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Doomed to informality: Familial versusmodern planning in Arab towns in IsraelNurit Alfasiaa Department of Geography and Environmental Development, Ben-GurionUniversity of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, IsraelPublished online: 20 May 2014.

To cite this article: Nurit Alfasi (2014) Doomed to informality: Familial versus modern planning in Arab townsin Israel, Planning Theory & Practice, 15:2, 170-186, DOI: 10.1080/14649357.2014.903291

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Doomed to informality: Familial versus modern planning in Arab towns inIsrael

Nurit Alfasi

Department of Geography and Environmental Development, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva,Israel

(Received 22 February 2013; accepted 7 March 2014)

Planning systems throughout the world are rooted in the modern, western-oriented worldviewand the rationale of liberal nationalism. In this view, society consists of relatively equal and freeindividuals, operating in a fairly free market, while state intervention in people’s lives and in theeconomy is only required in extreme cases such as market failure, as with urban and regionalplanning, and is conducted via top-to-bottom regulations. However, whether this outlook issuitable for sociopolitical cultures other than liberalism is questionable. This paper examines themodern planning machinery with respect to traditional, family-based societies, in particular theArab towns and villages in Israel. It claims that, in addition to the national conflict between Arabcitizens and the State of Israel, the embedded tensions between the spatiality of the Arab city andmodern planning systems have given rise to the informal, gray urbanism currently typical of Arabtowns. The paper analyzes the different planning tools resulting from the two worldviews. Theuse of a culturally based urban code and mutual agreements between interested parties formcentral planning instruments in familial societies, while administrative planning and regulationare central to modern traditions. Based on this analysis, the paper offers a framework forovercoming existing tensions.

Keywords: informality; familial-based planning; bottom-up planning; self-planning; grayurbanism; Arab towns

Introduction

Modern planning theory is tightly linked to modern, western-oriented ideas, the foremost being the

concept of liberal nationalism. According to this view, current societies are – or should be –

comprised of relatively free individuals, each having a distinct identity according to their

biography, skills and ideals. Under the umbrella of nationality, people should be free to fulfill their

destiny, i.e. to study, work, congregate and express themselves. According to the western concept,

social groups are formed in line with individuals’ features and preferences - usually ethnic and

cultural characteristics on the one hand and economic constraints on the other. The spatial

implications of this view are to be found in a wide array of literature on planning and urbanism,

from Le Corbusier’s (1935) La Ville Radieuse to Henri Lefebvre’s (1968/1996) The Right to the

City; from Ebenezer Howard’s (1902/1946) Garden Cities of To-Morrow to David Harvey’s

(1973/2009) Social Justice and the City; and from Hanford Eldredge’s (1967) Taming Megalopolis

to Patsy Healey’s (1997) Collaborative Planning, to name but a few. Moreover, the idea of liberal,

civic nationality is entrenched in planning systems and institutions throughout the world, creating

platforms for administrative decision-making regarding the development of the built environment.

Most of the terms currently used in practical and theoretical planning discourse derive from how

modern “national” planning envisions the basic structure of society. General ideas of public good,

q 2014 Taylor & Francis

*Email: nurital@bgu.ac.il

Planning Theory & Practice, 2014

Vol. 15, No. 2, 170–186, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14649357.2014.903291

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public space and public participation, as well as strategic plans, reviewing planning applications

and submitting objections – almost our entire knowledge of planning is rooted in this view.

However, the extent to which modern planning theories and practical frameworks are suitable

for cultures other than national liberalism are questionable. In particular, many African andMiddle-

Eastern societies are subjected to social codes derived from ancient tribal and familial customs that

exist in addition to the national order. As stated by Gellner (cited in Ayubi, 1996, p. 125) “the

process of transition from tribal to state may not mean the demise of the previous tribal foundations,

but rather the broadening of them.” The coexistence of national rationale and familial social mores

is widely discussed in political literature (Ayubi, 1996). Thus, a central trait of Middle-Eastern

familial culture is the individual’s self-identity being anchored in genealogical features. Belonging

to a social group is, in most cases, innate rather than affected by personality and biography. This

innate identity has further implications for the individual’s education and profession, marital

possibilities, and social contacts. Land tenure in traditional Middle-Eastern cities was based on

familial and tribal ownership, and the structure of many cities still expresses the tribal and extended

family divisions, impacting on accessibility to dwellings, commerce and public spaces.

The new urban forms currently evolving in African and Middle-Eastern locations have

abandoned the kinship structure. Alongside the modernization of cities, the most prominent

example being the development of global cities in the Arabian Gulf (see: Elsheshtawy, 2008;

Mahgoub, 2008), researchers relate to growing tensions and inadequacies, resulting from the

transition of familial spatial orders to newly introduced urban forms (Costa & Noble, 1986; Abu-

Lughod, 1987; Akbar, 1988; Watson, 2002, 2003; Al-Sallal, 2004; Mubarak, 2004; Hammami,

2012). These tensions have not skipped the Arab-Palestinian towns in Israel, which find the tools

offered by the Israeli planning system difficult to implement.

Scholarly discourse by Israeli researchers – both Jewish and Arab – emphasizes the

inequalities and discrimination faced by Arab citizens in Israel (Peled, 1992; Bligh, 2004; Smooha,

2004; Omer & Or, 2005; Hasson & Karayanni, 2006), by the State and by Israeli society (Schnell,

1994; Schnell & Sofer, 2003). Researchers discuss the destruction of old Arab cities and the

evacuation of Arab villages during the 1948 war and following the establishment of the Israeli state

(Paz, 1998; Golan, 2002; Yazbak, 2004; Goren, 2006; Pappe, 2006). The persistence of Arab-

Palestinians on the land (sumud) and the politically contentious issue of the Palestinian right of

return (haq al-‘awda) result from the mass expulsion from their villages and towns during the

course of the war and the early days of the state. This traumatic event, together with massive

confiscation of Arab lands (Pappe, 1992; Luz, 2007; Falah, 1989; 2003), are central elements

affecting the identity of Arab citizens (Khalidi, 1992), the spatiality of Arab towns, and the internal

structure of Arab conurbations throughout Israel. The intolerance toward Arabs in integrated cities

(Shmueli & Kipnis, 1998; Bollens, 2000, Goldhaber & Schnell, 2007), the discrimination against

Arab citizens by planning agencies (Newman, 1989; Yiftachel, 1992, 1997, 1998; Alterman &

Stav, 2001), and the unequal allocation of land to Arab cities (Yiftachel, 1999) are marked. At the

same time, planners and researchers discuss the planning system’s failure to guide, let alone

control, the development of Arab cities (Adib, 2005; Tal, 2010). Discourse refers to the illegal

constructions that are typical of Arab cities and towns, (Khamaisi, 1995; Nasser, 2012), the

fundamental lack of support for local Arab government (Hasson & Abu-Asbah, 2004; Khamaisi,

2005, 2010; El-Taji, 2008), and the resultant inappropriateness of Arab infrastructures and local

services (Schnell & Fares, 1996; Omer & Or, 2005).

This study aims to take the discourse a step forward, claiming that in addition to the impact of

the national conflict, a fundamental mismatch exists between the urban culture of the Arab city and

the Israeli planning system, and that many of the problems of Arab cities and towns derive from this

mismatch. Land-use statutory planning is irrelevant to the dynamics of Arab urban space.

In particular, there is a clash between Arab adherence to private land and old cultural codes, and the

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concept of top-to-bottom formal planning. Moreover, these structural discrepancies of modern

planning disrupt implementation of the old codes, and the traditional familial order disallows

adoption of modern forms, all of which contribute to the malfunctioning of Arab-Palestinian towns

today.

Recently, scholars have related to the informal urban development evident in cities worldwide

(Roy & AlSayyad, 2004). Informality is defined as “a state of exception from the formal order of

urbanization” (Roy, 2005, p. 147), also referred to as “gray urbanism”. It is neither black–illegal–

demolished, nor white–planned–permitted; it is the Third-World slums of Davis (2004) and the

back streets of the great western cities. Whether encroaching “from below” due to entry of

unregistered and marginalized groups to the big city, or created “from above” by expansion of

“formal” development into local/ethnic enclaves, gray urbanism represents the encounter of two

extremely different regimes: a neo-liberal economic regime supported by nationalism, ethnicity,

racism and social marginalization, versus populations in states of “permanent temporariness”

(Yiftachel, 2009, p. 90).This paper links the complex relations between modern, western-oriented

planning and the traditional, familial-based spatiality of Middle-Eastern urbanism with the gray

development of the Arab town in Israel. It claims that the contradictions in the discourse of both

mechanisms in regard to planning are dialogues-of-the-deaf, inducing the Israeli-Palestinian to

extend into open or agricultural land, generating intense, and sometimes violent, conflicts with

national and local administrations.

So how do modern planning ideas and tools affect the spatiality of societies based on principles

other than nationality? Why is it difficult to regulate the development of the built environment in a

familial–tribal society? And how can we bridge the gap between the Israeli planning machinery

and the spatial needs of the Arab town? The discussion below, together with a case study, is an

attempt to answer these questions.

Modern planning and familial order: complex relations

Middle-Eastern cities: urban codes and mutual agreement

The history of Middle-Eastern cities reveals a strong tradition of planning and management

enabling compact development of walled urban settlements. These cities were not planned in the

modern sense of the word, but developed gradually according to a socio-cultural code of

construction of new elements – houses, mosques and shops – and their occasional refurbishment.

Preserving the integrity of dwellings, equal distribution of water resources, and mutual rights of

pre-emption for neighbors (Costello, 1977; Grabar, 1979; Bianca, 2000) are integral to that code.

Hakim (2001), for example, cites a treatise from the sixth century delineating the rules of

construction and design in Ascalon, a Mediterranean city located in the province of Palestine (today

Israel), claiming that in the eastern territories of the Byzantine Empire the influence of the code

endured intermittently for almost 1400 years, well into the 20th century.

The socio-spatiality of Arab cities in the Middle East is anchored in the Muslim tradition, in

regard to both the organization of space and procedure, i.e. the bodies involved in making decisions

concerning new building (Lapidus, 1979; Akbar, 1988; Raymond, 1994; Hakim & Ahmed, 2006).

This tradition also affects inhabitants adhering to other cultures and religions – still evident in the

diverse Arab population in Israel. As in other Mediterranean societies, the basic social unit of the

Muslim home is the extended family (hamulah). The code’s initial orientation was towards

honoring the family and linking the level of privacy/openness between people with their degree of

kinship. Thus, “extended families, kinship groups and related individuals move about a

neighborhood freely, but an outsider is immediately recognized and frequently treated as an

intruder” (Costa & Noble, 1986, p. 165). Additions were made to buildings when families

expanded, usually when sons were married. The most prominent requirement code was the

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protection of visual and acoustic privacy in the living spaces. In particular, the privacy of women

was mandatory, so that women could carry on their daily activities in the home unobserved, and

without fear of being seen by passers-by and neighbors outside (Pacione, 2005; Elsheshtawy, 2004,

2008). Protection from outside observation of the home’s entrance was another strict unwritten rule.

The code also demanded agreement of adjacent neighbors to architectural transformations such

as adding storeys or rooms, or modifying access to buildings and public spaces. This was also

defined in the Ascalon treatise. According to Akbar (1988), planning and building in a Muslim city

was preceded by an agreement between the owners, the users, and those controlling the land or

building, including neighbors and leaders. The code facilitated the relations between the parties, as

well as the “soft” negotiations prior to amending and constructing urban elements. Such mutual

agreements made private building above and around public and semi-public areas possible, and

directed the construction of Mosques and public services in areas bordering extended-family

property, thus welcoming people belonging to various hamulahs as well as passers-by to make use

of them. Cities also had market-places (Suq), covered mercantile spaces (Qissariya) for valuable

articles, and manufacturing areas – all subject to the socio-cultural code and the (often silent)

agreement of all hamulahs (Akbar, 1988; Bianca, 2000).

The code thus enabled “planning-without-a-plan”. Its soundness and comprehensiveness

allowed the creation of a coherent and sensible built environment, as described by Alexander,

Ishikawa, and Silverstein (1977), and Alexander (1979). The term used for the spatial aspect of the

urban code is “pattern”, while the planning procedure is known as “the timeless way of building”

(Alexander, 1979). “The great traditional building of the past, the villages and tents and temples in

which man feels at home, have always been made by people who were very close to the center of

this way” says Alexander (p. 7). Indeed, the glorious Arab and Middle-Eastern cities were built like

this, by their inhabitants rather than by a government or municipal planner. As predicted by

Alexander et al. (1977) and Alexander (1979), however, modern planning has interfered with this

dynamic, resulting in the construction of much less fitting places. Akbar (1988, p. 141) sees the

essence of disruption in changing “the model of responsibility”, i.e., the transition from mutual

agreement to the control of regulations. The consensus among family members, neighbors and

leaders regarding the development of the built environment is replaced by the consent of formal

authorities. For modernizing urban areas, municipalities began to produce plans with prescriptive

regulations and specifications about what should be done and where. “The more prescriptive [the]

rules,” explains Akbar (1988, p. 145), “the less communication between parties.” This has affected

the quality of the built environment, often turning it from an ordered urban fabric reflecting a

variety of socio-spatial codes, to an organized environment, reflecting the dominance of centralized

authority.

Between central authority and individual/familial identity

Planning and building in many Middle-Eastern cities and towns is nowadays struggling to combine

modern planning with the values of familial societies and the ensuing tensions between the

individual and the central authority. In post-colonial Africa, this is the background to the

“conflicting rationalities” described by Watson (2003), and to her question regarding the usefulness

of (western-oriented) normative theories with respect to planning in sub-Saharan African cities

(Watson, 2002). It is also the essence of Hammami’s (2012) analysis of the clash between newly

planned environments in Botswana and the three cultural lifestyles – social, spatial, and political.

According to Gellner (1990), tensions arising in familial societies adopting modern planning

stem from the mutual dependency of members of the same tribe/extended family, and their distrust

of other people and agencies. “The corresponding negative trait of this kind of society is that there

is little or no external or superimposed policing by some special order-enforcing agency, ideally

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neutral” (Gellner, 1990, p. 109). Defining a shared interest common to all groups is difficult, and

(even if trust did exist) the degree of trust in governmental safeguarding of that interest would be

unachievable. Urbanization processes in the Middle East are consistent with accepting the idea of

national government (Elsheshtawy, 2004, 2008) and the legitimization of governmental power.

However, since many Middle-Eastern cities are ruled by elite groups – usually the local ruler or the

royal family – formal administration is conceived as the instrument by which the dominant group

exerts its power (Gellner, 1990; Pacione, 2005; Elsheshtawy, 2004, 2008). Basic mistrust of the

ruling family thus keeps familial order under the surface, and there is only partial and conditional

acceptance of the idea of public interest.

Arab-Palestinian towns in Israel

Most of the Arab citizens living in the Israel do not identify themselves as Israelis. Instead, they

prefer to be “Arabs living in Israel” or “Arabs of ’48”, connecting their unsettled status to the 1948

war and the rise of the State of Israel. Others identify themselves as Palestinians, stressing their

strong links with relatives in Gaza and the West Bank. Here, “Arab” and “Arab-Palestinian” are the

terms used when referring to this sector.

Arab citizens form about 20% of Israel’s population – 1.5 million in 2009.1 Most of them are

Muslims, the others are Christians and Druze. Despite this wide spectrum of cultures and lifestyles,

Arabs in Israel have the lowest levels of income, education, health, and standard of living, and the

highest levels of unemployment and poverty. Most of them live in exclusively Arab cities and

towns throughout Israel, where poor conditions are very evident. About 120 Arab settlements – 11

are mid-size towns and cities and the rest are small villages and towns – are the poorest in Israel,

according to the index of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). In 2006, for example, the

lowest rank in a 10-level index of Israeli cities and towns was that of seven Arab–Bedouin towns

and two Jewish ultra-Orthodox towns; only one Arab town reached the sixth level, and none

appeared in the seventh to tenth ranks.2 Arab towns usually suffer from a lack of basic infrastructure

such as paved streets, sewage disposal, and public spaces. The Arab settlements also suffer from

industrial and commercial activities in residential areas (Sofer, Potchter, Gnaim, & Gnaim, 2012).

Numerous buildings in Arab localities are classified as illegal and face the danger of being

demolished by the State (Nasser, 2012; Tal, 2010).

It seems that the ongoing conflict between the spatiality of the Arab towns and the rationales of

modern planning is responsible, at least in part, for the poor performance of the Israeli planning

system which is not meant to mitigate the effects of the low economic status of most Arab citizens,

or the discrimination against Arab citizens and towns. This adds yet another layer to the

problematic equation in the hope of future progress with better tools for the benefit of the Arab

towns.

The creation of the Israeli-Arab town

Israeli-Arab towns originated in the Arab villages of the 19th and early 20th century which, in most

cases, are the cores of existing towns. A village comprised a few hamulahs, each living on its own

separate and defined areas of land, which differentiated the founding families from nomads and

refugees who joined the village later (Khamaisi, 1995, 2005). The core of the village was densely

inhabited by these families, each having a demarcated area for the passage of strangers, while

mosques and churches were shared by all residents of the village.

In the early 1900s, Arabs living in Palestine experienced the beginning of an urbanization

process, as village inhabitants – usually young families – moved to the mixed environment of the

main cities (Khamaisi, 2004, 2005; Golan, 2003). Arab religious and political leadership in the

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early 1900s was mainly urban, and cities such as Haifa, Jaffa, Acre and Jerusalem were centers of

social and economic life. At the same time, massive immigration of Arab families to Palestine

expanded the old villages by building on their peripheries. This dispersed construction, retained the

distinctions between hamulahs, but enabled landless foreigners, usually workers in agriculture,

commerce and administration, to join the village. The urbanization process ceased with the

establishment of the State of Israel and the mass emigration of Arabs (Pappe, 2006). The

destruction of Arab villages and towns during and after the 1948 war, and the nationalization of

lands marked by the state as abandoned, made the Arab people very attached to their houses and

property. Some 130,000 Arab citizens who did not leave the nascent state remained in their homes.

In the intervening years the Arab population has increased, and is now 10-12 times larger, but

despite the government’s declared intention to build a new Arab city in northern Israel, no new

Arab settlements have been constructed.3 Most of this growing population lives in the original

towns and villages. Some of the old spatial codes, particularly those of land tenure and the

separation between hamulahs, have been retained.

The dissipation of the “code”

Changes in Israeli-Arab towns increased in the 1970s and 1980s, together with the continuous

expansion of size and population. Population growth remained at levels of almost 4% per annum,

(Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS), 2009), standards of living rose rapidly, and agricultural

usage of land was replaced with housing, industry and commerce. The growth was extremely

dispersed and occurred without proper planning, industrial infrastructure, or public building. While

most towns managed to safeguard the family structure, especially at the old crowded core, in some

cases, for those with grants of land from the Israel Land Authority (ILA), new areas were created,

mixing residences of various families with landless people. Since the 1990s, increasing numbers of

young Arab citizens have migrated to Jewish cities, but Arab individuals are reluctant to move

inside or between the Arab towns (the point is that Arab individuals can either immigrate to Jewish

localities or remain within their family territories; they cannot move to a different neighborhood

which is inhabited by a different family). This pattern of maintaining the old family structure and

the single-family building is known as “besieged urbanization” (Meir-Brodnitz, 1986) or

“selectively disturbed urbanism” (Khamaisi, 1995).

It was generally assumed that modernization processes would ultimately replace the traditional

familial and tribal values (Al-Haj, 1988; Gellner, 1990). The consensus was that “modernization

and kinship systems are inimical to each other in many respects” (Al-Haj, 1995, 311). The reality,

however, is far from simplistic. Despite rapid modernization, including education and

professionalism, reinforcement of the single-family household at the expense of the hamulah,

improved standards of living, and familial relations are still sources of generative social order and

impact on municipal politics (Khamaisi, 2005; El-Taji, 2008). Modernization has disrupted plans

for Arab towns in Israel; the old socio-spatial codes have become irrelevant, and the modern, top-

to-bottom hierarchy and statutory outlines for planning policies and regulations are hard to accept.

The management of Arab towns

Arab citizens’ distrust of the Israeli state, reinforced by their socio-economic problems, makes local

government weak and ineffective (Jabareen, 2006). Despite the hamulahs’ subsidies at the socio-

cultural level, they still play a central role in the local politics of Arab towns and villages. The

elected local government in Arab towns usually comprises the largest hamulah or a coalition of the

leading families, and serves their own narrow personal interests (El-Taji, 2008; Al-Haj, 1988,

1995). This reinforces the local authorities’ difficulty in collecting local taxes (Brender, 2005). In

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addition, municipal authorities cannot enforce planning laws, so that confiscation of land for roads

and public use is rare (El-Taji, 2008; Tal, 2010). Calls for more professional local management give

rise to disputes. Intra- and inter-family disagreements are raised in many Arab towns and cities,

regarding land ownership and public development, so that planning and quality of life have become

problematic and demanding issues.

The Arab local authorities have thus become increasingly dysfunctional. The Ministry of the

Interior can decide that a local authority does not meet the required criteria for removing the

chairmen and the dissolution of the council. During 1948–2004, 63 local authorities were dissolved

in Israel, 85% of them being Jewish authorities. The breakdown of Arab local authority is reflected

in the fact that since 2004, 85% of the 37 local authorities that have been dissolved are Arab towns

and villages. Twelve Arab local authorities have been dissolved,4 some of them since 2006 and

2007, i.e. for more than five years.5 The local authorities’ ability to enforce planning and building

law has diminished. Since the ancient urban code has faded away and the new laws cannot be

implemented, these towns continue to develop in an uncoordinated manner.

Gray’s anatomy: planning in Arab towns

Urban planning in Israel is part of a three-tier system of national, district and local outline (zoning)

plans. District outline plans allocate land for urban development, while local outline plans (LOPs)

deal with the internal structure of settlements and provide tools for planning and for authorizing

planning applications. Over the last decade, the Ministry of the Interior has made extensive efforts

to produce statutory LOPs, after the tragic events of October 2000, when riots occurred in the Arab

localities, coinciding with those of the Second Intifada in the West Bank. The intensity of the

violence and the painful results (12 Arabs and one Jew killed by the police) led to the appointment

of a National Commission of Inquiry headed by the high court Judge Theodor Or. The Or

Commission report, published in 2003, stated that “Government handling of the Arab localities has

been primarily neglectful and discriminatory”.6 Among many other fallacies, it pointed to the lack

of proper planning for Arab towns. The Ministry of the Interior then launched an initiative

preparing LOPs for 96 Arab localities and a regional plan for Wadi Ara, where many Arab towns

are located (Baana & Swede, 2012), intended to facilitate housing development and improve

infrastructure and services.

Twelve years later, some 50% of the LOPs have been authorized, and others are under

discussion by the Israeli Planning Administration.7 Nevertheless, planning and development in

Arabic localities is still problematic, as recurrent difficulties prevent their implementation, as is

evident from the analysis that follows.

The symbolic meaning of private land ownership: Land ownership is an issue that vitally affects

the legitimacy of planning in Arab towns in Israel (Khamaisi, 2007; Nasser, 2012). Because of the

traumatic events of the past, Arab landowners make all efforts to safeguard family property, to

refrain from trading the land and to live on it. Only those without lands or property mix with each

other. Land ownership is claimed to be unrestricted in regard to planning and development, and

landlords tend to ignore administrative intervention concerning land use.

Impracticability of land-use planning: Comprehensive land use plans do not always take

ownership into account, and increase tensions by offering impracticable solutions. Agricultural

land may be assigned for projected development, but the landowner does not wish to change its

status; agreements between residents and landowners regarding rights of way or permission to use

lands for public or semi-public use may be disregarded. Essentially, land use is defined by

the owners and users according to specific needs. In most cases, municipal agents understand that

the plans will not be allowed to affect the inner structure of the towns, and that the “blue line” on the

plan, marking the area designated for development, should be their cause for concern.

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Improper urban structure: Since lands in the center of Arab towns are privately owned,

confiscation is impracticable, so public buildings such as schools and community centers are

usually built on government land on the periphery, at contested locations that are sometimes

inaccessible. Unplanned commercial areas usually develop on the main roads dividing families/

hamulahs, because these are the only “real” public areas, though they usually lack accessibility,

parking facilities and safe sidewalks. Landowners are encouraged to build on empty lots or

agricultural land designated for public use in order to prevent confiscation.

Artificial land problems: While some families exploit their lands so that their youngsters are

forced to leave home (Schnell & Fares, 1996), land parcels belonging to other families are left

untouched. Hence, in some towns there are neighborhoods suffering from extreme population

density, while other areas remain vacant.

Mixed areas of residence and problematic activities: Landowners use their properties for their

own needs, including residence and livelihood. This results in dense, noisy, and polluted living-

commercial-industrial areas with inadequate infrastructure (Adib, 2005). Quality of life is constantly

under threat from unexpected decisions of neighboring landowners. Similarly, on land allocated for

industry by the ILA, the lack of space for housing compels residents to build apartments above their

industrial buildings, which is also detrimental to quality of life (Sofer et al., 2012).

There is also a constant shortfall of local tax payments. In most Israeli towns, commerce and

industry are the major taxpayers, whereas in Arab towns industry is mixed with residential areas,

with almost no industrial building by outside investors (Schnell, Benenson, & Sofer, 1999).

Self-building leads to unsuitable and dangerous construction: Building in the Arab towns in

Israel is initiated and performed almost solely by the end-users (Schnell & Fares, 1996). Self-

building allows Arab landowners to cut building costs and to build gradually (Kipnis, 1996).

Entrepreneurial construction for specific populations (young families, old people, middle-aged

couples) is extremely rare. Arab towns seldom undergo the “usual” type of large-scale development

for housing, industry or commerce. Self-building also enables owners to change or expand their

properties as needed, so that many homes are continuously being built and/or modified.

The main problem with self-building is that end-users tend to ignore the legal construction

permit and build illegally. This occurs whenever actual needs do not conform to the planning status

of the land. Tens, and sometimes hundreds, of houses are demolished each year in Arab localities

because of illegal building (Nasser, 2012) and thousands more face the same fate.

Thus, as land problems increase, more entrepreneurial construction appears, usually on public

land. This type of building still suffers from poor planning and extreme density, and is therefore

ostracized by landowners and other citizens (Schnell & Fares, 1996; Nasser, 2012).

The dynamics of informal development

An example of the conflict between the prevailing outline planning and the dynamics of the Arab

town is illustrated by the following case study, based on research conducted by Alfasi, Almagor,

and Benenson (2012). The aim was to assess the gap between comprehensive land-use plans and

actual development, i.e. to compare land allocated for development in (1) District Outline Plan 3

(DOP3), Israel’s central district land-use plan from 1982, (2) DOP3/21 from 2002; and c) actual

development in central Israel during three specific periods: 1980–90, 1990–2000, and 2000–06.

The research was based on interpretation and analysis of aerial photographs in 12 test areas,

representing 10% of the central district. Two of these areas include the Arab towns Tira and

Qalanswa, exposing the dynamics behind their development from 1980 until 2006.

Tira and Qalanwsa are located at the easternmost end of Israel’s central district (Map 1), originally

belonging to the southern part of the (Jordanian)Nablus–Jenin–Tulkarm triangle, inhabited by several

hamulahs. These towns now have populations of 23,000 and 19,000 respectively, and are ranked at the

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bottom of the 10-level index of Israeli cities and towns (Tira ranked 3 and Qalanswa ranked 2) (ICBS,

2011). Both towns are included in theMinistry of Interior’s local outline plans, and neither plan has yet

been authorized. However, implementing the plans will not solve the towns’ problems. In Qalanswa,

for example, the planners estimate that most of the private familial areas have been exploited. A

progress report indicates that up to 65%of the households are practically landless. About 300 buildings

in Qalanswa are already located outside the designated area for development and are therefore illegal

(Baana & Swede, 2012). They are scattered in the agricultural areas surrounding Qalanswa, forming a

gray urbanism and lacking basic infrastructure such as roads and sewage. They also interfere with

future development of the periphery.

The plan for Qalanswa allocates some new residential areas, but essentially promotes the

enhancement of a housing market with higher urban density. Apparently, the plan is an attempt to

prevent wild construction on newly allocated areas, but the inhabitants of Qalanswa have no faith in

plans for high density. In 2009, when the plan was publicized, activists protested that it surrounded

the town with main roads and a nature reserve that would prevent future development (Abu Rass,

2013). Thus, paradoxically, these limitations encourage unplanned construction on agricultural

lands, thereby preventing implementation of the plan.

In Tira, one of the oldest Arab municipalities in Israel, land problems are even more acute. The

town has, literally, no public land, the plan is designed for 38,000 residents by 2020, but estimates

of natural increase anticipate that the town will comprise about 40,000 residents by that time

(Baana & Swede, 2012). Plans from the 1990s permit construction of up to eight storeys in new

residential areas, but these have not been implemented. The town maintains its traditional urban

form and people continue to self-build single-family houses.

Map 1. Israel’s central region with Tira and Qalanswa.

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Thus, ongoing building of single-family houses in both towns encroaches on the open and

agricultural spaces. Map 2 presents the development of Qalanswa outside the areas designated in

the DOP3 plan of 1982 (a), and the DOP3/21, of 2002 (b). When DOP3 was authorized, extensive

building was already extant outside the authorized development area (Map 2a, marked in black).

Gradual development in 1980–90 (red) and 1990–2000 (blue) occurred on the periphery, beyond

the allocated threshold. By 2000, the town was surrounded with illegal developments. DOP3/21

enlarged the development area to include this informal development, but here too, existing

buildings remained outside the authorized area, and in 2000-2006, more unauthorized building

occurred outside the designated boundaries (Map 2b).

Similarly, in Tira (Map 3a, 3b) the periphery was gradually saturated, despite being beyond the

designated area. The encroachment of single-family buildings 1980–2000 was authorized by the

DOP3/21 of 2002, and new buildings continue to appear on open and agricultural lands on the edge

of the town.

The DOP3 and DOP3/21 maps were not implemented (Alfasi et al., 2012). Changes to the

original plans were made for large cities such as Netanya and Petah-Tikva, and for small towns and

Map 2. The development of Qalanswa in 1980–2006, compared with the district outline plans. (a)Comparison of the DOP3, authorized 1982, with the development of Qalanswa in the years 1980–2000; (b)Comparing the DOP3/21, authorized 2002, with the development of Qalanswa 2000–2006.

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suburban areas throughout the central district. However, in the Arab towns, building was not

coordinated by local planning emendations to the DOP. In public sessions conducted as part of the

planning process, the residents related residential and industrial building on agricultural lands as a

major setback that threatened both towns (Abu Rass, 2013). The difficulties are obvious – even

when illegal building is ultimately authorized, the informal spaces with their unpaved roads, lack of

sewage, street lighting, and public spaces remain.

Bridging the gaps: self-planning in the Arab town

The informality of the Arab towns and their poor conditions reflect more than poverty and ethnic

discrimination. The distinctive Arab cityscape, so different from those in Israel, is (also) an

outcome of the conflict between formal and traditional definitions of space. Thus, even when

Map 3. Development of Tira in 1980– –2006, compared with the district outline plans. (a) Comparing theDOP3, authorized in 1982, with the development of Tira in 1980–2000; (b) Comparing the DOP3/21,authorized 2002, with the development of Tira in the years 2000–2006.

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goodwill exists, and the state attempts to provide new opportunities for planning and expansion, it

uses the same ineffectual tool of outline planning. The statutory outline map is the main obstacle.

The fact that a single plan regulates an entire city or town, paying little attention to its problematic

management, is another obstacle. A new, improved apparatus for planning regulation is imperative.

Revitalizing the urban code

It might be possible to enhance or formalize the Arab town if some of the positions and tools of

modern planning were less rigid and the relevant features of the familial structure were taken into

account, for instance if the outline plans were replaced by traditional urban codes adapted to the

needs of a modern society, or the outer aspect and regulations of modern planning were subject to

the agreement of family members and neighbors. The scheme presented below is based on the self-

planning model of Alfasi and Portugali (2004, 2007, 2009), and includes the necessary adjustments

to spatial and political issues in Arab cities, starting with the formal statutory definitions and

dealing with issues of town management.

An “urban code” would be adopted as the legal base for regulating planning, instead of the

statutory outline plan. This code would comprise the norms, values and spatial principles of a proper

built environment. It would therefore be dynamic, to be updated when new situations and dilemmas

arise. “People need a living language in order to make buildings for themselves,” says Alexander

(1979, p. 240), “But the language needs the people too . . . so that its constant use, and feedback,

keeps its pattern in good order.” The urban code must include rules for the relationships between

buildings, roads, open spaces, and public services, subject to planning new elements in theArab town

and authorizing planning applications. The code should takemaintenance of privacy into account, for

example by insisting that residential spaces be entered from semi-private areas rather than from

public ones, and that there would be no view from the street to the interior of a house. A hierarchy of

public spaces should be defined, primarily to ensure that semi-private spaces should be inaccessible

from main roads. Since public and commercial uses are located on main roads, those urban arteries

must include the necessary facilities for public activity. The codemust also set aminimumdistance or

effective barrier between industries and residences in order to control environmental pollution.

Setting the administrative framework

For the urban code to be effective, it should be based on better relations between local government

and the town’s inhabitants. Fundamental mistrust would decrease if citizens knew that the code

applied to all the town’s inhabitants, regardless of familial affiliation. This could be achieved if the

code were statutorily defined by the local council,8 obligating municipality and landowners alike.

Furthermore, people must know that decisions about planning applications, though subject to the

code, are not influenced by municipal politics. Hence, the silent consent of the past, described by

Akbar (1988), Hakim (2001) and Hakim and Ahmed (2006) does not suffice. An independent panel

of public figures must therefore decide on planning applications. Alfasi and Portugali’s (2004,

2007, 2009) self-planning model suggests a legislative authority of public delegates to update and

implement the urban code, while the judicial authority should comprise nominated planners to

assess, approve, or reject plans for constructing or modifying buildings. The legitimacy and

absolute independence of this authority are especially necessary for rehabilitating the planning

machinery of Arab towns. Lastly, the executive authority, i.e. local government, should be

authorized to supervise construction, in order to reduce political tension and increase trust.

In the hands of a legitimate, independent panel, the urban code could overcome most of the

problems described above. Firstly, the code would reflect the residents’ ability to agree among

themselves about the qualities of the built environment. It would thus vary slightly between

families/neighborhoods, and its relation to public elements beyond the neighborhoods could

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gradually be extended. Secondly, the code would not threaten private landownership or prevent

development. The only limits to planning and building on private land must be accepted rules

concerning agreement among neighbors and respect for the structure of the town. Thirdly, this code

would obligate both local government (for example to provide infrastructure, services and

maintenance) and the state – subject to their accord with its contents. The separation of the bodies

setting the code from authorizing planning applications would increase residents’ trust in the

process, as well as dissipating mistrust of the state and problematic internal politics. It could

provide a new beginning, an answer to the complex problems besetting the Arab town today.

Conclusion

Beyond structured power relations, contested nationality and participation in the economy, the

distinction between the formal and the informal lies in technical definitions and procedures. Modern

planning theory and practice, basically contradicting the concepts of familial societies, inevitably

leads to the creation of informal places. The informal urbanism of Arab towns, for example, is defined

as “gray” as compared to “white” or “formal” built environments, and as the opposite of what is legal,

planned, and authorized. Apart from the national conflict between the Israeli state and the Palestinians,

the relative poverty ofArab citizens, inadequate local government, and the Arabs’mistrust of the state,

the spatiality of Arab towns reflects a different concept of planning and development. Modern

planning focuses on the individual and on how the built environment facilitates or hinders accessibility

to socio-cultural life. Formal planning thus provides for the individual while safeguarding public

interests against private ones. Conversely, in familial planning, and despite modernization processes,

the individual’s opportunities are basically linked with those of the group. The overriding supremacy

of the public interest is unacceptable, because tribal interests are neither private nor public. Although,

in the past, cultural conventions regulated the relations between elements of the built environment as

well as those between the initiator and the surrounding landowners, modernization processes and

formal expectations have interfered with the clarity of the code.

Self-planning (Alfasi & Portugali, 2004, 2007, 2009), presented here as a possible solution for

overcoming the deadlock in planning forArab towns in Israel, was originally designed for integrating

complexity theories in urban and regional planning, and for democratizing planning mechanisms.

Liberal democracy, a central premise of western thinking, is the idea behind the urban code,

functioning as an abstract framework for regulating planning. This, and the division of authority

between the legislator of the code/rule and the judge of a specific application, was designed to

enhance equal accessibility to decision-making and to ensure impartiality and publicity of the

planning criteria.

The thread linking this framework to the Arab town lies in the code and a return to mutual

agreements, as opposed to top-to-bottom regulation. A familial culture cannot live with

administrative planning of private and semi-private spaces, or with land-use maps allocating land

for individual and familial needs. A simple but comprehensive code dealing with spatial relations

between built elements – buildings, roads, housing, crafts and commercial uses – could be

articulated in a bottom-up process, starting with agreements within the hamulahs and proceeding to

agreements between people belonging to different families, and to those who are landless. The code

could be accepted simply because it is not specific and allows each landowner degrees of freedom

in planning future development. At the same time, the code is sensitive to cultural stipulations and

open to temporal and gradual changes in technology, lifestyles and fashions. The division of

authority stems from the need to mitigate the power of the local council, which is traditionally

anchored in the extended family structure. It promises public discourse on planning issues that will

ultimately accumulate spatial knowledge, with defined spatial accountability between individuals,

families, municipalities, and the state.

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The tension between modern-oriented and family-based planning is both ideological and

conceptual. The shift from top-to-bottom outline planning to bottom-up urban code is essentially

technical. Nevertheless, it could give rise to a useful framework for planning in Arab towns, and a

bridge between the formal and the informal. It could also provide a base for local government by

focusing interest on the articulation of codes while dealing with the problematic issue of planning

applications to an external, professional and unbiased body.

The conflict between comprehensive regulation of modern planning and the familial order of

the Arab urban environment is relevant to cities and towns throughout the Middle East. The Israeli

case exemplifies specific aspects of the clash between these orders, but it is by no means unique. In

these areas, gray urbanism could well be the outcome of a clash concerning the basic assumptions

of public planning and culturally unacceptable planning tools. Acknowledging gaps is mandatory

before new means for regulating planning can be instigated.

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by Israel Science Foundation [grant number 87276121].

Notes

1. The ratio of the Arab population is, however, increasing. In 2009, annual growth rate was 2.4%, while thetotal for Israel increased by 1.8%. The Muslim ratio increased from 78% to 84% of the Israeli-Arabpopulation in 1990, while the Christian percentage dropped from 13% to 8% in that period (ICBS, 2011).

2. The CBS index is formed according to data regarding income, level of motorization, education,employment and dependency.

3. The exceptions are the Bedouin towns in northern and southern Israel. In the south, in addition to seventowns that were constructed by the state in the 1980s, about 45–50 villages were founded by Bedouins.These are considered illegal by the state. The Bedouin case is not discussed in this paper. For furtherreading see Shamir (1996); Meir (1997); Yiftachel (2003).

4. Local authorities include: Taibeh, Kufr Manda, Daburriyeh, Turan, Yerka, Kufr Kana, Ma’ale Iron, Tuba-Zangriya, Baqua-Jat, Bustan El-Marj, Nahaf and Zemer.

5. Information from protocol no. 313 of the Commission for Interior and Environmental Issues, the Knesset(Israeli parliament), dated 10 January 2011, available from: http://www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/data/html/pnim/2011-01-10-02.html.

6. See the Official Summation of the Or Commission available from: http://www.jewishagency.org/JewishAgency/English/JewishþEducation/Compelling þ Content/Eye þ on þ Israel/Current þ Issues/Society þ and þ Politics/Or þ Commission þ Report.htm.

7. By 2012, 51 Arab localities have had an LOP authorized during or since 2000, and in 12 other localities theLOP is at an advanced stage (Baana & Swede, 2012).

8. In Israel, the local council also functions as the local planning and building commission, and thus has thepower to define statutory planning regulations.

Notes on contributor

Nurit Alfasi is a senior lecturer at the Department of Geography and Environmental Development in BenGurion University of the Negev and since 2011 the head of the planning graduate program. Her thesis centerson the self-planned city idea, incorporating the notion of complexity and the principles of liberal democracy inthe planning process.

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Interviews

Abu Rass, T. (2013, January 26). An urban planner, member of the planning teams of Tira and Qalanswa.

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