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Decentralizing Centralists, or thePolitical Language on ProvincialAdministration in the Second OttomanConstitutional PeriodNobuyoshi FujinamiPublished online: 27 Nov 2013.

To cite this article: Nobuyoshi Fujinami (2013) Decentralizing Centralists, or the Political Languageon Provincial Administration in the Second Ottoman Constitutional Period , Middle Eastern Studies,49:6, 880-900, DOI: 10.1080/00263206.2013.836496

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Decentralizing Centralists, or the PoliticalLanguage on Provincial Administration inthe Second Ottoman ConstitutionalPeriod

NOBUYOSHI FUJINAMI*

The centralization–decentralization controversy is frequently considered the primarycriterion for understanding Second Ottoman constitutional politics (1908–18) and,

accordingly, the political process of this period has often been described as a continu-

ous antagonism between centralist and decentralist camps. The Unionists (members

of the Committee of Union and Progress ( _Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti – CUP)) are

considered the champions of nascent Turkish nationalism and ardent supporters of

centralization, while the opposition (muhalefet) are regarded as disciples of the

decentralization theory of Prens Sabahattin with the wide support of non-Muslim

and non-Turkish ethnic groups.1

Although widely accepted, this thesis requires further investigation as few studies

have concentrated specifically on this issue. Following the Young Turk Revolution of

July 1908, the centralization–decentralization issue suddenly became both a political

and an intellectual concern for many Ottomans. With the restoration of the

Constitution and the parliamentary regime, the public arena was now open for multi-

ethnic and multi-religious Ottoman intellectuals to discuss such political issues. Hence,

merely pre-supposing Sabahattin’s views as ‘decentralist’ without analysing their precise

meaning appears insufficient. To understand the effect of the political rhetoric on theprovincial administration of that time, we first need to clarify what Sabahattin intended

when using the word ‘decentralization’, and then consider what other intellectuals were

saying concerning this topic. By answering these questions, I hope to shed new light on

the centralization–decentralization controversy in Ottoman constitutional politics.

Prens Sabahattin, born in 1877, was the maternal grandson of Sultan Mahmut II. In

1899, he fled to Paris with his father, Damat Mahmut Celalettin Pasa. No sooner

had he become involved in the Young Turk movement abroad than he became a sig-

nificant player among the exiles. Following the first Young Turk congress, held in

*The Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa (ILCAA), TokyoUniversity of Foreign Studies (TUFS), 3-11-1 Asahi-cho, Fuchu-shi, Tokyo-to, Japan. Email:fujinami@ca3.so-net.ne.jp

� 2013 Taylor & Francis

Middle Eastern Studies, 2013

Vol. 49, No. 6, 880–900, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2013.836496

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1902, Sabahattin broke away from Ahmet Rıza and his friends primarily because he

was in favour of foreign interference for the sake of political takeover. This split

made him a leading figure in the ‘majority’ faction of the Young Turks, though he

could not participate in the 1908 revolution which was achieved by the young army

officers in Macedonia close to Ahmet Rıza’s ‘minority’ faction. Returning to Istan-bul after the revolution, Sabahattin and his associates formed a new party, the Lib-

eral Party (Ahrar Fırkası). The party lost the 1908 election as it won only one seat in

the Chamber of Deputies. Moreover, following the ‘31 March Incident’ (Otuzbir

Mart Vakası) in April 1909 – a military uprising instigated by rank-and-file soldiers

in the capital who had become discontented with the new regime – Sabahattin was

obliged to flee to Paris again because he was held responsible for this ‘counter-revolu-

tion’.2 Until the end of the Second Constitutional Period, Sabahattin spent most of

his time abroad. With the exception of his short stay in Istanbul in 1912 after the fallof the pro-Unionist government, his commitment to actual political procedure in the

Ottoman capital was limited. He played little, if any, role in the establishment of the

biggest opposition party of the period, the Entente Lib�erale (H€urriyet ve _ItilafFırkası). Sabahattin returned to Istanbul after the end of the First World War, only

to leave his country again in 1924 as a member of the Ottoman Imperial House after

the foundation of the Turkish Republic. He died in exile in 1948.

In this article I will concentrate on Sabahattin’s writings between 1908 and 1912.

During this period, he published three pamphlets, and, in 1912, submitted an openpetition to the throne. ‘An Explanation’ (Bir _Izah) and ‘The Second Explanation’

( _Ikinci Bir _Izah) were published in 1908. ‘The Third and Last Explanation’ ( €Uc€unc€uve Son Bir _Izah), a collection of essays written in Paris after the ‘31 March Incident’,

was published in 1911. Together, these pamphlets demonstrate what Sabahattin

meant by the word decentralization (adem-i merkeziyet) and reflect the intellectual

atmosphere of the time.

It is striking that in Sabahattin’s first pamphlet he is already emphasizing the need todistinguish ‘administrative decentralization’ (adem-i merkeziyet-i idari) from ‘political

decentralization’ (adem-i merkeziyet-i siyasi). He invests considerable effort in con-

vincing his readers that administrative decentralization is anything but autonomy

(muhtariyet). According to Sabahattin, ‘if constitutionalism means setting up the right

of control in the centre through the Chamber of Deputies, without doubt administra-

tive decentralization means extending the same right into the provinces (vilayetler)

through provincial councils’. He says further, ‘the reform I have required in the name

of administrative decentralization is nothing but widening the rights of governors(vali) and other bureaucrats and opening provincial councils as soon as possible’. In

fact, this was promised in the 108th article of the Constitution which states: ‘the

administration of provinces shall be based on the principle of the delegation of

authority and the separation of duties’ (tevsi-i mezuniyet ve tefrik-i vezaif). In the offi-

cial French version of the Ottoman Constitution this article is translated as follows:

‘L’administration des provinces aura pour base le principe de la d�ecentralisation’.The original phrase, ‘tevsi-i mezuniyet ve tefrik-i vezaif’, is replaced by a simple word

‘d�ecentralisation’. Therefore, decentralization and the delegation of authority are oneand the same thing. According to Sabahattin, there was in fact no difference of opin-

ion between him and the Unionists over this article of the Constitution.3

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Sabahattin’s second pamphlet has a more polemical tone since it was written with

the more specific aim of refuting H€useyin Cahit (Yalcın), editor-in-chief of the de

facto organ of the CUP, Tanin. ‘The style of government I have advocated’, Sabahat-

tin argued, ‘is merely the implementation of the method written in the 108th article of

the Constitution and the Vilayet law.’ He also repeated his claim that political andadministrative decentralization should be distinguished from one another. He

believed that the former had to be rejected definitively since it entailed autonomy or

independence, and hence was detrimental to the Ottomans; on the contrary, the latter

should be implemented because it was synonymous with the delegation of authority,

which was clearly set out in the Constitution.4

Sabahattin neither proposed political decentralization nor offered it as a solution

to the ethnic problem. In his examination of the Provincial Administration Bill

( _Idare-i Vilayat Kanun Layihası), he limited his focus to the conditions determiningthe manner in which local people would participate in the local administration.5 It is

remarkable that in so doing, he never referred to the ethnicity factor in Ottoman pro-

vincial administration. Sabahattin’s view on the relations between decentralization

and the ethnic problem is made clear by the following remarks: ‘If there is an

arrangement in the Archipelago islands to be embraced in the Greek (Yunan) bosom,

what could prevent it is not centralization, but the armed forces. Armed force is

strengthened by the wealth of the nation. Then what will improve the wealth of the

nation? Private initiative! And what will facilitate private initiative?Decentralization!’6

It is interesting that Sabahattin underscored the usefulness of the Ottoman Empire

as providing an equilibrium between many ethnic groups on the world map. He went

on to state that ‘as long as the iron principle of struggle for existence exists’, power

would be needed to enjoy the right to live freely. Consequently, even if some of the

ethnic groups of the Ottoman Empire eventually obtained independence, there would

be no hope that these small countries would prosper, or even survive. Therefore ‘in

order to live free from military, economic and any other kind of external pressure, itis the most appropriate way for them to live as Ottoman subjects under egalitarian-

ism and justice’.7 A similar line of thinking was apparent in his first pamphlet, where

he enumerated the principles he held while participating in the Young Turk move-

ment. Among other things, he was ‘to convince the Christian compatriots of the

need for sincere unity with Muslims, that is, to convince Greeks, Armenians, Bulgar-

ians and other elements (anasır), that constitute the Ottomans irrespective of their

races or creeds, of the absolute need not to pursue the policy toward autonomy or

independence’.It is true that Sabahattin collaborated with some non-Turks, but so did the Union-

ists. From Sabahattin’s perspective, decentralization was necessary in order to pre-

vent the disintegration of the empire. His description of non-Turkish elements is

intriguing: according to Sabahattin, ‘Ottoman Christians could not demand special

independence, because, with the exception of the Archipelago islands, everywhere

they are smaller in number than their Muslim compatriots’. He also held that,

‘because most Arabs and Kurds are either in a state of semi-settled or complete

nomadic lifestyle or in dispute with one another . . . they are not at all prepared forpolitical independence’. His descriptions of the non-Turkish elements were far from

favourable.8

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In short, Sabahattin espoused a form of government that comprised a combina-

tion of political centralization and administrative decentralization.9 In other words,

he proclaimed the need ‘to strengthen Ottoman unity by accomplishing decentraliza-

tion administratively and centralization politically’.10 In a final analysis, Sabahattin

declared, in his open petition to the throne published in 1912, that if the meaning ofhis theory were truly understood and realized, then ‘the needs of both the centre and

provinces would be in complete harmony with regional (mevzii), not ethnic (unsuri),

decentralization, as we have always claimed’.11

These explanations lead to the question of why Sabahattin so ardently sup-

ported decentralization. When describing the benefits of decentralization, he

counted its merits of efficiency in the fields of education, the military and admin-

istration.12 In a similar vein, Sabahattin rejected centralization because of the

maladies caused by the concentration of duties in central government, resulting indelays to public works and infrastructure.13 As to why decentralization was so

suited to administrative efficiency, Sabahattin responded by simply stating that it

had been elucidated ‘scientifically’. This ‘scientific’ truth in which he believed was

that societies with the spirit of private initiative (tesebb€us-i sahsi) were far more

likely to progress than societies where individuals depended on communities. This

in turn proved the superiority of decentralization in terms of progress. Conse-

quently, it was a ‘scientific’ fact, at least for Sabahattin, that France was inferior

to England because the former was oriented toward centralization and the state,while decentralization and private individuals sustained the latter. Sabahattin’s

reasoning gives the impression that his ideas were copied from the science sociale

of the Le Play school, particularly those of Edmond Demolins. Their views were

widely accepted around that time, in both the Ottoman mainland and Egypt, as a

panacea for social maladies. His writings are very typical in reflecting the feelings

of the time towards the seemingly ‘scientific’.14

Sabahattin’s decentralization theory was built on his interest in administrative

efficiency, and not on his concern for the ethnic problem. After all, it is very hardto say that Sabahattin was friendly to the non-Turks’ ethnic consciousness.

According to him, it was impossible to eliminate the weakness and idleness of

Turkish society merely by changing government or sovereign.15 His prescription

was ‘to secure the development of our public life with true constitutionalism based

on decentralization, which is always in harmony with the growing needs of our

provinces, strengthens political centralization, and is effective in both developing

the social activity that would create the missing Ottoman unity and establishing

our sovereign right and national independence under the indispensable aegis of theHouse of Osman’.16

Turning to the way in which decentralization was discussed in the course of Ottoman

party politics, I first examine the view of H€useyin Cahit (Yalcın), Sabahattin’s arch-

enemy during the 1908 election campaign. As early as September 1908, H€useyinCahit concluded that decentralization would bring about the dissolution of the

empire. Contrary to the opinion that decentralization would guarantee the effective-

ness of reforms (Sabahattin’s view), H€useyin Cahit argued that in actuality, the typeof administration a given country would benefit from more depends greatly on the

needs and/or progress of that country; therefore, one could not say England was

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superior because it was decentralized and France was inferior because it was central-

ized. According to H€useyin Cahit, ‘if we are to impose extensive decentralization and

a kind of autonomy in the administration of our remote provinces where political

life has still to come to a state of competence today, then we are making matters

worse not better. This is because the result of this autonomy would be anarchy’.17 Ina similar vein, the official explanation of the 1908 programme of the CUP asserts the

relative merits of both centralization and decentralization.18

This does not mean, however, that H€useyin Cahit and his fellow Unionists did not

understand the merits of decentralization. On the contrary, he considered it progress-

ive to pursue administrative decentralization to the greatest extent possible, with one

condition: that it be preceded by and performed within the political centralization of

the state. H€useyin Cahit repeatedly insisted that provincial governors be equipped

with broad authority, making it imperative to insist on the principle of ‘delegation ofauthority’.19 Likewise, one of the civilian leaders of the CUP, Halil (Mentese) argued

as follows: ‘We fully approve the principle of the delegation of authority. This is very

clearly stated in our party programme. But we have never regarded the delegation of

authority as something illegal, built on the condition of rights in each place. It would

break the unity of administration’.20 Apparently these ideas were very close to Saba-

hattin’s view, discussed above. As a matter of fact, hard-core Unionists shared this

view with many other Ottoman intellectuals.

For example, Ali Haydar Mithat underscored the importance of ‘delegation ofauthority’ by quoting a report written by his father and the ‘founder of the Con-

stitution’, Mithat Pasa.21 Babanzade Mustafa Zihni, a provincial governor from a

notable Kurdish family, wrote a pamphlet on decentralization; his motive was to

offer readers a proper understanding of the topic because, according to him, the

Ottoman public lacked sufficient knowledge about decentralization even though

Sabahattin’s theory attracted much attention. Mustafa Zihni distinguished political

and administrative decentralization, dismissing the former because of the risk of it

causing autonomy and secession from the empire, and regarding the latter as synony-mous with the delegation of authority as written in the 108th article of the Constitu-

tion. He did not refer to the ethnicity factor in provincial administration. The only

thing he underscored was the usefulness of the delegation of authority in the context

of the development of public works.22

It is difficult to discern any fundamental difference between the CUP and the Lib-

eral Party on this issue; the pro-Unionist intellectuals sometimes explicitly admitted

that they could agree with Sabahattin on the need for the delegation of authority.23

Even H€useyin Cahit confessed that if Sahabattin’s intention when using the worddecentralization was nothing more than delegation of authority, then there was little

difference of opinion between them.24

H€useyin Cahit’s and Sabahattin’s views diverged over political considerations. It

appears that the real reason H€useyin Cahit opposed the word ‘decentralization’ was

his conviction that it would precipitate the desire of non-Turkish elements for seces-

sion and independence. He said that: ‘there emerges a suspicion from the way in

which non-Turkish elements of the Ottoman Empire respect and follow Sabahattin

due to his ideas; we could not but suspect that they are interpreting decentralizationas something compatible with an ideal that is detrimental to the unity of Ottomans.

We are afraid of this.’25

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Here, H€useyin Cahit meant to refer to the Greeks, and especially the Ecumenical

Patriarchate. According to Tanin, now that ‘the fact that social progress is a move

from decentralization towards centralization has been proved’ the obstacles to prog-

ress within the Ottoman nation must be found in tribes (asiret) and religious commu-

nities (cemaat). It would be difficult to achieve political centralization as long asthese remained the lay body politic; therefore, tribes should be completely disinte-

grated and fused into society while the lay character of religious communities should

be removed and reorganized into a pure ecclesiastical body. And this is the concept

of centralization that H€useyin Cahit had in mind. Once these preconditions had been

fulfilled, decentralization of the country’s administration would be badly needed. In

short, what was needed was political centralization and administrative decentraliza-

tion; the CUP wanted a combination of these two principles. From the viewpoint of

Tanin, ‘barbarous’ tribes as well as the ‘unpatriotic’ Patriarchate which claimed bothlay and ecclesiastical rights were the main enemies of the CUP and the obstacle to

progress.26

In this way, Greeks, especially the Ecumenical Patriarchate, became the prime tar-

get of Unionist attack. As late as December 1908 (and only in connection with Greek

politicians), the Unionist press began to proclaim that Sabahattin and his Liberal

Party were ‘decentralists’ and thus harming the Ottoman nation. The underlying rea-

son for this proclamation was that the Greek press such as Proodos and Neologos

introduced Sabahattin’s associates as Greek candidates for the Chamber of Deputies.This provoked the Unionists to invent a logic with which they could claim that both

the Greeks and Sabahattin were enemies of Ottoman patriotism; decentralization

was a convenient tool for this.

One Unionist tactic to rally Muslim voters to their camp was to claim that the Ecu-

menical Patriarchate was a treacherous institution whose sole aim was to pursue

Megali Idea, or irredentist Greek nationalism. Accordingly, in the logic of Unionist

propaganda, the Liberal Party was also considered disloyal to the Ottoman nation

because it collaborated with the Patriarchate.27 H€useyin Cahit illustrated the rela-tionship between them as follows: ‘in the eyes of the Patriarchate, Sabahattin’s Party,

the Liberal Party means decentralization. For them decentralization means making

every island such as Mytilene and Chios another Crete, and arranging to be

embraced in the Greek (Yunan) bosom’. Therefore, in his view, the success of this

unpatriotic scheme of the Patriarchate and the Liberal Party depended on the patri-

otism of the voters.28 According to H€useyin Cahit, the CUP and the Liberal Party

were separated from one another by their attitude towards the national interest:

while the Unionists thought only of the national interest (menafi-i vataniye), Sabahat-tin was motivated by personal interest (menafi-i hususiye).29

Consequently, it could be said that decentralization became a bone of contention in

1908 because of the Unionists’ election campaign to discredit simultaneously both of

their political enemies, the Greeks and Sabahattin. Unionists deliberately described

Sabahattin as a treacherous person motivated by personal interest and cooperating

with the ‘unpatriotic’ Greeks. In so doing, the term ‘decentralization’ was used as a

catchword for attacking both. Unionists made full use of the state of confusion con-

cerning the word ‘decentralization’ in order to delegitimize their opponents. Eventhough Sabahhatin’s and his associates’ argument had nothing to do with the offer of

autonomy to non-Muslims, as discussed above,30 and not all Ottoman Greeks were

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supporters of the Megali Idea, as shown below, the CUP described Sabahattin and his

party as ‘decentralists-cum-traitors’ as if they were pursuing ethnic autonomy of vari-

ous non-Turkish elements.31 This accusation was effective because the Unionists were

able to take advantage of the general anxiety about the possible dismemberment of the

empire. The accusation seems to have borne fruit: Sabahattin and his Liberal Partylost the 1908 general election and the historiography continues to describe Second

Ottoman constitutional politics as fought between the centralizing Unionists on one

side and the decentralists headed by Sabahattin with the help of non-Muslims on the

other.

In order to examine the representative view of provincial administration on the part

of the opposition, it is appropriate to contemplate the writings and speeches of L€utfiFikri, a Kurdish deputy from Dersim, who was among the most prominent figures ofthe two major opposition parties during this period: the Moderate Liberal Party

(Mutedil H€urriyetperveran Fırkası) and the Entente Lib�erale.On 11 May 1910, L€utfi Fikri presented his view on provincial administration to the

Chamber of Deputies as follows:

There are . . . two principles from the viewpoint of the government in this [Pro-

vincial Administration] law: delegation of authority and centralization. Central-

ization in its highest form is to bind the prefectures (sancaklar) directly to theMinistry of the Interior . . . If you consider this law, you will find that the gov-

ernment . . . delegates authority and broadens the influence of the provinces.’

L€utfi Fikri admitted that the current pro-Unionist government promoted decentrali-

zation, or, more precisely, the delegation of authority. At the same time, he criticized

those provincial deputies or notables who, in order to ‘win the people’s favour’,

made self-seeking demands on central government.32

L€utfi Fikri was convinced that the centralization–decentralization controversy wasnot the principal issue to be discussed.33 He believed that it did not necessarily distin-

guish one party from another because ‘one political party which proves itself very

conservative in many respects could support, even in an excessive manner, decentrali-

zation when it comes to the mutual relationships among the diverse elements (anasır)

of the Ottomans’. In addition, ‘it is also possible that a party, which is extremely lib-

eral in every respect and has a fully liberal programme, opposes decentralization in a

decisive manner. One should not assume that anyone who supports decentralization

must be a liberal and that anyone who is against decentralization must be aconservative’.34

This is not to say that L€utfi Fikri did not apprehend the significance of the delega-

tion of authority. On one occasion, he defined decentralization as the ‘broadening of

rights for the diverse elements (anasır) of the Ottomans in their countries’ and

acknowledged its importance.35 However, this broadening of rights (tevsi-i hukuk)

was not to be confused with giving different forms of government to each province.

In his words:

I am in favour of the delegation of authority. Many colleagues of mine agree

with me on this point. We must promote the delegation of authority in

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administration (tevsi-i mezuniyet-i idari), or in other words, we must allow pro-

vincial governments the full authority to supervise and administer several mat-

ters, taking into account the difficulty in handling everything from the centre

because of the vastness of our country.

He went on to clarify that he could not allow giving ‘different styles of government to

different provinces’.36

Undoubtedly, L€utfi Fikri did not advocate political decentralization. He supp-

orted the delegation of authority only on condition that every province within the

Ottoman border enjoy equal treatment before the law. L€utfi Fikri deplored the con-

fusion concerning the word ‘decentralization’, which had been utterly misunderstood

by the public. This word was casually given the meaning of federalism, which hisModerate Liberal Party opposed explicitly in the second article of its programme.

The party pledged to promote the delegation of authority and the separation of

duties, the scientific translation of which is ‘decentralization’, beyond what the CUP

had promised.37 In any case, in L€utfi Fikri’s opinion, there was no fundamental dif-

ference between today’s practices of centralization and decentralization; it must be

found in between the pre-modern style of governance based on tax farming and the

modern one following the reforms of Mahmut II.38 In his view, political centraliza-

tion was a sine qua non for any modern state; administrative decentralization wassomething to be implemented within the framework of the politically centralized

modern state and had nothing to do with the disintegration of the state.

Rıza Nur, another prominent figure in the opposition camp, who was elected from

Sinop, articulated a similar logic. It is interesting that, while advocating the need for

delegating authority, Rıza Nur rejected using the very word ‘decentralization’ on the

ground that he believed it had been erroneously interpreted as autonomy. Neverthe-

less, he admitted that the two Ottoman expressions, adem-i merkeziyet and tevsi-i

mezuniyet, the literal English translation of which are decentralization and the dele-gation of authority of the provinces, respectively, were actually derived from the

same French word d�ecentralisation.39

L€utfi Fikri and Rıza Nur were not alone in their definition of the delegation of

authority. Almost all the political parties of this period demonstrated a similar

understanding concerning provincial administration. It is true that few parties dared

to adopt the word ‘decentralization’. At the same time, however, almost all parties

(including the CUP) explicitly demanded the delegation of authority. Yet none of

them proposed it in the context of ethnic autonomy. They advocated the delegationof authority because it was thought useful for the promotion of public works and

infrastructure, the development of agriculture and commerce, and the expansion of

education in the provinces.40 In a similar vein, in the Chamber’s answer to the open-

ing speech of the throne, both the Unionists and opposition agreed on the following

sentence: ‘It is important to implement the principle of the broadening of discretion

in provincial administration on the condition that the political and administrative

unity of the Ottoman Empire be completely secured’.41

A similar distinction between political and administrative decentralization is foundnot only in political discourse but also in academic writings. Several prominent intell-

ectuals of the time with first-hand experience in provincial administration, such as

Bedi Nuri el-Husri and Abd€ulgani Seni (Yurtman), discussed this topic using similar

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vocabulary. Here, the cause of disagreement was the degree of administrative efficacy

which the delegation of authority was supposed to bring about. They made no sugges-

tion of ethnic autonomy in provincial administration.42 Ebubekir Hazım (Tepeyran),

another senior bureaucrat with wide experience of provincial administration, made an

almost identical argument when he discussed the reform plan concerning the provinceof Beirut.43

There was a consensus regarding how to improve provincial administration.

H€useyin Cahit’s following statement appears true: ‘all of us share the same opinion

concerning the broadening of discretion’.44 Both pro-Unionist and anti-Unionist

intellectuals agreed on the need for administrative decentralization while rejecting

political decentralization. Yet this does not imply that all of these politicians and

intellectuals were disciples of Sabahattin. His view on provincial administration wasshared by his contemporaries, but this is not because his theory was an original con-

tribution to the Ottoman intellectuals. In fact, Sabahattin himself admitted that

there was no novelty in his definition of the word d�ecentralisation, which he trans-

lated as adem-i merkeziyet. He classified decentralization into two types, administra-

tive and political, according to a theory of ‘specialists on administrative law’.45

Ottoman intellectuals who were in direct touch with the French social sciences could

observe a similar understanding of provincial administration without being

instructed by Sabahattin.Having said this, it is of interest to examine the example of opposition leaders

who denied ‘decentralization’ altogether. Rıza Tevfik (B€ol€ukbası), one of the

founders of the Entente Lib�erale, had once paid attention to the danger of decen-

tralization; he even espoused the necessity for administrative centralization.46

Similarly, several opposition politicians expressed a centralist interpretation of

the delegation of authority.47 Given these examples, it would be unfair not to rec-

ognize the Unionists’ intrinsic desire for administrative decentralization. It is

undeniable that the Unionists, together with many non-Unionist Ottoman intel-lectuals, were pursuing (at least in their subjective thinking) administrative decen-

tralization, or, more precisely, broadening the authority of provincial governors

within the framework of the centralized, one and inseparable empire. They

thought of this as a continuation of the project to make a modern state, set in

motion during the time of the Sultan Selim III, by reducing the power and influ-

ence of provincial notables (ayan). According to the Young Turks, the reign of

Abd€ulhamit II was the exception to this tradition, doing harm to Ottomans by

attempting excessive administrative centralization while at the same time allowingpolitical disintegration through indecisive policies as demonstrated in the Egyp-

tian, Bulgarian and Macedonian questions.

Although it is evident that Ottoman intellectuals shared the same political terminol-

ogy on provincial administration, one should not forget the fact that the centraliza-

tion–decentralization issue began to be politically loaded when the party struggle

became tense. Both camps, the Unionists and their opposition, used this issue todenounce their opponents. As H€useyin Cahit had used it against the Greeks and

Sabahattin during the 1908 election campaign, the word ‘decentralization’ once again

became the Unionists’ ideal tool to attack the Ententists as traitors during the 1912

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general election.48 During the campaign the CUP did everything it could do, both

legal and illegal, to win the election (thus called the ‘stick’ election (sopalı secim)),

and their tactic to call their opponents traitors is only one such example among

others. An article that appeared in Teminat, an organ of the Ententists, however, dis-

puted the Unionists’ claim by stating, ‘Our party completely approves the essence ofthe Provincial Administration Law. The degree of the delegation of authority written

in our programme is embodied in this law’. Therefore, it appears preposterous to

accuse the Entente Lib�erale of pursuing ‘political’ decentralization. On the contrary,

according to the Ententists, the principal reason for the ongoing calamities, such as

the uprisings in Yemen and Albania or the war with Italy over Libya, was nothing

but the four-year operation of the CUP’s centralization policy. The Ententists

accused Unionists of implementing administrative centralization while concealing it

through the slogan of the delegation of authority. On the other hand, the Ententistsargued that what was needed was to promote the delegation of authority, which

would reduce the bureaucratic works (kırtasiye muamelatı) of the centre. They were

quick to add that they did not want decentralization, which was synonymous with

autonomy.49 Interestingly, some opposition leaders such as Rıza Tevfik and Tahir

Hayrettin criticized the pro-Unionist government on the grounds that it brought

about political decentralization in Yemen and Albania.50

While the centralization–decentralization controversy once again became an

unsettled debate in party politics, it appears that both the Unionists and theEntentists regarded excessive centralization as well as political decentralization as

detrimental to the interest of the Ottoman nation, accusing their opponents of sup-

porting these principles. Simultaneously, both camps tried to defend themselves by

insisting that they were pursuing nothing but the delegation of authority.51 At a

time when the political struggle was at its peak, taking these statements at their

face value would have been na€ıve. In many cases, political calculation prevailed in

both camps. The fact remains, however, that the opposition parties consciously

refrained from using the word ‘decentralization’. They preferred the term ‘the dele-gation of authority’ in order to avoid giving the impression that they were seeking

autonomy. These arguments suggest that the ideas of the opposition leaders of

1912 were, as in 1908, actually very similar to those of the Unionists when it came

to provincial administration. Despite mutual criticism, the leaders of both camps

confessed that their political views were almost identical.52 Ottoman politicians

simply utilized the centralization–decentralization issue as a symbol to criticize

their opponents and justify their political stance, while in fact they shared the same

mentality.

A similar situation arose after the 1912 election. Soon after this ‘stick’ election in

which the Unionists won a decisive victory, they lost power in July 1912 because of

disillusionment and discontent among Albanians, old politicians and army officers.

While anti-Unionist governments were formed by Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Pasa and

then by Kamil Pasa, the Balkan Wars were soon to break out and bring the Union-

ists back to power in January 1913. During this period of political turmoil, the CUP

did not feel it necessary to change its discourse on provincial administration. The 12April 1912 by-law on provincial administration well demonstrates the CUP’s way of

thinking.53 The pro-Unionist government declared that this law was enacted with the

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aim of promoting the delegation of authority.54 Many intellectuals acknowledged

this fact and welcomed it.55

A good example of the general opinion of this law can be found in the view of

Ahmet Ferit (Tek), a prominent figure among the ‘independent’ (m€ustakil) camp.

He had deeply committed himself to drafting the provincial administration bill inthe Chamber of Deputies. According to Ferit, this law was ‘founded on the basis

of completely distinguishing what is political from what is administrative among

the affairs of the state; definitely abstaining from political decentralization while

on the contrary approving broader administrative decentralization’. He under-

scored the benefit in terms of administrative efficiency when considering develop-

ment in the spheres of infrastructure, agriculture and commerce, as well as the

expansion of elementary education in the provinces, which were to be achieved by

this law. It is remarkable that he applauded the Unionist government for modify-ing the bill in order to provide a broader discretion to the provinces, while the par-

liament did not understand its importance. Ferit’s version of administrative

decentralization was in no way related to ethnic autonomy, because, in his words,

‘the Ottoman fatherland is one and inseparable’56 and ‘the policy we are promot-

ing today is that of political unity, the policy of Ottomanism (Osmanlılık

politikası)’.57

Decentralization became a political issue yet again when the Hapsburg minister of

foreign affairs, Count Berchtold, proposed on 13 August 1912 that the great powersinitiate a reform in Ottoman Macedonia ‘in ihren neuen dezentralistischen Prinzipien’

in order to ameliorate the living conditions of Christians.58 The proposal, by some-

what carelessly using the word ‘decentralization’, loaded with a delicate connotation

since the revolution, created a sensation among the Ottoman public. During a time

when the Albanian uprising was still a fresh memory, Berchtold’s proposition pro-

vided an opportunity for the ethnic autonomy question to be discussed in conjunc-

tion with the decentralization issue.

Unionists, who had just lost power in July, knew this occurrence was the bestchance to attack all the anti-Unionists. Tanin made every effort to criticize the Muh-

tar Pasa cabinet for granting the Albanians a quasi-autonomy and the Hapsburgs a

means to enhance decentralization, which would lead to the disintegration of the

empire. Tanin repeatedly blamed Berchtold as well as the Ententists because, so the

argument went, both were in pursuit of decentralization with the aim of destroying

Ottoman unity.59 Unionists faithfully followed the Ottoman terminology concerning

provincial administration and labelled Berchtold, the Muhtar Pasa cabinet and the

Ententists all alike as ‘decentralists-cum-traitors’. Of course, opposition leadersrejected these attacks.60

As is apparent from all these examples discussed so far, the word ‘decentralization’

has been used as a tool of criticism since the Young Turk Revolution. Unionists used

it to label the opposition as ‘traitors’, even though there was in fact little difference

of opinion on provincial administration, particularly with respect to the need for del-

egation of authority. In actuality, not only the Turks but also many non-Turkish pol-

iticians adapted to this terminology. As there were both pro-Unionists and anti-

Unionists within each non-Turkish ethnic group, those non-Turkish politicians whocollaborated with either the Unionists or the Ententists tried to justify their choice to

Ottoman public opinion. In so doing, they utilized a similar tactic to their Turkish

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compatriots. In the rest of this article, I will analyse the non-Turkish voices on pro-

vincial administration.

As for the Ottoman Greek politicians, contrary to widespread opinion, they did notpursue decentralization as a political agenda. During the Second Constitutional

Period, what concerned the Greeks most was securing their representation in the

Chamber of Deputies by winning as many seats as possible, and then securing what

could be saved of their ‘religious privileges’ (imtiyazat-ı mezhebiye). Greek politicians,

particularly those close to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, made every effort to maintain

their ‘privileges’.61 While the Greeks could unite against the CUP and the Ottoman

government to defend their ‘privileges’, they were by no means monolithic since, even

ignoring how these ‘privileges’ could be defended, sometimes even the ultimate goalswith respect to local interests and ethnic/religious identities differed between actors

within the Orthodox community.62 Given that it was a natural desire of the Patriarch-

ate to bind its Rum flock as tightly as possible (particularly when non-Greek Orthodox

people were becoming increasingly conscious of their own ethnicities), it was inexpedi-

ent to take the risk of dissolving the Orthodox community by provoking the decentral-

ization of the empire. The centralized structure of the Orthodox Church under the

aegis of one indivisible Ottoman Empire was viewed as a guarantee of the unity of the

community as well as its privileges.63

Consequently, the Greeks’ concern during the 1908 election campaign was not

decentralization; they sought instead a religious/denominational quota system for

parliamentary seats. Greek newspapers as well as the Ecumenical Patriarchate explic-

itly made this demand before the Grand Vizier Kamil Pasa as well as the CUP.64

They thought that the empire’s various ethnic and religious groups needed to be

properly represented in the Chamber of Deputies and believed a quota system

offered the best guarantee.65 From the Greeks’ viewpoint, a quota system ‘like that

of Austria-Hungary’ would fit well with the values of justice and egalitarianism thatthe Ottoman Constitution demanded.66

The same holds true for the 1912 election campaign. It is true that Georges

Cl�eanthe Scalieri, a Greek and a close associate of Sabahattin, did ask for the imple-

mentation of administrative decentralization.67 However, his argument seems rather

mediocre, given the Ottoman terminology on provincial administration. Neither

pro-Unionist nor anti-Unionist camps within the Orthodox community chose the

issue of decentralization as a political agenda during the election.68 It is characteristic

that Pavlos Karolidis, a pro-Unionist deputy from Izmir and a prominent professorof history at the University of Athens, described the Ententists as decentralists

despite all the evidence to the contrary. He faithfully reflected the political atmo-

sphere of the time, denouncing the opposition as ‘decentralists-cum-traitors’.

Remarkably, Karolidis declared that the Greeks had for centuries strengthened and

promoted their ethnic rights by centralization within the framework of the Ottoman

Empire. In his view, decentralization weakened the Greek position vis-�a-vis the

nascent nationalisms in Macedonia and Thrace, while the Ottoman state, albeit

unconsciously, served the interest of the Greeks by promoting centralization.69

Nonetheless, this general state of mind did not prevent the Greek deputies from

using the term ‘delegation of authority’ in the context of provincial administration in

their political programmes.70 It appears that, to a certain extent, Greeks paid respect

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to the Ottoman terminology. This demonstrated how deeply the need for administra-

tive decentralization was conceived among the Ottoman public, since neither the

pro-Unionist nor anti-Unionist Greeks were disciples of Sabahattin’s theory. For

Athanasios Souliotis-Nicola€ıdis, one of the founders of an anti-Unionist organiza-

tion, ‘the Society of Constantinople’, alliance with the Liberal Party was only a tem-porary and tactical move.71 According to pro-Unionist Karolidis, Sabahattin was

only an inexperienced prince.72 It is very difficult to find ‘the influence of Sabahattin’

in their political orientations. In short, while the Ottoman Greeks were by no means

in favour of decentralization, their political wisdom induced them to adopt the domi-

nant Ottoman terminology on provincial administration.

In the case of the Armenians, soon after the revolution the Armenian Revolutionary

Federation, or the Dashnak Party, demanded in the ninth article of its programmethat the Ottoman Constitution be modified ‘on the basis of decentralization’.73 This

short passage left room for much speculation among the Ottoman public about the

real motivation behind it.74 However, shortly afterwards, the CUP and the Dashnaks

reached an agreement, the fourth article of which stated: ‘Both of these two commit-

tees agreed on the principle of the delegation of authority in the provinces, which

facilitates progress and improvement in our common fatherland’.75 In addition,

Unionists found the Armenian deputies’ programme acceptable, the eighth article of

which demanded the delegation of authority.76 The Dashnaks continued to use thisphrase in their programmes.77 Likewise, the argument of Krikor Zohrab, a promi-

nent Armenian deputy who was close to the Dashnaks, made in the Chamber of

Deputies as a reply to L€utfi Fikri’s query, shows that he was in full agreement with

the Ottoman terminology concerning provincial administration.78

This attitude was shared among other Armenians. The Armenian Patriarch

Madt’eos Izmirlian said that, as in other civilized countries, the delegation of author-

ity in the Ottoman Empire was the only path to progress; he did not forget to add

that the Armenians did not want autonomy.79 Sdep’an Karayian, the president ofthe lay council of the Patriarchate, divided Ottoman politicians into two camps,

those who called for decentralization and those who rejected it, and advocated

instead the delegation of authority. It appears that, as a supporter of the CUP, Kar-

ayian was referring to the Ententists as the former and the Unionists as the latter.

His definition of the Ententists as decentralists resembled that of Karolidis, using the

term to denounce the opposition. It was characteristic that Karayian refuted the

opposition’s claim that Unionists pursued the policy of Turkification.80 A similar

argument was made by another pro-Unionist Armenian, Diran K’elegian, editor-in-chief of Sabah. As he put it, the present national unity (vahdet-i milliye) was achieved

by the destruction of provincial power holders whose privileges were the signs of

political decentralization, through which Sultans Selim III and Mahmut II imple-

mented political centralization as well as the delegation of authority. Therefore, he

held that ‘our government should endeavour towards both centralization and the

delegation of authority’.81

Presenting one example of an anti-Unionist would be in order here. In com-

menting on the aforementioned Count Berchtold’s reform project, Gabriel Nora-dungian, as an Ottoman Armenian of the Amira class and as the minister of

foreign affairs of the empire, thought he had to clarify his stance on this proposal,

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since the word ‘decentralization’ aroused Muslim anxiety about Ottoman Christi-

ans as well as the intentions of the great powers. According to Noradungian, if

Berchtold’s use of ‘decentralization’ referred to the policy once adopted by the

Tanzimat statesmen like Resit and Fuat Pasas, and then abandoned by Abd€ulha-mit, that is, the policy of Ottomanization (Osmanlılastırma), he could supportBerchtold’s proposal. This was because, he explained, Ottomanization meant that

each ethnic group constituting the Ottomans would act uniformly as equal Otto-

man citizens in every affair concerning the interest of all Ottomans. Needless to

say, this Ottomanization did not imply Turkification.82

These Armenian politicians and journalists used the terminology then prevalent in

the Ottoman Empire. Karayian criticized the Ententists as ‘decentralists-cum-

traitors’, while he admitted the need for the delegation of authority. Noradungian

implicitly accused the Unionists of espousing the Turkification policy, while he inter-preted decentralization in Berchtold’s proposition as Ottomanization. Although it

may be na€ıve to take these comments at face value, it is nonetheless certain that nei-

ther the Dashnaks nor the Amira notables dared to propose decentralization as a sys-

tem of ethnic autonomy. In addition, one can reasonably assume that, given the

centralized structure of the Patriarchate,83 the Armenian elites whose power base

was in Istanbul actually did not welcome the ‘political’ decentralization of the

empire in much the same way that the Greeks did not want it. As for the Dashnaks,

since they had abandoned the armed revolt strategy after the Young Turk Revolu-tion with its pragmatist agenda,84 the safest tactic for them was to ally themselves

with the Unionists and thus respect the rules of the game in Ottoman politics.

In contrast to their Greek and Armenian counterparts, the Arab deputies in the

Ottoman parliament rarely remarked on decentralization either inside or outside the

chamber.85 In fact, the first Arab association formed after the revolution, the Arab-

Ottoman Brotherhood (Cemiyet€u’l- _Iha€u’l-Arabi€u’l-Osmani), never referred to decen-

tralization in its proclamation.86 Moreover, the Moderate Liberal Party, organizedby several Arab opposition deputies, rejected decentralization in its programme, stat-

ing that it was synonymous with the dismemberment of the empire. In addition, ‘Abd

al-Hamıd al-Zahrawı, a deputy from Hama and a principal figure among the Arab

opposition, took pains to declare that the Moderate Liberal Party’s policy was not to

pursue decentralization, nor was the party motivated by Sabahattin’s theory.87 He

said it was out of the question to grant autonomy to Yemen,88 and he did not men-

tion anything concerning decentralization when he reported the programme of the

Entente Lib�erale.89

Only after the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies became inevitable in early

1912 did the Arab opposition begin to utilize the centralization–decentralization

issue as a tool to criticize the Unionists. Obviously, Arabs did not fall behind in

adapting to the change of political language as a by-product of the ever-intensifying

conflict between Unionists and Ententists. Thus, following the example of his fellow

Ententists, al-Zahrawı began to claim as late as in early 1912 that the Unionists were

centralists, and, consequently, they were isolated from the remaining political groups

because all other parties wanted decentralization.90 He continued to accuse the CUPof this after the 1912 election was over, and his tone became more strident following

the fall of the Unionist government.91

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Interestingly, these Arab opposition leaders tried to differentiate themselves from

the CUP by asserting that by using the words al-lamarkaziyat al-idariyya (the Arabic

translation of Turkish adem-i merkziyet-i idari, or administrative decentralization),

what they were pursuing was different from the Unionists’ version of tawsı‘

ma’dhuniyya (equivalent to Turkish tevsi-i mezuniyet, or the delegation of authority).This is especially conspicuous in the pamphlet of another prominent Arab opposition

politician, Haqqı al-‘Azm, who described the political struggle at that time as an

antagonism between centralists and decentralists.92 Yet there was hardly any signifi-

cant difference between the Arab opposition’s demands under the rubric of al-

lamarkaziyyat al-idariyya and what the Unionists called tevsi-i mezuniyet. It was a

token of their political calculation that al-Manar, a famous Islamic modernist jour-

nal published by Rashıd Rida, referred to decentralization in the context of praise

for Sabahattin without any concrete definition of the term. What mattered was tocriticize the CUP. It seems that neither Sabahattin’s disdain for the Arabs nor the

actual content of his decentralization theory much concerned al-Manar. Simply, the

Arab opposition utilized this issue as a tool to legitimize itself and delegitimize the

Unionists before the Ottoman public.93

At the same time, the Arab opposition was cautious enough not to use the phrase

‘political decentralization’. It spoke only of ‘administrative decentralization’. Evi-

dently, the Arab opposition well understood the Ottoman terminology regarding the

issue. After all, it is no coincidence that its party, founded in 1913, was named the‘Ottoman Administrative Decentralization Party’ (Hizb al-lamarkaziyyat al-idariyyat

al-‘uthmanı) and all that was discussed at the June 1913 Arab Congress in Paris was

‘administrative decentralization’.94 These proved to be good tactics. Even if the real

aim was to achieve autonomy or independence, as long as it used the term

‘administrative decentralization’ the Arab opposition could still claim that all it

wanted was the delegation of authority, something the Unionists had also promised

to pursue. This is one reason al-Zahrawı could so easily reconcile with the CUP in

mid-1913. Al-Manar also justified his decision: according to al-Manar, al-Zahrawı’scooperation with the CUP was the first step towards administrative decentralization,

especially in the context of developing public works.95

The conventional understanding concerning the significance of decentralization

theory in the Arab opposition must be re-examined. No doubt, the struggle between

the urban notables in the Arab provinces and the Ottoman central government was

one of the decisive factors in this period. However, this does not necessarily imply

that Arab politicians always opted for decentralization as a theory in their political

platform. Rather, it seems that Hasan Kayalı’s point in the context of both theTurkish and Arab nationalist narratives concerning ‘Turkification’ also applies here.

The centralization–decentralization controversy was the surface, not the substance,

of the Turkish-Arab relations of this period, even though historians tend to take this

issue at face value. This controversy functioned as an effective label that was utilized

in their political struggles, in the same way that the opposition charged the Unionists

with a ‘Turkification’ policy, which actually did not exist in their agenda.96

To sum up, all non-Turkish ethnic groups adapted to the Ottoman political idiom.

Some of them simply did not want decentralization. For others, it better suited theirpurpose to avoid the word decentralization in order to preserve their image in the

eyes of their Muslim-Turkish compatriots as long as they carried on their activities

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within the Ottoman borders, even if their real and ultimate aim might be autonomy

or even independence. Advocating decentralization would give the impression that

they were collaborating with the European great powers, which aimed for the dis-

memberment of the empire in the guise of ‘reform’ or ‘decentralization’. If some

non-Turkish politicians used the centralization–decentralization issue as a tool formutual criticism, it was only because they found it effective in the course of Ottoman

domestic politics, similar to the way in which their Turkish compatriots used it.

As mentioned at the outset, both Turkish and non-Turkish historiographies have

regarded the centralization–decentralization issue as the principal determining

factor with respect to political identity in the Second Constitutional Period.

Sabahattin is thought to have been the ideological leader of the opposition parties.

However, the analysis in this article demonstrates that this assumption is not justi-fied. Both the Unionists and the opposition understood and emphasized the need

for administrative decentralization – or the delegation of authority – while they

considered political decentralization as the first step toward dismemberment of the

empire and thus strongly rejected it. To give each province a different governmental

system was by no means acceptable, as this would break the unity of the empire.

The factor of ethnicity rarely appeared in the Ottoman intellectuals’ minds when

referring to the need for administrative decentralization. Even Sabahattin explicitly

declared that the empire needed centralization politically and decentralizationadministratively.

To put it differently, the advocates of administrative decentralization in the early

twentieth century in no way denied the process of centralization that had been

attempted by successive sultans and grand viziers since the end of the eighteenth

century. On the contrary, they considered these reforms as an inevitable step toward

modernization and thus a precondition for their theory. What they opposed was the

excessive burden on the central bureaucracy, and hence they espoused administra-

tive efficiency accomplished by the delegation of authority. All these Ottoman intel-lectuals took for granted, at least in their public comments, that the Ottoman

Empire was a politically centralized, ‘one and inseparable’, modernizing nation

state.

At the same time, the Unionists sometimes used the word ‘decentralization’ as a

convenient label to denounce the opposition. Given the general anxiety over the pos-

sible dismemberment of the empire, it was effective to denounce one’s opponents as

‘decentralists-cum-traitors’. In such an atmosphere, the centralization–decentraliza-

tion issue became a symbol of the political conflict. However, this does not necessar-ily imply that the ideas of the Unionists and the opposition were totally at odds with

each other. On the contrary, Ottoman politicians themselves admitted that in fact

there was little difference of opinion, at least regarding provincial administration,

between Unionists and the opposition.

This general state of mind was shared with the non-Turkish politicians as well.

Even if the ultimate aim of some of them might be autonomy or independence, they

could not resort to Sabahattin’s, or in this sense any other Turkish politicians’ theory

of decentralization as a path to achieve their goal. As long as they carried out theiractivities within the empire, they were compelled to respect (at least in public state-

ments) the political unity of the empire. Consequently, they did not and could not

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demand ethnic autonomy under the name of decentralization; hence, they found it

more beneficial to adapt to the dominant Ottoman terminology of the delegation of

authority.

This conclusion leads to the question of re-examining the process of and reasons

for political bipolarization in late Ottoman history. It should not be presumed thatany political actor showed a distinct tendency for, and in any circumstances gave pri-

ority to, identity politics and/or the politics of sectarianism. Whatever their ‘real’

political orientations were, these participants often acted very tactically and prag-

matically, adapting themselves to the rules of the Ottoman political game, as is the

case of the centralization-decentralization controversy discussed here. I believe it is

high time to re-examine the policies adopted during the Second Constitutional

Period in the light of several mutually conflicting factors, such as compromise,

opportunism and pragmatism, besides the viewpoints of ideologies, identity politicsand/or the politics of sectarianism.97 If put into the broader context of centre–periph-

ery relations rather than centralist–decentralist antagonism and if the close relation-

ships among power, ideology and political calculation are examined, the activities of

the Ottoman political actors (both Turkish and non-Turkish) would be seen some-

what differently. In pursuing this project, I hope we would be able to obtain a better

understanding of the complex course of Ottoman constitutional politics.

Notes

1. E.J. Z€urcher, ‘Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists: Identity Politics 1908–

1938’, in K.H. Karpat (ed.), Ottoman Past and Today’s Turkey (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp.150–79; and

F.M. G€ocek, ‘What Is the Meaning of the 1908 Young Turk Revolution? A Critical Historical

Assessment in 2008’, _Istanbul €Universitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fak€ultesi Dergisi, Vol.38 (2008),

pp.179–214. More specifically, see T.Z. Tunaya, T€urkiye’de Siyasal Partiler Cilt 1. _Ikinci Mesrutiyet

D€onemi, 1908–1918 (_Istanbul: H€urriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1984), p.268; S. Aksin, J€on T€urkler ve _Ittihat

ve Terakki (Ankara: _Imge, 1998), p.272; and A. Birinci,H€urriyet ve _Itilaf Fırkası: II. Mesrutiyet Dev-

rinde _Ittihat ve Terakki’ye Karsı C ıkanlar (_Istanbul: Dergah, 1990), pp.55–7, 63–4. Similar ideas are

found in recent works such as C. Reyhan,Osmanlı’da _Iki Tarz-ı _Idare: Merkeziyetcilik – Adem-i Mer-

keziyetcilik (Ankara: _Imge, 2007); C. Reyhan, T€urkiye’de Liberalizmin K€okenleri: Prens Sabahattin

(1877–1948) (Ankara: _Imge, 2008); B. Hocao�glu, ‘II.Mesrutiyet’in _Ilanı Sırasında _Iki Tarz-ı Siyaset:

Merkeziyetciler ile Adem-i Merkeziyetciler M€ucadelesi’, Do�gu-Batı, Vol.46 (2008), pp.133–42.2. Tunaya, T€urkiye’de Siyasal Partiler Cilt 1, pp.142–54; S. Aksin, ‘31 Mart Olayına De�gin Sabahattin

Bey ve Ahrar Fırkası’, Ankara €Universitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fak€ultesi Dergisi, Vol.27, No.3 (1972),

pp.541–60; S. Aksin, Seriatcı Bir Ayaklanma: 31 Mart Olayı, 3rd ed. (_Istanbul: _Imge, 1994). See also

M.S. Hanio�glu, The Young Turks in Opposition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); and

M.S. Hanio�glu, Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908 (New York: Oxford Uni-

versity Press, 2001).

3. M. Sabahattin, Tesebb€us-i Sahsi ve Tevsi-i Mezuniyet Hakkında Bir _Izah (Dersaadet: Matbaa-i

K€ut€uphane-i Cihan, 1324), pp.6–7, 11–12, 14.4. M. Sabahattin, Tesebb€us-i Sahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Hakkında _Ikinci Bir _Izah (_Istanbul: Mahmut

Bey Matbaası, 1324), pp.18–19.

5. M. Sabahattin, _Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti’ne Acık Mektuplar: Mesle�gimiz Hakkında €Uc€unc€u ve Son

Bir _Izah (Dersaadet: Mahmut Bey Matbaası, 1327), pp.114–7.

6. Sabahattin, Tesebb€us-i Sahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Hakkında _Ikinci Bir _Izah, pp.42–3.

7. Ibid., pp.36–7.

8. Sabahattin, Tesebb€uus-i Sahsi ve Tevsi-i Mezuniyet Hakkında Bir _Izah, pp.6–8. See also Cenap

Sehabettin, ‘Bir _Istifsar-ı Siyasi’, Yeni Gazete, No.95, 23 Nov. 1908, p.1.

9. Sabahattin, _Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti’ne Acık Mektuplar, pp.23–5.

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10. Sabahattin, Tesebb€us-i Sahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Hakkında _Ikinci Bir _Izah, p.43.11. M. Sabahattin, 27 Tesrin-i Evvel 328 Tarihli Huzur-ı Mualla-i Padisahiye Takdim Edilen Acık Bir

Ariza (Dersaadet, 1328), p.6.

12. Sabahattin, _Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti’ne Acık Mektuplar, pp.103–13.

13. Sabahattin, Tesebb€uus-i Sahsi ve Tevsi-i Mezuniyet Hakkında Bir _Izah, pp.11–4.14. Sabahattin, _Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti’ne Acık Mektuplar, pp.65–6, 69–79, 83–98. On Demolins and Le

Play school consult B. Kalaora and A. Savoye, Les inventeurs oubli�es: Le Play et ses continuateurs aux

origines des sciences sociales (Paris: Champ Vallon, 1989). See also N.S. K€osemihal, ‘L’�ecole de Le Play

et son influence en Turquie’, in Recueil d’�etudes sociales publi�es �a la memoire de Fr�ed�eric Le Play (Paris:

A. et J. Picard, 1956), pp.35–47. Compare with the acceptance of Demolins’ work in Egypt. T. Mitchell,

Colonising Egypt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp.110–11.

15. It is interesting to note that Sabahattin frequently used the word Turkey/Turkish (T€urkiye/T€urk)instead of Ottoman (Osmanlı). This fact is intriguing, since he has been often considered

‘cosmopolitan’ in the literature, as opposed to the Turkish nationalists.

16. Sabahattin, _Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti’ne Acık Mektuplar, pp.23–4, 132–4.

17. H€useyin Cahit, ‘Adem-i Merkeziyet’, Tanin, No.35, 4 Sept. 1908, p.1.

18. ‘_Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti’nin Siyasi Programı 6 _Idare-i Vilayat’, _Ittihat ve Terakki, No.25, 1 Oct.

1908, p.1.

19. H€useyin Cahit, ‘Yeni _Idare Memurları’, Tanin, No.371, 13 Sept. 1909, p.1. See also H€useyin Cahit,

‘Beyanname’, Tanin, No.57, 26 Sept. 1908, pp.1–3.

20. Takvim-i Vekayi (hereafter TV), No.396, 4 Dec. 1909, p.16 (Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi [hereaf-

ter MMZC]), Devre 1, Sene-i _Ictimaiye 2, _Ictima 9).

21. Ali Haydar Mithat, ‘Tevsi-i Mezuniyet ve Tefrik-i Vezaif’, _Ikdam, No.5149, 24 Sept. 1908, p.1.

22. Babanzade Mustafa Zihni Pasa, Tevsi-i Mezuniyet (_Istanbul: Mahmut Bey Matbaası, 1324), pp.4–10,

21–70.

23. ‘Sabahattin Bey’in Konferansı’, _Ittihat ve Terakki, No.33, 20 Oct. 1908, p.3.

24. H€useyin Cahit, ‘Adem-i Merkeziyet’, Tanin, No.50, 19 Sept. 1908, p.1.

25. Ibid.

26. ‘Adem-i Merkeziyet’, Tanin, No.249, 10 April 1909, p.2. See also ‘_Ittihat ve Terakki Fırkası’, Sura-yı€Ummet, No.136, 18 Feb. 1909, pp.1–2.

27. H€useyin Cahit, ‘_Ittihat – Terakki’, Tanin, No.133, 13 Dec. 1908, p.1.

28. H€useyin Cahit, ‘_Intihabat Entrikaları’, Tanin, No.129, 9 Dec. 1908, p.1. An almost identical expres-

sion is found in H€useyin Cahit, “Tesebb€us-i Sahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Hakkında’, Tanin, No.217,

9 March 1909, p.1. See also H€useyin Cahit, ‘Anasır-ı Osmaniye’nin Birlesmesi’, Tanin, No.105, 15

Nov. 1908, p.1.

29. H€useyin Cahit, ‘Rumların Programı’, Tanin, No.34, 3 Sept. 1908, p.1. Similar argument is found in

H€useyin Cahit, ‘Fırkaların _Ittihadı’, Tanin, No.227, 19 March 1909, p.1.

30. See also Ali Kemal, ‘Tesebb€us-i Sahsi, Tevsi-i Mezuniyet, Adem-i Merkeziyet’, _Ikdam, No.5130, 5

Sept. 1908, p.1.

31. Seyh€ulislam-ı Esbak Cemalettin Efendi Merhumun Hatırat-ı Siyasiyesi (Dersaadet: M. Hovagimyan

Matbaası, 1336), pp.18–19.

32. MMZC, Devre 1, Sene-i _Ictimaiye 2, _Ictima 87, pp.1600–1601.

33. L€utfi Fikri, ‘_Idare-i Vilayat’, Tanzimat, No.6, 4 May 1911, p.1. Similar attitude is found in ‘Siyaset-i

Dahiliyemiz Hakkında’, Tanzimat, No.343, 5 Sept. 1912, p.2.

34. L€utfi Fikri, Selanik’te Bir Konferans (_Istanbul: Matbaa-i Ahmet _Ihsan ve S€urekası, 1326), pp.24–5.

35. Ibid., pp.26–7.

36. TV, No.396, 4 Dec. 1909, p.2. (MMZC, Devre 1, Sene-i _Ictimaiye 2, _Ictima 8).

37. L€utfi Fikri, ‘Mutedil H€urriyetperveran Fırkası’, Tanzimat, No.10, 8 May 1911, p.1.

38. Dersim Mebusu L€utfi Fikri Bey’in G€unl€u�g€u “Daima Muhalefet”, _Istanbul: Arma, 1991, pp.71–2.

39. Rıza Nur,Meclis-i Mebusan’da Fırkalar Meselesi (_Istanbul: _IkdamMatbaası, 1325), pp.20–21.

40. For the party programmes see Tunaya, T€urkiye’de Siyasal Partiler Cilt 1. Consult also H€useyin

Cahit, ‘_Ittihat ve Terakki Fırkası’, Tanin, No.252, 14 April 1909, p.1.

41. TV, No.402, 11 Dec. 1909, p.2. (MMZC, Devre 1, Sene-i _Ictimaiye 2, _Ictima 11). See also ‘Tevsi-i

Mezuniyet ve Meclis-i Mebusan’, Yeni Gazete, No.461, 7 Dec. 1909, p.1.

42. Hasan Hamit, ‘_Idare-i Vilayat’,M€ulkiye, Vol.3 (1909), pp.1–10; Bedi Nuri, ‘_Idare-i Vilayat’,M€ulkiye,

Vol.6 (1909), pp.1–4; ‘A. Seni, ‘_Idare-i Vilayat ve Taksimat-ı M€ulkiye’, M€ulkiye, Vol.7 (1909),

Political Language in the Second Ottoman Constitutional Period 897

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pp.15–30; el-Seyyit Mehmet. Emin (Abd€ulhadi), ‘_Idare-i Vilayat’, M€ulkiye, Vol.8 (1909), pp.39–40;

Bedi Nuri, ‘_Idare-i Vilayat ve _Izah’,M€ulkiye, Vol.9 (1909), pp.41–5.

43. Ebubekir Hazım, _Idari – _Ictimai Sanihat (Beyrut: Beyrut Vilayeti Matbaası, 1331), pp.34–52.

44. Sada-yı Millet, ‘Tevsi-i Mezuniyet’, Sada-yı Millet, No.14, 28 Oct. 1909, p.1; H€useyin Cahit,

‘Memurlarda Salahiyet’, Tanin, No.427, 10 Nov. 1909, p.1. See also Ali Haydar Mithat, ‘_Intihabat’,_Ikdam, No.5170, 15 Oct. 1908, pp.3–4; Suhtezade Ahmet, ‘Merkeziyet ve Adem-i Merkeziyet

Usulleri’, _Istisare, Vol.1 (1908), pp.32–7.

45. Sabahattin, Tesebb€us-i Sahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Hakkında _Ikinci Bir _Izah, pp.17–18.

46. ‘La situation jug�ee par Riza Tewfik bey’, Le Moniteur Oriental, No.5346, 19 March 1909, p.2.

47. ‘Siyasiyat’, _Ittihad-ı _Islam, No.1, 17 Dec. 1908, pp.2–3; ‘Arnavut Meselesi ve “Merkeziyet” Fikrinin

Hatalı Tatbikatı’, _Ikdam, No.5433, 4 Nov. 1909, p.1; Sehbenderzade Filibeli Ahmet Hilmi, ‘[Yine

Merkeziyet, Adem-i Merkeziyet Fikirleri] Biraz Etraflı D€us€unelim’, Hikmet, No.52, 13 April 1910,

pp.2–3; ‘Merkeziyet mi, Adem-i Merkeziyet mi?’, Yeni _Ikdam, No.411, 2 May 1911, p.1; and ‘Adem-i

Merkeziyet ve Temay€ul-i Anasır’,Hikmet, No.22, 22 Aug. 1912, p.1.

48. Hatipzade Ayetullah, Kime Rey Verelim? _Ittihat ve Terakki – H€urriyet ve _Itilaf, Hangisi _Iyi (_Istanbul:

Matbaa-i Hayriye ve S€urekası, 1328), pp.15–17.49. Rıza Tevfik, ‘Biz Baklayı A�gzımızdan Cıkarmayaca�gız’, Teminat, No.212, 16 Feb. 1912, pp.1–2;

‘H€urriyet ve _Itilaf Fırkası’nın Beyannamesi’, Teminat, No.208, 12 Feb. 1912, pp.1–2; and ‘Mir Gaze-

tesi ve Makedonya’, _Iktiham, No.4, 29 Feb. 1912, p.1. See also ‘H€urriyet ve _Itilaf Fırkası’nın

Beyannamesi’, Hedef, No.284-10, 2 March 1912, pp.1–2; ‘H€urriyet ve _Itilaf Fırkası Beyannamesi

Mabad’, Teminat, No.228, 3 March 1912, pp.1–3; and A., ‘Redd-i _Isnadat’, Teminat, No.239, 14

March 1912, p.3.

50. ‘ €Uc Seneden Sonra’, Tesisat, No.121, 15 Nov. 1911, p.1; T.Kh., ‘Adem-i Merkeziyet Meselesi’, Alem-

dar, No.193-93, 19 Nov. 1911, p.1; Filozof Rıza Tevfik, ‘Adem-i Merkeziyet Meselesi’, _Ikdam,

No.5570, 23 Aug. 1912, p.1; and ‘Tanin Malisya _Isinde Nerede _Idi?’, Tanzimat, No.335, 28 Aug.

1912, p.2.

51. X., ‘Les courants politiques dans la Turquie contemporaine’, Revue de Monde Musulman, Vol.21

(1912), pp.190–91. See also ‘Valilerde Tebedd€ulat’, Tanin, No.1225, 30 Jan. 1912, p.1; ‘Valilerin Teb-

dili Etrafında’, Teskilat, No.196, 31 Jan. 1912, pp.2–3.

52. Sabahattin, _Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti’ne Acık Mektuplar, p.125; and L€utfi Fikri, Selanik’te Bir Kon-

ferans, pp.6, 42–4. See also MMZC, Devre 1, Sene-i _Ictimaiye 4, _Ictima 12, p.242.

53. ‘_Idare-i Umumiye-i Vilayata M€utedair 29 Sevval 1287 Tarihli Nizamnameyi Muaddel Kanun-ı

Muvakkat (Bab-ı Sani) _Ikinci Bab. _Idare-i Hususiye-i Vilayat’, TV, No.1098, pp.1–7; D€ustur, tertib-i

sani, cilt 4 (Dersaadet: Matbaa-i Amire, 1331), pp.421–38.

54. ‘Tevsi-i Mezuniyet’, Tanin, No.1319, 3 May 1912, p.3; ‘Dahiliye Nezareti’nin Tamimi’, Yeni Gazete,

No.1328, 4 May 1912, p.3; ‘Tevsi-i Mezuniyet: Dahiliye Nezareti’nin Tamimi’, Vazife, No.21, 4 May

1912, p.1.

55. Yeni Gazete, ‘_Idare-i Umumiye-i Vilayat’, Yeni Gazete, No.1328, 4 May 1912, p.1; ‘_Idare-i Vilayat:Selanik Valisinin Bir Nutku’, _Ifham, No.278-94, 18 June 1912, pp.2–3; ‘_Idare-i Vilayat Bahsi’, _Ifham,

No.284-100, 24 June 1912, p.4; M. Pickthall, ‘The Hope of Moslem Progress’, The Nineteenth Cen-

tury, Vol.74 (1913), pp.475–6.

56. Ahmet Ferit, ‘Kanun-ı Esasi-i Vilayat’, T€urk Yurdu, Vol.2, No.3 (1328), pp.465–70.

57. MMZC, Devre 1, Sene-i _Ictimaiye 2, _Ictima 96, p.1837.

58. F.R. Bridge, ‘The Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire, 1900–18’, in M. Kent (ed.), The

Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), p.42; Y.H.

Bayur, T€urk _Inkılabı Tarihi. Cilt II. Trablusgarp ve Balkan Savasları. Osmanlı Asyasının paylasılması

icin anlasmalar. Kısım I. 1911 basından Balkan savasına kadar (Ankara: TTK, 1991[1943]),

pp.324–50.

59. ‘Adem-i Merkeziyete Do�gru? Son G€unlerinin Hadisat-ı M€uhimmesi’, Tanin, No.1418, 21 Aug. 1912,

pp.3–4; ‘Adem-i Merkeziyete Do�gru’, Tanin, No.1419, 22 Aug. 1912, pp.3–4; ‘Adem-i Merkeziyete

Do�gru? M€udahale Tarihi’, Tanin, No.1420, 23 Aug. 1912, pp.3–4; ‘Adem-i Merkeziyete Do�gru?’,

Tanin, No.1421, 24 Aug. 1912, p.4; ‘Adem-i Merkeziyete Do�gru? Berchtold Teklifinin _Icy€uz€u’, Tanin,

No.1422, 25 Aug. 1912, p.4; ‘Adem-i Merkeziyete Do�gru’, Tanin, No.1423, 26 Aug. 1912, pp.4–5;

‘Adem-i Merkeziyete Do�gru: Bir Mukayese’, Tanin, No.1424, 27 Aug. 1912, pp.1–2; ‘Adem-i Merke-

ziyete Do�gru’, Tanin, No.1426, 29 Aug. 1912, p.3; ‘Adem-i Merkeziyete Do�gru’, Tanin, No.1428, 31

Aug. 1912, p.3.

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60. L€utfi Fikri, ‘Daima _Iftira, Daima Ta�glit!’, Tanzimat, No.335, 28 Aug. 1912, p.1; L€utfi Fikri,

‘Namuslu Muhalefet!’, Tanzimat, No.337, 30 Aug. 1912, p.1.

61. X. Ἐξertzόgλoy, «To ‘‘pronomiakό’’ zήτhma», Ta Istorikά, Vol.16 (1992), pp.65–84; and V.

Kechriotis, ‘The Modernization of the Empire and the Community “Privileges”: Greek Orthodox

Responses to the Young Turk Policies’, in T. Atabaki (ed.), The State and the Subaltern: Moderniza-

tion, Society and the State in Turkey and Iran (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), pp.53–70.

62. Fujinami N., ‘“Church Law” and Ottoman-Greeks in the Second Constitutional Politics, 1910’,�Etudes Balkaniques, Vol.43, No.1 (2007), pp.107–32; Fujinami N., ‘The Patriarchal Crisis of 1910

and Constitutional Logic: Ottoman Greeks’ Dual Role in the Second Constitutional Politics’, Journal

of Modern Greek Studies, Vol.27, No.1 (2009), pp.1–30.

63. T. Veremis, ‘From the National State to the Stateless Nation 1821–1910’, in M. Blinkhorn and T.

Veremis (eds.),Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality (Athens: Eliamep, 1990), pp.9–22.

64. ‘Rum ve Ermeni Heyet-i Mahsusasının Beyanatı’, Yeni Gazete, No.83, 11 Nov. 1908, p.1; ‘Rum ve

Ermeni Cemaatleri Tarafından Makam-ı Sadarete Verilen Arz-ı Halin Suretidir’, Tanin, No.101, 11

Nov. 1908, p.3; A.SoyλiώτhB-NikoλaΐdhB, ὈrgάnvsiB KvnstantinoypόλevB (Ἀuήna: Dvdώnh,1984), p.78.

65. ‘Bir Program 1’, Servet-i F€unun, No.48-13, 29 Aug. 1908, p.3; ‘Rum Matbuatı’, Tanin, No.91, 1 Nov.

1908, p.3–4. See also D. Georgiad�es, La r�eg�en�eration de la Turquie est-elle possible? (Paris: Imprimerie

Chaix, 1909), p.152; and M. XrisτodoyλίdhB, Tὸ sύntagma ἐn Toyrkίᾳ kaὶ tὰ pronόmia toῦἙλλhnismoῦ (Ἐv ἈuήnaiB: N. XiώτhB kaὶK. PoysέaB, 1908), pp.11–4, 31–2.

66. «Poλύτima didάgmaτa», NeoλόgoB tῆB ἈnatoλῆB, No.46, 23 Feb. 1910, p.1; «Ἐpίkaira»,ἈnatoλikὸB TaxydrόmoB, No.187, 6 April 1910, p.2.

67. G.C. Scalieri, La r�eg�en�eration constitutionnelle: la d�ecentralisation et la r�eforme administrative (Con-

stantinople: L’Orient, 1911).

68. Fujinami N., The Ottomans and Constitutionalism: Politics, Religion, and Communities in the Young

Turk Revolution (Nagoya: The University of Nagoya Press, 2011), chapter 5 (in Japanese).

69. P. KaroλίdhB, Lόgoi kaὶ Ὑpomnήmata ἤtoi Lόgoi ἀpaggeλuέnteB ἐn tῇ ’Ouvmanikῇ Boyλῇ kaὶὙpomnήmata pem’uέnta ἀpὸ Kvnstantinoypόλev& prὸ& tὸn ἐpὶ tῶn Ἐξvterikῶn Ὑpoyrgὸn k.

G eώrgion Baλtatzῆn kaὶ prὸ& tὸn Prόedron tῆ& kybernήsev& k. E. Benizέλon (Ἐn Ἀuήnai&: Ἐk toῦTypogra’eίoy P.A. Petrάkoy, 1913), pp.380–81.

70. ‘Rum Mebusanının Programı’, _Ikdam, No.5501, 11 Jan. 1910, p.6; and ‘Rum Mebusanının Pro-

gramı’, _Ikdam, No.5503, 13 Jan. 1910, p.2. See also F. Ilıkan, ‘Meclis-i Meb’usan-ı Osmanı Rum

A’zasının Siyası Programı’, Tarih ve Toplum, Vol.118 (1993), pp.6–8.

71. Soyλiώth&-Nikoλaΐdh&, ὈrgάnvsiB KvnstantinoypόλevB, p.94.72. Karoλίdh&, Lόgoi kaὶ Ὑpomnήmata, pp.378–9.73. ‘Dasnaksutyun Programı’, Hukuk-ı Umumiye, No.14, 29 Sept. 1908, p.2; ‘Ermeni Cemiyetinin Siyasi

Programı’,Hukuk-ı Umumiye, No.16, 1 Oct. 1908, p.3.

74. H€useyin Cahit, ‘Dasnaksutyun Fırkası’nın Programı’, Tanin, No.94, 4 Nov. 1908, p.1.

75. ‘_Ittihad-ı Anasır’, Tanin, No.365, 7 Sept. 1909, p.3.

76. ‘Meclis-i Mebusan’da Ermenilerin Takip Edecekleri Meslek’, Servet-i F€unun, No.132, 22 Oct. 1908,

p.4; ‘Meclis-i Mebusan’da Ermenilerin Takip Edecekleri Maksat’, Sura-yı €Ummet, No.20, 25 Oct.

1908, p.1.

77. ‘Ermeni Dasnaksutyun Komistesinin Gecen Sehr-i Eyl€ul’de Varna’da Akt Etmis Oldu�gu Kongrede

Kaleme Alınan Resmi Beyannamenin Suret-i M€utercemesidir’, Sada-yı Millet, No.4, 18 Oct. 1909,

p.2.

78. TV, No.396, 4 Dec. 1909, p.15. (MMZC, Devre 1, Sene-i _Ictimaiye 2, _Ictima 9).

79. ‘Ermeni Patri�gi _Izmirliyan Efendi’nin Beyanatı’, Sura-yı €Ummet, No.33, 7 Nov. 1908, p.6.

80. _I. Karayan, Muhterem Osmanlı M€untehiplerine Bir Nida-yı _Irsad (_Istanbul: Matbaa-i Hayriye ve

S€urekası, 1330), pp.20–27, 34–40.

81. D.K., ‘Tevsi-i Mezuniyetin Mukaddeme-i Tatbikatı’, Sabah, No.8098, 6 April 1912, p.1.

82. ‘Noradongiyan Efendi’nin Beyanatı’, Tanzimat, No.333, 26 Aug. 1912, pp.1–2.

83. K.B. Bardakjian, ‘The Rise of the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople’, in B. Braude and B.

Lewis (eds.), Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, Volume

1 The Central Lands (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982), pp.96–7; V. Artinian, Osmanlı

Devleti’nde Ermeni Anayasası’nın Do�gusu 1839–1863 (_Istanbul: Aras Yayıncılık, 2004), p.109; and P.

Werth, ‘Imperial Russia and the Armenian Catholicos at Home and Abroad’, in Ieda O. and Uyama

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T. (eds.), Reconstruction and Interaction of Slavic Eurasia and its Neighboring Worlds (Sapporo: Slavic

Research Center, 2006), pp.215–16.

84. A. Avagyan, ‘_Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ile Ermeni Siyasi Partileri Arasındaki _Iliskiler’, in Ermeniler

ve _Ittihat ve Terakki: _I sbirli�ginden Catısmaya (_Istanbul: Aras, 2005), pp.36, 73, 133–4.

85. S. Pr€ator, Der arabische Faktor in der jungt€urkischen Politik: Eine Studie zum osmanischen Parlament

der II. Konstitution (1908–1918) (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 1993), pp.162–3.

86. “Cemiyet€u’l- _Iha€u’l-Arabi€u’l-Osmani”nin Bilhassa Ebna-yı Araba ve Bilumum C€umle-i Osmanlılara

Hitaben Tertip ve Nesr Etti�gi Arabi€u’l- _Ibare Beyannamenin Suret-i M€uterc€umesidir (Dersaadet: Zellic

Matbaası, 1324); L.B., ‘Autour du Monde Musulman: Empire ottoman’, Revue de Monde Musulman,

Vol.6 (1908), pp.517–18. See also E. Tauber, The Emergence of the Arab Movements (London: Frank

Cass, 1993), pp.61–5.

87. Abd€ulhamit Zehravi, ‘_Izah-ı Hakikat’, Yeni _Ikdam, No.138, 30 July 1910, p.3.

88. MMZCD.1, S_I.2, _Ict.39, p.295.

89. ‘Hizb jadıd’, al-Hadara, Vol.2, No.85, 23 Nov. 1911; ‘al-Hizb al-jadıd’, al-Hadara, Vol.2, No.86, 30

Nov. 1911; ‘Hizb al-Hurriyya wa’l-I’tilaf’, al-Hadara, Vol.2, No.87, 7 Dec. 1911. ‘Abd al-Hamıd.

al-Zahrawı, al-A‘mal al-Kamila, 3: Maqalat al-Hadara (Dimashq: Manshurat Wizara al-Thaqafa,

1996), pp.479–86.

90. MMZC, Devre 1, Sene-i _Ictimaiye 4, _Ictima 34, pp.713–14.

91. ‘Ba‘da arba‘ sanın’, al-Hadara, Vol.3, No.120, 25 July 1912; ‘Bayn al-maslakın’, al-Hadara, Vol.3,

No.126, 5 Sept. 1912; Zahrawı, al-A’mal al-Kamila, 3, pp.324–34, 501–5.

92. Haqqı al-‘Azm, Haqa’iq ‘an al-intikhabat al-niyabiyya: fı al-‘Iraq wa Fılastın wa Suriyya (Qahira:

Matba‘at al-Akhbar, 1912), pp.3–10, 79–84, 87–95. See also ‘Muhawara bayn ‘alim siyası wa tajir

zakı fı al-markaziyya wa’l-lamarkaziyya’, al-Manar, Vol.16 (1913), pp.344–52.

93. ‘al-Harb al-balqaniyya wa al-mas’alat al-sharqiyya’, al-Manar, Vol.15 (1912), p.957; ‘al-

Lamarkaziyyat al-idariyya, hayat al-bilad al-‘uthmaniyya’; and ‘Hizb al-Lamarkaziyya, wa lijan al-

islah al-Suriyya’, al-Manar, Vol.16 (1913), pp.237–9.

94. ‘Bayan Hizb al-Lamarkaziyya al-Idariyya al-‘Uthmanı’; and ‘Barnamaj Hizb al-Lamarkaziyya al-

Idariyya al-‘Uthmanı’, al-Manar, Vol.16 (1913), pp.226–31; ‘al-Islah al-lamarkazı fı’l-bilad al-

‘arabiyya, wa ittifaq al-turk ma‘a al-‘arab’, al-Manar, Vol.16 (1913), pp.798–800; ‘Bayan li’l-umma

al-‘arabiyya min Hizb al-Lamarkaziyya’, al-Manar, Vol.16 (1913), pp.849–52; M.K. al-Khatıb (ed.),

al-Mu’tamar al-‘arabı al-awwal: al-mun‘aqid fı al-qa‘a al-kubra li’l-jam‘iyya al-jugrafiyya bi-shari‘ San

Jarman fı Barıs, 2nd ed. (Dimashq: Manshurat Wizarat al-Thaqafa, 1996[1913]), pp.113–14. See also

Tauber, The Emergence, pp.121–34; and ‘A. Sultan, Tarıkh Suriyya 1908–1918, 2nd ed. (Dimashq,

1996), p.43.

95. ‘al-Muqabala bayn barnamaj al-hizb wa ittifaqiyya Barıs wa ma qarraratuhu al-hukuma’, al-Manar,

Vol.16 (1913), pp.852–7; ‘Bayan Hizb al-Lamarkaziyya wa’l-islah fı’l-wilayat al-‘arabiyya’, al-

Manar, Vol.16 (1913), pp.879–80; ‘al-Islah al-lamarkazı wa tullabihi fı’l-bilad al-‘arabiyya’, al-

Manar, Vol.17 (1914), pp.234–9.

96. H. Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–

1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), pp.2–4, 82–96. See also Z. Toprak, ‘Bir Hayal€Ur€un€u: _Ittihatcıların “T€urklestirme Politikası”’, Toplumsal Tarih, Vol.146 (2006), pp.14–22.

97. I. Blumi, Rethinking the Late Ottoman Empire: A Comparative Social and Political History of Albania

and Yemen 1878–1918 (_Istanbul: Isis, 2003); J. Klein, ‘Conflict and Collaboration: Rethinking Kurd-

ish-Armenian Relations in the Hamidian Period, 1876–1909’, in B. Tezcan and K.K. Barbir (eds.),

Identity and Identity Formation in the Ottoman World: A Volume of Essays in Honor of Norman Itzko-

witz (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), pp.153–66; M.U. Campos, Ottoman Broth-

ers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth-Century Palestine (Stanford, CA: Stanford

University Press, 2011); Fujinami, The Ottomans and Constitutionalism.

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