Cultural worldviews and environmental risk perceptions: A meta-analysis

CULTURAL WORLDVIEWS AND RISK PERCEPTION 1

Cultural Worldviews and Environmental Risk Perceptions: A Meta-Analysis

Wen Xue, Donald W. Hine, Natasha M. Loi,

Einar B. Thorsteinsson & Wendy J. Phillips

University of New England, Armidale

In press, Journal of Environmental Psychology

Accepted July 21, 2014

Please address correspondence to:

Professor Donald Hine

Psychology

School of Behavioural, Cognitive and Social Sciences

University of New England, Armidale, NSW, Australia

[email protected]


Abstract

This study examined the magnitude of the associations between four worldview

dimensions based on Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982) cultural theory of risk

(egalitarianism, individualism, hierarchism and fatalism) and environmental risk

perceptions. A meta-analysis of 67 effect sizes from a pooled sample of 15,660

respondents revealed that individuals who scored higher on egalitarianism perceived

more environmental risks (r = .25), whereas individuals who scored higher on

hierarchism and individualism perceived fewer environmental risks (r = -.18 and -.17,

respectively). Fatalism and environmental risk perceptions were not significantly

related (r = .03). Moderator analyses using an expanded set of 129 effect sizes found

that effect sizes varied significantly as a function of hazard type, worldview measure,

and study location. Our results are broadly consistent with cultural theory’s claim that

cultural worldviews are potentially important determinants of environmental risk

perceptions, although the magnitudes of these effects appear to be quite modest.

Keywords: cultural theory of risk; cultural cognition; worldviews; risk perception;

environmental risk


Cultural Worldviews and Environmental Risk Perceptions: A Meta-Analysis

1. Introduction

People vary considerably in their perceptions about environmental risks

and their beliefs about how these risks should be managed. Some are very

concerned about issues such as climate change, air quality, and nuclear waste

disposal, whereas others express scepticism or indifference. Some prefer risk

management to be left to so-called experts. Others favour solutions that involve

substantial community input and control. In their influential book Risk and

Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technological and Environmental

Dangers, Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982) proposed a cultural theory of risk that

provides a compelling explanation for this variation. According to the theory,

individuals possess distinct preferences for how society should be structured

(cultural worldviews), which in turn influence how they evaluate and respond to

environmental risks. Although Douglas and Wildavsky’s book has been cited

over 5000 times according to Google Scholar and has served as the theoretical

foundation for a substantial number of empirical studies, a recent narrative review

of the cultural theory literature concluded “support for this theory has been

surprising meagre” (Oltedal, Moen, Klempe, & Rundmo, 2004). In this study, we

conducted a meta-analysis to determine the magnitude of the associations between

four worldview dimensions based on cultural theory and environmental risk

perceptions, and assess whether Oltedal et al.’s critical assessment of the theory is

warranted. We also investigated several potential moderators to determine if the

effect sizes varied as a function of methodologies used by the studies in our

review.


1.1. Cultural theory of risk

Cultural theory posits that risk perceptions reflect and reinforce individuals’

preferences for various types of social organization or cultural ways of life. These

preferences are often referred to as cultural worldviews. According to the theory,

worldviews can be characterized by their location within a two dimensional space,

referred to by Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) as “group” and “grid” (see Figure

1). The “group” dimension reflects the extent to which individuals are committed

to social structures that foster strong social bonds, collective identity and

cooperation (high group) as opposed to emphasizing individual differences, self-

reliance, and competition (low group). The “grid” dimension reflects a

commitment to role- or class-based social stratification (high grid) versus the

belief that all individuals in society should not be excluded from social roles on

the basis of their sex, age, or colour (low grid). When combined, the group and

grid dimensions generate a 2 × 2 matrix reflecting four cultural worldviews:

egalitarianism, individualism, hierarchism, and fatalism (Thompson, Ellis &

Wildavsky, 1990).

According to Wildavsky and Dake (1990), egalitarians are characterized by

high levels of concern about social injustice, suspicion of authority, high tolerance

for social deviance, and exhibit strong support for participatory democracy and

consensus-based decision making. Individualists tend to fear restrictions on their

autonomy and favour deregulation, free market solutions, and providing

opportunities for people to maximize personal gain. They also tend to hold a

“cornucopian” view of nature in which the Earth’s supply of energy and resources

is virtually limitless, particularly in light of ongoing advances in technology for


exploration and extraction. Hierarchists are committed to maintaining existing

power structures that protect their interests. They fear social deviance that

threatens the status quo and defer to experts, who are also members of the

dominant social orders, when assessing the magnitude of risks. Finally, fatalists

are characterized by high levels of disengagement and believe that much of what

happens in society is largely beyond their control (Dake, 1992).

A key tenet of cultural theory is that individuals exhibit risk perceptions

that are generally consistent with their preferred structure of social organization

(Kahan, 2012). That is, individuals perceive things as risky if they threaten their

preferred cultural way of life. For example, individualists tend to be dismissive of

environmental and technological risks because giving credence to such risks

would invite restrictions on commerce and industry, two aspects of modern

society that they value. Similarly, hierarchists also tend to discount

environmental and technological risks, given that acknowledging such danger

could be viewed as “implicit indictments of competence and authority of societal

elites” (Kahan, 2012, p. 728). Egalitarians view commerce and industry as

important sources of social inequality and, as such, are more likely to view

environmental and technological risks associated with these endeavours as being

unacceptable. Given their generally high level of disengagement and external

locus of control, fatalists tend to be indifferent towards risk.


Figure 1. The cultural theory of risk model based on Thomspon et al. (1990).

1.2. Assessing cultural worldviews

Karl Dake conducted the first quantitative empirical studies formally evaluating

cultural theory (Dake, 1991; Wildavsky & Dake, 1990). Dake (1991) constructed

subscales to assess respondents’ commitment to hierarchism, individualism, and

egalitarianism. In subsequent work, Dake (1992) added a fourth subscale to assess

fatalism, and Jenkins-Smith and his collaborators produced modified versions to

improve the psychometric properties of the original scales (Jenkins-Smith & Herron,

2009; Jenkins-Smith, 2001; Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, & Braman, 2011).1 Dake’s

measures and their variations represent the dominant approach for assessing the

worldviews proposed by cultural theory, and have been employed in dozens of studies

focusing on environmental, technological and other types of risk (e.g., Marris,

Langford, & O'Riordan 1998; Peters & Slovic, 1996; Sjöberg, 2003, 2004).

More recently, Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic, and Mertz (2007) introduced

an alternative set of scales based on a “cultural cognition” framework. The new


scales consist of two continuous measures. The first, labelled “hierarchy-

egalitarianism” assesses individuals’ preference for low and high “grid” cultural

orientations. The second, labelled “individualism-communitarianism”, reflects

preferences for weak versus strong “group” orientation. Kahan (2012) argued that

his cultural cognition scales (CCS) have several advantages relative to Dake’s

measures. In particular, they exhibit higher levels of internal consistency, map

more directly onto Douglas and Wildavsky’s “group” and “grid” dimensions, and

avoid related problems of logical indeterminacy. For example, with Dake’s

scales, it is possible for an individual to score high (or low) on all four subscales

resulting in a set of scores that may not correspond to any of the four group/grid

quadrants presented in Figure 1. The CCS avoids this problem by providing each

respondent with a single score for “group” and a single score for “grid”,

generating a unique set of coordinates in the two-dimensional cultural space

defined by the theory. One of the goals of the present study was to investigate the

comparative predictive power of the CCS and Dake’s measures.

1.3. Current study

We conducted a meta-analysis to determine the magnitude of the

associations between respondents’ scores on four dimensions derived from

Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982) cultural theory of risk and their environmental

risk perceptions. Based on the theory, we predicted that higher scores on

egalitarianism and lower scores on hierarchism and individualism would be

associated with higher perceptions of environmental risk across a range of

domains. In addition, we also predicted there would be no relationship between

the extent to which respondents endorsed a fatalistic worldview and their risk


perception scores. We also investigated potential moderators of these

associations: hazard type (whether the hazard was primarily natural, human-

generated, or a combination of the two); and whether the study employed Dake’s

(1992) scales (or variants thereof) or Kahan’s (2007, 2012) CCS for assessing

cultural worldviews. We predicted that cultural worldviews would be a stronger

predictor of environmental risk perceptions in studies that investigated hazards

that were at least partially attributable to human activity2 relative to studies that

assessed hazards attributable to natural causes. This prediction is based on the

notion that human-generated (technological) hazards are products of culture,

whereas extreme environmental events linked to natural hazards exist

independently of culture, although cultural elements such as infrastructure and

emergency planning may accentuate or limit the risks associated with these

events.

In addition, we predicted that studies employing Kahan’s CCS would

produce larger effect sizes than studies using Dake’s cultural theory scales given

the psychometric limitations associated with Dake’s measures (Kahan, 2012).

Finally, we predicted that North American studies samples would produce larger

effect sizes than studies conducted elsewhere given that the cultural worldview

scales included in the review were developed specifically with North American

cultural concerns in mind and should not be assumed to generalize to other

cultural contexts (Kahan, 2012).


2. Method

2.1. Literature search and inclusion criteria

We used several strategies to locate relevant studies. First, we examined the

PsycINFO database using the following search terms related to cultural theory and

environmental risk perception: risk/threat/fear/disaster;

egalitarianism/individualism/hierarchism/fatalism; cultural theory; cultural

cognition; and grid/group; global warming/climate change; pollution; ozone

depletion. Second, the reference lists of all studies identified in the PsycINFO

search were reviewed to identify other relevant studies. All papers published up to

30th March, 2013 were examined. We also sent emails to one cultural cognition

researcher to identify unpublished datasets.

Studies that reported associations between at least one cultural theory

worldview dimension and at least one index of environmental risk perception

were included in the meta-analysis. For the purpose of this study, environmental

risk perception was defined as individuals’ subjective assessments about the

severity of risks stemming from natural or human-generated hazards with

potential impacts on environmental and/or human health. In total, 21 studies,

including two unpublished, were included in the meta-analysis.

2.2. Coding

Information for each study was entered into Comprehensive Meta-Analysis

2.0. Coded information included: year of publication, sample size, effect size (r),

scale reliabilities for worldview measures, and three methodological moderators:

(1) hazard type (natural hazards, human-generated hazards, and multiple-cause

hazards)3, (2) cultural worldview measure (Dake’s cultural theory subscales or

Kahan’s CCS), and (3) study location (North America or Europe).


Two independent judges completed the coding for the study. The first

author coded all articles, and the third author re-coded a random selection

consisting of 40% of the original article set. Inter-coder consistency for the

double-coded articles was very high (95%). All disagreements were resolved

through discussion between the two coders. The first coder then reviewed all

documents again to ensure all codes were consistent with any agreed changes.

2.3 Statistical analysis

Pearson correlation was used as the index of effect size in this study. All analyses

were conducted using Comprehensive Meta-Analysis Version 2 software (Borenstein,

Hedges, Higgins & Rothstein, 2005), using standard procedures recommended by

Borenstein et al. (2009). Inverse variance weighting was applied to all effect sizes (w

= 1/SE) to ensure that greater weight is given to more precise studies (usually those

with greater sample size). Fisher's transformation of r (zr) was used when computing

average effects, with ravg and CI values back-transformed from zr. Heterogeneity of

effect sizes were analysed via the Q statistic (Hedges & Olkin, 1985). Moderation

analyses employed an analogue to ANOVA in which pooled group effect sizes for a

categorical variable are tested for heterogeneity of variance using the Q-statistic

within groups, and also for differences in effect sizes between groups based on 95%

confidence intervals.

For some studies that investigated more than one environmental risk, more

than one effect size was entered into the database. To avoid problems associated

with data dependencies, we computed an average effect size for each worldview

for each of these studies to ensure that each study contributed a single effect size

to each of the overall analyses (k = 67). For the moderator analyses, the


hypothesis test was used as the unit of analysis. Thus, each study could contribute

more than one effect for each worldview to the analyses (k = 129).

Studies employing Kahan’s (2012) CCS measures generally reported effect

sizes for two dimensions (hierarchism-egalitarianism and individualism-

communitarianism). For these studies, we decomposed the measures and entered

three effect sizes into the analysis that corresponded to the dimensions assessed

by Dake’s (1992) cultural theory measures. For example, if a study employed the

CCS measure and reported effect sizes of -.36 for hierarchism-egalitarianism and

-.10 for individualism-communitarianism, we entered -.36 for hierarchism, .36 for

egalitarianism, and -.10 for individualism. We entered nothing for fatalism given

that the CCS does not include a measure that corresponds to this dimension.

3. Results

A list of included studies and a summary of their attributes is presented in Table 1.

The majority of studies (81%) utilized Dake’s (1991) scale to measure cultural

worldview (e.g., Peters, Burraston, & Mertz, 2004; Peters & Slovic, 1996; Sjöberg,

2003; Dake & Wildavsky, 1990), whereas 19% employed Kahan’s revised version

(e.g., Kahan et al., 2007; Phillips, Hine, & Marks, raw data). Approximately 20% of

studies used student samples, whereas 80% sampled from general populations. In

terms of hazard types, 20% assessed only natural hazards, 35% assessed only human-

generated hazards, and 45% assessed multiple-cause hazards generated by both nature

and humans.

3.1 Average effect sizes for worldview dimension

A summary of the average effect sizes for each worldview dimension and

environmental risk perception is presented in Table 2. Consistent with our


hypotheses, the overall weighted average effect size (r) for the association between

egalitarianism and environmental risk perception was .25 (p < .001), indicating that

individuals who scored higher on this worldview dimension perceived higher levels of

environmental risk. The average effect sizes for hierarchism (r = -.18, p < .001) and

individualism (r = -.17, p < .001) were smaller and in the opposite direction. Also as

predicted, fatalism was unrelated to environmental risk perception (r = -.03, ns). The

effect sizes for all four worldview dimensions exhibited substantial heterogeneity

(significant Q-statistics and I2 values above 80). Consequently a random effects

model was used for all analyses, which generates relatively conservative estimates

(Lipsey & Wilson, 2001).

3.2 Moderator analyses

Given substantial heterogeneity across effect sizes, we assessed the potential

impact of three moderator variables: hazard type, worldview measure, and study

location.

3.2.1 Hazard type. Table 3 presents the moderator analysis contrasting the effect

sizes between cultural worldviews and perceived risks for three hazard types: natural

hazards (e.g., floods and storms), human-generated hazards (e.g., nuclear power,

pollution), and multiple-cause hazards (e.g., climate change, non-specific

environmental hazards). Within each of the four worldview types, significant

between group Q-tests indicated that average effect sizes varied significantly by

hazard type (see note at the bottom of Table 3).

For egalitarianism, studies assessing risk perceptions of multiple-cause hazards

produced significantly larger effect sizes (r = .25) than studies assessing perceptions

of human-generated hazards (r = .19), which produced significantly larger effect sizes


(based on non-overlapping 95% confidence intervals) than studies on natural hazards

(r = .09). For all three hazard types the average effect sizes between egalitarianism

and environmental risk perception were positive and statistically significant (p

< .001), indicating that respondents with strong egalitarian worldviews perceived high

levels of risk.

The effect sizes for individualism and risk perception exhibited the same basic

pattern, with studies focusing on multiple-cause hazards producing the largest effect

sizes (r = -.16), followed by human-generated hazards (r = -.11) and natural hazards

(r = -.05). In all instances the correlations were negative and statistically signficant,

indicating that respondents with strong individualistic worldviews perceived low

levels of risk.

For hierarchism, studies focusing on multiple-cause hazards once again produced

stronger effect sizes (r = -.20) than those focusing on human-generated hazards (r = -

.07). Consistent with cultural theory, high levels of hierarchism were associated with

low levels of perceived risk. Unexpectedly, and counter to cultural theory,

hierarchism was positively related to risk perceptions of natural hazards (r = .10),

although it is worth noting that this average effect size was based on only three

hypothesis tests.

Finally, for fatalism, studies that focused on multiple-cause and human-

generated hazards failed to produce significant effect size in the meta-analysis.

However, for natural hazards, higher fatalism scores were significantly associated

with higher risk perceptions (r = .11).

3.2.2 Worldview measure. The results of the moderator analysis for worldview

measure type (Dake vs. Kahan) are presented in Table 4. Between group Q-tests


revealed signficant heterogeniety across measure types for egalitarianism, hierarchism

and individualism (see note at bottom of Table 4). Contrasts for fatalism were not

conducted given that Kahan’s CCS does not assess this worldview dimension. Both

measures produced significant average effects sizes for egalitarianism (rKahan = .26,

rDake = .20), hierarchism (rKahan = -.26, rDake = -.08), and individualism (rKahan = -.18,

rDake = -.13). However, as predicted, studies employing Kahan’s CCS produced

average effect sizes that were significantly larger (inferred from non-overlapping 95%

confidence intervales) than studies using Dake’s cultural theory scales. The

differences in effect sizes for the CSS and Dake’s scales were most pronounced for

hierarchism.

3.2.3 Study location. To determine if heterogeneity in effect sizes was related to

the study location, we contrasted studies that were conducted in European countries

(Sweden, United Kingdom, France and Germany) with those conducted in North

America (Unitied States and Canada). The outcome of this moderator analysis is

summarized in Table 5. Between group Q-tests revealed significant heterogenetity

between studies employing North American and European samples for all four

worldview dimensions. For egalitarianism (rNA = .23, rEurope = .19), hierarchism (rNA

= -.18, rEurope = -.12), and individualism (rNA = -.16, rEurope = -.11), North American

studies consistently produced stronger effect sizes than European studies. For

fatalism, European studies produced a small, positive statistically significant effect

size (r = .04), whereas North American studies produces a small negative correlation

that just ailed to rearch statistical signficance (r = -.03).

3.3 Correlations between subscales

Most studies included in the review did not report correlations between

cultural worldview subscales. Nevertheless, it was still possible to compute average


correlations based on the small set of studies that provided such values. This

information is reported in Table 6. For Dake’s scales, hierarchism and individualism

were positively correlated with each other and fatalism, and both were negatively

correlated with egalitarianism. Fatalism was not significantly correlated with

egalitarianism. Two of Kahan et al.’s studies (2011 and 2012) used orthogonal factor

scores. Thus, the correlation between Individualism-Communitarianism and

Hierarchy-Egalatarianism was 0 for these studies. For Kahan (2007), the correlation

between the two dimensions was .40 (Kahan, personal communication).

3.4 Publication bias

An important issue in meta-analytic investigations is the potential for publication

bias, where the collection of research reports in the published literature is not

representative of the total population of completed studies (Rothstein, Sutton, &

Borenstein, 2005). To assess potential publication bias in our sample, we examined

the funnel plots for each worldview dimension. Each study’s precision (inversion of

the standard error, y-axis) was plotted against its effect size (x-axis). Visual

inspection of the plots suggested that they were symetrical, indicating no systematic

bias. As a more rigorous test, we also employed Sterne and Egger’s (2005) regression

intercept test in which the precision of each study is used to predict standardized

effect sizes. In this test, a statistically significant intercept is indicative of bias. None

of the regression tests reached signficance, supporting the conclusion that there is no

appreciable funnel plot asymmetry, and hence no publication bias for this study.

4. Discussion

The goal of this meta-analysis was to examine the magnitude of the

relationships between scores on four cultural worldview dimensions (hierarchism,

individualism, egalitarianism, and fatalism) and environmental risk perceptions. As


predicted, higher scores on egalitarianism and lower scores on hierarchism and

individualism were associated with higher levels of perceived environmental risk.

Moderation analyses indicated that effect sizes varied significantly as a function of

hazard type, worldview measure, and study location. Each of these findings will be

examined in more detail in subsequent sections, followed by a discussion of the

limitations of the study and directions for future research.

4.1. Cultural worldviews and environmental risk perceptions

Overall, our results were broadly consistent with cultural theory’s prediction

that cultural worldviews, reflected in individuals’ preferred structures of social

organization, are important determinants of environmental risk perceptions. Three of

the four worldviews posited by cultural theory were significantly associated with

perceptions of environmental risk. As suggested by the theory, respondents who

scored high on individualism and/or hierarchism tended to perceive fewer

environmental risks, whereas those who scored high on egalitarianism perceived more

risk. According to cultural theory (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), individualists and

hierarchists are reluctant to acknowledge risks because doing so would invite

regulation (a threat to autonomy and the pursuit of personal financial gain), and

potentially undermine existing power structures that favour social and financial elites.

Egalitarians, on the other hand, tend to be inherently suspicious of the underlying

motives driving commerce and industry and, as such, perceive activities associated

with these sectors to be a greater threat to the environment. The fourth dimension

posited by cultural theory, fatalism, was unrelated to environmental risk perception,

reflecting a general indifference to societal and environmental issues (Dake, 1992).

4.2. Moderation effects


Importantly, the magnitude of the associations between cultural worldviews and

environmental risk perceptions varied significantly as a function of three factors:

hazard type, worldview measure, and study location. Each of these moderation

effects are discussed in the sections that follow.

4.2.1 Hazard type. For hazard type, egalitarianism and individualism were

stronger predictors of risk perceptions linked to hazards that were fully or partially

attributable to human activity (e.g., pollution, ozone depletion, nuclear power) than to

natural hazards (e.g., storms and floods), although it is worth noting that the average

effect size for natural hazards was still statistically significant. The stronger effect

sizes for human-generated hazards may reflect the fact that these hazards are products

of culture, in the form of our economic system and industry, whereas extreme

environmental events linked to natural hazards exist even in the absence of human

activity, or indeed the presence of humans. Thus, to the extent to which risk

perceptions are constructed within individuals to reinforce pre-existing preferences

for societal organization, it makes sense that the association between risk perceptions

and worldviews would be stronger for hazards that are most directly linked to cultural

products such as industry and the economic system. For example, egalitarians may

express greater fear of human-generated hazards (reflected in a larger positive effect

size) than natural hazards given that it provides them with a stronger basis for arguing

for increased regulation and social reforms to reduce social inequality (Douglas &

Wildavsky, 1982; Kahan, 2012). In contrast, individualists may express less fear of

human-generated hazards (reflected in a larger negative effect size) than natural

hazards to support their preference for less regulation and more individual freedom

(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Kahan, 2012).


An unexpected finding in the meta-analysis was that hierarchism was found to

be positively associated with natural hazards, but negatively associated with hazards

linked to human activity (i.e., multiple-cause and human-generated hazards). The

significant negative correlation between hierarchism and risk perceptions for human-

generated hazards is consistent with the predictions of cultural theory; hierarchists are

committed to preserving power structures and inequalities that exist in the current

social system. Therefore, they may avoid acknowledging hazards generated by this

system. The significant positive correlation between hierarchism and natural hazards,

opposite in direction to the overall effect for hierarchism and environmental risk

perception, may reflect a belief among hierarchists that natural hazards (e.g., storms,

flood, drought) constitute a potential threat to the existing social order by introducing

economic instability and social unrest. Importantly, hierarchists may be more willing

to acknowledge the potential impacts of natural threats given that they can do so

without explicitly implicating the current economic and social systems as a potential

causal agent in the threat generation process (e.g., by claiming that droughts and

floods are part of the natural variation in climate, or that climate change is occurring,

but is not caused by human activity). This provides an avenue for hierarchists to

argue that preserving the current social order, through economic growth and/or tax

breaks to help unleash investment and technological innovation, represents our best

hope for addressing these types of problems.

A second surprising finding from the hazard-type moderation analyses was that

individuals who scored higher on fatalism perceived greater risks associated with

natural hazards than individuals who scored lower on fatalism. This finding is at odds

with our more general conclusion that fatalists tend to be largely indifferent


environmental risks. One possible explanation for this discrepancy relates to relative

visibility of natural and human generated hazards. Brenot et al. (1998) found that

respondents who scored high fatalism tended not to trust information provided by

others about environmental risks. This tendency may be particularly strong for

human generated hazards that have low visibility, such as nuclear waste and carbon

emissions, which are difficult for the general public to accurately evaluate

independent of expert advice. On the other hand, many natural hazards, such as

floods and storms, tend to be easily observable, and require not additional expert input

to validate the existence of the threat. Thus, fatalists may acknowledge natural

hazards because they can do so without having to defer to experts and place their trust

the authenticity of the information provided. They may be more indifferent to human-

generated hazards, given that the assessment of such risk often requires expert input,

which they tend to mistrust.

4.2.3 Worldview measure type. For measurement type, we found that studies

employing Kahan et al.’s (2007) CCS measure consistently exhibited stronger effect

sizes than those using variants of Dake’s (1991) cultural theory scales. These

differences may be attributable to the psychometric properties of the two measures.

As illustrated in by the Cronbach’s alpha values reported in Table 1, Kahan’s CCS

exhibited greater internal consistency (with alphas ranging between .64 and .87 in the

studies included in this review) than Dake’s scales (which often fell below .50). In

turn, higher levels of measurement error can serve as an important source of

attenuation in correlational analyses, which likely explain the marginally weaker

effects reported in studies that employed Dake’s measures. In addition to their

superior psychometric properties, it is also worth reiterating that the two-dimensional


structure of Kahan’s CCS (i.e., hierarchism-egalitarianism, and individualism-

communitarianism) appears to map onto the original grid and group dimensions

proposed by Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) better than Dake’s (1991) scales, which

treat each quadrant in the grid-group framework as distinct dimensions. Thus on

balance, the CCS may constitute a preferable measure for assessing cultural

worldviews from both a psychometric and conceptual perspective.

4.2.4 Study location. Our results indicate that the vast majority of studies

assessing the associations between cultural worldviews and environmental risk

perceptions have been conducted in North America and Europe, with North American

studies, on average, producing larger effect sizes. It is worth noting that both of the

worldview measures included in this study were developed in the US and likely

reflect issues that are particularly salient to US respondents. In his recent review of

the cultural cognition literature, Kahan (2012, p. 737) notes that CCS was developed

explicitly to “understand variance in the perception of risk within the US public”, and

that the scales would likely need to be modified to be applied effectively in other

cultures. Similarly, Douglas (2003) acknowledged that some of Dake’s items have a

distinct “American feel”, and Sjöberg (1998b) noted that these measures tended to be

less reliable and exhibited weaker concurrent validity in non-US samples. Thus,

within this context, perhaps it is not surprising that the worldview measures employed

in this study generated somewhat larger effect sizes in North American samples.

4.3 Magnitude of effects: Implications for cultural theory

Although the average effect sizes for three of the four cultural theory

worldview dimensions were statistically signficant in the meta-analysis, overall the

magnitude of the association between cultural worldviews and environmental risk


perceptions was quite modest; few studies produced effect sizes (r) above .30. These

smaller than expected correlations can be partially explained by the low to moderate

reliabilities exhibited by worldview measures included in the review. Correcting for

attenuation due to measurement unreliability is recommended by some meta-analysis

experts (e.g., Hunter & Schmidt, 2004) and would have increased the magnitude of

the average effect sizes reported in our review. For example, assuming a reliability

index of .6 for both predictor and criterion, the average effect size for egalitarianism

would have increased from .25 to .42 after correcting for attenuation. We decided not

to adopt the Hunter and Schmidt approach in the current review given that such

corrections are rarely made in the cultural theory literature, and in our view serve to

gloss over measurement accuracy and precision problems that are more appropriately

addressed by refining the scales in question or developing new scales with improved

psychometric properties (e.g, Jenkins-Smith & Herron, 2009; Kahan et al., 2011).

Even if one believes that the true strength of associations between cultural

worldviews and environmental risk perceptions is somewhat larger than the values

reported in this meta-analysis, it is important to acknowledge that environmental risk

perceptions are determined by multiple factors, and that worldview is only one of

several potential influencers. For example, Slovic and Finucane’s seminal work on

the affect heuristic (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Slovic Finucane,

Peters & McGregor, 2002) suggests that individuals’ initial affective responses to

potential threats play a critical role in determining subsequent risk-benefit

assessments and behavioural responses to environmental threats. There has also been

extensive research indicating that heuristics and biases related to availability,

representativeness and anchoring and adjustment all influence risk perceptions


(Kahnenman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982), as do other factors such as perceived control,

equity, and voluntariness (Nickerson, 2003). Within this complex context of multiple

causes, it is not suprising that worldviews, by themselves, do not explain a large

amount of variance in the public’s perception of environmental risk. We believe that

worldviews are most appropriately viewed as a general orienting disposition; a distal

influencer of risk perceptions whose effects are mediated and moderated by the other

cognitive and situational factors mentioned above.

This multiple-determinant perspective suggests that cultural worldviews can

provide us with a general indication of what risks individuals will attend to and

become concerned about. But, by themselves, they are unlikely to provide precise

predictions of risk perceptions and behavioural responses within a specific context

(e.g., whether an individual will support or oppose coal seam gas extraction on their

property or within their state) in the absence of information about other more

proximal affective, cognitive and situational cues.

4. 4 Limitations and future research

Several limitations should be kept in mind when interpreting the results of this

meta-analysis. First, several categories included in the moderator analyses contained

relatively few effect sizes. In particular, average effect sizes associated with studies

that were conducted outside of North America, assessed risk perceptions related to

natural hazards, employed student samples, and/or used Kahan’s scales to assess

cultural cognition should be treated as tentative.

Second, although cultural theory proposes that cultural worldviews are an


important determinant of risk perceptions, it is important to note that all studies

included in the meta-analysis were correlational limiting our ability to make strong

causal conclusions. Given the moderate correlations between several of the cultural

worldview measures it seems plausible that some individuals may simultaneously

possess multiple worldviews, the expressions of which may be context specific. If

this is correct, it may be possible to conduct experimental studies in which different

worldviews are primed. Findings from such a research program could provide the

basis for stronger causal inferences.

Third, when conducting our literature review, we failed to identify any studies

employing Asian, African, or South American samples. Thus, it is not clear whether

the results of the meta-analysis will generalize to cultures other than those included in

the review. This issue of cross-cultural generalization represents a significant

challenge for researchers interested in understanding the relationship between

worldviews and risk perceptions given that all current measures based on cultural

theory have been developed in the West, and it is not clear whether these measures are

reliable, valid, and relevant in other cutural contexts. Research is needed to formally

assess the cross-cultural measurement invariance of existing measures to determine

whether existing measures are appropriate in non-Western populations or whether


new, more culturally appropriate, measures need to be developed.

Finally, our investigation revealed some unexpected correlations between

cultural worldview subscales. We found a moderate positive correlation between

Dake’s hierarchism and individualism measure. If hierarchism reflects high-grid and

high-group, and the individualism reflects low-grid and low-group, wouldn’t one

expect these subscales to be negatively correlated? For Kahan’s CCS scales, one

study reported a correlation of .40 between Individualism-Communitarianism and

Hierarchy-Egalatarianism (Kahan et al., 2007, personal communication), somewhat

higher than expected given that the cultural cognition model suggests these two

dimensions should be orthogonal. These unexpected findings suggest that both

worldview measures may benefit from further refinement.

4.5 General conclusions

This review investigated the magnitude of the associations between four

worldview dimensions based on Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982) cultural theory of

risk and environmental risk perceptions. As predicted by the theory, we found that

egalitarians were more risk sensitive, hierarchists and individualists were less risk

sensitive, and fatalists, for the most part, were indifferent to risk. Moderator analyses

revealed that effect sizes varied significantly as a function of hazard type, worldview

measure, and study location. Our results are broadly consistent with cultural theory’s

claim that cultural worldviews are important determinants of environmental risk

perceptions, although the effects were quite modest in magnitude. We identified poor

reliability of existing worldview measures as an important limitation in many studies

and noted that all studies had been conducted in Western developed countries. Given

environmental threats are increasing across the globe, a broader research program


with culturally appropriate measures is required to assess the generalizability of the

theory.


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Footnotes

1None of the studies employing these revised cultural theory measures assessed

environmental risk perceptions. Thus, they could not be included in the meta-

analysis.

2Within this general category we include both “human-generated” hazards such as

nuclear power, and “multiple cause” hazards such as climate change, which are

influenced by both human activity and natural processes.

3Threats posed by natural causes such as floods and storms were coded as natural

hazards. Threats related to pollution, nuclear power and ozone depletion were coded

as human generated hazards. Threats generated by both humans and nature were

coded as multiple-cause hazards, such as threats related to climate change and general

(non-specified) hazards.


Table 1

Key Characteristics of Studies

Author N Location Sample

Type

Hazard Hazard

Type

Worldview

Dimension

Worldview

Scale (α) r SE

Bouyer et al. (2001) 363 363 363 363

US S Environmental risks Environmental risks Environmental risks Environmental risks

MC Egalitarianism Fatalism Hierarchism Individualism

Dake (N/A)

.19 -.13 -.05 .15

.05

.05

.05

.05

Brenot et al. (1998) a 1022 1021 1022 1022 1022 1021 1022 1022 1022 1021 1022 1022 1022 1021 1022 1022

France G Atmospheric pollution Atmospheric pollution Atmospheric pollution Atmospheric pollution Domestic waste Domestic waste Domestic waste Domestic waste Natural catastrophes Natural catastrophes Natural catastrophes Natural catastrophes Nuclear power stations Nuclear power stations Nuclear power stations Nuclear power stations

HG

HG

NH

HG

Egalitarianism Fatalism Hierarchism Individualism Egalitarianism Fatalism Hierarchism Individualism Egalitarianism Fatalism Hierarchism Individualism Egalitarianism Fatalism Hierarchism Individualism

Dake (.44) (.56) (.60) (.57)

.14 -.03 .01 -.04 .14 .08 .05

-.01 .09 .16 .14

-.01 .12 .04 .08

0

.03

.03

.03

.03

.03

.03

.03

.03

.03

.03

.03

.03

.03

.03

.03

.03 Carlisle & Smith (2005)

810 810

US G Nuclear power Nuclear power

HG Egalitarianism Individualism

Dake (.72) (.54)

.25 -.20

.03

.03


Dake (1991) a 300 300 300 300 300 300

US G Environmental pollution Environmental pollution Environmental pollution Nuclear power Nuclear power Nuclear power

HG

HG

Egalitarianism Hierarchism Individualism Egalitarianism Hierarchism Individualism

Dake (N/A) .40 -.27 -.14 .42

-.28 -.12

.05

.05

.06

.05

.05

.06

Ellis &Thompson (1997)

377 377 377

US G Environment concern Environment concern Environment concern

MC Egalitarianism Hierarchism Individualism

Dake (.77) (.64) (.64)

.53 -.16 -.43

.04

.05

.04

Iwaki (2011)

60 60 60 60

US S Perceived climate risk Perceived climate risk Perceived climate risk Perceived climate risk

MC

Egalitarianism Fatalism Hierarchism Individualism

Dake (.48) (.62)

(.62) (.56)

.29 -.21 -.25 -.40

.12

.13

.12

.11

Kahan et al. (2007) 1844 1844 1844

US G Environmental risk Environmental risk Environmental risk


Kahan(.81) (.81) (.77)

.18 -.18 -.08

.02

.02

.02 Kahan et al. (2011) 1500

1500 1500

US G Global warming Global warming Global warming


Kahan(.87) (.87) (.81)

.20 -.20 -.17

.03

.03

.03 Kahan et al. (2012) a 1540

1540 1540 1540 1540 1540

US G Climate change Climate change Climate change Nuclear power Nuclear power Nuclear power

MC

HG

Egalitarianism Hierarchism Individualism Egalitarianism

Hierarchism Individualism

Kahan(.84) (.84)

(.76)

.46 -.46 -.30 .27

-.27 -.24

.02

.02

.02

.02

.02

.02 Krewski et al. (1995) 1500 Canada G Nuclear power HG Egalitarianism Dake (N/A) .12 .03 Leiserowitz (2003) 647

647 US G Global warming

Global warming MC Egalitarianism

Fatalism Dake (.77) (.71)

.25

.13 .04 .04


Marris et al. (1998) a 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129

UK G Ozone depletion Ozone depletion Ozone depletion Ozone depletion Nuclear power Nuclear power Nuclear power Nuclear power

HG Egalitarianism Fatalism Hierarchism Individualism Egalitarianism Fatalism Hierarchism Individualism

Dake (.63) (.73) (.57)

(.72)

.19 -.11 -.23 -.24 .24

0 -.15 -.13

.09

.09

.08

.08

.08

.09

.09

.09

Pendergraft (1998) 441 441 441

US G Environment concern Environment concern Environment concern


Dake (N/A) .24 -.17 -.26

.05

.05

.05

Peters & Slovic (1996) a

1512 1512 1512 1512 1512 1512 1512 1512 1512 1512 1512 1512 1512 1512 1512 1512 1512 1512 1512 1512

US G Chemical pollution Chemical pollution Chemical pollution Chemical pollution Global warming Global warming Global warming Global warming Nuclear power Nuclear power Nuclear power Nuclear power Ozone depletion Ozone depletion Ozone depletion Ozone depletion Storms and floods Storms and floods Storms and floods Storms and floods

HG

MC

HG

HG

NH

Egalitarianism Fatalism Hierarchism Individualism Egalitarianism Fatalism Hierarchism Individualism Egalitarianism Fatalism Hierarchism Individualism Egalitarianism Fatalism Hierarchism Individualism Egalitarianism Fatalism Hierarchism Individualism

Dake (.50) (.60) (.60) (.42)

.20 -.08 -.08 -.07 .18

-.03 -.03 -.08 .27

-.03 -.03 -.13 .18

-.06 -.06 -.12 .08 .09 .09

-.06

.03

.03

.03

.03

.03

.03

.03

.03

.02

.03

.03

.03

.03

.03

.03

.03

.03

.03

.03

.03


Peters et al. (2004) 198 198 198 198

US S Nuclear power Nuclear power Nuclear power Nuclear power

HG


Dake (N/A) .30 -.30 -.30 -.35

.07

.07

.07

.06

Phillips, Hine, & Marks (under preparation)

794 794 794

Australia G Climate change risk Climate change risk Climate change risk

MC

Egalitarianism Hierarchism Individualism

Kahan (.64) (.64)

(.70)

.36 -.36 -.25

.03

.03

.03 Rippl (2002) 475

475 Germany G Environmental risk

Environmental risk MC Egalitarianism

Hierarchism Dake (N/A) .29

-.29 .04 .04

Sjöberg (2003) a 797 797 797 797 797 797 797 797 797 797 797 797 797 797 797 797 797 797 797 797 797 797 797 797

Sweden G

Air pollution Air pollution Air pollution Air pollution Ozone depletion Ozone depletion Ozone depletion Ozone depletion Domestic nuclear power Domestic nuclear power Domestic nuclear power Domestic nuclear power Environment degradation Environment degradation Environment degradation Environment degradation Flood Flood Flood Flood Greenhouse effect Greenhouse effect Greenhouse effect Greenhouse effect

HG

HG

HG

MC

NH

MC

Egalitarianism Fatalism Hierarchism Individualism Egalitarianism Fatalism Hierarchism Individualism Egalitarianism Fatalism Hierarchism Individualism Egalitarianism Fatalism Hierarchism Individualism Egalitarianism Fatalism Hierarchism Individualism Egalitarianism Fatalism Hierarchism Individualism

Dake (N/A) .13 .02

-.07 -.08 .14 .00 -.07 -.11 .29 .12

-.05 -.19 .11 .06

-.06 -.12 .09 .10 .08

-.06 .13 .04

-.06 -.10

.04

.04

.04

.04

.04

.04

.04

.04

.03

.04

.04

.03

.04

.04

.04

.04

.04

.04

.04

.04

.04

.04

.04

.04


Note. Sample: S = Student Sample, G = General Public Sample. NH = natural hazard, HG = human-generated hazard, MC = multiple-cause hazard.

Reliabilities are provided in brackets after measure type. a The overall effect size for each dimension is based on the mean effect size of all risks in

this study.

797 797 797 797

Polluted drinking water Polluted drinking water Polluted drinking water Polluted drinking water

HG


.11

.12

.02 -.06

.04

.04

.04

.04 Sjöberg (2004) 797

797 797 797

Sweden G GM food hazard GM food hazard GM food hazard GM food hazard

HG


Dake (N/A) .08 .01

-.07 -.09

.04

.04

.04

.04

Stern et al. (1999) 420 420 420 420

US G Climate change Climate change Climate change Climate change

MC Egalitarianism Fatalism Hierarchism Individualism

Dake (.56) (.36) (.41) (.67)

.07

-.07

.09

-.03

.05

.05

.05

.05

Wildavsky & Dake (1990)

134 134 134

US G Environmental risk Environmental risk Environmental risk


Dake (N/A) .51 -.43

-.32

.07

.07

.08


Table 2

Effect Sizes for Worldview Dimensions and Environmental Risk Perceptions

Worldview k r CI 95% n p Test of heterogeneity

Lower Upper Q df p I2

Egalitarianism 21 .25 .20 .30 15660 <.001 207.5 20 <.001 90.36

Fatalism 10 -.03 -.10 .03 5944 .346 49.5 9 <.001 81.81

Hierarchism 18 -.18 -.25 -.10 12703 <.001 284.6 17 <.001 94.02

Individualism 18 -.17 -.23 -.12 13038 <.001 172.2 17 <.001 90.13


Table 3

Moderator Analysis for Hazard Type

Hazard type k r CI 95% p n Test of heterogeneity


Egalitarianism

MC 15 .25 .23 .27 <.001 11701 223.2 14 <.001 93.73

NH 3 .09 .05 .12 <.001 3331 .084 2 .96 <.001

HG 19 .19 .17 .21 <.001 16493 111.2 18 <.001 83.82

Fatalism

MC 7 .01 -.02 .04 .69 4596 27.50 6 <.001 78.18

NH 3 .11 .08 .15 <.001 3330 3.29 5 .193 39.12

HG 14 .00 -.02 .02 .83 12040 69.25 13 <.001 81.23

Hierarchism

MC 14 -.20 -.22 -.18 <.001 11054 295.1 6 <.001 95.59

NH 3 .10 .07 .14 <.001 3331 2.13 2 .35 5.86

HG 17 -.07 -.09 -.05 <.001 14183 161.6 16 <.001 90.10

Individualism

MC 13 -.16 -.18 -.14 <.001 10579 62.70 12 <.001 92.29

NH 3 -.05 -.08 -.01 <.001 3331 1.77 2 .41 0

HG 18 -.11 -.13 -.10 <.001 14993 89.17 17 <.001 80.94

Note. Egalitarianism Q between (2) = 80.11, p < .001. Fatalism Q between (2) = 36.33, p < .001. Hierarchism Q between (2) = 252.98, p < .001. Individualism Q between (2) = 36.47, p < .001. For hazard type, MC = multiple cause hazard, NH = natural hazard, and HG = human generated hazard.


Table 4

Moderator Analysis for Worldview Measure

k r CI 95% p n Test of heterogeneity


Egalitarianism

Dake 16 .20 .18 .22 < .001 9982 139.73 15 < .001 88.55

Kahan 4 .26 .24 .29 < .001 5678 51.14 3 < .001 94.13

Hierarchism

Dake

Kahan

14 -.08 -.10 -.05 < .001 7025 116.76 13 < .001 88.87

4 -.26 -.29 -.24 < .001 5678 104.9 3 < .001 94.13

Individualism

Dake

Kahan

14 -.13 -.15 -.10 < .001 3941 124.16 13 < .001 89.53

4 -.18 -.21 -.15 < .001 7218 38.19 3 < .001 92.14

Note. Fatalism is not assessed by Kahan’s Cultural Cognition scales and therefore was not included in

this moderator analysis. Egalitarianism Qbetween (1) = 16.59, p < .001; Hierarchism Qbetween (1) =

116.72, p < .001; Individualism Qbetween (1) = 9.887, p = .002


Table 5

Moderator Analysis for Study Location

k r CI 95% p n Test of heterogeneity


Egalitarianism

North American

European

15 .23 .22 .25 < .001 11646 152.12 14 < .001 90.80

6 .19 .16 .22 < .001 4014 49.03 5 < .001 89.80

Fatalism

North American

European

6 -.03 -.06 .00 .08 3200 38.42 5 <.001 67.71

4 .04 .01 .08 .03 2744 2.91 3 .41 50.77

Hierarchism

North American

European

12 -.18 -.20 -.16 < .001 8689 159.20 11 < .001 95.12

6 -.12 -.15 -.09 < .001 4014 113.20 5 < .001 79.90

Individualism

North American

European

13 -.16 -.18 -.14 < .001 9499 138.17 12 < .001 91.32

5 -.11 -.14 .08 .097 3539 27.01 4 < .001 85.19

Note. Egalitarianism Qbetween (1) = 6.32, p = .01; Fatalism Qbetween (1) = 8.16, p = .004; Hierarchism

Qbetween (1) = 12.23, p < .001, Individualism Qbetween (1) = 7.06, p = .01


Table 6.

Average correlations between cultural worldview subscales.

Variable 1 2 3 4

1 Egalitarianism 1

2 Fatalism -.11(3) 1

3 Hierarchism -.35* (6) .16*(2) 1

4 Individualism -.43*(5) .26*(2) .34*(7) 1

Note. *p < .05. Number of correlations used in the computation each average is

noted in the parentheses. All effect sizes are derived from Dake’s subscales. For

Kahan et al. (2011, 2012) orthogonal factor scores for Hierarchy-Egalitarianism and

Individualism-Communitarianism were employed. Thus, the correlations between the

subscales were 0 for these studies. For Kahan et al. (2007), the correlation between

the two CCS subscales was .40 (Kahan, personal communication).

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Cultural worldviews and environmental risk perceptions: A meta-analysis