Do Europarties Help to Standardise the Bulgarian Party System?

Introduction

The Bulgarian parliamentary elections of May 2013 raised several questions about the general health ofparty politics in the country, not least those relating to corruption, electoral fraud, and mass apathy overthe political class (Economist 2013). However, this paper suggests a more hopeful perspective: despitehistorical turbulence in the Bulgarian party system, here was an election in which for the second time in arow, and indeed in history, Bulgaria found itself with three main parties all of whom were endorsed by oneof the three biggest groups in the European Parliament (see figure 1) (Bulgarian Electoral Commission2013). That is to say, the three biggest parties could broadly be mapped as centre-right (GERB), centre-left(BSP) and liberal (DPS), according to their membership in, respectively, the European People's Party (EPP),the Party of European Socialists (PES), and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) (Gurovand Zankina 2013).

One potential explanation of this is that the groups within the European Parliament – henceforth referredto as 'Europarties', following Poguntke et al. (2007) – have succeeded in their attempts (Spirova 2008) tocraft in Bulgaria a stable, three-party system on the “standard” European model (Pridham 2001). This paperwill seek to test this explanation by developing a rational-choice framework for the motivations ofEuroparties and mechanisms for influencing domestic party systems, and the ways in which national partyactors can be receptive to this influence. I will then test this framework using the historical evidence offeredby the Bulgarian party system since communism. First, however, I will review existing literature on the topicand find that the role of Europarties in Eastern Europe is under-researched, and that this study will be of

interest to both the transition and Europeanisation literature.

I find that, contrary to appearances, Bulgarian politics is characterised not by stable ideology but populism,and that Europarties have failed or even been damaging to the formation of programmatic national partieson the Western European model. This research has serious implications for Europarties concerning theirstrategies within Bulgaria, and perhaps within the Central and Eastern Europe region as a whole.

Literature Review

The Importance of a Standard Party System

A party system which is “standardised” on the Western European model offers voters a political choicebetween two or more parties with identifiable policy programmes which fit one of the following models:social democratic, Christian democratic, conservative, and liberal (Pridham 2001). Research into whetherparty systems are programmatic is important because the latter are essential for democracy to functioneffectively.

First, political parties themselves are vital to the political process among Western democracies, and indeedit is difficult to imagine the modern democratic process functioning without them. This is because they forma link between politicians and the public, transmitting demands from the latter to the former (Lindberg et al2008). They do this by recruiting politicians on the basis of their ability to commit to fulfilling thesedemands, and likewise to dismiss them should they prove unable to commit (Mühlböck 2012). In this sense,parties can be thought of as the link between principals – the general public – and their agents – politicians(Strom 2000).

More than this, however, Evans and Whitefield (1993) argue that it is important that parties are elected onthe basis of their policy programmes, rather than the personal qualities of their leaders. Not only does thelatter reduce the incentive to make good policy, it risks volatility as repeatedly disappointed voters cyclethrough charismatic 'saviours'. With Evans and Whitefield, I categorise personalistic, charismatic politics asthe converse of programmatic, 'standard' politics.

“The conclusions suggest that, except where Western-style competition is evident, considerable doubtsexist about the future stability of political systems [in Central and Eastern Europe]” (ibid.). The question ofwhether Bulgaria has achieved such a system is consequently salient, as it forces us to consider whetherBulgaria truly possesses the “stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights andrespect for and protection of minorities” (Europa 2013) that are expected of all EU current and potentialmembers.

Democracy in Eastern Europe

Highlighting the role of Europarties would also represent a paradigm shift in the transition literature. Theliterature on democratic transition has to date focussed largely on domestic politics explanations for partyconfigurations in Eastern Europe (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). For example, Kitschelt et alpredicted in 1999 that Bulgaria would develop patrimonial politics with party cleavages based on nostalgiafor the communist past (or otherwise) and on social protection versus social liberalism. This was based onan analysis of the circumstances of the fall of communism in Bulgaria, which was managed by elites whichwere thus able to re-emerge as credible managers of the new polity. They have been proven wrong in thiscase. But more pertinent is that any explanation with permanent or semi-permanent social conditions orhistorical facts as its independent variable will have problems in explaining temporal change. Meanwhile,volatility is one of the defining features of politics in Central and Eastern Europe (Agh 1998). It seems likelythat these theories will have problems explaining such volatility. It is therefore worthwhile asking whetherinternational factors, and specifically Europeanisation, may be able to account for this volatility, and thussolve a lacuna in the transition literature.

Europeanisation and Political Parties in Eastern and Western Europe

By far the greater part of the literature on parties and Europeanisation has concerned Western Europe.While this means that more work on Eastern and Central Europe is certainly needed, Lewis (2000) arguesthat the regions are comparable, and that work on one can therefore inform work on another. For Mair(2000), then, “Of the many areas of domestic politics that may have experienced an impact from Europe...party systems have perhaps proved to be the most impervious to change”. This is because the issue ofEurope has not been judged particularly salient within major parties, nor have parties focussed on the issueof Europe been able to attract broad appeal in elections (ibid.). By contrast Marks and Wilson (2000) arguethat Europeanisation has had a profound impact on parties of the left, who have shifted from Eurosceptic topro-integration positions once integration got to a point that the EU became a viable tool for “regulatedcapitalism”. Lewis (2011a), writing about Eastern Europe, has shown that European issues were not salientenough to significantly affect party systems in Central and Eastern Europe, except in Poland with the rise oftwo strongly Eurosceptic parties.

However Europeanisation as a process is much more than European integration as a political issue atelection time. Mair (2000), Lewis (2011a) and Marks and Wilson (2000) therefore all suffer from an overlynarrow perspective. One can say the same with reference to studies focusing on Eastern and CentralEurope, such as Whitefield and Rohrschneider (2009). Ladrech (2002) therefore talks of two possible routesof analysis: that of observing party platforms, and that of focusing on the Europarties. The latter areunderanalysed, particularly with reference to Central and Eastern Europe (Spirova 2008). It is into this spacethat the forthcoming study is addressed.

Theory

Susceptibility of Bulgarian National Parties to Outside Influence

There are three reasons to believe that Europarties have a good chance of influencing Bulgarian nationalpolitics. First, that the Bulgarian party system is as yet unconsolidated makes it more amenable to influencefrom Europe (Lewis 2011a), as it increases their need for the training, funding and advice that Europartiesoffer. Also, frequent splintering, consolidation, and formation of new parties all present opportunities forEuroparties to become involved in political actors' strategies (Spirova 2008). Furthermore, the fact thatBulgarian parties are not particularly wedded to any socio-economic cleavage in the manner outlined byLipset and Rokkan (1967) (Zielinski 2002) means that they are not bound to expressing a particulareconomic interest. Parties can therefore change their ideology if the payoff seems large enough.

Second, endorsement by a Europarty confers legitimacy on the recipient in Eastern Europe to a greaterextent than in the West. This is because it offers a break from the communist past (Spirov 2008) and allowspolitical newcomers to show that they are trusted by reliable institutions (Gurov and Zankina 2013). Ledrach(2009) asserts that a 'return to Europe' was the central theme of Central and Eastern European partypolitics for the duration of the 90s. Pridham (2001) reports that “joining the EU thus represents an historicalmission. Linked with this, Europeanisation also carries a cultural or modernising message”.

Finally, politicians at this time did not only have to consider appearing legitimate before their electorates,but also to EU officials who were setting accession criteria. Conditionality targets during this time showed ahighly ad-hoc character (Grabbe 2002), introducing an element of unpredictability over what states wouldbe required to do and making personal relationships more important. Europarties were considered animportant forum for gaining the trust of European officials and receiving advice on “compatible Europeanpolitical behaviour” (Ledrach 2009).

Interests and Europarty Influence

All national parties pursue three goals: that of gaining office, of winning votes, and enacting the policy they

desire (Müller and Strom 1999). However, Europarties are unable to gain office. They therefore have onlytwo goals, votes and policy. These goals imply several incentives that Europarties and national parties havetowards inter-party cooperation. For Europarties, there are three benefits of cooperation with a Bulgariannational party. First, they gain a party's seats in the European Parliament, should the party choose to jointheir European grouping; second, they gain the opportunity to influence the domestic politics of themember state (Spirova 2008). Third, being seen to promote their ideologies in the newly democratisingcountries of Eastern Europe ameliorates the legitimacy crisis that such parties have experienced (Dakowska2002). This ties in with votes, as it is important for a party to appear legitimate if it is to win votes.

Political costs are incurred should they endorse a party too far from them in the ideological spectrum. Theseare manifested in policy outcomes that are far from the Europarty's ideal point, and in the extreme case aloss of political unity, ideological integrity and therefore political legitimacy. Europarties therefore seek tomaximise the seats they gain and the execution of their ideal policies, while minimising the ideologicaldistance between themselves and their national party members. It is therefore logical that Europarties willseek to influence the political ideology of susceptible parties in order to reduce political costs.

For the national parties, material benefits conferred by Europarties take the form of electoral funds,electoral training and strategic advice. These all lead to votes. On an ideational realm, as discussed aboveendorsement by an EU party confers legitimacy on the recipient, and therefore leads to more votes. Costsof being endorsed by a Europarty are the constriction it brings to electoral strategy and policy, as theEuroparty seeks to minimise the ideological distance between itself and the national partner using toolsdiscussed below. Again, the decision of seeking out an endorsement will be based on whether theseoutweigh the benefits.

In order to achieve the goals outlined above, Europarties will seek to influence domestic party systems byencouraging or discouraging party alliances, party mergers, and splinter groups (Spirova 2008). They canalso impose implicit or explicit conditionality to membership of the Europarty, which will bring the nationalparty the material and immaterial benefits discussed above. The latter point brings up an interesting game-theoretical issue: in order for conditionality such as this to work, the Europarty's threat to exclude thenational party in the future has to be credible, and it will therefore only work when the national partiesmembership is expected to benefit the Europarty very little in the future (Ordeshook 1986). To this extent,any projected increase in the political benefits or decrease in the political costs to the Europarty ofaccepting the national party will decrease its ability to use conditionality of membership as a tool to alterthe ideology of the national party.

In each case, we can expect Europarties to seek to create a party on the domestic sphere as analogous aspossible to themselves, in order to minimise political costs. Moreover, they will prefer one party rather thanmany, as this reduces transaction costs (Gurov and Zankina 2013) and increases the chance of success atelections and the chance to enact policy. National parties, meanwhile, may be very happy to comply,reasoning that the benefits of funds, training, advice, and legitimacy outweigh the costs of policyconstriction. Indeed, Enyedi and Lewis (2006) observe that where a Europarty does not have a local partner,a “vacuum” emerges, “sucking in” national parties in the nearby ideological space to compete forendorsement. Enyedi (2005) therefore predicts that European integration will “consolidate the dominanceof standard European party families.” The hypothesis can consequently be stated as:

H1: Europarties will successfully influence incentives to Bulgarian national parties in such a way thatencourages party consolidation along a 'standard' Western European party system analogous tothat found within the European Parliament

This hypothesis will be tested in the next section using a historical analysis of identifiable interventions ofEuroparties in Bulgarian politics. Through process-tracing, I will seek to establish whether these had apositive, negative, or neutral effect in Bulgaria on consolidation around 'standard' parties.

Bulgarian Parties 1990 – 2013: A Historical Perspective

Overview

Elections 1990 – 1997 in Bulgaria were dominated by the BSP, a party dominated by ex-communists andtrading on a combination of left-wing ideology, communist nostalgia and the credibility of experience, andthe SDS, a loose coalition of eleven parties situated on the centre-right of the spectrum (Stoyanov 2006).During this time, the PES and EPP only endorsed small parties on each side, demanding higher levels ofideological purity.

The 2001 parliamentary elections, however, saw a shock to the system in the form of Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha II, son of the former king of Bulgaria, who formed a party and entered the race only 11 weeks beforethe election, winning 42.2% of the vote (Gurov and Zankina 2013). Simeon's party, the NDSV, has been“unequivocally categorised as a populist party” (ibid.), and received endorsements neither from the EPP northe PES, despite attempting to woo the former. Though it is a clear representation of Bulgarian politicsveering from the 'standard' European model as defined by Evans and Whitefield (1993), Simeon's victorycannot be blamed on either of the Europarties, as it was demonstrably a direct result of the centre-rightgovernment's failure to 'bring to justice' the speculators who were perceived to have been responsible forBulgaria's economic crisis in 1997 (ibid.).

Voters quickly became disillusioned with the NDSV and the 2005 election saw a hung parliament withSimeon's share of the vote reduced by over half. Elections in 2009 were won by another populist, non-standard candidate, Boyko Borisov (Gurov and Zankina 2013), and his party, Citizens for the EuropeanDevelopment of Bulgaria (GERB). Borisov's form of populism had similarities to Simeon's: cabinetappointments were made on the basis of personal criteria, not ideological sympathies; elections manifestosare focussed on nebulous appeals to 'corruption' and 'crime' (ibid.). For both, their politics relied oncharisma (ibid.) and was thus non-standard.

'Political outsiders' naturally find it difficult to retain their appeal when in government, and disillusionmentwith GERB similarly led to another hung parliament in 2013 (Economist 2013). What follows is anexamination of the role of Europarties in these events. This will be separated into four sections based onthe era and Europarty under examination.

Credible Threats: The Party of European Socialists in Bulgaria 1990 – 2001

The greatest dilemma the PES faced during this time was not one of consolidation, as a large and dominantparty already existed on the left, but rather the question of whether this party was acceptable to Euroelites. A member of the Socialist International, who barred the BSP during this time, stated, “we still don'tknow if it is a reformed party or if it still has very strong tendencies of a communist party” (Pridham 2001).Spirova (2008) claims that the BSP was “considered unreformed and not even a candidate for cooperation”,and that the PES was more hopeful (in vain) that the historic social democratic force in Bulgaria, the BSDP,would become a competitive electoral force. Thus, for the duration of the 90s the PES in fact pursued ananti-consolidation policy, but admittedly one which sought to promote more European-style centre-leftparties over the ex-communist BSP.

Subsequent to the 1997 election defeat, however, the BSP recognised the need to reinvent itself and tobreak with its communist past (Stoyanov 2006). Contact with the PES and the Socialist International wereseen as key to establishing this: a BSP leader is quoted as saying:

“Recognition and legitimization of the BSP by its counterparts in Europe... will bring about newkinds of commitments which are important for the general education, maturing of the BSP to whatthe 'Socialist' ideal actually stands for, because in this country there is a very mixed and erroneousperception of socialism, both on the part of the opposition and on the part of many of the members

of the BSP. ” Pridham (2001).

Recognition by PES was therefore seen as a means for reforming the party internally – 'correcting' the“erroneous perception” of socialism held by “many of the members of the BSP” - as well as externally byindicating a commitment to social democratic policies. Moreover, by withholding membership throughoutthe 1990s, and indeed actively seeking alternatives to the BSP, the PES had made credible the threat thatthey could withhold membership to the BSP. From 1997, the BSP therefore adopted a pro-EU and pro-NATOmembership stance.

It is also notable that despite the PES's refusal to consider the BSP for membership for most of the 1990s,there was “a willingness to keep open contact with the BSP and to involve it in party discussion” (Pridham2001). This indicates that although the PES was clear that under current circumstances membership of theEuroparty would not be viable, the door was not completely closed and there were therefore incentives toreform.

Consolidation and Disappointment: The European People's Party in Bulgaria 1990 – 2001

To state that the SDS in 1990 consisted of 11 separate parties is perhaps to understate the level to which theright was fractured in Bulgaria at the beginning of the 1990s. The union was in fact formed out of 17different organisations in 1989, and centre-right ideology was scarcely a uniting factor. Stoyanov (2006)writes, “the only idea that held the range of structurally, ideologically and electorally different politicalbodies together was their desire for radical change in the existing communist system”. The EPP granted theDP, a member of the SDS, membership in 1992. After this, the DP left the SDS to form an alliance with theagrarian BZNS, for whom it also secured EPP membership in 1995 (Spirov 2008). The SDS itself gainedobserver status in 1997 and full membership in 1998, by which point it was the governing party.

However the key intervention of the EPP during this time was their efforts to forge a coalition between thethree main centre-right parties in the lead-up to the 1997 election (Spirova 1998). Supported by the KonradAdenauer Foundation, one of the many German political foundations which have similarly sought to provideaid to like-minded parties in Central and Eastern Europe (Dakowska 2002), this came to a head when theEPP organised a meeting on Lake Cuomo for the SDS, DPS and BZNS, in order to “convince them thattogether they can do more” (Spirova 2008). This resulted in the three parties fighting and winning the 1997election as a coalition, the ODS, and the SDS's official membership in the EPP quickly followed. Thus itwould seem that the EPP had a positive influence in consolidating a centre-right movement in Bulgaria.However, success was short-lived, as the ODS was swept from power in 2001 by the populist Simeon II,starting the next phase of Bulgarian politics, to be discussed below.

Europeanisation in Action: The Party of European Socialists 2001-2013

As mentioned, the BSP had adopted a pro-European and centre-left stance subsequent to its defeat in 1997.This was maintained throughout the rest of the period, and led to an upturn in electoral fortunes, withvictory for the BSP's reformist candidate Parvanov at the Presidential elections and finally becoming thelargest party once again in 2005, which enabled it to lead a coalition government until 2009 (Stoyanov2006). This government was characterised by moderating some of the financial austerity imposed by theIMF – consistent with a centre-left mandate – and successful implementation of the necessary reformsleading up to EU accession in 2007 (ibid.). The BSP itself became a member of the Socialist International in2003 and of the PES in 2005. For the preliminary delegation of Bulgarian MEPs sent to the EuropeanParliament, not only did the PES boast a far larger share of seats than the EPP (see figure 2), but it couldalso boast to have had a significant hand in reforming their national party. Vachudova (2008) thereforenotes that “ironically, as part of the accession process, the PSD [Romania], the HDZ [Croatia], and now theBSP have had to tackle endemic corruption in the economy and in state institutions that their partycomrades helped to create.”

To date, the BSP remains the only non-populist party with a realistic chance of forming a government, andthe PES's role in forcing it to reform can be said to have been pivotal in bringing this about. Relating tomechanisms for cooperation, the PES can be said to have reaped the rewards of cooperation, gaining bothvotes and policy as a result of its successful 'threatening' of the BSP.

European People's Party 2001-2013

At the beginning of this period, the EPP seemed to be in a poor position in Bulgaria. With their cherishedcoalition split and out of power, they convened a meeting in Bulgaria intended to be a rapprochementbetween the parties; however, the only real benefit reported by the Bulgarian media was that it “did allowthe EPP to see the 'real' situation of the Bulgarian centre right” (Spirova 2008). Significantly, in 2001 the EPPrefused admission to Simeon II's NDSV, despite it being the largest party at the time. This was becausemembership was blocked by the former members of the SDS, who remained members of the EPP.

In total, four centre-right parties fought the 2005 election, with SDS gaining the largest vote share at 7.7%.In 2006, the EPP responded to these problems by accepting the DSB as a member (Spirova 2008). However,when provisional MEPs were selected for the European Parliament in January 2007, this still gave the EPPonly 3 out of 18 seats at the European Parliament, seats which would have been lost if European Electionsin May 2007 were to exhibit a similar pattern to those in 2005 (see figure 2).

It was at this point that Boyko Borisov, Interior Minister under Simeon II, launched his political party, GERB,having been until then mayor of Sofia. GERB surprisingly went on to win the largest share of the vote in theEuropean Elections of 2007 (see figure 2), and subsequently in the parliamentary elections of 2008. What isperhaps more surprising, though, was that the EPP were willing to endorse his party in 2007, beforeelections had even taken place (Gurov and Zankina 2013). Three facts make this behaviour unexpected:first, the EPP had previously rejected Simeon II's populist movement, but were now willing to accept asimilarly populist movement led by Borisov. Second, the PES had shown in its dealing with the BSP thatEuroparties had considerable leverage to enact ideological reform, if threats were credible. Finally, theBorisov had been on the political scene for a considerable time, having served in Simeon II's 2001-2005cabinet, and the EPP therefore ought to have known that his sympathies were not those of a standardisedcentre-right politician. Moreover, allegations were circulating since at least 2006 that he was implicated indrug trafficking and other forms of corruption, as demonstrated by a leaked memo from the AmericanEmbassy:

(Wikileaks 2011)

Given that such allegations were circulating within the political community, it seems bizarre that the EPPwould be so eager to do a deal with Borisov as to offer his party membership before they had even run anelection.

Two potential explanations arise for the EPP's sudden change of heart. First, it could be that the EPP simplysaw the splintering and electoral misfortunes of the centre-right parties in 2005 and concluded that theywere not a viable political force. This is corroborated by the fact that the EPP rejected Simeon II's NDVPmainly because of pressure from the Bulgarian centre-right parties (Gurov and Zanika 2013). However,alone it cannot tell us the whole picture. Firstly, the PES had already shown the political benefits of waitingbefore granting accession to the BSP. Secondly, the combined vote share of the centre-right parties was22.3% in 2005, not a small portion of the electorate, and the fluidity of the system meant that even withpersonal disagreements at the top, there would be opportunities for a viable centre-right movement to co-opt MPs from other parties. Finally, Borisov's politically toxic past would present a huge cost to the EPP interms of legitimacy.

It would seem that a full explanation would require us to take into account the prospect of EuropeanParliament elections in May 2007, made non-credible any potential threat the EPP could have made aboutrefusing membership to GERB. Not only would the centre-right parties expect to see a similarly small shareof the vote, but as fragmented as they were, perhaps only the SDS could expect to pick up one of Bulgaria's18 seats in the European Parliament. Europarties seek votes and policy, and the EPP needed GERB for theformer. Gurov and Zankina (2013) therefore state that “the popularity of then mayor Borisov assured theEPP that he was a legitimate political figure who could guarantee more parliamentary seats than EPP'straditional Bulgarian partners from the Blue Coalition, the UDF, and the DSB.” The rising value of Borisov'sstock, given institutional factors, means that one would therefore expect GERB to find an alternativeEuroparty, if the EPP had rejected its advances. The EPP might have lost forever the chance to return asignificant number of MEPs to the European Parliament.

The effects of the EPP's endorsement were to boost legitimacy for Borisov's party, for, as Lewis (2011) finds,Europe has lost little of its resonance as a symbol of progress in the region since accession. Furthermore,membership of the EPP has brought material benefits in the form of lobbying. As Borisov acknowledged in2010,

“The government of GERB attaches great importance to its work and partnership with the EuropeanPeople's Party. Since we have no coalition partner in Bulgaria, the EPP is GERB's coalition partner.We don't have a strong lobby in Europe and the only thing we can count on is the friendship and

continued support of the EPP. Fortunately this is the largest party in Europe.” (EPP 2010)

Gurov and Zanika (2013) note that the EPP were instrumental in unlocking EU funds for Bulgaria, which hasin turn boosted the popularity of Borisov's government. Furthermore, as explained in the openingparagraphs of this section, Borisov's continued presence represents a step towards an unstandardisedpolitical system that risks being entrenched. It can therefore be said that the EPP, by endorsing Borisov, haveby their intervention served to de-standardise the Bulgarian party system. This can be linked to short-termpolitical calculations to maximise the number of seats they hold in the European Parliament.

Results and Analysis

The general trend of Bulgarian politics from a fairly programmatic left-right system to one based onpersonality rather than ideology suggests that, at the very least, Europarties were not successful in creatinganalogues of themselves at the national level in Bulgaria. My hypothesis is therefore for the most partrejected. The one qualification to this would be that it seems that the PES was instrumental in persuadingthe BSP to reform and change its policy from 1997 up until their being accepted as a member in 2005.Notably, this was achieved, as discussed in the theory, by recognising that their bargaining power wassufficient to withhold membership until they had extracted sufficient policy changes. Similarly, the EPP wasable to forge an alliance among centre-right parties – it is a moot point whether they would be able to post-accession.

Conversely, the story in the years leading up to accession was the complete opposite. Membership to theEPP was offered almost immediately after Borisov's campaign was announced. As discussed, it seems clearthat the main reason for this reaction is that the imminence of European Elections had significantly alteredthe balance in bargaining power between Europarties and national parties. Referring back to the politicalgoods exchanged, we can see that this was for two reasons. First, the prospect of having Bulgarian MEPssitting in the European Parliament meant that national parties suddenly had political goods to offer beyondlegitimacy. Even if we view “potential votes once we are members” as a political good, discount ratesapplied to such a good will have been removed, meaning that national parties now had much more to offerEuroparties. Second, Europarties' threats to withhold membership became non-credible once a nationalparty starts to return MEPs to the European Parliament, since the national party will likely opt to partnerwith a rival Europarty in such a case.

It might therefore be argued that while Europarties have a degree of leverage in shaping party systemsbefore accession becomes an immediate prospect, this leverage is greatly reduced once a member statebegins to return MEPs to the European Parliament. At this point, the chance for Europarties to actuallyharm the development of standard, programmatic party systems in the hope of gaining quick seats in theEuropean Parliament becomes a distinct possibility, as demonstrated by this study. As discussed in thetheory, this is because the political benefits to Europarties – in terms of EP seats – of allying with a nationalpartner increased with accession, making their threats of withholding membership non-credible.

Conclusion

The hypothesis is therefore largely rejected, but I believe that this study has been useful for a number ofreasons. Firstly, it is important to note that previous authors (Enyedi and Lewis 2006, Pridham 2001) haveargued that Europarties have largely been successful in moulding party systems that look like their own inminiature. Notably, these studies are now several years old and came before the integration of Bulgaria andRomania into the EU. Considering that my conclusion dictates that accession will change this fact, morestudies should look into whether this has now been the case in other Central and Eastern Europeancountries, and if we can work our way up to generalisations about the entire region.

A weakness of this study has been an inability to get inside the heads of the relevant political actors, and Isubmit that the assumption that the EPP made a self-interested calculation based on changing political

realities may be arbitrary. However, the assumption of rational-self interest is in any case arbitrary inpolitical and economic science – it is whether it generates testable conclusions that counts (Friedman1953). In which case I restate that more studies should test whether accession has altered the balance ofpower between parties and Europarties in other states. Nevertheless, access to privileged documents orelite interviews may reveal whether this was the case, or if EPP were simply mistaken over Borisov'smotivations.

It might be countered against my argument that the EPP encouraged Borisov's rise that the latter was moredue to general apathy with a system in which elites are considered remote from voters (Lewis 2011). Onemight point to turnout in Bulgaria's 2013 election, at barely above 50% (Economist 2013), as evidence ofthe despair that Bulgarian voters feel about their political class. I agree that this may be the case, but thepoint it that there is now an incentive for Europarties to exacerbate the rise of 'outsiders' by giving themcredibility. Separating this effect from that of voter apathy is perhaps a job for quantitative work on thesubject.

This presents serious concerns: jointly, the 11 Central and Eastern European states to have joined the EUsince 2004 return 206 MEPs, or 27% of the European Parliament. Should the same processes be present in anumber of Central and Eastern European states, it is likely that they will start feeding back on Europartiesthemselves, with profound consequences for their programs and for the ideological makeup of theEuropean Parliament.

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