Dilemma for Sentential Dualism

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A Dilemma for Sentential Dualism Author(s): Paul K. Moser Source: Linguistics and Philosophy, Vol. 13, No. 6 (Dec., 1990), pp. 687-698Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25001411Accessed: 31-12-2015 22:38 UTC

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PAUL K. MOSER

A DILEMMA FOR SENTENTIAL DUALISM

Since 1957 many philosophers have pursued H. P. Grice's program of intention-based semantics. A basic aim of this program is to reduce seman tic facts to psychological facts, specifically facts involving intentional

psychological behavior. Another central aim of this program, at least as understood by proponents sympathetic to physicalism, is to reduce the relevant psychological facts, specifically propositional-attitude facts such as belief-facts, to physical facts. In Remnants of Meaning (Cambridge,

Mass.: The MIT Press, 1987), Stephen Schiffer opposes this Gricean

program, and presents a novel approach to truths affirming the existence of propositional-attitudes. He calls this approach sentential dualism. I shall show that Schiffer's sentential dualism faces a fatal dilemma. But first I need to outline Schiffer's position on belief-affirming truths. (All subse

quent parenthetical page-numbers refer to Remnants of Meaning.)

1. SENTENTIAL DUALISM

Schiffer's attack on the Gricean program concludes that ".... there can be no reduction of propositional-attitude facts to facts statable in a non

mentalistic, nonintentional [i.e., purely physicalist] idiom" (p. 141). This conclusion seems to leave us with one of two undesirable options: either we should deny that we actually have beliefs with propositional content, or we should countenance irreducibly mental items and thus reject the

physicalism of the natural sciences. But Schiffer thinks we have a better

option. He proposes that we combine ontological physicalism, the view that there are no extralinguistic, irreducibly mental items, with sentential

dualism, which implies that there are true sentences that are irreducibly mentalistic and intentional (pp. 143-44).

Ontological physicalism implies that there are no irreducibly mental

properties of believing, whereas sentential dualism implies that some be

lief-affirming sentences state truths that are not statable by sentences free of mentalistic terms (p. 173). Consider the true sentence S [= Schiffer believes that he avoids swimming in purple paint]. Schiffer denies that there is an irreducibly mental property of believing that stands to the

predicate of S as he stands to the subject of S. None the less, Schiffer maintains that S is actually true.

Linguistics and Philosophy 13: 687-698, 1990.

? 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.



688 PAUL K. MOSER

So, we should ask what makes S true. That is, in virtue of what is S

true? Or, in other words, what makes it the case that Schiffer satisfies the

predicate of S? Given his sentential dualism, Schiffer does not answer this

question by appealing to physical belief-facts. And given his ontological physicalism, Schiffer does not appeal to irreducibly mental belief-facts. Given also that the relevant belief-facts, if there are any, are either physi cal or mental, Schiffer must conclude, and does conclude, that nothing extralinguistic makes S true, even though S is actually true (pp. 176-77).

It seems mysterious to say that S is true even though nothing extra

linguistic makes S true. And the mystery persists despite Schiffer's appeal to substitutional quantification to avoid ontological commitment (pp. 163-64, 167-69, 234-37). Clearly, it is insufficiently informative now to

say that S is true just because Schiffer satisfies the open sentence 'x believes that he avoids swimming in purple paint' (cf. p. 164). For we now need an answer to this question: in virtue of what does Schiffer satisfy that open sentence rather than its denial? That is, what makes it the case that Schiffer satisfies the predicate of S rather than a contrary predicate?

This question is not epistemic; it does not concern how one finds out that

something is the case. This question rather is semantic and alethic; it concerns what makes it the case that a predicate is satisfied and that a

statement is true. Schiffer's answer to my question appears to come from his view that

"the irreducibility of belief predicates is ['merely'] an innocuous feature of their conceptual roles. . ." (p. 163; cf. p. 167). On Schiffer's account, the conceptual role of a predicate, P, is P's causal/counterfactual role in

reasoning and judging in the language in which it occurs. The semantic

significance of belief-predicates, on this view, comes not from reference to language-independent belief-properties, but rather from the ways in

which language-users actually use, or at least would use, those predicates in a certain language.

But Schiffer's sentential dualism is not a thesis just about the meaning fulness, or semantic significance, of belief-predicates. Its central claim, for

present purposes, is that some belief-affirming sentences are true, and

irreducibly true. In Schiffer's own words:

The truths they [i.e., belief-affirming sentences] state are not statable by sentences devoid of psychological or intentional idioms. In this my sentential dualism consists. My ontological physicalism consists in my denial that there is anything extralinguistic, of any ontological category, that is irreducibly mental or intentional .... Since there are no language-indepen dent belief-properties, there are of course no language-independent belief-facts, either (p. 173).

So, Schiffer's position implies that some belief-affirming sentences are



A DILEMMA FOR SENTENTIAL DUALISM 689

true even though there is no objective, language-independent fact that makes them true by constituting the satisfaction of their predicates. But this returns us to my previous question: what makes certain belief-affirm

ing sentences true, or what makes it the case that certain belief-predicates are satisfied?

2. Two ANSWERS

Schiffer has two noteworthy options by way of answering my question. On one option, he builds on his view of the irreducibility of belief-predicates as a function simply of conceptual roles. That is, he proposes that the irreduc ible truth of a belief-affirming sentence - sentence S above, for example - is a function just of the way certain language-users use, or at least would

use, the predicate of that sentence with respect to its subject. On this

view, Schiffer satisfies the predicate of sentence S just in virtue of the way certain language-users use, or would use, that predicate with respect to him in reasoning and judging. Let's call this the language-use option in answer to my foregoing question about what constitutes truth, or predi cate-satisfaction, for a belief-affirming sentence.

Schiffer's second option is significantly more radical. Regarding, for

instance, Clem's meaning addition by 'plus' or believing that there are lions in Africa, Schiffer holds that "the demand to be told what makes those things the case... is a demand for the impossible;... nothing establishes, constitutes, or makes it the case that Clem means addition by 'plus' and believes that there are lions in Africa; and yet he means the

one and believes the other all the same" (p. 177). On this option, my foregoing question of what makes sentence S true has a 'false presupposi tion': it falsely presupposes that some things make certain belief-affirming sentences true, or determine the satisfaction of the predicates of those sentences. The sentential dualist, according to this approach, does not need to explain what makes S true or what determines the satisfaction of the predicate of S. Instead, on this option the dualist need only say that S is true simply because Schiffer believes that he avoids swimming in

purple paint. This option aims to avoid my dilemma by denying the need to invoke truth-determinants, or predicate-satisfaction-determinants, of

any sort in a characterization of truth. Let's call this the disappearance option, since it aims to make my foregoing question disappear as a result of a false presupposition.

The sentential dualist must now face this pressing issue: does either the

language-use option or the disappearance option provide a philosophically adequate response to the question of what makes certain belief-affirming



690 PAUL K. MOSER

sentences true? (Incidentally, in conversation Schiffer endorsed the disap pearance option, but we shouldn't let this automatically preclude the

language-use option for the sentential dualist.) Let's turn now to a di lemma for sentential dualism.

3. A DILEMMA

I shall argue that the language-use option and the disappearance option leave the Schiffer-style dualist with an unpalatable dilemma. Specifically, I shall argue first that, on the language-use option, the dualist faces intractable problems in explaining how facts about the mere use of belief

predicates could by themselves confer truth on certain sentences contain

ing those predicates. And I shall argue second that, on the disappearance option, the sentential dualist leaves us with an intolerable mystery, even

unintelligibility, concerning the notion of truth-conditions for belief

affirming sentences. Since Schiffer's sentential dualism is surely committed either to the language-use option or to the disappearance option (what other option is there?), such dualism leaves us with intractable explanatory problems or an unintelligible notion of truth. This will be the gist of my dilemma for sentential dualism.

3a. The Language-Use Option

A serious problem for this option results from the possibility, and the

actuality, of conflicting, contrary language-uses. By definition, both of two

contrary language-uses cannot constitute truth. How then can the senten tial dualist explain why the mere linguistic usage of certain language users, and not others (e.g., the eliminativists regarding belief-predicates), constitutes the truth-value of S. Schiffer does not actually explain this, and I doubt that the sentential dualist really can.

Let's call those language-users whose linguistic usage constitutes the truth of S (or the satisfaction of the predicate of S) privileged language users. On the language-use option, the sentence 'Schiffer satisfies the

predicate of S' is made true by this phenomenon - call it 'W: the way privileged language-users use the predicate of S with respect to Schiffer in their reasoning and judging. (We can now drop the vague modal term 'would use' by adopting the simplifying assumption that the supposedly

privileged language-users actually use the predicate of S in every relevant

way with respect to Schiffer.) Thus, the language-use option implies that W makes it the case that Schiffer satisfies the predicate of S. Essentially, W consists of how privileged language-users apply and refrain from apply




ing the predicate of S in their reasoning and judging with respect to Schiffer.

Many philosophers, under the influence of the later Wittgenstein's thesis of meaning as use, would claim that the semantic significance of 'Schiffer satisfies the predicate of S' is a function of W. But the distinctive impli cation of the language-use option for Schiffer's sentential dualism is that the truth, and not just the semantic significance, of the foregoing sentence is a function simply of W.

The following question leads to a serious problem for the language-use option: in virtue of what is certain language-use privileged with respect to

S, i.e., constitutive by itself of the truth of S? That is, why does certain

language-users' mere use of the predicate of S with respect to Schiffer constitute the truth of 'Schiffer satisfies the predicate of S'? Why, in other

words, is this mere use of the predicate, rather than a contrary use of its denial with respect to Schiffer, truth-making with regard to the issue whether Schiffer satisfies the predicate of S? This is the basic question that the language-use option for sentential dualism does not, and appar ently cannot, plausibly answer. Regarding this question, sentential dualism

gives us no explanatorily adequate answer. Note that my question is not epistemic; it is not a question about how,

on the language-use option, privileged language-users could have good reason to use the predicate of S in the way they do. Nor is my question a request for a causal explanation of why certain language-users use lan

guage as they do. Further, my question does not ask what might make Schiffer's philosophical account of belief-ascriptions correct. My question rather is semantic and alethic with respect to belief-ascriptions; it concerns

what it is about certain mere language-use that makes it the case, with

respect to certain belief-ascriptions, that a predicate is satisfied and that a statement is true.

The Schiffer-style dualist might reply as follows: "This use occurs among the privileged language-users whereas a contrary use does not; and certain belief ascriptions are true in virtue of the way their predicates are actually used by the privileged ones, and not in virtue of the way those predicates

might have been used." But it seems clear that the dualist cannot answer

the foregoing question by appealing simply to how certain language-users actually use the predicate of S in contrast to how they use the denial of

that predicate. For we now need to know why, or in virtue of what, one

use rather than a contrary use is truth-making, or why one use, rather

than a contrary use, constitutes predicate-satisfaction. We may define

'privileged use' in such a way that all privileged language-use is truth

making, but definitional fiat does not answer the foregoing question. For



692 PAUL K. MOSER

we still have no answer to the question of what makes one language-use, rather than a contrary use, truth-making. And without an answer to this

question, we lack a determinate notion of truth-making. Obviously, the proponent of Schiffer's sentential dualism cannot appeal

to something in the constitution of Schiffer himself, such as a belief

property, to explain what makes S true. For such dualism is conjoined with the view that there are no extralinguistic features that constitute the truth of "Schiffer satisfies the predicate of S" (pp. 176-77). So, the Schiff

er-style dualist cannot appeal either to something extralinguistic or to mere language-use to answer my question above. An appeal simply to mere language-use will always leave open the question why a contrary use is not actually truth-making instead with regard to the issue in question. Such an appeal will leave untouched, for instance, the pressing issue of

why an eliminativist approach to belief-ascriptions is not actually correct. But of course the sentential dualist cannot plausibly leave the latter issue

unsettled; the soundness of sentential dualism depends on the settling of that issue.

In sum, then, the language-use option for sentential dualism leaves us with a woefully inadequate account of what makes belief-affirming sen tences true. It does not, and apparently cannot, even begin to explain

why one use, rather than a contrary use, is truth-making. For this option has no recourse to plausible truth-makers that enable an adequate answer to my foregoing troublesome question.

A likely reply from the dualist proposes a special notion of truth. This

proposal is not just that some sentences are true simply in virtue of

linguistic use. Such a proposal would not be bothersome, since sentences

describing only features of linguistic use can be true simply in virtue of features of linguistic use. The relevant proposal is rather that the truth of sentences affirming propositional attitudes, such as belief-affirming sen

tences, consists in a special sort of phenomenon: the phenomenon of how those sentences are used independently of their predicates' satisfaction relations to extralinguistic reality. On this proposal, what it means to say that a belief-affirming sentence is true of a person is that a special use relation obtains between (a) the sentence's belief-predicate, (b) certain

privileged language-users, and (c) the person in question. The truth of such a sentence consists in the language-users' use of the belief-predicate

with respect to the person. But, on this view, there is nothing extralinguis tic about the person (nothing about the person in and of herself) that satisfies the belief-predicate. So, the truth of a belief-ascription consists in predicate-use without extra-linguistic predicate satisfaction.

But why should we accept this notion of predicate-use as a notion of




truth regarding belief-ascription? On this predicate-use notion of truth, truth is a function just of what certain language-users simply say, or

assume, to be the case with regard to a person. Why should we grant that truth regarding belief-ascriptions is a function just of what certain lan

guage-users simply say, or assume, to be the case? Doesn't this approach implausibly conflate the notion of what is true with the notion of what certain language-users simply assume to be true? Why not say instead that certain language-users use belief-predicates and affirm that people believe

things, but that their belief-ascriptions are not actually true, that these

people simply use belief-ascriptions as if they were true? After all, belief

predicates, on the present view, are not satisfied by any feature of what is the case independently of what certain people simply say, or assume, to be the case. Those predicates' being satisfied, on this view, is a function

simply of what certain people assume to be the case with respect to other

people. But of course we cannot lend credibility to a truth-claim (such as that

of Schiffer-style sentential dualism) merely by creating a notion of truth that fits that claim. On that strategy, everyone's favorite theory, however bizarre, could enjoy being true. My general point, then, is that the lan

guage-use option for dualism fails to account for the fundamental distinc tion between (a) a sentence's actually being true and (b) certain language users merely using a sentence as if it were true. Given this failure, the

language-use option leaves us with an unacceptable account of truth conditions for belief-ascriptions. This option does nothing to explain, or even to enable one to explain, why such a contrary view as eliminativism

regarding belief-ascriptions is incorrect. And this is a definite sign of the

explanatory inadequacy of the language-use option for sentential dualism. We should anticipate a couple of additional replies on behalf of the

Schiffer-style dualist. The first reply is that, in virtue of its meaning, a

belief-predicate makes essential reference to, and only to, the linguistic usage of that predicate by certain language-users. On this reply, belief

ascriptions are relevantly similar to the aforementioned sentences that describe only features of linguistic use. So, when we ascribe a belief

predicate to a person, we really are referring only to how certain language users use that predicate with respect to the person in question.

Such a view is of course far-fetched; indeed, only someone in the grips of a demanding theory could live with it. One problem is that we have

no reason whatsoever to think that all belief-predication is self-referential in the sense that it requires reference to the very predicate (or predicate type) being ascribed. When I, for one, ascribe a belief-predicate to my daughter, for example, I (aim to) refer only to certain features of my



694 PAUL K. MOSER

daughter; I do not (aim to) make any reference to the very predicate I

am using. We have no independent reason whatsoever to think that all

belief-ascription involves one's referring to the very belief-predicate being ascribed. Such a view seems psychologically unrealistic at best.

A related problem is that we have no reason whatsoever to think that all

belief-ascription involves reference to the linguistic tendencies of certain

supposedly privileged, truth-making language-users. Very few of us have even thought of such tendencies of such language-users. So, the reply at

hand implausibly restricts intelligent belief-ascription to a small circle of

philosophers sympathetic to Schiffer's dualism. Surely the sentential dual ist needs to avoid this sort of implausible reply. It only gets the dualist into deeper trouble.

A second line of reply for the dualist appeals to a Tarski-style disquot ation approach to truth, and proposes that on this view a notion of truth

need not explain or settle anything of philosophical substance. The reply is basically this:

'Schiffer believes that he avoids swimming in purple paint' is

true.

means:

Schiffer believes that he avoids swimming in. purple paint.

And, the reply continues, such a view about what it means to ascribe

a truth-predicate does not entail anything about what the true sentence

means or how it is to be analyzed or verified. The disquotation approach to truth is, by design, supposed to provide a philosophically neutral ap proach to truth, an approach that does not settle substantive questions of semantics, metaphysics, or epistemology. On this view, the truth-predicate is just an instrument for semantic ascent; it enables us to take claims from

an object language to a meta-language, without explaining anything of substance.

However convenient the disquotation approach is for semantic ascent, such an approach to truth does not salvage the language-use option for sentential dualism. And this is not surprising, given that the disquotation approach to truth is designed to be neutral on substantive philosophical issues. The key problem for the language-use option remains, and can even be put in terms that are ultimately independent of any truth-predi cate. Given the disquotation approach, the sentence 'we believe many things' is true if and only if we believe many things. Thus, the sentential

dualist might say that what makes it true that we believe many things is

just that we do believe many things. So far so good. But we still have an




untouched troublesome question for sentential dualism, a question about what is 'world-constituting'. What constitutes the world's being (at least in part) such that we do believe many things: (a) purely physical consider ations, (b) irreducibly mental considerations, or (c) something else? This is not a demand for a causal story about the origin of beliefs; it is rather the issue of what it is for the world to be (constituted) such that we believe

many things: is this purely physical, irreducibly mental, just a matter of

language-use, or something else? We have already seen that Schiffer's sentential dualism rejects (a) and (b). (See p. 173 of Remnants, and Part 1 above.) When conjoined with the language-use option, Schiffer's dualism

obviously endorses a version of (c). But in virtue of what does certain mere language-use, rather than certain

contrary language-use (say, that of the eliminativists) constitute the world's being a certain way with regard to the issue whether we have beliefs? What is it about mere pro-belief language-use that constitutes the world's being such that we have beliefs, and about eliminativist treatments of belief-ascriptions that does not constitute the world's being such that we do not have beliefs? Reformulated thus, as an issue of world-consti

tution, my basic question clearly is not removable just by appeal to a

disquotation approach to truth. The language-use option for sentential dualism leaves this formulation of my question completely untouched, and thus leaves us with a serious explanatory shortcoming.

So, the main problem for the language-use option is this: either (a) it leaves us with serious explanatory deficiency regarding the basic question

why one manner of use, rather than a contrary manner of use, is truth

making or world-constituting or (b) it commits us to a special notion of truth regarding belief-ascriptions, a notion created just to salvage senten tial dualism. I have already noted that option (b) dangerously opens the door to the correctness of a plethora of gratuitous, bizarre views. Option (a) is equally troublesome. We should refrain from holding that a parti cular use of a predicate is truth-making (or world-constituting) if we have no basis whatsoever for distinguishing its being truth-making from its

being falsity-making, or from its contrary's being truth-making; that is, if we have no relevant difference between the two contrary uses. For, by definition, both of such contrary uses cannot be truth-making (or world

constituting). Clearly, our notion of truth (or world-constitution) is explan atorily inadequate if it cannot account for the relevant truth-making (or

world-constituting) difference between contrary uses. The problem at hand is resolvable, it seems, once we avail ourselves of

extralinguistic truth-makers for the ascription of belief-predicates. And that's a relief for some of us, including those of us who are physicalists



696 PAUL K. MOSER

about belief-properties. But this latter option is, of course, not available to the Schiffer-style sentential dualist. In sum, then, the language-use option for sentential dualism raises more problems than it answers. If we have only the language-use option, we should abandon sentential dualism.

3b. The Disappearance Option

The Schiffer-style dualist might seek final refuge in the view that my question of what makes sentence S true has a false presupposition: it

falsely presupposes that some things make certain belief-affirming sen tences true (or determine the satisfaction of the predicates of those sen

tences). On this option, the dualist does not try, or even feel compelled to try, to explain what makes S true (or what determines the satisfaction of the predicate of S). Instead, the dualist rests content with saying that S is true simply because Schiffer believes that he avoids swimming in

purple paint. We can be quite brief with the disappearance option, mainly because

it falls prey to considerations suggested above, especially those noted in connection with the disquotation approach to truth. The intelligibility of the claim that S is true (the sort of claim essential to Schiffer's dualism) requires the availability, at least in principle, of some sort of characteriz ation of what the truth of S consists in, i.e., of that in virtue of which S

is true rather than false. Lacking such an available characterization, we don't have an intelligible notion of truth for belief-affirming sentences. Schiffer especially owes us such a characterization, because his dualism

essentially involves a distinctive truth-claim: the claim that certain belief

affirming sentences are true even though nothing extralinguistic makes those sentences true (pp. 176-77). This claim, in conjunction with Schif fer's appeal to conceptual roles to explain irreducibility, naturally leads one to suppose that on his view linguistic usage makes the relevant sen tences true. But we have just seen the serious problems facing such a

language-use option. The disappearance option, literally construed, implies that nothing what

soever makes S true even though S is true, or, more specifically, that

nothing whatsoever makes it true that Schiffer satisfies the predicate of S rather than a contrary predicate (cf. p. 177). But, taken literally, such a view leaves us with a completely mysterious approach to truth, an ap proach that denies that truth is a function of any features of the world

(whatever those features actually are). On this approach, truth is not determined by anything distinct from the sentences that are alleged to be true. So, we have truths, but no determinants of truth; and we have




predicate-satisfaction, but no determinants of predicate-satisfaction. Su

rely, this leaves us with an unintelligible approach to truth. For we are left with no idea whatsoever of what makes belief-affirming sentences true rather than false, of what makes belief-predicates satisfied rather than unsatisfied. Without any such idea, we do not really have a viable notion of truth. Thus, on this approach, Schiffer's sentential dualism has not even

given us an intelligible notion of truth to characterize belief-affirming sentences. So, such dualism itself becomes unintelligible. For it does not enable us to make sense of its distinctive claim concerning the truth of

belief-ascriptions. The problem here is not that the disappearance option conflicts with a correspondence notion of truth; it is rather that this option doesn't provide any determinate notion of truth.

The only thing that the disappearance option, literally construed, can contribute to Schiffer's dualism is a completely mystifying, unintelligible approach to truth. And this means that Schiffer's dualism cannot really benefit from the disappearance option.

Nor does it help to invoke the aforementioned disquotation approach to truth, although it might seem to help at first blush. The claim that

nothing makes S true (even though S is true) might be qualified to say that the only needed truth-maker is that provided by the disquotation approach to truth. On this last-ditch effort, the sentential dualist would

say that what makes S true is just that Schiffer believes that he avoids

swimming in purple paint. But, as noted above in Section 3a, we would still have an unanswered pressing question about what is world-constituting regarding beliefs. What constitutes the world's being such that Schiffer believes that he avoids swimming in purple paint: (a) purely physical considerations, (b) irreducibly mental considerations, or (c) something else? This, as noted above, is not a demand for a causal story about the

origin of beliefs. I have already noted that Schiffer's sentential dualism disowns (a) and (b), and cannot thrive with a language-use variation on

(c). Nor does Schiffer suggest any other variation on (c). This means that an appeal to the disquotation approach to truth does not salvage sentential dualism at present, but only leaves it with more troublesome questions about the constitution of beliefs.

Given the disappearance option based on a disquotation approach to

truth, the sentential dualist still owes us an account of world-constitution

regarding beliefs. And given what we have already learned about senten tial dualism, this account cannot appeal simply to purely physical consider

ations, irreducible mental items, or mere language-use. But what sort of account is left? Schiffer leaves us with no clue whatsoever. His sentential dualism needs, but does not have, an intelligible notion of world-consti



698 PAUL K. MOSER

tution regarding beliefs, a notion requiring elaboration on (c) above. So even if we give Schiffer a disquotation account of truth, we still must conclude that his dualism leaves unintelligible and mysterious the more basic notion of world-constitution regarding beliefs.

4. CONCLUSION

The central moral to my story is that Schiffer's combination of ontological physicalism and sentential dualism generates a troublesome dilemma. Since we rightly place a premium on avoiding such dilemmas, we should avoid Schiffer's combination. Specifically, we should acknowledge that eliminativism regarding propositional-attitude facts (or world-constitutors) cannot plausibly be combined with Schiffer's commitment to the truth of some propositional-attitude ascriptions. In short, we can't plausibly have it both ways. If we are going to eliminate belief-facts, we should eliminate

belief-ascribing truths too. I recommend that we reject Schiffer's view of the truth of propositional

attitude ascriptions, the view stating that we don't need belief-facts for

belief-ascribing truths. Of course, this move does not give us a positive account of propositional attitudes. But it does provide a first step out of the foregoing dilemma. And that is sufficient progress for my current

purposes. I leave as unfinished business whether we should also dispense with physicalism or with propositional-attitude truths. The latter business

is, of course, beyond the scope of any single article.*

REFERENCE

Schiffer, Stephen: 1987, Remnants of Meaning, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Loyola University of Chicago, 6525 North Sheridan Road, Chicago, Illinois 60626, U.S.A.

* This article has benefited from conversation with Stephen Schiffer and Suzanne Cun ningham and from comments from two referees for Linguistics and Philosophy.



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Dilemma for Sentential Dualism