Counterhegemony and the Islamic State: a research on policy influencing

Counterhegemony and the Islamic State: a research on policy influencing

Ayşe Ceren Sarı 21.01.2015

Ayse Ceren Sarı 114706019

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TABLE OF CONTENT INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 2

CONSTRAINTS .......................................................................................................................................... 4

AN OVERVIEW OF GRAMSCI’S ‘PRISON NOTES’ ...................................................................................... 5

ANTONIO GRAMSCI ............................................................................................................................. 5

HEGEMONY ......................................................................................................................................... 5

INFRASTRUCTURE-SUPERSTRUCTURE-HISTORIC BLOC ....................................................................... 6

CIVIL SOCIETY – POLITICAL SOCIETY .................................................................................................... 7

INTELLECTUALS .................................................................................................................................... 8

COUNTER-HEGEMONY ........................................................................................................................ 8

ISLAMIC STATE COUNTERHEGEMONIC STRATEGY: WORLDVIEW, STRUCTURE AND IDEOLOGICAL

TOOLS .................................................................................................................................................... 10

THE ISLAMIC STATE – A BRIEF HISTORY ............................................................................................ 10

THE ISLAMIC STATE - GOALS ............................................................................................................. 12

IS SUPERSTRUCTURE – ELEMENTS OF COUNTERHEGEMONY ........................................................... 13

IDEOLOGY- PHILOSOPHY ............................................................................................................... 13

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE – POLITICAL SOCIETY AND INSTITUTIONS

....................................................................................................................................................... 14

MEDIA POLICY ............................................................................................................................... 18

EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES .............................................................................................................. 22

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 25

APPENDIX .............................................................................................................................................. 27

REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................................... 28


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INTRODUCTION

“Policy influencing means the deliberate and systematic process of influencing the policies, practices and

behaviour of different targeted stakeholders who have most influence on the issue in question, involving

beneficiaries and increasing their ownership and capacity of the issue. Activities can be singled out, or a mixed

strategy can be applied, in which joint forces and concerted action increase the effectiveness of any policy

influencing interventions” (TASCO, 2011).

One of the first books the new campaigners in a movement are suggested to read for policy

influencing is ‘The Art of War’ of Sun Tzu.

The Art of War is seen one of the most important works on the subject of strategy in the world

today, although it is written 2,500 years ago in China. It stresses the importance of warfare for

a nation and the need to study it. Sun Tzu suggests that there are five factors of warfare: Way,

Heaven, Ground, General, and Law. He explains these factors as follows:

“War is the strong bond your people have with you. 'Heaven' is dark and light, cold and hot,

and the seasonal constraints. 'Ground' is high and low, far and near, obstructed and easy,

wide and narrow, and dangerous and safe. 'General' is your wisdom, authenticity,

benevolence, courage, and discipline. 'Law' is organization, the chain of command, logistics,

and the control of expenses.” (Tzu, 2006)

Sun Tzu suggests that for a general to be victorious, the general needs to attach importance to

each of these factors and determine their strength (Tzu, 2006).

The Art of War and the factors Sun Tzu stands as a reference guide of many campaigners.

The idea of campaign in a democratic society is to translate the ideas and campaigns to a great

number of people, gain the strength to act as a crowd for a common goal and aim to influence

policies; or with Antonio Gramsci’s words: to create a ‘counter-hegemony’.

Gramsci described hegemony as “the whole range of values, attitudes, beliefs, cultural norms,

legal precepts that are deeply embedded in the fabric of social relations.” (Gramsci, 1971).

Hegemony infuses its religion, world-view, moral norms and values to all levels of society as

natural, needed and indispensable. Civil society organizations, with their policy influencing

practices, aim to create, consolidate and expand a counter hegemony against the ruler’s

hegemony within cases of socio-political and environmental justice, and to mobilize masses

for a common cause; it is a subject of strategy.


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Then, ‘policy influencing’ practices of NGO’s can also be read as being a sort of war between

hegemonic and counter-hegemonic views upon a subject or matter. Then, the researcher

claims, analyzing a war itself and identifying the tools for establishing hegemony within a

society would be an important contribution to the policy influencing literature.

Then, the aim of this paper is to analyze the ideology, and strategies and tools of the Islamic

State (IS) for establishing its hegemony in the territories it controls and plans to seizure. It

employs Gramsci’s language of hegemony in order to examine the role of different strategies

and tools in creating, consolidating and expanding the control of IS and its leaders in different

levels of society for what it advocates for.

In this paper, the assessment will be in the form of a study that first explains Gramsci’s

hegemony, then moves to analyzing counter-hegemony strategies of the Islamic State. After

the background on the genesis of the Islamic State and its goals are covered, the research

advances through the basic elements of counter-hegemony IS seems to employ. Effort will be

made to outline how Gramsci’s ideas might be reflected in the Islamic State’s strategy and

tools.

This study is approached from the perspective of Islam as the driving force for Islamic State’s

ideal society as compared to the political and social change Gramsci sees in attaining an ideal

Socialist state. The purpose of this analysis is to offer an analysis of the Islamic State’s

strategies and tools for establishment and expansion of a Caliphate to govern the entire

spectrum of an individual’s life.

I must hereby also give credit to my flatmate Ahmed ElGhamrawi, who is an activist-

journalist working on IS and the fruitful conversations we have had –also with his visiting

friends from Egypt and Syria- since we started living together. Although I am the person

physically writing this paper, even the idea of this research question would be impossible

without the long conversations we have had throughout the months, let alone deepening my

understanding of the subject in a language that I do not know. He was especially very helpful

within the scope of this paper pointing out the most influential media products of IS, so I

could –although very limited- understand and explore how the media propaganda mechanism

of IS works and move further in my research.


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CONSTRAINTS There are many constraints to this research. First of all, there is not enough information

especially about the life inside the IS controlled cities, and in particular IS headquarter Raqqa.

There are few journalists that could have met people living in IS controlled cities face-to-face.

The other ones are interviews or documentaries with jihadists, made by Western journalists. It

became well known in the media of Turkey during the beginning of siege of Kobanê by IS

that the journalists have to obey the rules established by IS for obtaining permit for reporting.

Although this is also an important point within the subject of this paper, it has its constraints

of showing only one side of the story. Also there is a huge constraint analyzing the women’s

role in IS. Although the media channel for women, and the women brigades is of IS are

analyzed and part of this research, information about the encounters of women could not be

found. The factsheet produced by Clarion Project sheds partly light on this by reporting about

use of rape as a weapon of war and as a means of humiliating and subjugating conquered

populations. Although very insightful, the role and livings of the women in the ‘household in

IS remains a question. This paper aims to mainly focus on the institutions, strategies and tools

of hegemony employed by IS in the city of Raqqa, and although the researcher is well aware

of the fact that inner and outer policies are intertwined, there will be no throughout analysis of

jihad-war strategy of IS and/ or a timeline of its progress.

Another constraint of this analysis is that some of the references of this paper for the videos

and links may not be permanent. The links change continuously due the counterterrorism

movement in the online sphere. Also, no throughout analysis in the topic could be found in

academic literature, except for some exceptional efforts on Al Qaida, which have proven very

useful. While reading this paper it should be born in mind that this research is just a humble

effort, far from being a comprehensive analysis on the topic.


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AN OVERVIEW OF GRAMSCI’S ‘PRISON NOTES’

ANTONIO GRAMSCI Antonio Gramsci was born in 22 January 1891 in Southern Italy. During his early life, he first

started to study the problems of Southern Italy. In Italy, which completed its nationalization

process quite late with respect to other countries, there exist significant socio-economic

differences between Southern and Northern part of the country. While Northern Italy can be

said to be capitalized and is out of the feudalist structure, Southern Italy is more in a semi-

feudal structure. While Gramsci was conducting research on the underdevelopment in

Southern part of the country and carrying out analysis from a Sardinian nationalization

perspective – which is quite similar to ethnic nationalism-, he noticed the colonialist policies

of Northern Italy to the South. He meets with socialist ideas in a later period of his life and his

perspective shifts to socialist ideas from an ethnic nationalist point of view (Dural, 2012).

Antonio Gramsci, General Directorate of Italian Communist Party of his time, was arrested by

the Italian fascist-government in November 1926 and imprisoned for 20 years. During his

time -until his death in 1937- he wrote his ‘Prison Notes’. Through his ‘hegemony theory’ in

his ‘Prison Notes’ he made important contributions to Marxist theory (Bates, 1975).

Gramsci uses dialectic methodology in his analyzes. He is renowned as one of the most

prominent Marxist theorists of 20th

century. Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is a milestone

for Marxist theory of 19th

and 20th

century. It is of aim of this part of this paper is to define

and analyze the Gramscian concept of hegemony. Through this process it is of importance to

notice dialectics such as infrastructure-superstructure, civil society-political society and

organic-traditional intellectuals (Dural, 2012).

HEGEMONY

Gramsci analyzes exploitation of labor of proletariat of Southern Italy in Northern part of the

country within an ethnics-based perspective. He concludes that peasants and proletariat are

the two sides of the historic block of Italy. He stresses the need for proletariat to organize

itself and prepare its own revolution. However, he suggests a class shall develop its own

hegemony before and in order to be able to come to power. This was “hegemony becomes

cultural and moral governance in advance of political dominance” (ibid.)


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Gramsci disagrees with Marx’s view that ‘all states are dictatorships’. He does not see state as

a sole mechanism for oppression and states that states construct an ideological hegemony

through utilization of power of culture. Every state is in the end a dictatorship; however,

unless there is an interior or exterior threat it is not the basic structure of the political system.

There is another form than dictatorship and that is hegemony (Bates, 1975). While state

conceals its oppression through hegemony, it keeps these tools of oppression to use against

resistance groups to state’s hegemony (Dural, 2012).

Gramsci described hegemony as “the whole range of values, attitudes, beliefs, cultural norms,

legal precepts [that are] deeply embedded in the fabric of social relations.” (Gramsci, 1971).

Hegemony infuses its religion, world-view, moral norms and values to all levels of society as

natural, needed and indispensable. It can be understood as a class power creating consensus

among society. Then, individuals are not only dominated through coercion but with ideas. To

Gramsci, the reason of rise of fascism in Italy is the failure of proletariat and bourgeois to

develop their own hegemony (ibid.).

INFRASTRUCTURE-SUPERSTRUCTURE-HISTORIC BLOC Gramsci uses Marx idea that social structure is composed of two levels: infrastructure and

superstructure. Marx states economy (as infrastructure) is the determinant of superstructure.

However, Gramsci rejects economic determinism of Marx and claims that two structures

affect each other and are intertwined in a way that they are two pieces of a whole. Not only

superstructure develops within limitations of infrastructure, but it also has the power to affect

infrastructure. Thus, politics (superstructure) can form economics (infrastructure) (ibid.).

Gramsci also stresses the concept of a ‘historic bloc’ and claims that ‘historic bloc’ develops

as a result of the dialectic relationship between infrastructure and superstructure. Historic bloc

to Gramsci is the unity between contrasts and differences of infrastructure and superstructure.

Superstructure is a reflection on infrastructure and change starts in superstructure (ibid.)

Gramsci draws attention to the importance of cultural and intellectual factors in historical

development. He stresses the function of intellectuals organically connected to civil society or

the state, the necessity of the hegemonic class for maintaining cohesion and identity within

the bloc through the diffusion of common culture, and the moment of hegemony and

consensus as the necessary form of the concrete historical bloc (Cox, 1983).


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CIVIL SOCIETY – POLITICAL SOCIETY Gramsci suggests two main levels of superstructure: civil society and political society.

According to Gramsci, civil society comprises daily life and needs of individual, legal

structure, associations, ideas, religion, moral and ethics. Its institutions are schools, churches,

societies, newspapers, parties and independent civil organizations that contribute to

development of mainstreaming social and political mind. Civil society, based on hegemony,

captivates minds through a mechanism of conviction (Gramsci, 1971).

Political society, on the other hand, is comprised of state’s oppression and monitoring

mechanisms and establishes itself in society through mechanisms of enforcement. Its

institutions are institutions of direct oppression such as public institutions, courthouses, police

and military force (ibid.).

Gramsci positions political society and civil society as opposed to each other. While in the

dialectical sense they are in sharp contrast to each other; coercion and consent, enforcement

and hegemony stand together. These two structures correspond to functioning hegemony of

ruling class, on the one hand, and commands and direct oppression through state or

government, on the other. The functions here are organizational and unifying (ibid.).

Gramsci draws a process of three phases within the distinction of civil and political society. In

the first phase there is a relationship of contraposition, civil society and state stand in a

relationship of opposition and contradiction. Hegemony (cultural and ideological), realized

before its subject, conquers political power. Second phase presents an expanding model,

which Gramsci calls “state, dictatorship+hegemony (political society + civil society)”. Here,

hegemony (cultural and political) is realized when its subject becomes the state. It is being

protected through a shield of coercion and consent legitimizes domination. In the third phase

state is defined as integral of political and civil society, civil society stands also as political

society. Hegemony (infrastructural and superstructural unification of society) is realized when

the state disappears in civil society (Salamini, 2014). Thus, to Gramsci civil society is

distinguishable enough from political society so that it “can be independently conquered” by

an opposition movement. But, it is still linked closely enough to political society so that “its

conquest will be guaranteed to have political ramifications.” Then civil and political society


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are interlocked in “circular interaction within an organic whole,” which is the state (Lears,

1985).

INTELLECTUALS Gramsci also focuses on intellectuals within a society, together with historic bloc and

hegemony; and see their role as crucial in the context of maintaining hegemony and creating a

counter hegemony. He is not only interested in intellectuals as ‘scientists and academics’ and

states that every work branch has its own intellectuals. Gramsci states that intellectuals are

state’s officers of superstructure and have an organizational role between civil and political

society. Intellectuals enter civil society as "salesmen" of contending cultures. As they extend

the world view of the ruler class to the ruled, they are considered as successful in creating

hegemony and securing the "free" consent of the masses to the law and order of the land

(Gramsci, 1971). They perform the functions of hegemony in civil society and political

domination in political society.

Gramsci here differentiates between two types of intellectuals: traditional and organic.

Traditional intellectuals are those who regard themselves as autonomous and independent of

the dominant social group in the name of reason and thought, and are regarded as such buy

the population at large. They perform mainly in political society. Clergy, men of letters,

philosophers and professors are examples of traditional intellectuals (Burke, 2005). On the

other hand, organic intellectuals grow organically with the dominant ruling class, and is their

thinking and organizing element. Organic intellectuals are produced through an education

system, and they perform a function for the dominant social group in society. They perform

primality in civil society and the ruling class maintains its hegemony through society through

this class (ibid.).

COUNTER-HEGEMONY Changing the “dominant values and myths” of a society is an integral part of what constitutes

a revolutionary transformation. Gramsci explains this clearly and elaborately through his

exposition of the organic link between cultural and political change. He suggests that a ruling

regime legitimizes its domination through cultural hegemony. Then, its overthrown must

begin by countering this hegemony. Only this way can “huge masses” be antagonized and


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mobilized, and “put forward demands which taken together…add up to a revolution”

(Gramsci, 1971).

To Gramsci, opposition strategists must shift from “wars of maneuver” (from forceful assaults

against political institutions) to “wars of position” (cultural struggles within civil society)

(Gramsci, 1971). He argues that the modern state relies more on “acceptance by the ruled of a

‘conception of the world’ which belongs to the rulers” than on coercion. (Fiori, 1970). This

‘conception of the world’ of the rulers are accepted and internalized through the “educative

and formative” organs of the state (Gramsci 1971). Securing consensus within civil society

establishes hegemony of modern rulers (Adamson 1980).


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ISLAMIC STATE COUNTERHEGEMONIC STRATEGY: WORLDVIEW,

STRUCTURE AND IDEOLOGICAL TOOLS

The Islamic State is more than being merely a group carrying out terrorist attacks. It is a

political and military organization. It holds a radical interpretation of Islam as a political

philosophy and seeks to propagate this worldview by coercion and conviction on Muslims and

coercion on non-Muslims alike. Having announced itself as Caliphate, the Islamic State

claims to be the legitimate ruler of all Sunni Muslims worldwide. The Islamic State has seized

control over large amount of territory in Syria and Iraq, governed from Raqqa in Syria, and

declared itself as a state.

It is the aim of this part of this paper to analyze the Islamic State, its goals and elements of its

strategy to legitimize, consolidate and expand dominant values and myths to reach these

goals, within a Gramscian perspective of establishing counter-hegemony.

THE ISLAMIC STATE – A BRIEF HISTORY Originally founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and known as Jamaat al-Tahwid wa-i-Jihad

(JTWJ), IS was founded in 1999 with a focus on attempting to effect regime change in Jordan.

After the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States, Zarqawi became prominent in the

insurgency against American forces after the fall of Saddam Hussein. He was particularly

known for his ferocity, personal brutality and battlefield successes. His personal hatred for

Shiites is well documented and remains an integral part of Islamic State ideology. He called

them “a sect of treachery and betrayal ... the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious

scorpion.” (Joffe, 2006)

One of well-known high profile attacks of JTWJ was an August 2003 attack on the UN

compound in Baghdad that killed 22 (Larriera, 2013). Another one was on February 2004

when the JTWJ 150 people were killed in simultaneous attacks in Baghdad and the Shiite holy

city of Karbala during the Ashura festival (Burns & Gettleman, 2004).

The group became an Al-Qaeda affiliate in 2004 when Zarqawi performed bay’ah, the oath of

fealty, to Osama Bin Laden. Afterwards, it changed its name to Al-Qaeda in the Land of the

Two River (the Tigris and the Euphrates), more commonly known as Al- Qaeda in Iraq, or

AQI (al-Zarqawi, 2007). Although technically subordinate to Al-Qaeda central, AQI was

autonomous and it was able to develop its own ultraviolent brand of jihad; and during Iraq

insurgency, it built up its own network of supporters and fighters. In 2006, several smaller


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Iraqi jihadi factions joined AQI leadership under the banner of Majlis Shura al-Mujahedin

(MSM). In this period of AQI, Zarqawi focused on developing the infrastructure necessary to

enforce sharia law as a state (ClarionProject.a., 2014).

After Zarqawi was killed by a United States airstrike in 2006, AQI was led by Abu Ayyub Al-

Masri and then by Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. The group changed its name to the Islamic State in

Iraq (ISI), signaling its intention to focus on conquering Iraqi territory and creating a sharia

based state there. However its brutal attempts to enforce sharia law in Anbar province turned

the local population against them, and they were pushed out of Fallujah and the rest of Anbar

in bloody fighting by tribal militias called Sahwat al-Anbar (Anbar Awakening), supported by

American forces. Many of the members of Sahwat al-Anbar have now joined the Islamic

State.

After Al-Masri and Omar Al-Baghdadi were killed by a tank shell in 2010, Abu Bakr al-

Baghdadi took over ISI (Roggio, 2010) and renamed the organization the Islamic State in Iraq

and Syria (or the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant – ISIL), staging the comeback of ISIL in

Syrian Civil War in 2013. During this period he was able to rebuild some of the popular

support that had been lost under the group’s two earlier leaders and to develop the

organization’s strength. By Baghdadi’s decision to move into Syria, friction, power struggles

and methodological differences with al-Nusra within Al-Qaeda came onto surface, and in

March 2014 Al- Qaeda center denounced ISIL from the group (Dettmer, 2014).

After joining Syrian Civil War, ISIL mainly focused on building their Islamic state; defeating

the regime of Bashar al-Assad has not played the main role. In late 2013 and early 2014, ISIL

built its power base in Syria. It established its stronghold in Raqqa, where it was able to expel

all the rebel groups and seize total control. Since then, ISIL could hold its positions and

consolidate its power base. They also effectively used tactics of imposing control over areas

by empowering allies and crushing enemies and policies of divide and rule in fractious tribal

areas (Legrand, 2014).

ISIL also resurrected its plans about establishing an Islamic State in Iraq. In January 2014, the

group seized control of parts of Fallujah and Ramadi in Anbar province; and shocked the

world in early June 2014 by capturing Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, and the whole of

Nineveh province. With this, ISIL gained control of one third of area in the Iraq, and took

down the borders between Syria and Iraq (ClarionProject, 2014). Also it is important to note


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that ISIL gained the control of main water and oil resources through its seizure of area in

Syria and Iraq.

On June 29, 2014, the first day of Ramadan, ISIS declared itself a caliphate and Abu Bakr al-

Baghdadi as Caliph Ibrahim. Changing its name to Islamic State, the group made a call for the

immediate loyalty of all Muslims throughout the world.

This declaration is of particular importance as IS is the first and so far only attempt to

resurrect the governmental system of the early Muslims in the modern era and the

reestablishment of the caliphate has been a longstanding goal of all Islamist and jihadist

groups. The caliph is an incredibly important symbolic figure in Islamist terms. ‘He’ has the

sole religious and political jurisdiction over the entire Muslim ummah (nation); and a

caliphate as a system of government is considered to be a divine religious monarchy, where

all the power resides in the hands of the caliph (OnIslam, 2017) .

THE ISLAMIC STATE - GOALS The Islamic State has short, medium and long term goals.

IS has two short term goals: to consolidate the areas it already controls, and capture more

territory in Syria and Iraq. To advance its goals, one of the central tactics is to precipitate the

sectarian war between Sunnis and Shiites. IS tries to achieve this by massacring civilian

populations of Shiites in each and every possibility, leaning on the concepts of jahiliyya and

takfir. This strategy also aims to cause reprisal attacks from Shiite militia groups, fastening

the engagement of other Sunnis with IS (ClarionProject.a., 2014). One of the most common

discourses of IS is that “infidels and apostates will die”, and this is clearly reflected to Shiites

groups in the short run (ViceNews, 2014).

The Islamic State’s medium term goal is to consolidate and expand its control of territory in

Iraq and Syria and its long term goal is to advance into neighboring Sunni countries.


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IS SUPERSTRUCTURE – ELEMENTS OF COUNTERHEGEMONY

IDEOLOGY- PHILOSOPHY

Gramsci believed that “a man always belongs to a certain grouping, and precisely to that of

all the social elements who share the same ways of thinking and working.” (Gramsci, 1971).

A man, within his class, will share a certain view of the world and how people and processes

should work. Although the focus of Gramsci here is on class division, in the later parts of his

analysis he also acknowledges the unique power of religion in maintaining and disrupting

cultural hegemony (Fontana 2008). He suggests that for the great majority “the relationship

between common sense and religion is much more intimate than that between common sense

and philosophical systems of the intellectuals… in a religious society, citizens simply believe

that so many like-minded people cannot be wrong.”(Gramsci,1971). Then it is of crucial

importance of opposition movements to win the dominant religious institution to their side.

Gramsci explains the foundation of this as religion rarely loses its sway over believers during

the struggle for hegemony. He concludes that “The strength of religions has lain, and still

lies, in the fact that they feel very strongly the need for the doctrinal unity of the whole mass

of the faithful” (ibid.).

Not surprising, religion is the strongest asset of Islamic State. The ideology of the Islamic

State is that of Salafist-jihadism. Salafist thought is based on the idea of returning to the

supposedly pure form of Islam practiced by the successors to the founder of Islam,

Mohammed, and the earliest Muslims. They reject any later additions as bid’ah (innovation)

and un-Islamic. Sayyid Qutb, the Muslim Brotherhood ideologue hanged by Egyptian

President Nasser in 1966 and a major influence on all jihadist groups, terms anything other

than strict adherence to sharia law and Islam jahiliyya, including all contemporary Muslim

regimes. Jahiliyya is the concept stating that Arabs were in a state of ignorance prior to the

appearance of Mohammed and his Islamic teachings. Qutb suggests that all such regimes shall

be overthrown in order to be replaced with an Islamic state, allowing IS to proclaim as takfir

(heretics) Muslims who deviate from their strictly defined interpretation of Islam (Cheema,

2006).

It is also important to note that in Salafist-jihadism the distinction between religion and state

disappears. All decisions are based on a hardline interpretation of sharia and enforced in the

areas controlled by the Islamic State (ClarionProject.a., 2014).


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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE – POLITICAL SOCIETY AND

INSTITUTIONS

According to Gramsci, for changing a nation’s/community’s culture, development of

intellectuals and spreading philosophies across classes in society is necessary. This change in

culture would lead to a change in politics and governance, with those in power subjugated to

others that desire dominance (Swenson, 2009)

Leaders of various levels of established state and institutions of the Islamic State could

arguably fit the description of “intellectuals”. As there is no distinction between religion and

state in Salafist-jihadism and all decisions are based on a hardline interpretation of sharia,

leaders are promoting their belief that Islam solves individual, family and societal problems.

However, leader’s ability of communicating effectively with all levels of society with

coercion or content is crucial for the society to embrace and understand the change, which IS

is well aware of. Then the methods the leaders and institutions use in order to change culture

are of crucial importance (Kandil, 2011).

Then, to change a community’s culture, two components are of particular importance:

(1) generation of a worldview that prescribes how to think and act, which is demonstrated in

the previous chapter and (2) disseminating this worldview through various socialization

structures, which is what this chapter aims to dwell into (ibid.). With this aim, this chapter of

this paper focuses on organizational structure, infrastructures and institutions, media policy

and education system of IS; with a special focus on women and children.

Organizational Structure

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is the leader of the Islamic State and has declared himself the caliph.

(AlJazeera, 2014). Unlike his predecessors who reportedly kept the power very centralized,

Baghdadi has appointed a cadre of advisors, ministers and military commanders to manage

everything from military stores and roadside bomb attacks to the finances of the organization.

Under the rule of Baghdadi, IS is run by a sophisticated hierarchy of commanders, each with

specific areas of responsibility. The organizational structure of the group was revealed by

seizure of a flash drive from the house of a member of IS during a raid by the Iraqi military in

July 2014 (Sherlock, 2014).

There are two deputies, immediately under Baghdadi. One is for the territory in Syria and

other for Iraq. There is also a cabinet staffed with ministers that acts as an advisory board to

Baghdadi. Each of these ministers has a clearly demarcated role, a salary and delegated

powers. The ministries are for general management, media, military, treasury, transport,


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security, prisoners and detainees, and incoming Arab and foreign jihadi fighters. For the

logistics and technicalities of war, these is a specialized ‘war office’, with responsibilities of

guarding warehouses, affairs of martyrs and women, and operations using improvised

explosive devices and rigging bombs. These officials have either served as high-ranking

commanders in Saddam Hussein’s military, or have high level technical expertise, which is

reflected at all levels of IS war machine. In IS, there are known to be approximately 1,000

medium to top level field commanders, whose salaries range between $300- $2000/month.

Also, further down the hierarchy, there is a governor responsible for administration of each

province (ibid.).

Institutions and Infrastructure

Then, it is clear that, in addition to the military campaigns IS spends considerable energy on

building institutions and infrastructure of a statehood. One of goals of IS is to consolidate and

expand its control of territory. The Islamic State is well aware that it has to gain the

acquiescence of the governed, at least to a certain extent in order to build a state (Amos,

2014). In order to do so, it provides services for the population such as healthcare and

education, and aims to keep public order. These efforts are also disseminated through videos,

and thus they not only benefit the local population, but also serve as signals to outsiders of the

viability of the IS.

Court system: Moreover, courts, based on sharia law are operated. These courts govern every

aspect of daily life, from high crimes to civil disagreements, from economics to personal

behavior, under strict interpretations of sharia (ViceNews, 2014).

Here, it is beneficial to refer to Gramsci’s elaboration of the role court plays in establishing

hegemony. Gramsci suggests about “the law’s ability to induce submission to a dominant

worldview”(Gramsci, 1971). He describes achieving hegemony as promoting certain

behaviors and eliminating others. Then, rulers inevitably resort to the “repressive” function of

the law (Gramsci 1971, p. 247). Then, it can be said that the legal system is “hegemonic in the

Gramscian sense”. It induces “passive compliance” throughout society and perpetuate “the

status quo and its attendant inequalities, oppressions, and disaffections and mystify the

coercive side of politics” (Litowitz 2001). That is why Gramsci believed that courts “provide

room for counter-hegemonic struggles in the form of litigation that challenges key

components of the legal system” (Litowitz 2001, p. 549).


16

General services and enforcements: The Islamic State establishes these services and

enforcements everywhere it operates, but they are most entrenched in Raqqa. Last year, the

Islamic State has established Raqqa as a de facto capital, after conquering the city (al-Hakkar,

2014).

Firas al-Hakkar, a journalist of al-Akhbar news, reported from the capital Raqqa in July 2014

that IS transferred the busy Friday market next to Raqqa's old wall. Moreover, it moved the

market day to Thursday so that people would not be distracted from attending Friday prayers

in the mosque; mosque attendance is mandatory five times a day (al-Hakkar, 2014). Al-

Hakkar’s article is quite interesting, reflecting the effect of these policies in civil life:

“Two signs in particular are hanging in shop windows: "Sisters, please do not remove the

niqab inside the shop," said one. The other announced that "work stops 10 minutes before

prayers." Prayer rooms were established in public venues and streets become almost empty

before prayer times, save for ISIS’ patrols” (al-Hakkar, 2014).

Also, a consumer protection office is created and monthly payments on commercial

establishments are established in return for sanitation, electricity, water, and phone services.

Extension of this system to civilians is planned with the aim to ensure the continuity of

services. The Islamist Traffic Police is on every street and market, the recently created Islamic

Services Authority supervises state institutions; and The Accounts Bureau monitors the

markets, sales operations, applying sharia, and holding violators accountable. IS has also been

very calculating in its usage of incoming foreigners, placing individuals with important

governance skills in offices instead of on the front lines (al-Hakkar, 2014).

Hisbah morality police: The morality police, the Hisbah, patrol the streets to ensure that sharia

law is being followed. As the IS Press Officer Abu Mosa comments to Vice News; “Aim is to

establish Caliphate in Prophet’s way, so it is of Hisbah’s duty to teach it to the people.”

(ViceNews, 2014). Alcohol, tobacco and drugs are banned and “those who do not follow the

rules are responsible for their own actions, not Hisbah” (ViceNews, 2014). Transgression of

sharia law is punished in various ways; including flogging, amputation and death. In some

cases, transgressors are publicly crucified in the town square. (al-Hakkar, 2014).

Women Brigades: al-Khansaa and Umm al-Rayan: In IS controlled areas, gender segregation is

enforced and women are obliged to wear the nijab in public. As for morality police for women

in IS in Raqqa, two female brigades were established in 2014 in Raqqa: al-Khansaa and Umm


17

al-Rayan. These brigades have a position of authority, wear riffles and ensure that female

community members dress appropriately in full niqab and refrain from going out in public

without male accompaniment. "We have established the brigade to raise awareness of our

religion among women, and to punish women who do not abide by the law…Jihad is not a

man-only duty. Women must do their part as well.” Abu Ahmad, an ISIS official in Raqqa,

told Syria Deeply’s Ahmad al-Bahri (al-Bahri, 2014). Al-Khansaa and Umm al-Rayan also

accompany male fighters at checkpoints and on home raids, and recruit other women to join

the group and to provide assistance in less direct ways, such as by marrying ISIS fighters or

becoming involved in recruitment themselves (Veatch, 2014). Particularly Umm Hamza, who

is also known as Slaughterer and who administer the punishments- is particularly feared. She

guarding female prisoners at the Raqqa religious prison and her speeches can be found in

internet (CNNWIRE, 2014). “We are harsh with the infidels, but merciful among ourselves,”

an IS female brigade member told Khadija, who is a run-away member of al-Khansaa

(CNNWIRE, 2014).

Summary - Organizational Structure Of The Islamic State – Political Society And Institutions

The analysis of the organizational structure of IS suggests a new period during the life of the

Islamic State. It is seen that unlike its predecessors who kept the power very centralized, al-

Baghdadi established various levels of political society; with a sophisticated hierarchy of

commanders, each with specific areas of responsibility built around the needs of IS; and aim

to increase the effective communication of sharia with all levels of society through coercion

and conviction. In the first circle is a cadre of advisors, ministers and military commanders to

manage everything from military stores and roadside bomb attacks to the finances of the

organization. In the second circle stands public services and the new sharia court system. In

the third cycle are Hisbah morality police and the two women brigades who monitor the daily

life of citizens to ensure everything run according to the sharia rules. These methods are a

way of communication of leaders of IS effectively with all levels of society with coercion or

content, so that, according to Gramsci, the society will be able to embrace and understand the

change.

This method seems to be working, to exemplify in Fallujah province of Iraqi. According to

Foreign Policy, 2014, Sunni Muslims of the province stated that “despite the Islamic State’s

other flaws, their ability to deliver services on the ground and regular paychecks for

professionals such as doctors make them a better option than the Iraqi government in the eyes

of some.” (Bohn, 2014)


18

MEDIA POLICY

Media has a central role in shaping worldviews, and online media has a special role in this

with its inexpensiveness and reachability. (Kandil, 2011). Gramsci emphasizes the need for

repetitiveness of counterhegemonic movement. To him “repetition is the best didactic means

for working on the popular mentality” (Gramsci, 1971). Gramsci suggests that the media is all

about indoctrination through repetition (Fontana 2009, p. 83): “the whole complex system

devised to construct and generate, to communicate, store, and retrieve, knowledge and

information”(Gramsci,1971). He also recognized that an important part of promoting one’s

own ideas is preventing competing views from gaining currency, for the overall benefit of the

counterhegemonic strategy (Gramsci, 1971).

Videos and Social Media

IS is utilizing media very effectively as its propaganda arm, and as a tool for consolidating

and expanding its hegemony through supporters and spreading fear to enemies. IS is very

effective leveraging its media organization for gains in other areas. Most of the happening in

IS territory has a media component in it, allowing IS to maximize the value it gets from these

activities; they have not only kinetic but also psychological value. This effective media

organization allows the IS to select the good and omit the bad in the image it portrays.

IS is well known for releasing videos with high cinematographic of mass and individual

killings, such as those of American journalists James Foley (LeakSource.a., 2014) and

Stephen Sotloff (LeakSource.b., 2014), and British aid worker David Cawthorne Haines

(LeakSource.c., 2014). IS utilizes this tactic also in online strategy, in twitter and other social

platforms to ensure maximum visibility, such as the use of the hashtag #AllEyesOnISIS

following the seizure of Mosul by IS forces (Maher & Carter, 2014). This use of videos and

social platforms is an integral part of operations of IS and is quite obvious in its English-

language magazine online, Dabiq, used for propaganda and recruitment. The name of the

magazine is taken from a location in Muslim eschatology, highlighting millenarian appeal of

IS (ClarionProject.a., 2014).

Example: “Although the Disbelievers will Dislike It”

In order to understand the scale and scope of the videos released by IS, it would be helpful to

analyze of the latest most prominent propaganda video of the group: “Although the

disbelievers will dislike it.”, which is an attempt to project political influence, theological

legitimacy and military prowess of IS. The video can be split into five parts: map moving in


19

time, documentary-style narrative, parade of knives & execution of the 22, the bay’at

(pledges), Peter Kassig’s death announced (QuilliamFoundation, 2014).

- Map Moving in Time: First part of the video displays territories in which IS has official

affiliates, followed by countries in which it suggests it plans to expand; through the “light” of

IS spreading across the world from its origin in Iraq until finally to Mexico and the United

States. This part of the video is intended to inspire the audience into action with a clear

message: “the caliphate is inevitable and unstoppable." (ibid.)

- Documentary-style Narrative: Second part of is an attempt to historically legitimize IS.

The video is a gathering of clips depicting the emergence of the Islamic State since 2003. The

intention is to portray IS and its newly appointed “caliph” as the vanguard of Sunni Muslims

in the war against Shi’ite ascendancy, and to convince prospective adherents into joining IS.

In this bundle of clips, various enemies are pointed out. The first one is USA, deserving this

status through its occupation of Baghdad. Shia are the second main targets. They are claimed

to “have humiliated the people of Baghdad people every day”, so they deserve to taste all

sorts of killing and torment. Third target is “Nusayri regime”.

- Parade of Knives & Execution of the 22: Third part of the video is the most note-worthy

aspect. It depicts a beheading footage of twenty-two Syrian hostages from “Nusayri regime”.

First, hostages are paraded by their executioners through an olive grove; second, executioners

choose their knives from a box; and thirdly, hostages are simultaneously beheaded. This

footage is first of its kind, and sets a new precedent for terrorist propaganda: no synchronized

beheading of this size or scale by a non-state actor was shot before. In the video there are

twenty-two executioners in total, corresponding to 22 hostages. It is believed that there is a

reason to have each of these twenty-two executioners present. The executioners in the video

are young jihadists, and it is clear that they already have experience in execution. Whereas

previous IS productions have focused more broadly on IS’ political program, in this shooting

it can be seen that the executioners were featured much more than the prisoners, they were

carefully chosen for the honour of participating in this event. There are also claims that each

of these foreign jihadists have joined IS form another country. Then, the video is also a way

of honourizing the jihadist groups from/ in different countries. This footage is said to feature a

jihadist “homecoming”, focusing on mostly favoured foreign fighters focus on IS

(QuilliamFoundation, 2014). The footage is very high quality. It includes effects, apparent use

of indoor “green screen” filming in part of the video, extremely high quality cameras and


20

editing tools, and sound effects. The analysts claim that this procession was created on camera

in multiple “takes” over no less than 4-6 hours (ibid.).

- The Bay’at (Pledges): Fourth part of the video returns to the map and highlights countries,

accompanied with audio tracks, in which groups pledged allegiance to Baghdadi. In this part,

it is implied that IS mujahidin are “citizens” of the caliphate, not just participants or

supporters (ibid).

- Peter Kassig’s Death Announced: In the fifth part of the video, an image of the

executioner known as “Jihadi John” is seen, standing over the head of the American aid-

worker Peter Kassig. This is followed by a short clip of Jihadi John, challenging the United

States to face IS at Dabiq, and to fulfil the prophecy of the infidels’ demise there (ibid.).

Media Landscape

- Official media creation: Media Organization of IS has a complex web of the several

different actors that are somehow connected to each other. IS media landscape is populated

with a number of producers and distributors of content (for please see infographic in

Appendix, Figure 1).

The central hub for all creation and distribution of official IS content (videos, statements,

photos, etc) is Ministry of Media, which consists of four main components: al-Hayat, al-

Furqan, al-I’tisam, and Ajnad Foundation. Also recebtly al-Zora Foundation is established to

give advice to women (al-PlatformMedia, 2014).

Al-Zora Foundation is established in middle of October 2014. It operates through various

social networks and has currently around 6000 followers in twitter (@alzora_media). It

specifically targets women supporting jihadists and advocates contributing with ‘feminine

labor’ to IS. The Foundation’s slogan is "preparing for the honour of jihad", with videos and

tweets explaining the ways in which women can contribute to Isis' insurgency. The promo

video of the foundation include crude animations and brightly pink coloured backgrounds,

with images representing role of women in establishing the Caliphate: a sewing machine; a

first aid box; a fridge, a gas cooker and a microwave; the books of God sharia science; video

montage; and women in nijab walking with flag of IS (al-ZoraFoundation, 2014). Especially

interesting here are the courses in making slide shows and editing them – effectively making

propaganda - before the video finishes; as it brings a new aspect of “being good wives of

jihadists”.

https://twitter.com/alzora_media


21

Also, in each province of IS there is a regional media bureau. These bureaus can produce and

distribute their own content. However, these regional media bureaus are likely to not have

complete autonomy over their productions. A clue for this is the application of the same

format in all regional media offices. In all video productions, on the left side stands the logo

of IS and the newspapers name in beautiful calligraphy on the right side. In between is a black

stripe, with description of the video on white with the same font (al-PlatformMedia, 2014).

This gives us enough reason to believe that they are regulated somehow by a central body, i.e.

Ministry of Media, and may require to receive approval for some of their releases (CTC,

2014).

- Unofficial media creation: There is also a large unofficial content creator of IS media,

composed of activists and supporters of IS. Due to the low cost of entry in internet, activists

and supporters -although having no official capacity- can post content with relative ease in the

name of the group (CTC, 2014). This unofficial content lack the characteristics described

above, and experienced observers of IS can distinguish official and unofficial content.

IS supporters and activists fill also a crucial valuable role in IS propagation efforts. It is

important to note that IS relies on a number of different channels as it moves down to the

various channels of distribution, which is increased as counterterrorism efforts close some

channels down. For example, the most prominent pro-IS online forum is known to be Al-

Platform Media (or properly by its Arabic name- "al-Minbar al-'Ilami al-Jihadi"), which is

mainly in Arabic, but also has an English, French, Russian and German section (al-

PlatformMedia, 2014). To Al-Platform Media, each IS media channel posts its production

(generally using justpaste.it). The links these posts direct to are generally closed down within

some days and even hours through counterterrorism efforts. The prominent self-declared role

of IS supporters and activists is acted here by continuously recycling and disseminating

content that they find in various places under the same topic. Thus, despite the

counterterrorism efforts, the productions are somehow always made available. IS supporters

and activists have also taken up the role to translate the content to various languages almost

simultaneously as it is aired (al-PlatformMedia, 2014). These magnifies the reach of IS media

content. Moreover, different aspects of life in IS is also to be observed from this wave of

unofficial media network. An example of this is the ISILcats (@ISILCats): An unofficial IS

propaganda on Twitter turns kittens and lolspeak, where pictures of jihadists playing with

kittens are spread online; an attempt to normalize life as a jihadi fighter (Vincent, 2014). This


22

network of online supporters is reportedly larger than any insurgent organization has seen

before (CTC, 2014).

Summary-Media

Thus, coinciding with the views of Gramsci, media has a central role in the methods of

Islamic State; of disseminating its worldview of Salafi-jihadism through various socialization

structures. The media organization is carefully and centrally planned, ensuring repetitiveness

of the counterhegemonic movement (thus, indoctrination through repetition) and prevention

of competing views gaining currency under a scrutinized design, The messages are developed

for each target group, and the productions are effectual in terms of video and voice quality,

and cinematographic.

EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

Gramsci states that schools and universities become factories for producing technocrats and

professionals, primed for either serving the state or pursuing a narrowly individualistic career

at the hands of rulers. Then, curriculums and overall organization of the education process

must be influenced by a counterhegemonic movement (Gramsci, 1971).

Schooling provided another medium for the Islamic State to circulate its views. Also

recruitment of children as young fighters and their training plays an extensive role in IS

strategy.

- Schooling: After seizing Raqqa and Mosul, IS took control of schools and education

system of these cities. Students, staff members and administrators are segregated by gender. A

dress code that requires men to wear wide-legged pants and women to cover up their faces

and hair is imposed. Classes in art, music, history, geography, civics, philosophy, sociology,

psychology, and religious curricula to the Shiite sect and other elements they consider

“infidels” are cancelled. The concept of homeland and nation are demanded to be out of

textbooks and classrooms, and be replaced the new idea of the Islamic State’s caliphate or

religious government. Any questions referring to moneylending, democracy and elections are

asked to be removed from mathematics and evolution from biology classes. Chemistry and

physics teachers are asked to remind students that they must follow the laws of Allah. Un-

Islamic pictures and illustrations in curricula must be removed. Teaching any “polytheist”

poems is forbidden in Arabic classes (Sabah & Al-Ansary, 2014).


23

The Islamic State did spread an education manifesto and called for attempts to “decrease

ignorance, spread religious sciences, resist corrupt sciences and curricula and replace them

with righteous Islamic curricula.” (ibid.)

IS also asks academics and teachers to assist the militants and quote a verse from the Koran

exhorting the faithful to “terrify the enemy of Allah.” in this educational manifesto, where it is

also stated that military training will be mandatory as “the core of religion consists of the

guidance of the Koran and victory with swords.”(ibid.). Those who don’t attend will be

prevented from teaching (ibid.).

This educational policy of IS is also supported by children encouraged to attend videos of

beheadings in the city center (which can clearly be seen in the Islamic State documentary of

Vice News (ViceNews, 2014)), and other use of media. To exemplify, the trailer of a

computer game simulating terror attacks called “Grand Theft Auto: Salil al-Sawarem [Sound

of Swords]” is aired in September 2014. This video trailer takes place in the desert and

follows jihadists sneaking up on and then killing police officers, soldiers and military

convoys. An Islamic State official was quoted as saying that the game's goal is to “raise the

morale of the mujahedin and to train children and youth how to battle the West and to strike

terror into the hearts of those who oppose the Islamic State.” (Grossman, 2014)

Children in IS seized cities are also encouraged to watch crucifixions. Reportedly, they have

become so accustomed to these executions, that beheading of a human has no longer a shock

effect on them (ibid.). This can be also observed in the documentary of Vice News, where the

children and youngsters seem to enjoy and record with their smartphones the public showings

of killed “infidels” (ViceNews, 2014).

- Universities In Iraq, universities are also seeing sweeping changes. Some faculties are

cancelled and curricula of others including the Islamic studies are changed says a lecturer at

University of Mosul. It is also forbidden for Sufi and Shiite clerics to give Koranic lessons at

mosques (ibid.).

- Child soldiers and lion cubs: The Islamic State has a far-reaching and well-organized

system for recruiting children, and raising them as jihadists (Brannen, 2014). They believe

that this generation of children is the generation of the Caliphate. This generation that will

fight infidels, US and their allies. In the documentary of Vice News on the Islamic State, press


24

officer Abu Mosa claims that “the right doctrine has been implanted into the children and all

of them love to fight for the building of Islam” (ViceNews, 2014).

There are no hard figures on the number of children in these training programs. However, it is

suggested that they are widespread. There are reportedly several well-known youth training

camps across Raqqa province, including al-Zarqawi Camp, Osama Bin Laden Camp, al-

Sherkrak Camp, al-Talaea Camp, and al-Sharea Camp (Brannen, 2014).

Trainings are incorporated in two tiers: indoctrination of IS ideology and military training of

children, depending on their age. Children are taught everything from the Islamic State’s

interpretation of sharia law to how to handle a gun. They are even given dolls on which to

practice how to behead another human (Brannen, 2014). Press officer Abu Mosa explains the

training program: “The children younger than 15 years old go to the Sharia camp to learn

their Belief and Religion. The ones elder then 16 years old can go to the Military camp. Then

they can participate in military operations. This is the proper way. Mohammed the Prophet’s

adopted son Osama Ibn Zaid was leading an army when he was 17 or 18 years old, against

Rome.” (ViceNews, 2014). However, U.N. human rights experts have "received confirmed

reports of children as young as 12 or 13 undergoing military training organized by ISIL in

Mosul." (Brannen, 2014)

Children also take part in the battle. They are used as human shields on the front lines and

provide blood transfusions for Islamic State soldiers. They also conduct street patrols and

arrest locals (Brannen, 2014).

Some of these young boys also engage in killing. They are known as ‘lion cubs ‘and made

visibile very recently. In a recent video, a lion cub executer is featured alongside Abu Sa’ad

al-Dāghistāni (an IS intelligence commander) shooting two Russian intelligence soldiers

(inquisitor, 2015).

Summary – Education

The Islamic State follows very well Gramsci’s statement that curriculums and overall

organization of the education process must be influenced by a counterhegemonic movement.

Controlling schools and universities; changing their curriculum according to its ideology and

practices; and supporting these through online games and advice on participating in public

punishments have been one of the first things IS has done in Mosul and Raqqa Moreover, IS

created its own ‘school of young jihadists’, whom it believes are the generation of Caliphate.


25

These children receive special training on IS ideology, jihadism and martyrdom, and are

apparently the next generation of jihadist leaders.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION In this paper, the ideology, strategies and tools of the Islamic State (IS) for establishing its

hegemony in the territories it controls and plans to seizure are analyzed, employing Gramsci’s

language of hegemony in order to examine the role of different strategies and tools in

creating, consolidating and expanding the control of IS and its leaders in different levels of

society for what it advocates for. This study was inspired by ‘policy influencing’ practices of

NGO’s and wishes to be a valuable contribution to the literature of policy influencing.

Analysis of the Islamic State is done in four main aspects: its ideology, organizational and

institutional structure, media policy and education policy. The research is done, also referring

to Gramscie’s concept of hegemony and the ideas he knit around this concept.

Gramsci comprehends the intimacy between common sense and religion and suggests that

foundation of ideology as religion rarely loses its sway over believers during the struggle for

hegemony. Corresponding to Gramsci’s view, religion, with the ideology of Salafist-jihadism

is the strongest asset of Islamic State. The distinction between religion and state does not exist

in Salafist-jihadism and all decisions are based on a hardline interpretation of sharia. Still,

according to Gramsci, leader’s ability of communicating effectively with all levels of society

is crucial for the society to embrace and understand the change.

This is reflected in the current organizational and institutional structure of the Islamic State,

especially in Raqqa. Al-Baghdadi has established various levels of political society; with a

sophisticated hierarchy of commanders, each with specific areas of responsibility built around

the needs of IS. These are a cadre of advisors, ministers and military commanders to manage

everything from military stores and roadside bomb attacks to the finances of the organization;

public services and the new sharia court system; and Hisbah morality police and women

brigades. The role of these officers is to communicate the sharia law to all levels of society

with coercion or content, and remind them that Islam was a comprehensive system that

governed all aspects of social life which, according to Gramsci, creates some level of

hegemony on the society.

This hegemony is further established by the media policy of IS. As Gramsci notes, media has

a central role in the methods of Islamic State; of disseminating its worldview of Salafi-


26

jihadism through various socialization structures. The media organization is carefully and

centrally planned, ensuring repetitiveness of the counterhegemonic movement and prevention

of competing views gaining currency under a scrutinized design.

In terms of policies around education, both the Islamic State and Gramsci see it as the

foundation of counter-hegemony. Since IS seizure Raqqa and Mosul, curriculums and overall

organization of the education process have changed. Moreover, IS created its own ‘school of

young jihadists’, whom it believes are the generation of Caliphate. These children receive

special training on IS ideology, jihadism and martyrdom, and are apparently the next

generation of jihadist leaders.

These policies shed a light upon how the Islamic State, once pushed to the edges of society

has managed to successfully transform itself into an organization that controls territory,

attracts recruits from around the world, continues to make gains against other rebel groups

and national armies and build a historic bloc. Its policies centering around establishing its

ideology in every level of the society is worth considering from a policy influencing

perspective.

From a participation perspective it is important to note the centralization around men and

boys of the Islamic State. The women have limited roles assigned to them, and those are

taking care of their jihadi husband. This is also true for the women brigades. They act as a

tool for oppression of women and girls are totally invisible in the analysis.

The establishment of hegemony of Islamic State is not complete yet. The acts of coercion is

very common in the practices of IS, which is also part of its ideological philosophy. Then, it

shall me noted that this research is quite limited in scope. New aspects of strategies and tools

are reveled almost everyday, and there is a need for continuous update for this research.


27

APPENDIX

Table 1: COUNTRIES IN WHICH GROUPS HAVE DECLARED THEIR ALLEGIANCE TO ISLAMIC STATE:

33 REGIONS; OVER 60 GROUPS

IRAQ GERMANY

SYRIA MOROCCO

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA NEW ZEALAND

NETHERLANDS TURKEY

DENMARK UZBEKISTAN

PALESTINE ALGERIA

GAZA LIBYA

EGYPT NIGERIA

BAHRAIN SOMALIA

YEMEN MALI

JORDAN SUDAN

LEBANON TUNISIA

INDIA PHILIPPINES

AFGHANISTAN INDONESIA and MALAYSIA

PAKISTAN MALDIVES

BANGLADESH INDIVIDUALS

Figure 1: Organizational Media Structure of the Islamic State


28

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Documents

Counterhegemony and the Islamic State: a research on policy influencing