China’s Lancang Dam Cascade and Transnational Activism in the Mekong Region: Who’s Got the Power?

China’s Lancang Dam Cascade and Transnational Activism in the Mekong Region: Who’s Gotthe Power?Author(s): Pichamon YeophantongSource: Asian Survey, Vol. 54, No. 4 (July/August 2014), pp. 700-724Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2014.54.4.700 .

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PICHAMON YEOPHANTONG

China’s Lancang Dam Cascade and Transnational

Activism in the Mekong Region

Who’s Got the Power?

ABSTRACT

Over the years, China’s Lancang dam cascade has been the target of widespread

contestation arising mainly from an evolving network of dam opponents. Operating

across borders, these activists play an increasingly prominent role in the trans-

boundary governance of the Lancang-Mekong River, working to curb China’s hydro-

power expansion and hold its dam developers to account.

KEYWORDS: China, Lancang-Mekong River, hydropower dams, transnational advo-

cacy networks, water governance

INTRODUCTION

Hydropower is often lauded as a ‘‘cleaner’’ and more affordable alternativeto fossil fuels for meeting the rising energy demands of China’s thrivingpopulation and its growing industries. This has given rise to China’sambitious hydropower aspirations, whose expansion is actively pursued athome and abroad. This dam-building ‘‘boom’’ is especially prevalent in theMekong region, where extensive construction undertaken by major Chi-nese state-owned enterprises (SOEs)—such as China Guodian, Datang,and Sinohydro—has intensified in recent years due to the region’s (declin-ing) abundance in water resources, as well as Southeast Asian countries’thirst for energy and foreign investment.1

PICHAMON YEOPHANTONG is a Global Leaders Fellow in the Niehaus Center for Globalization andGovernance, Princeton University, and a Senior Fellow under the ASEAN-Canada Research Part-nership. Email: <[email protected]>.

1. See Cristelle Maurin and Pichamon Yeophantong, ‘‘Going Global Responsibly? China’sEvolving Strategies Toward ‘Sustainable’ Overseas Investments,’’ Pacific Affairs 86:2 (June 2013),pp. 295–300.

Asian Survey, Vol. 54, Number 4, pp. 700–724. ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2014

by the Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permissionto photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights andPermissions website, http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: 10.1525/AS.2014.54.4.700.

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Among the most controversial of China’s dam projects has been its cascadeof (originally) eight hydropower dams2 on the upper stretches of the MekongRiver, known within China as the Lancang Jiang,3 located partially in thesouthwestern province of Yunnan. The Lancang constitutes one of China’slongest rivers and features a drainage basin that accounts for nearly 2% of thecountry’s total land area.4 The potential cross-border consequences5 of thisseries of upstream dams for the river’s fragile ecology have elicited widespreaddisapprobation from local civil society groups and transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and communities, particularly amongdownstream countries in mainland Southeast Asia that stand to be adverselyaffected.

The recent construction and planning of 17 more dams on the river’s upperreaches between Gongguoqiao and the borders of Tibet and Yunnan, includ-ing the 1,900-megawatt (MW) Huangdeng and 1,400 MW Miaowei,6 havefurther heightened fears of long-term ecological damage within and beyondChina’s borders.7 The 795,000 sq. km Mekong River Basin drains an areaslightly bigger than Turkey and is home to approximately 70 million people inChina, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam whose subsistencerelies on the river’s natural ebbs and flows. The river also features a concentra-tion of fish biodiversity second only to that of the Amazon. Given these factors,how the issue of dam-building is addressed amounts to a litmus test both ofChina’s regional diplomacy and its projected image as a ‘‘responsible power’’

2. Following the Mengsong dam’s cancellation (discussed later), the cascade currently featuresseven known dams.

3. Here, the ‘‘Lancang River’’ refers to the upper stretches of the Mekong River located withinChinese territory. References to Chinese upstream dams in this article will, therefore, be made inrelation to the ‘‘Lancang,’’ while the use of the term ‘‘Lancang-Mekong River’’ will refer to the river’supstream and downstream sections.

4. In Yunnan, the river flows through seven prefectures. The Lancang watershed is populated bynearly five million people, while the fertile Lancang valley in Xishuangbanna Prefecture is inhabitedby various ethnic groups and has 75% of its surface area covered by ecologically diverse forests.

5. The full range of effects caused by the Lancang cascade is still disputed; to provide a definitiveor comprehensive account of its impacts is beyond the scope of this article.

6. Both dams are reportedly under construction in Yunnan Province’s Lanping and YunlongCounties.

7. The exact names, location, and specifications of these dams (some of which are located inTibet) remain in flux because of limited information. See Darrin Magee, ‘‘The Dragon Upstream:China’s Role in Lancang-Mekong Development,’’ in Politics and Development in a TransboundaryWatershed: The Case of the Lower Mekong Basin, ed. by Joakim Ojendal, Stina Hansson, and SofieHellberg (New York: Springer, 2008), pp. 171–93.

YEOPHANTONG / TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM ON THE MEKONG � 701



(fuzeren de daguo). In short, it speaks to the critical problem of transboundarywater governance within the region.

This article focuses on the emergence of an expanding network of damopponents within the Mekong region and their activism across borders.Taking as its departure point the public censure of China’s Lancang dams,the article interrogates the extent to which displays of transnational activismwithin this developing region have succeeded in influencing the policy behav-ior of the primary ‘‘target’’ actors. These are the Chinese government and theSOE responsible for developing the scheme, Huaneng Lancang River Hydro-power Corporation (Hydrolancang).8 Challenging them is a diverse cast ofnon-state, primarily civil society actors and their supporters. Their intent is tocontest the legitimacy of China’s unilateral dam-building on the upperLancang-Mekong, as well as Beijing’s underlying ‘‘development’’ rationalethat couples economic growth and modernization with large dams. For overa decade, they have exerted sustained pressure on the Chinese governmentand Hydrolancang to commit to greater public accountability. Resemblingprocesses of ‘‘civil regulation’’9 that are occurring on a transnational scale,these norm entrepreneurs exist outside the aegis of the state; collectively, theyrepresent an informal governing mechanism that is proving to be increasinglycentral to the transboundary management of the Lancang-Mekong River asa common-pool resource.

With instances of transnational activism occurring more frequently acrossmainland Southeast Asia, particularly in relation to large-scale hydropowerschemes,10 some observers have suggested the existence of a ‘‘Mekong civil

8. A subsidiary of one of China’s ‘‘big five’’ power SOEs, China Huaneng Group.9. See, for example, Peter Newell, ‘‘Civil Society, Corporate Accountability, and the Politics of

Climate Change,’’ Global Environmental Politics 8:3 (August 2008), p. 123.10. More than 100 Chinese-backed hydropower dams are estimated to be in existence or under

development in the Lower Mekong Basin, with certain projects like the Myitsone dam on Myan-mar’s Irrawaddy River and the Cheay Areng dam on Cambodia’s Areng River proving especiallycontroversial, drawing the ire of local communities. See International Rivers, ‘‘The New Great Wall:A Guide to China’s Overseas Dam Industry’’ (October 2012), p. 6, <http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/attachedfiles/intlrivers_newgreatwalls_2012.pdf>, accessed December 12, 2012. For accountsof the activism against some of the major Chinese-backed dams, see Adam Simpson, ‘‘ChallengingHydropower Development in Myanmar (Burma): Cross-Border Activism under a Regime in Tran-sition,’’ Pacific Review 26:2 (February 2013), pp. 129–52; and Pichamon Yeophantong, ‘‘China,Corporate Responsibility, and the Contentious Politics of Hydropower Development: TransnationalActivism in the Mekong Region?’’ GEG Working Paper 82 (Global Economic Governance Pro-gramme, Oxford University, July 2013), <http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/sites/geg/files/Yeophantong_GEG%20WP%202013_82.pdf>, accessed September 15, 2013.

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society.’’11 But despite burgeoning scholarship on this subject, much stillneeds to be done to further unpack the nature of this transnational entity.12

In fact, its very existence and the extent of its influence continue to be hotlydebated, especially among policy and practitioner circles.13

Instead of the notion of a Mekong civil society, this article draws on theconcept of transnational advocacy networks to account for the instances ofcross-border activism seen within the Mekong region, as exemplified by theLancang dams case. Understood as informal networks of issue-driven activ-ists, the fluidity of this concept aptly captures the evolving character of theregion’s emerging socio-environmental activism. While recognizing the piv-otal role played by civil society actors, the term also underscores the diversityof the stakeholders, with other non-state and, at times, state actors (e.g.,academics, policy advisors, and technocrats) shown to be equally crucial tothe effective mobilization of collective action at the local and regional levels.

This article argues that although the overall impact of transnational activ-ists on the Chinese government’s and Hydrolancang’s behavior remainstempered—construction on the cascade has continued with plans for addi-tional dams now proposed—the cumulative significance of the resultingpolicy shifts cannot be understated. Both the Chinese government andHydrolancang have felt compelled to address the major claims made bynetwork activists and affected communities over the adverse repercussions

11. Philip Hirsch, ‘‘Globalisation, Regionalisation, and Local Voices: The Asian DevelopmentBank and Re-scaled Politics of Environment in the Mekong Region,’’ Singapore Journal of TropicalGeography 22:3 (November 2001), p. 249.

12. See Fiona Miller and Philip Hirsch, ‘‘Civil Society and Internationalized River Basin Man-agement,’’ Australian Mekong Resource Centre Working Paper 7 (June 2003); Philip Hirsch, ‘‘Advo-cacy, Civil Society, and the State in the Mekong Region,’’ in NGOs as Advocates for Development ina Globalizing World, ed. by Barbara Rugendyke (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 185–99. A numberof studies that (indirectly) deal with this subject also tend to identify more with the regionalism andwater governance literature. Examples include Oliver Hensengerth, ‘‘Transboundary River Coop-eration and the Regional Public Good: The Case of the Mekong River,’’ Contemporary Southeast Asia31:2 (August 2009), pp. 326–49; Francois Molle, Tira Foran, and Mira Kakonen, eds., ContestedWaterscapes in the Mekong Region: Hydropower, Livelihoods, and Governance (London: Earthscan,2009); Chris Sneddon and Coleen Fox, ‘‘Power, Development, and Institutional Change: Partici-patory Governance in the Lower Mekong Basin,’’ World Development 35:12 (December 2007), pp.2161–81; and John Dore, ‘‘The Governance of Increasing Mekong Regionalism,’’ paper prepared forthe Regional Centre for Social and Sustainable Development Conference on ‘‘Politics of theCommons,’’ Chiang Mai University, July 11–14, 2003.

13. Author interviews in Bangkok, Thailand, April 2013; Phnom Penh, Cambodia, March 2014;and Vientiane, Laos, August 2013.




of the Lancang dams—whether through official statements, public partner-ships and collaboration with NGOs, or the initiation of corporate socialresponsibility (CSR) projects. Rather than ignoring or denying local con-cerns, they have sought to placate their critics with assurances of sustainabledevelopment and commitments to responsible dam-building.

TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM IN THE MEKONG REGION

Transnational advocacy networks have emerged within a panoply of ‘‘gen-eral’’ and ‘‘specific’’ issue-areas: from women’s and children’s rights to climatechange, wildlife conservation, and, as discussed here, river protection. Therealm of environmental governance, in particular, has witnessed a notablegrowth in previous years in the number of network actors advocating thebetter and more inclusive management of the environment. Identified asserious ‘‘non-traditional security’’ threats to both human and state welfare,environmental problems serve to highlight the deepening ecological interde-pendencies that demand concerted action on the part of relevant stakeholdersto engineer remedies for these complex challenges.

Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink define a ‘‘transnational advocacynetwork’’ as a network of activists ‘‘distinguishable largely by the centralityof principled ideas or values in motivating their formation,’’ working through‘‘dense exchanges of information and services’’ to frame certain issues aspressing and of collective concern.14 Engaged in civic activism within andacross borders, these actors fulfill an integral role in raising public awarenesson important—though often neglected—policy issues, as well as empoweringlocal actors who may otherwise be excluded from mainstream policy-makingprocesses. Following what is described as a ‘‘boomerang’’ pattern of influence,‘‘international’’ members of a network can also assist local actors operatingunder restrictive sociopolitical conditions to build capacity and leverage thenecessary resources in support of a common cause or policy enterprise—ineffect, to bypass the state.15 Certainly, a key feature of such networks is theiropen structure, which allows for flexibility and a wider, more varied mem-bership: from grassroots organizations and international NGOs to localcommunities, journalists, politicians, government bureaucrats, as well as

14. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks inInternational Politics (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 1.

15. Ibid., pp. 12–13.




‘‘knowledge-based experts.’’16 This organizational flexibility can prove use-ful not only for eluding authoritarian government oversight but also forensuring a degree of issue continuity. Should one group become unable topursue the cause, there will still be others within the network capable ofdoing so.

The Mekong region is, of course, known to suffer from deep-seated socialand environmental governance problems. Perhaps with the exception ofThailand, generally seen to exhibit a higher degree of political openness (atleast before the May 2014 coup), China as well as the remaining countries ofmainland Southeast Asia are characterized largely by (semi-)authoritarianrule. There is often little transparency in these countries’ policy-makingprocesses, with key decisions on large infrastructure projects in particularhabitually made without prior public consultation. As a result, althougha substantial body of environmental legislation exists in China as well as inthe Mekong countries, sizeable barriers to the enforcement of these regula-tions and policies remain.

The notion of state accountability for transnational harm has also gainedlittle traction within the region. Given enduring sovereignty claims thatjustify a country’s exploitation of resources within its territory, the incentivesfor state compliance with transnational environmental responsibilities andstandards are limited, while the economic and political gains from non-compliance appear comparably greater.

By the same token, fostering standards compliance among corporate actorshas proven to be equally, if not more, difficult. Despite Chinese domesticregulations aimed at monitoring and minimizing the social and environmen-tal impacts of Chinese SOEs (e.g., the 2003 Environmental Impact Assess-ment Law), enforcement is uneven and inconsistent. While a number ofChina’s major SOEs like China Southern Power Grid (CSG) and Huanengare active participants in the U.N. Global Compact (UNGC),17 which com-mits them to the annual publication of CSR reports, translating commitmentson paper into actual implementation continues to be a prominent challenge.

16. See Peter M. Haas, ‘‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coor-dination,’’ International Organization 46:1 (Winter 1992), p. 2.

17. The UNGC is a ‘‘strategic policy initiative for businesses,’’ launched in 2000, to promotegood corporate citizenship in the ‘‘environmental, social and governance realms.’’ UNGC, ‘‘Over-view of the UN Global Compact,’’ <http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html>,accessed January 10, 2013.



http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html


As such, ‘‘voluntary mechanisms of corporate environmentalism’’18 are oftenrelied upon, with environmentally conscious companies being responsible forregulating and reporting on their own performance.

The emergence of a regional advocacy network on the issue of the Lancangdams has served, in part, as a response to the institutional weaknesses ofextant regional water governance arrangements—specifically the MekongRiver Commission (MRC), which is the main intergovernmental organiza-tion responsible for managing the Lower Mekong Basin and the sustainabledevelopment of its resources.19 Two common complaints leveled against theMRC are that it exercises very limited authority in influencing and regulatingupstream (i.e., Chinese) use of water resources; and, despite its adoption ofthe integrated water resources management (IWRM) framework (originallyderived from the 1992 ‘‘Dublin Principles’’), the organization has yet to fullyincorporate a participatory mechanism into its policy-making and consulta-tion processes. At the same time, other regional initiatives such as the GreaterMekong Subregion (GMS) and the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Eco-nomic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) remain chiefly geared toward thefulfilment of regional economic cooperation imperatives, such that environ-mental protection remains of secondary concern.20

The advocacy network taking root within the region, therefore, presents aninformal mechanism that promises to help in mitigating the shortcomings ofexisting regional institutions. Because the modus operandi of this networkcontrasts sharply with the MRC’s ‘‘top-down’’ model of multi-stakeholdergovernance, it offers a governing arrangement that espouses participationfrom the ‘‘ground up,’’ engaging directly with the local and regional publicsin river stewardship.21

18. Michael Mason, The New Accountability: Environmental Responsibility across Borders (London:Earthscan, 2005), p. 15.

19. The MRC, founded in 1995, was preceded by the Committee for Coordination and In-vestigations of the Lower Mekong Basin (or Mekong Committee) (1957 to 1978), and the InterimMekong Committee (1978–95). Its member-states are Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam.

20. The GMS is a development program of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), initiated in1992. Since 2005, the GMS project includes Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, andChina’s Yunnan Province and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. ACMECS member-states areCambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam.

21. Philip Hirsch, ‘‘IWRM as a Participatory Governance Framework for the Mekong RiverBasin?’’ in Politics and Development in a Transboundary Watershed: The Case of the Lower MekongBasin, ed. by Joakim Ojendal et al. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012), pp. 155–69.




While inspired by the legacy of early anti-dam movements in the regionsuch as the Assembly of the Poor, which rallied with affected villagers againstthe Pak Mun Dam in Thailand in the 1990s,22 activism against the Lancangcascade differs markedly from these earlier movements. Its broad-based mem-bership transcends national borders, effectively mirroring the transboundarynature of the river itself.

Yet, to a number of civil society representatives interviewed, it is preciselythe wide scope, fluid nature, and loose organization that fuel their doubts asto whether a Mekong civil society can be said to exist.23 Still, this diffusestructure does not necessarily signal weakness. The Bangkok-based Save theMekong Coalition constitutes one manifestation of transnational activism,having been established in 2008 just as China’s Lancang cascade becamedeeply controversial.24 Open to ‘‘anyone who shares concerns regarding thefuture of one of the world’s greatest river systems,’’25 the Coalition compriseslocal civil society groups, as well as national and transnational NGOs, in-cluding Living River Siam, TERRA (Towards Ecological Recovery andRegional Alliance), Salween Watch, China Development Brief, EarthRights,Probe International, and International Rivers. Focused on boosting publicawareness about the risks of damming and pressing for sustainable options,the organization uses direct and indirect pressure-tactics to influence thecourse of the ‘‘dam debate.’’

Utilizing a two-pronged approach, opponents of the Lancang cascadework to shape public perceptions of ‘‘what governments and business shouldbe doing’’ through the sustained contestation of the rationale for large dams,while concomitantly pressuring state and corporate actors to alter their atti-tudes toward dam-building and regional development more broadly.26 Inframing China’s hydropower expansion as an exigent collective problem, and

22. Ibid., p. 164.23. The author conducted a series of in-depth interviews with representatives from prominent

civil society groups and international NGOs active in the region over the course of six months in2009 and 2010, and two months in 2013 and 2014.

24. It deserves note that while China’s Lancang cascade has been a key issue of concern for thecoalition, Save the Mekong does not focus exclusively on China’s upstream dams.

25. Save the Mekong, ‘‘About Save the Mekong Coalition,’’ <http://www.savethemekong.org/issue_detail.php?sid¼13>, accessed January 9, 2013.

26. Ann M. Florini and P. J. Simmons, ‘‘What the World Needs Now?’’ in The Third Force: TheRise of Transnational Civil Society, ed. by Ann M. Florini (Washington, D.C.: Brookings InstitutionPress, 2000), p. 11.



http://www.savethemekong.org/issue_detail.php?sid=13




hydropower dams as a ‘‘less-than-sustainable’’ energy alternative, activistshelp promote norms of sustainability and civic engagement while publicizingthe issues. For example, Living River Siam’s Thai Baan (Thai Village)research methodology, which has been ‘‘borrowed’’ by other NGOs includ-ing those from China, helps to build local capacity by encouraging villagers toconduct their own research on the river and its features.27

THE LANCANG-MEKONG RIVER AND THE DAM DEBATE

With China’s position as an ‘‘upstream superpower,’’28 the Lancang-MekongRiver has gained both ecological and geopolitical significance across Asia.Indeed, what the 1997 Stockholm Water Symposium observed more thana decade ago remains pertinent here: ‘‘The overriding issue—how to recon-cile upstream socio-economic development with downstream protection ofecological services—remains unsolved.’’29

An Overview of Chinese Dam Development on the Lancang

The Lancang-Mekong River is one of the least developed river systems inthe world. Only a fraction of the Lancang’s total hydropower potential—estimated at approximately 30,000 MW—has been harnessed. This ischanging, however, as the river’s water resources are ascribed newfoundeconomic value to be tapped for national development and regional eco-nomic growth. But while many analysts attribute hydro-development onthe Lancang (as seen in Yunnan and Tibet) to recent policies designed todevelop China’s western regions,30 plans for a Lancang cascade are actuallylongstanding. Proposals for large-scale hydropower development were madeas early as the 1970s. In building this cascade, China hopes to take advan-tage of the river’s 700-meter drop in elevation to produce around 15,700

27. Pichamon Yeophantong interview with Living River Siam representative, Chiang Mai,Thailand, March 28, 2013.

28. James E. Nickum, ‘‘The Upstream Superpower: China’s International Rivers,’’ in Manage-ment of Transboundary Rivers and Lakes, ed. by Olli Varis et al. (Berlin: Springer, 2008), pp. 227–44.

29. Quoted in Ken Conca, Governing Water: Contentious Transnational Politics and GlobalInstitution Building (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2007), p. 121.

30. Namely, the State Council’s 10th Five-Year Plan (2001–05) of ‘‘Great Western Development’’(Xibu Da Kaifa), an infrastructure-development plan seeking to exploit the energy potential ofYunnan and Tibet, among other provinces and regions.




MW (about 70% of the combined engineering capacity of the ThreeGorges Dam).31

By the late 1980s, reports surfaced about plans for eight power stations onthe Lancang to fuel the growth of Yunnan Province’s phosphorus, lead, andzinc mining industries.32 China also made overtures to foreign investors,especially from Southeast Asia, ‘‘to tap hydropower resources’’ along theLancang.33 Broader public knowledge of the scale and implications of thescheme (spurred by activist networks) is, however, fairly recent.34 It was onlyduring the early 2000s that the scheme became designated as an ‘‘issue’’demanding critical attention, largely the result of public debate facilitatedby organizations such as the ADB and MRC.35

Begun in 1985, the first of the planned eight-dam cascade—the 1,500 MWManwan dam—became operational in 1995.36 Construction of the largestdam in the cascade—the 292 meter-high Xiaowan dam with a reservoircapable of holding 15 billion cubic meters—was completed in 2010. Leadingto the submersion of a large swathe of land and the displacement of over30,000 people, it has generated major discontent inside and outside China.37

Equally large is the 261.5 meter-high Nuozhadu dam38—described as thehighest rock-fill dam in Asia and a ‘‘national key project’’ in the Chinesegovernment’s strategic plan to develop Yunnan into a ‘‘national hydropowerbase.’’39 It has a water storage capacity of more than 20 billion cubic meters.

31. Timo Menniken, ‘‘China’s Performance in International Resource Politics: Lessons from theMekong,’’ Contemporary Southeast Asia 29:1 (April 2007), p. 106.

32. News of feasibility studies conducted for the Xiaowan and Dachaoshan dams were already incirculation by the early 1990s. ‘‘Energy: Plan for Hydropower Stations in Yunnan,’’ BBC, May 27,1987; ‘‘Government to Accelerate Resources Development in Southwest,’’ Xinhua, March 30, 1991.

33. ‘‘Foreign Investors Welcome to Tap Hydropower in Yunnan,’’ ibid., August 31, 1992.34. Dore, ‘‘The Governance of Increasing Mekong Regionalism,’’ p. 24.35. Ibid.36. The project was touted as the first that featured investments from both the central and

Yunnan governments.37. Huaneng Hydrolancang, ‘‘Huaneng Xiaowan Shuidianzhan 6 Tai Jizu Quanbu Touchan’’

[Huaneng Xiaowan Hydropower Station—all 6 (power generating) units operational], September 6,2010, <http://www.hnlcj.cn/shownews.asp?newsid¼2069>, accessed October 7, 2012.

38. ‘‘Largest Hydropower Station on Mekong River Starts Operation,’’ China Daily, September 7,2012, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-09/07/content_15742514.htm>, accessed October7, 2012.

39. ‘‘Huaneng Nuozhadu Hydropower Station Approved by the National Development andReform Commission,’’ <http://www.chng.com.cn/eng/n75863/n75941/c546339/content.html>, ac-cessed February 1, 2014.



http://www.hnlcj.cn/shownews.asp?newsid=2069

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Together, the Xiaowan and Nuozhadu have a cumulated power capacity ofnearly 10,000 MW and are believed to have caused visible impacts on sea-sonal hydrological flows further downstream (see below). Locals in northernThailand’s Chiang Khong District, the closest major Southeast Asian town toYunnan, have consistently claimed that rises in water levels were noticeablewhenever the sluice gates of these dams were opened.40

China’s hydropower policy, however, should not be viewed as havingevolved in isolation from traditional development attitudes prevalent in theregion, which are skewed toward exploiting natural resources for the sake ofdevelopment imperatives. Both the Jinghong and Nuozhadu dams along theLancang were initially slated to be a joint venture with Thailand’s GMSPower, a private developer, with electricity to be exported to China’s Guang-dong Province and Thailand to meet rising energy demands.41 Although thisarrangement ultimately fell through due to delays on the Thai side, electricityfrom the dams remains connected to the broader GMS power grid—a keycomponent of the ADB-backed regional energy and infrastructure strategies.Ongoing debate over proposed Mekong mainstream dams in Laos (i.e., theXayaburi and Don Sahong) underscores how at least one government issteadfastly pursuing ambitious hydropower plans, despite remonstrationsfrom its neighbors downstream, Cambodia and Vietnam.

Debating the Environmental and Social Impacts of the Lancang Cascade

With upstream-downstream dynamics serving as a prominent source of con-tention, fears of dam-induced ecological degradation among downstreamriparian communities, who have witnessed river bank erosion and decliningfish stocks, have grown over time. Dam proponents cite the advantages ofChina’s upstream dams—namely, their ability to help regulate the river’sflow regime in times of drought and flood.42 However, aside from theirlingering doubts about the actual capacity of China’s dams to beneficially

40. Geoffrey Gunn and Brian McCartan, ‘‘Chinese Dams and the Great Mekong Floods of2008,’’ Japan Focus, August 31, 2008, <http://www.japanfocus.org/articles/print_article/2865>, ac-cessed August 2, 2010.

41. China was to hold 75% of the stake. See ‘‘China, Thailand Join Forces on Yunnan PowerProjects,’’ People’s Daily, July 17, 2004.

42. The Chinese side is to put around 40% more water into the river during the dry seasonand reduce monsoon flow by 17% as circumstances demand in the wet season. ‘‘Lancang JiangNuozhadu Shuidianzhan Jiangke Jianhuan Xiayou Guojia Honglao Zaihai’’ [Lancang River Nuozhadu



http://www.japanfocus.org/articles/print_article/2865


manipulate seasonal flows, downstream residents also fear various types ofdamage from large-scale damming. These scenarios range from upstreamflooding that transforms river valleys, villages, and farmlands into reservoirs,to reduced sediment loads and abnormal water levels due to fluctuations involume and flow rates. These can cumulatively affect the Lancang-Mekong’smorphology, along with its mineral and nutrient concentration, which arevital to the ecology of major watersheds such as the Tonle Sap in Cambodiaand Mekong Delta in Vietnam.

In some areas of Thailand and Cambodia, the fish catch has reportedlydecreased by half, supposedly from lower water temperatures caused by waterreleased from upstream reservoirs and sudden hydrological fluctuationscaused by the opening and closing of sluice gates to allow for ship navigation.As a downstream country with no access to the Lancang-Mekong’s hydro-power potential, Vietnam has been especially skeptical of the purportedboons of upstream hydropower development that could pose serious threatsto the delta, the country’s ‘‘rice bowl.’’ In a thinly veiled criticism of theLancang dams, Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang remarked at the 2012

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit how ‘‘[d]am construc-tion and stream adjustments by some countries in upstream rivers’’ werea ‘‘growing concern for many countries and implicitly impinge on relationsbetween relevant countries.’’43 Laos, with 95% of its territory in the LowerMekong Basin and a dependence on the river’s waters for irrigation, fisheries,and hydropower, also stands to lose considerably. A prevailing concern is that(cheaper) electricity generated from Chinese dams could compete with Laos’shydropower exports, undermining the latter’s aspirations to become the‘‘battery’’ (Lao: mofai) of Southeast Asia.

But just as Chinese policymakers tell downstream communities thatupstream dams can help regulate the Mekong’s hydrology, they concomitantlyposit that these dams will have little impact on water levels, given how theLancang contributes only 13.5% to the Mekong’s total discharge. Even so,regionwide controversy over Chinese dams was first triggered by the adventof unusually low water levels, which critically impeded navigation in Southeast

-

Hydropower Station can mitigate downstream floods], Hong Wang [Red Net], September 7, 2012,<http://ny.rednet.cn/c/2012/09/07/2742483.htm>, accessed October 7, 2012.

43. ‘‘China’s Dams a Threat to the Mekong,’’ United Press International, October 1, 2012,<http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2012/10/01/Chinas-dams-a-threat-to-the-Mekong/UPI-43291349114632/>, accessed September 7, 2012 [emphasis added].



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Asia’s Golden Triangle area, in 1993 and again in 1997. Downstream, localcommunities and subsequently the Mekong governments voiced concernsthat the Manwan dam, which had been filling its reservoir, was the culprit. Inresponse, China released water from its dam to raise water levels. Alarm overunnatural fluctuations in the river’s hydrology emerged again during the dryseason of 2004, when unusual flow patterns were observed, causing agricul-tural and fishing losses and stranding cargo vessels. Considering that theDachaoshan dam had just been completed a year earlier, China was againbelieved to be culpable—not for the drought per se but for exacerbating it.The situation became so critical that the MRC formally asked Beijing formore information on China’s dam operations.

This was followed by the so-called 2008 Great Mekong floods, whereupondownstream communities blamed Chinese dams for a disaster of unprece-dented severity that partially inundated the Lao capital, Vientiane, and LuangPrabang city, as well as several of Thailand’s northern provinces. Mediaoutlets in Laos and Thailand, together with local civil society groups, notedhow affected communities were convinced that upstream dams had swelledthe runoff from sudden downpours, further compounded by Chinese-backedriver navigation development projects that had raised water levels by blastingand dredging river rapids. More recently, the severe regional drought in 2010

and the sudden peak in water levels in late 2013—dubbed in Thai media asa Mekong River ‘‘tsunami’’—have refocused attention on the Lancangcascade.44

The 2010 drought, in particular, catalyzed a regionwide public outcryagainst China’s upstream dam-building. Not only did the issue receive exten-sive media coverage, but the problems posed by large dams also spurred widerpolicy resonance among governments, going beyond being a domestic con-cern to one with cross-border implications. Coinciding with the MRC’sinaugural summit held in Hua Hin, Thailand, the controversy generatedby the drought propelled the issue of China’s dams onto the summit’s

44. The ‘‘tsunami’’ prompted questions on whether this abnormality was caused by Chinesedams releasing heavy rainfall from their reservoirs. ‘‘‘Tsunami’ Mekong Dhuk Sum Klang Reu-dooNhao’’ [‘Tsunami’ (in) the Mekong, double suffering in the middle of winter], Thai Rath, Decem-ber, 27, 2013, <http://www.thairath.co.th/column/pol/page1scoop/391958>, accessed December 28,2013; ‘‘Sudden Peak in Water Levels Caused by Unusually High Rainfall,’’ MRC, December 25, 2013,<http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/sudden-peak-in-water-levels-caused-by-unusually-high-rainfall/>, accessed December 28, 2013.



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agenda. In response, the official Chinese representative elaborated about the‘‘extremely dry weather conditions’’ and China’s desire to promote ‘‘equalconsultation’’ and ‘‘good-neighborly relationships.’’45 Significantly, it wasduring this period that the region’s emergent advocacy network arguablyunderwent further expansion, drawing increased attention from internationalobservers, particularly the U.S.46

While acknowledging concerns, the Chinese have largely denied theseallegations, notably with some downstream support. The MRC, for one,attributes both the 2008 floods and 2010 drought to extreme and erraticrainfall induced by climatic irregularities.47 Illustrative of the underlyingtensions in the dam debate among the region’s governments, civil society,and affected communities, the MRC, together with Thai and Lao govern-ment officials, has asserted that Chinese dams are not at fault as their storageareas are too small to affect the Lancang-Mekong’s downstream flood hydrol-ogy. However, although the majority of studies on the Lancang cascade’seffects are either inconclusive or seem to suggest the lack of any major,systematic alterations to water levels,48 popular perception—whether mis-guided or not—that Chinese dams are in part to blame for such irregularitiesremains strong, reinforced by the advocacy efforts of anti-dam activists.

Harnessing the Lancang-Mekong’s transboundary waters invariably raisesunresolved questions to do with transnational environmental harm, as well as

45. Song Tao, ‘‘Work Together for Common Development,’’ speech delivered at the FirstMRC Summit, Hua Hin, Thailand, April 5, 2010, <http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/speeches/first-mrc-summit-5/>, accessed May 23, 2011; see also ‘‘China Denies Dams WorsenDrought in Mekong Basin,’’ China Daily, March 31, 2010, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-03/31/content_9664697.htm>, accessed May 23, 2011.

46. At the 2009 Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) Ministerial Meeting, Sec-retary of State Hillary Clinton proposed the creation of the Lower Mekong Initiative. This prompteda ‘‘sister-river’’ agreement between the Mississippi River Commission and the MRC—marking theU.S.’s first major involvement in the MRC since its inception—aimed at encouraging sustainabledevelopment in the Mekong River Basin.

47. MRC, Annual Mekong Flood Report 2009 (Phnom Penh: MRC Office of the Secretariat,2010).

48. See He Daming, Feng Yan, Gan Shu, Darrin Magee, and You Weihong, ‘‘TransboundaryHydrological Effects of Hydropower Dam Construction on the Lancang River,’’ Chinese ScienceBulletin 51 (2006), pp. 16–24; Lu Xi Xi, Wang Jian-Jun, and Carl Grundy-Warr, ‘‘Are the ChineseDams to Be Blamed for the Lower Water Levels in the Lower Mekong?’’ in Modern Myths ofthe Mekong—A Critical Review of Water and Development Concepts, Principles, and Policies, ed. byMatti Kummu, Marko Keskinen, and Olli Varis (Helsinki: Helsinki University of Technology,2008), pp. 39–51.



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equitable use and distribution. There are also social and political externalitiessuch as those stemming from forced displacement and resettlement. Butapart from the political opacity that surrounds China’s dam-building activ-ities, part of the underlying problem lies with the weakness of sentiments ofshared responsibility at the regional level.49 This has helped perpetuate gov-erning arrangements that fail to fully incorporate public participation inpolicy-making. Indeed, it is only occasionally, and mainly under criticalcircumstances, that one hears overt criticism of Chinese dam-building fromSoutheast Asian governments and the MRC. Here, scrutiny of—and oppo-sition to—Chinese upstream dams continue to emanate chiefly from civilsociety, especially downstream.50

‘‘SAVING THE MEKONG’’ : FROM ACTIVISM TO POLICY SHIFTS?

To say that civil society actors play a major role in contesting upstream damdevelopment is different from asserting that they have had any influence onChina’s hydropower policies. Given the restrictive political climate in Chinaand mainland Southeast Asia, it appears unlikely that we can attribute anypolicy changes by Beijing or Hydrolancang directly to activists. With civicengagement often circumscribed by governments that see these activities aspotentially harmful to domestic order, it is not unreasonable to expect activ-ists working on the Lancang dams issue to have only a limited effect on stateand corporate behavior.

A case in point is the proposed 13-dam cascade on the Nu-Salween River,which for some distance parallels the Lancang, flowing through China,Myanmar, and Thailand before emptying into the Andaman Sea. Althoughthen-Premier Wen Jiabao had complied with public pressure by ordering theproject’s suspension in 2004 and again in 2009, by the middle of 2011, plansto dam this major river—one of the last free-flowing rivers in the world—resurfaced as part of China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–15).51 This turn ofevents reveals the recurring challenges faced by Nujiang (as it is called in

49. Katri Mehtonen, ‘‘Do the Downstream Countries Oppose the Upstream Dams?’’ inKummu, Keskinen, and Varis, eds., Modern Myths of the Mekong, pp. 161–73.

50. See, for example, Save the Mekong Coalition, ‘‘Drought Brings Severe Hardship to RiversideCommunities, Demonstrates Need for Regional Cooperation to Protect Mekong River,’’ March 14,2010, <http://www.savethemekong.org/news_detail.php?nid¼95>, accessed September 15, 2013.

51. Construction of some of the planned dams was reportedly to commence under President XiJinping’s leadership. Deng Quanlun, ‘‘Campaigners Re-ignite Nu River Dam Debate,’’ China Dialogue,



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China) activists in maintaining successful advocacy outcomes in the face ofvested political and economic interests.

As previously discussed, construction of the Lancang cascade is likewisedriven by a constellation of economic and political interests. Not only ishydropower generated by the dams touted as a boon to China’s energysecurity and national development but, for the Yunnan government, hydro-power development comes with the promise of fulfilled economic growthtargets and investment quotas that constitute, among other considerations,prerequisites for official promotion.52 However, even though the pressurefrom transnational activists did not prevent dam construction on the Lan-cang, the effort has engendered greater accountability on the part of theChinese government and Hydrolancang by rendering Chinese dam-building activities more transparent to the public and by increasing thereputational costs of perceived Chinese ‘‘irresponsibility.’’ Without the sus-tained opposition instigated by these dam opponents, China’s Lancang cas-cade is unlikely to have become a major regional concern in the first place.The involvement of the mass media, specifically those of downstream coun-tries such as Thailand’s Bangkok Post and Nation newspapers, has been criticalin bringing public scrutiny to bear on the purported consequences of Chinesedams. Such outlets have helped legitimize opposition efforts and give voice tolocal activists, contributing to the regionalization as well as internationaliza-tion of the issue.

A growing community of experts (e.g., scientists, academics, policy advo-cates, and think tanks) from within and beyond the Mekong region—of whichthe Mekong Program on Water, Environment, and Resilience (M-POWER)constitutes one example—has further added to the dam debate. Their efforts inparticular have produced provocative research that reconsiders the scientificrationale for hydropower as a cost-effective and sustainable energy alternative.53

Aside from the methane and carbon dioxide output caused by the inundationof vegetation cover, and the fact that hydropower can attract energy-intensive-

February 11, 2013, <https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/5694-Campaigners-re-ignite-Nu-River-dam-debate>, accessed March 15, 2013.

52. And, conversely, insurance against demotions handed out by the central government for lowperformance. Pichamon Yeophantong interview, Beijing, China, December 8, 2010.

53. Pichamon Yeophantong interviews, Beijing, China, December 2011; and idem, Phnom Penh,Cambodia, March 2014. See also Richard P. Cronin and Timothy Hamlin, Mekong Tipping Point:Hydropower Dams, Human Security, and Regional Stability (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. StimsonCenter, 2010).



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industries,54 China’s Lancang dams are expected to trap a considerable amountof sediment, which could lower their storage capacity. This reportedly hap-pened to the Manwan after only three years of operation.

Employing a range of rhetorical devices, including argumentation andshaming, together with regional campaigns and grassroots strategies, theMekong region’s incipient advocacy network has focused on disputing ‘‘out-dated’’ development discourses that champion the benefits of hydropowerthrough appeals to social progress, economic growth, and poverty alleviation.Against these claims, network activists point to the Manwan dam or theWorld Bank’s Nam Theun 2 in Laos to demonstrate how poverty is paradox-ically exacerbated by ‘‘development’’ with local livelihoods jeopardized bydisplacement and the fragmentation of fragile ecologies. The overarching fearhere is that China’s dams will irrevocably turn the Lancang-Mekong intoanother Yangtze or Yellow River, both of which are dying from ‘‘over-devel-opment,’’ siltation, and heavy industrial pollution.55 Crucially, these sentimentsran high in April 2010 when, following the much-publicized occurrence ofabnormally low water levels, riparian communities from affected northernThai provinces protested, with the support of Living River Siam, against theLancang cascade in front of the Chinese Embassy in Bangkok.

These activists are re-orienting the river’s ‘‘value’’ as a commodifiableresource to a provider of invaluable ecological services—the latter beinga point often omitted from state-led development narratives. Some organiza-tions within the network, such as TERRA, International Rivers, and WorldWide Fund for Nature (WWF) have also resorted to using international ‘‘bestpractice’’ language to frame the issue, as they make references to globalframeworks like the World Commission on Dams (WCD) principles or theHydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol (HSAP) in an attempt toappeal to the Chinese government’s reputational considerations—improvingthe country’s soft-power attraction and dispelling ‘‘China threat’’ anxietieshave remained central to Beijing’s regional strategy—and Hydrolancang’sdesire to ‘‘go global.’’56

Furthermore, through the orchestration of mass petitions and protests, thepublication of assessment reports, and the organization of public forums like

54. See Meng Si, ‘‘Hydropower’s Green Excuse,’’ China Dialogue, February 14, 2011, <http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/4105>, accessed January 20, 2012.

55. Jane Qiu, ‘‘Trouble on the Yangtze,’’ Science 336:6079 (April 2012), pp. 288–91.56. Pichamon Yeophantong interview, Bangkok, Thailand, April 3, 2014.



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the 2010 forum on ‘‘Sharing the Mekong Basin’’57—which succeeded inbringing together representatives from civil society, media, academia, andgovernment (including the Chinese embassy in Thailand)—activists are rais-ing the public profile of affected communities and, in so doing, spotlightingthe ‘‘human face’’ of dam-induced environmental degradation. Doing so notonly helps to heighten the general public’s interest and empathy toward theircause but also ensures that the problem remains ‘‘current’’ in the issue-attention cycle.58 Certainly, documentary films like Eureka Films’ WhereHave All the Fish Gone (2006) also serve this purpose.

One grassroots approach to public pressure is evinced by the Save theMekong coalition’s 2009 postcard-petition campaign aimed at halting damconstruction on the Lancang-Mekong’s mainstream. More than 23,000 sig-natures—most from subsistence farmers and fishermen living along theriver—were delivered to the Cambodian, Lao, Thai, and Vietnamese govern-ments. Through this broad-based campaign, which gained the support ofpublic figures and saw the organization of public seminars around the world,59

the coalition raised awareness on the implications of mainstream dams for foodand water security, as well as local biodiversity (vis-a-vis endangered species likethe Mekong dolphin and manatee).60

In this way, transnational activism within the region has largely centeredon three interrelated concerns: first, the lack of transparency in Chinese dam-building; second, China’s ‘‘dialogue partner’’ status in the MRC; and, third,halting upstream dam construction in favor of more sustainable dam buildingpractices. The first concern is manifest in calls for China to share more of itshydrological information with downstream countries. Although China hasbeen providing wet-season data to the MRC since 2002, only in 2010 didBeijing agree, under growing public pressure, to provide dry-season hydro-logical data from the Yunjinghong and Manan hydrometric stations61 in light

57. The forum was hosted at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok and co-organized by NGOs,including Mekong Energy and Ecology Network (MEE Net), Chiang Kong Conservation Group,Vietnam Rivers Network, Mekong Watch, and International Rivers.

58. See Anthony Downs, ‘‘Up and Down with Ecology: The Issue-Attention Cycle,’’ PublicInterest 28 (Summer 1972), pp. 38-50.

59. Pichamon Yeophantong interview, Bangkok, Thailand, April 16, 2014.60. Thuy Ha, ‘‘World Joins Mekong Citizens in Battle to Stop Dam Building,’’ Viet Nam News,

June 19, 2009, <http://vietnamnews.vn/environment/189143/world-joins-mekong-citizens-in-battle-to-stop-dam-building.html>, accessed June 14, 2011.

61. These stations are located close to the Chinese border.



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of the extreme drought witnessed that year. The agreement was reached at the2010 MRC summit, and was explicitly framed in official statements as a dem-onstration of Chinese goodwill to help downstream countries ‘‘battle thedrought and mitigate disaster.’’62 Although some still contend that moreinformation is needed, this development in itself constitutes a noteworthypolicy shift considering China’s longstanding reluctance to doing so and itstendency to associate such concessions with national security and sovereigntyconsiderations.63

This agreement has since been coupled with other expressions of construc-tive engagement, which feed into a broader ‘‘public relations’’ offensive aimedat revalidating China’s ‘‘responsible upstream country’’64 image. Invitationswere extended in early 2010 for official representatives from Cambodia, Laos,Thailand, and Vietnam to visit the Jinghong dam. Beijing also committeditself to hosting an international training program on flood control manage-ment and disaster mitigation for personnel from the MRC and Mekongcountries. Moreover, in August 2013, the Chinese government renewed itsdata-sharing agreement with the MRC, extending the period of real-timehydrological data provision by 30 days and raising the frequency of informa-tion exchange from once to twice a day.

Even so, critics of China’s hydropower schemes continue to cite its failureto become an MRC member country as evidence of its ‘‘unilateral’’ dam-building intentions and proclivity to ‘‘forum-shop,’’ electing to participateonly in organizations that advance its interests. As a ‘‘dialogue partner,’’65

China is not formally required to observe all the rules and principles stipu-lated in the 1995 Mekong Agreement, meaning that the MRC’s capacity toinduce Chinese compliance with prevailing water-sharing arrangements re-mains limited. Should China join, the hope is that this would strengthen the

62. Song Tao, ‘‘Work Together for Common Development.’’ That said, China did not sharehydrological data for 2011, despite the drought and low water levels documented that year.

63. According to China’s ‘‘Regulations on State Confidentiality in Water Resources Managementand Its Specific Scope and Security Classification’’ (2000), certain information pertaining to riverhydrology, water use, and hydropower development is considered confidential if involving trans-boundary rivers.

64. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘‘Vice Foreign Minister: China Is Ready for PragmaticCooperation with the MRC,’’ April 5, 2010, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t677811.htm>,accessed June 24, 2011.

65. The only other dialogue partner is Myanmar.



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MRC’s operational mandate and generate greater transparency vis-a-visChina’s hydropower schemes.

Granted the rather equivocal nature of principles such as ‘‘reasonable andequitable use’’ that could constrain China’s ‘‘sovereign right’’ to use waterresources within its territory, the Chinese response on MRC membershipcontinues to be lukewarm. But while public pressure may not have yieldeddiscernible policy change on this matter, we should not discount its role ingetting Beijing to agree—at least at the rhetorical level—to deeper engagementwith the MRC and mainland Southeast Asian governments. As Witoon Perm-pongsachareon, director of TERRA, observes: ‘‘China is often very silent onmost issues; so when China responds, these are important signs of change.’’66

As such, although it seems to be more an exception than the norm for theChinese government and a major SOE like Hydrolancang to submit—oreven respond—to civil society demands, there are growing signs that suggestactivist efforts have not been entirely in vain. Amid censure from the regionalpublic, Hydrolancang’s Chairman Wang Yongxiang sought to demonstratehis company’s commitment to sustainable dam development by announcingthe establishment of ‘‘botanical gardens [for] rare plants and animal [rescue]stations’’ around the Nuozhadu dam site.67 Environmental protection mea-sures were likewise implemented at the other Lancang dam sites, includingthe creation of botanic gardens for replanting rare flora as well as stations forfish conservation and wildlife rehabilitation, with officials from the Mekongcountries invited to visit these locations.68

Equally significant are the collaborations between institutions, such asYunnan University’s Asian International Rivers Center and China Hydro-power Engineering Consulting Group (Hydrochina) to conduct scientificresearch on the upper Lancang-Mekong. Organizations like the Heinrich BollStiftung, WWF, and CGIAR’s Challenge Program on Water and Food(CPWF), which are active in the region, also play an important role in facil-itating multi-stakeholder dialogue among civil society, Mekong governments,Chinese officials, and the private sector. Of particular note was the five-year

66. Pichamon Yeophantong interview with Witoon Permpongsachareon, Bangkok, Thailand,September 20, 2013.

67. ‘‘Largest Hydrostation on Mekong River Starts Operation,’’ Xinhua, September 6, 2012,<http://www.china.org.cn/business/2012-09/06/content_26453142.htm>, accessed July 9, 2013.

68. ‘‘Summary Notes: Second Visit by a Delegation of Energy Planners and HydropowerDevelopers from China,’’ M-POWER (September 2012), p. 18.



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memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed in 2011 between the WWF-China Program and Hydrolancang. Supported by the Alcoa Foundation, thisagreement would support the unprecedented launch of a trial HSAP assess-ment on the Jinghong—the first unofficial hydropower sustainability assess-ment conducted in China—and, later, Nuozhadu hydropower stations. Theinitiative was, in part, prompted by a series of multi-stakeholder dialoguesessions, coordinated by CPWF and funded by a large grant from the Aus-tralian Agency for International Development (AusAID).69 This included the‘‘Roundtable on Sustainable Hydropower Development in the Mekong,’’ co-organized by WWF-China, M-POWER, and CPWF in September 2011,which focused on deepening cooperation between upper and lower ripariancountries.70

Network activists working on the Lancang issue have, moreover, met withsome success in their efforts to stop irresponsible dam-building upstream.This outcome came via Vice-Foreign Minister Song Tao’s announcement atthe 2010 MRC Summit that China, as a ‘‘responsible upstream country,’’ haddecided to cancel the Mengsong dam, then the last one in the cascade. Thisaction reflected an environmental impact assessment that indicated the dam’spotential negative impact on fish migration. In what appeared to indicateBeijing’s increased responsiveness to civil society demands, Song also revealedplans to construct a counter-regulation reservoir at Ganlanba to preventirregular downstream fluctuations in water levels, and plans to incorporatea US$30 million stratified water intake project into the Nuozhadu’s construc-tion. Consistent with recommendations proposed by hydro-engineering ex-perts from downstream countries,71 these measures—which Hydrolancangapparently suffered losses to undertake72—are expected to help mitigate thecascade’s effects on the Lancang-Mekong’s water temperature and, by exten-sion, downstream fisheries.73

Resistance to Chinese dams has not been confined just to downstreamcommunities. Networks of opposition that link the activities of downstream

69. ‘‘Australian Mekong Water Resources Program Annual Program Performance Report 2011,’’AusAID (2011), p. 10.

70. ‘‘WWF-China Programme Annual Report 2012,’’ WWF (2012), p. 33.71. Pichamon Yeophantong personal communication with Chaiyuth Sukhsri, Bangkok, Thai-

land, May 20, 2011. Nevertheless, skepticism remains as to the Ganlanba reservoir’s capacity toregulate the cumulative impact of all dams in the cascade.

72. Pichamon Yeophantong interview, Yunnan, China, August 26, 2013.73. Song Tao, ‘‘Work Together for Common Development.’’




activists to those upstream have also gradually come into being. WithinChina, mass displacement due to dam construction and inadequate compen-sation has posed persistent problems for local communities. This is com-pounded by such concerns as water pollution, soil erosion, industrial debris,and ecological fragmentation that are frequently caused by reservoir inunda-tion and forest habitat destruction in the post-dam construction phase.

Similar problems surfaced during the construction of the Lancang dams.In the case of the Manwan, advocacy campaigns spearheaded by grassrootsChinese NGOs—most notably, Yunnan-based Green Watershed—and sup-ported by transnational NGOs like Oxfam and International Rivers playeda key role in pushing for the implementation of ‘‘participatory’’ social impactassessments (SIA) alongside environmental ones. These efforts were aimed atpersuading the Chinese state and provincial governments to rethink the highsocial and environmental stakes involved in building the dam. In a boldmove, Green Watershed’s founder Yu Xiaogang led a delegation of dam-affected villagers to the U.N. Symposium on Hydropower and SustainableDevelopment in Beijing in 2004, where he gave a presentation on the Man-wan dam’s impacts.74 This was preceded by the ‘‘817’’ Incident in 2003, wherean estimated 3,000 people adversely affected by the Manwan’s constructionhad mobilized, under Green Watershed’s direction, to demand a meetingwith the Manwan Huaneng Power Company on resettlement and compen-sation issues. Lasting three days, the demonstration is often considered a mile-stone for anti-dam activists in China.75 Not only were these events successfulin rallying civic engagement, but they also helped to heighten the policyrelevance of activism at the local levels. Significantly, subsequent findingsfrom an SIA study conducted by Yu and Jia Jiguo would persuade theYunnan government to set aside an additional US$9.7 million in resettlementfunds to be allocated to communities displaced by the Manwan.76

74. See Yu Xiaogang, ‘‘The New Development View Is Calling for Participatory Social ImpactEvaluation—Case Study of Manwan Hydropower Station,’’ presented at the U.N. Symposium onHydropower and Sustainable Development, October 27–19, 2004, <http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/sdissues/energy/op/hydro_yu.pdf>, accessed May 10, 2011.

75. Andrew Mertha, China’s Water Warriors: Citizen Action and Policy Change (Ithaca, N. Y.:Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 112–14.

76. Yu Xiaogang and Jia Jiguo, ‘‘An Overview of Participatory Social Impact Assessment forManwan Hydropower Station in [sic] Lancang River’’ (2002), <http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/mekong-regional-initiatives/china/lancang-mekong-river/manwan-dam-social-impact-assessment>,accessed June 10, 2011.



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http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/mekong-regional-initiatives/china/lancang-mekong-river/manwan-dam-social-impact-assessment

http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/mekong-regional-initiatives/china/lancang-mekong-river/manwan-dam-social-impact-assessment


Notably, as a broader response to advocacy efforts, Chinese officials havecome to favor a ‘‘hydropower as clean energy’’ frame to vindicate the coun-try’s hydropower expansion at home and abroad. This falls in line withshifting regional discourses that seek to allay public concern by associatinglarge-scale hydropower projects with sustainable development and climatechange mitigation.77 As asserted by former MRC CEO Oliver Cogels,‘‘Hydropower has the big advantage of producing electricity without carbonemissions and the respective impact on global warming.’’78 Likewise illustra-tive of this amalgamation of old and new narratives is the ensuing statementby Song Tao: ‘‘The scientific . . . development and utilization of water re-source[s] meets the real need of people in the region to eradicate povertyand realize social and economic progress and is a major measure of usingrenewable and clean energy and addressing climate change.’’79 Clearly, one ofthe main justifications for the Lancang cascade—that it helps to mitigate theconsequences of climate variability by regulating the river’s run-offs duringthe dry and wet seasons—flows from this line of reasoning.

CONCLUSION

‘‘Meeting the needs and keeping the balance’’80 in the Mekong River Basin isa profoundly difficult task. Especially for developing countries, an enduringquestion is how this ideal ought to be translated into practice. By no means isChina the only country facing sizeable impediments to mainstreamingsustainable development; mainland Southeast Asian governments are alsogoing through a similar learning curve. At issue here is the familiar dilemmaof how national modernization and economic growth, in this case through

77. Philip Hirsch and Rosalia Sciortino, ‘‘Climate Change and the Resource Politics of theGreater Mekong Subregion,’’ in Climate Change Challenges, ed. by Kobkhun Rayanakorn (ChiangMai: Chiang Mai University Press, 2011), p. 230.

78. Oliver Cogels, ‘‘Mekong Hydropower Development Is Good,’’ Bangkok Post, January 9,2007.

79. Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry, ‘‘Vice Foreign Minister: China Is Ready for PragmaticCooperation with the MRC,’’ April 5, 2010, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Ireland,<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cenp/eng/zgwj/t677811.htm>, accessed June 10, 2011.

80. Partially taken from the MRC Hua Hin Declaration’s title: see MRC, ‘‘Meeting the Needsand Keeping the Balance: Towards Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin,’’ April 5,2010, <http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/speeches/mrc-hua-hin-declaration/>, accessedJune 9, 2011.



http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cenp/eng/zgwj/t677811.htm

http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/speeches/mrc-hua-hin-declaration/


hydropower development, are to be pursued without endangering liveli-hoods and vulnerable ecosystems.

Focusing on the case of China’s Lancang dam cascade, this article hasillustrated how, in the absence of effective regional and domestic institutionsfor managing the Lancang-Mekong’s shared water resources, a dynamic castof dam opponents has come to form a transnational advocacy network withinthis industrializing Mekong region. The article has further argued that, con-straints notwithstanding, this evolving advocacy network does matter. Work-ing to curb China’s hydropower ambitions and challenge conventionaldevelopment paradigms, network activists are playing an increasingly pivotalrole in transboundary river governance, pressuring the Chinese governmentand, to a lesser degree, Hydrolancang into accounting for the consequences oftheir upstream dam-building activities.

Results are evident from shifts in the policy discourse and behavior of thetarget actors. By shedding light on the Lancang cascade’s ecological and socialrepercussions, these activists have transformed it into a regional issue worthyof critical and concerted action. And by bringing public scrutiny to bear onthe cascade, they are increasing the scheme’s reputational costs for the Chi-nese government and Hydrolancang, eliciting a more conciliatory responsefrom both of these parties. Without sustained activism, such occurrences asthe 2010 drought would presumably not have become a major item on theMRC’s agenda at the Hua Hin summit; nor would there be broad publicknowledge of China’s upstream dams and their impacts in the first place.

As observed by a representative from one prominent international envi-ronmental organization operating within the region, an important quality ofthe Mekong region’s evolving transnational advocacy network lies with itspotential to become a knowledge network that facilitates the cultivation of‘‘learning landscapes’’ for multi-stakeholder dialogue and cooperation oncomplex problems of common concern.81 Driven by grassroots engagement,it promises to become a complementary mechanism to formal regime ar-rangements at the intergovernmental level that serves to enhance publicparticipation in river stewardship. Indeed, aside from the Lancang cascade,network activists have also succeeded in instigating campaigns against other

81. Pichamon Yeophantong interview with International Union for Conservation of Nature(IUCN) representative, Bangkok, Thailand, April 10, 2013.




planned mainstream dams in the Lower Mekong Basin (of which resistanceagainst the Xayaburi dam in Laos is instructive).

That said, activists’ direct influence on policy remains considerably cir-cumscribed. Plans to dam the Lancang continue to be pursued. There existsonly a weak institutional framework to enforce Chinese compliance withexisting legal and social mandates. It is, moreover, the case that Beijing stillprefers to deal with issues at the bilateral or MRC level, as opposed to directengagement with communities. The lack of an integrated mechanism forparticipatory representation at the regional level—despite the MRC’s ef-forts—has meant that civil society actors are constrained from deep partici-pation in regional policy-making. Among those interested parties deserving ofa more compelling voice are groups such as Save the Mekong coalition andGreen Watershed, and the communities they represent in northern Thailandor in the Chinese prefectures of Lincang, Simao, and Dali.82

Still, there is reason for the Chinese government and major dam devel-opers like Hydrolancang to pursue their hydropower aspirations with care. Ifanything, what the advocacy network taking root within this modernizingregion underscores is the crucial place of the ‘‘politics of the non-state,’’83

amid the often contentious processes of governing a shared environment—in this case, a shared river.

82. Communities from these areas were resettled due to the Manwan’s construction. See ZiYinsheng et al., ‘‘Comments on the ‘Four Rights’ of Immigrants Affected by Dam Construction’’(October 2004), paper prepared for the U.N. Symposium on Hydropower and Sustainable Devel-opment, <http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/attached-files/4rights.pdf>, accessed February1, 2014.

83. Conca, Governing Water, p. 24.



http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/attached-files/4rights.pdf


Documents

China’s Lancang Dam Cascade and Transnational Activism in the Mekong Region: Who’s Got the Power?