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1 國際政治經濟學 International Political Economy 授課教師:薛健吾 Chienwu (Alex) Hsueh 電子信箱:[email protected] 會談時間:每週四下午 2:00~4:00, by appointment, or walk-in welcome 學期:108 學年度第二學期 單位:東亞碩一、東亞博一 時間:每週四上午 9:10~12:00 教室:綜合院館 270813 學分:3 修別:選修 一、課程目標 國際政治經濟學(International Political Economy, IPE)探討的是每一個國家在追 求「富」(plenty)與「強」(power)的過程中,不可避免地將與其他的國家產生合作 與衝突的現象,其關鍵在於國家內部與國家之間的「追求利潤的經濟力量」與「追 求安全的政治力量」兩者之間的拉扯。作為一個為同學們建立未來 IPE 研究基礎的 起點,這堂課將包含兩個主要部分:第一個部分是為同學們介紹如何使用科學的研 究方法來對 IPE 的相關問題進行研究設計;第二個部分是介紹 IPE 的各種「一般理 論取向」(general theoretical orientations),以及從這些一般理論取向所衍伸出來的 各種「具體研究綱領」(specific research program)在當代 IPE 主要議題領域的發展與 應用,這個部分包含了目前最熱門的幾個 IPE 專題,包含經濟威壓、對外援助、貿 易與衝突,以及全球化的議題。 在這一堂課裡面我們會討論到的「一般性理論」與「研究綱領」分別為現實主 義與霸權穩定理論、自由主義與國際建制理論、馬克思主義與依賴理論及世界體系 理論;而將討論的當代 IPE 主要議題領域則包含了貿易、貨幣、金融、跨國公司、

國際政治經濟學International Political Economy 一、課程目標

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國際政治經濟學

International Political Economy

授課教師:薛健吾 Chienwu (Alex) Hsueh 電子信箱:[email protected] 會談時間:每週四下午 2:00~4:00, by appointment, or walk-in welcome 學期:108 學年度第二學期 單位:東亞碩一、東亞博一 時間:每週四上午 9:10~12:00 教室:綜合院館 270813 學分:3 修別:選修

一、課程目標

國際政治經濟學(International Political Economy, IPE)探討的是每一個國家在追

求「富」(plenty)與「強」(power)的過程中,不可避免地將與其他的國家產生合作

與衝突的現象,其關鍵在於國家內部與國家之間的「追求利潤的經濟力量」與「追

求安全的政治力量」兩者之間的拉扯。作為一個為同學們建立未來 IPE 研究基礎的

起點,這堂課將包含兩個主要部分:第一個部分是為同學們介紹如何使用科學的研

究方法來對 IPE 的相關問題進行研究設計;第二個部分是介紹 IPE 的各種「一般理

論取向」(general theoretical orientations),以及從這些一般理論取向所衍伸出來的

各種「具體研究綱領」(specific research program)在當代 IPE 主要議題領域的發展與

應用,這個部分包含了目前最熱門的幾個 IPE 專題,包含經濟威壓、對外援助、貿

易與衝突,以及全球化的議題。

在這一堂課裡面我們會討論到的「一般性理論」與「研究綱領」分別為現實主

義與霸權穩定理論、自由主義與國際建制理論、馬克思主義與依賴理論及世界體系

理論;而將討論的當代 IPE 主要議題領域則包含了貿易、貨幣、金融、跨國公司、

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對外直接投資、區域整合與全球治理等議題。近年來,隨著中國的崛起,與中國相

關的 IPE 問題也成為學界的熱門研究議題,因此我們也將在本堂課中的每一個單元

討論到相對應的中國的 IPE 問題。特別是,在文獻中許多以西方與第三世界的經驗

所建構出來的 IPE 理論,常常無法解釋目前中國的情形,這個「中國經驗」或是

「東方經驗」與世界經驗的鴻溝,是同學們很好的研究起點。西方世界如何透過政

治力和經濟力來影響中國?中國如何透過經濟力在全球政治布局、如何透過政治力

在全球經濟布局?各國又是如何對於中國的政治與經濟影響作出回應?這些更是未

來 IPE 研究的熱門議題。

受限於課程時間的限制,許多非以「理性主義」為主的研究途徑,或者是非以

「國家」為主要探討對象的研究途徑,以及一些重要的 IPE 相關議題(如人民與文

化的跨國流動的問題及其對當地社會的影響),我們都無法在課堂上納入,同學們

應注意到 IPE 的範圍遠比課堂上所提及的還要來得豐富得多。

這堂課對碩士班的同學的期望是,在修習這堂課之後,能夠擁有以理論來分析

時事的能力;而對博士班同學的期許是,除了擁有以理論來分析現狀的能力之外,

還能夠進一步掌握透過對理論的探討來發掘新問題、並且建構新理論來回答這些新

問題的能力。此外,正如每週的閱讀文獻中所列出的文章,當代的 IPE 研究極為重

視以經驗證據來檢證理論的適用性,因此,也鼓勵同學們有機會盡量修習統計與研

究方法方面的課程,才能掌握足夠的分析工具。

二、授課方式

在每週上課的第一個小時為小考,考試的題目為當週閱讀的內容,以及老師在

上一週所講授的內容,如果沒有其他變動的話,我們總共會有 13 次左右的小考,

在學期末老師會選擇大家成績最好的 10 次小考來計分。接著,在第二個和第三個

小時,由老師帶領大家討論每週閱讀的文章和講授課程。最後一週是期末考,期末

考將在課堂上以模擬「博士資格考」的方式來進行,請同學們利用課堂所讀過的文

章來回答問題,若引用文獻不足,或是胡亂引用充數,都將會嚴重影響考試成績。

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三、評分標準

(一) 每週小考:60%

在「2 頁、12 號字體、單行間距」的字數限制之內作答完成,時間 50 分鐘。我們

總共約有 13 次左右的小考,每次小考的分數是 100 分,老師將會選擇大家分數最

高的 10 次小考來計算小考部分的成績。

(二) 課堂參與討論:20%

視大家參與討論的情形由老師主觀給分。

(三) 期末模擬資格考:20%

在「6 頁 A4、12 號字體、1.5 倍行高」的字數限制之內作答完成,時間 3 小時,考

試的日期和時間是 6/18(四)早上 9:00~12:00。得到高分的關鍵是在作答時盡可能引

用到授課大綱中我們所念過的所有文獻。

四、教科書

(一) 推薦的 IPE 教科書(僅供同學參考,不須購買)

Robert Gilpin. 2001. Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Joseph M. Grieco and G. John Ikenberry. 2003. State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy. New York, NY: W. W. Norton.

Jeffry A. Frieden, David A. Lake, and J. Lawrence Broz, eds. 2017. International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth, 6th edition. New York, NY: W. W. Norton.

Thomas Oatley. 2018. International Political Economy, 6th edition. New York, NY: Routledge.

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John Ravenhill, ed. 2017. Global Political Economy, 5th edition. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

(二) 其他推薦的 IPE 讀物

Thomas L. Friedman. 1999. The Lexus and the Olive Tree. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus, Giroux. (有中譯本)

Thomas L. Friedman. 2007. The World Is Flat 3.0: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. (有中譯本)

Thomas L. Friedman. 2016. Thank You for Being Late: An Optimist’s Guide to Thriving in the Age of Accelerations. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. (有中譯本)

Satyajit Das. 2016. The Age of Stagnation: Why Perpetual Growth is Unattainable and the Global Economy is in Peril. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books. (有中譯本)

Gideon Rachman. 2016. Easternization: Asia’s Rise and America’s Decline from Obama to Trump and Beyond. New York, NY: Other Press. (有中譯本)

(三) 重要的 IPE 期刊(在政治大學的 IP 位置可以免費搜尋下載)

International Organization

World Politics

Review of International Political Economy

Review of International Organizations

JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies

New Political Economy

Journal of Political Economy

The Journal of Economic History

Journal of International Economics

International Studies Quarterly

International Studies Review

Comparative Political Studies

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Journal of Conflict Resolution

Journal of Peace Research

Conflict Management and Peace Science

International Interactions

International Security

Security Studies

Defense and Peace Economics

American Political Science Review

American Review of Political Science

Journal of Politics

Annual Review of Political Science

Foreign Policy

Foreign Affairs

International Affairs

The Economist http://www.economist.com/

The International Interest http://intlinterest.com/

The National Interest http://nationalinterest.org/

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五、各週授課大綱

Part I: 科學的研究方法

Week 1: (2/27) 課程簡介

Week 2: (3/5) 科學的研究方法與文獻探討的技巧

Week 3: (3/12) 因果關係與研究設計

Part II: 重要的 IPE 議題

Week 4: (3/19) IPE 的基本分析架構與觀點

Week 5: (3/26) 影片欣賞

Week 6: (4/2) 清明節補休,停課一次

Week 7: (4/9) 國際合作 I:霸權穩定論

Week 8: (4/16) 國際合作 II:對國際機制不同觀點的辯論、國際機制的功能與問題

Week 9: (4/23) 期中考週,彈性運用

Week 10: (4/30) 貿易政策 I:社會中心論的觀點—利益與制度

Week 11: (5/7) 貿易政策 II:國家中心論的觀點—政體與政治生存

Week 12: (5/14) 貿易政策 III:區域整合—社會、國家、與國際的影響

Week 13: (5/21) 貨幣政策:社會中心論和國家中心論的觀點

Week 14: (5/28) 經濟威壓

Week 15: (6/4) 互賴與衝突:商業自由主義的效果與挑戰

Week 16: (6/11) 全球化:定義、好處與壞處,及其治理之道

Week 17: (6/18) 期末考週,模擬資格考

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六、各週授課內容

Part I: 科學的研究方法

Week 1: (2/27) 課程簡介

Papers for Discussion:

None.

Recommended papers:

None.

Week 2: (3/5) 科學的研究方法與文獻探討的技巧

Papers for Discussion:

Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, “International Organization and the Study of World Politics,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (October 1, 1998): 645–85

Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat 3.0: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007). Chapter 1, 2, 3, 4.

Recommended papers:

William H. Riker, “The Future of a Science of Politics,” American Behavioral Scientist 21, no. 1 (September 1, 1977): 11–38.

Jeffrey Frieden and Lisa L. Martin, “International Political Economy: Global and Domestic Interactions,” in Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, eds. Political Science: State of the Discipline (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company), pp: 118-146.

David A. Lake, “Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review,” Review of

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International Organizations 4, no. 3 (September, 2009): 219-244.

Thomas Oatley, “The Reductionist Gamble: Open Economy Politics in the Global Economy,” International Organization 65, no. 2 (Spring, 2011): 311-341.

Week 3: (3/12) 因果關係與研究設計

Papers for Discussion:

Thomas L. Friedman, Thank You for Being Late: An Optimist’s Guide to Thriving in the Age of Accelerations (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2016). Chapter 2, 9, 10.

Recommended papers:

None.

Part II: 重要的 IPE 議題

Week 4: (3/19) IPE 的基本架構與觀點

Papers for Discussion:

Brian Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992). Chapter Introduction, 1, 2, 3, 10. (有中譯本)

Thomas Oatley, International Political Economy, 6th Edition (Boston, MA: Pearson, 2018). pp. 33-41.

Recommended papers:

1. Basic analytic frameworks

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Robert Gilpin, “Three Models of the Future,” International Organization 29, no. 1 (1975): 37–60

Peter J. Katzenstein, “International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States,” International Organization 30, no. 1 (1976): 1–45

Peter Alexis Gourevitch, “International Trade, Domestic Coalitions, and Liberty: Comparative Responses to the Crisis of 1873-1896,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 8, no. 2 (1977): 281–313

Peter Gourevitch, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,” International Organization 32, no. 4 (October 1, 1978): 881–912

Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (July 1, 1988): 427–60

Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo, “Capital in the Twenty-First Century—in the Rest of the World,” Annual Review of Political Science 19, no. 1 (2016): 49–66

2. The rise of nation states

J. Bradford De Long and Andrei Shleifer, “Princes and Merchants: European City Growth before the Industrial Revolution,” The Journal of Law & Economics 36, no. 2 (October, 1993): 671–702

Mark Dincecco and Massimiliano Gaetano Onorato, “Military Conflict and the Rise of Urban Europe,” Journal of Economic Growth 21, no. 3 (September 1, 2016): 259–82

Scott F. Abramson, “The Economic Origins of the Territorial State,” International Organization 71, no. 1 (Winter 2017): 97–130

Scott F. Abramson and Carles Boix, “Endogenous Parliaments: The Domestic and International Roots of Long-Term Economic Growth and Executive Constraints in Europe,” International Organization 73, no. 4 (Fall, 2019): 793–837

3. The rise of the Western world

Douglass C. North and Robert Paul Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (Cambridge University Press, 1973).

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Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” American Economic Review 91, no. 5 (December 2001): 1369–1401

Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, no. 4 (November 2002): 1231–94

William J. Bernstein, The Birth of Plenty: How the Prosperity of the Modern World Was Created (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2004).

Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, “The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth,” American Economic Review 95, no. 3 (June 2005): 546–79

Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Daron Acemoglu et al., “Income and Democracy,” American Economic Review 98, no. 3 (June 2008): 808–42

Carles Boix, “Democracy, Development, and the International System,” American Political Science Review 105, no. 4 (November 2011): 809–28

Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (Crown Business, 2012).

William Easterly and Ross Levine, “The European Origins of Economic Development,” Journal of Economic Growth 21, no. 3 (September 1, 2016): 225–57

Daron Acemoglu et al., “Democracy Does Cause Growth,” Journal of Political Economy 127, no. 1 (February 1, 2019): 47–100

Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty (New York: Penguin Press, 2019).

Paul Krugman, “Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 2 (April 1994): 28–44

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Week 5: (3/26) 影片欣賞

Papers for Discussion:

None.

Recommended papers:

None.

Week 6: (4/2) 清明節補休,停課一次

Papers for Discussion:

None.

Recommended papers:

None.

Week 7 (4/9) 國際合作 I:霸權穩定論

Papers for Discussion:

Stephen D. Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics 28, no. 3 (1976): 317–47.

Arthur A. Stein, “The Hegemon’s Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order,” International Organization 38, no. 2 (1984): 355–86.

[Book] Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton University Press, 1984; 2005). Chapter 3, 4, 5, 6.

Scott C. James and David A. Lake, “The Second Face of Hegemony: Britain’s

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Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846,” International Organization 43, no. 01 (December 1989): 1–29

Week 8: (4/16) 國際合作 II:對國際機制不同觀點的辯論、國際機制的功能與問題

Papers for Discussion:

Kenneth A. Oye, “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies,” World Politics 38, no. 1 (1985): 1–24.

John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3 (December 1, 1994): 5–49. Read pp. 5-26 only.

Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 39–51.

John J. Mearsheimer, “A Realist Reply,” International Security 20, no. 1 (July 1, 1995): 82–93. Read pp. 85-87 only.

Ronald B. Mitchell, “Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance,” International Organization 48, no. 3 (July 1, 1994): 425–58.

Kagan, Korina. 1997. “The Myth of the European Concert: The Realist‐institutionalist Debate and Great Power Behavior in the Eastern Question, 1821–41,” Security Studies 7 (2): 1–57. Read pp. 6-13 only.

Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations,” International Organization 53, no. 4 (October 1, 1999): 699–732.

Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney, “Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform,” International Organization 57, no. 02 (March 2003): 241–76.

Xinyuan Dai, “Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism,” International Organization 59, no. 2 (April 1, 2005): 363–98.

David H. Bearce and Stacy Bondanella, “Intergovernmental Organizations,

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Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence,” International Organization 61, no. 4 (October 1, 2007): 703–33.

Tanja A. Börzel et al., “Obstinate and Inefficient: Why Member States Do Not Comply With European Law,” Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 11 (November 1, 2010): 1363–90.

Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Christina J. Schneider, “The Dark Side of Cooperation: International Organizations and Member Corruption,” International Studies Quarterly 63, no. 4 (December 1, 2019): 1108–21

Week 9: (4/23) 期中考週,彈性運用

Week 10: (4/30) 貿易政策 I:社會中心論的觀點—利益與制度

Papers for Discussion:

1. Why Governments Expand:

David R. Cameron, “The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis,” The American Political Science Review 72, no. 4 (1978): 1243–61

John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” International Organization 36, no. 2 (April 1, 1982): 379–415

Nikolaos Zahariadis, “Why State Subsidies? Evidence from European Community Countries, 1981-1986,” International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 2 (June 1, 1997): 341–54

Dani Rodrik, “Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?” Journal of Political Economy 106, no. 5 (1998): 997–1032

Brian Burgoon, “Globalization and Welfare Compensation: Disentangling the Ties That Bind,” International Organization 55, no. 3 (2001): 509–51

Carles Boix, “Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political

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Underpinnings of Openness,” International Organization 56, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 229–62

Jude C. Hays, Sean D. Ehrlich, and Clint Peinhardt, “Government Spending and Public Support for Trade in the OECD: An Empirical Test of the Embedded Liberalism Thesis,” International Organization 59, no. 2 (April 1, 2005): 473–94

Sean D. Ehrlich, “Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy in Democracies,” International Organization 61, no. 3 (July 1, 2007): 571–605

Kishore Gawande, Pravin Krishna, and Marcelo Olarreaga, “What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade,” International Organization 63, no. 3 (July 1, 2009): 491–531

2. Individual’s Attitude toward Trade Openness

Michael J. Hiscox, “Class versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade,” International Organization 55, no. 1 (2001): 1–46

Kenneth F. Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter, “What Determines Individual Trade-Policy Preferences?” Journal of International Economics 54 (2001): 267–92

Andy Baker, “Why Is Trade Reform So Popular in Latin America? A Consumption-Based Theory of Trade Policy Preferences,” World Politics 55, no. 3 (April 2003): 423–455

Edward D. Mansfield and Diana C. Mutz, “Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety,” International Organization 63, no. 3 (July 1, 2009): 425–57

Benjamin O. Fordham and Katja B. Kleinberg, “How Can Economic Interests Influence Support for Free Trade?” International Organization 66, no. 02 (April 2012): 311–28

Robert Urbatsch, “A Referendum on Trade Theory: Voting on Free Trade in Costa Rica,” International Organization 67, no. 1 (January 2013): 197–214

Erica Owen and Noel P. Johnston, “Occupation and the Political Economy of Trade: Job Routineness, Offshorability, and Protectionist Sentiment,” International Organization 71, no. 4 (Fall 2017): 665–99

Diana C. Mutz and Eunji Kim, “The Impact of In-Group Favoritism on Trade Preferences,” International Organization 71, no. 4 (ed 2017): 827–50

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J. Bradford Jensen, Dennis P. Quinn, and Stephen Weymouth, “Winners and Losers in International Trade: The Effects on US Presidential Voting,” International Organization 71, no. 3 (July 2017): 423–57

Week 11: (5/7) 貿易政策 II:國家中心論的觀點—政體與政治生存

Papers for Discussion:

Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (July 1, 1988): 427–60.

Judith Goldstein and Lisa L. Martin, “Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note,” International Organization 54, no. 3 (July 1, 2000): 603–32.

Helen V. Milner and Keiko Kubota, “Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries,” International Organization 59, no. 1 (January 1, 2005): 107–43.

Lawrence R. Jacobs and Benjamin I. Page, “Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?” The American Political Science Review 99, no. 1 (2005): 107–23.

Daniel Yuichi Kono, “Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency.” American Political Science Review 100(3) (August 2006): 369–84.

Charles R. Hankla and Daniel Kuthy, “Economic Liberalism in Illiberal Regimes: Authoritarian Variation and the Political Economy of Trade,” International Studies Quarterly 57, no. 3 (September 1, 2013): 492–504.

Wen-Chin Wu, “When Do Dictators Decide to Liberalize Trade Regimes? Inequality and Trade Openness in Authoritarian Countries,” International Studies Quarterly 59, no. 4 (December 1, 2015): 790–801.

Wilfred Ming Chow and Daniel Yuichi Kono, “Entry, Vulnerability, and Trade Policy: Why Some Autocrats Like International Trade,” International Studies Quarterly 61, no. 4 (December 1, 2017): 892–906.

Timm Betz, “Tariff Evasion and Trade Policies,” International Studies Quarterly 63,

16

no. 2 (June 1, 2019): 380–93

Heather Elko McKibben and Timothy W. Taylor, “Trade Balance and Policy Complexity: Explaining Political Elites’ Focus on International Trade at the Domestic Level,” International Interactions 46, no. 1 (January 2, 2020): 28–50

Week 12: (5/14) 貿易政策 III:區域整合:社會、國家、與國際的影響

Papers for Discussion:

HeeMin Kim and Dale L. Smith, “Blocs or Rounds? An Analysis of Two Approaches to Trade Liberalization,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 30, no. 3 (1997): 427–49.

Anne O. Krueger, “Are Preferential Trading Arrangements Trade-Liberalizing or Protectionist?” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 13, no. 4 (1999): 105–24.

Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, “The New Wave of Regionalism,” International Organization 53, no. 3 (July 1, 1999): 589–627.

Edward D. Mansfield and Eric Reinhardt, “Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements,” International Organization 57, no. 4 (October 1, 2003): 829–62.

Christina J. Schneider, “The Political Economy of Regional Integration,” Annual Review of Political Science 20 (2017): 229–48.

Sara B. Hobolt and Catherine E. de Vries, “Public Support for European Integration,” Annual Review of Political Science 19, no. 1 (2016): 413–32.

[Book] Finn Laursen, ed. 2010. Comparative Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub, 2010). Chapter 1 and Chapter 13.

[Book] Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012). Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.

Yoram Z. Haftel and Stephanie C. Hofmann, “Rivalry and Overlap: Why Regional

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Economic Organizations Encroach on Security Organizations,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 63, no. 9 (October 1, 2019): 2180–2206

薛健吾,2018,〈大國與區域整合集團中貿易自由化程度變化之研究〉,《東吳

政治學報》,第 36 卷,第 3 期,頁 181-249。

Week 13: (5/21) 貨幣政策:社會中心論和國家中心論的觀點

Papers for Discussion:

1. Foreign Aid Politics

Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?,” Journal of Economic Growth 5, no. 1 (March 2000): 33–63.

Randall W. Stone, “The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa,” The American Political Science Review 98, no. 4 (November 1, 2004): 577–91.

Ilyana Kuziemko and Eric Werker, “How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations,” Journal of Political Economy 114, no. 5 (October 1, 2006): 905–30.

Daniel Yuichi Kono and Gabriella R. Montinola, “Does Foreign Aid Support Autocrats, Democrats, or Both?” The Journal of Politics 71, no. 2 (April 1, 2009): 704–18.

Tobias Heinrich, “When Is Foreign Aid Selfish, When Is It Selfless?,” The Journal of Politics 75, no. 02 (April 2013): 422–435.

2. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Politics

Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England,” The Journal of Economic History 49, no. 04 (December 1989): 803–32.

Mancur Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” The American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (1993): 567–76.

Barry R. Weingast, “The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law,”

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The American Political Science Review 91, no. 2 (June 1997): 245–63.

Nathan Sussman and Yishay Yafeh, “Institutions, Reforms, and Country Risk: Lessons from Japanese Government Debt in the Meiji Era,” The Journal of Economic History 60, no. 02 (June 2000): 442–67.

David Stasavage, “Credible Commitment in Early Modern Europe: North and Weingast Revisited,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 18, no. 1 (April 1, 2002): 155–86.

Quan Li, “Democracy, Autocracy, and Expropriation of Foreign Direct Investment,” Comparative Political Studies 42, no. 8 (August 1, 2009): 1098–1127.

Sonal S. Pandya, “Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment: Globalized Production in the Twenty-First Century,” Annual Review of Political Science 19, no. 1 (2016): 455–75.

Week 14: (5/28) 經濟威壓

Papers for Discussion:

1. Is Economic Coercion A Useful Tool?

R. Harrison Wagner, “Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (July 1, 1988): 461–83

Robert Mark Spaulding, “German Trade Policy in Eastern Europe, 1890-1990: Preconditions for Applying International Trade Leverage,” International Organization 45, no. 3 (July 1, 1991): 343–68.

[Book] Daniel W. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Chapter 1.

Daniel W. Drezner, “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion,” International Organization 57, no. 3 (July 1, 2003): 643–59.

Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Alexander H. Montgomery, “Power or Plenty: How

19

Do International Trade Institutions Affect Economic Sanctions?” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 2 (April 1, 2008): 213–42.

Daniel W. Drezner, “Bad Debts: Assessing China’s Financial Influence in Great Power Politics,” International Security 34, no. 2 (2009): 7–45.

Chi-hung Wei, “China’s Economic Offensive and Taiwan’s Defensive Measures: Cross-Strait Fruit Trade, 2005–2008,” The China Quarterly 215 (September 2013): 641–62.

2. Trade Liberalization and Democratization

Quan Li and Rafael Reuveny, “Economic Globalization and Democracy: An Empirical Analysis,” British Journal of Political Science 33, no. 1 (January 1, 2003): 29–54

José Kaire, “Compensating Autocratic Elites: How International Demands for Economic Liberalization Can Lead to More Repressive Dictatorships,” International Studies Quarterly 63, no. 2 (June 1, 2019): 394–405

3. Resource Curse

Patrick J. McDonald, “The Purse Strings of Peace,” American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 3 (July 1, 2007): 569–82.

Michael L. Ross, “Oil, Islam, and Women,” The American Political Science Review 102, no. 1 (2008): 107–23.

Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo, 2011, “Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse,” American Political Science Review 105, no. 1 (February 1, 2011): 1–26.

Jeff D. Colgan, “Oil, Domestic Conflict, and Opportunities for Democratization,” Journal of Peace Research 52, no. 1 (January 1, 2015): 3–16.

S. Erdem Aytaç, Michael Mousseau, and Ömer Faruk Örsün, “Why Some Countries Are Immune from the Resource Curse: The Role of Economic Norms,” Democratization 23, no. 1 (2016): 71–92.

4. China’s Influence

Deborah Bräutigam and Xiaoyang Tang, “Economic Statecraft in China’s New

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Overseas Special Economic Zones: Soft Power, Business or Resource Security?,” International Affairs 88, no. 4 (July 2012): 799–816.

Benjamin J. Cohen, “The Yuan Tomorrow? Evaluating China’s Currency Internationalisation Strategy,” New Political Economy 17, no. 3 (July 2012): 361–71.

Kevin P. Gallagher and Amos Irwin, “China’s Economic Statecraft in Latin America: Evidence from China’s Policy Banks,” Pacific Affairs 88, no. 1 (March 1, 2015): 99–121.

Julia Bader, “China, Autocratic Patron? An Empirical Investigation of China as a Factor in Autocratic Survival,” International Studies Quarterly 59, no. 1 (March 1, 2015): 23–33.

Julia Bader, “Propping up Dictators? Economic Cooperation from China and Its Impact on Authoritarian Persistence in Party and Non-Party Regimes,” European Journal of Political Research 54, no. 4 (November 1, 2015): 655–72.

Julia Bader and Ursula Daxecker, “A Chinese Resource Curse? The Human Rights Effects of Oil Export Dependence on China versus the United States,” Journal of Peace Research 52, no. 6 (November 1, 2015): 774–90.

Stephen B. Kaplan, “Banking Unconditionally: The Political Economy of Chinese Finance in Latin America,” Review of International Political Economy 23, no. 4 (July 3, 2016): 643–76.

Scott L. Kastner, “Buying Influence? Assessing the Political Effects of China’s International Trade,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 60, no. 6 (September 1, 2016): 980–1007.

Week 15: (6/4) 互賴與衝突:商業自由主義的效果與挑戰

Papers for Discussion:

Dale C. Copeland, 1996, “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations,” International Security 20, no. 4 (Spring, 1996): 5–41.

Edward D. Mansfield and Jon C. Pevehouse, “Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and International Conflict,” International Organization 54, no. 4 (October 1, 2000): 775–808.

21

David M. Rowe, David H. Bearce and Patrick J. McDonald, 2002, “Binding Prometheus: How the 19th Century Expansion of Trade Impeded Britain’s Ability to Raise an Army,” International Studies Quarterly 46, no. 4 (December 1, 2002): 551–578.

Mark J. C. Crescenzi, “Economic Exit, Interdependence, and Conflict,” The Journal of Politics 65, no. 3 (August 1, 2003): 809–32.

Jon C. Pevehouse, “Interdependence Theory and the Measurement of International Conflict,” Journal of Politics 66, no. 1 (2004): 247–66.

Patrick J. McDonald, 2004, “Peace through Trade or Free Trade?” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 4 (August 1, 2004): 547–572.

Patrick J. McDonald and Kevin Sweeney, 2007, “The Achilles’ Heel of Liberal IR Theory? Globalization and Conflict in the Pre-World War I Era,” World Politics 59, no. 3 (April 1, 2007): 370–403.

Timothy M. Peterson and Cameron G. Thies, “Beyond Ricardo: The Link between Intra-Industry Trade and Peace,” British Journal of Political Science 42, no. 04 (October 2012): 747–767

Erik Gartzke and Oliver Westerwinter, “The Complex Structure of Commercial Peace Contrasting Trade Interdependence, Asymmetry, and Multipolarity,” Journal of Peace Research 53, no. 3 (May 1, 2016): 325–43

薛健吾,2015,〈支持開放的國內政治聯盟對政治領袖的影響力:「貿易互賴」

與「國際衝突」關係中的關鍵調節變數〉,《台灣政治學刊》,第 19 卷,第 1 期,頁

147-240。

薛健吾,2017 年 10 月,〈中印邊境衝突中的貿易因素:貿易和平效果的局限

性〉,《全球政治評論》,第 60 期,頁 21-31。

Week 16: (6/11) 全球化:定義、好處與壞處,及其治理之道

Papers for Discussion:

1. What Is Globalization?

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Axel Dreher, “Does Globalization Affect Growth? Evidence from a New Index of Globalization,” Applied Economics 38, no. 10 (June 10, 2006): 1091–1110

Niklas Potrafke, “The Evidence on Globalisation,” The World Economy 38, no. 3 (2015): 509–52

Savina Gygli et al., “The KOF Globalisation Index – Revisited,” The Review of International Organizations 14, no. 3 (September 1, 2019): 543–74

薛健吾、林千文,2014,〈全球化了台灣的什麼?國際化與台灣的政治經濟變

遷〉,《台灣政治學刊》,第 18 卷,第 2 期,頁 139-215。

2. New Challenges?

Geoffrey Garrett, “Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle?” International Organization 52, no. 4 (October 1, 1998): 787–824.

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Globalization: What’s New? What’s Not? (And So What?),” Foreign Policy, no. 118 (2000): 104–19.

Daniel W. Drezner, “Globalization and Policy Convergence,” International Studies Review 3, no. 1 (January 1, 2001): 53–78.

Moisés Naím, “The Five Wars of Globalization,” Foreign Policy, no. 134 (2003): 28–37.

Beth A. Simmons, Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett, “Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism,” International Organization 60, no. 4 (2006): 781–810.

Daniel. W Drezner, “The New New World Order,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 2 (April 2007): 34–46.

Dani Rodrik, “How to Save Globalization from Its Cheerleaders?” The Journal of International Trade and Diplomacy 1, no. 2 (Fall, 2007): 1–33.

Lloyd Gruber, “Globalisation with Growth and Equity: Can We Really Have It All?” Third World Quarterly 32, no. 4 (May 1, 2011): 629–52.

3. Economic Globalization Governance

Richard B. Freeman, “Are Your Wages Set in Beijing?” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 9, no. 3 (1995): 15–32

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Robert O. Keohane, “Governance in a Partially Globalized World ‘Presidential Address’, ‘American Political Science Association, 2000,’” The American Political Science Review 95, no. 1 (March 1, 2001): 1–13

Helen V. Milner, “Globalization, Development, and International Institutions: Normative and Positive Perspectives,” Perspectives on Politics, no. 04 (December 2005): 833–54

Erik Wibbels, “Dependency Revisited: International Markets, Business Cycles, and Social Spending in the Developing World,” International Organization 60, no. 02 (April 2006): 433–68

Mark M. Gray, Miki Caul Kittilson, and Wayne Sandholtz, “Women and Globalization: A Study of 180 Countries, 1975–2000,” International Organization 60, no. 02 (April 2006): 293–333

Daniel W. Drezner, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” An IIGG Working Paper, Council on Foreign Relations Press (2012).

Francis Fukuyama, “Governance: What Do We Know, and How Do We Know It?” Annual Review of Political Science 19, no. 1 (2016): 89–105

4. Climate Change Governance

Aaron M. McCright and Riley E. Dunlap, “Defeating Kyoto: The Conservative Movement’s Impact on U.S. Climate Change Policy,” Social Problems 50, no. 3 (August 1, 2003): 348–73

Aaron M. McCright and Riley E. Dunlap, “The Politicization of Climate Change and Polarization in the American Public’s Views of Global Warming, 2001–2010,” Sociological Quarterly 52, no. 2 (March 1, 2011): 155–94

Berit Kvaløy, Henning Finseraas, and Ola Listhaug, “The Publics’ Concern for Global Warming: A Cross-National Study of 47 Countries,” Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 1 (January 1, 2012): 11–22

Melissa Lane, “Political Theory on Climate Change,” Annual Review of Political Science 19, no. 1 (2016): 107–23

Liliana B. Andonova, Thomas N. Hale, and Charles B. Roger, “National Policy and Transnational Governance of Climate Change: Substitutes or Complements?”

24

International Studies Quarterly 61, no. 2 (June 1, 2017): 253–68

薛健吾,2019,〈民主程度和發展程度對各國二氧化碳排放治理的影響〉,《台

灣民主季刊》,第 16 卷,第 2 期,頁 65-117。

Week 17: (6/18) 期末考週,模擬資格考

考試時間:9:10~12:00

考試方式:共兩大題申論題,每一題請在「6頁A4,12號字體,1.5倍行高」的

限制之內完成。