From Resistance to Adaptation: Uyghur Popular Music and Changing Attitudes among Uyghur Youth

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From Resistance to Adaptation: Uyghur Popular Music and Changing Attitudes among Uyghur Youth Author(s): Nimrod Baranovitch Source: The China Journal, No. 58 (Jul., 2007), pp. 59-82Published by: on behalf of the University of Chicago Press College of Asia and the Pacific, The

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FROM RESISTANCE TO ADAPTATION: UYGHUR POPULAR MUSIC AND CHANGING ATTITUDES

AMONG UYGHUR YOUTH

Nimrod Baranovitch*

The rise of ethnic nationalism among the Uyghurs in Xinjiang during the early and mid-1990s and the harsh political and cultural repression that followed in its wake have been studied extensively.1 This repression seemed to have

peaked with the 1996 "Strike Hard" (yanda f^t?) campaign, but the demonstrations that erupted in Ghulja/Yining in early 1997 led to harsher repression, which, according to some sources, became even more intense and

comprehensive after 11 September.2 The repressive measures, however, were

I am grateful to Avital Pollak, Noam Urbach, Michal Zelcer and several Uyghur individuals for their valuable assistance in this research. The research for this article was

supported by THE ISRAEL SCIENCE FOUNDATION (Grant No. 903/03). 1

For information on Uyghur ethnic nationalism, see, for instance, Justin Rudelson, Oasis

Identities: Uyghur Nationalism along China's Silk Road (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Nicolas Becquelin, "Xinjiang in the Nineties", The China Journal, No. 44

(2000), pp. 84-90; Cristina M. Cesaro, "Consuming Identities: Food and Resistance

among the Uyghur in Contemporary Xinjiang", Inner Asia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2000), pp. 225 38; Colin Mackerras, "Xinjiang at the Turn of the Century: The Causes of Separatism", Central Asia Survey, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2001), pp. 289-303; Ildik? Bell?r-Hann, "Temperamental Neighbours: Uighur-Han Relations in Xinjiang, Northwest China", in G?nther Schlee (ed.), Imagined Differences: Hatred and the Construction of Identity (M?nster; Hamburg: LIT Verlag, 2001), pp. 57-81; Gardner Bovingdon, "The Not-So Silent Majority: Uyghur Resistance to Han Rule in Xinjiang", Modern China, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2002), pp. 39-78; Joanne N. Smith, "'Making Culture Matter': Symbolic, Spatial and Social Boundaries between Uyghurs and Han Chinese", Asian Ethnicity, Vol. 3, No. 2

(2002), pp. 153-74. 2

On 5 February 1997, hundreds of Uyghurs started demonstrating through the streets of

Ghulja/Yining to protest against Chinese policies in Xinjiang. Armed police soon intervened and arrested, according to some sources, between 300 and 500 demonstrators.

In the following days the demonstrations developed into riots, and violent clashes ensued between demonstrators and a large number of anti-riot troops who had been brought into the city. In these clashes, protesters reportedly attacked police and Han residents and set fire to some vehicles, while the troops opened fire on protesters and rioters, killing some of them and injuring many others (see sources below for more details). For a general updated

THE CHINA JOURNAL, NO. 58, JULY 2007



60 THE CHINA JOURNAL, No. 58

only one part of the strategy that the Chinese government adopted to stabilize the situation in Xinjiang. Equally important was the launching of the "Great

Development of the West" program (xibu da kaifa B rP^C Jf $t), which has included a major effort to develop the economy of Xinjiang. This program has recently become a major topic for scholars interested in this region.3

Despite an impressive amount of research on each of the above topics, the extent to which the policies implemented in the region have affected Uyghur ethnic nationalism remains unclear. Most scholars seem to agree that the

Ghulja/Yining incident constituted a turning point in the recent history of Xinjiang, after which Uyghur dissent in the region was practically silenced, not only in public but also in private contexts. But how are we to interpret this silence? Has Uyghur ethnic nationalism and resistance to Han rule weakened as a result of the combined pressure of political repression and economic

development that the Chinese regime has exerted during the last decade, or

does the silence mask a festering resentment soon to explode? The difficulty in determining how the policies of the Chinese government

have affected the way Uyghurs think and feel is intimately connected with significant restrictions faced by researchers. As Frederick Starr writes in the

introduction to his edited volume on Xinjiang from 2004: "Strict controls arising from acute political sensitivities make it all but impossible for social scientists to conduct the kinds of field research, interviews, and surveys in

Xinjiang that would be the norm for rigorous study elsewhere".4

overview of the major incidents and trends in Xinjiang since the early 1990s, see Michael

Dillon, Xinjiang: China's Muslim Far Northwest (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp. 62-130; Dru C. Gladney, "Responses to Chinese Rule: Patterns of Cooperation and

Opposition", in Frederick F. Starr (ed.), Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland (London: M. E. Sharpe, 2004), pp. 375-96. For accounts that deal specifically with the repression in Xinjiang, see R?mi Castets, "The Uyghurs in Xinjiang: The Malaise Grows", China

Perspectives, No. 49 (2003), pp. 34-48; Nicolas Becquelin, "Criminalizing Ethnicity: Political Repression in Xinjiang", China Rights Forum, No. 1 (2004), pp. 39-46; Amnesty International, "People's Republic of China: Gross Violations of Human Rights in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region", 1 April, AI Index: ASA 17/018/1999

(1999), online http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasal70181999 (accessed 19 July 2005); Amnesty International, "People's Republic of China: China's Anti-Terrorism

Legislation and Repression in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region", 22 March, AI Index: ASA 17/010/2002 (2002) online http://web.amnesty.org/library/ index/engasal70102002 (accessed 22 May 2005); Human Rights in China (HRIC), "Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang", Human Rights Watch, Vol. 17, No. 2(C) (April 2005).

3 See, for instance, Nicolas Becquelin, "Who Benefits? Regional Disparities and the

Campaign to 'Develop the West'", China Rights Forum, No. 3 (2002), pp. 10-15, 27; Nicolas Becquelin, "Staged Development in Xinjiang", The China Quarterly, No. 178

(2004), pp. 358-78; Colin Mackerras, "Ethnicity in China: The Case of Xinjiang", Harvard Asia Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2004), especially pp. 6-8.

4 See Frederick Starr, "Introduction", in Frederick Starr, Xinjiang, pp. 15-16. One notable

exception to Starr's generalization is the survey conducted by Herbert S. Yee. See Yee's



FROM RESISTANCE TO ADAPTATION 61

This study proposes examining attitudes among the Uyghurs in Xinjiang by looking at Uyghur popular music. Popular music is known to be an excellent lens through which to examine any society, but it has proved especially useful in situations in which people are afraid to speak out freely about sensitive "issues".5 Given that popular music is a complex expressive form, combining sound, lyrics and visual elements (in cassette and CD covers

and MTV clips, as well as performances), it can communicate rich messages, and thus can be used to articulate dissent (or other feelings) in indirect forms.

Moreover, popular music by definition is widely disseminated, so it can also

tell us something about what a relatively large number of people think, feel, like and dislike. This is particularly true in the context of a market economy, in which popular music constitutes a commodity that people can choose to consume or not to consume, thus enabling the researcher to measure the actual

popularity of a certain musician or a certain body of songs. Another important advantage of popular music is its close association with youth. Given that

among the Uyghurs it is this social group that has been most closely associated since the late 1980s with separatist ideology, the examination of

Uyghur popular music enables us to direct our attention to those among whom

resistance is most likely to be found.6 This article focuses on the creative work of two famous Uyghur pop

musicians and their reception by Uyghur university students and urban youth since the mid-1990s. The first is a rocker named Askar (Chinese: Aisika'er j?

?T^/K), who, since the release of his first album in 1996, has been known among Uyghurs for his bold political dissent. The second is a pop musician named Arken (sometimes written Erkin; Chinese: Ai'erken j?/K#), who emerged on the Uyghur pop scene only in recent years, and whose music is

completely non-political and devoid of any sign of ethnic resistance. The article analyzes the content of the music of each of these two musicians, and their relative popularity among Uyghur youth. The assessment of popularity is based on conversations with Uyghur informants, observations in Xinjiang,

"Ethnie Relations in Xinjiang: A Survey of Uyghur-Han Relations in Urumqi", Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 12, No. 36 (2003), pp. 431-52.

5 Popular Uyghur music has been used as a major primary source by several scholars who

are not musicologists or ethnomusicologists. See, for instance, Jay Dautcher, "Reading Out-of-Print: Popular Culture and Protest on China's Western Frontier", in Timothy B.

Weston and Lionel M. Jensen (eds), China Beyond the Headlines (Oxford: Rowman and

Littlefield, 2000), pp. 273-94; Joanne N. Smith, "Barren Chickens, Stray Dogs, Fake Immortals and Thieves: Colonizer and Collaborator in Popular Uyghur Song and the

Quest for National Unity", paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies Annual

Meeting, New York (27-30 March 2003), online http://www.ncl.ac.uk/sacs/POP/papers/ smith.pdf (accessed 29 January 2006); Gardner Bovingdon, "The Not-So-Silent Majority". For the close link between Uyghur youth and political resistance during the 1990s, see Joanne N. Smith, "Four Generations of Uyghurs: The Shift towards Ethno-Political

Ideologies among Xinjiang's Youth", Inner Asia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2000), pp. 195-224; Dru

Gladney, "New Perspectives on the 'New Region' of China: Reconsidering Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region", Inner Asia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2000), p. 120.




sales figures of albums, and a survey that I conducted recently among 150

Uyghur university students. My assessment suggests that resistance among

Uyghur university students and urban youth has been on the decline in recent

years and that, in sharp contrast to the 1990s, many Uyghur students accept a

worldview not too distant from the vision that the Chinese regime is

propagating, reversing the "shift towards ethno-political ideologies among

Xinjiang's youth" that characterized much of the 1990s.7

Though popular music is less easy to censor than film or television, the Chinese government has still made significant efforts to influence it in Xinjiang as elsewhere in China. This influence manifests itself most forcefully in governmental promotion of certain kinds of music and musicians, and restrictions placed on others. Although the days in which the Chinese government monopolized cultural production and dissemination have gone, this article will show that the government still plays a significant role in determining the success of certain musicians and musical styles. The

government's manipulation of popular music constitutes an important part of its general effort to influence the attitudes of Uyghur youth, and this implies that popular music is actually used by the Chinese government as another, "soft" tool to contain Uyghur ethnic nationalism. The changes in Uyghur youth's musical tastes that this article documents suggest that the Chinese

government has been relatively successful in this regard.

Askar and the Defiant Youth of the 1990s Askar was born in 1964 and grew up in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang and its most sinicized and modern city. From childhood he attended a Chinese school, an experience that resulted in his being fluent in Chinese, but much less fluent in his mother tongue, Uyghur, which he can speak but cannot read or write. This background is evident in his music, as most of his lyrics are written and

sung in Chinese. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, rock music was practically unknown among Uyghurs (and even today it enjoys very little popularity in the region), but became increasingly popular among urban youth in major Chinese cities, particularly in Beijing. Thus, in the early 1990s, after

establishing one of Xinjiang's earliest and most famous rock bands, which he

named Grey Wolf (Hui lang MM) after the famous Uyghur nationalistic symbol, Askar left Xinjiang and moved to Beijing, where he has remained ever since.8

Despite his minkaohan background {minkaohan Pc^?X. is a Chinese term

denoting an Uyghur educated in Chinese) and the fact that he moved to

Beijing, Askar's albums have always focused on Xinjiang and Uyghur identity and have been imbued with anti-Han Chinese nationalistic sentiments and

veiled calls for Uyghur independence. The song below, entitled "Play"

7 Joanne N. Smith, "Four Generations of Uyghurs", p. 195.

8 For more details on Askar, and for soundtracks and clips of some of his songs, see his

websites http://www.askar-greywolf.com and http://www.zoommusic.com.hk.




("Wan" 5c), is sung in Uyghur, was first released in a 1999 VCD, and is representative of the large body of songs that the musician has produced in the last decade.9 It contains bold expressions of resistance and resentment, and the

nationalistic messages that characterize many of Askar's songs, especially those that he sings in Uyghur. In this song, Askar calls for unity among

Uyghurs, bemoans Uyghur suffering, criticizes other Uyghurs for expressing dissent only when drunk, and urges them to get rid of the "stinky air ... [that] ruins our beautiful place", "stinky air" being an allegorical reference to the Han Chinese and their culture:

Play (lyrics and music by Askar)

[They] ask you where you come from

[They] ask me where I come from

Kashgar, Ghulja, Hotan All are the same

My friends, my friends

Friends, let's play happily

We quarrel about this neighborhood and that neighborhood... In the end you tell your suffering to yourself...

Don't just yell when you drink

[You] should ask questions when you are sober What are the things left from our ancestors?

[Only] dance and song. Nonetheless, let's sell them...

We sting each other We are bleeding too much...

Where does this stinky air come from? It ruins our beautiful place Let's take a fan And fan this place together...

The call to drive the Han Chinese out of Xinjiang and to achieve some

kind of independent existence is repeated in several of Askar's songs, each time in a different guise. In a song entitled "Daolang" (7J?I-0,10 from the

musician's first album from 1996, Grey WolfI9nhe encourages his Uyghur

Aisika'er/Askar, Huilang-WanIGreywolf -

Play (Wulumuqi: An'ni yinxiang zhizuo

youxian gongsi/ Zhongguo changpian zonggongsi, 1999) (ISRC CN-A01-99-314-00/V.J.). The song is also included in Askar's album from 2001, Blessing (see below).

"Daolang" is the Chinese version of the Uyghur word "Dolan". It is the name of an

Uyghur subgroup, also often indicating, among Han Chinese, a traditional Uyghur dance

rhythm.

I was unable to obtain a copy of Askar's 1996 cassette album. The same album, however, was released in a VCD version several years later. See Aisika'er/Askar, Hui lang/Grey




listeners in Uyghur to "sing about youth and freedom", and "[not to] let darkness take over the world". In the second stanza of this song, Askar asks: "When will the sun rise,/ When will the demons leave?", a question which

many young Uyghur intellectuals interpreted as expressing the hope of the Uyghurs that the Han Chinese, the "demons", would leave Xinjiang. A similar call is also communicated in the song "Grey Wolf, which Askar sings entirely in Chinese. After depicting the oppression and misery experienced by himself and his fellow Uyghurs in Xinjiang, the musician turns directly to the Han Chinese and shouts at them wildly: "Please don't come again to disturb

my peaceful desert". The desire to cut the relationship with the Han Chinese and to gain independence is also expressed in another song from the first album called "Wife" ("Laopo" Ê?), where Askar uses a gender metaphor to

express his wish not to be controlled and subjugated by the Han Chinese. This song is also sung entirely in Chinese: "You make me forget who I am .../ Please don't come to awaken me,/1 have already done your schooling,/ Please don't help me anymore,/1 don't want to become your wife".

In addition to criticism and resentment, Askar's songs are often mixed with a strong sense of grief, victimization and loss. In a song called "Sunrise and Sunset" ("Richu riluo" 0 ttj 0 ?j|), which is sung in Uyghur and appears in his 2005 album, The People Who Embrace the Sun (Yongbao taiyang de ren ?^?&yfcr?l ?J?), Askar laments his people's tragic destiny:12

Sunrise and Sunset

(lyrics and music by Askar)

Oh world, Oh world, Oh world...

(a voice in the background: Oh Allah) Going out in the morning Returning in the evening Who are these guys? The sun rises The sun sets

(voices in the background: Oh, my beloved, your ordeal is too harsh, this world is for us to die) (Askar bursts into wild laughter)...

Oh Allah What should we do? ...

The sense of grief and loss is also communicated in a song called "Save the World" (Chinese: "Liuzhe diqiiT ^fîik?^) from an album entitled Blessing (Chinese: Zhufu |??I; Uyghur: Tilek), which Askar released in

Wolf (Zoom Music International/Guangxi: Jin fenghuang yinxiang chubanshe, 1998) (ISRC CN-F35-98-306 00/V.J6)

12 Aisika'er/Askar, Yongbao taiyang de ren (The People Who Embrace the Sun) (Zhongguo yinyuejia yinxiang chubanshe, 2005)(ISRC CN-A50-05-414-00/AJ6.)




2001.13 The song opens with the following lines in Chinese: "The sun shines everywhere but it doesn't shine in my thatched hut,/1 dream with all my might, trying to get some hope .../1 lost, I lost, I lost my home". Although the title of the song speaks about "the world", it immediately becomes clear that Askar is

actually singing about the loss of a very specific world, his homeland Xinjiang and Uyghur culture. That point is emphasized when, after singing most of the

lyrics in Chinese, he sings the refrain, "we have to save ourselves" in Uyghur. In the MTV clip of this song Askar is seen walking in the old alleys of

Kashgar with a tragic expression, surrounded by figures dressed in black

gowns, whose faces are smeared with white, and who remind one of the demons in Askar's earlier song, "Daolang". These figures, which clearly symbolize death, were also associated by some of my Uyghur interviewees with the Han Chinese who destroy Uyghur culture. The clip celebrates Uyghur traditional culture by featuring typical Uyghur sights, faces and objects, but at the same time it also communicates the tragic feeling that all of these are

about to disappear forever. The challenge embodied in Askar's lyrics and clips is underscored by the

music of the songs and his style of performance. Many of his songs, especially the earlier ones from the mid-1990s, are performed in a typical heavy-metal style, with distorted and loud electric guitars, a powerful bass line and forceful drum beats. Against this background, Askar often shouts the lyrics in a raspy voice and, when performing live, moves about wildly on stage. The effect is

particularly powerful when combined with lyrics in which he expresses anger and defiance. In the song "Grey Wolf, Askar compares himself to a

"frightening", "fierce and violent" grey wolf, whose "angry roars" will cause

his fellow people "not to feel miserable anymore". Towards the end of the

song, Askar even implies a threat, singing: "All the stars in the sky reach the moment when they fall to the ground,/ The silent tears cannot be shed in my heart forever".

In the mid-1990s, Askar became an idol among Uyghur university students and urban youth. According to Askar, Grey Wolf I sold 370,000

copies in Xinjiang alone, 70,000 in legal copies and the rest in pirated versions. This is an impressive figure, as at that time 100,000 legal copies were

considered a respectable showing even by the standards of nationally famous mainstream pop stars. Every Uyghur with whom I spoke who had attended

college or university during the mid-1990s expressed great respect for Askar and was familiar with at least some of the songs in his 1996 album.

By the early 2000s, however, Askar's popularity had suffered a setback. In 2005 he told me that, in sharp contrast to his first album, his 2001 album, Blessing, "didn't sell well" in Xinjiang.14 The same was also true for his 2005

album, The People Who Embrace the Sun, Askar explained that the poor sales

Aisika'er/Askar, Blessing/Zhufu/Tilag (Beijing: Xiyangyang wenhua fazhan youxian gongsi/Hebei yinxiang chubanshe, 2000) (ISRC CN-C12-00-365-00/AJ6.) Askar does not consider his 1999 VCD a real album, and thus never provided me with any information regarding its sales figures.




figures of his last two albums were a result of poor marketing. I believe, however, that this explanation is partial at best, especially if one considers that little marketing was ever done for his first album either.

Askar's popularity among Uyghur youth during the mid-1990s was

closely connected to the general mood of resistance that prevailed at that time in Xinjiang. His more recent decline in popularity derives from the fact that his songs of resistance do not fit the new sensibilities of the Uyghur youth of the early 2000s. In the years before the Ghulja/Yining incident, the public sphere in Xinjiang was saturated with expressions of resistance, which both

reflected and inspired a widespread belief among Uyghurs that they could achieve more autonomy and even independence in the near future.15 Uyghur pop music was an important domain for the celebration of ethnic nationalism.

While many pop songs lamented the poor socio-economic and political condition of the Uyghurs, others voiced angry dissent and veiled calls for national awakening and active resistance to Han Chinese domination.

Nationalist sentiments were also expressed in the music, in a kind of return to

Uyghur tradition which manifested itself in the use of traditional Uyghur instruments and musical style. Through their lyrics and music, these songs constructed a clear cultural boundary between Uyghurs and the growing number of Han Chinese who had migrated to Xinjiang.16

It was during this period that Askar became a star in Xinjiang. Despite his minkaohan background, his residence in Beijing, his extensive use of Chinese

and his highly Westernized rock music, all of which stood in clear contrast to the nationalistic ideals that were celebrated at that time in Xinjiang, he was

nonetheless embraced with warmth and admiration by many Uyghur youth because he gave a powerful voice to their nationalistic sentiments and

aspirations. Indeed, Askar's bold criticism went far beyond most if not all

other Uyghur musicians in Xinjiang. This reflected the fact that he lived in

Beijing, which paradoxically provided him with a greater freedom to speak out because of its distance from Xinjiang.17

The situation in Xinjiang, however, saw a drastic change after the

Ghulja/Yining incident. With a few notable exceptions, after the harsh

repression that followed the event, Uyghur dissent in Xinjiang was practically

15 See, for instance, Gardner Bovingdon, "The Not-So-Silent Majority", p. 39; Joanne N.

Smith, "Four Generations of Uyghurs", pp. 211-12. 16

See Rachel Harris, "Cassettes, Bazaars, and Saving the Nation: The Uyghur Music

Industry in Xinjiang, China", in Timothy J. Craig and Richard King (eds), Global Goes Local: Popular Culture in Asia (Honolulu: Association for Asian Studies and University of Hawaii Press, 2002), pp. 265-83; Joanne N. Smith, "Barren Chickens, Stray Dogs, Fake Immortals and Thieves"; Kurash Sultan and Marie Korpe, "Uighuristan: Politics and

Art", in Marie Korpe (ed.), Shoot the Singer: Music Censorship Today (London: Zed

Books, 2004), pp. 62-64; Jay Dautcher, "Reading Out-of-Print", p. 273; Gardner

Bovingdon, "The Not-So-Silent Majority", p. 54. 17

See Nimrod Baranovitch, "Inverted Exile: Uyghur Writers and Artists in Beijing and the Political Implications of their Works", Modern China, Vol. 33, No. 4 (forthcoming).




silenced, the public sphere became depoliticized and so did the popular music scene. During the early 2000s, a general mood of sad acceptance, hopelessness and helplessness emerged. Young educated Uyghurs with whom I spoke were

still nationalistic and antagonistic towards China, but also seemed terrorized and traumatized, and with each passing year spoke less and less about the

possibility of achieving autonomy or independence, or of driving the Han Chinese out of Xinjiang. A motif that surfaced in many of these conversations was that the Chinese regime was trying to annihilate Uyghur identity and culture and that Uyghurs were endangered and helpless.18 Many of these conversations were devoted to depictions of the suffering of Uyghurs and to

describing how life in Xinjiang had become unbearable for them. It was in part on the basis of these conversations that I proposed that many of the

Uyghurs who moved from Xinjiang to Beijing after the late 1990s were not ordinary internal migrants but in fact exiles forced out of their homeland due to political repression.19

This changing reality in Xinjiang and the general change in mood among Uyghurs influenced the contents of Blessing, the album that Askar released in 2001. Although containing hints of the nationalist sentiments, militant anger, sense of self-empowerment and hope of bringing about change that had dominated Grey Wolf I, Blessing primarily expresses a melancholic mood and a strong sense of powerlessness and disappointment. From this point on, many of Askar's songs have emphasized the loss of his home/land and past. The

feeling of powerlessness reveals itself most forcefully in a song called "Return Home" ("Huijia" 0^), where Askar asks sadly several times in Uyghur and Chinese: "Who will give me power?" and expresses his love for his homeland and his wish to return to Xinjiang. In the song "Blessing" which is sung in both Chinese and Uyghur, Askar turns to Allah for help, asking Allah to "wake the sheep from their deep sleep". While Askar is still pursuing his dream of a Uyghur awakening, he is no longer the powerful wolf of his first album, a savior promising liberation to his people, but rather a helpless individual who himself turns to Allah for help. In a similar vein, the image of the powerful wolf that was used to symbolize Uyghurness in Grey Wolf I is now replaced by the image of passive and powerless sheep.

Most recently, however, the sad acceptance of the late 1990s and early 2000s has been giving way to a practical accommodation, a coming to terms with the reality of a Han-dominated Xinjiang and a desire to make the most of it. This attitude has become increasingly widespread among young educated

Uyghurs, including many who, until the late 1990s, had participated in the celebration of resistance and were full of hope that a radical change in the

political status of Xinjiang was possible. The young Uyghurs with whom I spoke recently told me that there was no point in trying to achieve

18 Nimrod Baranovitch, "From the Margins to the Centre: The Uyghur Challenge in Beijing", The China Quarterly, No. 175 (2003), p. 747.

19 Nimrod Baranovitch, "Inverted Exile".




independence, at least not in the near future, and that it was better to concentrate on improving the ability of the Uyghurs to compete for a better

life, by learning Chinese, acquiring education and getting better jobs and higher incomes. This is what some of them had to say in 2005:

Throughout history, the relationship between Xinjiang and China changed from unification to separation and vice versa like in a game ... I want to

stay away from politics. I'm afraid of politics. Young people today want to live, they want to develop, they want to enjoy life. We need to forget about history. What good did history give us? Only suffering ... We didn't

go anywhere. We need to develop. We need to go forward. We need to

promote education. Only then, when we reach the level of the Chinese, will we be able to negotiate with them. The Uyghurs are still so backward,

they can't even speak up for themselves ...

Today parents send their children to study Chinese. They want their children to succeed in life. They want their children to be able to compete with the Chinese. These children don't necessarily have to stay in

Xinjiang. They can go abroad and stay there. As long as they remain

Uyghurs, it doesn't really matter ... Today there are many young Uyghurs who come to Beijing, speak good English, and get into foreign companies ... The economy is important. I work in trade. I think it will contribute to the future of the Uyghurs ...

Nowadays everyone wants to realize their potential. Young people are sick of politics. We don't want to be victims anymore ...

One could argue that the reason for the new, practical attitude and the lack of rebellious spirit that is evident in these statements is not so much the combined strategy of political repression and economic development that the Chinese regime is putting into practice in Xinjiang but rather the fact that the Uyghurs who made them, now in their late twenties and thirties, have simply become more mature. Such an explanation would have been sufficient if the mood of resistance among the new generation of Uyghur youth was strong, but this is also not the case. Whereas many Uyghurs in their late twenties and thirties have given up the separatist ideology that they celebrated in the 1990s, the new generation of young Uyghurs seems to have very little interest in

politics and anti-Han resistance at all. Askar's decline in popularity during the 2000s and the emergence of new

pop idols mirrors this significant shift in attitude among Uyghur youth. Askar gained popularity among Uyghur university students and urban youth during the mid-1990s because of the highly politicized, defiant nature of his music, ingredients that matched the general mood among these young Uyghurs at that time. In the mid-2000s, however, when resistance declined, Askar, still

perceived as a synonym for defiance and dissent, lost much of his appeal.




The New Pop Idol Arken and the Youth of the 2000s The popularity of Arken, a new Uyghur pop idol who was born in 1978 and is almost 15 years younger than Askar, is a sign of the attitude of the youngest

generation. Like Askar, Arken lives in Beijing, where he moved in the late

1990s, and sings in both Chinese and Uyghur. The two differ, however, in several significant ways. Unlike Askar, Arken grew up near Kashgar, in the

westernmost corner of Xinjiang, which is one of the region's most traditional and least sinicized areas, and he is a minkaomin (fe%l? the Chinese word denoting an Uyghur who attended an Uyghur school). He therefore only started to speak Chinese as an adult.20 His story is representative of many young Uyghurs who have tried to integrate into mainstream Chinese culture

despite the escalating tension in Xinjiang in the last 15 years. In sharp contrast to the highly politicized and critical ethos that dominates

Askar's albums, Arken's songs are totally devoid of any politically sensitive references and any expression of discontent, antagonism or criticism. Instead,

they are usually imbued with a light and joyful mood, and with calls to enjoy life as much as possible and not take anything too seriously. "Boy" ("Balangzai" E?I?fp),21 one of Arken's best-known hits, is a love song in

Chinese, performed in a fast, upbeat, Latin rhythm. In the refrain, Arken

repeats the word "come" in Chinese several times at high speed. The result, "lai ba lai ba lai ba ...", sounds like cheerful vocables and reinforces the

playful atmosphere that the rest of the lyrics and the music create. In the

song's MTV clip Arken is shown playing the classical guitar with his typical amused and sweet smile while three sexy girls dance to the rhythm beside him with their bellies exposed. Like the music, the lyrics, too, convey a sense of

joyfulness:

BoyÛm (lyrics and music by Arken, adapted from a Xinjiang folk ballad)

Girl ah, girl ah, listen to my words

Can you give me your QQ number?

RpF?m??3^ QQ tti^m If you are a big dinosaur, then I am a little frog

No one should dislike anyone, let's be friends, let's be friends, let's be friends

imr^mm$, m^mm, m^m%?&, m^mam My love, come, come, come, come...

*SW, M, *BB, *RB, *PE...

20 For a short discussion of minkaomin and minkaohan, see Justin Rudelson, Oasis Identities,

pp. 127-28. 21

The Chinese title "balangzai" derives from the Uyghur word for boy, "bala".




My love, come, come, come, come...



Tell me, tell me what's in your heart

Don't torture me...

Girl ah, girl ah, come with me

We'll play some music and dance, and then I'll take you back home...

Though not evident from the lyrics above, in many of Arken's songs, clips, and albums there is a proud celebration of Uyghurness. He sings some of his

songs in Uyghur and incorporates musical elements from traditional Uyghur music; his albums are decorated with typical images of Xinjiang (most notably the desert and camels); the covers of his albums and the notes attached to these albums feature Uyghur words in Arabic script; and he and his band

members often wear ethnic clothes to assert their otherness. Moreover, many of his clips are shot in Xinjiang and feature traditional villages, people dressed in traditional clothes, and places that symbolize Uyghur identity. Among the places highlighted are the Idgah mosque in Kashgar, the holiest place in China for Uyghurs, and the tomb of Yusuf Khass Hajib, an Uyghur scholar from the eleventh century, which is also located in Kashgar.

However, the Uyghurness that Arken celebrates is very different from the

Uyghurness that many Uyghur musicians, including Askar, celebrated in the 1990s. Whereas the latter was often not only highly political, but also very closed, exclusive, defensive and retrospective, Arken's version of Uyghurness is not only totally apolitical but also inclusive, outward-oriented and

multicultural. Indeed, parallel to the celebration of Uyghur tradition, Arken

simultaneously celebrates the move beyond Uyghur tradition and the

geographical boundaries of Xinjiang, and urges his young listeners to reach out to the outside world and to modernity.

The desire to reach out to the world is suggested in the title of Arken's first album from the early 2000s, The Daolang Who Got Out from the Desert (Zouchu shamo de Daolang M ??J tJ> ?H ?tf 71 ?R )

22 This title asserts the musician's Uyghurness by mentioning the Daolang and the desert, both of which are symbols of Xinjiang, but also the musician's movement out of

Xinjiang, implying an aspiration to connect to the rest of the world. The attitude reflected in this title contrasts sharply with the retrospective and defensive stance that dominates Askar's songs, many of which suggest a

22 Ai'erken/Arken, Zouchu s hamo de Daolang (The Daolang Who Got Out from the Desert). (Zhongguo changpian zonggongsi, 2004) (ISRC CN-A01-04-334-00/A.J6). This is

probably a pirated version of Arken's first album.




militant nationalism and a forced exile from his homeland, Xinjiang. For

Arken, by contrast, despite occasional expressions of homesickness, Beijing seems to be a desired destination. This essential difference between the two

musicians is revealed most forcefully in the contrast between the title of Arken's first album, The Daolang Who Got Out from the Desert, and the line in Askar's song, "Grey Wolf, in which he tells the Han Chinese not to "disturb [his] peaceful desert".

Similar expressions of the desire to move beyond the boundaries of

Uyghur tradition and Xinjiang are found in more explicit form in Arken's impressive website, which includes both Chinese and English texts but no

Uyghur. The site states in English: "Arken's musical work is not merely a

copy of traditional styles, but breaks free and surpasses its ethnic roots. Using Spanish guitar methods (for flamenco) he has created a new blend of Latin and traditional music, making his work more modern and international".23

Although some of Arken's songs are based on traditional Xinjiang folksongs, and some even celebrate traditional Uyghur music, his music could be best described as a hybrid of musical styles, most notably flamenco but also Latin music, Mediterranean music and jazz, as well as Western pop and rock and even country music. The image of multiculturalism and modernity manifests itself also in the musician's outer appearance. In sharp contrast to the popular male image among Uyghurs today, which tends to celebrate

conservative, traditional features of manhood, and to which many male pop musicians in Xinjiang still adhere, Arken does not have a mustache, and he

sports long hair, the latter of which is still regarded even by some young Uyghurs as anathema. These features not only give Arken a modern and

stylish look but, in the context of the Muslim environment from which he

comes, also imply a secular lifestyle. The image of modernity and multiculturalism also manifests itself in

Arken's style of dress. While he sometimes appears in a traditional-style ethnic shirt, at other times he appears in Michael Jackson-like outfits or dressed as an American cowboy, or in the kind of casual but fashionable clothes that youth in modern cities all over the world wear. Indeed, Arken's assertion of modernity cannot be separated from his engagement with style and consumption. In the song "Boy", note, for example, the reference to the

QQ messenger, a telecommunications technology similar to MSN that requires either access to the Internet or a mobile phone. Similarly, in the clip of a song, in Uyghur, called "Farm" (Uyghur: Sehra; Chinese: "Nongzhuang" ^J?),

Arken is seen walking in the streets of a big city in front of a billboard with the Nike symbol on it, clearly representative of modernity and a global outlook. All of these images seem to cater to the new sensibilities of many Uyghur youth, who are, as I noted earlier, much more concerned with fashion, life style, consumption and with being modern and global than with the independence or autonomy of Xinjiang or any other political issues.

23 See www.arkenmusic.com.




However, the most significant aspect of Arken's vision of multiculturalism and modernity is that his vision also includes Han China. Consider, for

example, the song "Where Is My Girl?" (Chinese: "Wo de guniang zai nali?"

AOtlt?$l??pIPM?). Based on a Xinjiang folksong, it is sung in Chinese, and performed in the same light mood found in "Boy":

Where Is My Girl? $c WMM?M? (lyrics by Arken; music adapted from a Xinjiang folksong and

arranged by Arken)

One two three four five six seven eight

Seven six five four three two one

Eight girls went back and forth

Where is my girl?... mmm&mm?... Elder sister is fine ah, younger sister is fine ah

Whoever is beautiful is fine

Beijing is fine ah, Xinjiang is fine ah

Wherever you are is fine...

In this playful song, Arken once again celebrates romance and further

suggests that romance, not place, is what really matters; as long as there is

romance, it is not so important where one is. In placing his romance above his

ties to his homeland, Arken poses an implicit challenge to the collectivism nationalistic discourse that was so prevalent in the Uyghur pop scene during the 1990s, a discourse which often placed Xinjiang and Uyghur culture and

identity above anything else. Moreover, by mentioning China's capital,

Beijing, and juxtaposing it with Xinjiang, Arken also challenges the tendency prevalent during much of the 1990s to construct an imagined Xinjiang that was separate and independent from China and excluded anything Chinese.

Another significant challenge to the popular nationalistic discourse of the

1990s is Arken's declaration that Beijing is a good place, a place as good as

Xinjiang, as long as his lover is there.24

24 In his personal life Arken actually goes beyond the explicit cosmopolitan statements that he communicates in this song and elsewhere. He not only lives in Beijing and sings many songs in Chinese, but also has a non-Uyghur girlfriend, a sensitive relationship in a society that does not approve of marriages with non-Uyghurs, especially Han. For a brief

discussion of the hostility with which Uyghurs perceive inter-ethnic marriages, especially with Han Chinese, see Nimrod Baranovitch, "From the Margins to the Centre", p. 742.




In many other songs, Arken also both connects Xinjiang to the rest of China and represents the latter in a positive light. In several of his video clips, in which he takes the viewer-listener on virtual tours outside Xinjiang to

China proper, Arken often moves back and forth between a traditional Uyghur

village and a big, modern Chinese city. These clips highlight contrast, but they lack the tension and conflict that dominate Askar's songs, and instead create a

bridge between the two worlds. In these clips not only is Han China not

threatening, but it actually represents the dream of desired modernity and

cosmopolitanism. In the clip of his song "Farm", Arken is seen walking in Beijing (and for a

few brief moments in other modern cities outside China) with two elderly Uyghur men dressed in traditional Uyghur clothes who look like total strangers. Despite the feeling of homesickness that the lyrics convey, the

music is joyful and the clip is amusing, showing the men smiling as they walk and watch the technological miracles of modernity. In the clip of the song "The Other Shore" ("Bi'an" ?j?t ^), Arken moves back and forth between the old alleys of a traditional Uyghur town and Shanghai. Although this song too conveys a sense of homesickness, Arken urges his young listeners to follow in

his footsteps and stride into the modern world. This message is suggested rather forcefully in one part of the clip, where a group of Uyghur school students are seen touring Shanghai in a bus, happy and amazed by the sights of (Chinese) modernity.

Arken's life and creative work are full of pragmatic accommodations to a

Han-dominated cultural market. Accommodation is evident in the fact that the musician lives in Beijing and sings most of his songs in Chinese. The fact that in many of his songs he depicts Xinjiang as part of China proper and

represents the latter in a positive light could also be seen as a form of accommodation necessary for achieving success in the Han-dominated media and market. Another accommodation is evident in the young musician's outer

appearance, particularly the fact that he does not have a mustache, which can be taken as both sign of a secular lifestyle and a form of Beijing-inspired political correctness. When the Kashgar-based musician Abdurehim Heyt was

photographed with his beard for the cover of one of his albums, he was

reportedly forced by the leaders of his work-unit to shave the beard because it was too religious-looking.25 Though a mustache is tolerated and unlike a beard does not necessarily imply religiosity in Xinjiang, the fact remains that many

Uyghur officials today prefer to be completely clean-shaven to distance themselves as much as possible from religion.

In addition, and no less importantly, in some of his pictures and clips Arken not only looks secular and modern but also delicate and even feminine,

See also Ildik? Bell?r-Hann, "Temperamental Neighbours", p. 75-77; and Herbert S. Yee, "Ethnic Relations in Xinjiang", p. 437.

25 See Matthew Forney, "Man of Constant Sorrow: One Uighur Makes Music for the

Masses", Timeasia.com, 25 March 2002. Online http:www.time.com/time/asia/features/

xinjiang/culture. html (accessed 7 June 2006).




in what seems to be an accommodation to the soft masculinity that dominates mainstream Chinese culture.26 No other Uyghur musician has ever enjoyed the

popularity that Arken enjoys today among Han Chinese, and there is little doubt that this popularity is aided by his singing in Chinese, the apolitical content of his songs, and his delicate, not to say cute, image. This image suits

mainstream Han aesthetics, as it provides a slightly exotic and non-threatening Uyghurness. Arken's soft and feminine image is almost the opposite of the

masculine, wild and rebellious Askar. Askar has unkempt long hair, but more

importantly, he also has a mustache and a beard, both of which are rare among Han Chinese men, especially among pop stars, and, as suggested earlier, carry

disturbing connotations of religious extremism and political rebellion when

sported by Uyghurs.

The Musical Preferences of Uyghur University Students: A Quantitative Analysis In the spring of 2006, I conducted a survey among 150 Uyghur university students to examine their musical preferences. The survey was conducted in four colleges and universities in China, one of which was in Xinjiang (50 respondents) and three outside Xinjiang (100 respondents in total). With a few exceptions, the results obtained from the four places showed a very high

degree of correlation. In the first part of the questionnaire the students were

presented with the names of eight famous Uyghur pop singers and were asked to indicate how much they liked each one of them on a six-point scale that

ranged from "[I] don't know [the singer]" to "[I] like [the singer] very much". These levels were then converted into a numerical scale ranging from 0 to 5.

This part of the survey did not aim to be comprehensive, but focused on the best-known names in the Uyghur popular music scene.

In the second part of the questionnaire, respondents were asked to indicate

why they liked the singers they liked the most and why they disliked the singers they disliked the most. The reasons included in this part of the questionnaire were: "beautiful/handsome", "not beautiful/not handsome", "fashionable and modern", "traditional", "sounds good", "doesn't sound

good", "has ethnic flavor", "doesn't have ethnic flavor", "patriotic", "too

political", "the pride of Uyghurs", "makes Uyghurs look ugly", "the lyrics have depth and are truthful" and "the lyrics are superficial". Respondents could have also entered "other reasons".

While 40 out of the total 150 respondents provided their answers in an

impressionistic style, not following the format of the questionnaire, 110 filled out the questionnaires systematically, indicating their sex and grading each of

the eight singers included in the survey. In addition, 60 out of the 150 respondents also indicated their exact age, whether they came originally from

26 For more details on the manifestations of this kind of soft masculinity in the realm of

popular Chinese music, see Nimrod Baranovitch, China's New Voices: Popular Music,

Ethnicity, Gender, and Politics, 1978-1997 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), pp. 132-44.




a city or a village in Xinjiang, whether they were minkaomin or minkaohan, and which part of Xinjiang they came from. These respondents also indicated all the reasons why they liked and disliked certain singers. Out of these 110 respondents who filled out the questionnaire systematically, 63 (57 per cent)

were female and 47 (43 per cent) were male. The ages of the 60 respondents who provided more personal details ranged from 19 to 25, with the ages of 48 of them ranging between 19 and 22. Forty-one of these 60 came from cities in

Xinjiang while 19 came from villages; and 50 of these 60 were minkaomin, while 10 were minkaohan.21

The survey confirmed that Arken was indeed very popular among Uyghur university students, that he was more popular than Askar, and that the new

generation of Uyghur university students preferred non-politicized singers. The three singers who scored the highest on the survey were those who were the least politicized. On the scale of 0 to 5 in the questionnaire, Arken scored 3.61 while Askar scored only 3.06. Arken scored just 0.06 points below the famous older singer, Omerjan Alim, who scored 3.67 points. Omerjan Alim was one of the most politicized musicians during the mid-1990s, but since the late 1990s and early 2000s his songs have become noticeably apolitical and have consistently avoided any sensitive issues.28 With the marginal gap between them, Omerjan Alim and Arken emerged as the second and third most popular singers, respectively, after Abdulla Abdurehim, the

unquestionable superstar of the Uyghur pop scene, who scored the highest mark of 4.53 points. Although, like many other Uyghur singers, Abdullah Abdurehim did participate for a while in the popular celebration of Uyghur resistance during the mid-1990s, since then his songs also have avoided

political issues, and with the exception of Arken, he is probably the least

politicized among the singers included in the survey.29 That Abdullah Abdurehim and Omerjan Alim emerged as the first and second most popular musicians among Uyghur students is important not only because the music of both is apolitical, but also, and no less importantly, because both were famous in Xinjiang even before Askar, and are about his age. This fact suggests that the decline in Askar's popularity should not be attributed to his age, but rather to the nature of his music.

Interestingly, Askar ranked even lower than the famous "state-singer" Bahargul (Baha'erguli EBn^Kl??BB), who scored 3.17 and who specializes in singing politically-correct songs in official venues and often performs her

songs dressed in army uniforms. Other singers whose names were included in the questionnaire were Abdurehim Heyt, who is still known for his songs of

27 Ten of these 60 respondents came from Turpan, 9 from Aksu, 8 from Hi, 7 from Kashgar, 5 from Urumqi, 5 from Korla, 4 from Hami, 3 from Hotan and 3 from Karamay, and the

remaining 6 came from other places in Xinjiang, each from a different place. 28

See Joanne N. Smith, "Barren Chickens, Stray Dogs, Fake Immortals and Thieves", p. 12; Nimrod Baranovitch, "Inverted Exile".

29 For more details on Abdullah, see Rachel Harris, "Cassettes, Bazaars, and Saving the

Nation", pp. 275-77.




resistance and who scored only 2.58 points,30 and Kerim Abdugul (Kelimu j? S^ ), the least-known and least-liked singer among those polled, who scored

only 1.82 points. Thirty-seven per cent of the respondents did not know Kerim, and almost 11 per cent of those who knew of him chose him as their most disliked singer. Kerim belongs to the older generation of "state-singers" of

minority origin, having been a member of the Song and Dance Troupe of the General Political Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army for many years.31

As for the factors that determine the likes and dislikes of Uyghur university students, the survey demonstrates that non-political or ideological factors appear most frequently as the reason that these young Uyghurs like or

dislike a certain musician. While the sound is the most frequent reason that

Uyghur university students like a certain singer, the second most frequent reason is lyrics. Also, though not the most important factor in determining the

musical taste of educated Uyghur youth, ethnicity proves very important.32 In

addition, almost half of the 60 respondents who answered the questionnaire in the most detailed fashion considered "fashionable and modern" to be an

important criterion for good music. That many young Uyghurs in the early 2000s preferred to listen to Arken's

romantic, depoliticized and highly commercialized music rather than to the rebellious and idealist "Grey Wolf was also evident when I visited Xinjiang in the summer of 2004. Although Askar's CDs with their bold expressions of resistance were on sale in some music shops in Xinjiang, they were

conspicuously absent from many other shops, particularly smaller ones. By

30 For more information on Abdurehim Heyt, see Neil Strauss, "In a Far-Flung Corner of

China, A Folk Star", The New York Times (7 February 1999), p. 30. 31

For more information on Kerim, see Nimrod Baranovitch, "From the Margins to the

Centre", pp. 733, 736. The eighth singer in the survey was Kurash Kusan, but since many

respondents confused him with another singer, I disregarded the results that pertained to him. Kusan became one of the most famous musicians in Xinjiang during the late 1980s and 1990s because of his highly politicized songs. One of his best-known songs from that

period is "Do Not Sell Your Land", in which he called upon his fellow Uyghur people not to sell their land to the Han Chinese. After he was persecuted by the authorities, Kusan fled China in 1996 and eventually settled in Sweden, where he died in October 2006 from a heart attack. For more information on Kurash Kusan, see Kurash Sultan and Marie

Korpe, "Uighuristan"; Rachel Harris, "Cassettes, Bazaars, and Saving the Nation", pp.

265-66; Erling Hoh, "Sultan's Song: A Long Way from His Homeland, the Singer Sultan Kurash is a Potent Voice for the Plight of the Uyghur People", Far Eastern Economic Review (30 September 2004), p. 69; Radio Free Asia (RFA), "Top Uyghur Musician Kurash Kosan Dies at 47", online http://www.rfa.org/english/news/2006/ll/04/ uyghursinger/ (accessed 16 February 2007).

32 The treatment of Askar in this survey provides a vivid example of the importance of

ethnicity. While two respondents (one female and one male) indicated that he was their favorite singer because his music "has ethnic flavor", two other respondents (one female

and one male) indicated that he was the singer that they disliked the most because his music "doesn't have ethnic flavor".




contrast, Arken's CDs, particularly his newly released first VCD, were sold

practically everywhere, despite the fact that, like Askar's CDs, the songs included in his CDs were also mainly in Chinese.

Another indication of the new musical preferences of Uyghur youth was

provided to me in September 2004 when I arrived in Turpan just a few days after Arken and Askar had given solo concerts night after night in the city square as part of the "Grape Festival" held annually in the city. According to several informants with whom I discussed the two concerts, Arken's audience

was "much larger" than that of Askar. These details are significant because

they suggest that the trend that I describe here is not limited only to Uyghur university students, among whom my survey was conducted, but also extends to the larger population of Uyghur urban youth, who are the main consumers of Uyghur pop culture.

The Influence of the State The shift in the musical preferences of Uyghur youth which I describe above reflects a general change in attitude that derives from broad changes in the

political reality in Xinjiang. It should be emphasized, however, that this shift in musical taste and general attitude was also influenced by the "soft" and not so-soft techniques of cultural manipulation used by the Chinese government. The nationalistic messages contained in many Uyghur pop songs during the

early and mid-1990s no doubt contributed to the strengthening of resistance

among Uyghurs by inspiring and spreading contentious ideologies among a

large number of them. However, since the mid-1990s, and in some instances even earlier, authorities in Xinjiang started to put great pressure on the local music industry to suppress and silence expressions of dissent in Uyghur popular music. The most common form of pressure was to tighten official control over the production of popular music and to censor song lyrics.

Moreover, politically problematic songs were not only banned from the media but their distribution in the cassette market was also prohibited. Musicians who were considered subversive were also prevented from giving live

performances. Some musicians were fired from their work units, and in a few cases musicians were even imprisoned.33 By silencing the contentious voices that dominated the Uyghur pop music scene in the 1990s, the government has been able to neutralize one of the forces that inspired and disseminated dissent

among large portions of society. As a result of this policy, Askar was

prevented for years from giving live concerts in Xinjiang, appeared only rarely on local television, and had some of his songs banned.34 Arguably, these restrictions have reduced his popularity and the influence of his music.

The effort to placate Uyghur dissent on the cultural front, however, did not

rely solely on repressive methods. The state has also rewarded musicians who

33 See Rachel Harris, "Cassettes, Bazaars, and Saving the Nation", pp. 265-66, 277, 279; Kurash Sultan and Marie Korpe, "Uighuristan"; Joanne N. Smith, "Barren Chickens, Stray Dogs, Fake Immortals and Thieves", pp. 11-12; Nimrod Baranovitch, "Inverted Exile".

For more details see Nimrod Baranovitch, "Inverted Exile".




conform to the official line and promote politically-correct messages. Musicians who did not challenge the regime and expressed "healthy" ideas

enjoyed increased exposure in the local and even national media, as well as more opportunities to give live concerts in large venues. These privileges are

important because in the context of China's market economy they translate not

only into fame but also into hard cash. This is the kind of treatment that Arken has received since the early 2000s, and there is little doubt that his meteoric rise in popularity is linked in part to the friendly treatment that he has received from the authorities. In sharp contrast to Askar, during the early 2000s Arken has been able to give frequent concerts in Xinjiang, including in places and venues that are regarded as politically sensitive, such as the city of Kashgar and university campuses in Urumqi. Likewise, the media in Xinjiang and outside the region have been noticeably more friendly with and supportive of Arken than it was with Askar, broadcasting his songs much more often than the latter's and inviting him to participate in important televised events.

Conclusions and Implications This article proposes that ethnic resistance among Uyghur university students and urban youth has been on the decline in recent years. Although it is still difficult to determine if and to what extent these young Uyghurs represent Uyghur society at large, the trend is significant in itself, considering that in the 1990s university students and urban youth were the most enthusiastic

supporters of Uyghur separatism. It should be emphasized that opposition to

Chinese rule and to Han dominance in Xinjiang is by no means dead.35

However, based on an analysis of Uyghur popular songs and their reception since the mid-1990s, I suggest that the strong political resistance of the former decade has been gradually replaced, first by a forced acquiescence in the

existing political order and then by an ideological re-orientation and pragmatic adaptation to that order. To be sure, most Uyghurs still resent the Chinese

government and the Han Chinese, particularly the Han who migrated to

Xinjiang in recent years. But in contrast to the 1990s, few believe that Uyghur independence and driving the Han Chinese settlers out of Xinjiang is a viable

option. Indeed, many Uyghur students and urban youth seem to concentrate

increasingly on how to improve their position within the system rather than on

how to challenge it. Likewise, the degree of anger and discontent among these

youth seems to be much lower than among those of the 1990s, who

themselves have become more moderate in recent years. Another major argument of this article is that Uyghur ethnic identity is still very important to young Uyghurs, but it is expressed today in both more folkloristic and more

cosmopolitan forms, as opposed to the highly politicized, antagonistic and exclusive expressions of Uyghurness that dominated much of the 1990s.

Askar's artistic creativity suggests that Uyghur dissent in China is not dead and that the voicing of Uyghur dissent is not totally impossible, even in

35 For recent expressions of Uyghur opposition in China in the domain of literature and art, see Nimrod Baranovitch, "Inverted Exile".




Xinjiang. Though Askar's ability to create songs of dissent is related to the relative freedom that he enjoys in Beijing, he has nonetheless been able to give occasional live concerts in Xinjiang and, most importantly, his albums have always been available for sale in music shops in the region. But Askar's fall in popularity among today's Uyghur youth suggests a contraction of social dissent and a reduction of interest in Uyghur nationalism. These youth can

listen to Askar's stirring songs of resistance if they wish, but they prefer to listen to the sweet, apolitical songs of Arken.

That the popularity of apolitical singers has grown at the expense of Askar's music suggests that dissent has not just been silenced on the surface, but at a much deeper level, a process that I would call "deep silencing". Indeed, this article proposes that the authorities have been able not just to silence most Uyghur oppositional voices but also to re-shape the sentiments and attitudes of many young Uyghurs.

The government's message is that nationalistic fantasies about

independence are hopeless and wrong, both practically and morally, and that instead Uyghurs should strive for stability and unity (with the Han Chinese), cooperate with the regime, and concentrate on the key issues of economic

development and prosperity, the paradise that will make everyone, including the Uyghurs, happy. The fact that during this very same period a massive effort to develop Xinjiang economically got under way helped the government to convey its message in a very concrete way. Rather than just pushing the

Uyghurs into the corner, the regime offers them an economic "exit".36 Scholars debate whether or not the campaign to develop the West has

really benefited the Uyghurs and whether or not the raising of living standards among the Uyghurs, if and when it comes, will necessarily diminish ethno nationalistic aspirations. I would suggest, however, that the rhetoric of the

campaign, the visibility of the development drive, and the massive state

encouraged migration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang have their own power and themselves exert a powerful influence on the minds of many Uyghurs. Even

without considering to what extent the Uyghurs have benefited so far from the

campaign, I would argue that these elements have already convinced many Uyghurs that the integration of Xinjiang into China and the presence of Han Chinese in Xinjiang are irreversible, and that it is better to come to terms with these realities than resist them.

The official messages regarding the future of Xinjiang are conveyed in various forms. Executions of hundreds of "separatists" and the imprisonment of thousands of others, restrictions on various cultural and religious activities, and powerful propaganda accompanied by a visible construction boom are some of the more direct forms through which the government delivers its

message and works to change the attitudes of the Uyghurs. However, as this article shows, there are also much more subtle techniques to influence these attitudes which are no less effective. Preventing Askar from giving frequent

36 I am using here the terminology of Albert O. Hirschman from his Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).




live concerts in Xinjiang and restricting his access to the local media is one

part of the technique. Promoting singers like Arken is another. Arken not only sings songs that trivialize politics and resistance,

communicate contentment, raise morale and subtly promote integration and

modernization, but he further serves as a living role model, who exemplifies with his own story that participating in the system and cooperating with official ideology is kindly rewarded. Being born in Kashgar and attending an Uyghur school in his childhood, then moving to Beijing and studying Chinese, and as a result becoming a star on a national level, Arken offers living proof that Uyghurs can make it in China if they just adopt the right attitude and

make efforts to accommodate. With his life story, Arken also demonstrates that Uyghurs do not have to sell their soul to the Chinese regime or to become collaborators in order to do well. After all, Arken is an independent musician

who sings apolitical songs, not a state-employed singer who sings the kind of

very unpopular songs that praise the Communist Party or the "Unity of the Nationalities".

That Arken also asserts a form of Uyghurness with pride proves that

Uyghurness is not endangered and that Uyghurs do not have to give up their ethnic identity to attain a better life. Unlike the anti-Han Chinese nationalistic

expressions of Uyghurness that dominated the Uyghur pop scene in the 1990s, Arken offers a vision in which Uyghurness and Chineseness can coexist and

integrate without conflict and without the former being assimilated. Arken also proves that Uyghurs can assert their Uyghurness even in the very heart of

China, and achieve recognition and respect. If, by promoting Arken, officials

hoped to promote this kind of vision among the Uyghur youth, then Arken's popularity among young Uyghurs in recent years indicates that officialdom is

winning the battle, at least for the time being. Despite important differences, the last decade in Xinjiang is reminiscent of

the previous decade in the rest of China, in that in both cases the Chinese state has been able to contain a serious political challenge by employing a strategy that combines harsh political repression with material treats and "soft"

techniques of cultural manipulation. Like the 1997 demonstrations in

Ghulja/Yining, the Tiananmen demonstrations of 1989 represented a peak in

popular discontent, self-empowerment and the hope of bringing about a

radical political change. In both cases the demonstrations were crushed by brutal force, and in both cases the event was followed by a period of harsh cultural and political repression that led to the de-politicization of the public sphere. Subsequently, however, again in both cases, the stick was

accompanied by a carrot in the form of a massive effort to accelerate economic development and raise living standards. The intensification of economic reforms following Deng Xiaoping's "Southern Tour" (Nanxun \%?M) of 1992 was in part the long-term response to the tension that erupted in 1989. In the years that followed, people's attention, energy and aspirations were

diverted from the realm of politics and ideology to the realm of economics and




consumerism, and the state was able to convince society that economic

development was the most important issue.37 The rest of the 1990s proved that the strategy worked. Deng's initiative

not only restored stability and re-consolidated the legitimacy of the

Communist Party but also led to an economic boom, which, of course,

encouraged stability and helped to legitimize the Party. In launching the "Great Development of the West" campaign in 2000, the state repeated the same strategy, this time in China's hinterland, and particularly in minority areas. Like the acceleration of economic development in China proper in the

early 1990s, the "Great Development of the West" campaign set out to bring stability to western China and to reduce the tensions that had accumulated there since the beginning of reforms, especially since the late 1980s.

The parallel between the Xinjiang case and the case of China proper also

applies to the realm of popular music. Like the political situation in Xinjiang and its relationship to Uyghur popular music, the political tension in China

proper during the late 1980s and early 1990s was both reflected in and shaped by popular songs, and in both cases the government manipulated popular music as part of its effort to contain the political challenge. In the late 1980s, Chinese popular music became increasingly politicized and was imbued with collective messages of dissent, anger, a sense of self-empowerment and the idealistic hope of changing things. Rock music in particular, which started to

emerge in China around that time, played an important role in inspiring student protest both before and during the Tiananmen demonstrations. The

songs remained politicized for a few years after the June 4th crackdown,

though the previous expressions of hope and self-empowerment were now

replaced by expressions of disappointment, disillusionment and a strong sense

of helplessness. However, as the 1990s progressed, popular music became

depoliticized, rock music declined, and highly commercialized soft love songs from Hong Kong and Taiwan started to dominate. This change not only reflected the fact that radical consumerism had taken over from ideology and

political resistance but also helped to bring about this shift by re-shaping people's minds. While allowing, if not encouraging, the saturation of the local music market with apolitical, docile, commercialized pop from Hong Kong and Taiwan, the authorities simultaneously suppressed the kind of music that it considered subversive, particularly rock music. If until the early 1990s rock

music, the main carrier of youth dissent, was banned from television and other official media, beginning around 1993, harsh restrictions were also placed on

37 For a discussion of the relationship between Deng's "Southern Tour" and the 1989 movement, see, for example, Zheng Yongnian, "Ideological Decline, the Rise of an

Interest-based Social Order, and the Demise of Communism in China", in John Wong and

Zheng Yongnian (eds), The Nanxun Legacy and China's Development in the Post-Deng Era (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2001), especially pp. 180-82. Zheng refers here to Hirschman's theory, and reminds us that the economic "exit" is also "a strategy to

transform people's 'public action' (demands for political reforms) to 'private interest'

(economic activities)" (p. 181).




rock performances, especially in Beijing, the stronghold of Chinese rock and also the site of the eruption of the pro-democracy movement of 1989.38

In 2004, Dru Gladney wrote: "The relative quiet of the most recent two or three years [in Xinjiang] does not indicate that the ongoing problems of the region have been resolved or that opposition has dissolved ... Economic stimuli through the Develop the Great Northwest campaign and continued affirmative action for minorities have done little to resolve these ongoing tensions".39 To support his argument, Gladney cites a recent intelligence report

which concludes that "[a]ll the indications are that China faces a major increase in Uyghur militancy".40

My analysis does not support Gladney's contention, at least not where

Uyghur university students and urban youth are concerned. On the contrary, it

suggests that the strong resistance of the former decade has been gradually replaced by pragmatic adaptation to the existing political and economic order. It also implies that the regime of combining harsh political repression with economic incentives, propaganda and "soft" techniques of cultural

manipulation is working, at least for the time being. China has already proved that this combination can be quite effective in neutralizing, or at least in

postponing, the struggle and even the aspiration for democracy. Although it is too early to say that this strategy has also proved useful in neutralizing ethnic and religious nationalism in Xinjiang, there are some important signs that

point in that direction.

38 For more details on the link between popular music and the politics of the late 1980s and

early 1990s in China, see Nimrod Baranovitch, China's New Voices, pp. 10-48. 39

Dru Gladney, "Responses to Chinese Rule", pp. 393, 395-96. 40

Ibid., p. 396.



Documents

From Resistance to Adaptation: Uyghur Popular Music and Changing Attitudes among Uyghur Youth