36-1

Chapter 36, in: Handbook of Forensic Anthropology and Archaeology by S. Blau and D. H.

Ubelaker (eds.), World Archaeological Congress Research Handbooks in Archaeology, Left

Coast Press, Walnut Creek, CA.

Grave Challenges in Iraq

Derek Congram

Jon Sterenberg

[ext]…the potential information contained in human burials is far greater than is usually

extracted from them [end ext] (Willems 1978: 88, cited Sprague 2005: 5).

In this chapter we discuss the new and limited role that forensic archaeology and

anthropology have had in Iraq, focusing on events since the 2003 overthrow of the Iraqi

government by the United States and allies. There are three background issues that have resulted

in major problems for investigating and researching the situation of forensic archaeology and

anthropology in Iraq:

1. The variety of contexts that may constitute the focus of forensic work (e.g., various

offenders, victims, time periods, etc.);

2. The lack of organized and available information and data on forced disappearances,

killings and clandestine burials; and

3. The disorganized approach and ability to investigate alleged crimes to date.

Both of us have forensic experience in Iraq and several other countries and will draw upon this to

36-2

comment on these three issues. We also discuss the work that has taken place recently

investigating mass graves in Iraq. Finally, we address several other issues, including several

social and ethical considerations that pertain to the practice of forensic archaeology and

anthropology in Iraq in particular, but also other countries. For reasons related to confidentiality

regarding cases currently under investigation or on trial and contractual obligations, this chapter

will take a broader perspective to describe past investigations and make recommendations for

future work.

Background Issues [1ST ORDER]

Definition of Context [2ND ORDER]

In many cases, contemporary mass graves are an expression of the maximum effort

required to dispose of persons considered unworthy of proper burial (let alone the right to life),

which have been executed by the authorities that carry the responsibility of protecting these same

people. In Iraq, these graves began long before Saddam Hussein. In fact, recent accusations by

British politicians of the barbarity of chemical weapons usage against the Kurds in the 1980s are

hypocritical. In 1920, during the Iraqi revolution against British rule “[a]t Winston Churchill’s

suggestion, the RAF (Royal Air Force), used poison gas against the rebellious Kurds” (Simpson

2003: 28).

State-sponsored criminal events resulting in mass death, however, appear to have

increased dramatically under Saddam Hussein. There is a very broad range of events, the

evidence of which may or does lie in mass graves throughout Iraq (Table 1).

Date Victims Perpetrators Source

1920 6,000 Iraqis British colonial government Tripp 2007:44

1933 Thousands of

Kurds and

British colonial government

(RAF); Iraqi military; Kurdish

McDowall 2000;

Simpson 2003:38; Tripp

36-3

Assyrians tribesmen 2007:80

Oct 1935 Hundreds of

Yazidi Kurds

Iraqi military Tripp 2007:87

1968-1971 2,000 political

prisoners

Iraqi military Simpson 2003:50

1979 500+ political

conspirators

against Saddam

Hussein

Iraqi military Simpson 2003:59

1980-1988 Thousands of

Iranian prisoners

of war

Iraqi military McMahon 2004

July 1983 Up to 8,000

members of

Barzani clan

Iraqi military Amin 1994; Human

Rights Watch 2004;

Recknagel 2006

1987-1989 50,000-200,000

Kurds

Iraqi military Cordner 2005;

McDowall 2007:357-

360; Middle East Watch

1993

March 17,

1988

5,000 + Kurds at

Halabjah

Iraqi military Barber & Epstein 2004;

Simpson 2003:88

August 2,

1990

Up to 600

Kuwaiti POWs

Iraqi military AP 2005a; Barber &

Epstein 2004;

Recknagel 2003

Jan-Mar,

1991

100,000+ Iraqi

military

UN-sanctioned military forces Fisk 2005:849; Pilger

2003:18; Simpson

2003:1, 99, 200

February 13,

1991

Up to 1,600 Iraqi

civilians

US military, Stealth plane bombs Keeble 1997:166;

Simpson 2003

Feb-Apr,

1991

30,000- 180,000

Shia and Kurds

Iraqi military; possibly Iranian

government

Barber & Epstein 2004;

Bouchaert 2003; Burns

2006; Cordner 2005;

McDowall 2000; Tripp

2007

1999 1,000 Shia in

Najaf

Iraqi military Cordner 2005

March 2003-

May 2008

83,000-90,000

non combatants

Coalition military forces; other

military and paramilitary

www.iraqbodycount.org

Table 1. Summary of modern-era events in Iraq from which victims may be buried in mass

graves and therefore subject to forensic archaeological and anthropological investigation.

Each of these different events has a unique context, relating to a different period of time

36-4

and circumstances, diverse offenders and victims. Some graves hold evidence of crimes-against-

humanity and/or genocide, others of war crimes, the so-called “collateral damage” of misdirected

or errant missile attacks, political purges, intra- or international fighting. Experience from other

countries has shown that the comprehensive and wide-scale interviewing of witnesses,

prospection for graves, planned and controlled excavation of graves and exhumations and careful

analysis of remains towards identification and cause of death determination is possible (e.g., see

EAAF annual reports (http://eaaf.typepad.com/eaaf_reports/), Haglund 2002; Ramey Burns

1999).

Data Sources [2nd ORDER]

Archaeological evidence suggests that Mesopotamia is the birthplace of written language.

The 2,500-year literary history has resulted in reams of documents and related artifacts outlining

significant (and also mundane) events in human history (Bahn 1999). This tradition of recording

has continued through the modern era and has resulted in documents pertaining to events of the

recent past, of particular interest here those authorizing and describing mass arrests, detentions,

executions, and burials of victims of the Ba’ath Party regime under Saddam Hussein (Human

Rights Watch 2004). In 1991, in the Kurdish area of Iraq alone, 18 tons of regime documents on

prisoners and executions were seized following the first Gulf War (McIntosh 2002). This

preliminary evidence brings hope to grave investigators, despite the claim by Stover et al. (2003:

664) and Human Rights Watch (2004) that the secrecy under which the Iraqi military and police

operated means that some graves are simply undiscoverable. One must also remember that mass

executions and burials are not discreet events and inevitable witnesses, confessing participants,

satellite imagery and able archaeologists will all assist in the discovery and analysis of graves in

36-5

Iraq.

Currently there is a broad array of different sources of information, mostly mass media or

the United States and Iraqi government reports. The objectives of each of the organizations

responsible and the filter through which much information must pass to reach the researcher and

investigator require serious consideration. Likewise, much information gathered by governments

and militaries in particular is simply unavailable. Despite both of us having worked in Iraq, there

is much that is unknown as a result of the disorganized state of the country and authorities

operating within. There is a very wide disparity in numbers of missing persons and deaths

according to the source being cited, whether Human Rights Watch, Iraqi Special Tribunal judges,

or others. For this reason, ranges and sources are cited and the reader must judge for themselves

what they choose to believe. For those conducting formal investigations, it is our experience and

it is foreseeable in the future that under the current administration of Iraq only information

pertaining to crimes committed by the Ba’ath Party under Saddam Hussein will be available.

Operational Organization [2nd ORDER]

Limited forensic work on, and related to, mass graves in the country has already been

conducted by various groups and in different ways. The security and political situation limits

control, coordination, and enactment of any large-scale national program. Baraybar et al. (2007)

cite the negative example of poorly planned exhumations and autopsies in Kosovo to accentuate

the need for a centralized and coordinated approach to investigations in Iraq. Work conducted to

date in Iraq, however, shows no sign of having accounted for such mistakes elsewhere.

Despite the disorganized state that may currently exist, the vast majority of mass graves

in Iraq remain unexcavated. Most of the exceptions are graves that have been unprofessionally

36-6

opened (Figure 36.1), and some of these have been well publicized in the mass media (Barber

and Epstein 2004; Bouckaert 2003; Hunter and Cox 2005: 206; Recknagel 2003). For example,

in January of 2004, Hess (2004) reported that:

“Eleven of the 271 suspected mass graves were exhumed by family members immediately after

the war… In Hillah, a scene of major atrocities against Shi’ites in 1991, the discovery of a mass

grave containing at least 3,000 bodies kicked off nearly a week of digging and bone collecting by

family members.”

Figure 36.1 Iraqis opening a mass grave allegedly of Shia killed in 1991, P.

Bouckaert/Human Rights Watch 2003

The patience of the people who have refrained from ad hoc exhumations and are waiting

for “professional” excavations of graves is limited (Human Rights Watch 2004). The controlled

and apolitical excavation and analysis of these graves and the remains within is a matter that can

36-7

and should be addressed by those with appropriate education, training, and skills in

archaeological excavation and biological/forensic anthropology. Greg Kehoe, an investigator for

the Regime Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO), which has conducted controlled excavations of eight

mass graves since late 2004, claimed that these excavations were hindered by the failure of

European experts to assist due to qualms over the possible use of the death penalty for those

eventually convicted of crimes (BBC 2004a; Fairweather 2004). The main issue preventing their

participation, however, is certainly the poor security situation (Figure 36.2) and it is questionable

as to how serious the death penalty rates as a factor in whether or not international forensic

specialists choose to participate. Nevertheless, Hunter and Cox (2005: 210) ask “how acceptable

is it, for example, for largely white middle-class, educated Westerners to ‘parachute’ into less-

developed post-conflict scenarios, investigate a crime- to their ideal of justice, and then bale out

leaving their garbage, in all its various forms, behind?”

[Figure 36.2 here]

Hunter and Cox are criticizing how operations have been conducted in the past in other countries

and it is thus the methods and mandate- and not necessarily those performing the work- which is

being questioned. They suggest that “…in many contexts it is better to train and empower than to

intervene and then walk away” (Margaret Cox, INFORCE, personal communication 2006).

Some have claimed that Iraq has no “forensic” archaeologists or anthropologists (Human

Rights Watch 2004; Stover et al. 2003). This is difficult to judge as there are no universal

national (or international) systems to qualify such expertise in any country. This stands in

contradiction to the constant reference in related literature to “international standards” (e.g.,

Amnesty International 2004; BBC 2004a; Cordner and Mc Kelvie 2002; Human Rights Watch

2003b; Skinner et al. 2003).

36-8

The best qualified in Iraq may be those who participated in training courses with the

International Forensic Centre of Excellence for the Investigation of Genocide (Inforce)1 (see Cox

this volume) and the International Commission for Missing Persons, (ICMP)2. It must also be

said that their participation in training programs involving real or simulated mass graves and

their real-life experience in Iraq may make them better able to lead forensic investigations there

than many experienced foreigners. It is important to remember that many practitioners from

Western Europe or North America (including many authors in this volume) first became

involved in forensic work by being “loaned” out from universities to police services without any

prior education and training in forensic methods, objectives and protocols.

1 International Forensic Centre of Excellence for the Investigation of Genocide, a UK-based

charity.

2 An international organization based in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, operating largely in the

former Yugoslavia.

36-9

Figure 36.3 Inforce simulated mass grave with plastic teaching skeletons (photograph

Inforce Foundation; used with permission by Inforce Foundation)

Developments Since 2003 [1st ORDER]

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Forensic Team [2nd ORDER]

In June 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) took political control of Iraq and

set about to investigate alleged mass graves. The pressure on coalition forces to protect grave

sites for full forensic investigation and to prevent unregulated excavations and exhumations had

to be carefully weighed against antagonizing a desperate population who had seized the moment

to recover their relatives during this brief period of stability. This initial “rush to the graves”

resulted in forensic evidence being destroyed, and many of the bodies claimed by families were

36-10

most likely not those of the individual being sought. Many sets of remains were simply given a

presumptive identification from clothing, identification documents or personal items found

during these recoveries and some sets of remains were identified by such tenuous associations as

the brand of cigarettes they smoked at the time of disappearance (experience of author (JS),

Bouckaert 2003; Human Rights Watch 2004).

The objectives of the CPA forensic team included assisting in preserving forensic

evidence at known grave sites, advising on procedures involved in locating grave sites, actually

locating sites, and advising on a strategy for the future handling of evidence. This last aspect also

involved graves that had already been disturbed. Other responsibilities included coordinating the

ongoing investigation with other relevant parties; independent monitoring of the standards

employed by national or international forensic teams when working within Iraq; assessment of

the current Iraqi capacity to undertake forensic work and to assess the availability of training

facilities within Iraq.

One major problem for the CPA was that there was no specialized equipment or

identified forensic facilities suitable for use in support of the scientific investigation of mass

graves. Capacity building would be one such issue that to date (May 2008), has yet to be

adequately addressed.

Capacity-building involved the need to identify personnel who could be trained in

forensic archaeology and anthropology in order to maintain high standards at all Iraqi-led

“humanitarian exhumations” (i.e., those that were not being conducted with a primary mandate

of evidence collection for criminal trials). This involved supporting respective

universities/institutes to build forensic modules into their programs. The CPA team also assessed

existing forensic capacity at established professional medical institutes, (e.g., the Medical Legal

36-11

Institute (MLI) in Baghdad and regional mortuary facilities).

The work involved the identification of conventional archaeologists and anthropologists

in Iraq, many of whom had experience with the recovery and analysis of human remains and

newly graduated doctors from Medical Degree programs, where skeletal anatomy is a core

subject. Although not forensic specialists per se it was felt that with training these people could

form a core of expertise for future operations. Currently, pathologists in Iraq are under constant

pressure to deal with recent cases as a result of ongoing armed conflict. Further, with only 12

pathologists throughout the country, pathology services are limited, particularly in areas such as

the declaration of cause of death.

The CPA team was supported in site assessments by two satellite analysts, which helped

with the positive identification of sites. Although it is believed that some aspects of satellite and

aerial imagery analysis were used in Iraq prior to 1991, at present Iraq does not have the capacity

to conduct its own satellite investigations.

Finally, forensic scientists capable of undertaking DNA work will be critical for

establishing positive identifications. Theoretical aspects of DNA identification techniques are

taught at Baghdad University, although there is currently no DNA analysis capability within

Iraq. The only current possibility, then, is to have samples processed externally.

In the recent past, limited work concerning sites of atrocities had been undertaken by

several NGOs including Human Rights Watch, Middle East Watch and Physicians for Human

Rights (PHR). Information has since been built upon by numerous organizations and authorities,

including the Human Rights Ministries in Baghdad, Basra, Erbil and Sulaimaniyah, the Anfal

Organization in Sulaimaniyah, the Society for the Preservation of Mass Graves, the Free

Prisoners Association, the U.S. Marine Expeditionary Force, the Criminal Investigations

36-12

Division (CID) of the United States Army, and other international and local Human Rights

organizations.

As a result of the multiple organizations at work, and the lack of centralization, the CPA

had difficulty identifying and confirming the existence of the reported gravesites. Ongoing

violence compounded this problem. The CPA forensic team therefore developed a simple

database, (adapted from one developed by Ute Hoffmeister of ICMP in 2003), into which all

relevant data, reports, images or site assessments could be input, including information for the

comparison of antemortem and post-mortem data. Data inputting continued over an eight-month

period.

Since the CPA team left Iraq in April 2004, uncontrolled excavations have continued,

although as stated in Hunter and Cox (2005: 206), the frequency of these appears to have

declined. Something to consider, however, is that information on these events is sparse, perhaps

due to the fact that the “western’ media is ‘embedded” with coalition forces and not in regular

contact with Iraqis. The lack of Iraqi media infrastructure by which information can reach an

international audience means that little about Iraqi group-led excavations becomes known

outside of, or even within, Iraq. Most of the sites are not under the protection of military forces

due simply to operational demands of a higher priority, such as general security, and it

demonstrates how this one factor can affect all aspects of the recovery operation.

Initially, only a few incidents of atrocities were designated for detailed investigation and

prosecution through the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) court, as determined in the CPA ‘Mass

Grave Action Plan.” A team from Denmark undertook the assessment of 20 sites across the

country in a time span of nine weeks. A team from Finland undertook the first large-scale ground

penetrating radar (GPR) survey of a reported site south of Baghdad. Inforce personnel also

36-13

conducted geophysical surveys of graves.

Regime Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO) [2nd ORDER]

In late 2003, the U.S. Government sought more physical forensic evidence for prosecution of the

heads of the former regime that had been captured (approximately 22 individuals at this time).

The Regime Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO) was formed and tasked with working with the CPA

forensic team on the location and strategy for mass grave excavations. RCLO was charged with

sampling several sites including one which had previously been partially exhumed by the United

States Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) (Sinje Stoyke, personal communication

20063). In 2004, the reported RCLO budget was £55 million, or over $100 million US

(Fairweather 2004).

RCLO dealt primarily with evidence collection and did not specifically aim to establish

the personal identification of recovered remains, although DNA samples were taken from all sets

of remains exhumed. Any information was then passed on to the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST), at

that time not yet in place, and used to aid the court. By June 2005, RCLO had completed the

excavation of two mass graves near Mosul, “al-Hatra” (BBC 2004a; Rubenstein 2005), and one

in Muthanna (Rubenstein 2005; Knickmeyer 2005). Rubenstein claimed that operations were

“marked by the refinement of and improvement on earlier efforts conducted in Iraq and other

places in Europe and Africa” (p.7). While a $US100 million budget inevitably facilitates a

certain level of refinement, operations were, overall, on par with- though different from- many

3This information and that related to Archaeologists for Human Rights, below, was provided by

Sinje Stoyke, formerly of AFHR and later Programme Co-ordinator, Iraq with ICMP, with a

contribution from Ursula Janssen, founding member of AFHR.

36-14

performed by ICTY in the former Yugoslavia. Between August 2004 and June 2006, RCLO had

excavated six mass graves and exhumed and examined 335 sets of human remains (Daragahi

2006).

ICMP and Inforce [2nd ORDER]

During 2003 and 2004 two different organizations, ICMP and Inforce, each directed

teaching and training programs for Iraqi professionals with an aim of helping develop skills and

knowledge towards the investigation of graves (Table 36.1). Inforce’s training of 33 Iraqi

professionals, (including 13 medics and six archaeologists) over 15 weeks took place in the

United Kingdom and that by ICMP in Bosnia-Herzegovina, using simulated (Inforce) and real

(ICMP) mass graves. One of the Inforce trainees has since gone on to lead a course in Iraq on

pathology in anticipation of future work. In 2003, Inforce also seconded personnel who

contributed to a CPA team and was involved in site assessments in 2003 (BBC 2004b).

Archaeologists for Human Rights (AFHR) [2nd ORDER]

A German NGO, Archaeologists for Human Rights (AFHR), was founded in June 2003

by members who had archaeological experience in northern Iraq and elsewhere in the region.

They deployed two archaeologists to Ainkawa, Erbil, in Northern Iraq to work with the local

communities and the Kurdish Ministries in order to assist them in the recovery of remains. The

group collaborated with government and other representatives including those of the United

Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)

offices, the CPA and representatives of PHR and Human Rights Watch in Iraq. Coordination

with South Korean Coalition Forces resulted in that country supplying excavation and mortuary

36-15

equipment for the Ministry of Human Rights in Erbil. The equipment and supplies are being

stored for future investigations.

One member of AFHR also took part in the excavations of the Regime Crime Liaison

Office (RCLO) at al-Hatra between August-November 2004 as a representative for the Ministry

of Human Rights in Erbil.

Looking to the Future [1st ORDER]

“Humantiarian” versus “Forensic” Excavations [2nd ORDER]

What will the focus of grave investigations in Iraq be: humanitarian or evidentiary? Must

these be distinguished? The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has suggested that a limited

number of sites have been selected for evidentiary examination, while the rest of the graves

would be left to others, mainly Iraqi groups, for “humanitarian” investigation (Barber and

Epstein 2004, UN 2004; US Dept of State 2003;). This decision seems pragmatic; a way of

protecting and examining only a limited number of graves and of allowing anxious and willing

Iraqis to open up all of the rest of the graves. The damage towards the so-called humanitarian

mission of excavations by those untrained in technical methods, by those without osteological

and archaeological knowledge, however, cannot be repaired. Commingling of remains and post-

mortem excavation fractures, the removal of commingled remains by families making presumed

identifications (and the unreliability of those identifications) result in a situation whereby proper

identifications of these victims will almost surely never happen. Neither justice nor humanitarian

aims are being served in this way.

Cordner (2005) also groups investigations into two types, which he labels “Justice” and

“Humanitarian”. This dichotomy is unnecessary, however, and there is no reason why both ends

36-16

cannot be served at the same time. It is true that, legally speaking, genocide or war crimes may

require only group identification (e.g., ethnic group or civilian status), rather than individual, but

even this also serves the “humanitarian” needs of the origin community and families. Indeed,

justice could be called a humanitarian need and is a Human Right. To divide mass grave

excavations into two mutually exclusive groups suggests that the work can serve only one end,

which is simply not true. Careful excavation, documentation, and analysis leading to

identification of victims and the events that led up to their deaths and burials serve multiple

purposes.

To a small degree, uncontrolled excavations serve the “humanitarian” aims of answering

some questions about the fate of unidentified individuals, although information related to the

timing and circumstances of their deaths is lost. Some resolution may come from the recovery of

an identification document found in a grave, but if it has been separated from a set of remains,

the ability to associate is gone. Is the discovery of identification papers in a grave enough to

satisfy the grieving family of the death of that missing person? It would be significantly better if

the sex of an associated body could be determined, if dental characteristics could be confirmed or

if clothing could be used to corroborate the suspicion that that person was killed and buried in

that place. It would also be significantly better for the families if they could organize a proper

burial for those remains with confidence that they actually belong to their family member and

that they are complete. DNA identification would be ideal.

In many cases, it is reasonable to assume that the discovery of skulls with what appear to

be gunshot trauma from a grave in this context means that the victims could all have been

executed. Evidence of this type is likely to be generalized in an assumption that the remains in a

grave all shared this fate. There is great danger, however, in generalizing as bodies in a single

36-17

mass grave may represent distinct events and types of victims. Perhaps some Iraqi soldiers

refused to commit executions and were in turn killed and thrown in with the others. Distinctions

between prisoners of war, enemy combatants, and innocent civilians can be made but may be

missed without the appropriate analyses. Witnesses of executions may also become victims in

the same grave. An innocent civilian, missing since the time of the execution of prisoners, may

continue to be sought by family members after a declaration has been made stating that those in a

grave are prisoners of war, based on limited evidence of, for example, three victims seen wearing

military clothing. While unprofessional excavations in Iraq clarify the existence of graves, there

remains potential for misinterpretation about the complete contents of the graves and the

circumstances surrounding the deaths of those interred.

Cultural Considerations [2nd ORDER]

A significant challenge that must be recognized in Iraq is the very different social and

cultural context from past projects in other countries. Religious concerns regarding treatment of

the dead may affect the way work is conducted. Although there may be few differences between,

for example, Shia and Sunni treatment of the dead (M. Yasin, personal communication 20064;

Gatrad 1994), there are certain considerations that range from “obligation” (halal) to “forbidden”

(haram) (Jonker 1996). Understanding cultural and religious norms enables one to better

interpret the context of the works being undertaken. The ability, for example, to distinguish

different types of head garments (which may have different names according to each ethnic

group), from blindfolds, or head garments used as blindfolds is crucial in the interpretation of

events. The idea that martyrs are buried in the clothing in which they died will be important in

4 Majid Yasin, Imam, Bournemouth Islamic Centre, personal interview May 3rd 2006.

36-18

the assessment of criminal and clandestine burials. There is clearly a place for cultural

anthropologists with knowledge of local practices.

Other considerations may involve the use of “cadaver” dogs. Such dogs are used with

some regularity in missing person investigations, for mass disasters such as landslides or

earthquakes and have been used for the detection of single clandestine graves (e.g., Lasseter et

al. 2003; Owsley 1995; Rebmann et al. 2000: 2). They are also used to detect unexploded

ordinance as has been employed by the UN ICTY to search for booby traps around graves.

Although in Islam dogs are considered “unclean,’ the Hadith (sayings of the prophet

Mohammed) illustrate that human interaction with dogs is not strictly forbidden. As explained by

one Imam (Yasin, personal communication 2006), there are two types of dogs: clean and

unclean. The type considered “clean” is that which we train to help people (e.g., seeing-eye or

search and rescue dogs), and they may be viewed as acceptable in searches for bodies in

clandestine graves. It is important for the investigator to understand these views and to discuss

them with those in an affected community, which may have an interest in, and connection with,

the victims. In light of prisoner abuse by U.S. forces at the Abu Graib prison, it is also very

important to consider the possible reaction of locals if similar looking dogs are used to find

graves.

Perhaps the most contentious issue, although one which is notoriously quiet in the

anthropological literature, is that of bone sampling of victims of known identity. The challenges

of developing population-specific standards for anthropological ageing are well-known. While

sample-taking and research deriving from known-age victims can be used to better age those in

the future, there is the inevitable question of the ethical rightness of doing so, with or without

permission from the next of kin (Skinner et al. 2003). Ethical standards exist within confined

36-19

contexts such as universities or regional or national jurisdictions. Operating as part of an

international team in a foreign country without such standards or related legislation, however,

presents a number of unanswered questions that must be resolved before work proceeds.

Grave Sampling [2nd ORDER]

Another issue to consider is the partial excavation of mass graves as suggested by

Skinner in 1987, whereby only a portion of a grave will be excavated and possibly some (though

probably not all) bodies exhumed (e.g., “grave sampling”). The idea of such an undertaking does

not necessarily suggest that it would only ever be partially excavated. As with conventional

archaeology, sampling via partial excavation allows one to better understand what one is facing.

It provides limited information to better judge what approach to take if full excavation were to be

carried out. The experience of one of us (DC) suggests that some people do not want their

relatives exhumed for further investigation and autopsy. With preliminary information gleaned

from testing a grave, investigators can then proceed to seek the advice of the affected community

as to how they wish to proceed.

Another type of sampling may be related to sites where there are multiple mass graves

(e.g., “site sampling”). It may be naïve to think that all of the mass graves in Iraq will be

excavated and all of the victims found and identified because of the resources required. It should

be for the Iraqis and specific communities related to victims within Iraq to decide the extent to

which excavations and exhumations should occur, and the idea of sampling graves—in the sense

that only some will be excavated (e.g., those believed to be representative)—may provide a

pragmatic, perhaps temporary, solution.

While sampling is commonplace in conventional archaeology, the forensic context

36-20

introduces more serious ethical concerns. It is hard to imagine that families would be content

with the exhumation of ten of their community members from a grave of one thousand victims,

or of a single mass grave at a site with ten mass graves. With the group or individual

identification of the smaller sample, however, decisions can be made as to whom, when and how

a grave will be approached. Certain communities may decide simply to erect a memorial in that

place. Others may wish to pursue full excavation and exhumation.

There is a significant risk, however, in sampling graves or sites which may circumvent its

use. While in general mass graves contain bodies, victims of genocide that belong to one

particular ethnic or national group and of a single event, this is not necessarily so. Both of us,

along with others (e.g., Wright et al. 2005), have participated in excavations where the nature of

the evidence strongly suggested that bodies in graves arrived at different times, from different

places, and events surrounding their deaths may have varied. These events may be both criminal

and non-criminal, the victims of which are all in the same mass grave. Site and/or grave

sampling could result in incorrect premature conclusions that affect decisions to exhume or not.

If members of one community are opposed to exhumation, their decision to leave a grave may

affect the members of other communities whose members remain undiscovered in the same

grave. The search for those members would then continue indefinitely on the false assumption

that they must be elsewhere.

Who Will Lead? [2nd ORDER]

One problem of mass grave investigations from other countries as a model for Iraq, such

as the former Yugoslavia, is the unlikely involvement of the United Nations if large-scale

violence continues. Political and military/security capability of the UN is extremely limited in

36-21

this context and thus the challenge of protecting sites and personnel from armed aggression

practically rules out their present participation.

A possible future scenario incorporates a multinational/multi-organizational effort,

involving teams from different governments and NGOs under centralized Iraqi government

coordination. The scale and cost of potential operations means that one organization alone will

not be able to properly address the situation. Despite early inter-organizational cooperation in

Iraq between organizations like the Inforce contribution to the CPA team and that of

Archaeologists for Human Rights, such events have been isolated.

What is required to coordinate several groups, however, is a standard operating procedure

and an oversight group that can monitor and instruct individual groups. A similar situation has

been used in the former Yugoslavia with UN monitors, advising and assisting national teams. A

national system of monitors would help ensure consistent standards and coordination of

information as well as enable other groups and countries to assist with the burden of resources.

Given current political instability in Iraq, an organization such as International Commission of

the Red Cross (ICRC) could play a role. The ICRC have experience in conflict and post-conflict

countries, a general trust-position with governments and their current program, “The Missing,”

could be used as a platform for the launch of a mass grave investigation coordination system.

Until now, however, ICRC’s Missing program has generally not conducted grave excavations,

exhumations and autopsies (Tidball-Binz 2006).

The suggestion made by Cordner (2005) and by ICRC (Human Rights Watch 2004) of

local community-led exhumations is certainly an option for Iraq, but we must keep in mind that

many mass graves are located in remote areas. Furthermore, as many victims were transported to

other parts of the country before being executed and buried, local communities may not be

36-22

interested in investing their resources in recovering the dead of other groups. Indeed, this could

affect the integrity of such investigations given mounting ethnic rivalries.

There has been great reservation in the anthropological community about participating in

any sort of work in Iraq in light of the fact that many consider the war, invasion and occupation

to have been illegal and immoral (Concerned Anthropologists [online],

http://concerned.anthropologists.googlepages.com/). For this reason, practitioners may consider

that work in Iraq may be acceptable but working for foreign or even Iraqi governments is

unacceptable. The idea that forensic practitioners (and forensic archaeologists specifically), can

take the initiative in proposing and leading investigations, (i.e., be proactive, rather than

reactive), has been suggested by Blau and Skinner (2005). This could easily be foreseen as

coming into conflict (although not necessarily) with the advice given by Hunter and Cox (2005:

217) when they suggest that one should “…refrain from working with non-police or other formal

investigative agencies”. This latter advice is diluted by their later statement, true though it may

be, that: “Justice means different things to different peoples: the meaning of justice varies

culturally, and can be multi-faceted and complex” (Hunter and Cox 2005:207). Given the current

political instability and uncertainty in Iraq, the large presence of foreign military powers and the

institution of a judiciary funded and actively “advised” by a foreign power, then, one must

wonder what qualifies as an Iraqi formal investigative agency.

In other countries such as Argentina, Guatemala, Colombia and Kosovo the perpetrators

of crimes have included the military and members of active and continuing governments. Thus,

exhumations have been led by non-government organizations (NGOs) despite disinterest or

actual opposition of formal investigative bodies. With time, and change of government, the

information gathered by these groups, has been used for trials against the perpetrators of crimes

36-23

and continued to serve the humanitarian need of the families of the missing, arguably a

responsibility of the state (Castiglione 2004: 133, 134).

For whom one works or with which objectives are issues that have been raised about

work in Iraq. It is very possible that a funding organization would provide resources for the

exhumations of only one ethnic group. Is the exhumation of some victims better than none? In

Kosovo, after NATO entry, access to ethnic Serb witnesses of crimes, many of whom had fled as

refugees to Serbia, was limited meaning that much more information was available on other

victims, thus affecting which crimes were investigated and which bodies exhumed. The

deliberate focus on only certain groups in Iraq would clearly exacerbate ethnic tensions, (unless

specific groups deliberately chose not to support exhumations of their own people), and therefore

would be unacceptable.

There are, of course, many other social and ethical issues that warrant discussion. Given

the limitations of this work, they will only be addressed in brief with the hope that they will

initiate further discussion. While the comments of RCLO investigator Kehoe about Europeans

not participating in forensic work out of fear of the death penalty were generally dismissed

previously, there may be some truth to it. Some may claim that a forensic scientist has no right to

judge the sentencing process and should merely stick to their job. Inevitably, however, we are

not only scientists and may have competing concerns based on the multiple identities of each

practitioner. It is not difficult to foresee that those concerned with human rights may also be

strongly opposed to the death penalty in some or all circumstances.

The level of participation in projects is also an issue to be decided. If one is told that they

may simply observe exhumations, do they then give implicit approval to the process, regardless

of how it is managed and performed? By posting coalition soldiers at the graveside of

36-24

uncontrolled excavations in 2003, or by providing the locals with water, shelter, and shovels are

they implying that the work is being done to an acceptable level? If advice on how to excavate

more carefully is given and ignored, should the advisor leave in protest (see also Skinner et al.

2003)?

The consequences of not engaging and sharing experience and knowledge is that the

grave excavation process may be taken up and performed by those completely unqualified to do

so. This has been seen in other countries where people who had no experience or training in

archaeology, anthropology or pathology were leading mass grave excavations and exhumations,

not taking notes and not making any records of the process. Given the early stages of mass grave

work in Iraq, this can be avoided by continuing to engage Iraqi professionals with related

experience and pressuring governments to support the work.

Conclusions [1st ORDER]

Three major challenges face those investigating graves of missing persons and alleged

atrocity crimes in Iraq: the variety of contexts of crimes; the lack of organized and available

information on victims and killings; and the disorganized and disabled approach employed to

date to investigate. Although a very small proportion of mass burials have been excavated in Iraq

in recent years, they have been done so by different local community and non-governmental

groups and also U.S.-sponsored groups, each with different objectives and employing different

methodologies (including ad hockery) with varying results and little or no communication or

coordination amongst them. The number of victims from recent decades numbers hundreds of

thousands, whose bodies surely lie in thousands of unmarked graves throughout the country.

Currently, due to the security situation, excavations only appear to be possible in the

36-25

Kurdish-controlled north. The Regime Crimes Liaison Office appears to have ceased U.S.

government-sponsored excavations. It is possible that local Iraqi groups are active but there is no

evidence in the Western press or literature of this. With increasing awareness of the contribution

of archaeologists and anthropologists to grave investigations greater interest by Iraqi and other

governmental and non-governmental organizations is likely, but only feasible on any significant

scale once greater security has been established across the country.

There are many broader challenges that face the development and employment of

forensic archaeology and anthropology in Iraq and elsewhere, some of which we have addressed

here. We believe that this volume is a major event towards this development and will act as a

catalyst for further thought, discussion and service.

In the 1980s in Latin America and the 1990s elsewhere, we saw Forensic Generation

One: students who went straight into forensic archaeology and anthropology as a career after

graduating. Despite decades of experience and development of these forensic disciplines, we still

lack standard protocols, professional organization, and accreditation systems. In many countries,

other more traditional forensic or police practitioners still play the role of archaeologist or

anthropologist at the crime scene and in the lab. The tremendous interest and experience of

conventional archaeology and anthropology in Iraq, indigenous and from abroad, means that the

transition to a forensic context can be easily foreseen. For the purposes of accurate historical

records, criminal investigations, identification and repatriation of victims, the central

organization of this forensic context is a significant, primary task.

Lessons from work in other countries in many ways enable us to learn from mistakes and

build upon successes. Given past neglect of these types of investigations in the region, it is a new

context that warrants special treatment and not a simple transference of a system from another

36-26

country. Engagement with the Iraqi population towards methodologically sound investigations is

the only proper way to proceed. Working in association with Iraqis, learning from them, and

teaching what some of us have learned in our experience elsewhere are the only practical ways of

achieving any measure of success in the enormous challenge of investigating modern, unmarked

graves in Iraq.

Acknowledgements

DC gives particular thanks to the other authors of this long-awaited book. The majority have

taught and inspired him either as formal teachers or as exemplary colleagues.

References Cited

Amin, R. 1994. Plight of the Kurdish people. Letters; British Medical Journal 309: 875-76.

AP (Associated Press) 2005a. Excavators find mass grave in Iraq [online]. Sunday, April 17.

Available from: http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,153676,00.html. (Accessed May 29th

2006).

AP (Associated Press) 2005b. Mass grave in Karbala thought to date from ’91. In: Stars and

Stripes, 3(261), December 28th: 3.

Bahn, P.G. (ed.) 1999. Cambridge Illustrated History of Archaeology. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Baraybar, J.P., Brasey, V. & A. Zadel In press. The need for a centralized and humanitarian-

based approach to missing persons in Iraq: an example from Kosovo. International Journal of

Human Rights 11.

Barber, B & S. Epstein. 2004. Iraq’s Legacy of Terror; Mass Graves. U.S. Agency for

36-27

International Development (USAID). Available from: http://www.cpa-

iraq.org/human_rights/iraq_mass_graves.pdf (Accessed August 14th 2006).

BBC 2004a. Babies found in mass grave [online]. Available from:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/3738368.stm. Published: 13 October (Accessed

August 14th 2006).

BBC 2004b. Archaeologists play key role in Iraq [online]. Available from:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3378931.stm. Last updated: Thursday, 8 January.

(Accessed August 14th 2006).

Blau, S. & M. Skinner. 2005. The use of forensic archaeology in the investigation of human

rights abuse: Unearthing the past in East Timor. The International Journal of Human Rights

9(4): 449-63.

Bouckaert, P. 2003. The Mass Graves of al-Mahawil: The Truth Uncovered. Human Rights

Watch report, 15(5)(E), May 2003 [online].

Available from: http://hrw.org/reports/2003/iraq0503/ (Accessed August 14th 2006).

Castiglione, S. 2004. Legal aspects, in Management of Dead Bodies in Disaster Situations,

Disaster Manuals and Guidelines Series, No. 5: 129-47. Washington, D.C.: Pan-American Health

Organization.

Cordner, S. 2005. The Missing; Action to resolve the problem of those unaccounted for as a

result of armed conflict or internal violence, and to assist their families. VIFM Review 3(1): 2-6.

Burns, J.F. 2006. Uncovering Iraq’s horrors in desert graves [online]. New York Times, June 5.

Available from:

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/05/world/middleeast/05grave.html?ex=1307160000&en=f616

82fbc3536b01&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss. (Accessed September 8th 2006).

36-28

Cerkez-Robinson, A. 2007. 131 bodies exhumed from Bosnian grave [online]. USA Today, July

27. Available from: http://www.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2007-07-27-3941419480_x.htm

(Accessed October 17th 2007).

CNN 2005. Experts combing through mass grave in Iraq [online]. Saturday, April 30. Available

from: http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/04/30/iraq.main/ (Accessed August 14th 2006).

CNN 2006. Bush: ‘I’m the decider’ on Rumsfeld [online]. Tuesday, April 18. Available from:

http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/04/18/rumsfeld/ (Accessed April 26, 2008).

Daragahi, B. 2006. Victims in mass graves hid clues in clothing [online]. Los Angeles Times,

June 27. Available from: http://www.borzou.com/stories/2006/20060627.mht. (Accessed

September 8th 2006).

EAAF (Equipo Argentino de Antropologia Forense, (Argentinean Forensic Anthropology

Team]) annual reports [online]. Available from: http://eaaf.typepad.com/eaaf_reports/. (Accessed

August 14th 2006).

Fairweather, J. 2004. Lack of EU support ‘is hindering pace of inquiry’ [online]. Available from:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/10/14/wirq314.xml&sSheet=/new

s/2004/10/14/ixnewstop.html, Telegraph Group Limited (Accessed August 14th 2006).

Fisk, R. 2005. The Great War for Civilisation - The Conquest of the Middle East. Fourth Estate,

London.

Gatrad, A.R. 1994. Muslim customs surrounding death, bereavement, postmortem examinations,

and organ transplants. British Medical Journal 309: 521-23.

Haglund, W.D. 2002. Recent mass graves: An introduction, in Haglund, W.D & M.H. Sorg

(eds.) Advances in Forensic Taphonomy; Method, Theory, and Archaeological Perspectives:

243-261.Boca Raton: CRC Press.

36-29

Hess, P. 2004. Evidence to be unearthed from mass graves [online]. The Washington Times,

January 7th. Available from: http://www.house.gov./hasc/issues/Hussein/04-01-

07washtimes.htm (Accessed August 14th 2006).

Hiel, B. 2003. Iraqis train for gruesome task. Tribune-Review, Tuesday, December 16, 2003

[online]. Available from: http://www.pittsburgh live.com/x/tribune-

review/specialreports/iraqgraves/s_170172.html (Accessed August 14th 2006).

Human Rights Watch. 2003. Iraq: US unresponsive on Mass Graves [online]. Human Rights

News. Available from: http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/05/14/iraq6046.htm. (Accessed August

14th 2006).

Human Rights Watch. 2004. Iraq: State of the Evidence. Human Rights Watch report, 16(7).

Hunter, J. & M. Cox. 2005. Forensic Archaeology: Advances in Theory and Practice. London:

Routledge.

Jonker G. 1996. The knife’s edge: Muslim burial in the diaspora. Mortality 1(1): 27-44.

Keeble, R. 1997. Secret State, Silent Press. Bedfordshire: John Libbey Media.

Knickmeyer, H. 2005. 113 Kurds are found in mass gave. Washington Post, April 30: A09.

Lasseter, A.E., Jacobi, K.P., Farley, R. & L. Hensel. 2003. Cadaver dog and handler team

capabilities in the recovery of buried human remains in the Southeastern United States. Journal

of Forensic Sciences 48(3): 1-5.

McDowall, D. 2000. A Modern History of the Kurds. New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.

McMahon, R. 2004. Iraq: Who is buried in Hussein’s mass graves? (Part 2) [online]. Radio Free

Europe. Available from: http://www.rferl.org/features/2003/07/07072003165402.asp (Accessed

August 14th 2006).

Middle East Watch Report. 1993. Genocide in Iraq; The Anfal Campaign against the Kurds.

36-30

New York: Human Rights Watch.

News24. 2006. 1000 bodies found in Iraq [online]. News 24, South Africa, 06/04/2006.

Available from: http://www.news24.com/News24/World/Iraq/0,,2-10-1460_1912229,00.html

(Accessed August 14th 2006).

Owsley, D.W. 1995. Techniques for locating burials, with emphasis on the probe. Journal of

Forensic Sciences 40(5): 735-740.

Pilger, J. 2003. The lies of old, in D. Miller (ed.) Tell Me Lies: 18-22. London: Pluto Press.

Ramey Burns, K. 1999. Forensic Anthropology Training Manual. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,

Inc.

Rebmann, A., Edward, D. & M.H. Sorg. 2000. Cadaver Dog Handbook. Boca Raton: CRC

Press.

Recknagel, C. 2003. Iraqis open Saddam Hussein’s mass graves, demand justice (Part 1)

[online]. Radio Free Europe, July 7th. Available from:

http://www.rferl.org/features/2003/07/07072003163318.asp (Accessed August 14th 2006).

Recknagel, C. 2006. Iraq: Kurds collect evidence for more cases against Hussein [online]. Radio

Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 24th. Available from:

http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/01/a5bf8e58-f53e-4143-83c6-dd20fe7c1a53.html

(Accessed August 14th 2006).

Rosenfeld, N. 1991. Buried alive. Lies of our Times, October, pp. 12-13.

Rubenstein, P. 2005. The Iraq Mass Graves Team: USACE Leads a Team of Scientists to Learn

the Truth About the Killing Fields of Iraq. Planning Ahead, June 8(6). US Army Corps of

Engineers.

Seattle Times, The. 2003. The History of Iraq [online]. Available from:

36-31

http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/news/nation-world/usiraq/timeline/03.html (Accessed August

14th 2006).

Simpson, J. 2003. The Wars Against Saddam; Taking the Hard Road to Baghdad. London:

Macmillan.

Skinner, M. 1987. Planning the archaeological recovery of evidence from recent mass graves.

Forensic Science International 34: 267-287.

Skinner, M., Alempijevic, D. & M. Djuric-Srejic. 2003. Guidelines for international forensic bio-

archaeology monitors of mass grave exhumations. Forensic Science International 134: 81-92.

Sprague, R. 2005. Burial Terminology; A Guide for Researchers. New York: Altamira.

Stover, E., Haglund, W.D. & M, Samuels. 2003. Exhumation of mass graves in Iraq;

Considerations for forensic investigations, humanitarian needs, and the demands of justice.

Journal of the American Medical Association 290(5): 663-66.

Straziuso, J. 2005. Iraq Remains Thought to Be from 1991 Grave [online]. ABC News

International. Available from:

http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=1445699&page=1 (Accessed May 24th 2006).

Tidball-Binz, M. 2006. Forensic Investigations into the Missing; Recommendations and

Operational Best Practices. Chapter 16 in: Forensic Anthropology and Medicine:

Complementary Sciences from Recovery to Cause of Death by A. Schmitt, E. Cunha, and J.

Pinheiro (eds.). Totowa, NJ: Humana Press Inc.

Tripp, C. 2007. A History of Iraq. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

UN. 2004. Iraq: Focus on mass graves. United Nations Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA. Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), 7 January.

Available online at: http://iys.cidi.org/humanitarian/hsr/iraq/04a/ixl7.html (Accessed May 26th

36-32

2006).

UNSC1, United Nations Security Council report. 2005. Twentieth report of the Secretary

General pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 1284 (1999), 8 August, S/2005/513.

UNSC2, United Nations Security Council report. 2005. Twenty-first report of the Secretary

General pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 1284 (1999), 8 December 2005, S/2005/769.

US Department of State. 2003. Mass Graves in Iraq; Uncovering Past Atrocities. Publication

Number 11106. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor with the Bureau of Public

Affairs. Washington, DC: December 19. Available online at:

http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/27000.html (Accessed May 26th 2006).

Wright, R., Hanson, I. & J, Sterenberg. 2005. The archaeology of mass graves, in Hunter, J. &

M. Cox (eds.) Forensic Archaeology: Advances in Theory and Practice: 137-58. London:

Routledge.