during which the effects of the ill-fated conjunction were most threatening.

Once the stars spelled Shah 'Abbas's abdication, he decided to annihilate the Nuqtavis. The shah's personal and public role in this affair is fascinating. After

73. Natanzi, Naqdwat al-athar, 518. 74. Iskandar Bek, 'Alam-ara-yi 'Abbds- 1:474. Interestingly, Queen Elizabeth was

faced with similar prophetic forecasts for the year 1588, which was seen as a fatal year in which the world would be destroyed and the Lord would appear triumphant. She, too, attempted to suppress and refute these forecasts that occurred in the Armada year. See Margaret Aston, "The Fiery Trigon Conjunction: An Elizabethan Astrolog- ical Prediction," ISIS (1970): 177.



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having ordered the attack upon the Nuqtavi cloister in Qazvin and the imprison- ment of all the followers, 'Abbas summoned Tarkishduz and signaled for his at- tendants to bring kingly attire (charqdb) with a crown and an inlaid belt along with other kingly accoutrements with which he proceeded to garb Tarkishduz. 'Abbas placed the kingly tuft (jighah) on Tarkishduz's head and sat him on the throne. Holding an inlaid cane, 'Abbas stood guard as the ishik a-qa7si-bdshi of the divdin (master of ceremonies). The high-ranking officials of state and the notables (a'yan) each stood in accordance to his particular rank and position. For three days all the grand amirs and noble viziers participated in this court mas- querade. On the fourth day Shah 'Abbas ordered that a high scaffold be built, and they carried Tarkishduz outside where he was shot by a firing squad and his body hung on the scaffold in full public view.75

The manner in which the Nuqtavis' forecast was dealt with-the fact that the shah abdicated the throne in favor of a Nuqtavi amin (trustee)-illustrates the se- riousness of that threat and of Shah 'Abbas's fascination with their geomantical calculations. The transfer of the throne, the seat of political power, to a rival Nuqtavi for a three-day period during which, according to the shah's horoscope, he was at the highest risk of losing his temporal authority, is indicative of the "real" nature of the Nuqtavi menace. In addition, the abdication scenario presented an opportunity for the shah to expose the impotence of the Nuqtavis and the paradoxical nature of their forecast. Of course, the -whole thing was a sham. Tarkishduz was placed on the throne once all the influential Nuqtavi disciples had been imprisoned, leaving them absolutely no room to maneuver. Yet Shah 'Abbas took great care to authenticate this abdication. Beyond his possible belief in the cabalistic doctrines of the Nuqtavis, the shah had to contend with many high-ranking Qizilbash functionaries who had become Darvish Khusraw's disciples.

Following the suppression of the Nuqtavis (1002/1593), Shah 'Abbas proceeded to centralize control in the hands of the Safavid duidman, relying more heavily on the ghulams, the shahisivans, and the ulama in this process.76 And he em- barked (in 1009/1601) on yet another symbolic act, a twenty-eight-day pilgrim- age on foot from Isfahan to Mashhad-a public act of pious devotion to Imam Riza, the son of the eponymous Imam of the Safavid House. 'Abbas performed this act of piety and reverence for Imam Riza as part of a vow (nadhr) he had made asserting his public commitment to the Imamite faith.77 His subsequent endowment of all his personal estates as a benefaction to the "Fourteen Immacu- late Ones" may have been linked to this very vow he had promised to fulfill. The first lands 'Abbas endowed (1011/1602-03) were those surrounding the sa-

75. Natanzi, Naqawat al-athdr, 522-3. 76. Shahisivan literally means "those who love the shah." They were recruited from

among the different Qizilbash tribes. In return for official posts, they readily broke away from tribal loyalties and fought for the person of the shah. 77. Iskandar Bek, 'Alam-ara--yi 'Abbasi 2:610-12.




cred threshold of Imam Riza's tomb and the courtyard of the mosque.78 These lands were to provide space for those who wished to be buried in the proximity of the eighth Imam, and members of Shah 'Abbas's direct line were to have privileged access. Mashhad was replacing Ardabil as the Safavid holy city. The transfer of the capital from Qazvin in the northwest of Iran to Isfahan in the heartland reflected this mood. The move away from Anatolia towards Fars signaled both the Iranianization and Imamification of the empire. The Maydan-i Naqsh-i Jahan and the Masjid-i Jadid-i Shah came to represent the era of Safavid absolutism. The new order associated with this Isfahan phase had as its distinct features the ghulam system, the ulama, and the Iranian tradition of monarchy. Shah 'Abbas's role as murshid-i kacmil, his.tariqat legitimacy, and his devoted Qizilbash were elements of the "classical age" of Safavid rule. In the Isfahan era these components took on a ritualistic function. Unlike Isma'il I, who was still bound to the role of mahdl/pir and to the revolutionary power structure of the Safavid movement, Shah 'Abbas retained only the ceremonial title of murshid-i ka-mil and donned the red taj of the Qizilbash in public. This transformation is reflected in the chronicles. Iskandar Bek, for example, refers to the red (qizil) headgear, introduced by Shaykh Haydar (d. 1488) to symbolize the ghulat character of the Qizilbash, as the "Ithna-'Ashari twelve-fold taj."79

As the headgear of the Qizilbash was changing in meaning, so, too, were the terms "Sufi" and "Qizilbash" evolving. In 1024/1615 Shah 'Abbas ordered a massacre of the remaining Lahijan Sufis. We have already encountered these Sufis from Qarachidaq who had given protection and assistance to Isma'il during the dark days when he had taken refuge in Gilan. Once Isma'il had conquered Iran, these old Lahijan Sufis (ufiyan-i qadim-i La-hijatni) were granted immuni- ties (mu'cfi) and land grants (soyuirghdls) in appreciation for their loyalty. Seven years after the success of his revolution Isma'il permitted a massacre (1508) of these Sufis.80 Was 'Abbas I reenacting his great-great-grandfather's aspirations? This time around the Safavids would emerge triumphant over the Qizilbash. Iskandar Bek writes that some Lahijan khalifas and Sufis were killed to set an example, "to show that from now on if a group exited from the circle of Sufidom (sufigari), the Sufi shall be distinguished from the non-Sufi (na- suif,).''81 Iskandar Bek goes on to state that the pir-murid relationship required total obedience from the disciple: no matter how much pressure was exerted on the murid, he must not betray his murshid. Blind obedience was thus separated out and isolated from the Sufi context which had given rise to the murid's total submission to his murshid. The new/real Sufi was to remain obedient to the Safavid house, yet he was no longer to expect miracles from the shah. The "old Sufis of Lahijan" represented the classical ghuluww allegiance that had allowed for Shaykh Isma'il, the pir, to take on the role of shah. In classical Safavid us- age the Sufi and the Sufiesque ghulat (Qizilbash) were one. To demonstrate how

78. See Robert McChesney, "Waqf and Public Policy: The Waqf of Shah 'Abbas, 101 1-1023/1602-16," Asian and African Studies 15 (1981): 169-70. 79. Iskandar Bek, 'Alam-ara--yi 'Abbdsi 2:882. 80. Aubin, "Revolution chiite." 81. Iskandar Bek, 'Alam-ara--yi 'Abbasi 2:882.



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he distinguished "the Sufi from the non-Sufi," 'Abbas massacred the group that epitomized the classical meaning of the Safavid Sufi. That element of past loyalty and spiritual comradeship meant little in the politics of the Isfahan age. It is clear that this punishment was yet another symbolic act, orchestrated by Shah 'Abbas to illuminate his religious policy. At the same time, 'Abbas continued to play on the Sufi cult. He publicly engaged in the rituals of the Nuqtavi takiya. However, this was done in his capacity as murid rather than murshid. As vice-regent (nai'ib) to the Mahdi, he still could gain legitimacy through his public respect for Sufism.

The struggles over succession that surfaced upon the death of Shah 'Abbas I fi- nalized the victory of the ghulam faction at court. Indeed, the Qizilbash had lost their political hegemony, and now the erosion of Qizilbash Islam had become an institutional reality. Shah 'Abbas I's reforms had set in motion a dynamic that perpetuated the Isfahan phase of Safavid rule beyond his reign. And with the accession of the ghulam cabal's candidate, Shah Safi (1629-42), the new imperial language of power was articulated in his support. Officially Safi' s candidacy was sanctioned over that of his rival and cousin, Sayyid Muhammad Khan Shaykha- vand (a descendant of Haydar's half-brother Khwajah Muhammad), for the right to sovereignty and kingship was said to have rested with the patrilineal descendants of Haydar (Isma'il and Tahmasb) "who, having sent their dust- and-wind borne opponents to Hell with the fire of their well-tempered swords, revealed and manifested Imamism and spread it throughout the world."82 As propagators of this new faith, Isma'il's male descendants were to be sole heirs to Safavid dominion. Imamite legitimacy separated his direct descendants from collateral members of the Safavid extended family who reeked of the spirit of Qizilbash Islam. Legiti- macy to rule was thus reserved for the Haydari line alone that had revived and would continue to defend Imamism in Iran. In the Isfahan phase Turco-Mongol notions of an eponymous dynastic clan and Indo-Iranian notions of a sacrosanct family (duidman) were being replaced by the concept of a fixed patrilineal line in which succession passed to the next generation through primogeniture. Since the Safavid goal of centralization could not be achieved within the framework of classical Safavid political culture, the particular blend of Turco-Mongol and Sufi paradigms of authority was being overshadowed by a new synthesis of Iranian kingship and Imamite temporal legitimacy. This gradual shift to a self-con- sciously logical conception of political rule parallels the Safavid public rejection of Sufism and of other syncretic forms of cultural practice that had moved beyond the pale of textual and normative Islam in the post-Mongol era.

In the age of Shah Sulayman (1077-1105/1666-94), Muhammad Baqir Majlisi (d. 1111/1699), the Shaykh al-Islam of Isfahan, although maintaining the Mahdist colorings of Safavid legitimacy, came to interpret the rise of Shah Isma'il as a sign of the coming of the "Lord of the Age" rather than the advent of the Mahdi himself. Majlisi II prophesied, however, that the Mahdi would make his appearance in another sixty-five years (1143/1730), implying that he could

82. Iskandar Bek, Dhayl-i tarikh-i 'dlam-drd-yi 'Abbasi, 87.




very well be of Safavid descent.83 Majlisi II was catering to the Safavid house- hold as well as to those who believed that in their life-time they would encounter the Mahdi. Although Majlisi II relegated the eventual rise of the Mahdi to the near future, he saw this advent as having been partially fulfilled with the rise to power of Isma'il of Gilan, whom he recognized as being of the family of the Prophet.84 By the last decade of the seventeenth century Majlisi II, one of the most prominent mujtahids of the Safavid era, completely dismissed Shah Isma'il's claims to Mahdihood: a century and a half after Isma'il's ascent, the official Imamite line viewed it merely as a sign leading to the emergence of the Mahdi who may be a Safavid. Finally, the time had come when the Imamite ulama no longer had to cater to Qizilbash Islam, for the political climate was such that it had allowed for a different, more sharl'a-based, legitimization of Safavid rule.

By the reign of the last Safavid, Shah Sultan Husayn, the relationship between the oyma-q and the Safavid du-dman had undergone such transformation that very few oymaq members would have entered the battlefield unarmed, willing to sacrifice their lives for their shah who was now a mere dynast deriving his legitimacy from his Musavi descent and by enforcing strict observance of the shart'a. The most visible actors at the court of Shah Sultan Husayn were the ulama and the elder of the harem (rish-safid), a eunuch. The French missionary Martin Gaud- ereau's account of the death of Shah Sulayman and the coronation of Shah Sul- tan Husayn speaks of two ritual innovations in Sultan Husayn's coronation cer- emony. To begin with, the shah did not want to be girded by the Sufis, "as had been the custom upon the accession of the other Safavid shahs. Instead he summoned the akhu-nd or the Shaykh al-Islam to perform this ritual."85 Shah Sultan Husayn is said then to have asked Majlisi II what he would want as a rec- ompense. Majlisi II requested three things: to prohibit Muslims from drinking wine, with the shah setting the example; to ban prostitution; and, finally, to prohibit gambling, in the form of "pigeon-betting" (kaftarbazi). Shah Sultan Husayn is said to have granted Majlisi II all three wishes. A second peculiarity of this coronation, according to the French missionary, was the shah's insistence on placing the crown on his own head-once again breaking with tradition. In the classical age the khalifat al-khulafd' had placed the Qizil Taj on the Safavid

83. Majlisi II, Raj'at, ed. Abu Dharr Bidar (Tehran, 1367 Sh./1988), 16-17. 84. Majlisi II, Bihair al-anwar, 2nd ed. (Qum, n.d), 13:836 (translated by 'All Davani

as Mahdi-yi maw'ud). 85. Martin Gaudereau, Relation de la mort de Shdh Soliman, roy de Perse et du

couronement de Sultan Husayn, son fils, avec plusieurs particularites, Bibliotheque National (Microfiche 8o 02h.168), 95. The author, probably a missionary priest of the Augustinian order, says, "Les schismatiques armeniens ont profite de la maladie du Roi [Sulayman] pour nous surprendre, et a force d'argent ont cxtorqu6 de la Reine mere un ordre au DiOvan Begi de se transporter a Zulpha pour en chasser tous les Mission- aires. 11 y vint en effet le I I janvier 1694, chasa premierement les peres Carmes, rasa l'Eglise qu'ils avoient commence de batir . . . ils vouloient bien ensuite faire le meme aux j6suites et a nous."



160 Babayan

pir's head and had girded him.86 The ritual had been retained ceremonially during the Isfahan phase of Safavid rule, when the twelve-fold headgear of the Safavid pir was beginning to be associated with the twelve Imams rather than the Qizil- bash. Finally, under Shah Sultan Husayn, once the Irano-Imamite theory of political legitimacy had been institutionalized, the classical practice was abandoned.

The contemporaneous Dastutr-i shahriyaran reveals as well a change in mood, language, and actors from even, say, Shah 'Abbas II's official chronicles, where the Qizilbash had all but disappeared but were still remembered nostalgically. Thirty years of history needs to be studied before generalizations about Shah Sul- tan Husayn's court can be made. It can be said with some conviction, however, that the sharl'a-minded ulama's version of Imamism had been enthroned at the Safavid court. According to Dastar-i shahriydran, once the chief eunuch of the harem, Aqa Kamal, announced the shah's succession (14 Dhu'l-Hijja 1105/6 August 1694), it was Majlisi II who placed the crown on Sultan Husayn's head and girded him with a sword.87 The Persian court chronicle of Shah Sultan Husayn's reign depicts Majlisi II as inheriting both ritual prerogatives of the khalifat al-khulafa'. Not only does a facsimile of the khutba (sermon) read in the name of Shah Sultan Husayn appear in the Dastutr-i shahriyaran-the first time I have seen a khutba appear in a Safavid chronicle-but an interesting farman (dated 1106/1694-95) prohibiting wine and all non-shar'i activities, sealed by the shah and signed by the Shayhk al-Islam and six other 'ailims, is also reproduced in the same text.88 As the mujahid was replacing the Qizilbash in Safavid official language, Imamism was replacing Qizilbash Islam at court and would begin to consolidate its power among the community of believers. The decree was to be read in all mosques. Provincial goVernors, kalantars, and

86. In his journal of travels to Iran in 1609 John Cartwright mentions that in ancient times the Safavid shahs had been crowned and girded by the khalifat al-khulafd'. I would like to thank Willem Floor for providing me with this information. See W. Floor, The Persian Textile Industry, Its Development, Production and Use, Biblio- theca Persica, ed. E. Yarshter (forthcoming). 87. Muhammad Ibrahim b. Zayn al-'Abidin Nasiri, Dastur-i shahriyararn (British

Library, Or. 2942), f. 17a, a defective unicum manuscript that stops at the year 1110/ 1698-99. It was two weeks before Shah Sultan Husayn ascended the throne, an indication that the court was divided at the time of Shah Sulayman's death (1 Dhu'l-Hijja 1105/24 July 1694). Martin Gaudereau speaks of the prominence of the eunuchs in Sultan Husayn's succession politics.. The eunuchs were to be divided between two candidates: Sultan Husayn, the oldest son among the surviving princes and a talib-i 'ilhtn (seeker of religious knowledge); and Sultan Tahmasb, who was younger but was said to have been his father's choice (Gaudereau, Relation, 35). Likewise, the court had been divided .over an heir to Shah 'Abbas I, and it was not until ten days after his death that his grandson Safi was enthroned. By contrast, 'Abbas II's accession took place four days after his father's death, for his mother, Anna Khanum, was in alliance with the powerful grand vizier, Saru Taqi; together they controlled the court. 88. Nasiri, Dastu,r-i shahriydran. The six other 'alims were: the sadr-i khdssa, the

sadr-i mamdlik, Aqa Jamal, Shaykh Muhammad Ja'far Qazi, Aqa Razi b. Husayn Khwansari, and Shaykh 'Ali b. Shaykh Husayn Karbala'i. The khutba appears on ff. 19b-20b; thefarman appears on ff. 44a-46a.




qdais were to enforce the sharl'a. Functionaries who had neglected the shari'a in the past were punished. Wine bottles from court cellars were publicly smashed in the Maydan-i Naqsh-i Jahan. The French missionary lamented that 6,000 bottles of the best wine from Shiraz and Georgia were broken. Music and dance were to cease at all weddings and in male and female receptions. Prostitu- tion and gambling were banned. Coffeehouses were closed down. Opium and "colorful herbs" were declared illegal. Islamic garb was enforced.89

By the accession of Shah Sultan Husayn the sharl-'a-minded version of Islam became hegemonic, putting an end to the era of exchange and tolerance that had set in motion a process of mutual stimulation between aspects of oral and written Islam. An age of colloquium had come to a close. Once the Safavid pir cast off his dervish cloak to become a pious Imamite shah of Iran, gymnasiums (TzCirkha-nas) were endowed through royal patronage and began to replace tariqats and coffeehouses as public arenas for social interchange. As Rustam and 'Ali became the heroes Iranians would invoke and revere in the zarkhacnas, shari'a- minded Imamism asserted itself at court, in the mosque, the madrasas, the bazaars, and the streets of Isfahan. The Irano-Semitic and Imamite synthesis was in the making. Now the Safavid domains had entered the markers of a normative Iranian society in which (without quotation marks) duidman meant dynasty, oymaq meant tribe, Tajik meant Iranian, and Imamism meant purism.

Kathryn Babayan, Department of Near Eastern Studies, University of Michigan

89. Ibid., f. 43b.



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