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Fast-Feedback Operations for Ill-Defined Problems: Investigating and Acting in Poorly Understood, Conflict-Affected Local Contexts International Studies Association Conference (March 17, 2016) John Hoven and Joel Lawton Abstract: Locally focused peacebuilding and stability operations need fast, in-depth understanding of an operational context where unknown unknowns are important. Qualitative interviewing and causal inference methods do that in depth. Lean Startup product innovation does it fast. We use both. Our goal is to provide this capability to soldiers at the lowest levels, because they have the most direct, daily contact with the local people. For that, we need a clearly articulated, easy-to-use methodology for ill- defined problems. Part I describes the essential basics, and Part II discusses how to apply it to conflict-affected environments. The key attribute of the methodology is fast- feedback learning, so we refer to it as Fast-Feedback Operations. About the Authors John Hoven <[email protected]> (www.linkedin.com/in/johnhoven) is an innovation broker between those who do qualitative analysis and those who need its capabilities for fast-feedback operations and assessment. He recently completed a 40-year stint analyzing complex, dynamic relationships in merger investigations, as a qualitative microeconomist in the U.S. Justice Department's Antitrust Division. Dr. Hoven earned a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Wisconsin at Madison, an M.S. in physics from the University of California at Berkeley, and a B.A. in mathematics and physics from the University of Montana at Missoula. He is also an accomplished bassoonist, performing regularly in the D.C. area at lunchtime concerts of the Friday Morning Music Club. Joel Lawton <[email protected]> (www.linkedin.com/in/joellawton0125) is a former member of the U.S. Army’s Human Terrain System (HTS), U.S. Army, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). His work with HTS included working in the U.S. and two tours to Afghanistan where he conducted socio-cultural research management, collection, and support; as well as open-source intelligence analysis and qualitative data collection and analysis. Joel served in the USMC, deploying to southern Helmand Province in 2009 in support of combat operations. Further, Joel is an advocate of qualitative analysis and its use in Military Intelligence collection efforts. He currently works as an Intelligence Analyst for the TRADOC G-2 at Fort Eustis, VA and resides in Newport News, VA.

Fast-Feedback Operations for Ill-Defined Problems: Investigating and Acting in Poorly Understood, Conflict-Affected Local Contexts

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Fast-Feedback Operations for Ill-Defined Problems:

Investigating and Acting in Poorly Understood,

Conflict-Affected Local Contexts

International Studies Association Conference (March 17, 2016)

John Hoven and Joel Lawton

Abstract: Locally focused peacebuilding and stability operations need fast, in-depth

understanding of an operational context where unknown unknowns are important.

Qualitative interviewing and causal inference methods do that in depth. Lean Startup

product innovation does it fast. We use both. Our goal is to provide this capability to

soldiers at the lowest levels, because they have the most direct, daily contact with the

local people. For that, we need a clearly articulated, easy-to-use methodology for ill-

defined problems. Part I describes the essential basics, and Part II discusses how to apply

it to conflict-affected environments. The key attribute of the methodology is fast-

feedback learning, so we refer to it as Fast-Feedback Operations.

About the Authors

John Hoven <[email protected]> (www.linkedin.com/in/johnhoven) is an innovation

broker between those who do qualitative analysis and those who need its capabilities for

fast-feedback operations and assessment. He recently completed a 40-year stint analyzing

complex, dynamic relationships in merger investigations, as a qualitative microeconomist

in the U.S. Justice Department's Antitrust Division. Dr. Hoven earned a Ph.D. in

economics from the University of Wisconsin at Madison, an M.S. in physics from the

University of California at Berkeley, and a B.A. in mathematics and physics from the

University of Montana at Missoula. He is also an accomplished bassoonist, performing

regularly in the D.C. area at lunchtime concerts of the Friday Morning Music Club.

Joel Lawton <[email protected]> (www.linkedin.com/in/joellawton0125) is a

former member of the U.S. Army’s Human Terrain System (HTS), U.S. Army, Training

and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). His work with HTS included working in the U.S.

and two tours to Afghanistan where he conducted socio-cultural research management,

collection, and support; as well as open-source intelligence analysis and qualitative data

collection and analysis. Joel served in the USMC, deploying to southern Helmand

Province in 2009 in support of combat operations. Further, Joel is an advocate of

qualitative analysis and its use in Military Intelligence collection efforts. He currently

works as an Intelligence Analyst for the TRADOC G-2 at Fort Eustis, VA and resides in

Newport News, VA.

2

Fast-Feedback Operations for Ill-Defined Problems, Part I:

Investigating and Acting in Poorly Understood Local Contexts

Problem Solutions

"US forces have many opportunities

to interact with the local population

in the normal course of their duties

in operations. This source perhaps is

the most under-utilized HUMINT

collection resource." (Army FM 2-

22.3 2006: 5-22)

"… relationships, people, cultural

economics, human terrain … You

really need to analyze in depth the

linkage between your turf and the

problems." MAJ Thornton, in SWJ

Editors, "Thoughts from the Field

on Kilcullen's 28 Articles (Pt. I),"

Small Wars Journal Blog Post

(April 19, 2007)

Research tools

o qualitative interviewing

o qualitative causal inference

Entrepreneurship tools

o Lean Startup

Development tools

o Adaptable (value chains,

private sector)

o Local focus (M4P, MaFI)

o Conflict affected areas

Practitioner know-how

o Special Operations Forces

(Human Domain)

o Civil Affairs (active

military)

o Peacebuilding case studies

3

Salesmen call on customers. Researchers and decisionmakers go to conferences. All of us

attend meetings. If you want to understand people and build relationships, nothing beats a

face-to-face conversation.

We know that, all of us. However, we ignore it, even when that understanding is critically

important, when we believe it simply can't be done.

So in this paper, we are going to share with you a collection of practical tools that will

enable minimally trained soldiers at the lowest levels to conduct probing interviews,

analyze their findings, and take action with custom-tailored, constantly evolving

operational plans.

These practical tools are in common use outside of the US military and intelligence

system. They are specifically designed to get fast, in-depth understanding of an

operational context where unknown unknowns are likely to be present and important.

To give you a sense of what that is like, my background1 is a few decades of experience

investigating mergers for the Antitrust Division of the US Justice Department. Often

these were industries I had never heard of. Starting from clueless, we have three weeks to

get to a recommendation on whether to open a full-blown investigation. That's three

weeks of interviews to discover (a) a particular line of business for which (b) some

customers have no good alternative except the merging companies, and (c) there are no

likely potential entrants. I investigated all manner of industries, from chicken farms to jet

fighter radar. Always, the key issues were to understand the capabilities and relationships

of the actors in one specific context. That understanding was obtained almost entirely

from qualitative interviewing and qualitative causal inference.

Now let me make that sound simple. Qualitative interviewing is conversational

interviewing. It's the same sort of conversation we have when we meet someone

interesting for the first time. We listen intently, ask follow-up questions, discover

answers to questions we were too clueless to ask.

Qualitative causal inference is simple, too. We do that whenever we do our own event or

vacation planning. We make plans, get feedback, revise our plans, and we keep iterating

until the event is over and done.

It really is that simple.

Well, almost. The one really hard bit is persuading US military personnel to consider a

bundle of tools that none of their professional peers have taken any interest in. That is

genuinely compelling evidence that the tools are not worth considering. The business

literature calls this hurdle the "fuzzy front end of radical innovation." One way over the

hurdle is to guess, or learn, enough about the intended use to present a version that is

concrete enough for others to see the vision. That is the aim of this paper.

1 Some sections of this paper just seemed easier to write in the first person. For those sections, "I" refers to

John Hoven.

4

Conversational Interviewing: Learning by Leaps

Conversational qualitative interviewing is the best part of the toolkit we call Fast-

Feedback Operations. I vividly remember one merger investigation that started when we

heard that the merging parties were the only suppliers of an essential device for

steelmaking. I did a cursory internet search, and discovered scores of firms that make

every conceivable variant of the device. You can choose from a menu of feature options,

or you can hire a high-end, custom-design firm. That was enough for me. But the lawyer

I was working with insisted that we interview at least one steelmaker.

And we learned that steelmakers buy the really cheap kind. But their requirements are so

distinctive that no one makes it except the two merging parties. We interviewed a couple

of internet companies, and they confirmed that. They don't have the capability to make it.

And then we learned that manufacturers outside the US make the steelmaking devices –

and US steelmakers buy them for their overseas plants. These are trusted suppliers. They

could readily enter the US market.

Wrong again. And for a totally unexpected reason. Steelmakers rely on the suppliers to

maintain these devices – and the know-how to do that is different for every steel plant. So

you must have this know-how to be a successful competitor, and you can't get it unless

you are a successful competitor. The foreign suppliers don't have it, and couldn't get it.

Human relationships of all kinds are as nuanced as those we discovered in that

investigation. Consequently, investigating them requires a way to get answers to

questions we are too clueless to ask. Surveys and specific information requests don't do

that. Interviews do, because you can ask probing follow-up questions instantly, as soon as

you hear something unexpected: "What do you mean? Can you give me an example?"

That fast feedback is the key to learning about "relationships, people, cultural economics,

human terrain … the linkage between your turf and the problems." (MAJ Thornton, op.

cit. 2007)

And it is fun. It takes some time to become comfortable conversing about things you

know nothing about, but it is not hard to learn. A few hours of predeployment training

may be sufficient for lower-level Army soldiers.

5

Investigating relationships is easier than you think

The analytic approach that is used in merger analysis provides crystal-clear direction to

investigating relationships, and it is applicable to almost any sort of relationship. Figure 1

offers a simple, visual roadmap.

ActorA and ActorB

may be individuals,

organizations, or

groups defined by an

analyst –e.g., "youth

who are deciding

whether to be

terrorists."

Each actor gives

something and gets

something – GoodA

for ActorB, GoodB

for ActorA. These

may be noneconomic

goods (a sense of

belonging). The

relationship may be

coercive ("your

money or your life").

Figure 1 serves as a checklist for these key questions:

What does each entity get out of the relationship? (GoodA for ActorB, GoodB for

ActorA)

Why do they value those goods? (wants)

How are they able to provide those goods? (key capabilities)

Who else could readily supply those goods? (ActorA2 for GoodA, ActorB2 for

GoodB)

What else would be a good substitute, or at least the next-best alternative?

("GoodX from ActorX" for GoodA, "GoodY from ActorY" for GoodB)

What future commitments and expectations sustain the relationship? (compliance

commitments and benefits)

What mechanisms exist to monitor compliance with these commitments and

expectations? What are the consequences of noncompliance? What incidents of

noncompliance have occurred?

Figure 1. Analyzing Relationships

RelationshipType

● Compliance commitments and benefits ● Noncompliance monitoring and consequences

incidents

Actions

Attributes ● key capabilities ● wants

ActorB

Actions

Attributes ● key capabilities ● wants

ActorA

GoodA

GoodB

GoodY from

ActorY

GoodX from

ActorX

ActorA2

ActorB2

6

Qualitative Hypothesis Testing in a Specific Context (Sample Size of One)

At its most basic, practical level,

qualitative hypothesis testing is simple

and direct. My initial hypothesis in the

steelmaking-device merger was soundly

refuted by just two interviews. A

steelmaker (ActorB) explained why they

need a device that is designed

specifically for steelmaking (GoodA). A

manufacturer of similar devices (GoodX

from ActorX) confirmed that their

product was a poor substitute, and

explained why they can't make a device

that works for steelmaking.

In the initial exploratory stage of a

qualitative investigation, the evidence

we collect is nearly all evidence

AGAINST our hypotheses, for two

reasons. First, we don't know enough to

articulate a defensible hypothesis.

Typically, it takes some investigation

just to define the categories that we call

GoodA, GoodB, ActorA, and ActorB.

Secondly, as we gain confidence in a

hypothesis, we explicitly search for

evidence against it. At this later stage,

the hypothesis is already well confirmed,

so these contrary cases are exceptions.

We use them to define the outer

boundaries of the context where our hypothesis is strongly confirmed.

Cause-and-Effect: What Happens, Here and Now, if we do A, B, and C?

The hypothesis testing in Figure 2 is for a static hypothesis: Is GoodX from ActorX

currently a good substitute for GoodA? In contrast, an operational goal is dynamic

change – e.g., facilitating entry by GoodX from ActorX, in order to give ActorB a better

option than GoodA. ActorB might represent "youth who would leave the terrorist life if

they had a job that could support a wife and family." Or ActorB might represent an

agrifood trader who would expand his business, if he had some alternative to the power

brokers that control business opportunities. More generally, conflict is frequently a

competition for lootable rents – especially monopolizable natural resources and the

power of government. In those instance, choice (a new "GoodX from ActorX") and

market-based competition can take away the lootable rent, and the motive for conflict.

Figure 2. Qualitative Hypothesis Testing

Actions

Attributes ● key capabilities ● wants

ActorB

Actions

Attributes ● key capabilities ● wants

ActorA

GoodA

GoodB

GoodX from

ActorX

ActorA2

Evidence AGAINST

Evidence FOR

7

Problem Diagnosis

Figure 3 illustrates the key elements in a cause-and-effect chain for problem diagnosis.

Symptoms and root causes are like the scenic backdrop of a play. The primary focus of

the investigation – the actors and events on the stage – are the ongoing contributing

causes, linked by "ands" and "ors." Those in Figure 3 are generic types of causes. A

context-specific investigation would use them as a starting point, quickly focus on one

significant aspect of the problem in the local context, investigate that in depth, and

develop a much more locally nuanced chain of cause-and-effect.

Symptoms

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Root causes

Sources:

Davis, Paul K. (2011) "Primer for Building Factor Trees to Represent Social-

Science Knowledge,” in Proceedings of the 2011 Winter Simulation Conference,

ed. by S. Jain, R.R. Creasey, J. Himmelspach, K.P. White, and M. Fu

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.416.2076&rep=rep1&t

ype=pdf

Davis, Paul K. and Kim Cragin (2009) "Summary," in Social Science for

Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together, ed. by Paul K. Davis, and Kim

Cragin, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation. xvii – li

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG849.html

“Counterterrorism that attacks only one of several “or” branches

will likely prove ineffective because of the substitutions. On the

other hand, successful attacks on any of the “and” branches might

prove to [be] quite effective.” (Davis and Cragin 2009: xxxix)

Figure 3. Excerpt from Davis (2011),

"Figure 7: Factors in Terrorists-

Organization Decision Making"

8

Solution finding

Finding solutions to a problem – a new "GoodX from ActorX" – is a search for a

solution-oriented chain of cause-and-effect. The following excerpt gives a flavor of the

search process:

In 1990, Jerry Sternin was working for Save the Children, the international

organization that helps children in need. He'd been asked to open a new office in

Vietnam… "We were like orphans at the airport when we arrived in Vietnam," he

recalled. "We had no idea what we were going to do." …

Sternin …traveled to rural villages and met with groups of local mothers. The

mothers divided into teams and went out to weigh and measure every child in their

village...

Sternin asked them, "Did you find any very, very poor kids who are bigger and

healthier than the typical child?" The women, scanning the data, nodded and said,

"Có, có, có." (Yes, yes, yes.)

Sternin said, "You mean it's possible today in this village for a very poor family to

have a well-nourished child?"

"Có, có, có."

"Then let's go see what they're doing."

Sternin's strategy was to search the community for bright spots – successful

efforts worth emulating…

For one thing, bright-spot moms were feeding their kids four meals a day (using

the same amount of food as other moms but spreading it across four servings rather

than two). The larger twice-a-day meals eaten by most families turned out to be a

mistake for children, because their malnourished stomachs couldn't process that much

food at one time…

The bright-spot mothers were collecting tiny shrimp and crabs from the rice

paddies and mixing them in with their kids' rice… The mothers also tossed in sweet-

potato greens, which were considered a low-class food. These dietary improvisations,

however strange or "low class," were doing something precious: adding sorely needed

protein and vitamins to the children's diet.

As an outsider, Sternin never could have foreseen these practices. He knew

nothing about sweet-potato greens. The solution was a native one, emerging from the

real-world experience of the villagers, and for that reason it was inherently realistic

and inherently sustainable…

The community designed a program in which fifty malnourished families, in

groups of ten, would meet at a hut each day and prepare food. The families were

required to bring shrimp, crabs, and sweet-potato greens. The mothers washed their

hands with soap and cooked the meal together. Sternin said that the moms were

"acting their way into a new way of thinking."

Heath, Chip, and Dan Heath (2010) Switch: How to Change Things When Change is

Hard, pp. 27-29

Figure 4 illustrates a solution-oriented chain of cause-and-effect. The components of this

example have been selected based on academic literature and my personal experience. A

9

similar sort of generic causal chain could be designed for a specific type of operational

context. During operations, that generic chain would be custom-tailored for the specific

operational context.

Figure 4. "Cause-and-effect" chain for solutions ("Theory of change")

Iterate rapidly. Pivot sharply as needed to

explore more promising opportunities.

Lean Startup

Try out one very small piece of a

solution. The goal is simply to learn.

Evidence AGAINST

Evidence FOR

Build credibility

"What could be done?"

Discover a destination.

AND

OR

Assemble a searchable collection

of "bright spots" – successful

efforts worth emulating – together

with detailed descriptions of the

context, problem, and solution.

Copy "bright spots"

from similar contexts

Design a program

("GoodX by ActorX")

Build the concept

What is a first step?"

Find local "bright spots"

Recruit local change agents

("ActorX")

AND

10

Summary of the essential basics

Conversational interviewing is easy to learn, and it is an essential tool for learning

about "relationships, people, cultural economics, human terrain … the linkage

between your turf and the problems." (MAJ Thornton, in SWJ Editors, "Thoughts

from the Field on Kilcullen's 28 Articles (Pt. I)," Small Wars Journal Blog Post,

April 19, 2007)

A few key questions are a good start for analyzing any sort of human relationship.

Figure 1 offers a visual checklist.

Yes, there are well-established methods to discover and test hypotheses for a

specific context (sample size of one) – and the essential basics are easy to do.

A chain of causal factors linked by "AND" and "OR" is a simple and hugely

valuable device to help you think more clearly about ill-defined problems,

solutions, and fast-feedback operations.

Build credibility and build the concept with fast, simple experiments that are

designed simply to learn.

11

Fast-Feedback Operations for Ill-Defined Problems, Part II:

Investigating and Acting in Conflict-Affected Local Contexts

Problems Solutions

[R]esearch at more aggregate levels … has been less useful

for … sub-national patterns of conflict (for instance, why

conflict happens in some communities or regions but not

others), variation in types, forms and consequences of violence

(for instance, why some people are targeted by armed groups,

or why some wars are very brutal while others are less so), and

variation in the consequences of violent conflict (for instance,

why and how some groups and regions benefit … while others

lose out).2

… the factors that

explain … violent

conflict are closely

interrelated with how

people behave, make

choices and interact

with their immediate

surroundings….3

[A]ny local population includes a multitude of political,

economic, social and religious groups, which each has its own

goals, beliefs, customs and attitudes…

[P]olicy-makers and practitioners continually deplore

that while they know many of the standard peacebuilding

models, templates and techniques that they use are

ineffective … no one has yet offered a convincing alternative.4

Future examinations of

local impacts should

use qualitative

inquiries … and

consider multiple local-

level factors…5

2 Justino et al. 2013: 3 3 Justino et al. 2013: 3 4 Autesserre 2014: 494, 497 5 Autesserre 2014: 495

12

Locally focused peacebuilding and stability operations need fast, in-depth understanding

of an operational context where unknown unknowns are important. Our goal is to provide

this capability to soldiers at the lowest levels, because they have the most direct, daily

contact with the local people. For that, we need a clearly articulated, easy-to-use

methodology for ill-defined problems. Part I of this paper describes the essential basics,

and Part II suggests a way to adapt it to conflict-affected areas.

The methodology we seek needs to be flexible enough to become a theory of conflict in

one specific context. It also needs to be flexible enough to learn from ad hoc theories of

conflict in similar contexts, and from well-researched theories of conflict from a variety

of academic disciplines, macro-level data like PMESII/ASCOPE, and macro-level

conflict analysis tools:

The dynamics between a given value chain and the wider context …vary from

case to case, and not all aspects of a conflict need to be taken into account in

designing, implementing and monitoring every value chain intervention. Standard,

often quite macro-level, conflict analysis tools …are useful as a starting point for

understanding the wider conflict context, including its profile (the history of the

conflict, relevant demographic, geostratic and geographic factors, and so on),

dynamics (tracing changes in a conflict trajectory over time and looking at

conflict levels and types); actors (including parties to the conflict, potential

spoilers, parties to peace, third parties like mediators, political actors, civil society

leaders, business, NGOs, religious institutions like churches or mosques, etc); and

causes and drivers of conflict (political, social, economic and other issues). Value

chain practitioners should build on an initial, macro-level conflict analysis,

narrowing it down to look at conflict-related variables as they relate directly to a

chain. (Gündüz and Klein 2008: 2)

A value chain is a social network

This quote offers a good place to begin:

Violence is used strategically by certain groups of actors – the entrepreneurs of

conflict… Then others (the followers) get caught up in this process, either by

choice or by force. This starts a dynamic process of interaction whereby the

behaviour (or expected behaviour) of one group will determine and be affected by

the (expected) behaviour of other actors. (Justino et al. 2013: 15)

This quote characterizes violence as a sort of business decision. If we take that

perspective, we can use the analytic frameworks of value chain analysis (in economic

development) and merger analysis. Those frameworks are already flexible enough to

accommodate all manner of relationships (including coercive relationships). They are

even flexible enough to accommodate noneconomic goods – e.g., reputation and trust –

because those are core concerns for understanding business relationships, just as with any

other human relationship.

13

For entrepreneurs of violence, the value chain might look something like this:

Inputs: unemployed youth, social networks that can be redirected to violence,

lootable rents (monopolizable natural resources and the power of government)

Intermediate Outputs: Grievances, Identities that support the desired conflict

Output: Successful competition for lootable rents, or resolution of grievances

To illustrate the analysis, Figure 5 is a

value chain for broiler chickens

(chickens for eating, rather than egg-

laying). The actors in these boxes could

be categories defined for analytic

convenience, or they could be names of

individual businesses in one specific

value chain.

Typically, a broiler chicken slaughter

plant will have long-term relationships

with one hatchery, one feed mill, and a

number of independently farmer-owned

broiler chicken houses. It will also have

established relationships with three

types of customers: fast food, retail, and

food service & export.

Farmers who own and operate broiler chicken houses have no access to customers except

through a broiler chicken slaughter plant. Consequently, if their region has only one plant,

that plant would appear to have "market power" (the term used in merger analysis), or

simply "power" (the term that is used with varied meanings in conflict analysis).

Moreover, it costs a few hundred thousand dollars to construct a new chicken house, and

it's not good for anything else. A substantial part of that investment may even be dictated

by the specific requirements of one slaughter plant. Consequently, a grower is "locked-

in" by this sunk investment, perhaps to a single slaughter plant.

These conditions would seem to offer a ripe opportunity for exploitation, and even

violent conflict: "Vertical relations characterized by inequality in benefits, power and

opportunity can instigate violent conflict." (Saperstein and Campbell 2008: 6)

Why doesn't it?

One last pillar in the micro-level approach to the analysis of violent conflict is the

recognition that violence only emerges in very specific circumstances. Some

societies, despite having conditions pre-disposing them to violent conflict, such as

horizontal inequality, polarisation and natural resource rents, do not descend into

conflict…

Figure 5. A value chain is a social network

Feed mill Hatchery

Broiler chicken houses

GrowerA GrowerB GrowerC

Food service

& export Retail Fast food

Broiler chicken slaughter plant

14

In general, violent conflict is unlikely to take hold if a country has a

framework of widely-agreed rules, both formal and informal, that govern the

allocation of resources and rents and the peaceful settlement of grievances.

(Justino et al. 2013: 12)

The obvious candidate for peaceful settlement of grievances is contract enforcement

through the legal system. However, that is a costly, uncertain undertaking, so it is an

atypical way to enforce contract compliance in any industry, even in the U.S. Instead, the

commonplace strategy is reliance on informal "relational contracts" – agreements or

understandings of good conduct that are enforced through loss of reputation and future

business, rather than through regulatory oversight or the legal system. (MacLeod 2007)

For example, a broiler chicken "relational contract" might look like this:

What are the terms of the “relational contract”?

o Trust – the slaughter plant will act consistently and keep promises.

o Nondiscrimination – all growers are treated equally (including those who

are located far away from any competing slaughter plant). The exceptions

are few, explicit, and generally accepted – e.g., incentive payments and

formal long-term contracts for new growers.

o Loyalty – the slaughter plant won't cut off growers unless the plant is shut

down or sold.

o Long-term profitability – the slaughter plant provides accurate, honest

estimates of the expected cash flow to growers who take out loans for new

construction or upgrades; and if there are unforeseen negative events (like

increased energy prices), the slaughter plant raises compensation to

growers enough that they can still make their loan payments.

How does breach of contract result in the loss of future business?

o Growers choose not to invest in new houses or upgrades.

o Growers choose other slaughter plants, in circumstances where this does

not imply disloyalty – e.g., when a young grower buys or inherits the

family farm

o Banks deny loans for the slaughter plant's growers.

These two sets of questions are the

"compliance commitments" and

"noncompliance consequences"

referenced in Figure 6 (taken from

Figure 1).

RelationshipType

● Compliance commitments and benefits ● Noncompliance monitoring and consequences

incidents

GoodA

GoodB

Figure 6. Compliance

commitments

15

The great advantage of these informal contracts is that they are enforceable through

unilateral conduct (I’ll take my business elsewhere) rather than by persuading some third

party (judge, regulator, or legislative body).

In a conflict environment, of course, enforcement through the legal system may be

especially dubious, and the unilateral conduct that enforces relationships contracts may

be a threat of violence. Nevertheless, enhancing relationship contracts may be a conflict

antidote that is easier to implement than reforming the legal system. For example, one of

the great trust-building innovations of the internet is the 5-star user rating system. So

consider the following. Throughout the developing world, agribusiness is conducted

almost entirely through informal markets, because growers cannot provide the consistent

quality that is demanded by supermarkets and export markets. Traders pick up whatever a

farmer has, and take it to the city wholesale market. Small retailers go there at 3am to

visually inspect and buy their daily produce. Now suppose that a cellphone app for rating

traders and growers were made available, using the rough indicators of quality (color,

smell, etc.) that local traders use among themselves. With that, growers and traders could

develop a reputation for delivering a known quality, expand their markets, offer more

options to growers and retailers, and build the local economy.

Competing value chains are a cooperating, competing social system

Figure 7 – a simple extension of Figure 5 –

helps focus the search for factors that

contribute to conflict in a specific context.

Instead of a single value chain governed

by a single actor – say, PlantA – Figure 7

shows all of the actors engaged in this

activity (PlantA, PlantB, PlantC, and their

value chains).

We can zoom out even further by

relabeling the boxes to highlight apparent

sources of conflict in the specific context

we are investigating. The boxes might be

sectors of industry or employment that are

dominated by particular ethnic groups, or

they could be inputs that are monopolized

by ruling elites (land, water, government

regulation).

Charting them in a value chain prompts us to look for competitive alternatives to

monopolized inputs, connectors for polarized groups (e.g., business relationships that

build trust, capabilities, and positive social interactions), and better options than terrorism

(job opportunities for unemployed youth).

Figure 7. Competing value chains are a

cooperating, competing social system

Food service

& export Retail Fast food

Broiler chicken slaughter plant

PlantC PlantB PlantA

Feed mill Hatchery

Broiler chicken houses

GrowerA GrowerB GrowerC

16

With that, we can begin a more focused investigation of questions like these:

Actors and Relationships

What are value chain actors’ relationships with conflict actors? Where are

there overlaps?

Does the value chain strengthen existing collaborative and mutually beneficial

links between actors across conflict divides?

Conversely, does it reinforce divisions between communities? Is it located in a

sector that is dominated by a certain group or in a specific region only,

without benefit for others?

Are products and services generated by the chain broadly accessible and do

they benefit the full spectrum of the population, including across conflict

divides?

Conversely, do people see chain products and services benefitting only certain

parts of the population and in a way that could generate resentment and

tensions?

Conflict Analysis of Value Chain Participants and Relationships

Do value chain group identities correspond to those featuring in the conflict?

How is power wielded among value chain actors? Who holds it and who

benefits from it?

Do any of the identified conflict actors have a stake in the value chain and if

so, in what form?

Do relationships exist between value chain actors and conflict parties and, if

so, what is their nature?

Who within the value chain profits or benefits from the conflict and who loses?

Gündüz and Klein 2008: 6, 15

Conclusion

Our goal is to develop a clearly articulated, easy-to-use methodology for ill-defined

problems – in particular, for use by lower-level soldiers in peacebuilding and stability

operations. Part I of this paper emphasizes the ease of use. Part II emphasizes how hard

the problems are, and urges consideration of a toolkit that is specifically designed for

these kinds of problems.

We should emphasize that if the toolkit works as well as we believe it will, these ill-

defined problems will still be really hard. Moreover, our project is itself an ill-defined

problem, so we are using the toolkit to develop it.

17

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