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Framing Dynamics and Political Gridlock: TheCurious Case of Hydraulic Fracturing in New York

Jennifer Dodge & Jeongyoon Lee

To cite this article: Jennifer Dodge & Jeongyoon Lee (2015): Framing Dynamics and PoliticalGridlock: The Curious Case of Hydraulic Fracturing in New York, Journal of Environmental Policy& Planning, DOI: 10.1080/1523908X.2015.1116378

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1523908X.2015.1116378

Published online: 07 Dec 2015.

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Framing Dynamics and Political Gridlock: The Curious Case

of Hydraulic Fracturing in New York

JENNIFER DODGE & JEONGYOON LEE

Rockefeller College, University at Albany - SUNY, Albany, NY, USA

ABSTRACT ‘Fracking’ was on New York’s agenda since 2008, yet no decision was madeabout it until late 2014. The gridlock is an intriguing puzzle given that the Marcellusshale is considered a ‘world class’ energy supply, and development has been aggressivein other US states. While policy scholars typically conceptualize gridlock as policy stab-ility, this paper examines it as a dynamic process by which competing discoursecoalitions engage in interactive framing processes that (re)structure the discussion. Thissuggests that the interaction between contending coalitions influences gridlock. Yet, welack knowledge about interactive framing between competing coalitions during policy con-troversies. Our main finding is that a central mechanism of gridlock is the production ofconflict through interactive framing dynamics that deny a shared discursive space capableof ushering in a consensus, or reasoned agreement. In New York, this contest evolved froma policy consensus about the economic benefits of fracking to policy negotiation thatincorporated environmental threats, and to prolonged policy controversy in which com-peting discourse coalitions contested notions of fracking in relation to energy production,environmental protection, public health, economic development, and governance. While aban has been instituted, the failure to bridge discourse coalitions suggests that controversywill persist unless meaning disputes are resolved.

KEY WORDS: Hydraulic fracturing, fracking, interpretive policy analysis, framing,discourse coalition, environmental policy

Introduction

Fracking was on the agenda in New York since mid-2008, and as of November2014, no decision had been made about whether or not to allow it and underwhat conditions. Why did fracking become so controversial when other states—including Texas, Wyoming, and Pennsylvania—had been using it since the early2000s without much initial controversy? What explains the long-standing policygridlock? This is an intriguing puzzle because the Marcellus Shale is considereda ‘world class’ energy supply (e.g. Anadarko, 2013) comparable to the Barnett

Correspondence Address: Jennifer Dodge, Rockefeller College, University at Albany - SUNY,Milne Hall, 3rd Floor, 135 Western Avenue, Albany, NY 12222, USA. Email: jdodge@albany.edu

Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning, 2015

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1523908X.2015.1116378

# 2015 Taylor & Francis

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Shale in Texas, which the New York Times described as an ‘industry sensation’(Krauss, 2008). It also arrived on the agenda during the economic crisis wheneconomic arguments in favour of development should have had broad appeal.

Typically, policy scholars conceptualize gridlock as policy stability or themaintenance of the status quo (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Klyza & Sousa,2013). But the controversy over fracking suggests something more complex. Notonly are competing groups petitioning governments to change policy, but theyare also engaging each other in interactive framing dynamics to make sense offracking. This suggests that the dynamic interaction between contending publicsalso influences gridlock. Yet, we lack knowledge about the strategies citizens, citi-zens’ organizations, businesses, and governments use to respond to each otherduring policy controversies, and how this shapes gridlock. This paper adds toour understanding by asking: How do contending discourse coalitions competeto frame the discussion over fracking in New York? Do their framing practicescontribute to policy gridlock? If so, how? And how do framing dynamics movepolicy discussions between consensus, negotiation, and gridlock?

We introduce a novel approach that conceptualizes gridlock as a process bywhich interactive framing dynamics (re)structure the discussion, to produce con-flict and deny the development of a shared discursive space capable of buildingconsensus or reasoned agreement.

Framing Contests and Policy Gridlock

Definitions of gridlock in the policy literature typically follow Baumgartner andJones’ (2009) punctured equilibrium framework, which emphasizes how insti-tutional inertia, competition for policy-makers’ attention, and jurisdictional com-petition and complexity stall inclusion of an item on the agenda. Gridlock is thestatic quality of legislation. It results when policy-makers disallow new policyitems on the agenda because ‘decision costs’ associated with changing insti-tutional routines, processing new information, and giving attention to newissues are too high (Jones & Baumgartner, 2012). This suggests that once anissue is on the agenda, policy-makers should address it expeditiously becausecosts of indecision are also high: policy-makers must continually process newinformation and address the public. But as fracking in New York demonstrates,gridlock after the agenda has been set can also be enduring and dynamic (seealso Kriesi & Jegen, 2001).

This accepted view of gridlock also tends to be government centric. It typi-cally examines how diverse interests seek to influence government policy-makers and how policy-makers shift attention (or not) to puncture the statusquo (Workman, Jones, & Jochim, 2009).1 Yet the dynamic interaction between con-tending coalitions over time also shapes policy agendas and decisions, and thusgridlock.

One way of conceptualizing this dynamic interaction is to focus on framingconflicts. Given that disagreements over meaning are often at the heart of policycontroversies (Fischer, 2003), competing coalitions fiercely compete to frameissues to structure the conversation in favourable terms (Hajer & Versteeg,2005). By repeating shared frames, adherents integrate facts, theories, and norma-tive orientations into an argumentative structure that provides an orientationto the issue (Fischer, 2003; Rein & Schon, 1996). Their ability to establish meaningsreflects a form of power: to constitute understandings of policy and policy-making

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processes (Feindt & Oels, 2005), or to ‘create the world in a certain fashion’(Fischer, 2003) and bring about desired effects such as favourable policydecisions.2

From this perspective, we conceptualize gridlock as a process through whichcompeting ‘discourse coalitions’ (Hajer, 1995) engage in interactive framingdynamics to (re)structure a policy conversation. A discourse coalition is a loosenetwork of actors who develop a shared way of interpreting a policy issue(Cotton, Rattle, & Van Alstine, 2014; Hajer, 2005). Adherents support, perpetuate,and reinvent an interpretation of the situation over time, making sense of it basedon a particular perspective and the ongoing flow of events (Fischer, 2003) in com-petition with other discourse coalitions (Bulkeley, 2000; Mander, 2008). Theydeploy storylines to highlight some issues and downplay others, using them asframing devices (Stevenson, 2009; Yanow & van der Haar, 2013) to gain adherentsto their interpretation, expand their coalitions, and win the attention of decision-makers (Benford & Snow, 2000). ‘Causal stories’ are important storylines in con-flicts because they link actions to specific consequences, thus articulating blameand responsibility for social problems (Stone, 1989).

Any discourse coalition’s success in structuring the conversation depends oninteractive dynamics with opponents and allies. Thus, gridlock can be analysedthrough ‘double interacts’ (Dewulf & Bouwen, 2012), framing and counter-framing sequences in which actors acknowledge or deny others’ framing.Dewulf and Bouwen (2012, p. 179) define five double interacts:

. Frame polarization—‘Polarizing the difference [between framings] by reaffirm-ing your own issue framing or an upgraded version of your own issue framing’.

. Frame disconnection—‘Disconnecting the challenging element [of another’sframing] from the ongoing conversation as irrelevant, unimportant or the like’.

. Frame incorporation—‘Incorporating a downgraded reformulation of a challen-ging element into your own issue framing’.

. Frame accommodation—‘Accommodating your own issue framing to the chal-lenging issue element’.

. Frame reconnection—‘Reconnecting frames by taking both elements seriouslyand taking away the incompatibility between them’.

We argue that conflict escalation and thus gridlock occur when groupsrespond to each with frame polarization, frame disconnection, and even frameincorporation strategies. Conversely, frame accommodation and frame reconnec-tion reflect attempts to overcome framing conflicts to arrive at a consensus oragreement.

Discourse coalitions may contest or support framing of issues, actors, andinstitutions through double interacts. Issue framing involves struggles over ‘thedefinition or meaning of an issue’ and its correspondence with ‘topics ofconcern’ in conflict (Dewulf et al., 2009, p. 170). When framing issues, actorsoften (1) name the issue, (2) identify blame, and/or (3) make a claim on policy-makers or others to address it (Dewulf et al., 2009, p. 170). Framing actors involvesframing self and others (Dewulf et al., 2009), and supporting or questioninganother’s credibility or legitimacy (Hajer, 2009). Third, framing institutionsinvolves identifying the proper setting for addressing policy. Each framingelement can be contested through double interacts.

Analysing the dynamics of gridlock requires unpacking how ‘double inter-acts’ shape the structure of the conversation. We posit that the structure will

Framing dynamics and political gridlock 3

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take different forms ranging by the degree of competition across discoursecoalitions and the diversity of their storylines (see Table 1).3

(1) When there is high diversity of storylines and high competition among dis-course coalitions, it is unlikely that one frame will dominate, creating PolicyControversy. Discourse coalitions will use frame polarization, disconnection,and incorporation strategies, revealing disputes over underlying assumptionsin public discourse. Policy gridlock happens when failure to agree on a story-line allows policy controversy to persist.

(2) Through frame reconnection and accommodation strategies, discoursecoalitions can integrate frames to arrive at a common policy definition andmove into Policy Negotiation. Competition persists over the particulars ofimplementation—seen in frame disconnection or incorporation strategies—but there is some consensus over the terms of discussion. Rein and Schon(1996) call this ‘policy disagreement’ which can be resolved through anappeal to facts or existing rules given a shared problem definition.

(3) Overtime, discourse coalitions may decrease competition through negotiation(e.g. when there are new advantages to cooperation) or exit the discussion.Thus, a dominant frame will produce Policy Consensus. Discourse coalitionsmore completely integrate their frames (e.g. through further frame reconnec-tion or accommodation) to produce a dominant frame that guides policydecisions.

(4) Finally, high diversity but low competition produces Latent Policy Issues thatare excluded from the agenda.4

Scholars have critiqued interpretive traditions similar to our approach forfailing to account for material realities that impact policy formation and decisions.Of course, in the fracking case in New York other critical factors are relevant,including ebbs and flows of energy markets, discourse coalitions’ differentialeconomic and other resources, and the actions of powerful leaders. Our pointis that policy discourse has an independent effect on gridlock through the

Table 1. Shifting structures of discussion.

Diversity ofstorylines

Degree of competition across discourse coalitions

Low High

High 4. Latent policy issue: Low competitionreflects latent policy issues that havenot been articulated or placed on thepublic agenda. Discourse coalition(s)have not mobilized the possible rangeof storylines to make sense of an issue

1. Policy controversy: Strong competitionthrough frame polarization,disconnection, and incorporationstrategies generates disputes overunderlying assumptions of diversestorylines, thus producing gridlock

Low 3. Policy consensus: Frame accommodationand reconnection strategies generate orreinforce an accepted storylinereflecting a general consensus.Discourse coalitions exhibit lowcompetition/high cooperation—ormerge into a dominant discoursecoalition

2. Policy negotiation: Frameaccommodation and reconnectionstrategies produce a widely acceptedstoryline. Competition through framedisconnection and incorporationstrategies exists over particular framingelements within an agreed upon policydirection

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interaction of discourse coalitions that struggle to make sense of events andpersuade others. In our account, we are concerned with how actors frame materialand economic conditions—such as landowners’ economic hardship—and howthis shapes ongoing conflict (see also Dryzek, 2007; Pettinger, 2007).

Methods

To understand the development of policy gridlock, we collected 3759 articles men-tioning the terms ‘fracking’, ‘hydraulic fracturing’, or ‘hydrofracturing’, in fournewspapers covering the fracking controversy in New York: New York Times(state/national), Albany Times Union (state), Ithaca Journal (local progressive),and Binghamton Press and Sun Bulletin (local conservative). We identified mediapeaks where fracking was mentioned with greater frequency, and which reflected‘shifts in the intensity and focus of public discourses’ (Mattson & Clark, 2012,p. 316). We selected 452 articles in 6 peaks for analysis. For each peak, we sup-plemented article data with policy documents, open letters, public hearing tran-scripts, websites, and press releases.5

Analysis proceeded in iterative steps using interactive framing analysis(Dewulf & Bouwen, 2012). First, we used interactive framing analysis to illumi-nate framing dynamics over time. Specifically, we used atlas.ti software to codeline-by-line data related to each peak, looking for (1) framing of issues, actors,and institutions and (2) ‘double interacts’—responses to others’ framing—includ-ing polarization, disconnection, incorporation, accommodation, and reconnectionstrategies. A double interact is identified through a framing sequence: an act intro-duces an initial frame and its elements (e.g. fracking is an economic opportunity);an interact introduces an alternative frame, making visible differences in elements(e.g. fracking is an environmental threat); and finally, a double interact identifieswhat the difference means and thus the possibilities for action (e.g. fracking canbe done in a way that generates economic benefits while protecting the environ-ment; see Dewulf & Bouwen, 2012, for a fuller description). In our analysis,coding categories were both thematic (framing elements) and structural (type ofdouble interact). Our innovation is applying this framework to public discourseby identifying patterned framing sequences within media peaks, across articles.This required writing extensive analytical memos to precisely identify patternedframing sequences (keeping associated elements intact), and mapping out theirrelation to prior framings in the discussion.

Third, based on careful analysis of double interacts, we manually identifiedshifts in discourse coalitions. ‘The criterion for change lies in the interaction.Framing changes over the course of the interaction, as interactants react to eachothers’ framing’ (Dewulf et al., 2009, p. 163). Shifts involve changes in the pat-terned framing sequences (e.g. reconnection introduces a new way of thinkingthat becomes widely repeated). These shifts mark the beginning and end of ‘epi-sodes’, which we define as roughly bounded collections of patterned interactionsequences. Episode boundaries are not sharp but overlap and change graduallyas framing dynamics (re)structure the discussion. We selected quotations thatmost clearly illustrate framing elements and shifts across episodes.

The validity of categories was established not through inter-coder reliabilitychecks, but by establishing the coherence of contrasting categories in three ways:by discussing the fit between data and conceptual categories, by testing therobustness of differences and similarities of framing elements across discourse

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coalitions through repeated comparison, and by presenting rich evidence offraming sequences and elements (Maxwell, 2005).

Policy Controversy over Fracking in New York

High-volume horizontal hydraulic fracturing (‘fracking’) has significantlyimpacted energy production in the USA. Industry first developed the techniquein the Barnett Shale in Texas in 1992 (US DOE, 2009), introducing high-volumeand horizontal drilling techniques to ‘conventional’ fracturing. Rising gasprices, successful recovery operations in several states, and advancements inhydrofracturing techniques made the development of formerly inaccessibleshale in other states economically viable (US DOE, 2009), with 12 states develop-ing shale gas by 2010 (Richardson, Gottlieb, Krupnick, & Wiseman, 2013). As apercentage of total energy production, shale gas increased from 1% to over 20%in the USA from 2001 to 2010, with projections of 35% by 2035 (Energy InformationAdministration, 2014).

While development proceeded aggressively, New York was the only statewith a moratorium through 2014.6 The US Energy Information Administrationestimates that the portion of the Marcellus Shale located in the ‘Southern Tier’region of New York has 141 trillion cubic feet of recoverable shale gas (2014),although estimates vary widely (e.g. Berman & Pittinger, 2014; USGS, 2011). Inthe early 2000s prospectors began developing nearby formations to position them-selves to develop the Marcellus (Wilber, 2012), while various discourse coalitionsmobilized for and against the development.

The national context has favoured oil and gas development since the 1980s.The 2005 Energy Policy Act created and strengthened expansive exemptions inseven environmental statutes (Brady & Crannell, 2012). For example, the ‘Halli-burton loophole’ exempts fracking from the Safe Drinking Water Act regardlessof whether it threatens drinking water (Brady & Crannell, 2012). These changeslargely shifted regulatory burdens onto states. In New York, the Department ofEnvironmental Conservation (DEC) released a draft Supplementary GenericEnvironmental Impact Statement in 2009 that updated regulations related to frack-ing, but the final draft was delayed amidst controversy, and an effective morator-ium was implemented from 2010 through 2014. Over that period, severalmunicipalities banned fracking through zoning laws, and the state legislatureactively proposed and passed legislation relevant to fracking (National Confer-ence of State Legislatures, 2014). In December 2014, Governor Cuomo announceda ban on fracking in New York.

Between 2007 and 2014, the policy controversy over fracking in New Yorkshifted over five episodes through discourse coalitions’ framing and counter-framing interactions.

Episode 1: Policy Consensus: Economic Opportunity and Landowners as Watchdogs

In the first episode, a ‘gas rush’ discourse coalition developed—including pro-development landowners, oil and gas industry representative, DEC staff in theDivision of Mineral Resources, Chemung and New York Farm Bureau representa-tives, and some local officials. From as early 2007, they framed hydraulic fractur-ing in the Marcellus Shale region as ‘a modern day gold rush’ (Krauss, 2008,p. C1). Citizens began imagining the possibility of a major transformation of

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their economic prospects, which had been in decline for decades, and local gov-ernments began contemplating leasing public lands for tax revenue, forexample, under a local airport running a deficit.

The gold rush storyline included key framing elements. It framed develop-ment of the Marcellus Shale as an economic opportunity. It implicitly named econ-omic struggles for farmers and upstate economies as a policy problem, andnatural gas development as the solution. It also framed shale gas as a solutionto energy independence and the need for clean energy, but these virtues were sec-ondary.

The ‘gas rush’ discourse coalition highlighted estimates of economic invest-ment, gas reserves, and landowners’ personal enrichment. For example, onearticle cited Thomas Murphy, a Penn State researcher, who claimed ‘that morethan 20 oil and gas companies will invest (US)$700 million this year developingthe Marcellus Shale’ (Krauss, 2008, p. C4). This article reported stories of Pennsyl-vania residents who, through gas leases, would retire in comfort and improvetheir purchasing power, and highlighted Penn State and SUNY-Fredonia research-ers who estimated that ‘the Marcellus has 50 trillion cubic feet of recoverablenatural gas, roughly twice the amount . . . consumed in the United States [in2007]’ (Krauss, 2008, p. C4).

This ‘gas rush’ discourse coalition also framed environmental disturbance asminimal—and incorporated it as a downgraded element. One editorial put it thisway:

The extraction process will produce some headaches as well—roads foraccess to the wells . . . , and storage and transportation of the gas—butso long as everyone involved emphasizes safety and takes care toprotect the environment the situation could well prove to be a win-win-win. //The nation certainly can use the energy source (which is farcleaner than oil or coal), the gas companies and landowners will enjoyprofits, and the Southern Tier will benefit from the economic boost.(Anonymous, 2008a, p. B2)

From this perspective, addressing environmental ‘headaches’ required onlyminor regulatory adjustments. Correspondingly, DEC staff from the mineralsdepartment sought legislation early in 2008 that would allow fracking in the Mar-cellus through streamlined permitting and new spacing requirements, whiletelling state legislature that fracking posed little environmental threat (Marritz,2008).

In this episode, some actors associated with the gas rush storyline frameddevelopment as requiring a strong private response in what would become a ‘land-owner rights’ discourse coalition. For example,

. . . a Kirkland landowner and member of the town planning board, said

. . . [l]andowners will have to be watchdogs over drilling operations ontheir land, and that begins with drafting lease agreements that givethem control over important issues. (Wilber, 2008, p. A1)

This emerging discourse coalition was supported by landowner rights workshopssponsored by Farm Bureaus and landowner coalitions from New York and Penn-sylvania, whose leaders framed corporations in adversarial terms, and urgedlandowners to resist ‘institutional exploitation’ (Wilber, 2012, p. 39–40). Land-owners began borrowing collective bargaining practices from Pennsylvania

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(Jacquet & Stedman, 2011), and in mid-2008 six landowner coalitions had formedto collectively negotiate leases with gas companies.

Despite a split within the ‘gas rush’ discourse coalition, the structure of theconversation reflected Policy Consensus about the desirability of developmentthat incorporated potential environmental threats. This structure supported theformation of landowner coalitions, legislative changes, and planning for large-scale development.

Episode 2: Policy Negotiation: a Bill and Environmental Warnings

As Governor Paterson contemplated signing a bill that would allow fracking of theMarcellus Shale, an environmental threat discourse coalition emerged to challengethe relatively successful ‘gas rush’ discourse coalition. The new coalition includedmembers of the public, public officials, lawmakers, and established environmentalorganizations. They began framing potential development as unprecedented inscale and scope with considerable and frightening environmental impacts. Repor-ters and environmental organizations used various strategies reflecting a politics ofproblem definition to get ‘fracking’ on the agenda (Davis & Hoffer, 2012; Rochefort& Cobb, 1994). These challenges increased framing contests (Metze, 2014) andshifted the conversation from Policy Consensus to Policy Negotiation.

First, members used a polarization strategy to reframe the problem as a longlist of environmental threats, which focused on massive water withdrawals,capacity for and knowledge about treatment and disposal of toxic water from‘frac fluid’, and potential water contamination. They reframed fracking as awater-intensive technique, which some called perilous or dangerous, andwarned about losing control to gas companies and the difficulty of managingenvironmental threats in this context. Contributors used ‘framing moves’ (Abola-fia, 2004) such as portraying a vivid transformation from a bucolic region to anindustrial zone in New York as elsewhere, raising doubts about knowledge ofimpacts and how to address them, and citing reports of similar problems inother US states. Some framed landowners as greedy and companies as exploiters.

Second, this discourse coalition began framing institutions as unprepared.For example, it highlighted DEC’s lack of experience with and knowledge aboutthe type of development needed to access the Marcellus and the inadequacy ofcurrent regulations (Marritz, 2008). Susan Riha, Director of NYS Water ResourcesInstitute at Cornell University, was quoted saying, ‘It’s not clear to me that there isany group who is looking at the overall impact of withdrawing the amount ofwater that might be required for the hydrofracking. Who is looking at thebroader picture?’ (Lustgarten, 2008a, p. A1).

This episode reflects Policy Negotiation because citizens and environmentalorganizations did not articulate a clear normative stance against fracking, butinstead reconnected environmental threats and economic opportunity byimplicitly assuming development was inevitable and a moratorium was ‘ahorse’ that ‘has left the barn’ (Anonymous, 2008b, p. B2). In the media and else-where citizens repeated a mantra: we are not saying do not drill, let’s just do itright (e.g. Seltz, 2008, p. A7). While lobbying legislators to vote against DEC’sbill, environmental organizations joined others calling to slow the process toenable comprehensive planning at state and local levels.

‘Gas rush’ adherents—mostly industry lobbyists—responded by disconnect-ing the threat frame, resembling a rhetorical strategy of denial (Cobb & Ross, 1997;

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Hudgins & Poole, 2014). For example, Gill (2008, p. A10) dismissed environmentalthreats as irrelevant and unfounded based on a technical explanation of fracking:

The fracturing of the Marcellus often occurs more than one mile below thefresh water aquifer. //The fresh water aquifer is protected by multiplesteel casings and then reinforced with cement. Fluids used in the fractur-ing process cannot penetrate the fresh water aquifer.

Gill also dismissed studies showing negative environmental impacts, and com-pared chemicals in fracking fluid to canola oil, personal care products, and chlor-ine in drinking water. Finally, he called New York regulations strong, andhighlighted its developers’ ‘exceptional track record of environmental complianceand safety standards’ (Gill, 2008, p. A10).

The DEC staff initially also tried to disconnect the threat frame by emphasiz-ing DEC’s positive environmental ‘track record’, claiming that neither New York’s13,000 conventional wells nor the nation’s horizontal wells have shown ground-water contamination, and asserting the harmlessness of fracking fluid additives(Lustgarten, 2008a). However, after the environmental threat frame gained promi-nence, Governor Paterson and DEC officials deployed an accommodation strategythat integrated environmental threats into a pro-development frame, forexample, stating, ‘no permit will be issued without a complete environmentalreview of the specific issues raised by horizontal drilling’ (Nearing, 2008,p. A1). In addition, while Paterson signed a bill that would allow fracking, healso directed DEC to update its 1992 regulations to account for potentialimpacts of fracking, and to ensure it had adequate staff, effectively creating a mor-atorium on fracking until DEC’s study was complete.

In parallel, NYC’s Environment Commissioner Emily Lloyd, NYC Council-man James Gennaro, and two environmental organizations (Riverkeeper andNatural Resources Defense Council) employed a frame reconnection strategy byintroducing a possible ban on shale gas development in New York City’s water-shed. This effort integrated economic opportunity and environmental threatframes by dividing the state into frack and no frack zones: fracking was an oppor-tunity for zones where it would do no environmental harm, but a threat to envir-onmentally sensitive zones.

On one hand, the ‘environmental threat’ coalition sought to disconnect theseframes claiming the proposal perpetuated upstate–downstate inequities (Lustgar-ten, 2008b, p. A1). On the other, industry representatives polarized Lloyd’s framingand reasserted the ‘gas rush’ storyline. For example, Lee Fuller, of the Indepen-dent Petroleum Association of America, wrote:

If the state process involves a lot of concurrence with other agencies orenvironmental reviews . . . it can create potential for considerable delay. . . , affect the cost of development and the schedule of developmentand the willingness of some producers to engage in that development.(Lustgarten, 2008b, p. A1)

This framing sought to contain conflict by eliminating NYC’s jurisdictional auth-ority. Yet, Lloyd had legal standing to be included, and her spokesperson laternoted: ‘DEC has given us every assurance we have asked for . . . ’ (Applebome,2008, p. A29). As such, reconnecting the environmental threat and opportunityframes succeeded, enabling a focus on planning and risk mitigation that wouldallow development while protecting the environment.

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Episode 3: Policy Controversy: Gridlock as Creative Chaos

Media coverage of fracking sharply increased throughout 2009 as DEC preparedand released draft regulations for public comment. The discussion quickly polar-ized and moved into Policy Controversy. The ‘gas rush’ discourse coalition stoodstrong. For example, gas companies continued buying mineral rights (or sellingthem for profit), constructing infrastructure and transporting equipment. Land-owner coalitions continued forming to negotiate better leases, and 2000 land-owners attended a pro-development rally mid-year. Local legislators in BroomeCounty hired a lobbyist to petition DEC to expedite its environmental review,while those in Tomkins County passed a resolution requesting more time toplan. But the ‘environmental threat’ discourse coalition broadened into an ‘anti-fracking’ coalition that challenged fundamental assumptions about economy,energy, environment, and health. With the emergence of new civic organizations,competition to win the public intensified.

First, the environmental threat discourse coalition employed several framepolarization strategies. Citizens and grassroots environmental organizations ques-tioned the inevitability of fracking for economic benefits. One editorial claimed:

Neither the companies nor the state, which stands to reap an estimated $1billion revenue windfall from the drilling, should take it for granted thatdrilling must happen. (Anonymous, 2009, p. A8)

Similar editorials contrasted narrow private economic benefits of developmentwith widespread public environmental costs. One local resident wrote, ‘A smallnumber of folks in our communities may get very rich, and the lakes andstreams we all share may become very polluted’ (Wright, 2008, p. A7).

Another frame polarization strategy exposed a problematic assumption ofeconomic opportunity framing: that regulating fracking was a matter for the mar-ketplace. For example, several editorials reframed the composition of frackingfluid as a public question rather than a trade secret. Contrasting fracking fluidto a ‘legitimate’ trade secret—formula for coca cola—one editorial asserts ‘theland that lies above the . . . Marcellus Shale is not just the domain of private prop-erty owners. How it’s used is a matter of public interest’ (Anonymous, 2008c,p. A6).

Reporters, activists, health experts, and grassroots environmental organiz-ations further polarized the discussion by framing fracking as another threat: topublic health. They affirmed this frame by introducing the idea of a constitutionalright to health, safety, and welfare, and by articulating causal stories linking frack-ing to specific harms (Stone, 1989). In one example, Tom Wilber questionedwhether well explosions in Pennsylvania were due to naturally occurring gasmigration, or Cabot Oil & Gas’s development activity. The former placed respon-sibility on well landowners, the latter on Cabot, moving a problematic situationfrom fate to corporate agency.

Second, the anti-fracking discourse coalition used a frame (re)connection strat-egy to bridge environmental threat with social justice, but this frame did notbecome well-articulated—at least in the media—until the following episode.

Finally, the anti-fracking discourse coalition used frame incorporation strat-egies to transform the meaning of elements of the ‘gas rush’ storyline. First, itframed fracking not as a ‘bridge fuel’ but as a ‘false solution’ to the need forclean energy. For example, Assemblywoman Barbara Lifton, according to reporter

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Shackford (2009, n.p.), called ‘continued investment in natural gas . . . a false sol-ution to climate change and that the money should be plowed into speeding upthe development of renewable energy instead’. Second, this discourse coalitionincorporated economic opportunity, transforming its meaning by focusing on nega-tive economic impacts. As early as August 2008, Trout Unlimited framed frackingas harmful to New York’s ‘sustainable economic powerhouse’ including morethan US$3 billion annually in economic activity for ‘state and local communitiesfrom fishing, hunting, and wildlife-related recreation’ (Urban, 2008, p. A1). Thisframe incorporation strategy transformed economic concerns, finding the solutionin existing economic activities, such as tourism, organic farming, and wineries.

The ‘gas rush’ discourse coalition responded. First, it again sought to discon-nect the environmental threat frame. For example, Gill (2009, p. A11) accusedenvironmentalists of spreading ‘misinformation’ by citing ‘incidences in otherstates where natural gas may have entered residential water supplies as a resultof natural gas exploration’. In addition, a citizen admonished others to ‘learnthe facts and science of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing’, imputinglittle chance of gas migration given ‘[t]he fact is that there are multiple layers ofcement and steel casing protecting any aquifers from natural gas contamination,not to mention thousands of feet of bedrock’ (Levine, 2009, p. B4). A similarpattern occurred over fracking fluid. While the national congress debated policyto regulate fracking through the Clean Water Act in mid-2009, the anti-frackingdiscourse coalition in New York perpetuated this causal story: fracking fluidcan leak into water supplies posing risks of chemical exposure; it can mix withtoxic substances underground (such as radioactive material) producing waste-water needing treatment without proper knowledge of its contents. However,industry representatives disconnected this causal story, referencing evidencethat fracking fluids are harmless.

Second, the ‘gas rush’ discourse coalition also incorporated environmental con-cerns by claiming that providing a list of chemicals to state regulators was suffi-cient for regulating fracking fluid, and that federal regulations were unnecessary.

Third, the ‘gas rush’ discourse coalition repeatedly polarized the discussion byreaffirming fracking as an economic opportunity. For example, Brad Gill claimeddevelopment of 300 wells could produce US$20 million in real property taxrevenue for municipalities and US$91 million in landowner royalties annually(Gashler, 2009b, p. A1). Broome County’s Department of Economic Developmentreleased a draft report estimating economic benefits of fracking including US$7.5billion in direct economic stimulation, US$42 million in state and local revenue,and US$2 billion in new economic activity annually (Wilber, 2009). And pro-frack-ing landowners sharpened a property rights frame to bolster this storyline, as inthis editorial:

Suppose your neighbor didn’t want you to drill for gas and reap the econ-omic rewards for having gas on your property because he thought that itmight cause pollution to his water system. Shouldn’t he agree to reim-burse you for the revenues you would lose by not drilling? // . . . If youdon’t want drilling near the watershed, pony up the money to stop it.It’s called property rights. (Woodmansee, 2009, p. B4)

Several evoked the term ‘Valley of Opportunity’, a phrase Ronald Regan used touphold the region as a national economic model for its manufacturing sector(Wilber, 2009, p. A1). Given the steady decline of industry, however, one editorial

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asked, ‘Where did the Valley of Opportunity go . . . ?’ and described Fort Worth,where fracking has been booming, as ‘an economy that most of us wish wehad’ (Kelley, 2009, n.p.).

Throughout this episode, actors across sectors rearticulated a possible thirdway through a reconnection strategy that bridged opportunity and threat storylines,claiming economic opportunity and energy independence were possible but onlywith strict environmental regulations. Albert Appleton, former commissioner ofNYC’s environment department, called natural gas drilling less regulated thana septic system in your backyard and, ‘If we’re going to have natural gas explora-tion you can live with, then we’ve got to have environmental oversight you cantrust’ (Gashler, 2009a, n.p.). This integration represented a possible move topolicy negotiation. But when DEC released updated regulations for publiccomment, the broad anti-fracking discourse coalition—including NYC’s MayorBloomberg, NYC’s Department of Environmental Protection, unionized staff atDEC, the national Environmental Protection Agency, and mainstream environ-mental organizations—called the regulations deeply flawed. A move towardspolicy negotiation was framed as impossible under the proposed framework.

In this episode, the environmental threat discourse coalition broadened into aloose anti-fracking coalition that contested consensus about planning as a sol-ution, offering other options such as a statewide ban. The gas rush discoursecoalition fought against this storyline by disconnecting and incorporatingenvironmental concerns to downgrading them, and polarizing the discussion byreaffirming economic opportunity. The discursive move towards gridlock wasnot merely dysfunctional; public debates reflected intense creativity as variousactors raised questions about economic development, environmental sustainabil-ity, public health, and energy production. However, the possibility of policy nego-tiation through risk mitigation failed when diverse actors framed updatedregulations as inadequate for environmental protection.

Episode 4: Policy Controversy: Increasing Polarization

During the next episode, policy controversy persisted but changed. Rather thanreflecting creativity, discourse coalitions further polarized and mobilized protests.Each side broke into distinct coalitions amplifying fault lines from earlier epi-sodes. A landowner rights discourse coalition distinguished itself not to contestthe gas rush storyline but to elevate landowner rights within it. The anti-frackingdiscourse coalition split into a ‘multiple threat’ coalition focused on risk mitiga-tion and an ‘environmental justice’ coalition focused on banning fracking. Theenvironmental coalitions gained success. Early in 2010, NYC and Syracuse water-sheds were separated from the generic environmental review effectively banningfracking there, at the end of 2010 the state legislature passed a moratorium onfracking, and between 2010 and 2011, dozens of local governments banned frack-ing. While Governor Paterson vetoed the moratorium for including conventionalwells, he also directed DEC to revise its new regulations to account for additionalrisks, extending an earlier moratorium.

Several strategies produced this shift. First, NYC public officials, the Environ-mental Protection Agency, mainstream environmental organizations, and a unionof DEC professional staff used a disconnection strategy to challenge the (weak) inte-gration of opportunity and threat frames codified in DEC’s revised regulations,which many called a ‘sham’ if not paired with oversight resources. For

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example, the union of DEC professionals wrote a letter to DEC’s Division ofMineral Resources, noting that draft regulations failed to evaluate cumulativeimpacts, identify sources for water withdrawal, and address recapture/treat-ment/disposal of flowback water, among others. It called on DEC to use ‘thebest possible available academic, scientific and engineering research and infor-mation’ to set the highest possible standards (Bayer & Berger, 2009, n.p.). Whileindustry representatives expressed satisfaction with DEC’s regulations, pressureresulted in the state’s decision to extend the public comment period and separateenvironmental review of NYC and Syracuse watersheds. NYC regulators andpublic officials supported the separate review. But residents and grassrootsenvironmental organizations in upstate New York used a disconnection strategythat framed as unjust the creation of such frack and no frack zones. ShaleshockAction Alliance organized an event called ‘What are we, Chopped Liver?’ todraw attention to unequal standards for NYC and upstate residents (Anonymous,2010a).

Second, all discourse coalitions continued to use frame incorporation, discon-nection, and polarization strategies typical of the previous period. These strategieswere increasingly accompanied by the use of a growing body of (contested) evi-dence supporting claims of environmental threats and economic opportunity, aseries of highly visible accidents in the industry including the BP oil spill in theGulf of Mexico, the presence of anti-fracking celebrities including Yoko Ono,and the release of the Gasland movie. For example, one editorial remarked:

At the Penfield well [in Pennsylvania] . . . explosive gas and pollutedwater spewed for 16 hours on Thursday before the leak was stopped . . . .The very thing that was supposed to stop a leak also failed at a BP wellin the Gulf of Mexico on 20 April, and what is now the nation’s worst oilspill threatens livelihoods, beaches and wildlife in at least four states.(Anonymous, 2010b, p. A8)

Industry advocates’ attempts to disconnect these claims as irrelevant, minor, orrare not only cast doubt on the safety of fracking, but also engendered mistrustin government and industry.

The landowner rights discourse coalition used a polarization strategy thatdownplayed environmental risks while emphasizing landowners’ economic des-peration and political disenfranchisement. For example, one landowner wrote inan opinion editorial:

. . . who speaks for those county landowners and others who may benefitfrom successful gas-related activity? // . . . I have witnessed the painfuldemise of the family dairy farm. . . . [I]ncome from milk did not keep upwith cost to produce it. Sons and daughters left the farm to make aliving elsewhere . . . . Then [farmers] auctioned off the cows and equip-ment and tried to stay . . . . (Carlson, 2009, p. A10)

Some began to articulate an anti-government, anti-regulatory stance. One editorialsays,

. . . until the ‘children’ in Albany figure out how [to] maximize taxes on thegas companies and landowners, [environmental regulations] will not bereleased. Pure greed. (Morrissey, 2009, p. B8)

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From this perspective, the political machine is ‘killing upstate’ (Morrissey, 2009)and politicians should work on behalf of ‘farmers who are dying’ (Colley, 2009).In early 2010, the Joint Landowner Coalition of New York formed to advocate for land-owner coalitions. In 2012, it would amplify (Benford & Snow, 2000) the landownerrights storyline in its ‘Declaration of Landowner Rights’, asserting landowners’rights to develop mineral property under the US Constitution and to ‘pursue econ-omic opportunities’ (Joint Landowners Coalition of New York, 2012, n.p.).

Finally, the environmental justice discourse coalition used a frame polarizingstrategy to advocate for fracking bans. Efforts to prepare local governments formanaging risks resulted in a discussion about whether or not local governmentshad the authority to impose bans. Peter Stein, a Town of Ithaca board member,wrote after a contentious public meeting that local governments had limitedpower under state law to ban fracking (Stein, 2009). Yet dozens of local govern-ments passed bans by the end of 2011. Two bans were challenged but upheld inNew York’s highest court in 2012.

Governor Paterson disappointed the gas rush coalition’s expectation thatregulations would be released mid-2010, instead he directed DEC to revisethem again. DEC released revised regulations in mid-2011, and the gridlock per-sisted.

Episode 5: Policy Controversy: Attempts to Restructure the Discussion7

The final episode is characterized by ongoing policy controversy punctuated by pri-marily failed attempts to restructure the conversation to overcome gridlock. Toillustrate, Governor Cuomo used frame reconnection that would again frack thestate into frack and no frack zones. He proposed in June 2012 to allow frackingin the Southern Tier only in communities that wanted it (Hakim, 2012). Theplan represented a potential middle ground as it sought to reduce risk to ground-water by limiting drilling to deep areas of the Marcellus, ban fracking in sensitiveareas, limit the number of wells to 50, and require a buffer zone between shalereserves and water sources (Hakim, 2012). But the proposal fuelled controversyinstead of quelling it.

The gas rush discourse coalition, in a frame accommodation strategy, labelledthe proposal ‘a positive step’ and ‘good news’ for farmers, businesses, and land-owners in the Southern Tier, and local governments who would see increased taxbenefits (De Avila, 2012; Hakim, 2012). Contributors repeated the idea of an econ-omic ‘boom’ that would aid declining rural communities.

But the multiple threat discourse coalition sought to disconnect the proposalcalling it a ‘cynical departure’ from Cuomo’s promise to use science to decideon fracking. While previously open to reconnecting economic opportunity andenvironmental threat frames, members of the environmental threat discoursecoalition again labelled DEC as ‘unprepared’ and requested studies to addressdeficiencies in its review (Environmental Working Group of Physicians, Scientistsand Engineers for Healthy Energy, 2012; Lifton et al., 2012; Sierra Club, 2012). Soonafter Cuomo floated his plan, over 100 organizations and individuals—includingprofessionalized and community-based environmental organizations—sent anopen letter to Cuomo expressing opposition claiming ‘any decision . . . shouldnot be made before the impacts to our health, environment and economy havebeen comprehensively and properly assessed’ (Advocates for Cheery Valley,Inc. et al., 2012).

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The environmental justice discourse coalition distanced itself from theenvironmental threat discourse coalition in a polarizing strategy, labellingCuomo’s proposal a violation of environmental justice. Sandra Steingrabe, an acti-vist and biologist at Cornell University focusing on toxics and human health,called it ‘a shameful idea’ to send ‘a polluting industry into our most economicallyimpoverished communities’ (Hakim, 2012). In the next days, protesters called for afracking ban. Two months later, Steingraber and a group of ‘independent experts’sent another open letter to Cuomo that sought to disconnect economic develop-ment and environmental protection while calling for a ban:

We believe that ‘safe’ development of shale gas is not possible at this timeusing existing technologies . . . . The process as we know it is simply toounpredictable and dangerous to be allowed to go forward in our state.(Allstadt et al., 2012)

The letter blamed DEC for lacking objectivity and inclusiveness, called the energyindustry secretive and accident-prone, and framed fracking as ‘inherently danger-ous’, ‘spatially intensive’, and ‘unconventional’.

After several months, Cuomo dropped his plan claiming DEC was complet-ing its review. In alignment with the multiple-threat discourse coalition, herequested the health department conduct a health impact study, and policyremained in gridlock until the end of 2014. While Cuomo’s attempt to restructurethe conversation by allowing limited fracking failed to overcome gridlock, thepublic health frame gained prominence. On December 2014, the healthdepartment released its health study, and the Governor announced thatfracking would be banned in New York given the findings that it could not bedone safely.

Despite this decision, conflict will persist unless this health storyline becomesinstitutionalized or a new storyline emerges to resolve competing claims. Land-owner rights groups are discussing options to sue the government for ‘takings’of private property, others are advocating to revisit fracking given new technologi-cal developments, and environmentalists are considering how to maintain mobil-ization.

Discussion and Conclusions

Interpretive analytical approaches are gaining importance for understandingpolicy conflicts (Fischer, 2003; Fletcher, 2009; Hoffman, 2011). This article buildson this research and the policy process literature (e.g. Baumgartner & Jones,2009; Davis & Hoffer, 2012) to develop a new understanding of policy gridlock.Our main finding is that a central mechanism of gridlock is the production of conflictthrough which framing contests deny the development of a shared discursivespace capable of forming consensus or reasoned agreement. More precisely, webegan with the notion that gridlock involves (1) intense competition among dis-course coalitions and (2) sustained conflict over diverse storylines. While theseconditions are necessary, they are insufficient for explaining gridlock. In addition,the shift from ordinary conflict to policy gridlock also involves (3) the interruptionof possible shared storylines through frame polarization and disconnectionstrategies (e.g. when environmental justice activists interrupted GovernorCuomo’s idea to allow limited development), and (4) the refusal to accommodateframing elements that gain broad acceptance (e.g. industry efforts to disconnect

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environmental risks). Together, these elements explain policy gridlock as adynamic process.

This approach complements other studies of gridlock (e.g. Klyza & Sousa,2013) by tracing the ways policy narratives move discussions between consensus,negotiation, and gridlock. The New York case shows that gridlock can be an inten-sely creative process. As discourse coalitions adapt framing in response to others,they make societal conflicts explicit (Dodge, 2015). But this creativity is productiveonly as new issue framings arise. Otherwise polarization develops and becomesentrenched, especially when conflict expansion strategies are met with therefusal of powerful coalitions to accommodate ongoing critique, through denialor complacency. Policy conflicts transform into gridlock when new ways offraming issues are insufficient for breaking existing patterns of polarization.

New frames may break through gridlock, but only by addressing fundamen-tal conflicts over meaning. A new frame is sufficiently robust when it resists inter-ruption and refusals to accommodate so that favoured framing elements areincorporated into a new storyline that attracts adherents. Discourse coalitionsdo not have to share a discourse to overcome gridlock, rather a sufficientnumber of actors have to agree, implicitly or explicitly, that a new frame has thepotential to advance the discussion. The health risk frame, for example, enabledGovernor Cuomo to ban fracking even though the decision risked offendingindustry, landowner rights coalitions, and others.

From an agenda setting perspective, winning coalitions are those that suc-cessfully expand to beat out others (Davis & Hoffer, 2012, p. 224). Strategiesinclude conflict expansion or contraction (Pralle, 2006), venue shopping (Buffardi,Pekkanen, & Smith, 2015), problem definition and related symbolic politics(Rochefort & Cobb, 1994; Stone, 1989), and policy entrepreneurship (Kingdon,1995). Our analysis suggests that strong coalitions have the additional power tointerrupt a storyline that offends them, and expose refusals to accommodatetheir own, favoured framing elements. Weaker coalitions do not have this power.

Our approach also suggests that analytical attention be paid in research ondiscourse coalitions not only to the emergence of a dominant storyline, but alsoto the ways multiple discourse coalitions interact in tension with one anotherover time. In this case, the environmental threat discourse coalitions convergedand diverged to incorporate ideas about multiple threats, risk mitigation, andenvironmental justice. These divergences introduced a productive tension: aslong-standing environmental organizations negotiated for stronger regulations,activists engaged in protests and issue campaigns to challenge these organizationsand to raise questions about justice and multiple threats. The broad pro-frackingcoalition was more challenged to integrate its storyline: landowner rights groupsnot only supported development, but also framed themselves as watchdogs overindustry activities, and industry representatives resisted accommodation ofincreasingly accepted environmental framing elements.

We would not expect the same dynamics in states where fracking has beenimplemented. Although a full comparative analysis is beyond our scope, recentresearch about fracking in Pennsylvania reveals very different dynamics. On thesurface, framing elements are similar: pro-development coalitions frame frackingas an opportunity for jobs, energy independence, and clean energy; and anti-frack-ing coalitions raise concerns about environmental threats. Yet, while New York hasbanned fracking, Pennsylvania has implemented a form of weak risk governance.For example, Governor Corbitt signed Act 13 into law in 2012. Pennsylvania’s

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Department of Environmental Protection claims the bill implements strongerenvironmental standards,8 but it has been roundly critiqued for allowing develop-ment in residential areas and national and state forests, guarding secrecy of chemi-cals used in fracking fluids, and stripping away the power of localities to regulatefracking through zoning (Hudgins & Poole, 2014). In this case, we would expectframe accommodation and reconnection strategies to have become institutiona-lized to support these decisions. There is some evidence of this. For example, areport by Pennsylvania’s Marcellus Shale Commission exhibits frame accommo-dation between economic opportunity and environmental protection. A pressrelease in 2011 quotes Lieutenant Governor Cawley saying fracking is a positivestep for Pennsylvania that will create jobs and create energy independence in anenvironmentally responsible way.9 This does not deny controversy aroundimplementation as citizens and others raise concerns about negative environ-mental, economic, and social impacts. But it does suggest that the underlyingmechanism of gridlock—the production of conflict through framing conflicts—was less effective during the initial stages of agenda setting and decision-making. Especially missing is the productive stage of gridlock when alternativescould be aired and reflected upon prior to a decision.

On a practical level, our findings inform the environmental policy literature,which often implicitly assumes conflict is about irreconcilable differences inframing and proposes dialogue to overcome conflict (e.g. Cherney & Clark,2009). We suggest that these processes will fail when conflicts over meaningremain unaddressed, especially when corporations and governments disconnectcitizens’ environmental concerns, and when citizens have access to alternative dis-cursive resources. Alternately, these attempts might work when leaders success-fully integrate storylines to resolve conflicts over meaning, and take consistentaction.

Acknowledgements

Our grateful thanks to Mitch Abolafia for his feedback on earlier conceptualiz-ations of this research, and to Beth Berman, Abby Kinchy, Kendra Smith-Howard, and the contributors of this special issue for helpful comments onearlier drafts. Thanks also to Steve Jackson and Elizabeth Bough Martin fortheir research assistance.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding

This work was supported by the Faculty Research Awards Program of the Division of Research at theUniversity at Albany, SUNY.

Notes

1. Explanations for gridlock on environmental policy in the USA include divided government, weak-ening liberalism, public opinion, declining trust in government, interest group politics, pervasive

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media, the changing nature of public problems, and overlapping policy ‘orders’ that open multiplepathways of influence (Klyza & Sousa, 2013).

2. This notion of gridlock rests on a conceptualization of policy controversy as ‘relatively immune toresolution by reference to evidence’ or existing rules (Rein & Schon, 1996) because competing per-spectives require different evidence to demonstrate problem definitions, and the same evidencecould inform very different claims.

3. Thanks to Abby Kinchy who helped clarify this argument.

4. Identifying the range of storylines can be challenging when policy issues are latent, given lowlevels of mobilization in the media and elsewhere. Yet it is possible by examining the discourseof long-standing and emerging institutions. Analytically, this requires defensible decisions todefine the boundaries of the case and to direct analytical attention in meaningful ways (Yanow,2006).

5. The representation of a controversy in the media is not equivalent to the political controversy itself.Not only does the media filter information, but it also ‘constructs a reality that is adapted to mediaformats and requirements’, a process that is ‘co-produced’ through the interactions and decisions ofeditors, journalists, and actors skilled at securing media coverage (Feindt & Kleinschmit, 2011,p. 188). While we focus on the news media, we broaden the perspective with information fromother venues to provide a more well-rounded assessment of each episode of the controversy.

6. Vermont, which likely has little recoverable shale gas, has banned fracking.

7. Analysis of episode 5 draws on Dodge (2015).

8. http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/act_13/20789.

9. http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/marcellus-shale-commission-issues-final-report-in-pennsylvania-126013718.html.

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