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Immigration, Redistribution and Universal Suffrage.

Published in Public Choice. DOI 10.1007/s11127-013-0094-6

Raul Magni-Berton,

Grenoble University, Science po Grenoble, PACTE

Department of Political Science

raul.magni-berton@iep-grenoble.fr

The effect of immigration on redistribution has been widely debated. This paper contributes to

this debate by testing two explanations, which are that (i) immigration tends to reduce

redistribution due to people’s higher levels of xenophobia, and that (ii) immigration affects

redistribution because immigrants do not have the right to vote. Since the demand for

redistribution depends on the (expected) gap between median voter income and mean income,

immigrants affect the demand for redistribution because, as non-citizens, they do not change

the median voter’s income, but, as economic stakeholders, they do affect the mean income.

Five empirical consequences of (i) and (ii) are tested at the individual level. Evidence from

the European Values Survey in 45 countries confirms (ii), showing that immigrants' expected

competitiveness on the labor market affects preferences for redistribution and that it is

amplified when the perceived number of immigrants is high. In contrast, (i) is globally

rejected since the impact of the citizens' declared level of solidarity with immigrants tends to

be weak and depends on the type of measurement or specification used.

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The rise in immigrant populations in the last decade has introduced a large minority of people

into developed countries who are entitled to economic rights (such as property rights, labor

rights, and so on), but not to political rights. When foreign immigrants are residents, they

cannot vote, hold political and administrative offices, serve on a jury, or participate more

broadly in the country’s political decisions, at least not in the national elections.1 But, contrary

to other populations deprived of political rights, such as children or prison inmates,

immigrants are stakeholders of the productive system. This implies that as the number of

immigrants increases, the proportion of residents entitled to vote decreases. Thus today’s

societies are moving away from universal suffrage, not because of restrictions on political

rights, but because of a spectacular increase in cross-border mobility. In such a context,

citizens can make decisions knowing that other stakeholders cannot.

This situation is particularly relevant for redistribution, because immigrants are taxpayers and

tax consumers, but not tax decision-makers.2 This has been demonstrated by Razin et al.

(2002) using the standard theory of the size of government under majority rule, and it can be

intuitively illustrated here: when the number of immigrants grows, and assuming immigrants

to be poorer than natives, the proportion of the fiscal revenues ending up in the hands of

immigrants increases, which implies that voters will opt for lower taxes. However, this

explanation has never been tested at the individual level. This article provides such a test.

1 The only exception being New Zealand, where all permanent residents may vote. Several countries grant such a

right at local elections. 2 In recent history, there has been a clear trend towards bringing democracies closer to universal suffrage.

Women or different ethnic minorities have obtained the right to vote in the last century and several studies have

proved that these events have led to an increase in the level of redistribution (Lott and Kenny 1999; Aidt et al.

2006; Aidt and Dallal 2008). In fact, franchise extension to poorer populations on average tends to increase

inequalities among voters and, hence, leads to a greater political demand for redistribution. Note, also, that when

the franchise is limited, franchise extension can reduce income taxation (Plümper and Martin 2003; Aidt and

Jensen 2009).

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Note that the current path for non-citizens to be franchised is through naturalization.

Naturalization is legally possible in all European states, but it takes time.3 These time

requirements associated with the rise in immigration lead to a larger disenfranchised

population, even though the immigrants themselves are not permanently disenfranchised. In

2010, in the European Union, 47 million residents are foreign-born and, among them, 69%

(6.5% of residents) (Vasileva 2011).

While recent studies have provided evidence of a negative correlation between income

redistribution and the rise in immigration (Roemer et al. 2007; Finseraas 2008; Senik et al.

2009; Eger 2010), only a small strand of the literature on this issue provides an explanation

based on immigrant disenfranchisement (see Razin et al. 2002; Hansen 2003; Mayr 2007).

Most studies tend to view immigrants as belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic groups

that differ from those of the natives and argue that heterogeneity, especially ethnic

fractionalization, reduces the size of the welfare state (Mueller and Murrel 1986; James 1993;

Lind 2007; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). Empirically, focusing on the U.S. case, scholars

have found evidence that racial stereotypes or lack of solidarity with immigrants influence

white people’s support for welfare spending (Gilens 1999; Alesina et al. 2001; Luttmer 2001),

even though in other countries the results prove to be weak or insignificant (Soroka et al.

2006; Van Oorschot 2008). Note that until very recently in the United States – unlike in

Europe – race does not distinguish between citizens and immigrants, so, initially, the results

had nothing to do with immigration. However, this effect leads Alesina and Glaeser (2004,

11) to predict that “if Europe becomes more heterogeneous due to immigration, ethnic

divisions will be used to challenge the generous welfare state.”

3 For example, beyond special requirements that can be more or less demanding, in France, Turkey and the

United Kingdom, immigrants can qualify for enfranchisement after five years of residence; in Germany, after

eight years; in Italy, Poland and Spain after ten years; 12 years are required in Switzerland.

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All in all, two mechanisms link immigration to the demand for income redistribution. First,

the “anti-solidarity explanation” (Finseraas 2008) assumes that redistribution is the result of

citizens’ altruistic preferences (Hochman and Rodgers 1969), and that individuals are more

altruistic toward their own ethnic group than toward other (Tajfel et al. 1971; Alesina and La

Ferrara 2005), and concludes that ethnic diversity reduces the demand for the welfare state.4

Second the “selfish citizen explanation” assumes that redistribution is the result of citizens’

selfish preferences under majority rule (Meltzer and Richards 1981) and that immigrants are

disenfranchised. Meltzer and Richard conclude that immigration affects the political demand

for the welfare state in different ways.5

Both explanations differ mainly with respect to the role played by solidarity with immigrants,

i.e., by whether the immigrants’ welfare is an argument in citizens’ utility function. The

empirical consequences of these explanations are tested with a static micro-level analysis

based on survey data. The next section details the hypothesis of a relationship between

immigrants as nonvoters and redistribution. In section 3, the dataset and the micro-level tests

are described, and section 4 reports the findings. Finally, section 5 provides a broad

discussion of the empirical and normative implications of the results.

1. Redistribution and universal suffrage

4 Another variant is based on a concept of redistribution as a public good. Assuming that redistribution is a kind

of public good and that individuals cooperate more with people who belong to their own ethnic group than with

other people (Putnam 2007; Habyarimana et al. 2007), ethnic diversity will reduce the demand for the welfare

state. 5 When immigrants have voting rights, immigration affects the demand for the welfare state as well. However, as

I will show below, when immigrants are entitled to voting rights, the impact of immigration on redistribution is

opposite to when immigrants cannot vote.

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This section develops the selfish citizen explanation and provides five testable hypotheses to

distinguish it from the anti-solidarity explanation. According to the selfish citizen explanation,

support for the welfare state can increase among citizens who feel disadvantaged in the labor

market compared to immigrants (H1), while among other citizens this support decreases with

immigration (H2). According to the anti-solidarity explanation, though, xenophobia should

systematically reduce support for the welfare state (H3). These effects are expected to amplify

when the number of immigrants is large (H4).

1.1 The Meltzer and Richard model.

The most famous political economy model for explaining the level of preference for

redistribution has been provided by Meltzer and Richard (1981), hereafter M&R, who stated

that the demand for redistribution depends on the gap between the mean income and the

median income. The model starts with the assumption that agents are rational, self-interested

and fully aware, and assumes that agents regard redistribution as a way to maximize their own

incomes. M&R argue that, first, under a linear tax rate, with lump-sum and proportional

redistribution, the agents’ preferences can be placed in a one-dimensional space: the richer the

agents, the less favorable they are to introducing redistribution. Second, under majority rule,

the median voter is decisive. So, the policy outputs as well as the majority’s preference

correspond to the median voter’s preference. Third, under universal suffrage, a person who

earns the median income is the median voter. Therefore, redistribution maximizes the

earnings of the agent with median income.

Hence the model asserts that the collective preference for redistribution is greater when the

gap between median and mean income is wider, and that the optimal tax rate brings the

median income closer to the mean income, while maintaining a level of inequality that

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provides taxpayers with incentives to optimally finance redistribution. Thus, the demand for

redistribution is:

Demand for redistribution = myK y− , (1)

where y is the mean income, my the median income and K a coefficient that gauges the

negative effect of a tax rate increase on productivity.

The M&R model has been tested several times (Bradley et al. 2003; Iversen & Soskice 2006;

Kenworthy and McCall 2008; Moene & Wallerstein 2003), but the results are at best uneven.

However, recent public opinion research supplies evidence of a positive relationship between

inequality and support for redistribution (Finseraas 2009; Georgiadis and Manning 2012).

These differences in the evidence provided could be due to the complex causal chain implied

in the model: inequality causes perceived inequality, which causes support for redistribution,

which leads to redistribution. The simplest way to test M&R’s mechanism is by observing

causality in the chain’s middle link: the perception of inequality leads to stronger support for

redistribution.

1.2 Introducing partial suffrage

In this study, I define “immigrants” as agents able to undertake economic decisions, but not

political decisions, and “partial suffrage” as a situation in which such agents exist. The aim of

this subsection is to analyze the consequences that can be expected when we replace universal

suffrage with partial suffrage in the M&R model, i.e., when the population proportion of

foreign-born residents increases.

The first consequence is that the median income does not necessarily match the median voter

anymore. Here, the median voter is the agent who earns the median income among

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citizens mcy . Hence, under partial suffrage, the demand for redistribution of mcy remains the

same as under universal suffrage only if the mean income of citizens cy equals the mean

income of immigrants iy . In this case, substituting it into the M&R formula

Demand for redistribution c c i imc

y n y n K yn+= − (2)

does not produce any changes when immigrants arrive. However, when c iy y> , the mean

income in the whole population falls below that in the citizen population. Thus the demand

for redistribution should also decrease. In other words, the median income among citizens is –

at the time of new immigrants’ arrival - too close to the general mean income, exactly as if too

much redistribution has occurred. As a consequence, voters should ask for less redistribution.

This mechanism suggests that the impact of the arrival of immigrants, who are on average

poorer than citizens, is comparable to that of an over-redistributive situation under universal

suffrage. Indeed, both configurations lead to declines in the demand for redistribution due to a

reduction in the distance between the median and the mean income. Nevertheless, one

difference stems from the fact that, on the one hand, over-redistributing leads to an increase in

the median income, while the mean income remains stable and, on the other hand, low-

income immigration decreases the mean income (at least temporarily) without affecting the

median voter’s income, so the distance is reduced through a different mechanism.

Moreover, when c iy y< , the mean income increases, and the median voter can maximize

his/her income by demanding more redistribution. Thus, the immigration of high-income

earners increases the demand for redistribution.

Note that (2) also implies that the magnitude of this effect depends on the proportion of

citizens in the general population. In other words, the smaller is the population percentage of

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immigrants (i.e., the closer the political system is to universal suffrage), the smaller the

impact of c iy y≠ on demand for redistribution.

1.3 Dynamic models

Until now, citizens have been considered only as people who assess their actual earnings

before deciding their degree of support for redistribution. Yet, political economic explanations

for redistributive policies argue that the level of exposure to labor market risks, especially

unemployment, is the main determining factor of individual preferences for redistribution

(Cusack 2006). So, in contrast to the M&R thesis, people are expected to anticipate their

future income.

In such conditions, two scenarios are possible. First, since redistribution is regarded as a

simple transfer, individuals support redistribution when they expect to lose income and to

have to deal with their own downward mobility (Benabou and Ok 2001). Alternatively, if

redistribution is viewed as insurance, support for it increases when people perceive the risk of

future income loss. In this case, people do not necessarily expect that their incomes will fall,

but rather that the standard deviation of their future income will increase. Thus, assuming

citizens’ aversion to risk, they will demand more redistribution.

Both scenarios are compatible with a kind of perceived threat from immigrants. When the

latter are regarded as competitive in the labor market, some citizens fear losing their jobs or

part of their incomes, or, simply, suffering from downward mobility. In this case, immigrants

introduce both risky competition with citizens and, on average, a downward mobility

sometimes associated with an income loss for citizens. Contrary to the static M&R model,

immigrants can produce fear of labor market instability even when they are, on average,

unskilled and relatively poor, because they compete for jobs with those citizens who benefit

from redistribution.

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In contrast, when immigrants are regarded as non-competitive in the labor market, citizens

who do not fear income losses, benefit from upward mobility due to the arrival of new low-

income stakeholders who reduce the mean income. In particular, the median voter, who is a

native-born member, would now lose under the current income tax rate because a larger share

of the revenues they generate would benefit the migrants whose number has increased. So,

citizens who earn the median voter’s income or above now support a lower tax rate (Razin et

al. 2002).

Note, however, that this argument can be formulated in two different ways. First, immigrants

affect the desire of the median voter for redistribution according to whether immigrants are

expected to earn above or below the median income. Second, immigrants may also affect the

support for redistribution depending on whether they are expected to decrease citizens’

incomes through labor market competition or through tax-financed wealth transfers. These

different analyses may have different psychological effects on, for example, xenophobia.

People prefer richer immigrants who increase the size of the cake to competitive immigrants

who make their own situations unstable. However, as far as redistribution is concerned, both

analyses are conjectured to have the same impact: in both cases individuals become relatively

poorer compared to the mean income, even though in the second case they also risk becoming

absolutely poorer, while this is not the case in the first interpretation.

1.4 Testable hypotheses.

Three testable hypotheses are provided to test the selfish citizen explanation:

(H1) when citizens believe that immigrants take jobs away from natives, their preference for

redistribution increases and

(H2) when citizens believe that immigrants strain the welfare state, their preference for

redistribution declines.

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Notice that only H2 is compatible with the anti-solidarity explanation. In order to clarify this

point empirically, it should also be expected that

(H3) Demand for redistribution also depends on the lack of solidarity with immigrants.

Moreover, the expected effects described in H1 and H2 should be amplified when the

respondents believe that the proportion of immigrants in the population is large.

(H4) The perceived population share of immigrants increases the validity of H1 and H2.

Finally, the impact of specific beliefs about immigrants – such as those listed above – should

exclusively influence citizens, at least in the expected direction.

2. Data and methodology

I use data from the last round of the European Values Survey (EVS) conducted in 2008. These

data are interesting for several reasons. First, they cover 45 countries and almost 70,000

respondents (countries and respondents per country are described in the Appendix). Most

countries are quite poor and receive “white collar” immigration. They are rarely studied and,

for all these reasons, they are worth taking into account. Also, this database asks questions

that are well adapted to the aim of this article. Only citizens are taken into account in the

estimations, meaning people within the country who are thus entitled to vote.

2.1. Demand for equality and for social protection

The demand for redistribution is the dependent variable. It is difficult, in the real world, to

identify how to measure redistribution. It can be regarded both as a form of insurance or as a

way to equalize incomes. For this reason, I have used two indicators.

The first one measures support for redistribution as a way of protecting people from risks. The

respondents had to place themselves on a ten-point scale: “The government should take more

responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for” (9) versus “People should take more

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responsibility to provide for themselves” (0). This question indicates the demand for social

protection, meaning insurance-type redistribution.

The second indicator captures the preference for redistribution based on equalizing incomes.

The scale is: “Incomes should be made more equal” (9) versus “We need larger income

differences as incentives” (0). This second dependent variable is called demand for equality.

Surprisingly, neither indicator is correlated with the other. Besides, both of them appear to be

continuous and normally distributed variables, in which the value 4 is the mean, the median

and the mode of the demand for social protection, whereas this value is 5 in the case of

demand for equality (see Table 1).

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

2.2. Perceived immigrant competitiveness and solidarity with immigrants.

According to the selfish citizen explanation, the perception of immigrants’ labor market

competitiveness has an impact on citizens’ attitudes toward redistribution, regardless of the

extent of solidarity with foreign-born arrivals. The main concern of this prediction is

separating the competition effect from the solidarity effect. Indeed, when immigrants are

perceived as competitive, they are also more accepted by the people who earn less than the

median income, because immigrants contribute to paying taxes, and by rich people who are

keen to share the fiscal burden. This fact has been highlighted by Hainmueller and Hiscox

(2010), who demonstrate that, regardless of their incomes, people are less xenophobic toward

highly skilled immigrants. Also, Senik et al. (2009) have found a correlation between

perceptions of immigrants’ contributions to national prosperity and attitudes toward

immigration. In order to avoid this problem, I need to identify four groups: xenophobic and

non-xenophobic people, on the one hand, and citizens who believe that immigrants are

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competitive in the labor market, or not, on the other. This means that people can be

xenophobic because they think that immigrants are competitive with their fellow citizens and,

conversely, they can be unxenophobic when they perceive immigrants as non-competitive.

Hence, I use two questions that ask respondents to place themselves on a ten-point scale:

A. Immigrants take jobs away: Immigrants take jobs away from natives (9) versus Immigrants

do not take jobs away from natives (0)

B. Immigrants strain the welfare state: Immigrants are a strain on the welfare system (9)

versus immigrants are not a strain on the welfare system (0)

On the first scale, immigrants are regarded as dangerous because they actually compete with

citizens in the labor market. So, immigrants are considered to be at a potential advantage

compared to citizens as far as income is concerned. On the second scale, immigrants are

viewed as poor and disadvantaged when competing with citizens.

Note that both scales can measure some kind of xenophobic attitude: whatever the

immigrants’ level of competitiveness, they are perceived negatively on both scales. However,

in case A, xenophobia should lead to a demand for redistribution, because immigrants

threaten citizens with downward mobility, while in case B, citizens should oppose

redistribution because non-competitive immigrants facilitate citizens’ upward mobility.

It is also worth noting that the correlation between both variables is high (r = 0.52). This

could indicate that many people answer both questions in similar ways. In fact, there is a set

of people that are systematically opposed or systematically favorable to immigrants. Hence,

whatever immigrants do, respondents will keep seeing them either as a threat to or as a benefit

for society.

Nevertheless, in this paper, I argue that, whatever the level of xenophobia, only the relative

perception of the immigrants’ average economic situation is relevant. That is why I also use a

variable that is the result of subtracting immigrants take jobs away from immigrants strain the

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welfare state (called relative competitiveness hereafter). Thus, the larger is this value, the

more competitive immigrants are deemed to be. This indicator does not consider the level of

xenophobia, because people answering 9 for both questions have the same score as the

individuals answering 0 for both questions, but it captures the intensity of the preference for

one idea of immigrants over the other. Therefore, it measures why people are more sensitive

to one issue than another, regardless of their degree of xenophobia.

Regarding negative beliefs about immigrants, existing studies measure attitudes toward

immigrants mainly by offering options about their perceived numbers (Mayda 2006;

Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2004; Givens 2004). In the EVS survey,

the most widely used question is whether respondents agree with the statement “Today in my

country, there are too many immigrants”. Respondents had to choose among five responses:

strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree and disagree strongly (see Simon

and Lynch 1999; Givens 2004). This question is correlated with both Immigrants take jobs

away (0.41) and Immigrants strain the welfare state (0.44), but not correlated with Relative

competitiveness. However it provides an ambiguous piece of information: it measures both the

perceived number of immigrants and negative attitudes towards them (“too many”). So, this

question can be viewed as a measurement of generic xenophobia, as well as the perceived

proportion of immigrants in the country. When this variable is interacted with Immigrants

take jobs away and Immigrants strain the welfare state (which encapsulate negative attitudes

towards immigrants), its effect plausibly captures only the perceived number of immigrants.6

Finally, in line with the explanations based on solidarity, the demand for redistribution arises

when people feel solidarity with fellow-citizens or with immigrants. I use two variables which

measure the level of solidarity with those populations. Citizens were asked to what extent they

6 For interaction terms, I computed the items to obtain a variable using two values: 1 when respondents strongly

agree or agree with the statement and null otherwise.

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are concerned by the living conditions of fellow countrymen (Concerned by fellow-citizens)

and of immigrants (Concerned by immigrants), on a five-point scale.

2.3. Individual and contextual control variables.

Above all, I have to test that beliefs about immigrants’ labor market competitiveness is a

cause, and not an effect, of attitudes towards redistribution. To identify the specific impact of

beliefs about immigration on the demand for redistribution, the general attitudinal

predisposition towards redistribution is held constant. Basic values in favor of the free market

(hereafter Preference for freedom) are measured by the respondent’s choice between freedom

and equality.7

Another dimension potentially able to account for both perceptions of immigrants and support

for redistribution is the right-wing or left-wing identification (Van Der Brug and Van Spanje

2009). Within this framework, people located on the left side of the political scale are

expected to favor immigration and to oppose the market. I used the classic self-placement on

the ten-point scale in which 1 is “left” and 10 is “right”. The variable is, therefore, called

right-wing.

Beyond these attitudinal controls, I enter several structural independent variables. Income is a

decisive variable and the most appropriate indicator of this is the monthly household income

in Euros (x1000), adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP).8

Finally, I have taken into account three major demographic characteristics: Gender

(1=female), Age and Education (in six points given by the ISCED code). Older people and

7 Respondents who have chosen the statement “I would consider personal freedom more important, that is,

everyone can live in freedom and develop without hindrance” is coded 1, while people who believe that equality

is more important, “that is, that nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”

equals -1. Note that about 6% of respondents did not agree with either of these statements. They are coded with

0. 8 PPP is derived from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database (October 2008 Edition).

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females are more likely to support redistribution (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003, Keely and

Tan 2008); religious attendance traditionally is associated with less support for the welfare

state.

At the aggregate level, studies of the impact of inequality on the demand for redistribution use

the Gini coefficient to measure the skewness of the income distribution. Its effect has

sometimes been observed – in line with the M&R hypothesis - as positive (Aalberg 2003;

Finseraas 2009), sometimes as insignificant (Lübker 2007; Kenworthy and McCall 2008) and

some studies point to a negative relationship (Bowles and Gintis 2000). According to the

M&R hypothesis, Gini impacts the demand for redistribution only among the people who earn

the median income or less. Therefore, the Gini coefficient is interacted with belonging to the

median income or less category (Gini*low income) and it is expected to have a positive

impact, especially on the demand for equality. On the other hand, the demand for social

protection, which implies insurance-type redistribution, can be more influenced by the

country’s degree of openness to trade (Rodrik 1998). Immigrants are not the only reason for

income-loss risks: the domestic labor market is more vulnerable to turbulence on the world

markets when the economy is more open. In line with Finseraas (2009), I measure trade

openness (in natural logarithms), using exports plus imports as a share of GDP, in constant

prices. However, since this mechanism concerns the people whose income is more affected by

market turbulence, trade openness is interacted with low levels of education, i.e., the fraction

of the population with a secondary education or less (trade openness (ln)*low education).

Low education is here a proxy for vulnerability to market instability.

3. Results.

3.1 Individual and country level correlations.

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Before proceeding to a multivariate analysis, simple correlations at the individual and country

levels are computed. Table 2 correlates the demands for equality and for social protection

with the variables related to solidarity with immigrants and their labor market

competitiveness. Each country’s score is the mean of the individual answers given by the

citizens of that country.

Interestingly, the results are ambiguous respecting the demand for equality, while the demand

for social protection clearly is affected by the perceived degree of immigrants’

competitiveness. More accurately, at an individual level, the demand for equality is associated

positively with negative opinions about immigrants, but it is also positively correlated with

feeling concerned by immigrants (and, to a lesser extent, by citizens), in line with the anti-

solidarity hypothesis. No significant correlations are registered at the country level.

The results are more interesting with respect to the demand for social protection. The latter is

positively correlated with believing that immigrants take jobs away from citizens and

negatively with believing that immigrants strain the welfare state. Subtracting one from the

other (relative competitiveness) is strongly and positively correlated with the demand for

social protection. These results are confirmed both at the country and individual level.

Solidarity with citizens and immigrants has a positive impact, while thinking that there are too

many immigrants surprisingly remains positively associated with redistribution at the

individual level.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

While these results have to be confirmed with a multivariate analysis, they suggest that when

redistribution is regarded as a form of insurance, people assess the way in which their own

situation in the labor market could be affected by immigration, regardless of their level of

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solidarity with immigrants. In contrast, when redistribution is simply a way of equalizing

incomes, the results do not have a clear interpretation.

3.2 Multivariate estimations with structural controls

In order to estimate our ten-point scale dependent variable, several methods have been used,

but whatever the method the results do not change. I choose to mainly show here the results

from a simple ordinary least squares method, as if the relationships were, because the results

are more easily interpretable. However, Table 3 compares OLS and Probit estimations with

structural controls.9 Both sets of regressions also include country fixed effects and error

variances are corrected using the cluster method. This largely ensures the quality of the

estimations.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

Table 3 offers two estimations of the demand for equality and two for the demand for social

protection. In each case, the first column uses OLS estimation (take jobs away and strain the

welfare state), while the second column uses Probit estimation. Only structural control

variables are taken into account, to avoid any concern about endogeneity.

In the four columns, the classic individual control variables have the expected impact:

income, education and being male have a negative impact on the demand for redistribution.

Religious attendance and age have no influence.

The impact of contextual variables globally confirms the hypotheses tested, with some

caveats. The Gini coefficient significantly and positively affects the demand for social

protection, while it has no impact on the demand for equality. This result confirms the 9 In the probit model, the dependent variable is dummy (I have considered the answers from 1-5 values as 0, and

the values from 6 up to 10, as 1).

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political economy model even though it was expected to better explain the demand for

equality than the demand for social protection. On the other hand, trade openness has the

expected impact on both the demand for social protection and for equality (in the latter case,

only in the OLS estimation).

Concerning immigrants, the variable Immigrants take jobs away has a positive impact on the

demand for redistribution, but is significant only in the case of the demand for equality, while

the impact of Immigrants strain the welfare state is significant and negative as far as the

demand for social protection is concerned. This result partly confirms hypotheses H1 and H2.

3.3 Multivariate estimations with structural and attitudinal controls

Tables 4 and 5 carry out several OLS estimations with different specifications that take into

account structural and attitudinal control variables. Including attitudinal controls does not

change the global findings reported previously. However, they allow us to shed light on

hypotheses H3 and H4 and on the relationship between the different motives associated with

redistribution. The results globally confirm the selfish citizen hypothesis (H1, H2, H4). The

anti-solidarity hypothesis (H3) is not clearly invalidated, even though the results are

somewhat fuzzy. The control variables are steady and in line with what Table 3 already

established. The attitudinal variables not related to the immigration issue (Preference for

freedom and Right-wing) negatively influence the demand for redistribution in all estimations,

as expected.

Table 4 estimates the demand for social protection. Column 1 shows, as in Table 3, the

opposite impact of Immigrants take jobs away and of Immigrants strain the welfare state,

with only the latter significant at the 5% level. The same effect is confirmed in column 2.

Feeling concerned by fellow-citizens does not significantly influence support for social

protection, but caring about immigrants does, at the 10% level (column 1). However, thinking

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that there are too many immigrants (column 2) does not have the expected negative impact,

but a positive one. These results go a small way to confirming the idea that solidarity with

immigrants (H3) can explain support for redistribution.

Columns 3 and 4 replicate the previous estimations, but use the Relative competitiveness

variable, and the results do not change.

Finally, columns 5 and 6 test H4. The impact of Immigrants takes jobs away and of

Immigrants strain the welfare state is expected to be amplified when people perceive that

there are “too many” immigrants . This expectation is confirmed only for the first hypothesis,

not for the second. In particular, while the Immigrants take jobs away coefficient is not

significant in standard specifications (columns 1 and 2), it becomes significant when it is

interacted with the perceived number of immigrants. When both variables are combined into

Relative competitiveness, however, the results are also not significant at the 5% level.

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

Let us now consider the demand for equality (Table 5). The positive effect of Immigrants

take jobs away is confirmed, but the variable Immigrants strain the welfare state is now

insignificant. Taken together (column 3 and 4), the expected effect is observed. Again, the

most notable effect is provided in columns 5 and 6. When these variables are interacted with

too many immigrants, the effect is clearly amplified in both cases. In particular, Immigrants

strain the welfare state regains its significant and negative influence on the demand for

equality when respondents think that there are too many immigrants. On the other hand, the

coefficient Immigrants takes jobs away is simply larger when immigrants are viewed as too

numerous.

20

Finally, variables measuring hostility to immigrants do not have their expected signs.

Solidarity with immigrants has a barely significant impact (10% level), and its sign is

positive. Hypothesis 3 is, however, better confirmed in terms of solidarity with fellow

citizens, which positively influences the demand for redistribution.

TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

All in all, the most consistent finding, reinforced by the perceived number of immigrants, is

the positive effect of Immigrants take jobs away. So, H1 is confirmed in most estimations.

Immigrants strain the welfare state tends to maintain the expected negative sign, even though,

with respect to support for equality, this effect is visible only when the variable is interacted

with too many immigrants. So, H2 is also broadly confirmed.

The evidence for H3 is weak. Generally negative attitudes towards immigrants do not seem to

have the expected influence. On the other hand, solidarity with others (with immigrants and

with fellow citizens) affects the demand for redistribution. However, solidarity specifically

regarding immigrants seems to have no significant effect.

According to hypothesis 4, H1 and H2 should be truer when they are interacted with Too

many immigrants. This is confirmed in three cases out of four. Thus, H4 is globally validated.

4. Conclusion

This article has compared two concurrent explanations for the observed link between

immigration and attitudes toward income redistribution; it operationalized two concepts of

redistribution: the first is based on equality of income, and the second on social insurance.

The anti-solidarity explanation argues that lack of concern for immigrants’ welfare is

responsible for the (negative) link between immigration and the demand for redistribution.

21

Our data partly confirm this hypothesis since, on average, people are less concerned about the

living conditions of immigrants than about those of fellow citizens. Moreover, the data show

that, at an individual level, there is a positive correlation between solidarity for immigrants

and the demand for more redistribution. However, after a multivariate analysis with

appropriate controls, the anti-solidarity explanation turns out to be globally weak: indeed, the

influence of solidarity is unsteady but robust only with respect to fellow citizens.

On the other hand, the selfish citizen explanation states that citizens’ support for redistribution

depends on their expectations about future incomes and their anticipated position on the

income scale. Those expectations are influenced by the economic changes produced by the

entry of new workers into the labor market. Within this framework, solidarity with

immigrants does not play any causal role, and citizens assess their present or future position in

order to evaluate if they will benefit personally from more or less redistribution. This

mechanism is broadly confirmed by our data. Indeed, when immigration is viewed as leading

to more instability in the labor market, citizens opt for more redistribution. On the other hand,

when immigrants as seen as being less educated and less skilled people who will benefit from

income transfers, citizens anticipate, on average, that they themselves will gain from

redistribution, leading them to display less support for it. Moreover, this double effect proved

to be stronger when citizens believe that there are ‘too many’ immigrants.

This psychological mechanism is the necessary condition for the selfish citizen explanation.

Its consequence is that the demand for redistribution changes with immigration, except when

immigrants’ profiles are similar to those of citizens.

To conclude on the idea that immigration affects not only the demand for redistribution, but

actual redistribution, two assumptions are required. First, redistribution policies are a response

to citizens’ demands. Some authors remain skeptical about this causality (Kenworthy 2009),

which is why this paper does not take any stance on this point. Second, people correctly

22

perceive immigrants’ numbers and labor market competitiveness, which largely also is

questionable: according to our data, individuals’ perceptions of the number of immigrants are

significantly, but weakly correlated with their effective number (0.04). Besides, according to

recent studies, and contrary to what around one of three respondents in our sample believe,

foreign labor likely does not have a relevant negative effect on the natives’ job opportunities

(D'Amuri et al. 2010; Longhi et al. 2006; Schmidt and Jensen 2012).

If we assume that these assumptions are valid, the question whether or not to give immigrants

the right to vote surely would have a major impact on debates on the welfare state. For

example, we can determine whether the optimal level of redistribution is more easily reached

when immigrants are enfranchised, or when they are not. Or, also, if maximizing political

inclusiveness leads to rising prosperity (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012), then extending

voting rights to all economic agents can favor economic development. Whatever the answer,

according to this empirical analysis on individual preferences for redistribution, the issue of

immigrants’ voting rights certainly appears to be an important element in the debate about

redistribution and the economy.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank André Blais and the other members of the Canada Research

Chair in Electoral Studies, Abel François, Anna Jeannesson, and Robert Kowalenko for their

helpful comments. Finally, I would like to stress the excellent comments from two

anonymous reviewers who considerably improved this article.

23

Appendix Column I: Observations included in each country (peoples who have answered both questions about redistribution). Column II and III: Available data on foreigners (persons who are not citizens of the country of residence) per country in the sample and according to Eurostat (Vasileva 2011). The correlation is r = .94. Respondents % Foregners (sample) % Foreigners (Eurostat) Albania 1455 1 Azerbaijan 1157 0 Austria 1455 2 11 Armenia 1446 1 Belgium 1501 6 10 Bosnia Herzegovina 1475 1 Bulgaria 1413 1 Belarus 1445 2 Croatia 1450 0 Cyprus 929 6 16 Czech Republic 1733 1 4 Denmark 1478 3 6 Estonia 1483 16 16 Finland 1058 0 3 France 3039 4 6 Georgia 1392 0 Germany 2041 4 Greece 1482 7 8 Hungary 1486 0 2 Iceland 797 2 7 Ireland 965 4 9 Italy 1431 0 7 Latvia 1474 22 17 Lithuania 1386 0 1 Luxembourg 1549 47 43 Malta 1389 2 4 Moldova 1402 8 Montenegro 1427 5 Netherlands 1543 2 4 Norway 1085 5 7 Poland 1475 0 0 Portugal 1462 4 4 Romania 1380 0 Russian Federation 1431 0 Serbia 1458 0 Slovak Republic 1430 0 1 Slovenia 1341 6 4 Spain 1383 9 12 Sweden 1111 4 6 Switzerland 1230 19 22 Turkey 2226 0 Ukraine 1470 1 Macedonia 1428 1 Great Britain 2004 8 7 Kosovo 1521 20

24

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Table 1: Statistical description of variables* Mean sd min max Dependent variable Demand for equality 4.68 0.011 0 9 Demand for social protection 4.01 0.011 0 9 About immigrants Immigrants take jobs away 4.94 0.011 0 9 Immigrants strain the welfare state 5.42 0.011 0 9 Relative competitiveness -0.49 0.011 -9 9 Concerned by fellow-citizens 2.00 0.004 0 4 Concerned by immigrants 1.75 0.004 0 4 Too many immigrants 2.16 0.005 1 5 Individual control variables Preference for freedom 0.095 0.004 -1 1 Right-wing 5.38 0.01 1 10 Female 1.554 0.002 1 2 Age 46.37 0.07 14 108 Education 3.08 0.005 1 6 Income 1.212 0.005 0 14.73 Religious attendance 2.390 0.007 0 6 * For all variables but income, the unit is 1. The variable income includes 611 values computed from specific scales for each country, adjusted for PPP.

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Table 2: Correlations at Country Level (means per country) and at Individual level in 45

European countries

Demand for equality Demand for social

protection

Country

Level

Individual

Level

Country

Level

Individual

Level

Immigrants take jobs away 0.18 0.10** 0.30** 0.02**

Immigrants strain the welfare state 0.15 0.06** -0.27* -0.05**

Relative competitiveness 0.06 0.05** 0.54** 0.07**

Concerned by fellow-citizens -0.05 0.03** 0.10 0.003**

Concerned by immigrants 0.23 0.05** 0.04 0.003**

Too many immigrants 0.13 0.05** -0.04 0.01** **Significant 5% level * significant 10% level

Each country’s score is the mean of the individual answers given by the citizens of that country.

31

Table 3: Estimations of citizens’ demand for equality and social protection with structural control variables Demand for equality Demand for social

protection

OLS Probit OLS Probit

Immigrants take jobs away 0.077*** (0.011)

0.031*** (0.005)

0.013 (0.012)

0.005 (0.005)

Immigrants strain the welfare state 0.010 (0.016)

0.002 (0.007)

-0.037** (0.014)

-0.013** (0.006)

Female 0.154*** (0.043)

0.067*** (0.019)

0.228*** (0.028)

0.076*** (0.014)

Age 0.001

(0.001) 0.001

(0.001) 0.000

(0.001) -0.000 (0.001)

Education -0.063***

(0.010) -0.059** (0.009)

-0.106*** (0.026)

-0.048*** (0.011)

Income -0.070***

(0.015) -0.075** (0.014)

-0.106** (0.026)

-0.057*** (0.012)

Religious attendance 0.025* (0.015)

0.007 (0.007)

0.007 (0.016)

0.003 (0.007)

GINI index*low income 0.001

(0.002) 0.001

(0.001) 0.008*** (0.002)

0.003*** (0.001)

ln (Trade Openness)*low education 0.183** (0.083)

0.063 (0.043)

0.230* (0.126)

0.119*** (0.051)

Constant 5.023*** (0.165)

0.335*** (0.085)

3.619*** (0.217)

-0.302*** (0.088)

N 47309 47309 47448 47448 R² 0.15 0.09 0.07 0.04

Standard errors, corrected with the cluster method (by country), are in parentheses. We include country fixed effects. ** p<0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.