Dialectical Thinking and Creativity from Many Perspectives: Contradiction and Tension

Dialectical Thinking and Creativity 1

Running Head: Dialectical Thinking and Creativity

Dialectical Thinking and Creativity from Many Perspectives: Contradiction and Tension

Susannah B. F. Paletz

Center for Advanced Study of Language, University of Maryland, College Park

Kyle Bogue

Learning Research & Development Center, University of Pittsburgh

Ella Miron-Spektor

Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology

Julie Spencer-Rodgers

Department of Psychology and Child Development, California Polytechnic State University

Cite with permission: Paletz, S. B. F., Bogue, K., Miron-Spektor, E., & Spencer-Rodgers, J. Dialectical thinking and creativity from many perspectives: Contradiction and tension. To be in J. Spencer-Rodgers & K. Peng (Eds.), Psychological and cultural foundations of dialectical thinking. Oxford University Press.

Acknowledgements: This research was supported, in part, by the United States National Science

Foundation Grant #SBE-1064083 through the Science of Science and Innovation Policy Program

to the first author when she was at the Learning Research and Development Center at the

University of Pittsburgh.


Abstract

Dialectical thinking has been investigated together with creativity for decades. This chapter

organizes the literature by contrasting the different conceptualizations of dialectical thinking

used to study creativity. ‘Dialectical thinking’ has been defined quite differently from a variety

of theoretical perspectives. From the Hegelian perspective, dialectical thinking has come to mean

the apex of formal thinking or a particular cognitive strategy. On the other hand, naïve or East

Asian dialectical thinking includes a sense that contradictions exist that need not be resolved. In

this chapter, we compare and contrast these conceptions of dialectical thinking, and we: (1)

discuss how creativity may be differentially impacted by different kinds of dialectical thinking,

(2) describe cultural differences for acceptance-oriented (naïve) dialectical thinking, (3) review

the literature on concepts related to dialectical thinking, (4) point out gaps in current theory and

research, and (5) recommend future cross-cultural and within-culture research.

Keywords: Culture, creativity, dialecticism, naïve dialectical thinking, contradiction, paradox,

tension


From the existence of the placebo effect to dark matter in space, scientists have struggled

with contradiction and anomalies (Brooks, 2005). Acknowledging, addressing, and resolving

anomalies are all important in both basic and applied scientific creativity. How the contradictions

and anomalies are approached impacts how scientific fields move forward and how phenomena

are understood (Trickett, Trafton, & Schunn, 2009; see also Ch. 2, this volume). How individuals

face contradiction is closely related to both dialectical thinking and creativity, as this chapter will

discuss.

Dialectical thinking has been studied under different guises in relation to creativity, with

the general assumption being that dialectical thinking increases creativity. However, this

assumption relies on certain conceptualizations of both dialectical thinking and creativity. In this

chapter, we present the varying definitions and uses of ‘dialectical thinking’ across different

theoretical traditions, with a key difference among them being the assumptions they make about

how to handle contradiction and the psychological tension that may arise from contradiction. We

then discuss how creativity may be differentially impacted by these different types of dialectical

thinking, describe the relevant differences between cultures in “naïve” or acceptance-oriented

dialectical thinking, describe the relationship between creativity and other constructs related to

dialectical thinking, point out gaps in current theory, and recommend areas for future research.

Creativity Defined

Creativity is not a simple, one-dimensional construct. Creativity is typically defined as a

person, product, discovery, or process that exhibits both novelty and appropriateness (Amabile,

1983, 1996; Brown, 1989; Guilford, 1950; Mumford, 2001; Plucker, Beghetto, & Down, 2004).

For example, for a new smartphone to be creative, it must fulfill some aspect of appropriateness

(e.g., be useful and practical), but also be novel—different from its predecessors to some degree.


For a piece of art to be creative, it will also need to fulfill some aspect of appropriateness (in this

case, meet certain aesthetic requirements such as technical quality), as well as be original. For a

person to be creative, that person must generate ideas, products, art, and/or organizational

processes that are both novel and fit the situational constraints appropriately. Creative outputs

themselves can be judged on a variety of dimensions, such as fluency (number of ideas),

flexibility (number of higher-level categories), originality/novelty, and elaboration (detail and

richness of the idea; Guilford, 1950; Mumford, 2001; Torrance, 1966). For instance, imagine that

a group of students has generated ideas about how to enhance transportation options for a college

campus. These ideas can be evaluated on several dimensions of creativity: the sheer number of

ideas (fluency); the number of categories into which the ideas cluster (flexibility, e.g., building

new parking structures and finding more parking, but also increasing public transportation

options, enhancing bicycle sharing, and other types of solutions); the degree of originality (e.g.,

building new parking structures -low, versus adding gondolas from nearby high-rise apartment

complexes down toward campus -high); and elaboration, or the degree to which the ideas are

given a lot of detail (e.g., a detailed plan about where parking spaces could be located based on

student need and available space). These dimensions are all measures of divergent creative

thinking, such that each element of creativity results in a greater number, amount, or richness of

solutions; whereas, processes and outcomes related to convergent thinking tend to involve

evaluation or the choice of a single right answer (Cropley, 2006).

Creativity is also comprised of many subprocesses and stages, such as preparation,

problem finding and problem structuring, insight, recombination, analogy, mental simulation,

and evaluation (Reiter-Palmon, Mumford, O’Connor Boes, & Runco, 1997; Trickett et al., 2009;

Ward, Smith, & Finke, 1999; Ward, Smith, & Vaid, 1997). For instance, recombination (also


known as conceptual combination) is a fundamental cognitive process that involves putting

together elements from preexisting ideas into a new, coherent whole (Ward et al., 2007). In

combining a phone, a camera, and a small computer, smartphone developers created a novel and

useful new product. Problem finding, both a process and an early stage of creativity, entails

formulating the problem before even starting to find a creative solution. For example, imagine

that you observe a monkey eating dirt (Paletz & Peng, 2009): You could define the problem as a

lack of nutrition or illness on the part of the monkey, a special property of the dirt, a rare need on

the part of the particular monkey, or as an observational error (i.e., the monkey was actually

eating grubs in the dirt). Depending on how the problem is defined, the solution may be more or

less creative.

Of note are cultural differences and similarities in the definition and measurement of

creativity. Creativity itself has slightly different meanings in different cultures (e.g., Niu &

Sternberg, 2002), even though it has been primarily studied as a psychological construct in the

West (Niu & Kaufman, 2013). Several studies suggest that there are cultural differences in

implicit theories of creativity (assumptions about creativity), with nuanced differences in what it

means to be a creative person or product (e.g., Niu & Sternberg, 2002; Paletz, Peng, & Li, 2011;

Rudowicz & Yue, 2000; Runco & Johnson, 2002; Yue & Rudowicz, 2002). Different kinds of

creativity are also valued differently in different cultures, such as how verbal creativity is deeply

appreciated in Islamic cultures (Khaleefa, Erdos, & Ashria, 1997). Standard creativity tests are

often considered biased because of differences in definitions, values, and operationalizations of

creativity between not just national cultures, but between rural/agricultural and

urban/industrialized communities as well (e.g., Ford & Harris, 1992; Khaleefa et al., 1997;

Torrance, 1968). Inspired at least obliquely by this research, the psychological concept of


creativity has been expanding to encompass a greater diversity of constructs (Niu & Kaufman,

2013). Not only should creativity include the creativity of eminent individuals and everyday

creativity, but the construct should also include creativity inherent in the process of learning and

the creativity of experts (Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009).

Several theoretical models, drawing on cultural values research (e.g., individualism-

collectivism, power distance), contend that East Asian creativity focuses on appropriateness

whereas Western creativity focuses on novelty (e.g., Erez & Nouri, 2010; Lubart, 1999).

Empirical results have been mixed: In a survey study where individuals had to make explicit

judgments, this stereotype was confirmed (Nouri, 2014). Explicit judgments involve answering

clearly stated questions about a construct, such as rating the degree to which creativity involves

novelty (and explicit theories of creativity would be such explicit judgments as described by

experts within scientific fields). However, in a cross-cultural scenario study of implicit theories

of creativity, or layperson assumptions about a construct, novelty was viewed as equally

important to creativity by participants from China, Japan, and the United States. In that study,

college students were asked to rate the creativity and desirability of hypothetical products

(textbooks and meals) that varied in their underlying novelty and appropriateness.

Appropriateness was seen as both more desirable and important to creativity by participants from

Japan and the United States compared to participants from China, and novel products were more

appreciated in China than in the other countries (Paletz & Peng, 2008). There were no

differences in ratings between the Japanese and American participants, suggesting

commonalities in implicit theories of creativity above and beyond possible cross-cultural

differences. Indeed, novelty and appropriateness were both vital to conceptions of creativity in


all three countries, suggesting that some fundamental universals may exist (Niu & Kaufman,

2013).

This review also discusses innovation, long considered a sibling construct of creativity.

Innovation is broader than creativity, additionally including implementation and intentional

usefulness (West & Farr, 1990). It is creative to design hardware, a piece of art, or a work

process; it is innovative to overcome the practical, societal, physical, and logistical obstacles

such that one ends up with a product in hand, art on a wall, or a work process that is used across

a company.

Creativity, innovation, and the different creative subprocesses may be impacted

differently by different types of dialectical thinking. Given the importance of creativity and

innovation to both successful individual businesses and to a growing economy (Ahlstrom, 2010),

it behooves us to not simply accept a link between dialectical thinking and creativity, but to

understand how different types of dialectical thinking may affect different types of creativity.

Even beyond economic issues, creativity and innovation are vital to tackling complex,

multidisciplinary global problems, such as the spread of disease, the search for new power

sources, climate change, and food production. Next, we review the extant theory and research on

dialectical thinking.

Theoretical Approaches to Dialectical Thinking

The phrases “dialectical thinking” and “dialectics” have a long history, reaching across

eras and cultures (Wong, 2006; see also Ch. X, Grossman this volume). How they are defined

vary greatly. For this review, we focus on dialectical thinking as a cognitive style or frame,

although it also means a method of argumentation, a stage of cognitive development, and a lay


theory of thought (see Table 1). This section covers the Western post-Hegelian dialectic (e.g.,

Basseches, 1980) and East Asian naïve dialecticism, which is contrasted with linear thinking

(e.g., Peng & Nisbett, 1999). We later discuss several constructs related to dialectical thinking

(Table 1). Although other types of dialectical thinking have been described (e.g., Indian and

German negative dialectics, Wong, 2006), those will not be covered. When we discuss research

on creativity and dialectical thinking, however, we will expand our review to include related

concepts (Table 1).

Table 1 Around Here

Hegelian and Integrative Dialectical Thinking

One of the oldest types of dialectical thinking is the Greek dialectic, which involves a

structured, question/answer form of debate as detailed in the Socratic dialogues by Plato

(McCabe, 2008). This method has its modern-day equivalents in the dialogic argumentation

approach (e.g., Crowell & Kuhn, 2012), which is not the topic of this chapter. More recent

Western philosophy has developed what has been termed the “Hegelian Dialectic,” which

involves three stages: a thesis, which entails one set of facts supporting a hypothesis; the

antithesis, which are opposite facts supporting a contradictory hypothesis; and the synthesis,

which unifies and combines the thesis and antithesis (Cosier & Dalton, 1982). Others have noted

that it was Fichte, not Hegel, who detailed these terms for the tripartite dialectic (Stepelevich,

1990, as cited in Wong, 2006). Rather than referring to it as quasi-Hegelian, we will continue to

use the phrase Hegelian dialectical thinking.

Wong (2006) drew on the philosophical literature to argue that the Hegelian dialectic

does not simply proceed linearly through three phases, but also includes deeper subtleties and

complexities, such as all three phases potentially occurring simultaneously. According to


Wong’s (2006) review, the Hegelian dialectic from its inception has been broadly applied: It can

refer to the development of knowledge and thought within an individual, but also to the

development of scientific knowledge, the material world, humanity, and the spirit. Thus,

Hegelian dialectical thinking, as a philosophical construct, has not historically been limited to

describing a particular psychological frame of thinking. What the various iterations of Hegelian

dialectical thinking have in common, however, whether enacted by an individual, organization,

or nation, is that “change occurs through the resolution and confrontation of contradiction, rather

than the avoidance of it" (Livingstone, Palich, & Carini, 2002, p. 322). We contend that this

element is key to the difference between Hegelian dialectical thinking and naïve dialectical

thinking (see below).

One descendent of Hegelian dialectics in academic psychology is the notion that

dialectical thinking is an advanced developmental stage of cognitive thought (Basseches, 1980;

Wong, 2006). Basseches (1980) extended Piaget’s (1952) theory of cognitive development to

propose that dialectical thinking is an adult stage of cognitive development that goes beyond

adolescent formal operations. He catalogued 24 different schemata, or “moves in thought,” that

reflect dialectical thinking as a postformal-operational stage of cognitive organization

(Basseches, 1980; Benack, Basseches, & Swan, 1989, p. 200). Examples of schemata include,

“thesis-antithesis-synthesis movement in thought,” “assertion of internal relations,” “attention to

problems of coordinating systems (forms) in relation,” and “assumption of contextual relativism”

(Basseches, 1980, p. 408). In other words, an individual who has reached the dialectical stage

perceives reality as being composed of elements that are constantly changing, rather than static;

emphasizes the whole as more than a sum of its parts; and has a systems view that focuses on

relationships rather than separate entities (Benack et al., 1989). Basseches (1980) found through


an interview protocol at a small coeducational liberal arts college that professors were more

likely to exhibit a broader range of dialectical thinking as categorized by these moves, compared

to senior undergraduates, who, in turn, exhibited more dialectical thinking than freshmen. For

example, a biology professor described how arguments and perspectives in the abstract can

develop in an explicitly Hegelian manner, mentioning how a new synthesis can arise from a

thesis and antithesis. Conceptualized as a developmental stage, the Hegelian theoretical tradition

thus emphasizes the integrative aspect of dialectical thinking. The tension that exists between the

two opposing elements is generally resolved into a new synthesis, or a creative change

(Livingston et al., 2002).

East Asian, Chinese1 or Naïve Dialectical Thinking

So far, we have discussed dialectical thinking as it has been described in Western

philosophical and psychological works. Benack’s (1980) findings give credence to the idea that

Hegelian dialectical thinking is learned as one gains more education, and/or is an inevitable later

stage of cognitive thought and development (Piaget, 1972). These types of cognitive thought are

distinguished from lay, implicit, or folk theories, which involve underlying, shared assumptions

that guide thinking (e.g., Kruglanski, 1989; Peng, Ames, & Knowles, 2001). In China, Japan, and

Korea, folk theories share assumptions from East Asian philosophical and religious traditions

such as Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism (Peng, Spencer-Rodgers, & Zhong, 2006). Peng

and Nisbett (1999) proposed and provided empirical support for a separate, lay/folk (hence

“naïve”) East Asian type of dialectical thought.

1 While Peng and Nisbett (1999) and colleagues (e.g., Peng, Spencer-Rodgers, & Zhong, 2006) refer to naïve dialecticism as originating in China and then extending across East Asia, Wong (2006) calls it Chinese dialectical thinking. Thus, we use both terms.


The three components of naïve dialecticism are the theory of change, the theory of

contradiction, and the theory of holism (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). In the theory of change, much as

with postformal dialectical thinking (Basseches, 1980), reality is considered a dynamic process

(Peng & Nisbett, 1999). Individual elements within the world are not objective or fixed, but are

subjective and changeable. For example, personality traits are not considered inherent or

unchanging, but are subject to situational demands and contextual pressures (e.g., Spencer-

Rodgers, Boucher, Mori, Wang, & Peng, 2009). The theory of contradiction, the second

component of dialectical thinking, arises from the first. Because aspects of reality are constantly

changing, oppositions also coexist and are ever-present (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). One cannot truly

understand one concept (e.g., beauty) without understanding its opposite (e.g., ugliness; Peng &

Nisbett, 1999). According to this lay theory, these contradictions need not be resolved—a key

difference with modern Hegelian theory (see below).

The third component of naïve dialectical thinking is the theory of holism (Peng &

Nisbett, 1999). In this theory, everything is interrelated. Holism is also related to a tendency to

focus on the field within which objects are embedded, rather than focusing on objects as

independent (Choi & Nisbett, 2000). This theory has similarities to postformal Hegelian thought,

which similarly presents a systems, relationship view of the world.

Despite being referred to as ‘Chinese/East Asian/naïve dialectical thinking’ and

‘Western/Hegelian’ dialectical thinking, these two modes of cognition are likely present in all

humans to some degree. On the one hand, various Western scholars have struggled with

contradiction in a way that reflects naïve dialectical thinking (Li, 2014), and Caucasian

Americans can be primed with naïve dialectical thinking (e.g., Paletz & Peng, 2009, see more

below). For instance, the philosopher Henri Wald (1975) grappled with articulating an extension


to formal logic that incorporated dialectical concepts to create a “dialectical logic,” proposing

simultaneous contradiction as a new part of the logic system in a way reminiscent of, albeit

distinct from, naïve dialectical thinking. As noted previously, the concepts of change, interaction,

and holism are a part of Hegelian, Western, or integrative dialectical thinking (e.g., Benack et al.,

1989; Kallio, 2011). Hegel himself referred to Buddhist concepts (see Weiss, 1974, p. 97).

Similarly, synthesis is part of the Chinese conception of dialectical thinking, and the psychic

tension from simultaneously holding two opposites may give rise to change (Wong, 2006).

Although the Social Paradigms Belief Inventory, which includes a postformal operations

dialectical scale, was created in the West, it has acceptable test-retest reliability (.77) in Taiwan

and exhibits convergent validity when compared to a divergent thinking test (Yang, Wan, &

Chiou, 2010). In sum, despite mean level cultural differences in habitual thinking styles,

Hegelian dialectical thinking certainly exists among East Asians, and naïve dialectical thinking is

found among Westerners (Li, 2014). The next section will describe the differences between these

two types of dialectical thinking, and a third mode of thought: linear thinking.

Reactions to Contradictory Elements: Hegelian versus Naïve Dialecticism versus Linear

Thinking

There are two main distinctions between naïve dialecticism and Hegelian dialecticism.

The first distinction is one of form rather than content. Naïve dialecticism is a lay theory of

thought that draws from a rich and varied philosophical tradition: It is a culturally-influenced set

of assumptions that are experienced as a cognitive style of approaching information, people, and

things. Whereas, Hegelian dialecticism has been operationalized in many different forms: It is

generally conceptualized as either directly descended from a specific Western philosophical


theory and/or is a postformal (advanced) cognitive stage of development (albeit defined as such

by Western scientists). Stages of cognitive development (and their research) seem to be

influenced by a combination of implicit cultural norms, explicit educational practices, individual

aptitude, and developmental universals (Piaget, 1972). Naïve dialectical thinking is considered to

be a culturally-based lay theory, and perhaps influenced by educational practices, but is not

considered an individual aptitude or universal stage of development. Thus, Hegelian dialectical

thinking and naïve dialectical thinking are different forms of cognitive styles.

The second distinction, which is most pertinent to the issue of creativity, is between the

two in their content, specifically in their approaches to contradiction. Hegelian dialecticism

places an emphasis on synthesis and integration, whereas naïve dialecticism emphasizes

tolerance and acceptance of contradiction. In East Asian philosophy, contradiction may give rise

to a tension that need never be resolved (Paletz & Peng, 2009). Chinese scholars of Buddhism

have pointed out that a “‘middle way’ by no means refers to a solution achieved by averaging or

mixing. Rather, it is accomplished through “a simultaneous application of the two opposite

poles” (Wong, 2006, p. 246). We consider the main difference between the East Asian naïve

dialectic and the Hegelian dialectic to be the affective and cognitive reactions to observing polar

opposites and experiencing contradiction. Whereas Chinese dialecticism views concepts/objects

as both perceived to be and being potentially composite (“both-and”), Hegelian dialecticism

views concepts/objects as being categorical but perceived as combined (“either-and”; Li, 2014,

p. 9). While this particular distinction between these two types of dialectical thinking needs more

direct empirical study, prior research suggests that East Asians indeed are more likely to tolerate

and accept contradiction without a need for synthesis, when compared to North Americans. East

Asians are more tolerant of the coexistence of opposing traits, emotions, and attitudes within


themselves (e.g., Choi & Choi, 2002; Spencer-Rodgers, et al., 2009; Spencer-Rodgers, Peng, &

Wang, 2010; Spencer-Rodgers, Peng, Wang, & Hou, 2004). East Asians are also more likely to

tolerate contradictions in others and in the world (Peng & Nisbett, 1999, 2000) and, on average,

they are less surprised by contradictory evidence (Choi & Nisbett, 2000). As we will see below,

the affective and cognitive reactions to contradiction have direct implications for the effects of

dialectical thinking, of either kind, on creativity.

Dialectical thinking has been contrasted most dramatically with linear thinking, formal

thinking, and analytic cognition (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001; Paletz & Peng,

2009; Peng & Nisbett, 1999; Yang, Wan, & Chiou, 2010). In linear or analytic thought, the focus

is on the object rather than the field, dispositional rather than situational attributions, and the lay

theories of formal logic dominate (e.g., if A = B and B = C, A = C; Peng & Nisbett, 1999;

Nisbett et al., 2001). In linear thinking, participants want to choose one of two opposing options.

For instance, a linear thinker might view herself as introverted or extraverted, but a dialectical

thinker (of either type) might view herself as both. While Hegelian dialectical thinking is thought

to be an advanced cognitive stage, linear thinking is a Western lay theory derived more directly

from formal logic. Linear thinking is similar to the “formal” stage of cognitive development,

whereas Hegelian dialectical thinking is considered postformal (Yang et al., 2010). Indeed,

Hegel himself outlines, but moves beyond, simple formal logic: He describes dialectical

constructs, such as how Being and Nothing co-exist simultaneously in the concepts of Becoming

and Beginning (Weiss, 1975, p. 120). Thus, linear thinking, not Hegelian dialectical thinking, is

the Western lay theory that parallels and is most different from naïve dialectical thinking.

Analytic thinking is more likely to be held in Western cultures such as North America that

emphasize stability and coherence in the self, physical and social objects, and the world (Nisbett


et al., 2001). It is this distinction—between naïve dialectical and analytic/linear cognition—that

has underlain much of the recent cross-cultural research on naïve dialectical thinking.

Thus, when people are faced with contradiction, different cognitive frames may be used.

With the three cognitive styles described above, the contradiction is observed and acknowledged.

However, in naïve dialectical thinking, the contradiction is accepted and tolerated, and perhaps

no tension is felt (Lee, Newby-Clark, & Zanna, 2008); in linear thinking, tension is felt and

compromise is rejected, with a choice made between the available options; and in Hegelian

dialectical thinking, the motive is to resolve the felt tension through integration and synthesis

(see Figure 1).

Insert Figure 1 About Here

Hypotheses

Each of these dialectical responses to contradiction has implications for creativity,

depending on the type of creativity. We hypothesize that Hegelian dialectical thinking would

likely be positively associated with divergent and convergent creative processes and outcomes.

In particular, Hegelian dialectical thinking should be most closely related to creative processes

that involve drawing on contradictory or disparate sources to make something new (e.g., the

creative process of recombination). We propose a contradiction-tension-resolution-creativity

connection, such that tension or conflict mediates the effect between contradiction and creativity.

The attempts to resolve the tension between opposing elements result in a more creative

outcome. The creative process of recombination involves taking different elements, which may

or may not be in opposition, and combining them into a new, creative outcome (Ward et al.,

1997). In support of this premise, recent research has found that reflection on paradoxes and


contradictions increased the creativity of Western participants, who are motivated to resolve

tensions by finding a synthesis, more than it increased the creativity of East Asians who accept

tensions and search for middle-way solutions (Leung, Liou, Miron-Spektor, Chan, Eisenberg, &

Schneider, 2014).

We propose that naïve dialectical thinking would be unrelated to most types of creativity

for individuals from most cultures, as it requires neither choice nor synthesis. Individuals who

default to using naïve dialectical thinking may see there is no tension to be resolved, and be less

motivated to explore the tension, and thus engage in less integrative processing. If naïve

dialectical thinking is related at all to creativity, it may be related to the types of creativity that

are associated with steady learning (Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009) or incremental improvements

(Madjar, Greenberg, & Chen, 2011), as new information can potentially be added into existing

knowledge structures without the need to resolve an inherent tension. Furthermore, we suggest

that manipulations that hinge on the resolution of contradiction are less likely to lead to greater

creativity among naïve dialectical thinkers.

In the review that follows, we describe the research evidence on dialectical thinking and

creativity. Given that scholars have not yet systematically tested these hypotheses, and in only a

few cases examines dialectical thinking at all, by necessity we cover the available, related

literature as well.

Research on Dialectical Thinking and Creativity

Because of the differences between Hegelian dialectical thinking and naïve dialectical

thinking, this section is organized by type of dialectical thinking. We also discuss dialectical


thinking as it appears in related constructs throughout the psychological literature. First, we

examine conceptual and empirical work on Hegelian dialectical thinking and creativity.

Hegelian Dialectical Thinking and Creativity

Hegelian dialectical thinking has traditionally been viewed as being positively associated

with creativity. Conceptual combination, or the bringing together of opposing elements and

generating a new and appropriate solution, is one of the core processes of creativity (Ward, et al.,

1997). The janusian scientific creative process theory, as proposed by Rothenberg (1995, 1996)

is clearly inspired by Hegelian dialecticism. The scientist goes through several phases in

creation: (1) a motivation to create that entails immersion in a field, (2) an identification of

unresolved elements in a novel way, (3) the simultaneous bringing together of the janusian

opposition pairs in a creative way, and (4) further construction and testing of the new theory,

experiment, or discovery (Rothenberg, 1996). As an example of Phase 3, Rothenberg (1996)

cites Einstein’s description of how an observer who is falling from a roof is simultaneously in

motion (falling) and at rest. By embracing these simultaneous contradictory elements (rest and

motion), Einstein was then able to generate a detailed theory of relativity of motion in Phase 4.

Rothenberg (1996) explicitly distinguishes between this third phase and original Hegelian

dialectical thinking, contending that in the janusian process, the opposites coexist

simultaneously, rather than sequentially, as proposed in Hegel’s original philosophy.

“Contradictory elements are not reconciled but remain in conflict; opposites are not combined,

and oppositions are not resolved. Antitheses and opposites in the janusian process are held in

tense apposition: they operate side by side and, in later phases, generate new and valuable

constructions” (Rothenberg, 1996, p. 208). Although this description has elements of naïve


dialectical thinking (simultaneous coexistence), the description of tension and eventual

resolution in Phase 4 aligns the overall janusian theory with Hegelian dialecticism, rather than

with naïve dialectical thinking. The bringing together of contradictory elements also often

produces surprise (Rothenberg, 1995). Some research has suggested that surprise mediates the

relationship between positive affect (e.g., elation) and creativity, at least in males from a large

Western university (Filipowiz, 2006). The janusian theory was derived from accounts of

eminent, creative individuals (e.g., Nobel laureates from the United States, Europe, and Japan;

Rothberg, 1996), but it needs additional empirical testing.

Another theory relating Hegelian dialectical thinking to creativity draws on Basseches’

(1980) theory of dialectical thinking as postformal cognitive thought. Benack and colleagues

(1989) argued that dialectical thinking should lead to attention to and the synthesis of

contradiction, set breaking (i.e., thinking beyond pre-existing patterns and knowledge), self-

awareness of change, and awareness of both novelty and the complex relationships between

elements. On the emotional side, dialectical thinking should encourage tolerance of ambiguity

and the ability to identify and hold the tension of noting opposing elements. Benack and

colleagues (1989) theorized that these cognitive and emotional abilities of the dialectical thinker

would promote creativity.

There is also some empirical evidence for the positive connection between Hegelian

dialectical thinking and creativity. In a sample of Taiwanese adults aged 23 to 40, Yang and

colleagues (2010) tested whether a correlation exists between dialectical postformal attitudes and

performance on a divergent thinking task that involved completing drawings. The divergent

thinking task was scored on six dimensions, including fluency, flexibility, elaboration, and

originality. The dialectical thinking attitudes scale used forced-choice items with “formal” and


“dialectical” choices, such as “(a) In a war, there is usually a right side and a wrong side. This is

because if both sides disagree, logically they couldn’t both be right” (formal), “(b) In a war, both

sides contribute to the problem. This is because they belong to the same world and are part of the

problems in that world” (dialectical) (Yang et al., 2010, p. 6). As noted previously, formal

thought is similar to Western linear lay theories. The dialectical choices in Yang and colleagues’

(2010) study demonstrate the understanding of holism, change, and simultaneous opposites that

are evident in Hegelian dialectical thinking, but also in naïve dialectical thinking. This measure

resulted in continuous scores for both formal (linear) and dialectical thinking. Yang and

colleagues (2010) found positive correlations (Pearson’s r = .31 to .38) between the dialectical

thinking scale and each of the creativity dimensions, and negative correlations (-.41 to -.51) for

the formal thinking scale and the creativity dimensions. These general trends were further

supported by a multiple discriminant analysis that distinguished between participants categorized

as either formal or postformal (dialectical) thinkers. However, these analyses did not seem to

control for or test for potential relevant covariates, such as age, education, or disciplinary focus,

which other studies suggest may be related to postformal thinking in Americans (e.g., Basseches,

1980).

Arlin (1989) similarly found a positive correlation between dialectical thinking and

problem finding question quality in a sample of 15-19 year old artists and scientists from a

medium-sized New England town in the United States. She measured dialectical thinking by

applying Basseches’s (1980) coding scheme to answers to open-ended interview questions about

how the scientists and artists went about their respective work and creative processes. In a

separate study, she also found that problem finding and dialectical thinking statistically loaded

on a single factor in a sample of gifted Canadian 12th graders, suggesting that problem finding


and Hegelian dialectical thinking were tapping into a similar construct (Arlin & Levitt, 1998).

The implication that problem finding and dialectical thinking are positively related supports

Arlin’s (1975) theory that problem finding is, like dialectical thinking, an advanced, postformal

stage of cognitive development. Although we conceptualize dialectical thinking and creativity as

distinct, Arlin’s findings suggest that dialectical thinking may enable a deeper method of

examining the world, which leads to better problem finding, which in turn leads to better

creativity.

Summary of research on Hegelian dialectical thinking and creativity findings. The

current literature seems to suggest that taking a Hegelian dialectical mindset is positively

associated with creativity—and this relationship was found for both East Asians and European

Americans (e.g., Yang et al., 2010). As suggested by both the janusian theory and the theory of

dialectical thinking as a postformal stage of cognitive development, (Hegelian) dialectical

thinking presupposes a holistic, nuanced view of the world that enables the identification of

contradictory elements and the synthesis and integration of those elements. These cognitive

processes are closely related to the creative process of recombination. However, the direct,

empirical literature is extremely limited. Toward the end of this chapter, we return to this

literature to suggest what studies are needed or could be conducted.

Naïve Dialectical Thinking and Creativity

Given the theoretical differences between naïve and Hegelian dialectical thinking, what is

the relationship between naïve dialectical thinking and creativity? Assuming that naïve

dialectical thinking is different from Hegelian dialectical thinking, mainly in that it does not

cause a tension between contradictory elements (and/or does not require that tension to be


resolved), one would expect this association to differ. We propose that naïve dialectical thinking

is generally unrelated to creativity, with the possible exception of creativity as it relates to

learning processes and incremental rather than radical innovation. Research on naïve dialectical

thinking and creativity exists, but it is rare.

Naïve dialectical thinking and problem finding. The only published research to date to

directly test for a relationship between naïve dialectical thinking and creativity yielded complex

results across three studies (Paletz & Peng, 2009). In Study 1, Paletz and Peng (2009) found a

negative relationship between originality on a problem restructuring task and self-reported

dialectical thinking among Caucasian Americans. Naïve dialecticism was assessed with the

Dialectical Self Scale (DSS; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2010), which measures self-reported

tolerance of contradiction (e.g., “My world is full of contradictions that cannot be resolved”),

perceptions of the self as involving change (e.g., “I am constantly changing and am different

from one time to the next”), and behavioral change (e.g., “The way I behave usually has more to

do with immediate circumstances than with my personal preferences”), on a 1 (strongly disagree)

to 7 (strongly agree) scale (32 items, 15 reversed). The Asians (e.g., Chinese, Vietnamese, and

Japanese) and Asian Americans in the sample did not show this relationship. This interaction

effect for ethnicity is echoed in a study by Lun, Fischer, and Ward (2010). Using the DSS

(Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2010), Lun and colleagues (2010) found that naïve dialectical thinking

was positively associated with critical thinking scores, but only for Asian students and not for

those of European ethnicity.

In Study 2 of Paletz and Peng (2009), however, there was a small positive association

between self-reported dialectical thinking (DSS) and originality on a scientific problem finding

task across the entire sample of Asians, Asian Americans, and Caucasian Americans. In an


attempt to resolve the conflicting findings between Studies 1 and 2, Paletz and Peng (2009)

conducted a third study, which (a) tested only Caucasian Americans, (b) experimentally

manipulated linear and naïve dialectical thinking using a writing prime (asking the participants to

write about a personal experience from the past), and (c) presented participants with scientific

problem finding tasks with either low or high inherent contradiction. They found an interaction

effect between contradiction in the scientific problem finding task and primed linear versus

dialectical thinking. The linear prime combined with the low contradiction task yielded the

highest originality. The other three conditions, being both contradiction conditions with the naïve

dialectical thinking prime and the linear prime in the high inherent contradiction, were all

relatively lower. The high-contradiction, naïve dialectical thinking condition did not yield

significantly higher originality than the low-contradiction, naïve dialectical thinking condition.

Taken together, these findings from the above studies suggest a complex relationship

between cultural background, type of task, and naïve dialectical thinking for originality, such that

naïve dialectical thinking is not advantageous for Caucasian Americans, particularly for low

contradiction tasks. For East Asians, naïve dialectical thinking did not seem meaningfully related

to originality.

Naïve versus Hegelian dialectical thinking and insight. Paletz and Miron-Spektor (2010)

attempted to replicate Paletz and Peng’s (2009)’s findings for Caucasian Americans on a

different creativity task. The sample was 178 North American college students, 147 of whom

self-reported being European American, 15 reported being East Asian, 3 South Asian, 1 Pacific

Islander, 12 African American or Black, 2 Native American, 4 Hispanic, and 1 Middle

Eastern/North African (participants could choose more than one ethnicity). Each participant

received one of three primes: a linear thinking prime (Parker-Tapias & Peng, 2001; Paletz &


Peng, 2009), a naïve dialectical thinking prime (Parker-Tapias & Peng, 2001; Paletz & Peng,

2009), and a ‘synthesis’ dialectical thinking prime created for this study. For the linear thinking

prime, the participant was told that teenagers who “think about the world as relatively stable and

consistent” were better adjusted socially and emotionally, and that a useful strategy was to “think

analytically—that is, to focus on what the one truth could be and choose the best solution to the

problem.” For the naïve dialectical thinking prime, the participant was told that better adjusted

teenagers “think about the world as full of change and contradiction” and that a useful strategy

was “to think dialectically—that is, to accept that there are going to be conflicting perspectives to

any problem, including the opposing ones, without trying to reconcile them.” For the synthesis

(Hegelian) dialectical thinking prime, better adjusted teenagers “think about the world as full of

change and contradiction” and that the useful strategy was “to think dialectically—that is, to

think through all the facts and possible perspectives to any problem, including the opposing ones,

and come up with the best synthesis.” In each case, the participant was then asked to recall an

episode from his/her life that fit this description and to write a brief paragraph about it.

The dependent variables consisted of a series of creativity insight tasks. Insight tasks are

convergent thinking tasks, which tend to have only one correct answer. Insight tasks, in

particular, are usually experienced by the problem solver as having the answer suddenly come to

him/her in a flash. This study employed 10 remote associate tasks (RAT, e.g., find the word

common to envy, golf, and beans; green), 5 math insight tasks, 5 verbal insight tasks (e.g., “Two

mothers and two daughters were fishing. They managed to catch one big fish, one small fish, and

one fat fish. Since only three fish were caught, how is it possible that each woman had her own

fish?”), and 5 spatial insight tasks (e.g., “Show how you can arrange 10 pennies so that you have

5 rows (lines) of 4 pennies in each row”). Insight creativity was measured by the average number


of correct responses for each type of insight task. Paletz and Miron-Spektor (2010) failed to find

a significant associations between insight creativity and either self-reported naïve dialectical

thinking as assessed with the Dialectical Self Scale or any of the prime manipulations in both the

entire sample and among the self-reported European Americans (n=147). Thus, for insight

creativity, this study failed to replicate Paletz and Peng (2009; albeit on a different task) and

found no effect for the synthesis (Hegelian) dialectical thinking prime.

These null results comparing naïve dialectical thinking, Hegelian dialectical thinking, and

linear thinking are difficult to interpret, and null results must always be interpreted with caution.

The manipulation created to prime synthesis-oriented dialectical thinking may have been too

weak or ineffective. It is also possible that neither dialectical thinking nor linear thinking may be

related to insight-based convergent creative thinking, and hence the manipulations had no effect.

Observing contradiction and choosing one option or either tolerating it or striving to resolve it

may have been irrelevant for this task. Future research on this topic should examine different

types of creativity tasks and different manipulations of dialectical thinking. For instance, other

types of convergent thinking tasks involve choosing a correct answer (i.e., evaluation), rather

than generating a single one, and so those may be more likely to be related to linear thinking.

Nevertheless, this study is noteworthy for being the only study to date that attempts to compare

directly the effects of naïve dialectical thinking, Hegelian dialectical thinking, and linear thinking

on the same task.

Summary: Naïve dialectical thinking and creativity. Clearly, research on naïve dialectical

thinking and creativity is extremely limited and more studies are needed. Whether and how naïve

dialectical thinking is related to creativity appears to depend on cultural background (i.e., one’s

familiarity with and prior experience with naïve dialectical thinking), the level of contradiction


inherent in the creativity task, and additional potential moderators. The null results from

comparing naïve dialectical thinking and Hegelian dialectical thinking on insight tasks suggests

that other creativity tasks should be tried in the future.

Concepts Related to Dialectical Thinking

So far, this review demonstrates how rare it is for researchers to test the effects of either

type of dialectical thinking on any kind of creativity, making it a promising area for future

research. However, there exists a wide range of constructs and theories in the psychology and

organizational behavior literatures with regards to creativity that deal with contradiction,

opposition, and the managing of paradox. These theories and constructs are not often explicitly

discussed as descendants of Hegelian or naïve dialectical thinking, but nonetheless have enough

similarities to be relevant to this discussion. This section covers integrative complexity, the

dialectical inquiry method, paradoxical frames, and adaptive expertise (Table 1). These

constructs are variously located at the individual, team, and organizational levels.

Integrative complexity. Peng and Nisbett (1999) pointed out the resemblance between

Hegelian dialectical thinking and the construct of integrative complexity, the latter which is a

mode of thinking rather than a postformal stage of development or a culturally-based folk theory

(e.g., Suedfeld, Tetlock, & Streufert, 1992; Tetlock, 1983, 1985). Integrative complexity, as

studied by Suedfeld, Tetlock, and others, is a particular information processing style that has

variously been examined as a trait and a state. To possess a high level of integrative complexity,

the person must demonstrate differentiation, or the ability to perceive different perspectives and

dimensions as valid within the topic at hand, but also integration, which is “conceptual

connections among differentiated dimensions or perspectives” (Suedfeld et al., 1992, p. 393).


Integrative complexity research usually involves judging arguments (whether from speeches,

text, or elicited from interviews), rather than assessing individuals using self-report methods

(Suedfeld et al., 1992). For example, in the coding scheme for integrative complexity (Baker-

Brown, Ballard, Bluck, et al., 1992), differentiation is described as the author’s use of at least

two distinct dimensions of judgment, such as recognizing that there are multiple independent

causal factors in determining an outcome (e.g., how the availability of skilled artisans and low

demand both influence the cost of handcrafted furniture). The highest scores on the integrative

complexity coding scheme require both differentiation and integration, whereas middling scores

are assigned when only differentiation is identified. Integration can take many forms, such as the

participant’s describing a higher-level superstructure that includes multiple dimensions, or the

author’s text revealing an understanding of specific relationships and interactions among

differentiated elements (Suedfeld et al., 1992). For example, an economic argument with high

integration, and thus integrative complexity, would describe not only a collection of independent

factors (e.g., willingness of artisans to create a product, skill in creating a product, cost the

market will bear), but also how these factors interact and change in a dynamic system (e.g.,

during a recession, demand falls because people also seek out more functional and less attractive

furniture, as well as having less money to spend; Baker-Brown et al., 1992).

Working in developmental psychology, Kallio (2011) subsumed Basseches’ idea of a

dialectical stage of cognitive operations into a postformal stage called integration (or integrative

thinking), which involves the synthesis of opposing systems of knowledge / information into a

whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. Integrative complexity is thus similar to Hegelian

dialectical thinking in that both entail a deeper examination of information, perspective taking,

and a synthesis of possibly contradictory elements.


Given these similarities between integrative complexity and Hegelian dialectical

thinking, it should be no surprise that there are significant, but modest positive associations

between integrative complexity and creativity (e.g., Charlton & Bakan, 1988 using male and

female American university students, Suedfeld & Coren, 1992 using male and female Canadian

first year undergraduates). Among biculturals, or individuals who had lived abroad in a country

that was different from their country of origin, integrative complexity was related to creativity.

Those who identified strongly with both host and home cultures are better able to take into

account distinct perspectives and to integrate them, and this integrative complexity mediates the

greater ability of biculturals to be creative and succeed at their jobs (Tadmor, Galinsky, &

Maddux, 2012). This research suggests that integrative complexity is positively associated with

creativity.

Dialectical inquiry method. Seemingly inspired by both Socratic and Hegelian dialectics,

the dialectical inquiry method is designed to encourage and structure interpersonal discussions

and problem solving (e.g., Cosier & Dalton, 1982; Valacich & Schwenk, 1995). Using this

method, the decision maker generates solutions, makes assumptions explicit, and then comes up

with counter-arguments based on the negated form of the assumptions (Cosier & Dalton, 1982).

For example, when trying to figure out how to cross a hypothetical 12-foot wide ravine, a

decision maker might suggest jumping over, which assumes that a person can jump 12 feet; the

negation of that assumption is that a person cannot jump 12 feet (Cosier & Dalton, 1982).

The dialectical inquiry approach to problem solving has historically been contrasted with

other approaches such as the devil’s advocate technique (Cosier & Dalton, 1982; Valacich &

Schwenk, 1995). In the devil’s advocate technique, ideas are criticized and argued against by

assignment, whereas the dialectical inquiry technique requires the generation of specific


alternative solutions by each individual (Katzenstein, 1996). Although some studies have shown

that the devil’s advocate approach yields better solutions than the dialectical inquiry approach,

particularly for individuals working alone (e.g., Cosier, 1978; Cosier & Dalton, 1982; Valacich

& Schwenk, 1995), the findings for groups/teams were mixed (Katzenstein, 1996). One

limitation of the majority of these studies was that they did not assess creativity or innovation per

se, but rather, participants needed to solve management cases or make predictions based on cues

(Katzenstein, 1996). Management case studies are widely used in business schools as rich,

problem-solving exercises based on real-life organizational examples (e.g., sexual harassment at

the CIA, Almon-Smith, 1998). One small study of 45 business school students) did examine the

number of recommendations and assumptions generated (Cosier & Dalton, 1982), which are

measures of divergent thinking (fluency). However, this study found no difference between the

dialectical inquiry approach and simply being told to be open-minded (the control condition),

and that the devil’s advocate was a superior technique—a finding in line with other studies

comparing dialectical inquiry and the devil’s advocate technique with other dependent variables

(e.g., Valacich & Schwenk, 1995).

In sum, there is a modest literature on a problem solving technique termed ‘dialectical

inquiry’, but it is not obviously better (and likely worse) for creativity than alternative techniques

(e.g., the devil’s advocate). In addition, the degree to which users of the technique feel tension

from or resolve contradiction is unclear and needs further examination.

Paradoxical frames. Organizational scholars have recently applied theory on paradox for

managing organizational tensions (Lewis, 2000; Smith & Burg, 1986; Smith & Lewis, 2011).

Paradox refers to “contradictory yet interrelated elements that exist simultaneously and persist

over time” (Smith & Lewis, 2011, p. 382). Paradoxical frames are “mental templates individuals


use to embrace seemingly contradictory statements or dimensions of a task or situation” (Miron-

Spektor et al., 2011, p. 229). In the context of organizational science, this construct borrows from

and overlaps with both types of dialectical thinking (and integrative complexity) without being

precisely either (Smith, 2009; see Table 1). In managing organizations, contradictions arise

between competing and inconsistent needs, values, identities, organizational structures,

personalities, and so on (Smith, 2009). There are many ways of managing these organizational

paradoxes (Smith, 2009; Smith & Lewis, 2011). Some of these strategies are similar to Hegelian

dialectical thinking, involving integration and synthesis of disparate elements (although in a

simultaneous manner rather than necessarily sequentially). Another strategy involves splitting

the effort such that different needs are handled at different times or by different parts of the

organization, thus not integrating at all (Smith, 2009).

Some strategies are similar to naïve dialectical thinking, entailing the embracement and

acceptance of organizational tensions without attempting to resolve them. For example,

oftentimes employees experience tension between the need to work fast and be productive as

possible and the need to produce high quality solutions and avoid errors. When adopting one

type of paradox frame, individuals recognize the tension between quality and speed, but instead

of focusing on speed or quality, they acknowledge that speed and quality are interrelated and that

both demands should be successfully addressed. Unlike Hegelian dialectical thinking, where the

thinker resolves the tension by finding an integrative solution that addresses both demands (e.g.,

adopting a new technology that improves quality and efficiency), this type of paradox entails

accepting tensions and providing managerial strategies that support coexisting tensions (Smith,

2009). However, paradoxical thinking is not quite naïve dialectical thinking, either: Paradoxical

thinking is considered such because of the acknowledgement of a tension, contradiction, or


inconsistency (Smith & Lewis, 2011), but, as previously discussed, with naïve dialectical

thinking the perceiver may not experience tension at all when acknowledging and embracing

contradiction.

Paradoxical thinking enhances integrative complexity and can elicit the two processes of

differentiating and integrating the opposing elements. By setting distinctions between elements,

individuals can better understand the requirements needed for achieving each demand without

compromising. Integrating enables the discovery of new solutions that simultaneously address

both demands. Research by Miron-Spektor and colleagues (Miron-Spektor, Gino, & Argote

2008,2011) found that a paradoxical frame resulted in greater creativity than alternative frames.

These findings were obtained in four different experiments using different cognitive priming

manipulations and creativity tasks. The experiments included about 42% European Americans,

5% African-American, 3% Hispanic, 10% East Asians, 38% South Asians and 4% other..

Their fourth study is particularly pertinent for this review, given that it directly

manipulated the differentiation and integration thought processes, and showed that being able to

both differentiate and integrate opposing task demands was particularly beneficial for creativity.

In organizational settings, there is often a tension between the needs to be creative and efficient

(Lewis, Welsh, Dahler & Green, 2002). Using this creativity-efficiency tension, the study

employed a 2X2 design that manipulated the extent to which the study participants perceived

creativity and efficiency demands as contradictory or not (high vs. low differentiation

conditions), and the extent to which participants viewed creativity and efficiency as

complementary and interrelated or not (high vs. low integration). Participants were randomly

assigned to one of four conditions, read instructions that shaped their cognitive frame, and then

performed different creativity tasks including insight (the Remote Associates Test, RAT) and


divergent thinking tasks. The findings suggest that both high integration and differentiation

enhanced creativity, but the two processes were dependent on each other such that the effect of

differentiation on creativity was stronger in the high rather than low integration condition.

Similarly, integration had a stronger effect on creativity when participants also differentiated the

opposing demands. Interestingly, the highest creativity was observed in the high

differentiation/high integration condition, the condition with the greatest perceived tension

between creativity and efficiency, but which included the possibility of an integrative solution.

Miron-Spektor and colleagues’ (2011) study measures constructs related to naïve and

Hegelian dialectical thinking. They did not suggest that the contradiction had to be resolved, but

that, as with the integrative complexity literature, the combination of both differentiation and

integration contributed to creativity. Differentiation ensures both elements are addressed

successfully without a compromise, whereas integration usually happens at a higher level in

which both oppositions can coexist (e.g., within a top management team). Miron-Spektor and

colleagues’ (2011) study, which found less creativity in the high differentiation/low integration

condition than in the high differentiation/high integration condition, implies that outright naïve

dialectical thinking, which accepts contradiction and lacks synthesis, is less useful in promoting

creativity at least among (mostly) Western participants.

Further evidence for this hypothesis comes from a study that examined the effect of

reflecting on contradictions and paradoxes on creativity, and showed that individual differences

in tolerance of contradiction moderates the effect of paradox on performance on an insight task

(i.e., the RAT; Eisenberg & Miron-Spektor, 2014). In this study, participants in the US (83%

European Americans, 6% African Americans, 1% Hispanics and 3% East Asians) were asked to

either list as many paradoxical statements (paradoxical frames condition) or as many interesting


statements as possible (control condition). In the paradoxical frames condition, participants

received the following clarification: “By ‘paradoxical’ we mean seemingly contradictory but

nonetheless possibly true. For instance, one such statement could be ‘it is paradoxical that

standing is more tiring than walking’.” In the control condition, participants received the

following example: “For instance, one such statement could be ‘people often believe that

standing is more tiring than walking’” (Miron-Spektor, et al., 2011). Then they performed an

insight creativity task (the RAT). Prior to the manipulation and performing the creativity task,

participants completed the tolerance of contradiction subscale of the Dialectical Self Scale, a

measure of naïve dialectical thinking in the domain of the self (DSS; Spencer-Rodgers et al.,

2010). Participants who listed paradoxes solved more RAT problems than those who listed

interesting sentences. Tolerance of contradiction was not related to creativity; however, it

moderated the effect of the paradox manipulation on creativity. Thinking about paradoxes

enhanced creativity, mainly for participants with a low tolerance of contradiction (i.e., low on

naïve dialecticism). Individuals high on tolerance of contradiction benefited less from thinking

and reflecting on paradoxes, perhaps because individuals high in naïve dialectical thinking are

less motivated to resolve contradiction.

Another study by Leung and her colleagues (Leung et al., 2014), found that reflecting on

paradoxes increased the creativity of Western participants, but had a weaker effect on the

creativity of East Asian participants, who tended to harmonize conflict and endorse the middle

ground approach to contradictions. When people choose to pursue a middle ground, they may

approach contradictions with a mentality to make compromises (De Dreu, Evers, Beersma,

Kluwer, & Nauta, 2001), in that they embrace partly the two opposing elements in an attempt to

harmonize conflict. Thus, they may normalize and harmonize conflict as opposed to optimally


resolving conflict, and they might not engage in deep enough cognitive processing to reveal and

clarify the distinctions between contradictory elements and to synthesize these elements. This

study used the same paradox manipulations as Miron-Spektor and her colleagues (2008, 2011)

and tested their effect on performance in divergent thinking and insight tasks. The authors

identified individual and cultural differences in endorsement of the middle ground as a

moderator, and showed that the activation of paradoxical frames increased creativity mainly for

individuals who do not endorse the middle ground. Perhaps, paradoxical/contradictory

manipulations have a weaker effect on creativity among people who are habitually or chronically

more dialectical in their cognitive orientation.

Together these studies suggest that paradoxical frames and utilizing both differentiation

and integration may increase creativity, but not for naïve dialectical thinkers who tend to endorse

the middle ground and tolerate contradictions. Because naïve dialectical thinkers tend to accept

and normalize contradictions and paradoxes, and because they endorse the middle ground, they

benefit less from reflecting on paradoxes and contradictions than do Hegelian dialectical thinkers

and linear thinkers, at least in Western samples. These findings parallel those of Fong (2006),

which showed that when mixed emotions (simultaneous negative and positive emotions) are

perceived as unusual, people experience greater insight creativity as measured by the Remote

Associate Test (RAT). Fong’s (2006) sample was 138 business school students in a paid subject

pool in a university in the western United States. Because naïve dialectical thinkers are less

likely to see contradiction as unusual, they may be less influenced by contradiction and paradox

priming manipulations and thus benefit less from these strategies. Most of the evidence for this

assertion comes from Western samples, and further research is needed on the effects of

paradoxical/contradictory thinking manipulations among East Asians. Because East Asians


(Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, etc.), on average, are habitual naïve dialectical thinkers, it would be

reasonable to expect a weaker association between naïve dialectical thinking (assessed either via

manipulations or individual differences variables such as the DSS) and creativity.

Adaptive expertise. The tension between creativity and efficiency in paradoxical frames

at the organizational level is echoed by the concept of adaptive expertise at the cognitive level in

individuals and teams. Adaptive expertise is a concept used to describe a certain type of

advanced expert innovation (recall that creativity, and thus innovation, can be expressed by

experts, eminent individuals, lay people in their day-to-day lives, and individuals as they learn,

Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009). The concept of adaptive expertise was developed to explain the

mixed findings in the individual expertise literature (Hatano & Inagaki, 1984, 1986). The goal of

adaptive expertise is to overcome the contradictions inherent in being simultaneously innovative

and efficient (Schwartz, Bransford, & Sears, 2005; Paletz, Kim, Schunn, Tollinger, & Vera,

2013). Adaptive expertise is typically contrasted with routine expertise. By “routine,” scholars

mean that the task has become automatic, not that it is inherently easy or difficult. Routine

expertise can include both simple and complex tasks, such as surgery and medical diagnoses

(e.g., Darr, Argote, & Epple, 1995; Reagans, Argote, & Brooks, 2005; Schwartz et al., 2005). In

routine expertise, experts become efficient, practicing tasks so that solutions come faster when

the experts are later faced with a problem (Schwartz et al., 2005). The development of routine

expertise involves learning how to apply domain-specific strategies quickly (Kozlowski, 1998),

but it can fail when problem solvers apply past strategies to new situations when the strategies

are inappropriate (Dane, 2010; Lovett & Anderson, 1996). Thus, the construct of adaptive

expertise was formulated.

Adaptive expertise involves learning and knowing when modifications to previous


strategies are necessary and how to make changes to those strategies (Hatano & Inagaki, 1984,

1986). As a result, the goals of efficiency and innovation are combined for adaptive experts

(Schwartz et al., 2005). Adaptive expertise is generally conceptualized as a learned ability at the

individual level but has also been applied to teams (Kozlowski, 1998; Paletz et al., 2013).

Adaptive expertise is thought to entail practicing a skill in different situations and settings, thus

enabling adaptive experts to learn meta-cognitive skills (Hatano & Inagaki, 1984, 1986). In other

words, the individual learns skills in unpredictable and changing environments. Predictable

environments are more likely to lead to cognitive entrenchment, which is when individuals lose

flexibility and creativity in the service of becoming domain experts (Dane, 2010). For example,

an adaptive expert may learn how to perform an appendectomy not only in one type of

environment, but in different rooms with different resources (e.g., assisting staff, equipment),

with patients with different underlying conditions and complications. The adaptive expert

thereby learns meta-cognitive skills (e.g., when to apply which techniques), thus optimizing both

efficiency and innovation.

The concept of adaptive expertise has parallels with the construct of Hegelian dialectical

thinking. Adaptive experts and Hegelian dialectical thinkers both have a deeper awareness of the

changeable and dynamic nature of the world, and they are both then better able to resolve the

contradictions that inherently arise as they experience them (such as the one between efficiency

and innovation).

Empirical studies on adaptive expertise are limited. One small study demonstrated that

business consultants (general experts, 12 participants), on average, outperformed restaurant

managers (domain experts, 12 participants) and college students (novices, 12 participants) when

given hypothetical, novel problems involved in running a restaurant (Barnett & Koslowski,


2002). The solutions elicited from the interviews were coded for how optimal they were. The

dependent variable was the number of optimal answers minus the number of answers that were

the opposite of the optimal answers. Then, using qualitative process analyses, Barnett and

Koslowski (2002) found that the business consultants were more likely to use broad abstract

concepts in solving problems, whereas the restaurant managers’ domain knowledge did not

transfer to novel situations. In a quantitative case study of daily planning among the Mars

Exploration Rover scientists (who were Americans and Europeans), Paletz and colleagues (2013)

demonstrated that adaptive expertise grew over time, and that adaptive expertise was an

empirically distinct (statistically unrelated) construct from both novelty and efficiency. However,

neither of these studies tested the causes of the development of adaptive expertise, and neither

delved into the relationship between adaptive expertise and either dialectical thinking or

creativity. Nevertheless, this construct may provide a new way of examining expertise and

learning that is related to both dialectical thinking and creativity.

Summary of constructs related to dialectical thinking. When one examines constructs

related to dialectical thinking, the literature is extremely diverse, ranging from organizational

research on paradoxical frames, to literature on the dialectical inquiry method, to individual and

team research on adaptive expertise. A common theme is the ability to effectively manage the

contradiction that underlies the successful integration of efficiency and novelty, or, as is even

more challenging, efficiency and innovation. Each of these constructs has a somewhat different

approach to dealing with and managing contradiction, and each is to some degree aligned with

either Hegelian or naïve dialectical thinking.

Further, each has different findings with regards to creativity, mainly because creativity

has been operationalized differently in each study. Integrative complexity, which is the most


similar to Hegelian dialectical thinking in its emphasis on integration, shows the most consistent

positive relationship with creativity. Paradoxical frames are highly relevant to the dialectical

thinking literature, but further research needs to tease apart this construct to determine how

closely it matches the two different types of dialectical thinking. In addition, prior research

suggests that paradoxical frames enhance creativity, but only among individuals with low levels

of naïve dialectical thinking (e.g., Eisenberg & Miron-Spektor, 2014; Leung et al., 2014). Of all

of these constructs, the dialectical inquiry method has been the least successful in promoting

creativity, but research on it has also primarily involved (non-creative) decision-making tasks.

The dialectical inquiry method also has the most tenuous connections to either native or Hegelian

dialectical thinking, vis-à-vis how individuals who use it resolve or accept contradiction.

Although still in the early stages, research on paradoxical frames and adaptive expertise

suggests that the contradiction-tension-creativity connection is a likely one, but questions the

degree to which the resolution of contradiction is necessary. The strongest evidence for an

association between some type of dialectical thinking and creativity comes from the

experimental manipulations conducted by Miron-Spektor and colleagues (2008, 2011) and the

research on integrative complexity. Although these studies did not precisely prime naïve or

Hegelian dialectical thinking, they shed light on the relationship between related constructs and

creativity.

In sum, with respect to naïve dialectical thinking, the research on related constructs has

provided inconclusive evidence regarding its relationship to creativity. Moreover, studies that

directly assessed and primed naïve dialectical thinking yielded mixed or null results, lending

some credence to the hypothesis that naïve dialectical thinking is unrelated, weakly related, and

even under some circumstances, negatively related to creativity (e.g., Leung et al., 2014; Paletz


& Peng, 2009; Paletz & Miron-Spektor, 2010). With respect to Hegelian dialectical thinking, the

research evidence is stronger, suggesting a potential positive relationship with creativity (at least

for non-naïve dialectical individuals and predominantly Western samples), whether the Hegelian

dialectical thinking is operationalized as postformal thought, integrative complexity, or

paradoxical frames. More research is needed on the association between Hegelian dialectical

thinking and creativity in East Asian and other samples.

Areas for Potential Future Research

Overall, this review suggests that different types of dialectical thinking may have

differential effects on creativity, and that there may be an interaction effect between the different

types of dialectical thinking. Key leverage points seem to be whether the contradiction is

expected or accepted, whether tension arises, and, if tension arises, whether the individual

attempts to resolve it by making the contradiction go away via synthesis or integration or by

managing it such that the tension is resolved but the contradiction remains. As noted, in naïve

dialectical thinking, the tension does not arise. It is not clear whether maintaining a state of

contradiction without tension contributes to or decreases creativity. Tension from contradiction,

or at least an underlying motivation to resolve contradiction, does seem important to creativity

(Leung et al., 2014). However, as this review reveals, there is very little empirical research on

dialectical thinking and creativity, particularly literature that distinguishes between Hegelian and

naïve dialectical thinking, directly tests the importance of felt tension in contradiction, and

examines potential additional variables. Specific gaps, along with suggestions for future

research, are: the clarification of all the primary constructs, the refinement of measurement

techniques, the examination of the relationship between Hegelian and naïve dialectical thinking,


as well as that between dialectical thinking and relevant constructs, the addition of the holism

and change components of both types of dialectical thinking, and the inclusion of more

moderators and mediators through empirical theory-building.

Clarification of Constructs

Conceptual clarity of both dialectical thinking and creativity is necessary before progress

can be made in this area. Both constructs could be expanded and more thoroughly studied in

future research.

Conceptualization of creativity. As this chapter illustrates, creativity in this area of

research was mainly examined through divergent thinking, insight, and problem finding.

However, creativity has been conceptualized in many different ways: as a personality trait, an

attribute of a product (Amabile, 1996), a history of lifetime achievements (e.g., Dudek & Hall,

1991), as a process, or even as an environment (Brown, 1989; Mooney, 1963). Even when

examined as a process, creativity is reflected in many additional ways, such as recombination,

analogy, and conceptual expansion (e.g., Ward et al., 1997). Creativity can be expressed by

experts, learners, eminent individuals, and even novices (Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009). As

demonstrated by the research on naïve and Hegelian dialectical thinking insight, the type of

creativity task assessed is important. Paradoxical frames can enhance insight creativity but not in

naïve dialectical thinkers. If naïve dialectical thinking is related to creativity, it is most likely to

be associated with learning-related creativity, as, theoretically, that is the type where the

acceptance of contradiction is most advantageous. In addition, the type of creativity hypothesized

to be related most strongly to Hegelian dialectical thinking is recombination. Future research

could examine these types of creativity, specifically.


Furthermore, as noted in the introduction, while there are commonalities in cross-cultural

conceptions of creativity such that different cultural groups view both novelty and

appropriateness as important, the degree may differ (Paletz & Peng, 2008). What is considered to

be prototypically creative may be different across different cultures, as can how much different

creative activities and traits are valued (e.g., Khaleefa et al., 1997; Niu & Sternberg, 2002; Paletz

et al., 2011; Rudowicz & Yue, 2000). Thus, the type of creative activity may be an important

moderator for any relationship between dialectical thinking (of either type) and creativity. For

example, a study could examine the effect of Hegelian dialectical thinking on verbal creativity as

assessed by local experts in a culture with a rich tradition of verbal creativity and in a culture

where verbal creativity is less emphasized. If an interaction effect were discovered, it would

further illuminate the relationship between culture and creativity. Another study could examine

whether the type of dialectical thinking that is predominant in a culture is related to the type of

creativity that is also most in line with that culture’s conceptions and values. For instance,

researchers could examine types of creativity that are particularly valued and prototypical in

China (e.g., Yue, 2003; Yue & Rudowicz, 2002), and they could uncover the relationship

between naïve dialectical thinking versus Hegelian dialectical thinking on those types of creative

activities versus activities that are more valued in other cultures.

Conceptualization of both types of dialectical thinking. This review distinguished

between naïve dialectical thinking and Hegelian dialectical thinking, but additional studies could

also examine whether historically-rooted and culture-bound types of dialectical thinking are still

prevalent today in India, Germany, and other nations, and the extent to which they have spread

across nations (Wong, 2006). Wong (2006) suggested that acceptance and tolerance of

contradiction among Chinese could be due in part to the recent sociocultural situation in China,


rather than only due to ancient philosophy. Current Chinese naïve dialectical thinking may

actually be “an interaction between naïve Chinese beliefs and the new forces which the Chinese

are encountering in contemporary societies” (Wong, 2006, p. 251). Similarly, Paletz and Peng

(2008) offered the post-hoc explanation for the relative desirability of novelty in China versus

Japan and the United States that Japan and the United States were undergoing recessions during

data collection in 2002, whereas Beijing, specifically, was experiencing an economic boom. In

line with other research on promotion/approach and prevention/avoidance mindsets and

creativity (e.g., Friedman & Forster, 2001, 2002), an economic boom could encourage risk-

taking and novelty seeking, whereas a recession could encourage risk-aversion and security

seeking. Researchers can examine the modern expression of naïve dialectical thinking and

Hegelian dialectical thinking in different cultures and socioeconomic contexts.

Further, the exact affective and cognitive reactions to contradiction should be unpacked.

Based on theory and some converging research evidence, we suggest that for naïve dialectical

thinking, contradiction does not result in tension, whereas it does for Hegelian dialectical

thinking (Leung et al., 2014). This claim needs to be tested more explicitly among members of

different cultural groups.

Measurement of Dialectical Thinking and Creativity

Once the concepts are clarified, there is a need for more measures of the various forms of

dialectical thinking and creativity, specifically measures that have been cross-culturally

validated. The literature would benefit from more dialectical thinking measures that

operationalize both naïve and Hegelian dialectical thinking as traits and states, as well as

dialectical thinking manipulations and primes. Each of the ways of conceptualizing creativity


listed above (e.g., personality traits, various processes, etc.) can be measured in a variety of

ways, such as self-report, supervisor ratings of creativity, various dimensions on outputs from

creativity tasks, etc. The literature so far has generally utilized creativity tasks rather than self-

report trait measures (which seems most appropriate in this case), but even the same creative

process (e.g., insight) can be measured in more than one way. For example, insight can be

measured not only by using the Remote Associates Test, but also by using mathematical insight

tasks. Even more importantly, creativity as a dependent variable should be measured based on

specific hypotheses regarding the different types of creative processes, such as by measuring

recombination, specifically.

Naïve and Hegelian Dialectical Thinking

One of the main gaps illustrated in this review is that there are no studies empirically

examining the relationship between naïve dialectical thinking and Hegelian dialectical thinking.

The simplest way to test whether Hegelian and naïve dialectical thinking are different (or

positively or negatively associated with each other) is by comparing responses on different scales

(e.g., the DSS and a measure of Hegelian dialectical thinking). More thorough studies could go

beyond self-report Likert scales: Other-report scales, scenario methods, and discriminant tests

based on the coding of archival materials such as speeches, diaries, and/or blogs could all be

utilized. A primary goal would be to determine whether Hegelian and naïve dialectical thinking

are truly distinguished by the synthesis versus acceptance of tension and contradiction. Further,

are Hegelian and naïve dialecticism always distinct, or within some subcultures, settings, and

contexts (e.g., Asian Americans), are they indiscernible? A blended dialectical thinking might

entail the recognition and acceptance of contradiction that sometimes, but not always, needs to


be or is resolved. Additional research is necessary to determine the prevalence of either type of

dialectical thinking in other countries and subcultures, such as Germany, Iran, or Spain, and

within different levels of education and types of profession within those countries. More research

should also examine possible interaction effects between naïve and Hegelian dialectical thinking.

Concepts Related to Dialectical Thinking

As noted in this review, researchers could examine constructs related to naïve and

Hegelian dialectical thinking. In addition to further research tying paradoxical frames and

adaptive expertise more directly to creativity, East Asian and other non-Western constructs could

be examined. For example, Yao, Yang, Dong, and Wang (2010) tested the relationships between

self-reported Zhong Yong, self-reported creativity, and supervisor’s perceptions of the

employee’s innovativeness in a sample of 273 paired questionnaires from Chinese employees.

Zhong Yong is a Chinese construct that involves attempting to achieve harmonious social

interactions via holism and balancing extremes (Yao et al., 2010). Yao and colleagues (2010)

consider it to be different from naïve dialectical thinking and not quite an information processing

style, although it has elements in common with naïve dialectical thinking, such as the preference

for compromise (Peng & Nisbett, 1999) and a middle ground tactic (Leung et al., 2014). “The

harmony of Zhong Yong entails finding the middle position between two opposing ideas,” and is

similarly a lay theory, being “a suggested mode of action to be applied in everyday interpersonal

interactions” (Yao et al., 2010, p. 53). Zhong Yong was not correlated with self-reported

creativity, but it did moderate the relationship between creativity and innovation. While there

was generally a significant positive relationship between self-reported creativity and manager-

reported innovation, this relationship was not significant among those with high levels of Zhong


Yong. The authors suggest that people who endorse Zhong Yong will seek compromises and not

advocate for their own ideas. More research is needed on East Asian (and other) indigenous

constructs that may be related to both dialectical thinking and creativity.

Change and Holism

Another topic for examination is how other aspects of dialecticism, namely, change and

holism, might be related to creativity. The theories and empirical studies of creativity and

dialectical thinking, so far, have mainly focused on reactions to contradiction. But, both Hegelian

and naïve dialectical thinking also involve holism, or the perception of interconnections and

relationships such that the whole is greater than the sum of parts, and change, such that the

system (world, self, and others) under examination is assumed to always be in a state of flux. An

acknowledgement that the world (and the self) are prone to change may be positively related to

creativity, in that exploration, as opposed to exploitation, seems more closely related to radical

creativity. There is some empirical evidence to support this hypothesis. The change elements of

naïve dialectical thinking (as measured by the change subscale of the Dialectical Self Scale) were

related to a commitment to organizational change among Chinese employees (Chen, Wang,

Huang, & Spencer-Rodgers, 2012).

Likewise, holism may be positively related to forming connections between elements and

expanding concepts, which are both creative processes (Ward et al., 1997). Both an awareness of

interrelations between components (holism) and the expectation of change should promote set

breaking (i.e., move away from past ways of thinking, Benack et al., 1989). However, the finding

that self-reported naïve dialectical thinking (Dialectical Self Scale) was negatively related to

creativity on low contradiction tasks for Caucasian Americans in Paletz and Peng (2009; study 1)


seemed to be driven by responses on the behavioral change subscale. This finding suggests that a

preference for change may depend on the type of creativity task, at least for Caucasians and

European Americans. Thus, any studies focusing on the impact of the change and holism

dimensions of dialectical thinking on creativity should take into account potential interaction

effects with cultural background and the type of task.

Additional Mediators and Moderators: Creating Theory

Research on dialectical thinking and creativity has been guided by various theories, but

the literature lacks a coherent structure. Some scholars state that Hegelian dialectical thinking is

creativity (Yan & Arlin, 1999), while others examine dialectical thinking as an independent

variable affecting creativity (e.g., Paletz & Peng, 2009). Whenever a simple

independent/dependent variable pair is presented, one must consider alternative causal

combinations, such as bidirectionality and third variables. Could creativity as a personality trait,

environment, or experience (e.g., working on a creative product) influence dialectical thinking,

thus switching the initially proposed causal direction? Could a third variable, such as integrative

complexity, affect both variables and account for the relationship between them? Could the

different aspects of the different types of dialectical thinking (e.g. tolerance of contradiction and

the middle ground approach versus a motivation to resolve tension) have interactive effects on

creativity? Ultimately, more conceptual development and empirical data are required before a

coherent theory beyond the simple connections noted here can be generated.

Further, there is a need for additional research on moderators and mediators. For

example, in addition to Asian versus European cultural background (Paletz & Peng, 2009), other

demographic moderators may be important, particularly educational level. Developmental


psychologists propose that dialectical thinking is a level of postformal thinking, suggesting that

advanced academics and older adults, compared to other professions and age groups, may be

more likely to think dialectically (see Grossman, this volume, chapter 5). A possible interaction

between culture and education may also be important: just as Hegelian dialectical thinking may

increase with education in Americans (e.g., Basseches, 1980), naïve dialectical thinking may

decrease with education among Chinese, as college students in China are taught formal

logic/linear thinking, as well as Hegelian dialectics (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2010).

One gap in the literature is the identification of specific mechanisms linking dialectical

thinking (Hegelian or naïve) and creativity. In particular, the presence and experience of tension

or lack thereof seems to be a potential key mediator. More studies, ideally experimental, are

needed to test the effects of dialectical thinking on tension, and then of tension on expressed

creativity. Another potential mediator is the emotion of surprise, which has been found to

mediate the association between positive affect and creativity (Filipowicz, 2006). Surprise is also

potentially key to synthesizing contradiction (Rothenberg, 1995). Depending on culture, the

presence of threat or conflict might also affect the relationship between dialectical thinking and

creativity as a mediator or a moderator (Paletz, Miron-Spektor, & Lin, 2013).

Lastly, a theory of creativity and dialectical thinking (Hegelian and/or naïve) needs to

explicitly note the level of analysis of all variables. Confusing different levels of analysis can

create biases and inaccurate findings, such as a mismatch between the level that is

conceptualized and the level that is measured, inappropriate aggregation, and overlooking

potential cross-level effects (e.g., Rousseau, 1985). Creativity can occur at different levels of

analysis, be it at the individual, team, organization, or disciplinary level (e.g., global aeronautics

development). The relationship between the multitude of levels of dialectical thinking and the


levels where creativity and innovation arise is an open question. Mediators and moderators may

be at the same level, such as when the contradiction inherent in a creativity task (individual

level) moderates the effect between naïve or Hegelian dialectical thinking (individual level) and

people’s performance on a creativity task (individual level). However, these effects may also

cross levels, such as when, hypothetically, organizational climate regarding how to deal with

contradiction (organization level) impacts individual Hegelian dialectical thinking and creativity

(individual level). Another cross-level study could involve examining how the effects of team

composition with regards to both ethnicity and the average endorsement of naïve and Hegelian

dialectical thinking (team level) impact individual and organizational creativity. Any of these

examples would make for fruitful future studies. Furthermore, any multi-level theory of Hegelian

and naïve dialectical thinking on creativity may include feedback loops between variables and

levels. For instance, being in a setting where a lot of creative ideas are generated may have an

impact on which dialectical thinking styles are encouraged, learned, and expressed.

Conclusion

The literature on dialectical thinking and creativity is diverse and does not generally

communicate across subdisciplines (e.g., organizational science, cross-cultural psychology).

Each of the disciplines and traditions reviewed in this chapter has different emphases and ways

of defining and measuring both dialectical thinking and creativity. By leveraging research both

within and across disciplines and cultures, we have the potential to understand the myriad

relationships between different types of dialectical thinking and creativity. This area of research

has important implications. Innovation and creativity are not only necessary for economic

growth and prosperity (e.g., Ahlstrom, 2010), but they are vital to solving some of the world’s


most complex, intractable problems. By deconstructing and uncovering the relationship between

different types of dialectical thinking and creativity, we can make practical suggestions for

organizational work processes, training, and education.


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Table 1: Concepts Related to Dialectical Thinking and Their Definitions

Concepts Definition

Hegelian dialectic thinking A Western philosophically-based theory. Thesis

(initial facts), antithesis (opposite facts), and synthesis

(combination of thesis and antithesis)

Naïve dialectical thinking An East Asian lay theory. The three main (but not all)

components to naïve dialecticism are: the theory of

change (reality is a dynamic process), the theory of

contradiction (oppositions coexist and are ever-

present), and the theory of holism (everything is

interrelated; Peng & Nisbett, 1999)

Linear thinking or analytic

cognition

A Western lay theory based on formal logic involving

the three principles of identity (a thing is what it is),

noncontradiction (the same thing cannot be true and

false at the same time), and the excluded middle

(statements are either false or true but not both; Peng

& Nisbett, 1999)

Dialectical thinking (developmental

psychology)

A postformal stage of cognitive development, a type

of thinking that looks for “a developmental

transformation (i.e., developmental movement through

forms), which occurs via constitutive and interactive

relationships” (Basseches, 1980, p. 405). Emphasizes

interrelationships, change, holism, and identification


Concepts Definition

of contradiction, and involves 24 schemata

(Basseches, 1980)

Integrative complexity A mode of thinking involving both differentiation and

integration (synthesis and/or comparing/contrasting)

of disparate elements (Suedfeld et al., 1992)

Dialectic inquiry A method of problem solving where the decision

maker generates solutions, makes assumptions

explicit, and then comes up with counter-arguments

based on the negated form of the assumptions (Cosier

& Dalton, 1982)

Paradoxical frames Paradoxical frames are mental templates that

individuals impose on an environment in order to

recognize and embrace contradictions (Smith &

Tushman, 2005, p. 523).

Adaptive expertise Learned expertise involving knowing when variations

to previous strategies/heuristics are necessary and how

to make changes to those strategies, such that both

efficiency and innovation result (Hatano & Inagaki,

1984, 1986)


Contradiction Solution Linear Thinking

Tension, conflict

Resolution: one is right and one is wrong

or

Hegelian dialecticism

Tension, conflict

Resolution: synthesis, removing the tension by integrating the elements

Naïve dialecticism Acceptance, no tension

Resolution: no need to resolve, middle-way (both are right), and/or embeddedness

Figure 1. Linear Thinking, Hegelian dialecticism, and naïve dialecticism: Differences in

perceptions of contradiction and solutions

Documents

Dialectical Thinking and Creativity from Many Perspectives: Contradiction and Tension