How the world is changing skin: the demographic transition

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6.5

How the world is changing skin: the demographic transition

Luca MuscaràTav 6.5 —

Fig 6.5 —

Mappa 6.5 —

If current forecasts are confirmed, by 2050 the global demographic transition will have significantly altered the current appearance of the World. The Earth’s population will exceed 9 billion and aging, from Japan and Europe, will have extended to most emerging and developing countries. The United States will be an exception, but most of Asia, Latin America and North Africa/Middle East will see the proportion of people over sixty years of age increase by 10%, while that of the population under 25 years of age will decrease even by as much as 20%. The implications of this aging is not limited to putting welfare systems under pressure and the need to import young people from the few countries, mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa, which will still have them. Among the consequences of population growth, there is also one of a psychological nature, which would explain the emergence of an increasingly individualistic ideology, devoid of any social responsibility, and which is merely a defensive reaction in the face of increasing global complexity boosted by demographic growth and the inability to address the challenges related to it.

GLOBAL SCALE

The human population is now estimated at 7.2 billion people, of which about 60% is in Asia (4.3 billion); 16% in Africa (1.1 billion); one-tenth in Europe and Russia (0.7 billion); 8.5% in Latin America (0.6 billion), while almost 5% is in

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North America (0.353 billion). Lastly, Oceania accounts for 0.5% (0.037 billion people)1.

Considering economic development, the population of the Less Developed Countries (Ldc) is currently more than 5.9 billion (82.6%), compared to that of the Most Developed Countries (Mdc) of about 1.3 billion people (17.4%)2.

Considering the distribution by age, currently almost two thirds of the global population is less than forty years old. 88.4% of the population under 25 years of age is located in the Ldc, while only 11.6% of young people are in the Mdc. Over 60% of Africa, 43.7% in Latin America and about 41% (almost 1.8 billion) in Asia are under 25 years of age. In North America, on the other hand, 32.6% of the population is young, while in Europe this figure is 26.8%.

The presence of a large population of young people is often accompanied by a small number of the elderly. The opposite is also true.

Regarding the group over sixty-five years of age, the lowest values are in Africa, where fewer than 40 million (3.5%) of people out of over a billion reach that age. A slightly higher percentage can be found in Asia, including Japan: 7.6% of the population is over 65 years old.

Europe is the oldest region, with nearly 130 million over sixty-five year olds, equal to 17.1% of the total. The most geriatric states are Germany (21.1%) and Italy (21%), closely followed by Greece (20%), Finland and Sweden (both 19.8%).

The over 65s in France and the Uk are 18.3 and 17.5% of the total, respectively, 17.6% in the Netherlands and 16.1% in Norway.

The Americas comprise 52 million in North America and 45 million people over 65 in Latin America, which account for 13.4% and 6.9% of the total.

1 Except where otherwise stated, demographics are taken from the International Data Base of the Us Bureau of Census, December 2013, http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb, referred to in June 2014. Giovanna Cannizzaro assisted with the research.2 This generalisation is rather approximate if Israel and Kuwait are included among the Ldc and Kosovo and Moldova are included among the Mdc.

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A low level of economic development and a large young population help to explain migration flows to countries with a high level of economic development and a large elderly population.

The three main trajectories of migration on a global level (to Western Europe, from Africa, Eastern Europe and Russia; to North America, from Central America and Asia; to the Middle East, especially from the Philippines, Indonesia and India) confirm the correlation between demographic imbalance and economic imbalance, although the economic crisis has, at least in some cases, begun to reverse the trajectories, such as between Mexico and the United States or between Europe and North Africa3.

DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION

The theory of demographic transition allows us to estimate populations change over time: in fact, by measuring the distance between fertility and mortality of a population, at least four major stages of its growth emerge.

In the first stage, before modernisation, fertility and mortality rates are both equally high and the population grows very slowly.

In the second stage, after the onset of modernisation, improvements in nutrition and sanitary conditions, in preventive medicine and public health lead to a decline in mortality, while fertility remains high: the overall population begins to increase.

In the third stage, partly due to female education, fertility also declines and overall growth slows down.

Finally, the fourth stage sees the completion of the demographic transition: fertility and mortality are synchronised back to similarly low levels, even though the overall population has achieved a high value.

There is a hypothesis of a fifth stage in which a new rise in mortality that exceeds the birth rate emerges, while fertility is below the replacement level of two children per woman.

3 Cf. L. Muscarà, “International migrations and economic crisis”, in G. Cucchi, G. Dottori (eds.), Nomos & Khaos, The 2012-2013 Nomisma Report on economic-strategic horizons - Observatory of Strategic and Security Scenarios, Bologna, Nomisma, 2013, pp. 249-270.

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A sixth stage can apply to countries with advanced development in which there is a subsequent resumption of fertility.

Over the past two centuries, from Europe to Japan, the developed world has already gone through all of the first four stages of demographic transition and, since the Sixties, fertility is now below the replacement level, while birth and mortality rates are equally low.

Forecasts suggest that this situation will remain stable over the next three decades.

The growth rate is also low and could become negative by 2050. The population of Mdc is already composed of 17% of over sixty-five year olds, which could become more than a quarter of the total by 2050, surpassing the number of young people under 25 years of age.

There are some exceptions, such as the United States and France, but in Mdc the population tends to grow mainly due to the contribution of immigrants, who tend to reproduce more than the native population, at least initially, as is the case in Italy.

Almost all the other countries have already begun the same process.

Ldc (Least Developed Countries excluded) are going through the third phase of the transition, with an already low mortality rate and a high birth rate, which is decreasing and has begun to align itself with the mortality rate.

Population growth continues, albeit with a growth rate which will be less than 1% by 2025. Fertility will remain above the replacement level (2.3 children per woman) in the next decade, but by 2050 it will drop to 2 children per woman.

The demographic growth of Asia, starting with China and India, sees these two states advancing rapidly in their demographic transition. By 2025, China’s population will be overtaken by India’s, before the latter’s fertility also begins to decrease (see Table 6.5.1).

Western Asia and North Africa are also at an advanced stage of demographic transition: the growth of the last twenty years has already slowed down.


Table 6.5.1 — Population forecasts for the first 25 states

Ranking # 2014 2025 2050

1 China 1.355.692.576 India 1.396.046.308 India 1.656.553.632

2 India 1.236.344.631 China 1.394.638.699 China 1.303.723.332

3 USA 318.892.103 USA 346.407.223 USA 399.803.369

4 Indonesia 253.609.643 Indonesia 276.746.433 Nigeria 391.296.754

5 Brazil 202.656.788 Nigeria 230.570.741 Indonesia 300.183.166

6 Pakistan 196.174.380 Pakistan 228.385.138 Pakistan 290.847.790

7 Nigeria 177.155.754 Brazil 218.259.140 Bangladesh 250.155.274

8 Bangladesh 166.280.712 Bangladesh 197.673.655 Brazil 232.304.177

9 Russia 142.470.272 Russia 140.139.049 Ethiopia 228.066.276

10 Japan 127.103.388 Mexico 134.828.700 The Phlippines 171.964.187

11 Mexico 120.286.655 Ethiopia 131.260.566 Mexico 150.567.503

12 The Phlippines 107.668.231 The Phlippines 128.921.424 Congo (Kinsh.) 144.805.434

13 Ethiopia 96.633.458 Japan 123.385.521 Egypt 137.872.522

14 Vietnam 93.421.835 Egypt 103.742.157 Russia 129.908.086

15 Egypt 86.895.099 Vietnam 102.458.828 Tanzania 118.586.412

16 Turkey 81.619.392 Congo (Kinsh.) 99.162.003 Vietnam 111.173.583

17 Germany 80.996.685 Turkey 90.498.016 Japan 107.209.536

18 Iran 80.840.713 Iran 90.481.226 Turkey 100.955.188

19 Congo (Kinsh.) 77.433.744 Germany 79.226.209 Iran 100.044.564

20 Thailand 67.741.401 Thailand 69.588.429 Uganda 93.476.229

21 France 66.259.012 France 68.860.292 Germany 71.541.906

22 UK 63.742.977 UK 67.243.723 UK 71.153.797

23 Italy 61.680.122 Tanzania 66.904.889 Kenya 70.755.460

24 Myanmar 55.746.253 Italy 62.591.055 Myanmar 70.673.160

25 Tanzania 49.639.138 Myanmar 61.747.758 France 69.484.481

Source: Us Census 2014.

The impact on a cultural level of the speed of transition should not be underestimated: whereas Europe took about two centuries to complete the four stages of demographic transition, in just thirty years North Africa has gone from an average of 7.5 to an average of two children per woman.

Only the Least Developed Countries are still in the second stage of demographic transition and two-thirds of them are in Africa.

The mortality rate continues to fall, while the birth rate is still high. With a fertility rate of more than 4 children per woman, these are still very young countries, in which 60% of the population is under 25 years of age, and they have the highest population growth.

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USA, THE BRICS AND OTHER EMERGING COUNTRIES

The United States remains the third most populous state, with an annual growth rate of 0.8% and a fertility of 2 children per woman.

Following a decline in births caused by the economic and financial crisis that began in 2007 (-4% between 2008 and June 2010), during which births reached the lowest rate since the thirties, it rose back to 13.4 in 2013, with the number of births again exceeding 4 million4.

Fertility will remain permanently below the replacement level until 2050. Nowadays, young people under the age of 25 account for 33% of the population, while those over 65, which account for 15% of the population, could reach 20% by 2030.

The dependency of such a proportion of the population on that of the working age population is already 21.6%. However, the demographic behaviour of the United States remains strongly influenced by the presence of international migrants, estimated at 43 million (13.5% of the total) in 2010.

While geopolitics has long been oriented towards a multipolar world, the so-called “emerging powers” seem more similar in terms of significant economic growth rates in recent years, rather than rates of population growth (see Table 6.5.2). In terms of demographics, they would be more correctly represented (in descending order) by the acronym Cibrs.

With regard to populations, the situation of the Brics is highly heterogeneous, given that India and China have populations of over a billion, Brazil exceeds 200 million, Russia exceeds 142 million, while South Africa has a population of only 48 million.

At a time when China is poised to conclude its demographic transition and its population gradually becomes older (over 65s represent 9.6% of the total and will reach 27% by 2050, exceeding the proportion of young people under 25 years of age), India, in which the demographic transition started late, is

4 Us Department of Health and Human Services, “Births: final data for 2012”, National Vital Statistics Reports, vol. 62, n. 9, December 2013.


currently at the third stage, with a fertility rate that is in decline, but higher than the replacement level, which will only be reached in 20505.

Table 6.5.2 — Population and growth rates of the United States, the Brics and other emerging to 2014, 2025, and 2050

2014 2025 2050

States population rate of growth (%): population rate of

growth (%): population rate of growth (%):

USA 318.892.103 0.8 346.407.223 0.7 399.803.369 0.5

CHINA 1.355.692.576 0.4 1.394.638.699 0 1.303.723.332 -0.5

INDIA 1.236.344.631 1.3 1.396.046.308 1 1.656.553.632 0.4

BRAZIL 202.656.788 0.8 218.259.140 0.6 232.304.177 -0.1

RUSSIA 142.470.272 0 140.139.049 -0.3 129.908.086 -0.4

SOUTH AFRICA 48.376.000 -0.5 48.714.000 0.1 49.401.000 0.1

INDONESIA 253.609.643 1 276.746.433 0.7 300.183.166 0

PAKISTAN 196.174.380 1.5 228.385.138 1.3 290.847.790 0.7

NIGERIA 177.155.754 2.5 230.570.741 2.3 391.296.754 1.9

BANGLADESH 166.280.712 1.6 197.673.655 1.4 250.155.274 0.6

MEXICO 120.286.655 1.2 134.828.700 0.9 150.567.503 0

THE PHILIPPINES 107.668.231 1.8 128.921.424 1.5 171.964.187 0.8

TURKEY 81.619.392 1.1 90.498.016 0.8 100.955.188 0.1

Source: Us Census 2014.

The second most populous state in the world is therefore destined to become the first and, with respect to China, is and will remain a relatively young country. Currently, 46% of the population is below 24 years of age, while the over sixty-fives do not even account for 6%. In 2050, young people will still represent more than a third of the total, while the age group above 65 years will grow (15%). Overall, the population of India will grow by more than 400 million, close to one billion and 700 million.

Brazil is going through the different stages of demographic transition quickly. While its population has nearly tripled since 1961 (from 73 million to almost 203 million), in recent years a rapid decline in fertility has slowed growth.

Birth and mortality rates will begin to synchronise and the population over 65 years of age will increase. Young people currently represent 40% of

5 C. Haub, J. Gribble, “The World at 7 Billion”, Population Bulletin, vol. 66, n. 2, Population Reference Bureau, July 2011.

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the population, but by 2050 that could fall to 27.5%. Older people currently represent 7.6% of the population, but will account for 21% by 2050.

The only European state, among the top most populated ten, Russia, with its 142 million inhabitants, has had a zero growth rate for twenty years, and fertility, although slightly increased, remains below the replacement level (1.6 children per woman).

Since the dissolution of the Ussr, the Russian population has decreased by about 5 million, partly due to the scourge of alcoholism. Birth and mortality rates are high, but have a tendency to shrink slightly. By 2050, the Russian population will have decreased by another 13 million people.

The over 65s, currently 13%, will double to 26% by 2050. The percentage of young people under 25 years of age, however, will fall from 27% to 24% by 2050. The dependency ratio of over 65s on the working age population is already 18.5% and will only increase.

Lastly, South Africa stands out for its limited growth. Presently, it is still a young country, almost half the population is under 25 years of age, but by 2050 the percentage of young people will fall to 37%, while those over 65 will rise from 6% to 11%.

Other states could join the traditional emerging powers: considering that Indonesia has 253 million inhabitants and its average rate of economic growth between 2000 and 2014 was 5.4% (while the rate of economic growth in South Africa was 3.17%), it would probably be more correct to speak of Briics or Ciibrs. Perhaps even Nigeria, which is oil-rich, and Mexico could hold some surprises.

Indonesia has long since entered the demographic transition. In 1981, its population was 153 million and grew by 2% per year, with 4.2 children per woman. Today it has a growth rate of 1% and a fertility of 2.2 children per woman. Its population is young (43%, but forecast to fall to 30%), while those over 65 will increase from 6.5% to 19%. By 2050, birth and mortality rates will almost be aligned and the growth rate will be zero, but in the meantime the population will have increased by about 50 million.


RICH AND OLD? JAPAN AND EUROPE

Although the entire world’s population is getting older, the phenomenon is more pronounced in Japan and Europe. The latter, which is already among the oldest regions, will continue to age, if the over 65s increase from 17% to 27.8% of the total by 2050, while the proportion of young people falls from 26.8% to 24.1% over the same period.

The Old Continent currently has a growth rate of just above 0% and falling, an overall fertility below the replacement level and a strong trend towards an aging population, which by 2050 will consist of more over 65s than young people.

Almost 75 years since the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis, with mortality rates that are higher than birth rates, Japan, Germany and Italy lead the overall geriatric states.

Japan, at the fifth stage of demographic transition, is now the tenth most populous state in the world. It has a negative growth rate (-0.1%) which will decrease to -0.7% by 2050 and the forecast is that the current population of 127 million will decrease by about 20 million inhabitants.

With a median age of 46 years, the Japanese archipelago is the leading geriatric state: the percentage of over 65s is greater than the number of people under the age of 25 (25.8% versus 22.9%). By 2050, forecasts place the respective percentages at 40% and 18.7%: more than twice as many over sixty-five year olds as there are young people.

A comparable trend can be found in Germany, which is also at the fifth stage of demographic transition. The country has a negative growth rate and the current population, which stands at 80 million, will see a decrease of 9 million inhabitants by 2050.

Germany is currently the second most geriatric state in the world, with 21.1% of the population over sixty-five years of age, although the proportion of young people is 23.5%. The number of elderly people is expected to exceed that of young people by 2025 and it is estimated that by 2050 they will account for 30% of the total, while the proportion of young people will fall slightly.

Italy is the third geriatric country. Its growth rate of 0.3% in 2014 will fall to zero by 2025 and become negative (-0.2%) by 2050. The current population of

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61 million could increase to 62.6 million by 2025, while it will no longer be part of the list of the 25 most populated states by 2050, due to the rise of Tanzania, Myanmar (Burma), Uganda and Kenya.

Currently, 21% of the Italian population is over 65 years of age, while 23.6% is below 25 years old. The proportion of seniors (23.4%) should exceed that of the under 25s (22.7%) by 2025. By 2050, there will be almost 20 million people over the age of 65: 31% of the total, while young people will amount to 22,7%.

France, in which the senior population equates to 18% (26% by 2050), and the United Kingdom, in which the over-sixties amount to 17.5% (24% by 2050) share the tendencies of a decreasing population and aging. At least until 2050, this is mitigated not only by the proportion of young people, currently 30% of the total (27% by 2050), but by a fertility rate of 2.1 children in France and just below the threshold for replacement in the United Kingdom.

The dependency ratio over 65s to the working-age population in all these European countries is close to 30%. This explains (in addition to historical reasons) the significant presence of international migrants: they account for 14% of the population in Spain, 10% in France, the Uk and Greece, and 7.4% in Italy.

Even Eurasian Turkey is set to conclude its demographic transition, following an increase from 14 million in 1927 to the current 81 million: demographic policies have lowered the birth rate since the sixties6.

In Turkey, 42% of the population is currently under 25 years of age and seniors represent less than 7% of the population. However, fertility will fall below the replacement level by 2025 and the young population will drop below 30% by 2050, while those over 65 will increase to 19%.

Thus, the so-called developed world seems to have little alternative to the advent of a dual population: on the one hand, an increasing number of elderly native citizens, while on the other, a youth made up of migrants born overseas, particularly in Africa and Asia, which is increasingly essential to support the economy and services in richer countries that have become geriatric7.

6 J. M. Le Goff and Y. Forney, “The Turkish demographic transition. Fertility and child mortality”, Epc European population conference 2006.7 W. A. V. Clark, “Human Mobility in a Globalizing World: Urban development Trends and


By 2050, the only countries that will still be young will be some of the poorest countries in the world, such as Afghanistan (49% of the population under 25 years old) and Madagascar (43.7% of young people). Most will be in Sub-Saharan Africa: in Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda, Somalia and Tanzania over half the population will be in the age group up to 24 years, in Eritrea, Congo, Ethiopia and Senegal the figure will be higher than 40% and in Zambia will be equal to 60%.

These countries will be the only ones capable of providing young people to the rest of the world, which will have become increasingly aged and will have a dependency of the over 65 year old group on the working-age population that is increasingly unbalanced.

WHERE ARE THE YOUNG PEOPLE? AFRICA, ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA

Africa contains two-thirds of the population of the Least Developed Countries and is the continent that will grow the most over the next 35 years, doubling its population (2.2 billion people by 2050).

Sub-Saharan Africa is the least developed region regarding demographic transition in the world8 and is still at the second stage, in which the population is growing rapidly.

The region has experienced a significant reduction in the mortality rate, which had been delayed for a long time by wars and infectious diseases (HIV, in particular).

Overall, West, East and Central Africa now have growth rates of over 2% and these will only fall below 2% in 2050. Fertility is greater than 4 children per woman everywhere and will only drop to 3 in 2050.

Mortality rates are lower than birth rates and still falling. The population is very young and more than 40% of the inhabitants of these regions are less than 15 years old, while 60% have not yet turned 25. In the coming decades, East

Policy Implications”, in H. S. Geyer (ed.), International Handbook of Urban Policy, vol. I, Contentious Global Issues, Edward Elgar, 2008.8 P. Vimard. and R. Fassassi, “Démographie et développement en Afrique: éléments rétrospectifs et prospectifs”, Cahiers Québécois de Démographie, vol. 40, n. 2, 2011, pp. 331-64.

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Africa will grow by 125%, from the current 363 million to 813 million by 2050, while West Africa will have 400 million more inhabitants.

Ethiopia alone will increase from 96 million to 228 million by 2050, while Nigeria, the most populated and one of the youngest and most prolific African states, will remain largely above the replacement level, growing by more than 210 million inhabitants by 2050. Like most of Sub-Saharan Africa, it is entering the second stage of demographic transition9.

In North Africa and the Middle East, demographic transition began after World War II, with a sharp fall in mortality rates (especially among children) and the consequent rapid growth of the population between 1950 and 2000.

The decrease in birth rates began after the sixties, but has been particularly rapid: North Africa went from about 7 (1960) to less than three children per woman in 2005-2010. Life expectancy rose from 42.5 years in 1950-55 to 70 years in 201010.

Nowadays, both North Africa and Western Asia have a population growth rate of less than 2%, which will fall to 1% by 2050.

In Western Asia, fertility will decrease to the replacement level by 2030 and fall to 1.9 children per woman by 2050. Nowadays, however, strong recent growth of the population contributes to keeping it young and continues to drive its rise.

In North Africa, the population over 65 will grow from the current 5% to 14% by 2050, while life expectancy for those born in that year will reach 80 years, nearly 10 more than the current figure.

In Nigeria, Pakistan and Bangladesh, there was a delay in demographic transition, which explains why these countries are extraordinarily young. In Pakistan, 55% of the population is under 25 years of age. By 2050, the percentage of young people will fall to 34.7% and the proportion over 65 will rise to 11%. Fertility will fall below the replacement level by 2050. Bangladesh will evolve in a similar fashion.

9 International Journal of Social Sciences, vol. 2, n. 2, 2013.10 M. E. Cosio Zavala, “Les Transitions Démographiques”, Cahiers d’Emam, n. 21, 2013, pp.13-31.


In the Philippines, the proportion of young people will not decrease as much (from 53% today to 40% by 2050). People over 65 years of age, currently standing at less than 5%, will double by 2050.

In Mexico, Latin America’s second most populated country, mortality has already decreased and fertility has continued to decline since the mid-sixties, but the birth rate, which is still quite high, will continue to decline, progressively aligning itself to the rate of mortality11.

Over 65s will rise from 7% to 18% by 2050. Young people, currently 46% of the population, will drop to 31% by 2050. Growth will only reach zero and the fertility rate will only drop below the replacement level in 2050.

THE WORLD IS CHANGING SKIN

If current forecasts are confirmed, by 2050 the global demographic transition will have significantly altered the current appearance of the world.

World growth will continue, albeit at a slower pace compared to recent decades, with two billion more people on Earth and, after reaching 8 billion by 2024, the human population will exceed 9 billion by 2050.

The Earth is certainly big enough to accommodate a much larger population, but it is the geographic distribution of the population and resources, in addition to the speed of this change, which matters.

In general, the distribution of the population will see a further increase in the proportion of urban population compared rural areas: from the current 54%, by 2050 two-thirds of the world’s population will be urbanised and a good part of this new urban population will inhabit the network of existing settlements, therefore a further growth in the so-called informal settlements is expected, especially in Asia and Africa.

India will have surpassed China as the most populated state in the world by 2025 and, according to some estimates, the population of Nigeria will have surpassed that of the Us by 2050, thereby relegating Indonesia. Pakistan will

11 R. Tuiran, V. Partida, O. Mojarro, E. Zúñiga, “Fertility in Mexico, Trends and Forecast”, in Expert Group Meeting on Completing the Fertility Transition, Un Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, New York, 11-14 March 2002, pp. 483-506.

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maintain its current position, while Brazil will fall to eighth place, surpassed by Bangladesh, as well.

Ethiopia will be the ninth most populated state, while Russia, which currently occupies that position, will fall to 14th. By 2025, Mexico will have surpassed Japan and will itself be surpassed by the Philippines in 2050.

Although demographic size does not coincide with the economic, political or military importance and the unexpected is always lurking, demographic forecasts up to 2050 confirm the following:

a. with the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa and a few Asian and Latin American countries, there will be a general aging of the population worldwide and the overall proportion of over sixty-five year olds will double from the current 8% to 16.5%, amounting to over 1.5 billion people;

b. the United States will have to deal with an even more multi-polar world and, in particular, with the increasing global importance of Asia (which will also include Vietnam, Iran and Burma), which will make the concept of Brics obsolete;

c. the demographic rise of Nigeria and Ethiopia (and the Congo, Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya) will correspond to more important role for Africa on a global level;

d. the demographic decline and aging of Japan and Europe.

With regard to the distribution of resources, agriculture could feed nine billion people: the problem is the organisation of distribution (as well as energy resources, if you think of the disputes caused over their control over the last few decades alone).

If anything, concern should centre around the impact on the environment: further population growth will necessarily place a burden on the biosphere, given that today’s choices regarding the environment (along with those of the last fifty years) may end up creating one of those factors that are difficult to predict, but which alter the whole scenario of forecasts12.

12 Although climate change, as well as pandemics, is among the types of disaster that could alter the scenario of global demographic forecasts, it would not be correct to classify it as an


Speed of change is the other concerning factor.

While reaching the first billion people (1800) required hundreds of thousands of years, since 1800 (in correspondence of the industrial revolution in Europe), the human population has multiplied 7 fold, with increasing speed: 130 years to reach a second billion. The pace has been dizzying since World War II: from 2.5 billion in 1950 to the current 7.2, an average increase of 80 million people each year, which equates to an average of a billion people every 13 years or so.

Given this acceleration, a clear difficulty emerges when trying to imagine the world: from the adaptation of our conceptual categories, our laws, our institutions, our cities and cohabitation itself, to the extent and speed of change.

Starting in Europe and gradually spreading to emerging countries, the general aging of the population will continue to increase stress on the welfare systems and exacerbate the challenges on issues such as retirement age, family composition (extremely aged generations which depend on increasingly small families) and the decline in the size of European populations (which inevitably affects the policies of migration control, given the decline of the local young workforce and the consequent need to import young workers from an increasingly fewer countries that will still have them).

One of the main consequences of rapid population growth over the last forty years has been on a psychological level. The increasing complexity implied by the new doubling of the Earth’s population from 4 billion to 8 billion between 1974 and 2024 seems to explain both a chronic anxiety that seems to plague the vision of the future, in particular in the field of energy resources, and especially the rise of a dominant ideology of individualism.

As argued by Gilman, while the two antagonists of the Cold War between 1945 and 1971, albeit opposed due to their economic and political ideologies, were states that still had the aim of improving well-being in their societies, following the growth of the world’s population to over 4 billion, concern for the welfare of their respective national societies has been replaced by a vision which, assuming individual economic success as the dominant and only criteria, appears to subtract the wealthier and more globalised population

unexpected factor, given that the scientific community has continued to sound the alarm – albeit ignored – for almost twenty years.

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from a sense of responsibility towards the rest of their respective national societies, which was previously the case both in the Us and the Ussr13.

This is what Gilman calls “the plutocratic insurrection” against the state itself, an insurrection of the “winners of globalisation” (which made their money at the global scale by taking advantage of the different jurisdictions, and therefore do not feel any particular allegiance towards the state, as it used to be the case with previous generations of “winners”). It does not aim to take control, but rather to create the ideal conditions for their business: cut taxes and privatise welfare systems, starting with health and education, and so much the worse for unemployment.

The challenges posed by the growth and aging of the population on a global level are compounded by a difficulty in acknowledging that the plutocratic response to these challenges seems to be more an escape into individualism in the face of increasing complexity, rather than a solution to the latter’s problems. In fact it may well be the sign of a defeat. This may therefore lead to further disputes, not just between states, but also within national societies and growing megacities themselves, increasingly divided into slums and gated communities.

13 N. Gilman, “The Twin Insurgency”, The American Interest, 15 June 2014.

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How the world is changing skin: the demographic transition