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Acta Astronautica

Acta Astronautica 81 (2012) 484–498

0094-57

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journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/actaastro

Evaluating research for disruptive innovation in the space sector$

L. Summerer

ESA Advanced Concepts Team, Keplerlaan 1, 2201 Noordwijk, The Netherlands

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:

Received 16 February 2012

Received in revised form

18 June 2012

Accepted 7 August 2012Available online 12 October 2012

Keywords:

Disruptive technology

Advanced research

Space

65/$ - see front matter & 2012 Elsevier Ltd. A

x.doi.org/10.1016/j.actaastro.2012.08.009

s paper was presented during the 62nd IAC i

ail address: Leopold.Summerer@esa.int

a b s t r a c t

Many governmental space activities need to be planned with a time horizon that

extends beyond the comfort zone of reliable technology development assessments and

predictions. In an environment of accelerating technological change, a methodological

approach to addressing non-core technology trends and potentially disruptive, game-

changing developments not yet linked to the space sector is increasingly important to

complement efforts in core technology R&D planning.

Various models and organisational setups aimed at fulfilling this purpose are in

existence. These include, with varying levels of relevance to space, the National

Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Institute for Advanced Concepts (NIAC,

operational form 1998 to 2007 and recently re-established), the Defence Advanced

Research Projects Agency of the US Department of Defence, the Massachusetts Institute

of Technology (MIT) Medialab, the early versions of Starlab, the Lockheed Skunk Works

and the European Space Agency’s Advanced Concepts Team.

Some of these organisations have been reviewed and assessed individually, though

systematic comparison of their methods, approaches and results have not been

published. This may be due in part to the relatively sparse scientific literature on

organisational parameters for enabling disruptive innovation as well as to the lack of

commonly agreed indicators for the evaluation of their performance. Furthermore,

innovation support systems in the space sector are organised differently than in

traditional, open competitive markets, which serve as the basis for most scholarly

literature on the organisation of innovation. The present paper is intended to advance

and stimulate discussion on the organisation of disruptive innovation mechanisms

specifically for the space sector. It uses the examples of the NASA Institute for Advanced

Concepts and the ESA Advanced Concepts Team, analyses their respective approaches

and compares their results, leading to the proposal of measures for the analysis and

eventual evaluation of research for disruptive innovation in the space sector.

& 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

1.1. Scope

Governmental ambitions in space have exerted a formid-able technology pull since the early days of the space age.During its first two decades, practically every space mission

ll rights reserved.

n Cape Town.

required the development of new technologies and thus theundertaking of substantial risks. As von Braun formulated itin a letter to then US Vice-President Johnson on 29 April1961, shortly before the space race reached its peak: theSoviet Union was competing in the space race by putting a‘‘peace time economy on a wartime footing’’ and to continue ‘‘Ido not believe that we can win this race unless we take at least

some measures which thus far have been considered acceptable

only in times of a national emergency’’ [1].By the end of the Apollo programme, the situation had

already changed substantially, though some legacy of the

L. Summerer / Acta Astronautica 81 (2012) 484–498 485

space race and thus its mechanisms for innovationremained dominant at least until the end the cold warand the collapse of the Soviet Union. The first highly visibleand symbolic cooperation in space was the docking ofApollo and Soyuz in July 1975. This cooperation later grewinto the Shuttle-Mir programme in the mid 1990s and theongoing unprecedented international cooperation in theframe of the International Space Station (ISS), the largestinternational science project ever conducted. The movefrom cold-war driven competition to cooperation, and theassociated change in motivations (measures acceptable onlyin times of a national emergency are not longer taken forspace activities) had substantial consequences on the wayspace technology and innovation in and for space have beenconducted. In parallel, and similarly important, some spaceactivities have generated new commercial markets (e.g.telecommunications) and are now driven more by eco-nomic, market oriented decisions than by governmentalones. Space agencies (civilian and military), traditionally themain funding bodies, for advancing space related technol-ogies and concepts have been adapting to this change bydiversifying their innovation and technology developmentstrategies.

The innovation environment for space activities haschanged substantially over time. The decreasing share ofgovernmental, strategy- and defence-driven technologypush has increased the difficulties for space applicationsand space solutions to remain competitive with terrestrialsolutions. At the same time, accelerated consumer-marketdriven changes in information technology and the con-sequences of a continuation of Moore’s law offer terres-trial solutions a dynamic and broad pool of technologies,and gives them the opportunity and need to regularlyupgrade their systems and frequently change their offers(frequent creative destruction) in a highly competitive,innovation-driven supplier base with strong marketincentives. Space systems, on the other hand, continueto suffer from relatively long development times, increas-ingly risk-adverse customers, the need to remain compe-titive using chosen technologies during their entirelifetime. They are furthermore subject to a still dominantgovernmental quasi-monopsony, a highly concentrated,vertically integrated space industry with dominant primecontractors, relatively few incentives for independent,competition-driven industry lead investments into inter-nal R&D and even smaller incentives for R&D investmentsinto potentially disruptive innovation [2–4].

Governmental entities have therefore put mechanismsin place to compensate for some of these deficienciesinherent to the space sector. This paper analyses two ofthese mechanisms, one in the US and one in Europe, bothdedicated to supporting disruptive innovation for thespace sector.

With some simplifications, one could classify spacetechnology into three different categories:

1.

Technology led by space as a niche, unique application(many times shared by the defence sector).

2.

Technology, using space as a lead market. 3. Technology driven by terrestrial markets, adapted

to space.

relative importance of these three kinds, simplified under

A schematic representation of the evolution of the

the headings ‘‘space-only’’, ‘‘space-led’’, ‘‘space-also’’ isshown in Fig. 1.

With the maturation of the space sector, accompaniedby the maturation of some of its key technologies, therelative share of space-only technologies has been gradu-ally shrinking. At the same time, space technology spin-off activities have matured into a more complex spin-off/spin-in relationship between space and non-spacetechnologies.

Interestingly, these quite substantial changes have ledonly to relatively smooth, gradual and cautious changes inthe space technology management and innovation pro-grammes of space agencies. These cover all three cate-gories of space technology displayed in Fig. 1, as all threestill require some level of governmental support.

As with all high-technology dominated sectors, thespace sector requires a healthy mix between technologyprogrammes aimed at sustaining innovation and thoseaimed at potentially disruptive innovation. Ample scho-larly literature exists on the first, whereas the latter typehas so far received relatively little attention specific to thespace sector [2]. This paper attempts to contribute torebalance this situation by providing an overview of twogovernmental tools aimed at supporting disruptive inno-vation and a first tentative analysis of methods forevaluating disruptive innovation programmes for space.

1.2. Innovation types

One of the earliest scholarly definitions of innovationdates back to the Austrian economist Schumpeter, whodescribed it as ‘‘innovation implies bringing somethingnew into use’’ [5]. There are still scholarly debates on thebest definition and apparent difficulties in finding aconsensus across disciplines. Szajnfarber and Weigel haverecently attempted an explanation of these apparentdifficulties by relating the dynamics of innovation to theenvironment in which it occurs and the choice of the unitof innovation [6].

The European Commission proposed the followingdefinition in its 1995 Green Paper on Innovation: ‘‘Inno-vation is the renewal and enlargement of the range ofproducts and services and the associated markets; theestablishment of new methods of production, supply anddistribution; the introduction of changes in management,work organisation, and the working conditions and skillsof the workforce’’ [7].

One of the most commonly used differentiations of theinnovation process considers the type of impact theresults of the innovation process create. This is done bydistinguishing between processes of incremental andradical innovation (as defined by e.g. Ettlie et al. [8]) orsustaining and disruptive innovation, as defined by Chris-tensen [9–11].

In this definition, incremental innovation is charac-terised by small or relatively minor changes and improve-ments that do not alter in a substantial way the basicunderlying concept. Incremental innovation strives tooptimise products and services. Contrary to this, radical

Fig. 1. Schematic, symbolic representation of space technology categories in three different types: space-only, space-led and space-also technologies

together with a few example technology area trajectories.

L. Summerer / Acta Astronautica 81 (2012) 484–498486

innovation is based on a different set of engineering andscientific principles and intends to open up new marketsand new potential applications.

Similarly, when analysing why established marketleaders and well-run companies tend to fail to understandand incorporate disruptive innovation by considering theeffect of innovation on the market leaders (incumbents),Christensen defines sustaining innovation as thosechanges that ‘‘foster improved product performance’’.While these can be incremental or discontinuous/radicalin nature, they have in common that ‘‘they improve theperformance of established products, along the dimen-sions of performance that mainstream customers in majormarkets have historically valued’’ [10]. Market leadersusually champion this type of innovation.

Contrary to sustaining innovation, Christensen hasdefined disruptive innovations as those that ‘‘bring tothe market a very different value proposition than hadbeen available previously’’ and that generally ‘‘under-perform established products in mainstream markets’’but offer new qualities that new, typically originallymarginal customers value. Refined in a later work, Chris-tensen and Raynor define disruptive innovation as ‘‘aninnovation that cannot be used by customers in main-stream markets. It defines a new performance trajectoryby defining new dimensions of performance in compar-ison to existing innovations. Disruptive innovations eithercreate new markets by bringing new features to nonconsumers or offer more convenience or lower prices tocustomers at the low end of an existing market’’ [11]. Aslightly different, though possibly more elegant definition

has been proposed by Daneels: ‘‘A disruptive technologyis a technology that changes the bases of competition bychanging the performance metrics along which firmscompete’’ [12].

Disruptive innovation usually changes a product orservice in ways that the market does not expect, typicallyby being lower priced or designed for a different set ofusers. It will often have characteristics that traditionalcustomer segments may initially not want, but somemarginal or new segment will value. Anthony associatesthe following keywords with a disruptive innovation:simpler, lower-priced, good-enough performance, greatleap downward.

Radical innovation and disruptive technologicalchanges tend to create difficulties for existing, establishedmarket players. Reasons for these difficulties include thehigh levels of uncertainties involved in radical innovation,the unclear customer basis and the usually negativefeedback from established, traditional customers withregard to the potential of the innovation for their productsand services. These lead to an associated higher risk andlower return on investment. Despite often being fullyaware of disruptive changes, this makes it difficult forestablished organisations to embrace them quickly andearly and to re-orient their organisation towards leadingsuch innovation instead of reacting to them. Therefore,even though disruptive technologies initially under-perform established ones in serving the mainstreammarket, they eventually displace the established technol-ogies. According to this theory, this process leads toentrant firms that support the disruptive technology

L. Summerer / Acta Astronautica 81 (2012) 484–498 487

displacing incumbent firms that supported the priortechnology [12].

In competitive, free market environments, this situa-tion leads to opportunities for new entrants and (usuallysmall) specialised companies that can sustain their busi-ness model based on emerging niche markets and lowerprofit margins. It is therefore argued that the only wayincumbents can embrace disruptive innovation is tocreate separate, independent entities, unconstrained bythe core business.

Contrary to incremental innovation, which aims tooptimise, radical innovation focuses on changes in themore profound domain of core concepts or base princi-ples. These therefore tend to lead to or require radicalchanges in the whole structure, society, product, orservice (plus its context; e.g., by opening up completelynew markets). Radical innovation thus touches some ofthe basic assumptions that are usually validated byexperience and as such strongly anchored inorganisations.

It would be pretentious to argue that the space sectoras a whole and ESA are not subject to the same difficulty.It is hard not only to recognise but also to embrace,encourage and stimulate disruptive innovation. Theestablished decision mechanisms and required prudencewhen spending public funds tend to favour the security ofopting for a known path forward, strengthening theincumbents and sustaining existing competence andemployment levels. Furthermore, the space market hassome particularities, which require further analysis; e.g.in space markets, there is relatively little margin norincentive for space industry to develop and maturetechnology entirely on own funds, especially one thatleads to sustaining or disruptive change. Most technologydevelopments for space applications are therefore linkedto governmental technology development programmesand embedded in roadmaps usually built by consensus,thus putting even higher pressure on the governments toadopt the right balance.

1.3. Research on disruptive innovation in the space sector

When Christensen published the concept of disruptiveinnovation in 1997, initially labelled under the term‘‘disruptive technology’’, he triggered strong interest bothfrom practitioners as well as from scholars. Since Chris-tensen used the hard-drive data storage sector, a subset ofthe computer and IT industry, as one of his most illus-trative examples of how incumbent, highly successfulcompanies fail to respond adequately to early signs ofdisruptive innovation, it has had an especially strongimpact in the fast evolving IT sector. The space sectorand scholarly literature about innovation in the spacesector largely ignored the concept when it was published.In the absence of scholarly work on its causes, speculativereasons for this oversight might include the relativeabsence of the space sector in the scholarly literature oninnovation. This absence is in turn likely to be due tostrong governmental involvement, which is perceived asdistorting the market and market-driven innovation. It

might also be linked to the small size of the space market,or the limited amount of easily accessible data [3].

It is well recognised in the commercial market, thatfirms need to engage in the process of revolutionary ordisruptive innovation for their long-term survival[9,10,13]. While not governed by the same forces, similarmechanisms related to their respective and changingrelevance to market needs govern public sector innova-tion [4]. Smyrlakis et al. have shown how a simplifiedmodel of the European space sector can explain the roleand responsibilities of a governmental monopsonist onthe innovation level of its supplier base [14].

Henderson et al have shown that how difficult it canbe for an established organisation to respond to signifi-cant shifts in the environment, throwing into high reliefproblems of cognitive framing and resource allocation, byexploring the role of embedded organisational competen-cies in shaping what Christensen has coined the ‘‘innova-tors dilemma’’ [10,15].

Henderson et al demonstrated that in addition to theimportant role of senior management in recognisingdisruptive changes early on and reorienting the organisa-tion towards recognising and adapting to disruptivechanges, the legacy of proven organisational setups playa critical role in preventing timely change, includingembedded customer or market-related competencies[15]. While Henderson’s analysis is focussed on competi-tive markets, the results of the work by Szainfarber et al.on the close relationship between governmental mono-psonist, industry and scientists in space science missionspoint towards a potentially similar, organisational situa-tion in governmental markets [2,16].

Furthermore, Christensen explicitly showed that pro-blems in technological competence could not serve as anexplanation for the frequent failures of incumbent firmsto adapt to disruptive innovation (He demonstrates thatthese had no technical difficulties in developing the nextgeneration of product, in his example hard drives), butthat decision making was too strongly influenced by thecurrent demands and needs of the largest, core customers.It therefore proved to be difficult to allocate resources toinitiatives that would serve new customers at lowermargins, even if these were technically easily within thereach of the firm. In order to create industrial firms able tocompete in the world market, a process of substantialindustrial consolidation has taken place in both Europeand the US, where the space industry is dominated byfew big prime contractors, which receive the majorityof the allocated governmental budgets for space pro-grammes [3].

It is worth noting that the approach adopted initiallyby Christensen has not only received a large, generallypositive response, but it has also triggered some wellfounded criticism related to the methodology and therelative simplicity of the underlying concept [12,17].Danneel questions whether disruptive technologies werealways simpler, cheaper, and more reliable and conveni-ent than established technologies as described by Chris-tensen, since e.g. there are also some mainstreamcustomers valuing disruptive technology and disruptivetechnology emerging in the high-end market segment,

L. Summerer / Acta Astronautica 81 (2012) 484–498488

rather than with lower performance [12]. Some of thiscriticism of the initial concept has been addressed bysubsequent publications by Christensen and Raynor, whoadded some granularity to the approach by differentiatingbetween low-end disruptions, addressing the low end of anexisting value network, and new-market disruptions,which create a new value network [11]. In this laterframework, a new-market disruption is defined as an

innovation that enables a larger population of people who

previously lacked the money or skill to begin buying and

using a product [11].

2. Methodology

2.1. Structure and overview

Of the different organisations that are engaged inresearch for disruptive innovation with links to the spacesector, data exist only for European and US organisations.For the initial research for this paper, the followingorganisations have been preliminarily assessed: the NASAInstitute for Advanced Concepts (NIAC, operational form1998 to 2007 and re-established in 2010), the DefenceAdvanced Research Projects Agency of the US Departmentof Defence, the MIT Medialab, the early versions ofStarlab, the Lockheed Skunk Works and ESAs AdvancedConcepts Team. Some of these organisations have beenreviewed and assessed individually, including in thescholarly literature. In particular, the Defence AdvancedResearch Projects Agency has been the subject of sub-stantial analysis. However, a systematic comparison oftheir methods, approaches and results has not beenpublished. This might be related to the relatively sparsescientific literature on organisational parameters for orga-nising disruptive innovation as well as to the lack ofcommonly agreed performance indicators for their eva-luation. Furthermore, innovation support systems in thespace sector are organised differently than in traditional,open competitive markets, which serve as the basis formost scholarly literature on the organisation of innova-tion. The present paper therefore intends to advance andto stimulate a discussion on the organisation of disruptiveinnovation mechanisms specifically for the space sector.Two case studies are used for this initial step: the NASAInstitute for Advanced Concepts and the ESA AdvancedConcepts Team to analyse their respective approaches andcompare results. Both organisations have published dataon 9 years of operations in the same timeframe and withsimilar objectives and scopes. This restriction to twoorganisations is voluntary since it allows to start withtwo relatively similar cases, before expanding the com-plexity of the analysis by including further organisations.The work, which takes into account quantitative as wellas where necessary qualitative parameters, leads to someproposed measures for the analysis and evaluation ofresearch for disruptive innovation in the space sector.

2.2. Data sources

This paper relies on publicly available first hand data(publications, citations, programme announcements,

budgets), on review papers and reports and the data theseare using and on secondary scholarly articles. The sourcesof the data are provided in the text as references.

Most of the data concerning the original NIAC pro-gramme comes from an independent review by the USNational Research Council, which published a report in2009, originally asked for by the US House of Representa-tives in 2008, 1 year after the termination of NIAC after 9years or operations. This relatively detailed reviewincluded conclusions and recommendations for re-establishment of an entity similar to NIAC [18]. ‘NIAC-2’has subsequently been created with slightly differentfunctioning parameters and orientations under the officeof the NASA Chief Technologist in 2010. Additional dataare also taken from official final reports of NIAC andespecially its the 9th annual and final report [19]. Wherethere are differences between these two, these are speci-fied in the text. In general, the data from the NRC havebeen given higher credibility due to the later publicationdate as well as the independence of the review process.

Most of the data on the ESA Advanced Concepts Team(ACT) is taken directly from the publicly available websiteof the ACT, which includes all its scientific publications,information on the research network, Ariadna studiesdetails, research partners and team members [20–22].

Information regarding the research conducted byDARPA is coming from the website of DARPA as well asfrom scholarly articles written on and about its activities[23,24].

2.2.1. Currencies

The time span of the present evaluation extends from1998 to 2010 and covers amounts in US$ as well as in h.Currency values have not been inflation adapted, neitherfor the 9 years of NIAC operations nor for the 9 yearsanalysed for the ACT. In this context it is worth mention-ing that neither NIAC nor the ACT have adjusted theirgrant values to inflation. US$ and h-values are further-more not converted but left in their respective originalvalues. The relative values of these two currencies havechanged substantially over the assessment period. Forhistoric exchange rate data, referred to e.g. [27]. Theapproach adopted here is considered sufficient for thepurpose of this paper since both entities have dealt onlywith contracts in their respective currencies and thusrelative purchasing power changes would not have sub-stantial impact on the ’domestic’ value of the respectivegrants.

3. Case studies

3.1. NASA institute for advanced concepts – NIAC

This section deals with the original NIAC, operationalfrom 1998 to 2007. It does not take into account therecently re-established NIAC, for which only preliminarydata are available.

3.1.1. Origins and goals

In 1998, NASA created its Institute for AdvancedConcepts (NIAC) with the aim to ‘‘provide an independent,

L. Summerer / Acta Astronautica 81 (2012) 484–498 489

open forum for the external analysis and definition ofrevolutionary space and aeronautics advanced concepts tocomplement the advanced concepts activities conductedwithin the NASA Enterprises’’. In the words of NIAC, ‘‘The

NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts (NIAC) was formed to

provide an independent source of revolutionary aeronautical

and space concepts that could dramatically impact how

NASA develops and conducts its missions. The Institute

provided a highly visible, recognised and agency-level entry

point for outside thinkers and researchers. The ultimate goal

of NIAC was to infuse the most promising NIAC-funded

advanced concepts into NASA plans and programs’’ [19].It was terminated by NASA in 2007. One year later, the

National Research Council established a group of 12experts under the co-chairmanship of R. Braun and D.Wiley to conduct an independent review of the achieve-ments of NIAC. It can be reasonably assumed that therecommendations of this report ultimately lead to the re-establishment of NIAC within the Office of the NASA ChiefTechnologist [18]. Most of the statistic and proceduraldata on NIAC for this paper is taken from this review aswell as from the final report of NIAC [19]. In the forewordof its final annual report, the NIAC director summariseshis view as ‘‘NIAC has sought creative researchers who have

the ability to transcend current perceptions of scientific

knowledge and, with imagination and vision, to leap beyond

incremental development towards the possibilities of dra-

matic breakthroughs in performance of aerospace systems.’’

3.1.2. Funding

NIAC has been funded at approximately $4 M per year,received a total of $36.2 M from NASA, of which it spent75% on grants.1 While not specifically detailed, it isassumed that the remaining 25% or $8.9 M was spent oninternal organisation including its six person staff (situa-tion 2007), the peer review process and USRA overheadcosts.

NIAC followed a two phase innovation and projectmaturation process, which allowed anybody outside ofNASA to submit grant proposals for

Phase 1grants

1 It is not

between the 7

calculated in t

work.2 There is

for phase II stu

upper limit an

phase II grants

since even if al

maximum amo

only to $26.1 M

on all grants.

: Lasting for 6 months and with fundingbetween $50 and 75k, or

Phase 2grants

: Lasting up to 2 years and dedicated tofurther concept maturation with a fundingup to $500k.2

Phase 2 grants were awarded after successful Phase 1grants to provide further maturation. In total, NIAC has

clear to the author what the origin is of the discrepancy

0% mentioned in the NIAC final report and the 75%

he NRC review. The latter one is taken as basis for this

a discrepancy between the maximum amount of funding

dies between the NIAC final report, which gives $400k as

d the NRC review, which states $500k as upper limit for

. For the purpose of this paper, the latter value is taken

l 126 phase I and all 42 phase II contracts had received the

unt given by the NIAC final report, this would add up

and thus $1.2 M short of the sum reported to be spent

received about 1300 proposals3 (1066 Phase 1 proposalsand 129 Phase 2 proposals) out of which it awarded 168grants, for a total of $27.3 M. These were divided into 126Phase I grants, 42 of which followed with more substan-tial Phase II grants [18].

3.1.3. Organisation

NIAC was operated to a certain extent external to NASAsince it was established as an Institute of the UniversitiesSpace Research Association, with its director reporting not toNASA but to the President of Universities Space ResearchAssociation (USRA). USRA is a private, nonprofit corporationunder the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences(NAS). It has 105 colleges and universities as institutionalmembers currently, all of which offer some space science andtechnology graduate programme [28].

While less visible, NIAC leadership also had strong,though indirect involvement from the U.S. military aero-space activities, DoD research facilities, and the DefenseAdvanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), providedvia ANSER through a subcontract. ANSER participated inthe operation of NIAC and ‘‘enabled the Institute to haveaccess to significant resources developed over decades ofsupport to the government through the Department ofDefense (DoD)’’ [28].

When it was formed, NIAC was managed by a high-level agency executive who was intended to be concernedwith the objectives and needs of all NASA enterprises andmissions. The NRC review concluded that when this cross-organisational aspect of NIAC was abandoned with thetransfer of NIAC to a mission-specific directorate, NIAClost its alignment with NASA’s overall objectives andpriorities.

NASA personnel were not allowed to compete for NIACgrants. The reported reason for this is that when NIAC wasformed, there was adequate funding for development ofnovel, long-term ideas internal to NASA. Since this NASAinternal funding, which was essential to pick up ideasfrom NIAC and develop them further within the regularNASA structures was gradually reduced. One of therecommendations of the NRC review board was to allowalso NASA personnel and centres to compete with any-body else for NIAC grants.4

Administratively, NIAC grants were handled outside ofthe standard NASA contractual processes, since NIAC wasoperated on behalf of NASA as an institute of USRA [28].

NIAC used a relatively transparent internet-basedmanagement environment and a peer review system forevaluating proposals. It also published all its reports on itswebsite allowing critical review.

3.1.4. Impact parameters

The NRC review used several measures, both qualita-tive and quantitative, to assess the success of NIAC.

3 According to the statistics in the NRC review, 1195 proposals were

actually reviewed. The assumptions is that the remaining 114 or 9% of all

proposals did not pass formal acceptance criteria and were thus rejected

before the peer review process.4 This recommendation has been implemented in the new NIAC

setup.

L. Summerer / Acta Astronautica 81 (2012) 484–498490

Ultimately, they were all directly related to the originalgoal of NIAC when it was created. Since NIAC had a 10–40year planning horizon for its mission, it is not surprisingthat some of the concepts have not yet entered into eitherthe relevant NASA mission directorate decadal surveys,strategic plans, or mission streams. According to thecontract between NASA and USRA, a key contract perfor-mance metric was ‘‘that 5–10% of the selected conceptswere infused into NASA’s long range plans’’ [19].

Additional subsequent funding: One of these measures isthe amount of additional funding generated by ideasemanating from NIAC projects after the projects hadbeen finished. While there is no overall figure quoted inthe assessment nor the final NIAC report, possibly due tolack of suitable data, the NRC review committee foundthat 14 NIAC Phase I and Phase II projects, which wereawarded at a total of $7 M by NIAC, received an additional$23.8 M in funding from a wide range of organisations.Among the 42 Phase II grants for further maturing ofconcepts awarded Phase I grants, 12 (28.6%) had receivedadditional funding from parties other than NIAC, the largemajority (75%) coming from NASA [18,19]. The differencebetween the 25% of Phase IIs having received furthervalidation by additional funding quoted in the final NIACreport [19] and the higher number quoted in the laterNRC review [18] indicates that due to the long timeframe,this number is likely to increase even further overthe years.

Impact on NASA long term planning: Three NIAC Phase IIstudies (7% of the Phase II awards) are reported to haveimpacted NASAs long-term plans, and two of these effortshave either already been incorporated or are currentlyunder consideration by the NRC Astronomy and Astro-physics Decadal Survey as future NASA missions [18]. Theconclusion was therefore that when the assessment wasmade, the performance metric of 5–10% of concepts toimpact NASA long-term planning had already been fulfilled.

Network: NIAC developed a community of researchers,inventors and entrepreneurs interested in principle ininnovative advanced concepts. The larger number couldbe deduced from the total number of 1309 proposalsreceived during in its 9-year lifetime. The inner circle ofthis network were those with whom NIAC actuallyengaged in studies: The 126 NIAC Phase I studies (someof which were continued into Phase II studies) were ledby a total of 109 distinct principal investigators. Each ofthese typically led a research team of 3–10 persons. Intotal, the number of persons directly engaged with NIACcan thus be evaluated as being between 300 and 1000persons, 500–600 persons probably being a reasonablygood estimate of the actual number. Under the assump-tions that

1.

5 The data between the NIAC final report and the NRC review differ

slightly. The data from the NRC review are taken as more authoritative

non-selected and selected proposals have roughly thesame number of individual contributors (probably anover-estimation since more contributors tend toincrease the proposal quality),

for this paper. The NIAC final report data are 45% to universities, 40% to

2. small businesses, 7% to small and disadvantaged business, 2% to

historically black colleges and universities and minority institutions,

and 7% to large businesses. It is assumed that the total of 101% is due to

rounding errors in the final report.

there were a negligible number of ‘‘random’’ proposals(e.g. quickly submitted ideas, usually by one personswho did not have/take the time and effort to explainand describe it in a structured manner), and

3.

there were a negligible number of persons involved inmore than one proposal or proposing more than oneidea (also probably leading to overestimation),

and given the 1309 proposals received, between 3900 and13,000 persons have been involved in submitting ideas onadvanced space concepts to NIAC.

The grants spanned all categories of external entitieswith 41.7% going to universities, 44.0% being awarded tosmall businesses, 4.8% to small and disadvantaged busi-ness, 1.8% to historically black colleges and universitiesand minority institutions, 6.0% to large businesses and1.8% to national laboratories [19].5 Interestingly, while45% of the attributed grants went to academia and only40% to small businesses, the proportion of submissionswas the inverse: 53% of the applications were from smallbusinesses and only 33% from universities [18].

Media-coverage: Both the reviews by NRC and the NIACfinal report underline the importance of the success ofNIAC in providing widespread positive publicity for NASA,including TV and media coverage and internet interest.

Encouragement of careers in science and technology:While no hard data is provided in the NRC review, theauthors considered the ‘‘anecdotal evidence’’ substantialenough to conclude that the NIAC student undergraduateFellows program and the media coverage of its activitiesmotivated young people to pursue studies in engineeringand science.

3.2. ESA’s advanced concepts team (ACT)

3.2.1. Origins and goals

The ESA Advanced Concepts Team (ACT) was createdin 2002 with the mission to ‘‘monitor, perform and foster

research on advanced space systems, innovative concepts

and working methods’’ [21]. As part of its task, the teamhas to deliver to ESA rigorous and rapid assessments ofadvanced concepts not necessarily yet linked to space. Itis interesting to note in this context that the formulationof mission of the ACT is focussed on the means to achievea goal, rather than on the goals and objectives themselves.The context of its creation, within the then directorate ofStrategy and External Relations, provides the missinginformation since its task was ‘‘proposing the overallstrategy and long-term vision of the Agency including,inter alia, ESA-wide policies relevant to the Europeanstrategy for space, advanced concepts, relations withESA Member States, the EU and non-member States, andcommunication’’ [29]. Even more specifically, the teamreported within this directorate to the head of the‘Advanced Concepts and Studies Office’, responsible for‘‘outlining, in coordination with the Agency’s other

L. Summerer / Acta Astronautica 81 (2012) 484–498 491

directorates, a programmatic and technical long-termvision of the Agency’s future development’’.

The time horizon of the team’s work is not provided innumbers of years ahead but is defined relative to thehorizon of all other ESA programmes and projects, byrequiring the topics to be one step ahead. Therefore the‘golden rule’ of the team is that if anybody else within ESAstarts working on concepts and technologies addressed bythe team, the team hands these topics over and moves onto new ones.

3.2.2. Funding

The ACT operates at an average annual funding ofabout h1M, provided entirely by the ESA General StudiesProgramme [30]. This figure includes its internal costs andoverheads in the form of salaries for its researchers aswell as external research contracts, and thus variesslightly from year to year, depending on the number ofstudies and the number of internal researchers presentduring that year.

External research contracts of the ACT are performedwithin the Ariadna scheme, a mechanism for collaborativeresearch between ACT and university researchers [31].Three funding levels are associated to Ariadna studies:

Small studies 15k h

Standard studies 25k h

Extended studies 35k h

These three Ariadna study types are not associated inany way to a progressing sequence, but instead are one-off studies with no follow-up studies within the Ariadna

scheme. The types of studies are defined by the ACTdepending on estimates on how much time and effortwould be required for the planned research.

While, at its conception, these were associated withindicative durations of 2 months, 4 months and 6 monthsrespectively, experience from the first few years of opera-tions showed that these time constraints were not useful(e.g. standard studies lasting on average 9 months, morethan twice the planned duration) and have thus beendropped entirely; the duration being decided on a case bycase basis between the ACT researchers and the universityresearch team. Given the prevailing importance of otherfactors, statistically there is no correlation between theduration of studies and their total funding [31].

3.2.3. Organisation

The structure of the team took account of lessonslearned from previous approaches within ESA and themethods adopted by the NASA Institute for AdvancedConcepts, DARPA, the central research and developmentorganisation in the US DoD, the MIT Medialab, Starlab, byLockheed’s Skunk Works and some of its later imitators aswell as of setups within highly innovative commercialcompanies not linked to the space sector such as GoogleInc., IBM and others [21].

Implementing these lessons learned within the structuresof the ESA environment, led in 2002 to the following mainparameters of the ACT: the team was set up as a group of

researchers, mainly research fellows (RF—post-doctoralresearchers joining the team for two years) and younggraduates (YGT—recent Masters-level graduates joining theteam for 1 year), who originate from a broad variety ofacademic fields and aim at an academic career. The pursuit ofthe highest scientific standards is therefore as much in theirown interest as in the interest of the team. The steadyrenewal of researchers (one or two year periods within theteam) allows a continuous, flexible adaptation of the teamscompetence base to the needs of ESA and to evolutions inscience and technology. It is also the basis for fresh unbiasedassessments and re-evaluations, while avoiding empire-building and preventing ESA career-considerations to influ-ence the orientation and conduct of research.

The ACT relies mainly on the research ideas of itstemporary researchers, and thus internal research. In theconduct of such research, a mechanism to solicit universities(the Ariadna scheme) has been developed which allows forjoint research collaborations on very specific topics [31].

The team can therefore be considered as a hybridbetween an entirely internal, closed research team/thinktank and a funding source for external researchers work-ing on advanced concepts.

As far as is known to the authors, the combination oftemporary in-house researchers from a multitude of disci-plines, the reliance on empowered young researchers whoare encouraged to propose and are relatively free to pursuenew ideas, together with a framework to perform collabora-tive research in ad-hoc virtual teams is quite unique andinnovative in itself. Recent initiatives have emerged atnational level inspired by the ACT model [32,33].

Externally the team interacts almost exclusively withuniversities—specifically small, innovative research labsoften with no prior link to ESA or the space sector. Basedon the analysis of success models of other innovationleaders, administratively, the team has always beensituated at the corporate level, outside of the missionand support directorates and independent from the coretechnical strategies and road-maps. Originally, the teamwas created as an integral part of the General StudiesProgramme of ESA and it has always been contributing tothe goals of the GSP [30].

3.2.4. Impact parameters

Additional subsequent funding: The total of all fundsinvested in Ariadna studies with universities since thescheme was created in 2004 and until 2010 amounts toh1:9M. While there is no precise tracking of all fundingsubsequently received by universities, the sum of thoseadditional funds awarded to these same universities forfollow-on work for which numbers are available amountsto h5:3M from non-ESA sources. ESA funds to continueAriadna studies directly after their completion are the rareexception and add less than few 100k h to this total. Themajority of this additional investment is taken by a fewhigh-flying activities, e.g. one h25k Ariadna study with ateam with no prior knowledge in space led directly to ah3:5M EU FP7 project led by the same university team butnow involving major European space industry). The over-all financial leverage on investment by ESA from Ariadna

studies is about 1:3 for the Ariadna scheme when taking

L. Summerer / Acta Astronautica 81 (2012) 484–498492

into account only non-ESA funds, and roughly 1:3.5 whenadding ESA funding to mature concepts further.

This analysis of the Ariadna studies however repre-sents only part of the overall picture since Ariadna studiesrepresent in total per year between 18% and 39% of thetotal ACT budget (24% of the total ACT budget between2002 and 2010), which is dominated by the personnelcost of internal researchers. Therefore, while the Ariadna

scheme offers an essential mechanism for the research ofthe team, most of the actual work of the team is doneoutside of Ariadna studies, including mutual interestbased common studies with researchers usually fromwithin the existing network of ACT researchers [21].

Impact on ESA long-term planning and strategy: Con-trary to NIAC, the ACT was not created with the explicitgoal to impact ESA’s long-term planning and strategy.However, administratively the ACT has always beenlocated outside of the core technical directorate and closeto corporate strategy making (originally it was situatedwithin the Directorate of Strategy and External Relations;most of its existence it has been located within theservices of the Director General). Therefore, the resultsand competence of the team have always been used alsoto provide input to strategy.

In its function as an internal think-tank, the ACT alsoattempts to identify trends, new research advances andevents that have the potential to impact the future of spaceand describe these in form of internal reports. Their impact isnot easy to quantify and thus this assessment remains largelyqualitative. Examples of early identification by the team oftopics of ‘‘future’’ interest which have since then becomedirectly relevant include the emergence of suborbital andprivate spaceflight (report entitled ‘‘Is a second space agecoming?’’ which was followed later by studies on spacetourism and related technologies as well as by an ESA-wideworking group on the same topic, delivering a first coordi-nated coherent position of ESA on the topic [34]. Similarmechanisms have been at place for the topics of nuclearpower sources for space, planetary protection aspects and the(then) emerging maturity of global optimisation techniques[35–37]. Reports and recommendations have been producedby the team several years prior to these topics receiving theattention of mainstream ESA and most initial points madeand directions proposed in this work can be clearly identifiedin subsequent roadmaps and technology strategy documentson these topics [38,39].

There is at least one area, where activities of the teamhad an immediate, directly traceable effect on a newprogramme of ESA: activities and reports by the teamon the (then) upcoming importance of the energy themewhen energy was still receiving almost no attention in2002/2003 have led to the introduction of the generaltheme of ‘‘space and energy’’ into the proposal of theintegrated applications promotions programme to theministerial council in 2008 and contributed to the pre-paredness of ESA for ongoing activities with the EC on thetopic of space and energy [40,41].

Another aspect of how concepts and topics of the teamare transferred to the core of the Agency is to consider thetransfer of disciplines and general topics initiated by theteam and then contributed to and taken over by other ESA

departments. So far, three general disciplines have beenstarted by the team and then taken up by other ESAdepartments (space nuclear power sources, planetaryprotection, global optimisation for trajectory design).The very different pathways they have taken indicate thatthere is no standard take-up mechanism.

Network: Since the team is based on a small number ofinternal researchers, an active network of universities andexternal researchers has been created and maintained tofoster a vibrant innovation network. Since the topics of theteam are located on the fringes of space activities andbeyond, such a network includes many research centres notspecialised in space. This emerged as a valuable asset in itself,especially since the space sector has long been considered asa ‘‘lonely forerunner’’ and has experienced difficulties inengagement and cross-fertilisation with other sectors.

This research network is neither static nor fixed, butevolves with the team, its orientations and its members.One quantitative way to measure its size is representedby the more than 450 unique co-authors of publicationspublished by the team and available on the website. Theseare persons that have actively worked with one or severalresearchers of the team in a successful project that led toa publication. It is therefore a conservative low estimate;the number of actual research contacts and loose co-operations is much higher.

Since practically all members of the team are temporaryresearchers, the alumni network is constantly growing. 69%of ACT members go back to academia immediately afterleaving the team and of all the team members 54% of all pastmembers remained within an academic career.

Media-coverage: There is no systematic analysis of themedia coverage of research results from the AdvancedConcepts Team. While the website contains some 60þ pressclippings about the team, these are just a small fraction andwere mostly added before 2005. Since in general, the teamdoes not make specific efforts towards communicating withthe media, most of the appearances are triggered by uni-versity researchers involved in studies by the team.

Encouragement of careers in science and technology:Similar to NIAC, there is no hard data as to whether theteam provides additional stimulus for students to startcareers in science and technology. The only faint indicatorof the higher than average attractiveness of the teamcould be taken from the over proportional number ofapplicants for vacant post-graduate positions.

4. Comparison of goals, means and results

This chapter attempts a first comparison between theapproaches adopted by NIAC and the ACT respectively.The comparison parameters will be covering

1.

goals and objectives, 2. organisational structures and means to achieve these

goals, and

3. results obtained in achieving these goals.

The comparison must be read with some caution withrespect to the relative timeframes: while there is some

Table 1Comparison of qualitative goals and operational means between the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts (NIAC) and the ESA Advanced Concepts Team

(ACT).

NIACa ACT

Goals Provide an independent source of

revolutionary aeronautical and space concepts

that could dramatically impact how NASA

develops and conducts its missions;

Monitor, perform and foster research on

advanced space systems, innovative

concepts and working methods

Infuse the most promising NIAC-funded

advanced concepts into NASA plans and

programs

Time horizon 10–40 years Beyond regular ESA programmes

Means Funding source -Internal research team

Externally conducted research Collab. ext. research contracts

Main source of ideas External, fully open calls Internal, temporary researchers

Relation with parent organisation External Internal

Liaison persons Within corporate functions

Indep. of core technical entity Indep. of core technical entity

Follow-up of activities Phase 2 contracts to successful phase 1 studies No follow-up mechanism

Not involved in evaluation of own research

results

External follow-up Mainly NASA contracts Mainly non-ESA contracts

a Evaluation based on the original NIAC, its re-establishment in 2010 with slightly different parameters is not taken into account in this table.

L. Summerer / Acta Astronautica 81 (2012) 484–498 493

overlap in the existence between NIAC and the ACTbetween 2002 and 2007, the organisational setups forboth organisations have been defined with 4 years of timedifference. Table 1 gives a summary of the main qualita-tive goals and means of the two organisations, describedfurther in the following subsections.

4.1. Comparison of goals

While the wording of the mandates of the NASAInstitute for Advanced Concepts and the ESA AdvancedConcepts Team are not identical, the overall goals of thetwo mechanisms to perform research on potentiallydisruptive space concepts and technologies are compar-able (see Sections 3.1.1 and 3.2.1). In addition, both havesimilar time horizons, defined as 10–40 years for NIACand defined as beyond the horizon of regular ESA pro-grammes for the ACT.

While one of the explicit goals of NIAC has been toprovide input and have an impact on NASA’s long-termplanning, this aspect is not explicitly stated for the ACT,while in practical terms this aspect is included in pub-lications and presentations of the ACT. The reasons forthis might relate to the fact that it was establisheddirectly within the organisation’s entity close to strategydevelopment. (see Section 3.2.1).

4.2. Comparison of organisational means to achieve the

goals

Even though the goals of the two entities are largelycomparable, the mechanisms adopted by NIAC and ACT toachieve these goals show substantial differences:

Funding entity versus internal research team: WhileNIAC acts essentially as a funding organisation, the ACTfunctions mainly as an internal research think-tank, usingfunding only for collaborative peer research with

academia. As a consequence, the ACT is constitutedmainly of temporary internal researchers (10–15 per-sons), thus very frequent turnover and a constant changein competences and orientations. On the other hand,operating NIAC was possible by a smaller, six personsteam, mainly administering the process.

Role and location within parent organisation: While theACT is located administratively at the core of ESA, tradi-tionally close to corporate strategy functions, NIAC hasbeen effectively been outsourced to an independent uni-versity association. To the best of the authors knowledge,there is no public account for the reasons for thesedecisions. Interestingly, it is worth noting that based onthe recommendations of the NRC assessment, NIAC-2 wasre-created at corporate level within the office of the NASAChief Technologist.

Both groups are thus organisationally not within thecore technical establishment and largely shielded frommain-stream technology roadmaps, priorities and goals.This follows one of the guidelines developed by ColorelliO’Connor in the context of ‘major innovation’: buildingupon concepts formulated by Bennet and Tushman andothers, Colorelli O’Connor concludes that major innova-tions require distinct organisational entities, such asinstitutionalised groups responsible for breakthroughinnovation, since it cannot be expected to happen withoutsuch incentives in an organic environment, where flex-ibility, consensus building, and fluidity are the primarymanagerial mechanisms for accomplishing the overallobjectives of the organisations, thus adding delays,second-guessing and compromises. Such groups thereforeneed to be physically and culturally separate from themain organisation [42,43].

Sources of ideas: While NIAC relies entirely on researchtopics and concepts proposed by external entities, the ACTrelies mainly on the collective insight of its researchersand solicits external ideas only on specific topics in the

L. Summerer / Acta Astronautica 81 (2012) 484–498494

form of call for ideas. As a consequence, the breadth ofideas and concepts considered by NIAC is greater thanthat of the ACT. In this context it is worth noting that thenew NIAC also allows NASA internal ideas to besubmitted.

Contractual interactions: The ACT limits its externalcontractual interactions to academia and academicresearch centres employing a fixed and standardisedcontractual framework. NIAC has been open to all entities,including industry. In practical terms therefore, 100% ofexternal research partners of the ACT are from academia,compared to about 42% of NIAC grants. The NRC review ofNIAC does not make any distinction between academicand non-academic entities in the account of the successesof NIAC’s results.

Maturation of advanced concepts: NIAC uses a two-phase process, of which the second phase is a furthermaturation phase with almost an order of magnitudemore resources and conditional on positive resultsachieved during the first phase. Therefore NIAC isinvolved in the selection, judgement and further matura-tion of concepts and technology.

The ACT approach does not include any further tech-nology or concept maturation within the team, but reliesentirely on others for this process.

Table 2Comparison of key quantitative data and characteristics b

(NIAC) and the ESA Advanced Concepts Team (ACT).

NIACa

Created in

Operational until

Operational years assessed

Grant amount phase 1

Grant amount phase 2

External partners 42%

44%

6%

8%

Average funding per year

Total funding

Funding to research grants

Funding to research grants (in %)c

Total number of research studiesd 168

External follow-up fundinge

Ratio external follow-up/initial funding

Research networkf (number of researchers)

a The data are based on the original NIAC and do not

slightly different parameters and no available data yet.b See explanation in main text for difference between Nc The percentage value is based on the total funds sp

percentages spent on external research contracts (their vari

study activities the team was conducting during the first yd The number for the ACT does not take into account r

includes only those done within the Ariadna scheme.e The NIAC value is based on a selection of 14 studies w

reported by the NRC evaluation. The total value is not p

evaluation.f The number for NIAC is based on estimations of resea

number for the ACT is the number of unique co-authors of

during their stay at the ACT.g Numerically, the average annual funding of the ACT

functioning of the team, it required approximately 2 years

funding level, which is taken as a basis for this assessment

4.3. Comparison of results

Table 2 summarises most of the quantitative compar-ison parameters of NIAC and the ACT.

4.3.1. Follow-up of new concepts – additional funding

Both approaches have generated a significant amountof additional follow-up funding. While there is no data forall of NIAC studies, the NIAC final report as well as theNRC report have selected 14 successful studies, whichhave received originally $7 M from NIAC via phase 1 andphase 2 grants and which obtained $ 23.8 M of additionalfollow-up funding. In the case of the ACT, a few high-value follow-up R&D contracts dominate the additionalfunding: the ACT has spent h1:8M on Ariadna studies,which in total have received about h5:3M of externalfollow-up funding.

While in the case of NIAC studies, most (75%) of theadditional funding following their studies has come fromNASA via other, regular NASA programmes, in the case ofAriadna studies performed by the ACT, the large majority(more than 80%) of additional funding has been comingfrom non-ESA sources. This substantial difference isrelated to many factors, among which the different fund-ing environments in the US and in Europe certainly play a

etween the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts

ACT

1998 2002

2007 Today

9 9

$50–75k h15235k

r $500kb None

Academia 100% academia

Small businesses

Large businesses

Others

$4 M h1M

$36.2 M h7:8Mg

$27.3 M h1:8M

75% 24%

Phase 1: 126 90

Phase 2: 46

$7 M having led to $23.8 M � h5:3M

Missing data 3 : 1

500–600 450

take into account its re-establishment in 2010 with

IAC and NRC reports.

ent over 9 years and not the average of the annual

ation is from 11 to 39%); if furthermore excludes GSP

ears of its creation.

esearch studies done without exchange of funds, but

hich had received substantial additional funding as

rovided by the NIAC final report nor by the NRC

rchers involved in successful NIAC grants, while the

scientific papers authored by the team’s researchers

would be h860k though due to the structure and

before being fully operational and reaching the h1M

.

L. Summerer / Acta Astronautica 81 (2012) 484–498 495

role, though this could also be interpreted as being relatedto one of the goals of NIAC, that is to impact NASA’s long-term planning, which is absent from the ACT’s remit.

4.3.2. Creation of advanced concepts research networks

Both processes have created a substantial network,which had not existed previously and which has proved tobe useful in both cases to connect those interested andknowledgeable in advanced space concepts and toprovide them with a common platform for communica-tion. While no exact figures exist, based on the reportednumber of proposals and reasonable estimates concerningteam sizes (extrapolation from successful proposals to allproposals), the total amount of persons having beeninvolved in submitting proposals to NIAC is likelymuch higher than the total number of individualsinvolved in submitting proposals to Ariadna calls for ideasand calls for proposals. Under the assumptions made inSection 3.1, between 3900 and 13,000 persons mighthave been involved in some way in submitting ideas toNIAC, with a figure between 5000 and 6000 being mostlikely. NIAC having been operational for nine years, thisamounts to between 550 and 660 person per year onaverage.

The 60 unique calls for proposals under Ariadna

have received a total of approximately 180 proposals,with each containing a minimum of two researchers as arequirement, and in practice between three and six.The total number of European researchers involvedin Ariadna study proposals can therefore be estimatedto be between 540 and 1080, with a likely number ofaround 700 researchers, or 100 researchers per year onaverage.

The number of researchers involved in writing appli-cations cannot be considered as part of the actualnetwork—the persons actually involved in selected stu-dies and research cooperations leading to tangible resultsform the functioning network of researchers. In the caseof NIAC, the selected 126 NIAC Phase I studies (some ofwhich were continued into Phase II studies) are to beconsidered. As accounted for in Section 3.1.4, theseincluded 109 distinct principal investigators forming atotal network of about 500–600 persons created during itsnine years of operations, thus an average of 50–60researchers added per year of operations. There are noaccounts of publications and unique co-authorships forNIAC study results. In the case of the ACT, the 60 uniquestudy topics released through calls for proposals have ledto 90 actual studies (some being conducted in parallel),thus between 270 and 540 researchers under the aboveassumptions.

A more accurate result is however obtained by takingas a basis the 450 unique co-authors of papers also co-authored by ACT team members. Taking as a basis the 7years of operations of the Ariadna scheme, this results alsoin about 60 researchers added per year. If the timebetween the creation of the team and the creation ofthe Ariadna scheme is taken into account (since the teamhad already published before the Ariadna research schemehad been put in place), on average 50 new researchers

have been added per year to the active research networkof the ACT.

5. Derived recommendations and proposed evaluationparameters

5.1. Organisational recommendations

Based on an analysis of the working methods used byDARPA, possibly the most successful disruptive innova-tion agency of the last decades [24], some key parametersare proposed for the organisation of a successful entitymandated to provide the first steps, the ‘‘seeds’’ fordisruptive innovation. While the use of the mechanismsdeveloped by DARPA is of interest to derive organisationalrecommendations, its different objectives, the level ofresources it employs and the larger scope both in termsof applications as well as the continued support of ideasfrom the fundamental research level up to prototypesshows also the limits of any direct comparison with eitherNIAC or ACT. The following general recommendationsconcerning the organisation are therefore provided hereexplicitly as a basis for a scholarly debate. Both NIAC andthe ACT case follow most of these, though to differentdegrees and more or less explicitly.

Renewal of researchers. The organisation should includea mechanism for a regular renewal of keyresearchers and innovators to assure a constantinflux of new ideas, approaches and concepts;importance of not building up heritage thatprevents new approaches to matureunconstrained.

Risk taking. The organisational setup and reward systemneeds to encourage risk taking.

Scientific rigour. Research on potential concepts andtechnology related to disruptive innovation tendto be outside the scientific comfort zone of manyresearchers, lack established researcher commu-nities and associated journals and thus recogni-tion; scientific rigour and the right mix ofcompetence is therefore key to guaranteeing anunquestionable methodological approach and toavoid drifting into the realms of science fiction.

Interdisciplinarity. Disruptive, potentially game-changingdevelopments tend to emerge on the fringes andintersections of disciplines.

Support from top management. Such teams and activ-ities tend to be ridiculed, admired, not takenseriously, and seen as a threat by the core of theestablishment—depending on the respectiveinterests at stake. Without clear support fromtop-management, including the shielding fromcore technical establishments and procedures,such groups struggle to survive, especially insuccessful organisations.

Importance of academia. While SMEs and start-upcompanies seem to be key for disruptive inno-vation in a 5–10 year time-span, the mostrelevant ideas and concepts for 10–15þ years

L. Summerer / Acta Astronautica 81 (2012) 484–498496

are first generated within academia and researchcentres.

5.2. Evaluation parameters

Scholarly literature has not yet converged upon gen-erally accepted evaluation parameters for disruptive inno-vation approaches. With hindsight, it is easy to qualify ifand when an innovation has been disruptive or sustain-ing, radical or incremental. With hindsight, it is also easyto analyse and understand the reasons why some actorssucceeded and some others failed, deriving some generalpatterns [9,10,44,45].

The shorter the time spans of products and thus thefaster the rate of change, the easier it becomes to generatedata and underlying patterns, which might help makedecisions regarding the optimal organisational structureto address them. For sectors with very long product cyclessuch as the space sector, which additionally is stillrelatively young, and dominated by governmental mono-psony conditions, data on disruptive innovation policiesand results are sparse.

The comparison between the NASA Institute forAdvanced Concepts and the ESA Advanced Concepts Teamtherefore followed a straight forward, fact-basedapproach. These are now inserted into one method,proposed by O’Connor for the organisational setup criteriato prepare for major innovations, with the understandingthat this reference can only serve as a starting point fordiscussion, leading potentially to an arguably betterunderstanding of the most appropriate method for thespace sector [43].

5.2.1. Preparation for ‘major innovation’—organisational

parameters

While there is substantial scholarly literature on dis-ruptive innovation, and an emergent consensus on someof its key parameters, there are still widespread differ-ences concerning how to best prepare for disruptiveinnovation in organisations. Furthermore the scholarlyliterature on this topic always assumes the mechanismsgoverning competitive markets. The space sector is how-ever fundamentally different in this respect. Therefore theproposed conclusions derived in the scholarly literaturemight not be fully applicable to the mechanisms in thespace sector.

An interesting approach is proposed by O’Connor, whoproposes seven key system elements as being central toenabling what she terms ‘major innovation’ to happen[43]. The argument is based on the assumption thatorganisations are unable to take full advantage of theirinternal resources for preparing for ‘major innovation’ ifthey continue to rely mainly on innovation champions.The important role of these passionate innovators hasbeen well described in scholarly literature on innovationand it is argued that they need to be recognised andfostered by the organisation’s management. However,O’Connor argues, based on advances in systems theory,advances in dynamic capabilities theory, and the manage-ment of innovation literature that organisations need to

develop what she called a ‘‘dynamic capability’’ thatincludes the key innovators as only one element of aninnovation system [43].

The article then develops a framework for buildingsuch a dynamic capability for major innovation. Since, inthis context, major innovation has been defined bycombining two very similar types of innovation, ‘‘radicalinnovation’’ and ‘‘really new innovation’’, a distinction notimportant for the purposes of the present paper, theproposed framework for major innovation can be consid-ered as fully applicable to radical innovation and suffi-cient to also include disruptive innovation. Common to allof these are high levels of uncertainty in multiple dimen-sions, which require the organisation to move intouncharted territory, where ‘‘reliance on experience, cur-rent knowledge assets, and loyal customers is not anadvantage’’ [43].

The proposed framework contains seven elements thattogether intend to form a management system ratherthan a process-based approach. It is argued that dynamiccapabilities for such complex phenomena need to beconsidered in a systems fashion rather than as operatingroutines and repeatable processes [43]. These systemelements are:

1.

an identifiable organisation structure; 2. interface mechanisms with the mainstream organisa-

tion, some of which are tightly coupled and others ofwhich are loose;

3.

exploratory processes; 4. requisite skills and talent development; 5. governance and decision-making mechanisms at pro-

ject, innovation portfolio, and innovation systemlevels;

6.

appropriate performance metrics; and 7. an appropriate culture and leadership context.

This framework is intended to be applied at a organi-sational level, therefore its usefulness in the frame of theanalysis of the mechanisms and processes developed byboth NIAC and ACT is related partially to these mechan-isms and partially to the role of these entities within theoverall innovation framework of the respective parentorganisations.

Based on the results of the general comparison asreported in chapters 3 and 4, the organisational setupschosen by both NASA and ESA correspond to the followingof elements: Both organisations use a clearly identifiedorganisational structure, both have established clearinterface mechanisms with the mainstream organisation,both allow exploratory processes and risk taking tohappen and even encourage it, both have some perfor-mance metrics, even if those are defined wider than in theconcept of O’Connor, and both have developed a specific,adapted culture and leadership context. The remainingtwo aspects, the requisite skills and talent developmentand the governance and decision making mechanisms atproject, innovation portfolio and innovation systemlevels have not been included in the above assessment.These also have not been included as key aspects in the

L. Summerer / Acta Astronautica 81 (2012) 484–498 497

external review of NIAC and data related to these points isscarce.

5.3. Proposed disruptive innovation evaluation parameters

for the space sector

The analysis of the present paper is based on data fromthe US and European space sector and especially twoorganisational units. Therefore the evaluation parametersproposed are necessarily reflecting the environment inwhich they have been developed and thus remain a priori

solely confined to the space sector. Since they are how-ever relatively high-level, it could be of interest investi-gating their extension to other sectors.

5.3.1. Take-up of results by the parent organisation

One of the key evaluation parameters needs to be thepercentage uptake of concepts, technologies, ideas andmethods initially developed by teams in charge of pre-paring for disruptive innovation. Ultimately, the parentorganisation needs to benefit from the activities of suchgroups and the direct take-up of results constitutes oneclear measure. The right percentage of those ideas that arefurther developed by the mainstream organisation withrespect to those not taken up depends on where on therisk-benefit scale the parent organisation wants to posi-tion the team. High-risk high-return approaches typicallyaim at success rates in the area between 10 and 30%. Theevaluation of this parameter needs to include the uncer-tainty related to the initial ideas and thus take intoaccount potentially important evolutions (thematic) ofthemes over their initial maturation period.

5.3.2. Impact on parent organisation

While the first parameter is mainly related to thefurther funding of studies and topics pursued by suchmechanisms and is therefore quantitative, there are otherimpact parameters on the parent organisation, which alsodeserve to be included in such an evaluation. Theseinclude the infusion of methods, methodologies, and theimpact on the parent organisation’s ‘culture’ in general, aswell as it’s image and attractiveness.

5.3.3. Take-up of results by independent 3rd party

organisations

While this parameter might not be relevant to othersetups, mechanisms and structures set up by govern-ments to support disruptive innovation tend to have ascope that extends beyond the mere provision of benefitsto the mother organisation to include the larger sector. Inthis respect, both the ACT and NIAC, even if less explicitfor the latter, have as scope to be beneficial to therespective US and European space sector and not only toESA and NASA. Therefore, this parameter should includethe percentage of concepts, technologies, ideas and meth-ods initially developed by such teams take up and furtherfunded by other entities than their parent organisation.

5.3.4. Impact on sector

In addition to the quantitative fourth parameter, somequalitative impacts also need to be included in such an

evaluation. These include the diffusion of ideas, concepts,methods and results from such teams to the sector ingeneral.

5.3.5. ‘Resonance’ of results

The time horizon of disruptive innovation researchconducted by both organisations and analysed in thepresent paper is roughly 10þ years ahead. Due to thelong planning perspectives of mainstream research anddevelopment programmes for space missions, one doesnot need to wait 10þ years for ideas from such teams tobe inserted into mainstream activities, most of themwould still enter only years after the initial activities. Itis therefore useful to have intermediate parameters.These, labelled for the purposes of the present paper as‘‘resonance of results’’, include the traditional parametersused for research activities: e.g. number and impact ofpublications, quotations.

6. Conclusions

Compared to other sectors, the implementation ofmechanisms for preparing for disruptive innovation needsto take into account the specificities of the space sectorand the specificities of how the space sector is currentlyorganised: strong governmental influences close to gov-ernmental monopsony structures, few vertically inte-grated prime contractors, limited incentives forcommercial companies to invest in disruptive innovation,very long lead times, long product cycles and a conflictbetween very advanced technologies pushing the bound-aries of what is technically feasible and inherent conser-vatism to avoid any non-mission enabling risks.Therefore, the pursuit and stimulation of disruptive inno-vation has been undertaken almost entirely by govern-mental entities.

The present comparison of the NASA Institute forAdvanced Concepts and the ESA Advanced Concepts Teamshows two mechanisms, distinct in their approacheswhile similar in their objectives. From their comparison,an attempt has been made to derive both organisationalparameters as well as evaluation parameters for theorganisation of supporting disruptive innovation in thespace sector.

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to Nicholas Lan for the thoroughenglish proof reading and to the reviewers. Their sugges-tions and comments have improved the quality ofthe paper.

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