Development of the ISM CodeA number of very serious accidents which occurred during the late 1980's, were manifestly caused by human errors, with management faults also identified as contributing factors.Lord Justice Sheen in his inquiry into the loss of the Herald of Free Enterprise famously described the management failures as "the disease of sloppiness".At its 16th Assembly in October 1989, IMO adopted resolution A.647(16), Guidelines on Management for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention.urpose of these Guidelines was to provide those responsible for the operation of ships with a framework for the proper development, implementation and assessmentof safety and pollution prevention management in accordance with good practice.The objective was to ensure safety, to prevent human injury or loss of life, and to avoid damage to the environment, in particular, the marine environment, and to property. The Guidelines were based on general principles and objectives so as to promote evolution of The psound management and operating practices within the industry as a whole.The Guidelines recognised the importance of the existing international instruments as the most important means of preventing maritime casualties and pollution of the sea and included sections on management and the importance ofa safety and environmental policy.After some experience in the use of the Guidelines, in 1993 IMO adopted the International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (the ISM Code).In 1998, the ISM Code became mandatory.The Code establishes safety-management objectives and requires a safety management system (SMS) to be established by "the Company", which is defined as the shipowner or any person, such as the manager or bareboat

charterer, who has assumed responsibility for operating the ship.The Company is then required to establish and implement apolicy for achieving these objectives. This includes providing the necessary resources and shore-based support.Every company is expected "to designate a person or persons ashore having direct access to the highest level of management".The procedures required by the Code should be documented and compiled in a Safety Management Manual, a copy of which should be kept on board.Amendments to the ISM CodeThe ISM Code was amended in December 2000 by resolution MSC.104(73), and these amendments entered into force on 1July 2002. It was further amended in December 2004 by resolution MSC.179(79), and these amendments entered intoforce on 1 July 2006. It was further amended in May 2005 by resolution MSC.195(80), and these amendments entered into force on 1 January 2009.  The ISM Code was also amended in December 2008 by resolution MSC.273(85). This resolution was adopted on 1 January 2010, and the amendments entered into force on 1 July 2010. The Code was further amended in June 2013 by resolution MSC.353(92) and these amendments will enter into force on1 January 2015. Development of the Guidelines on implementation of the ISM Code Recalling resolution A.741(18) by which the Assembly adopted the International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (International Safety Management (ISM) Code), IMO adoptedon 23 November 1995 resolution A.788(19) on Guidelines on  implementation of the International Safety Management(ISM) Code by Administrations. Noting that the ISM Code was expected, under the provisions of chapter IX of the International Convention

for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, to become mandatory for companies operating certain types of ships,as from 1 July 1998, and recognizing  that an Administration, in establishing that safety standards arebeing maintained, has a responsibility to ensure that Documents of Compliance have been issued in accordance with the Guidelines, and that there may be a need for Administrations to enter into agreements in respect of issuance of certificates by other Administrations in compliance with chapter IX of the 1974 SOLAS Convention and in accordance with resolution A.741(18), IMO recognized further the need for uniform implementation ofthe ISM Code. Having considered the recommendation made by the MaritimeSafety Committee at its sixty-fifth session and the Marine Environment Protection Committee at its thirty-seventh session, the Assembly adopted the Guidelines on Implementation of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code by Administrations (resolution A.788(19)). The resolution urged Governments, when implementing the ISM Code, to adhere to the Guidelines, in particular withregard to the validity of the Document of Compliance and the Safety Management Certificate required by the ISM Code; and also urged Governments to request the companiesconcerned to apply for certification under the ISM Code as soon as possible but not later than twelve months prior to the ISM Code becoming mandatory for ships belonging thereto;  to inform the Organization of any difficulties they have experienced in using these Guidelines, so that the Maritime Safety Committee and theMarine Environment Protection Committee could  keep the annexed Guidelines under review and to amend them as necessary.  These Guidelines established basic principles for verifying that the Safety Management System (SMS) of a Company responsible for the operation of ships or the SMSfor the ship or ships controlled by the company complies with the ISM Code; and for the issue and periodical

verification of the DOC and SMC. These Guidelines are applicable to Administrations. Amendments to Guidelines The Guidelines on implementation of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code by Administrations, resolution A.788(19) were replaced with revised Guidelines, which were adopted by resolution A.913(22) inNovember  2001 which revoked resolution A.788(19). Further revision of these guidelines resulted in Guidelines on implementation of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code by Administrations adopted by resolution A.1022(26) in December 2009. This resolution revokes resolution A.913(22) with effect from 1 July 2010. Revised guidelines on the implementation of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code by Administrations were adopted by resolution A.1071(28) in December 2013. This resolution revokes resolution A.1022(26) with effect from 1 July 2014.  

Assessment of the impact and effectiveness of the ISM Code

The success of the ISM Code depends on its effective implementation and is underpinned to a great extent by the competence and continued commitment and motivation of individuals at all levels, in both companies and on boardships, who are tasked with its implementation.The outcome of the successful implementation of the ISM Code envisages the enhancement of a safety culture throughout the shipping industry. Through implementing the ISM Code and the application of its requirements over the past decade, shipping companies, classification societies and other industry organizations would have gained significant experience in assessing its manifest benefits and drawbacks, if any. Evidence of an enhanced safety culture and acknowledgement of its many benefits would therefore be a measure of the global impact of the ISM Code on the shippingindustry in general, and on safety in particular.The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), at its seventy-fifth session (15 to 24May 2002), agreed that, an analysis should be undertaken to assess the

impact of the ISM Code on the safety of ships to ascertain its contributionto the enhancement of safety in the shipping industry. The Secretariat was instructed to collect from regional PSC MoUs/Agreements, IACS and industry organizations, their information on the impact of the ISM Code on ISM Code-certificated ships vis-à-vis detentions, serious deficiencies, casualties, etc., as well as on any assessment of the impact of the ISM Code and its effectiveness on ships.In order to make a meaningful assessment, the Secretary-General  established an Independent Expert Group comprising of experts from Governments, organizations, universities and the shipping industry and the Secretariat to collect and analyze data to study the impact of the ISM Codeand its effectiveness. This Independent Expert Group, on conclusion of its study submitted its report on 18 November 2005 (MSC 81) to the Secretary-General on its findings and recommendations given below.

General Information and References

The ISM Code was adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) by resolution A.741(18). The objectives of the ISM Code are to ensure safety at sea, prevention of human injury or loss of life, and avoidanceof damage to the environment, in particular, to the marine environment, and to property. The Code requires companies to establish safety objectives as described in section 1.2 of the ISM Code. In addition companies must develop, implement and maintain a Safety Management System (SMS) which includes functional requirements as listed in section 1.4 of the ISM Code.

Compliance with the ISM Code became mandatory with the adoption of SOLAS, Chapter IX, "Management for the Safe Operation of Ships." The IMO provided amplifying guidanceon implementation of the requirements of SOLAS, Chapter IX, and the ISM Code in resolution A.788(19), "Guidelineson the Implementation of the International Safety management (ISM) Code by Administrations."

In a Final Rule, published on December 24, 1997, the U.S.Coast Guard implemented the requirements of the ISM Code into its regulations. These regulations apply to both foreign and domestic commercial ships operating in U.S.

waters. To maintain consistency with existing U.S. shipping regulations, some of the terms used in the FinalRule differ from those used in SOLAS and the ISM Code. The following table provides a list of some of those terms and the equivalent SOLAS term.

U.S. Terms SOLAS TermsVessel transporting more than 12 passengers is equivalent to Passenger Ship

Tanker is equivalent toOil Tanker, Chemical tanker and Gas Carrier

Bulk Freight Vessel is equivalent to Bulk CarrierFreight Vessel is equivalent to Cargo Ship

 

Applicability of the ISM Code

SOLAS, Chapter IX, and the ISM Code applies to ships, regardless of the date of construction, as follows:

Passenger ships, including passenger high-speed craft, not later than 1 July 1998  Oil tankers, chemical tankers, gas carriers, bulk carriers and cargo high-speedcraft of 500 gross tons or more, not later than 1 July 1998  Other cargo ships and mobile offshore drilling units (MODUs) of 500 gross tons or more, not later than 1July 2002

 

Background to the International Safety Management (ISM) Code

The Code's origins can be traced back to the late 1980s, when concern was growing about poor management standards in the shipping industry. In 1989, IMO adopted Guidelineson management for the safe operation of ships and for pollution prevention "to provide those responsible for the operation of ships with a framework for the proper development, implementation and assessment of safety and

pollution prevention management in accordance with good practice."

These guidelines were revised in November 1991 and the ISM Code itself was adopted as a recommendation in 1993. However, after several years of practical experience, it was felt that the Code was so important that it should bemandatory.

It was decided that the best way of achieving this would be through the International Convention for the Safety ofLife at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS). This was done by means of amendments adopted on 24 May 1994, which added a new Chapter IX to the Convention entitled Management for the safe operation of ships. The Code itself is not actually included in the Convention, but is made mandatory by means of a reference in Chapter IX.

 

Chapter IX: Management for the Safe Operation of Ships

The main purpose of the new chapter is to make the International Safety Management (ISM) Code mandatory. By adding the ISM Code to SOLAS it is intended to provide aninternational standard for the safe management of ships and for pollution prevention.

The ISM Code establishes safety management objectives which are:

to provide for safe practices in ship operation and a safe working environment;  to establish safeguards against all identified risks;  to continuously improve safety management skills of personnel, including preparing for emergencies.

The Code requires a safety management system (SMS) to be established by "the Company", which is defined as the shipowner or any person, such as the manager or bareboat charterer, who has assumed responsibility for operating the ship. This system should be designed to ensure compliance with all mandatory regulations and that codes,

guidelines and standards recommended by IMO and others are taken into account.

The SMS in turn should include a number of functional requirements:

a safety and environmental protection policy; instructions and procedures to ensure safety and environmental protection;  defined levels of authority and lines of communication between and amongst shore and shipboard personnel;  procedures for reporting accidents, etc.;  procedures for responding to emergencies;  procedures for internal audits and management review.

The Company is then required to establish and implement apolicy for achieving these objectives. This includes providing the necessary resources and shore-based support. Every company is expected "to designate a personor persons ashore having direct access to the highest level of management".

The Code then goes on to outline the responsibility and authority of the master of the ship. It states that the SMS should make it clear that "the master has the overriding authority and the responsibility to make decisions ..." The Code then deals with other seagoing personnel and emphasizes the importance of training.

Companies are required to prepare plans and instructions for key shipboard operations and to make preparations fordealing with any emergencies which might arise. The importance of maintenance is stressed and companies are required to ensure that regular inspections are held and corrective measures taken where necessary.

The procedures required by the Code should be documented and compiled in a Safety Management Manual, a copy of which should be kept on board. Regular checks and audits should be held by the company to ensure that the SMS is being complied with and the system itself should be reviewed periodically to evaluate its efficiency.

After outlining the responsibilities of the company, the Code then stresses that the responsibility for ensuring that the Code is complied with rests with the Government.Companies which comply with the Code should be issued with a document of compliance, a copy of which should be kept on board. Administrations should also issue a SafetyManagement Certificate to indicate that the company operates in accordance with the SMS and periodic checks should be carried out to verify that the ship's SMS is functioning properly.

The Chapter entered into force under the tacit acceptanceprocedure on 1 July 1998. It will apply to passenger ships, oil and chemical tankers, bulk carriers, gas carriers and cargo high speed craft of 500 gross tonnage and above not later than that date and to other cargo ships and mobile offshore drilling units of 500 gross tonnage and above not later than 1 July 2002.

ISM Code § 4 DESIGNATED PERSON(S)      "Pour To ensure the safe operation of each ship and toprovide a link between the Company and those on board, everyCompany, as appropriate, should designate a person or personsashore having direct access to the highest level of management.The responsibility and authority of the designated person orpersons should include monitoring the safety and pollutionprevention aspects of the operation of each ship and ensuringthat adequate resources and shore-based support are applied, asrequired.

1. History

      The idea of a code for management was in thespirit of the maritime industry since the middle ofthe Eighties, however the concept of the DesignatedPerson Ashore appeared only after the accident ofHOFE (HERALD OF FREE ENTERPRISE) on 6.3.87 at theexit of ZEEBRUGE causing the loss of 188 humanlives.      Deeply chocked by this accident, the British

"invented" the Designated Person. He acts, inaddition to the normal staff of a traditionalshipping company, to have a person especiallydesignated to ensure a reliable connection betweenthe management and the sailors and to supervise theoperations of their ships. Why ?      Remember, the Management of Townsend-Thoresen,was recognized guilty of failure in the managementof safety of its ferries and it was estimated that aperson particularly designated to deal with theproblems of safety in the company was missing.       This failure was regarded as one of the causesof the accident. This was perhaps the case in thiscompany, but in the majority of the other shippingcompanies, a marine superintendent – with assistantsfor large companies - was traditionally the "SafetyOfficer" in charge of all the problems of safety ofships and operations.       The General Management of TOWNSEND THORESENreorganized its management structure after the trialand named an Operation manager having a marinequalification !       The General Management of TOWNSEND THORESENreorganized its management structure after the trialand named an Operation manager having a marinequalification!       This concept of Designated Person Ashorepresented by the British had problems to enter inthe successive resolutions of IMO on the managementof safety; once again it is a dramatic accident, thefire on board “SCANDINAVIAN STAR” in April 90 making158 dead, which has boosted the Resolution A 680 in1991 and then the famous Resolution A 741 in 1993which is the official birth of the ISM Code such aswe know it.      The concept of the Designated Person Ashore ismaintained by the British and thus finally ratifiedin its current form by the working group on the ISMthen by the MSC and finally by the 17th assembly ofIMO in 93. 

2. Study of the text of the code:

      Though written in a strange manner, the textis rather clear: the responsibilities and theminimum authority of the DPA (Designated PersonAshore) are found there: 

Provide a link between the Company and those on board, …a person ashore having direct access to the highest level ofmanagement       by highest management we include thedecisional level in particular at the financiallevel and when we speak about those on board wethink of all the crew members because if not,the code would have said the ship or thecaptain.       This lack of connection was clarified bythe court in the accident of HOFE and specifiesin its “attendus”: "the need for… maintenanceof proper channels of communication betweenShip and Shore for the receipt anddissemination of information"

The responsibility and authority of the designated person orpersons should include monitoring the safety and pollutionprevention aspects of the operation of each ship (which wewill call monitoring task N°1):       Often forgotten, this responsibility ofthe Designated Person is not simple to ensure.Indeed, how, from shore, supervise theoperations of each ship concerning safety andenvironmental protection?       Bad habits taken by the crews of TOWNSENDTHORESEN (several ships were concerned) toleave the port with ship’s doors open and/orwith a negative trim of almost 1m, would haveperhaps been abandoned if a person, charged tosupervise the operations, had informed thehighest level of the management of these badhabits!

include…. ensuring that adequate resources and shore-based support are applied, as required. (monitoring taskN°2):        The requests of the HOFE’s Captains (andothers ferries) which had taken theirresponsibility in these bad practices with aunique commercial aim (departure before thetime, arrival on time, maximum of passengers orfreight) were not granted but did not receiveany answer even a verbal refusal !.They asked for: 

Warning lamps for the opening of the frontdoors (doors were invisible from thebridge), request which made laughing the"directors" ….they acknowledge in front ofthe court!

Replacement of the ballast pump by a morepowerful one to accelerate the correctionof trim after the departure

Request for calculation of stability inthis significant negative trim situation(abnormal situation not studied in thestability booklet)

      These requests of the captains thus wereblocked at the "operations" level by one ormore of the non competent persons in the fieldsconcerned.       A qualified person ashore having these competencesand seeing these requests could have intervened and atleast ensured an answer to the captains.

NB: The legal implications of theresponsibilities for the designated personappeared very quickly to the industry and theopinions or studies are published since 1996. 

3. What is this job finally ?

a. Connection task

      This connection is significant,universally understood and applied: it is aquestion of ensuring a reliable connectionbetween the highest management level and thepersons on board each ship.       The connections between the Captains andthe top management generally exist. For smallercompanies, the problem does not arise (theGeneral Manager is always close to his shipswhich are sometimes his own assets), for others... perhaps, though today a Captain always can,via mail or e mail or mobile phone, contactdirectly the General manager". So, we do notneed a Designated Person for that!      Traditionally the other officers on boardhave frequent connections with the persons incharge ashore ( Chief engineer with theTechnical Superintendent, Chief Officer withthe Safety Officer, Purser with the Head ofCatering department etc.).      The other crew members have means ofcommunication with the Marine Superintendent orthe Management ashore via their heads ofdepartment, their representatives on board(trade-union or safety representative, safetycommittee etc…) if they exist. 

      Why do they need another communication way?

      It is of course about anothercommunication way which could be used if thetraditional ways mentioned above would notwork! The causes can be multiple : 

Dysfunction at the intermediate level(case of the HOFE)

Dysfunction at the Captain’s level (nottaken into account or personal implicationof the Captain)

Dysfunction at the level of the head ofservice (not taken into account or lapseof memory)

Quite simply, at the level of the crewmembers, timidity or fear of reactions ofclose or immediate management (existingculture in to day multi-national crews)

      It is to compensate this type ofdysfunction and to create a communication waywhich will work every time: the ISM way! 

      The ISM way is a parallel way, used when the normalor traditional ways do not work: it is a sort of By-pass! 

      This supplementary communication way : 

Applied to the case of the HOFE, theaccident would certainly have avoided: viathe designated person the captains reachesthe CEO (Chief Executive Officer) which,knowing very well his responsibilitieswhen he is informed, will hasten to findthe solution because the obligation of"due diligence" is of primary importancefor the insurer.

Applied to other cases where the behaviourof the Captain or officers did notcorrespond to their responsibilities(Officer of the watch under influence ofalcohol, Captain in front of certainfraudulent intrigues on board), thisconnection would have perhaps avoided somedramas (spectacular groundings, dramaticjettison of stowaways)

Etc.

      This interpretation passes well with thecrews by however a training or adequate

information in order to avoid some mistakes as:ISM way used to claim or settle up a score! 

Consequently, the Safety Management System(SMS) of the company must envisage theoperation of this connection : 

Reality of the possibility for thedesignated person to contact the CEO for aproblem which can not be solved at theoperational level

Proof of evidence of transmission (Email/recording/letter)

The name and the role of DPA are known ofall persons on board; moreover smallposters on the bridge and in crewaccommodations give all directions

The designated person (or her substitute)can be touched 24/7 mainly by telephone orE mail.

      The SMS will not forget to specify theresponsibilities for DPA in this transmission.

      In the event of accident, the courtlooking for the cause, will seek which did notensure "due diligence". The responsibility forthe designated person could be required if bymisfortune, he did not transmit to the head ofcompany, as it is his duty according to the ISMCode, significant information related to apossible cause of accident.       Often, to frighten a little, thedesignated person who had not seen thesepossible consequences of his acts, I speak ofthe maximum sentencing which they risk in theevent of judgement in the United Kingdom (£5.000 and/or 2 years)… hard! 

b. Monitoring Nº1

      It is materially impossible to ensure themonitoring of safety of the operations of eachship without having on each ship a person to doit!      Many authors have failed by proposingmany solutions… except the good one!       Indeed the DPA can ensure part of thismonitoring via visits/inspections on boardduring calls or trips, the follow-up ofshipboard recordings as safety drills reports,familiarisation recordings, maintenance andperiodic tests of all ship’s equipment, safetyand training meetings, orders for repairs orspare parts, captains reviews and of course theinternal audits. .... but it is only a controla fortiori!       Indeed, nothing is better than control onthe spot, during the operations. So do we needa representative of the designated person onboard, a controller in situ in charge ofsupervising… the work of the others?      It is astonishing that only a fewpersons, at my knowledge, have seen that thecode itself had envisaged the solution:remember, the responsibilities of the Captaininclude that he must "verify that specifiedrequirements are observed " (ISM Code § 5.1.4)ie he must supervise: 

that all ship’s operations, all activitiesare carried as it should be,

that the ship must be in a state such asit has been envisaged by rules andregulations and ….the SMS

etc.

… the Captain is thus the natural representative of thedesignated person on board !

      These tasks of continuous monitoring andespecially of remote monitoring for the DPArequire obviously an excellent knowledge of theoperations to be supervised.

      The relations between the DPA and theCaptain are thus privileged relationscorresponding to the § 4 of the ISM Code.

c. Monitoring Nº2

      The DPA will not be able to ensure thatthe company brings its adequate supports to theCaptain only being aware about the needsexpressed by the Captain and the conditions ofthese requests.       So, the DPA must be on the circuit of theships requests about safety and prevention ofpollution in normal conditions (stores ordemand of repairs or technical refit) or inemergency (specific Captain’s requests to helphim to manage the situation).      So the DPA must be in the crisis cell andbe recipient, in one way or another, of theapplications for repairs and lists of workcarried out (or not carried out) during repairsor technical refits.       The DPA, and this is linked to the § 4.1,often has the possibility to answer forrequests refused by another budget but, in ancertainly low financial level (the managementis their removing a pain in his neck because hedoesn’t want to see their officers squabblingand thus avoids disturbances for oftenridiculous sums) 

      In conclusion, our study of the § 4 ofthe ISM code lays down a DPA well apart of thenormal operational circuit of a shippingcompany; so much apart that nothing prevents

the DPA not being an executive of the company       The designated person can come, forexample, from the head office, from anotherpart of the group or from a specialized sub-contracting company.       Numbers of small companies see in thissolution the response to their problems andsome plan to share the same designated personbetween a few small companies! 

      All that is theory, see now what is thereal practise! 

2. Inventory of fixtures today :

      Practically, the real job of the DPA is notalways the same one according to the companies andtheir safety culture, and all companies do not havethe means "of having" such a qualified person incharge of supervising the operations of the shipseverywhere around the world and who will benecessarily "expensive".       Indeed, I do meet a DPA really apart of theoperational management only in "rich" companies” orat least of a certain size. Indeed, I do meet a DPAreally apart of the operational management only in"rich" companies” or at least of a certain size.

      We will study the 3 solutions, one after theother. 

1st case :

the DPA is the Safety Officer, the fleet ormarine superintendent or his assistant. 

      The connection task with the persons on boardwas always traditionally provided by them andthis connection was ensured with the entirecrew. It was sometimes paternalism, sometimes

the Marine superintendent passed by the galleyor the kitchen before going to see the Captainwith sometimes of shameful intentions ofgetting information from the field or "gangwaygossip". An information or demand which wouldnot have passed the Captain’s office can thustheoretically go through this superintendentpassage on board. It is easier to say that thanto do it! And especially it is notinstantaneous; but the letter (or the E mailnow) directly to the Superintendent is ofcourse also possible in this case.       Except perhaps the direct letter to themarine superintendent, such a connection istraditional. In addition the fleet or marinesuperintendent is normally a person who has adirect access to the higher level of thecompany management. 

      So we see that the connection task required by theISM Code is ensured. 

      The monitoring task N°1, 1 ie themonitoring of the safety aspects of shipsoperations is theoretically possible via theinspections of the captain himself, otherinspections and audits which would be carriedout by the Safety Officer or itsrepresentatives.That is not new either, you have known like me,these Captain-inspectors who accomplishedsometimes an entire trip on board and thensubmitted their reports to the CEO.       So, in theory, the requirement ofmonitoring task N°1 is also satisfied. 

      The monitoring task N°2 ie monitoringthat adequate resources and a support is givento the ship does not have here much senseexcept for a request directed towards theengineering department which can be totallyindependent of the traditional Marine

department. Indeed the marine superintendent orSafety officer cannot control or monitorhimself; to receive a request of which it hasthe decision and… to make sure that it will besatisfied if it is necessary! Judge and jury,two caps on only one head: it is impossible! 

      So this requirement of monitoring is not satisfied inthis case. 

      Finally this solution thus does not seemin conformity because a requirement of the codecannot be satisfied and we are thus in majornonconformity (definition ISM Code, 2002edition, § 1.1.10)       In this case also, the role of DPA is noteasy because there can be contradiction oropposition between a limited budget and arequest of a captain who cannot wait. For aDPA/Superintendent, motivated and convinced ofthe utility of the ISM Code, such an obstaclecould be raised only at the "higher level" withperhaps the effort of persuasion than you canimagine.       Not really in conformity and not easy torun, especially for a motivated DPA. Fromresponsibility also the situation is sensitive(see above) 

2nd case :

The designated person is a manager not having anyresponsibilities in the ship’s operations, safety ormaintenance: for example the financial or marketingor human resources manager or research anddevelopment or, better, the quality manager.      The General Manager or the President specifiedwhen he nominated this DPA, that he had a directlink with him and that he could, and even had tocontact him constantly when it was necessary.       In this case, it is more easy to ensure a

reliable link between the personnel on board and thehigh level of the company, to ensure the monitoringof ship’s operations for safety and prevention ofpollution with the assistance of the captains, as wehave seen above and finally to check that if asupport is provided to the captain so he can ensurehis task and his responsibilities all time and notonly in emergency. 

      In this case, the three minimum requirements aresatisfied 

      Then, we can entrust the management of theCompany’s SMS to the DPA, whereas the code does notenvisage it at all.       The SMS, if it is well made, envisages aboutall the ship’s life and the "SMS Manager" should beable with the help of the Captains and all theinstruments of the ISM code, "to supervise" or tomonitor the operations of each ship in connectionwith safety and environmental protection. 

3rd case:

      The application of the ISM code ledimportant companies to create an ISM structurewith staff, office and budget.      This structure ensures the totalmanagement of the SMS including: 

Connection between crews and the generalmanager

Connection with the captains formonitoring

Control and evolution of the SMS Edition, corrections, revisions of SMS

documents Inspections and internal audits Follow-up of nonconformities or other

observations Analyzes of the captains’ reviews Analyzes of accidents and near-misses.

Preparation of the management review ISM Training on board or ashore Organization of conferences or training

courses identified as necessary Regulation watch-over including the

analysis of amendments and thetransmission of all information to theships

The information of the company onimprovements stated

etc.

      In this case, all the requirements of thecode on the designated person are satisfiedplus the requirements with the § 9, § 11 andmainly the §12.       So we can go back on the ideal diagram atthe beginning of this study. 

These structures are the best undoubtedly. 

2. In conclusion :

      Only the third solution is satisfactory if wecompare to the text of the Code.       It is the only satisfactory solution for thecertifier, the company and… for the designatedperson itself! 

But there is far from theory to reality! 

The problem of the designated person does not seemto be highlighted: 

by considerable certification auditors whichsometimes, we wonder that they have read thecode before coming!

with certain companies which interpreted thecode at their own manner

This problem will not be long to arise, with thefirst ISM trial (ERIKA trail for example)       Mr.Philip ANDERSON (regarded as an ISM specialist inthe United Kingdom) which does not agree completelywith me, thinks that the precise details on theresponsibilities of the DPA will be given only bythe courts when they will have to treat of penalmanner a huge post ISM accident. In France we callthat “to kick the ball“!