1

Publ. in Arjomand & Brown: The Rule of Law, Islam and Constitutional Politics in Egypt and Iran. Suny Press, 2013, pp 279-302

Egypt’s `Ulama In The State, In Politics And In The Islamist Vision

Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen

The constitutional history of Iran reminds us that `ulama could have been playing

a rather more significant role in the history of the Egyptian Constitution than has actually

been the case. Similarly, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran demonstrates

that a constitution could well define the powers, institutional structures and formal

position of ‘ulama in the state. In the Egyptian Constitution, this has never been the case.

Nevertheless, since 1971, the principles of the Islamic shari`a takes an important place in

the Egyptian Constitution as a (and later as the) main source of legislation. In Egypt, it

seems that the shari`a is important, whereas the `ulama are not.

There are reasons for this discrepancy, including the traditional Sunni rejection of

clericalism, the emergence of Islamism in the form of a predominantly lay movement in

Egypt, and the secularist traditions of legislation which are still reflected in the Egyptian

political structure (even if Islam is increasingly mentioned). As Nathalie Bernard-

Maugiron, Clark Lombardi and others have demonstrated, in practice it is now the

Supreme Constitutional Court which formally has the final say in defining what the

principles of the shari`a to be implemented in Egyptian law are. And that body does not,

for now, include the`ulama.

2

So where have all the scholars gone? Why do they not figure in the constitution?

And, what role can they have in politics in a country where legislation must be in

accordance with the principles of the shari`a? How are they regulated then? And are

there no attempts at bringing them back in?

When the modern Egyptian state bureaucracy evolved in the 19th

century, the

`ulama as a group were little involved. The establishment of ministries and directories

were generally seen as a strengthening of the governing capacities of the ruler. Nathan

Brown (1997) once raised the question why the `ulama responded so meekly in the face

of full-scale import of foreign law systems, complete with codified laws, a bar and a

hierarchy of state courts, while they tended to obstruct even minor administrative reforms

at the main school of higher Islamic learning, al-Azhar. Part of the answer is al-Azhar

was not only the habitat of the `ulama, their bread and soup, as it were, but also their fief,

independent of the state. Few `ulama had much interest in, or understanding of, the kind

of state organization that was emerging. There were exceptions to this rule, and from the

early 20th

century with the further encroachment of the state, and the development of the

Egyptian press and public opinion, the `’ulama and al-Azhar as a whole became active

participants in the public struggle over political initiatives in fields such as education and

family law.

The twentieth century has witnessed an overall expansion of the state religious

bureaucracy and increased state control of the `ulama. This paper will fall into two parts.

It first sketches this history in the traditional `ulama fields of courts, ifta, higher

education, and preaching, culminating in the abolition of the shari`a courts and the

nationalization of al-Azhar in 1961. It argues that this etatization of the `ulama is widely

3

resented today, by `ulama, by Islamists, and by broader strata of the religious awakening

in Egypt. This sets the stage for the second part which follows the Muslim Brotherhood’s

relationship and attitude to al-Azhar and discusses the Brotherhood’s recent turn towards

political liberalism. Recently, the Brotherhood has been calling for the complete political

and economic independence of al-Azhar and the `ulama from the state, in some ways

turning its classic slogan “Islam is religion and state” on its head. On the other hand,

there is a fraction inside the Brotherhood which now wants to place the `ulama in a

central position, even proposing that having a body of `ulama control that legislation is

not contrary to the shari`a. This new conception of a “civil state with an Islamic

authoritative rooting” appears to be inspired by the well-known ‘alim Yusuf al-Qaradawi

whose political thought could be characterized as “democratic `Ulamaism”.

The Etatization of Islamic Services

The emergence of a modern state administration in Egypt had significant

implications for the way Islamic services were administered and controlled. This state

encroachment of the administration of Islam goes back to the late 19th

century, but

reached its peak in the 1950s. The most dramatic expression of this can be seen in the

courts. During the 1870s and 1880s, a new court system was set up in Egypt, essentially

establishing three parallel systems: the Mixed Courts (where foreign nationals were

involved), the National Courts, and the Religious Courts, dealing with issues of personal

status, inheritance and religious endowments (awqaf) of the various religious

communities in the country. This meant that the state was defining a specific and limited

role to the classic Sunni qadis in the so-called “Shari`a Courts”, complete with their own

4

modern bar and legal journal. For some 70 years, these courts provided a major work

opportunity for `ulama, who could sit as judges and assistants but also pursue a career in

court administration. When the Shari`a Courts were abolished in 1956, the personnel

were transferred to the national courts, but the syndicate and the journal were shut down.

From then onwards, Azhar `ulama would be forced to compete with graduates of all other

law faculties for employment in the courts, and the most important career ladder for top

`ulama was gone. The state was now in more direct control of a unified legal system

through the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry itself has never been a significant employer

of `ulama.

An exception to this is the State Mufti, an office which has been retained in the

Ministry, and has somehow grown in stature even while the Shari`a Courts have

disappeared. The office of State Mufti dates back to 1895 when the head of the Hanafi

madhhab was appointed the “Mufti of the Egyptian Lands” at a time when law had been

codified and fatwas were no longer accepted as legally relevant in courts. With the

abolition of the shari`a Courts, the State Mufti took over some tasks formerly attached to

the head of the Cairo Shari`a Court, such as the establishment of the appearance of the

new moon, and thus the precise beginning of Ramadan, Sha`ban and the other Islamic

months. While during the 1960s the State seemed to need a Mufti less and less, since the

late 1970s the State Mufti has been allowed resurgence, as the Islamic awakening and the

re-emergence of an Islamist opposition forced the state to rely on trusted `ulama to

defend its Islamic legality and identity. From the early 1990s the administration of the

Mufti has grown significantly, and the present Mufti, Ali Gumaa, has set out on an

ambitious plan to reform ifta and train muftis from abroad. An employee at the Ministry

5

of Justice, the Mufti is a fairly reliable supporter of regime policies, and fully financed by

the state.

The biggest employer of `ulama is the Ministry of Awqaf which for most of its

life has been headed by an `alim (Abd al-Fattah, 1997, pp. 60-61). The religious

administration in Egypt generally falls under the Ministry of Awqaf. Set up in 1913 to

supervise the administration of family and benevolent awqaf (religious endowments), it

gradually became the supervisor and distributor of awqaf; a significant step in this

direction was taken with the Law 48 of 1946 for the organization of awqaf, and the

abolition of family awqaf in 1948. Today, the Ministry is the sole administrator of

Islamic awqaf, but it also administers the religious tasks previously financed by awqaf.

These include the construction and maintenance of mosques and salaries of their staff, the

public teaching of the Qur’an (including competitions), institutes of da`wa, caravans of

da`wa and teaching in the countryside, and special organizational tasks during hajj

pilgrimage season, the holy month of Ramadan, Mulid al-Nabi (the birthday of the

prophet), and other religious festivals and occasions. A special branch of the Ministry is

the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs which organizes international conferences and

publications and sends teachers abroad.

The second major employer of `ulama is the Ministry of al-Azhar. Formerly part

of the Ministry of Awqaf, it was set up as a special ministry in the 1970s to administer

the al-Azhar University with all its domestic and foreign branches and foreign student

city, and the al-Azhar school system, an Islamic parallel to the state school system.

The history of al-Azhar’s reforms since the late 19th

century has often been told.

Again, it is one of growing etatization (Eccel, 1984). To sum up the state policy towards

6

al-Azhar, it could be said that, in the 19th

century, the government initially decided to

bypass al-Azhar and set up other more relevant, and more amenable, educational

institutions. Early reforms at the turn of the century aimed at centralizing decision-

making at al-Azhar, standardizing its teaching with curricula, classes and exams, and

professionalizing its recruitment policies and staff, in the hope of producing a greater

number of candidates with more reliable skills. A new reform in 1930 sought to

academicize the studies by setting up specific faculties, more progression within the

individual studies which were now to lead to more individual written products

(resembling an MA and a doctorate). The most thoroughgoing reform took place in 1961,

nationalizing al-Azhar and placing it on the state budget, partly to ensure state control

and supervision – a general policy of the Socialist-leaning governments of the early

1960s. But the aim was also to integrate al-Azhar into general higher education, and to

instrumentalize it in foreign policy, and in specific domestic campaigns in fields such as

family planning and stressing the Socialist core of Islam. The 1961 reforms also

introduced faculties of medicine, engineering and other non-religious subjects, and a

campus for women which also included theology. Finally, it established the Academy of

Islamic Research (Majma` al-Buhuth al-Islamiya) as a body of 50 top `ulama who, in

various subcommittees and in regular sessions, study the Islamic position on

contemporary inventions and issues and prepares or certifies Islamic material. The

Academy was meant to be a world-dominating Islamic academy with foreign members –

but as it was also always meant to be dominated by Egyptians, this has never taken off,

and after its first ten years with biannual international congresses, these have now

become rare.

7

To end this section on the state’s encroachment on traditional `ulama territory, it

should be briefly noted that although state legislation was never the domain of the

`ulama, they have not been completely absent from it in the 20th

century. Top `ulama,

headed by the Shaykh al-Azhar and the Mufti, sat in the committees preparing the

codification of relevant laws, such as those on family, inheritance and awqaf, and later

major overhauls of these laws have always had their signature. Also, there is a long

tradition of `ulama running for Parliament and sitting in it, both for the ruling party and

for the opposition. Often, top Azhari’s such as `Atiya Saqr, have had prominent positions

in the NDP and in relevant parliamentary committees, whereas more marginal `ulama

with Brotherhood connections, such as Salah Abu Ismail, have been representing

oppositional parties and denounced government policies as going against Islam.

The reemergence of the `ulama as political actors

The instrumentalization of al-Azhar has come back to haunt the government. With

the Islamic awakening of the 1970s, it saw itself increasingly relying on the Islamic

legitimization of al-Azhar, e.g. in the case of the Camp David accords, and when radical

Islamist groups killed President Sadat after declaring him an apostate. The introduction

into the 1971 Constitution of the famous article 2 stating that “the principles of the

Islamic shari`a are a main source of legislation” also contributed to establishing the

scholars of the shari`a, and their institution, al-Azhar, as holding a key to legitimization –

or de-legitimization – of specific government policies. This has mainly been in the form

of statements by the Shaykh al-Azhar. Although he, like the State Mufti, is nominated by

the President, as the head of a huge organization with its own budget and hierarchy, he

8

holds a greater independence than the Mufti, and the government has shied away from

dismissing a Shaykh al-Azhar for many years. Instead, it has increasingly made use of the

State Mufti, and the last couple of Shaykh al-Azhars have in fact been former State

Muftis whose reliability was rewarded with the appointment.

As in the case of the State Mufti, the government reliance on al-Azhar, and

especially the Shaykh al-Azhar, has come at a price. Funds for al-Azhar have been

greatly increased since the 1970s, and the University has expanded all over Egypt. With

some 7% of all Egyptian children inscribed in its primary (kuttab) and secondary

(ma`had) schools, and close to half a million students in the al-Azhar University and its

branches, al-Azhar forms a huge educational sector of its own and employs its own

graduates at all levels. The price, however, is not only material but also moral and

cultural. Over the years, the regime has introduced more and more religious programs on

television, with Azhari shaykhs sometimes voicing strong criticism of the immorality of

contemporary lifestyles and practices. Even more controversially, since the early 1990s,

the Academy of Islamic Research has expanded its censorial role from approving editions

of the Qur’an and hadith to censoring all books about Islam, including novels and fiction,

in a practice where the Ministry of Interior solicits the Academy’s opinion and follows it.

The regime has had to accept this interference of al-Azhar in cultural life as a price to be

paid for its loyalty, or even perhaps to strengthen the religious authority of the top `ulama

it was relying on, as they were increasingly criticized for being government stooges.

The state support, and demand for legitimization, has accorded a central role to

the top `ulama that they had lost for decades, but at the expense of a general respect and

esteem, among oppositional Islamists in particular, but among many lower `ulama as

9

well. Inside al-Azhar, a teachers’ organization, the Front of the Azhar Scholars, had been

dormant since the early 1950s, but was revived by Islamist-leaning shaykhs. In the 1990s,

the Front increasingly showed a willingness to make statements, especially on cultural

and educational issues, that went against the government and also often against the

position of the Shaykh al-Azhar. After a showdown with the new Shaykh al-Azhar,

Sayyid Tantawi, in 1999 the Ministry of Social Affairs revoked the Front’s license as a

civil organization.

The reemergence of the Front was, however, indicative of widespread

dissatisfaction among the `ulama. Malika Zeghal conducted interviews with some 35

`ulama at the Cairo branch of al-Azhar in the mid-1990s and traced widespread criticism

of the Shaykh al-Azhar and the deans among more marginal teachers and students. Such

dissidents waxed nostalgically about an Azhar of the 19th

and early 20th

century when

teaching was better, relations between teachers and students were more intimate, and al-

Azhar as an institution and the `ulama as a corps played a role in national issues such as

the resistance against colonialism. Many pointed to al-Azhar’s dependency on the state as

the underlying cause of what they saw as a deterioration of the quality of the studies, and

of the moral standing of al-Azhar in Egyptian society (Zeghal, 1996, pp. 365-366).

How have the Shaykh al-Islam, the State Mufti and the Academy of Islamic

Research responded to the criticism from Azhari `ulama and from Islamist media and

activists? It may be argued that while in their practical dealings they have resorted to the

instruments of the authoritarian state, on the ideological level they have felt compelled to

adopt the language of their detractors.

10

At al-Azhar itself, the Shaykh al-Azhar controls the funds, the hiring and the

promotions and has thus, much like the general strategy of the regime, been able to

pursue a policy of rewarding loyalists, coopting critics, and punishing opponents. The

above-mentioned confrontation with the Front is an example of the latter. The most

remarkable attempt at cooptation is probably the invitation to a long-standing critic,

Yusuf al-Qaradawi, to talk to the Azhar alumni in 2006, and two years later the invitation

to join the Academy of Islamic Research.1 Qaradawi is, however, not so easy to placate,

and already in early 2010 he was not invited to the Academy’s meeting, due to his fatwa

on the Egyptian construction of a separation wall between Sinai and Gaza.2

The political role, and vulnerability, also depends on the personality and political

inclinations of the Shaykh al-Azhar himself. Jadd al-Haqq `Ali Jadd al-Haqq who held

the position from 1982 to 1996, was a generally respected scholar of fiqh, one of the last

to have had a career in the Sharia courts that were abolished in 1955. Even if, for many

Islamists and `ulama, his endorsement as a Mufti of the Camp David accords in 1979 was

an unforgivable act of political subservience, there were other moments when he held his

own in the face of significant political pressure, for instance by defending female

circumcision at the time of the 1994 UN population conference in Cairo. His successor,

Sayyed Tantawi (1996-2010) was much more maligned and attacked and often had to

defend himself in the media. More politically involved than his predecessor, Tantawi

actively sought a role in inter-religious dialogue (accepting to meet with even Israeli

1 International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) website www.iumsonline.net

, 30/6 2008. http://www.iumsonline.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=142:2009-05-

28-08-35-15&catid=2:news&Itemid=79 2 International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) website, www.iumsonline.net

2/3 2010. http://www.iumsonline.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=862:2010-03-02-

09-22-28&catid=2:news&Itemid=79

11

rabbis), and he accepted to make what he knew would be unpopular public statements,

for instance in January 2004 declaring the the issue of the hijab in France was a matter

only for the French. The recently appointed Ahmad al-Tayyeb (2010- ) has distanced

himself from Tantawi in several ways, including a vow not to meet with Israelis. His

agenda seems to be to stay out of the political limelight and work for the academic

upgrading of the university, even though he is a known antagonist of Islamism.

In the oppositional media the criticism has often been virulent, and with the

emergence of pan-Arab satellite television and the internet, this criticism can reach ever

wider audiences and escape any kind of government control. In the Egyptian state media,

on the other hand, the criticism of the Shaykh al-Azhar and the Mufti will generally be

muted, or only referred to, and they will be given ample space to defend themselves.

More importantly, they have very easy access to these powerful media and are promoted

in them as the representatives and defenders of the true Islam which is sadly being

betrayed by some less educated zealots who claim to speak in its name.

Recently, the state television has also employed drama to prop up its allies among

the top `ulama. In 2005 and 2008, two major TV-serials of thirty episodes (musalsalat

ramadaniyya), one on the Shaykh al-Azhar in the 1970s, `Abd al-Halim Mahmud, and

the other on the Minister of Waqf during the same period, Muhammad Amin al-Sha`rawi,

depicted these top `ulama as deeply pious and committed to the preservation of true Islam

against its many enemies, both Muslim and foreigners. But this is a bargain; although the

serials strongly condemn the militant Islamist youth, at the same time they endorse an

essentially religious vision of Egypt’s identity and political interests. For example, in the

Shaarawi serial, the 1967 defeat is explained as caused by materialism, and the 1973

12

victory as a result of the reintroduction of imams in the army which would now fight with

religious zeal.3 In this context it is worth noting that they have also popularized the

explanation of the al-Azhar’s disease as stemming from its nationalization in 1961. And

the theme of a pious religious man fighting against corrupt administrators and politicizing

elites who had embraced anti-Islamic, materialist ideologies fits quite well with the

revised ideology of Egypt’s dominant Islamist group, the Muslim Brotherhood.

To sum up part one, Egypt has witnessed a thorough etatization of Islamic services which

were once provided by more independent `ulama institutions and funded by awqaf. Since

the 1960s, there has been an implicit bargain where the state provides funds for the

`ulama, and for the expansion of their services, in return for some loyalty, in particular

from the “great `ulama” heading the `ulama institutions. This has, however, been

unpopular with the `ulama. And they have not been alone in their feelings. Islamists and

leftists have increasingly criticized the Shaykh al-Azhar and Muftis for merely providing

an Islamic fig-leaf to government policies, and these prominent `ulama regularly have to

defend themselves against their critics. There has, then, for some time been a call for a

more independent role of the `ulama, but those who partake in this discussion rarely

express a wish for the state funding to stop.

The Muslim Brotherhood

3 “Imam al-du`a” (2005, dir. Hassan Yusuf), episodes 18 and 20.

13

After returning to Parliament in force in the 2005 elections, the Muslim

Brotherhood – and its media – have toned down their rhetoric from their more

confrontational style of the 1970s and 1980s. As a rule, the organization today attacks the

government not for being un-Islamic, but for being un-democratic. As a part of this trend,

the Brotherhood has taken up the theme of the independence of the state religious

institutions and the subservience of the `ulama to the state.

The Brotherhood is essentially a lay movement. Hassan al-Banna, its founder, was

a school teacher graduate of Dar al-Ulum. None of the subsequent six general guides has

been an `alim or a graduate of al-Azhar. Moreover, the lay element was crucial to al-

Banna who believed that the strength of Islam could only be regained if Islam was

something that each and every Muslim felt responsible for, and he blamed Islam’s demise

on the traditional tendency of “hanging it around the neck of an `alim and walk away

safe” as an Egyptian adage would have it. But Hassan al-Banna lay much of the blame at

al-Azhar’s door; al-Azhar had not defended the umma, and its demonstrations had mainly

been about salaries and work opportunities. Al-Banna spoke contemptuously about the

“functionary `ulama” (Mitchell, 1969, pp. 211-213; Zeghal, 1996, p. 85). Al-Banna

supported the Azhar reforms of 1930 but did not think that they went far enough. To him,

the `ulama were more a part of the problem than of the solution. The Brotherhood

developed its own political reading of history and teaching methods that new brethren

were to submit to. It strongly stressed the da`wa, or calling of Muslims to true Islamic

living, and sent its members out on this mission to transform Egypt into a truly Islamic

society. But, al-Banna also believed that his would have to come from above, and the

Brotherhood saw the state as a central actor in this transformation. Its early slogan of

14

“Islam is religion and state” underlines the centrality of the state polity in Brotherhood

thought, although another early slogan, “The Qur’an is our Constitution” testifies to the

lack of detail in its institutional thinking.

As the Muslim Brotherhood grew during the 1930s, there were relatively few

`ulama in the Brotherhood, and few Brothers at al-Azhar (Lia, 1998, pp. 112-113). There

were, however, Brotherhood student activities in the 1940s, and there were also some

well-known Azhari shaykhs in the Brotherhood, notably al-Sayyid Sabiq, Muhammad al-

Ghazzali, Ahmad Hassan al-Baquri and al-Bahi al-Khuli. These shaykhs were known as

the “Azhari Shaykh Group.” Some of them took part in the occupation of the

headquarters in November 1953, calling for the resignation of General Guide Hassan

Hudhaybi, the most important split in the history of the organization (Qaradawi, 2004,

vol. 2, pp. 36-39). Several members of the Azhari Shaykh Group were subsequently

excluded from the Brotherhood. Hussam Tamam has recently observed that Azhari

shaykhs were either absorbed by the Brotherhood and became its representatives at al-

Azhar, or they had to leave it again, as the Organization’s discipline did not allow for

scholarly independence (Tammam, 2009, p. 56). There are still important Azhari

members of the Brotherhood, notably Shaykh Muhammad Abd Allah al-Khatib who is a

member of the Office of Guidance (Maktab al-Irshad), and they seem to fall on the more

conservative side of the organization. The most prominent Egyptian shaykh today, Yusuf

al-Qaradawi, still considers himself both an Azhari (he was recently appointed member

of the Academy of Islamic Studies) and an Ikhwani (in his memoirs he reveals that he has

twice been asked by Brotherhood representatives to head the movement as its general

guide). Having lived outside the country since 1961 he has little presence in any of the

15

organizations, and has instead established his own organization, the International Union

of Muslim Scholars, which works for the independence and unity of world `ulama and

the umma at large, and promotes an ideology and policy of al-wasatiya, the middle

ground. This term is now also often employed in both Azhari and Brotherhood

statements. Qaradawi has published a whole book criticizing the Azhar dependence of the

state, and he has several times devoted his weekly program on al-Jazeera to the question

of reforms at al-Azhar (Skovgaard-Petersen, 2009).

It seems, then, that while the Muslim Brotherhood initially was quite critical of al-

Azhar, and believed in a strong and interfering state, it has modified its stand on al-Azhar

and seems to think that al-Azhar’s most important failing is precisely the complete

financial and political control of the authoritarian state which is reproduced by the

authoritarian leadership of al-Azhar. This is evident in the Brotherhood’s political

declarations since 2003.

Debating Reforms in Egypt since 2003

From around the time of the US invasion in Iraq, and pressure on other Arab

governments for democratization, there has been tremendous talk of political reform in

Egypt, both by the government and by the opposition. An initial reform was the

amendment of the Constitution to allow for multi-candidate presidential elections. This

amendment was adopted by popular referendum in 2005, and such multi-candidate

presidential elections were held in September of that year. The fact that the current

president Hosni Mubarak was re-elected with an overwhelming majority – and that it was

in fact he himself who had proposed the amendment – demonstrates that the powers in

16

Egypt are interested in political reforms mainly to continue their dominance in reformed

ways. This was also the case with the second constitutional amendment, again launched

by President Mubarak himself in December 2006 and adopted by a referendum in March

2007, where 34 articles were changed, especially on electoral supervision and the

procedures for the election of the president, but also (article 5) outlawing any political

party based on religion.

In the midst of the reform period, between the first and the second amendments,

came the parliamentary elections of November-December 2005. It was those elections

that brought the Muslim Brotherhood into Parliament as the only significant opposition

block with 20% of the seats. This performance and the low levels of participation -

officially announced at 26% but probably lower – must have made it clear to the

governing NDP party that its public mandate was weak. Since 2001, the NDP itself had

been implementing internal reforms, but after 2005 this process seems to have slowed

down. The Brotherhood, too, has been trying to re-invent itself, not so much internally,

but mainly by formulating more specific political stands on reform in Egypt. These

formulations have been published, first in a document on reform from 2004, then in its

electoral program of 2005, and in its comments to the Constitutional amendments of

2007. Finally in August 2007, the Brotherhood issued a draft platform for a party, even

though such a party will likely never be accepted by the regime and even violates the

amended constitution.

What do these new political documents say about Egypt’s religious institutions

and the position of the `ulama? Firstly, it must be noted that, although the success of the

Muslim Brotherhood has set the stage not only for its own documents, but probably also

17

is at least part of the reason for the second Constitutional amendment, the issue of the

`ulama and al-Azhar is not all that important in the overall political struggle between the

government and the Brotherhood. Secondly, neither al-Azhar itself nor the other official

Islamic bodies have been prominent actors in the constitutional debate. The NDP reform

process has been about the party structure itself, and reinventing its ideology in a more

economically liberal way. The pressure to put the Islamic institutions on the agenda

comes principally from the Brotherhood.

Egypt’s constitution as it stands after the amendments of 2007, still does not

mention al-Azhar or the `ulama in any clause (Brown, this volume). During the spring of

2007 there was, however, much discussion about its article two which states that “Islam

is the religion of the state”, and that “the principles of the Islamic shari`a are the main

source of legislation” (as it was sharpened in 1980). Some liberal writers, human rights

groups, and Copts wanted these sentences to be deleted or supplemented by the

mentioning of other religions or traditions (such as human rights). In a press release from

the Cairo Institute for Human Rights, article two was rejected because of the power it had

given to state religious institutions which had “been used to justify the overwhelming

encroachment of religious formalities on all aspects of social, cultural, political and

economic life”, a reference to the Azhar Academy of Islamic Research and the

publications of the Ministry of Waqf. 4 The Muslim Brotherhood and al-Azhar found

themselves on the side of the NDP, supporting its rejection of any amendment to article

2, arguing that it expressed the identity of the country and its legal tradition. The

Brotherhood published a long list of criticism against each of the proposed amendments,

concluding that they will turn Egypt into a “constitutional police-state”. But apart from

4 Press Release from Cairo Institute for Human Rights, dated March 5, 2007.

18

pointing out that the new addition to article 5 prohibiting religious parties would go

against article two, there is no mentioning of religion in its criticism – which includes

suggestions to the amendments that should be made.5 Article 2, supplemented with the

mentioning of social justice, the division of powers and the like, would appear to be

sufficient for the Brotherhood, at least for the time being.

From the Reform Initiative to the Election Program.

By contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood’s reform declarations have elicited a

growing interest in the religious sector in Egypt, principally al-Azhar. In the reform

document from 2004, al-Azhar is seen as the centrepiece of the Islamic identity of Egypt:

Al-Azhar is a unique institution worldwide that Allah bestowed on Egypt. It was

established on the basis of studying, spreading and protecting the knowledge of

Noble Qur’an, shari`ah and Arabic language in Egypt. Scholars from across the

Muslim world have graduated there from and become the best ambassadors from

Egypt to their peoples. In addition, Al-Azhar has played an historic, glorious role

in raising the flag of jihad and leading Mujahideen to confront foreign occupiers

targeting Egypt. It has also raised the sound of right in the face of unjust rulers

and supported the needy and weak. All that made it a target for students from

across the Islamic word, earned it the respect and sanctity of Muslims from

Indonesia to Morocco. This makes it a duty on those who love Egypt and Islam to

seek the support and strength of Al-Azhar, to grant it freedom of thought,

5 http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.asp?ArtID=26051&SecID=212

19

movement and call, in addition to providing it with money and men capable of

carrying out its responsibility and achieving its message.6

Note that in this pre-amble – which is reproduced and expanded in the Party Platform of

2007 – the Brotherhood now fully subscribes to the Azhari self-understanding, including

the claim to have been at the centre of resistance against foreign occupiers and what

Zeghal (1996) calls the “myth of independence” (p. 276). To hear the old Islamist version

of al-Azhar’s failure to oppose the French and the British invasions, one will now have to

turn to the radical groups.7

The preamble is followed by a list of seven concrete proposals as to how to

strengthen the Azhari education, both in the schools, the institutes and at the university

level. It wants the non-religious faculties to give a thorough education in Islam so that

every doctor or engineer is also a da`i. More concrete and political are the calls to end the

state meddling with the purposes of awqaf, to have the Shaykh al-Azhar elected by a

committee of `ulama and only nominated by the President. And, proposal number seven

which calls for

Freedom of callers, Imams and preachers in explaining the principles of Islam, its

shari`ah, values and organization of peoples’ lives and solving their problems,

without interference from the administrative authority unless need arises from

Islamic moral and teachings.8

6 Quoted from the Brotherhood’s English translation at

http://www.muslimbrotherhood.co.uk/Home.asp?zPage=Systems&System=PressR&Press=Show&Lang=E

&ID=4162 7 Such as the „Neglected Duty“ of the Jihad group. See Jansen, 1986, p. 190.

8http://www.muslimbrotherhood.co.uk/Home.asp?zPage=Systems&System=PressR&Press=Show&Lang=

E&ID=4162

20

The old bargain of the 1960s and 1970s of expanding al-Azhar through state funding in

return for state influence is here being partially reversed in that the proposals seek to limit

state influence but even further expand state funding to the Azhar education sector. The

proposals closely mirror Qaradawi’s in his book on Azhar reforms from 1984.

The Brotherhood’s election program of November 2005 also gave a broad outline

of reforms that the Brotherhood would strive to implement in parliament. In Egyptian

terms, this was a remarkably specific electoral program, covering 34 pages and outlining

economic, social, educational and political reforms. It is, however, strikingly uninterested

in Islamic affairs. In the introduction it establishes the Islamic marja`iya, or frame of

reference, for itself and for the state. But this marja`iya is not very specific. And it states

that “because Islam rejects the religious rule, and the state in Islam is a civil state (dawla

madaniya), the umma will itself establish its systems and institutions, for the umma is the

source of the governmental powers, and this is a human ijtihad among other human

ijtihads which can be changed and improved within the firm framework of the shari`a,

and its marja`iya that must direct the powers of the nation and the state.” 9

The election program does not raise any specific issue within the state

organization of religion. Reforms of al-Azhar and religious decision-making are not

mentioned. The section about education, university studies and reforms which makes

some 45 specific points of policies to be pursued, simply states in one of these points that

the Azhar education must be strengthened and better coordinated with the dominant

national system. Apart from this, there are a couple of general remarks about the need for

girls and boys to be separated in school and about “strengthening the spiritual, intellectual

and bodily development of pupils through deepening their awareness of the Islamic

9 http://www.ikhwanonline.org/Article.asp?ArtID=15548&SecID=342, p. 2.

21

values.”10

All in all, the election program seems to shy away from talking about Islamic

policies or Islamic institutions, except in general terms, probably to demonstrate the

Brotherhood’s capacities and sense of responsibility as a national political actor, and to

allay the fears of those who do not subscribe to its Islamist vision of Egypt (Brown and

Hamzawy, 2008, pp. 1-2).

The Party Program of 2007

With the successful experience of the 2005 elections, it was therefore somewhat

surprising that the Brotherhood in its 2007 Party Program had decided to take up several

controversial points about reforms at al-Azhar, and specifically about a much more

central role of the `ulama. Published in mid-August as a draft in the daily al-Misri al-

Yawm, independent political commentators in Egypt generally commended it for a

number of democratic formulations, but criticized it for lack of vision, not least in its

economic section. However, Supreme Guide Mahdi `Akif explained that it was only a

draft. And when in September a second version of the program was released, observers

were in for a surprise: the program had been markedly changed, e.g. in the foreign policy

section and in its demand that the President and Prime Minister must be a male Muslim.

Outsiders – and even well-known members of the Brotherhood itself – expressed deep

surprise by the introduction of a Council of Senior `Ulama (Hay’at Kubar al-`Ulama)

who were given the task to vet new laws before they were enacted (Brown and

Hamzawy, 2008).

10

Ibid. P. 16.

22

Before we discuss this institution, let us take a look at the issue of the state

religious institutions. On this subject, the party program goes into more detail than the

Reform Program of 2004 or any other Brotherhood document.

As in the Reform Document, al-Azhar receives significant attention and is praised

as the seat of Islam in Egypt, and a beacon of Islam in the world, this time with the

addition that it is the Islamic program of ahl al-sunna wa l-jama`a, that is, the correct

Sunni Islam. There are now 13 concrete proposals, comprising the earlier seven, but

adding several interesting ones: that teaching programs should be developed based on

“intellectual authenticity and the moderate middle ground (wasatiyya) which includes the

creation of an investigative, critical and ijtihadi mindset” in order to be able to address

contemporary problems from an Islamic perspective. “Moderate wasatiyya” is also to be

applied in the instruction in the Section of Preaching and Guidance. Much more than in

the Reform Document, the Party Program insists on the complete political independence

of al-Azhar, and of its preaching. To ensure this, al-Azhar shall take full control over its

old awqaf again, even if it will also remain a recipient of direct state support, which will

be significantly augmented. The Shaykh al-Azhar must be elected by the high `ulama

who will be organized in a resurrected Council of Senior `Ulama - presumably the same

one which will also be tasked with vetting the legislation of the Parliament. The

Academy of Islamic Research will, however, also be strengthened, through election of its

members by the broader `ulama of al-Azhar, by making its decision-making more

effective through majority vote, and finally by making its decisions binding on the

official institutions. The state will back down from redefining the purposes of awqaf for

its own benefit, and instead create new legislation that will encourage the revival of

23

awqaf as a civil socioeconomic tool, for instance in tax-exempt partnerships with civil

benevolent societies. 11

Finally, the State Mufti also seems to survive, but with more limited mandate. He

will be the head of a council of ifta – as this, in the Brotherhood’s understanding (but

contrary to classical fiqh and the ideas of the state muftis themselves) must be a collective

endeavor. The “fatwa chaos” must be ended by making a huge authoritative fatwa

website, the various fatwa bodies of al-Azhar, the Mufti and the mosques must be

coordinated, and strict conditions must be formulated that muftis in the media must

meet.12

The ideas of a centralization and standardization of ifta, of the strengthening of

the authority and efficiency of the Academy, and of the promotion of al-wasatiya as the

right version of Islam overall, point to a quite specific idea of what true Islam entails – an

idea which is probably also expressed in the classical formulation of ahl al-sunna wa l-

jama`a. While `ulama can have disagreements and discussions, they also have ways of

reaching an agreement which must then be binding on all. This version of the

Brotherhood program is careful to emphasize an Islamic orthodoxy in matters of law

which was not present in the previous programs.

This is where the new idea of a Council of Senior `Ulama comes in. In the 2007

party program, the Brotherhood seems to be struggling to accommodate its recent

democratic and liberalist tendencies with a more authoritarian and legalistic idea of an

Islam only known by the `ulama.

11

The Party Program, part III, section 4 1 a. From

http://www.islamonline.net/arabic/Daawa/2007/08/ikhwan.pdf, dated 25/8 2007. 12

Ibid.

24

The Party Program takes as its departure the idea of the sovereign umma which

can govern itself through shura in a Parliament whose members have been elected in free

and transparent elections supervised by civil organizations. This Parliament will make

laws by majority vote, but these laws must be in conformity with the principles of the

Islamic shari`a, as stated in the constitution. To this end “it is incumbent on the

legislative to ask the opinion of a corps of scholars of religion which is completely and

truly independent of the executive branch in all its technical, financial and administrative

affairs, and which is aided by committees and advisors with technical and scientific

experience in all relevant specializations.” This goes for presidential decrees, as well.

“And this Council will establish the dominant opinion in accordance with the public

interest”…”but the legislative power will have the final decision, except in cases where

there are absolute and certified shari`a rulings based on established textual evidence.” As

far as I can see, this means that the legislative will have to vote on the opinion of the

Council and it seems that it will even have to await the Council’s acceptance of this vote.

A law will define the qualifications of the religious scholars who are eligible to the

Council, and the conditions they have to fulfill as members in the Council.13

This idea of a Council of High `Ulama was a novelty in the Brotherhood’s

political thinking and had no counterpart in the programs of its sister organizations in

other Arab countries. A body of the that name was in existence at al-Azhar from 1911 to

1961 when it was supplanted by the Academy of Islamic Research, and there are

occasional calls to reintroduce it; while it had no connection to the Parliament at the time,

it was a respected institution which, especially in the period between 1923 and 1952, held

13

The Party Program, p. 9. From http://www.islamonline.net/arabic/Daawa/2007/08/ikhwan.pdf, dated

25/8 2007.

25

some moral power. In contrast to the Academy it was also solely an Egyptian body. As

mentioned, the idea of this body was only thrown into the party program at the last

minute, and the composition and functioning of the Council are yet to be decided. But the

idea behind it seems clear: even if the elected representatives may know, and represent,

the general interest of the umma, it is only the `ulama who know the precise details of the

“principles of the shari`a.” This is a remarkable position from the Muslim Brotherhood.

The proposed Council of Senior `Ulama was instantly attacked by liberals, NDP

loyalists, and others who saw it as an Iranian “Guardian Council” alien to Egyptian and

Sunni political traditions.14

But it was also unpopular with some more liberal-leaning

members of the Brotherhood itself, such as `Abd al-Mun`im Abu al-Futuh. Equally

interesting was the response of the Islamist intellectuals who have worked in the field of

Islamic Constitutional Law, and who often seem to be the Brotherhood’s intellectual

feeders. The well-known Islamist journalist Fahmy Huwaidy pointed out that the Council

was superfluous because the constitutional check on legislation was in place with article

2 and the Constitutional Court. Moreover, the Council would be a regression from the

Brotherhood’s lay orientation and belief in the competence of all conscious Muslims.

Huwaidy saw it as a coup on the part of a da`wa oriented faction inside the Brotherhood

with little understanding of politics.15

This seems plausible.16

There is, however, also a

claim by a well-known Coptic intellectual with Muslim Brother connections, Rafiq al-

14

See for instance Abd al-Moneim Said: Dawlat al-Ikhwan ad-Diniya fi Misr. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 26/9

2007, p. 13 15

Fahmy Huwaidy: Ikhwan in their Party Program: Oppressing and Oppressed. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 3/10

2007, p. 13. 16

Internal elections to the Guidance Council of the Brotherhood in 2008 confirmed that a more

conservative wing had asserted itself as the dominant tendency in the Brotherhood. See the analysis by

Husam Tammam in

http://islamyoon.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=ArticleA_C&cid=1235628711316&pagename=Islamy

oun%2FIYALayout&ref=body

26

Habib, that he was the one who proposed the adoption of the Council which he stresses

would only have an advisory function, also to the Brethren in Parliament.17

Whoever was the immediate initiator of the insertion of the Council of High

`Ulama , there is reason to believe that Yusuf al-Qaradawi may be the inspiration for this

faction. As noted earlier, the general propositions of the election of the Shaykh al-Azhar,

and the revitalization of the Academy of Islamic Studies, and the idea of al-Azhar as

fanning a new orthodoxy in the Islamic World are all present in his book on al-Azhar

from 1984. Moreover, the party program’s criticism on “fatwa chaos” is also a favourite

theme of Qaradawi’s, and the notion of wasatiya that it so strongly promotes, is

particularly connected to his writings and preaching.18

The idea of an `ulama-dominated body vetting the laws enacted by Parliament is

also to be found in Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s work. Qaradawi considers himself an Islamic

moderate and a democrat, and has often in his programs criticized the leaders of the

Muslim World for their undemocratic behavior. His own views on democracy are clearly

inspired by the above-mentioned lay Islamist intellectual writers on the nature of the

Islamic state, thinkers such as Muhammad Salim al-`Awwa, Tariq al-Bishri, and Kamal

Abu al-Magd. These thinkers see a modern Islamic state as a republic with a parliament

and an elected president. They – and the Brotherhood – stress that an Islamic state is

“civil” (madani), both in contrast to military and to clerical. And they want the

government to be elected in free and fair elections (Krämer, 1999). Qaradawi agrees with

17

http://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D9%82%D8%B5%D8%A9_%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A6

%D8%A9_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A1_%D9%81%D9%8A_%

D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%AC_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9

%88%D8%A7%D9%86....%D8%B1%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%82_%D8%AD%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%

A8&direction=next&oldid=22217 18

Bettina Gräf argues that the term was probably coined by Qaradāwi, and certainly has been popularised

by him. Gräf, 2009, p. 213.

27

all of this, and like the others he believes that these representatives can work for the best

of the umma. But he is also concerned that nothing contrary to true Islam must ever be

promulgated, and that there must be an Islamic check on legislation which cannot simply

be a constitution with a provision like article 2 of the current Egyptian Constitution. In

his book on the subject – significantly named “on the jurisprudence of the state in Islam”

– Qaradawi (1997) explains that even if every Muslim is responsible for his belief, there

are specialists, the `ulama, who must therefore provide counsel to the believers and to

their state. The state, in turn, “must set up a Corps of them, or a High Constitutional

Court, and present them with the projects for laws and ordinances, so that they will not

enact anything that contradicts Islam” (p. 31). The best thing would be if the ruler were

himself a scholar with capacity of ijtihad, such as the rightly-guided caliphs. Qaradawi,

then, embraces numerous components of a democratic system, but within limits set by the

`ulama.

To sum up, the 2007 Party Program of the Muslim Brotherhood seemed to

proceed along the liberal lines of the Reform Program and Electoral Program, but new

elements were added that blurred the picture.

The overall idea of the program still appeared to be to build up checks and

balances and limit the powers of the executive branch, all the while providing a specific

Islamic legitimation for democratic institutions, procedures and principles such as general

elections or the independence of the judiciary. The Brotherhood, or its most liberal wing,

had been pursuing this policy for some years with success, at least until 2006-07 when a

new round of state suppression against the Brotherhood set in with arrests, rejection of

candidates for the local elections, and the prohibition of religious parties in the amended

28

Constitution. But when it came to al-Azhar and the official Islamic institutions, the Party

Program sought simultaneously to ensure independence, increase state funding and

increase `ulama influence in general education, culture and society. And, with the

Council of Senior `Ulama they were also given substantial influence on legislation, in

particular as it seemed to be up to the Council itself to decide whether there is a clear

text-based rule in a case – a substantial discretionary power. During the following two

years, Brotherhood members were often asked about the program; in January 2009 its

spokesman Essam al-Aryan told me that the issue of the role of the `ulama was at the

center of deep disagreement within the leadership, and they had simply resolved to leave

the discussion of a party program for the time being.

Postscript: the 2011 events

In January 2011 peaceful but massive protests broke out in Cairo and a number of Lower

Egyptian Cities, leading the military to take over the government, and President Mubarak

to resign on February 11, Although not the initiators of the protests, the Muslim Brothers

had participated in force, and soon after the ousting of the president, they were asked to

participate in the political reconstruction of the country by holding a seat in a committee

preparing constitutional amendments. These amendments which were adopted in a

referendum on March 19, did not include article 2.

Only a few days after the fall of president Mubarak, Shaykh al-Azhar Ahmad al-

Tayyeb – who had supported Mubarak till the end – in a press conference called for

major changes at al-Azhar. He wanted to revive the old Corps of High `Ulama, and that

29

the position of Shaykh al-Azhar be elected and for a limited term. This was evidently in

line with the plans of the Muslim Brotherhood party program, and it was supported by the

most prominent brother among the Azhari staff, Abd al-Rahman al-Birr.19

The initiative

was popular, and may have helped to avert a mutiny against al-Tayyeb among the

teachers and students, some of whom had also been protesting on the square. In the

following weeks there was heavy criticism of al-Tayyeb, who at one point was barred

from entering his office. On two occasions he offered his resignation, and the leadership

defended itself against criticism by maintaining that al-Azhar was an autonomous body

and Azhari affairs were internal.20

Several Islamic groups announced that they would establish parties and contest in

the parliamentary elections announced for the fall. The Muslim Brotherhood revived its

old party plans, and on April 5 a draft of its new party, “Freedom and Justice”, was

leaked in the press.21

Its chapter 6, on religious policies, was copypasted from the 2007

program. Only now it wanter a more centralized Islamic sector, merging the Ministries of

Awqaf and al-Azhar, and incorporating the Mufti Office (Dar al-Ifta) into al-Azhar.

Much more importantly, there was no rejection of a female og non-Muslim president of

the Republic, and the idea of the Council of Senior `Ulama vetting legislation had been

abandoned. Instead, the program states as the most basic principle that “the principles of

the Islamic Sharia are the main source of legislation”. According to chapter two, “the

basic difference between an Islamic state and other states is that its authorization

(marja`iya) is the Islamic Sharia, based on the confession of the overwhelming majority

of the Egyptian people

19

http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=608360&issueno=11767 20

Al-Sharq al-Awsat 9/3, 2011, p. 25. 21

http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/388019

30

Conclusions

The process of incorporating `ulama institutions and `ulama services into the state

apparatus reached its peak in Egypt in the 1960s. Since then there has been much

criticism of this state dependence (and a concomitant myth about an earlier

independence) among the `ulama, all the while the regime, in turn, has grown more

dependent on legitimizing statements by top `ulama.

The Islamic awakening, and the rise of the Islamist opposition in the form of the

Muslim Brotherhood, has raised the stakes of Islamic legitimization and put the `ulama in

a central, if precarious, position. Within the last decade, there has been a general pressure

to reform Egypt in the liberal and democratic direction. This pressure has led to various

attempts to redefine the relations between state, society and individual, and to deregulate

and roll back the state in selected sectors. So far, the religious sector has not been much

influenced by this, although private actors are emerging, for instance in the field of

Islamic education, or Islamic television. The `ulama are, by and large, still government

employees, and the Ministry of Awqaf and the Azhar administration still hold formidable

powers over them as a group.

As a lay movement, the Muslim Brotherhood has a long history of being critical

of the `ulama as “those who slept” and “let the Muslims fall behind”. While always

31

having Azhari shaykhs and students among its members, it never had an Azhari leader,

and Azharis never exceeded ten per cent of the Guidance Council.

The Brotherhood was initially in favor of a strong, but also active state which

promoted and enforced its Islamic vision through legislation and the moral education and

supervision of its citizens. The Brotherhood has, however, also moved in a liberal

direction within recent years, partly in order to secure its inclusion and even influence in

Egyptian politics, but also partly in order to limit the role of the state in an Egyptian

society which has Islamized to a significant degree in spite of state policies, rather than

due to them (although, as pointed out by Nathan Brown in this volume, state policies

have been far from coherent).

Recently, the Brotherhood has taken up the issue of Azhari independence from

the state, and in its declarations described al-Azhar as the natural and deserving centre of

Islam in Egypt. Here, again, things are not quite clear. In its election program from 2005,

and in many of its statements, al-Azhar hardly figures, and the policies that the

Brotherhood wants to pursue are fairly secular and not in need of input from `ulama. In

general, the Brotherhood considers itself, and not al-Azhar or any other state religious

institution, as the forceful and legitimate voice of Islam in Egypt.

The overall impression of the role of al-Azhar and `ulama in the Party Program is

one of a redefinition; both of the Brotherhood relations to the `ulama and al-Azhar, and of

the Brotherhood understanding of relationship between state, society and Islam. It is,

however, a complex and partly unresolved position.

The overall strategy of supporting an expansion of al-Azhar’s reach in Egyptian

society, and abroad, while securing a greater independence of the institution from the

32

state by giving the `ulama self-determination, is perhaps in line with the Brotherhood’s

redefined Liberalist position. But the Party Program’s project of establishing a Council of

Senior `Ulama to be consulted over legislation appears to be in breach of both the

classical Brotherhood Islamic egalitarianism and of its new-found Liberalism. The fact

that this idea has been unpopular with the independent Islamist commentators and

Constitutional thinkers such as Tariq al-Bishri and Fahmy Huwaidi, along with a few

publicly known liberals within the group itself, testifies to this sense of a breach. The

Brotherhood’s projected party appears as a conservative party which will preserve the

Islamic identity of Egypt by adapting Islamic teachings and institutions to meet the

challenges of the age, and using the state actively in this cultural policy while upholding

the rule of law, legal independence and constitutional rights. The Party Program’s

insertion of the definition of al-Azhar as the seat of the ahl al-sunna wa ‘l-jama`a, while

upholding Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s well-known criticism of al-Azhar, and adopting his

ideology of wasatiya makes it conceivable that its second version has been edited by a

group of people inspired by his understanding of politics, al-Azhar and the pivotal role of

`ulama as the true leaders of the umma. This ideology of circumscribed democratic

Ulamaism is actually not very widespread in Egypt, or indeed in the Sunni Muslim world.

But it is, of course, not alien to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

33

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