Building New Democrats or New Bin Ladens? The US Illusion of Spreading Democracy and Fighting Terrorism, Democracy and Security, 2007

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Democracy and Security, 3:1–20, 2007Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN: 1741-9166 print/1555-5860 onlineDOI: 10.1080/17419160701539521

FDAS1741-91661555-5860Democracy and Security, Vol. 3, No. 3, October 2007: pp. 1–33Democracy and SecurityBuilding New Democrats or New Bin Ladens? The US Illusion of Spreading Democracy and Fighting TerrorismBuilding New Democrats or New Bin Ladens?M.D. Crosston

Dr. Matthew D. Crosston (Brown ’03)

Assistant Professor Department of Political Science, Clemson University

The United States proclaims two major foreign policy objectives: to fight terrorismwherever it is found and to spread democracy wherever it can be promulgated. It issteadfastly believed that these two priorities can be achieved simultaneously and donot collide. This article explains how these two objectives, as presently pursued by theUS, will in fact inevitably collide. The Central Asian region is used as empirical evi-dence. This collision not only undermines the short-term objective of fighting terror-ism, it engages other states in ways that undermine democracy long-term andenflames Islamic rage not only against the local regimes but also against Americaitself. This collision is an absence of synergy between professed US diplomacy andactual policy implementation. The US is thereby its own worst enemy in the waragainst terror because instead of building democracy it is building new bin Ladens.

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INTRODUCTION

The problems inherent to fighting terrorism and spreading democracy are socomplex and emotional that the literature has a rigid divide between conser-vative and liberal angles. Very few pieces have tried to bridge the middle gap.This article does by arguing for the essential prioritization of long-term secu-rity strategies that focus on legitimate democratic development, even if itappears to compromise the short-term fight against terror, and uses the littleknown region of Central Asia to reveal the consequences when this advice isignored. This analysis goes beyond the standard moral vs. national interestdebates that inform most of the literature. Instead it argues the missing

Crosston is Assistant Professor in Comparative Politics/International Relations atClemson University. He specializes in the problems of democratization and terrorism,with special emphasis on the former Soviet Union and the Middle East.Address correspondence to

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middle ground that the war against terror offers the US a unique opportunity:a situation where doing what is moral and just is actually the best way toserve American and global security.

This article makes explicit for the first time how compromising principlesof democracy in areas already sensitive to Islamic revolutionary thought ulti-mately undermines the war on terror in the most significant way: it makes thefight against terror not simply intractable but infinite in length and bottom-less in its pool of future fighters who will try to kill Americans. It asks a ques-tion that is so difficult that up to now the United States government has beenreluctant to seriously consider it: are the two objectives, fighting terror andspreading democracy, actually compatible? This work shows that the US hasbeen incorrectly fighting the former, compromising its principles on the latter,and thus enflaming its own future security problems.

The evidence here reveals a disturbing trend that verbally endorses long-term strategies but then consistently undermines them in real-time withshort-term policy implementation. It shows how the effort to fight the waragainst terror often results in the US compromising its formal policy on demo-cratic development in such a way as to give cause for future terror to grow.These dual foreign policy priorities do in fact collide. The aftermath of that col-lision makes the US less safe because its engagement too often works againstthe very principles it supposedly is aiming to achieve: an open society,representative government, and social justice.

The present argument runs contrary to diplomatic tradition. Protectingphysical security has always been considered a more immediate nationalinterest while democratization is only an indirect benefit to the United States,producing results much further down the political road. This article offers thenew argument that the present fight against terror (think Iraq and Afghani-stan) is not actually the greatest danger fueling radical fires to burn againstthe United States. The ultimate danger in the war against terror emergesfrom the compromises made on democratic development with governmentswho cooperate in the war against terror. These are governments who in factmove further away from freedom while the US inexplicably claims its engage-ment moves them closer to liberty. This hypocrisy radicalizes local oppositionnot only against the home regime but against the foreign power duplicitouslysupporting it. This inevitably leads to an emerging hatred against the UnitedStates best expressed through terrorism. The time to achieve synergy betweenpolicy and practice could never be more important.

This analysis appeals to those who think the only choice in regions likeCentral Asia is between chaotic democracy and authoritarian stability. Itwarns that a new, more deadly third option is available: a violent Islamic rad-icalism that will have not only a cultural, linguistic, and religious connectionto the general population but will rest on a political foundation that is logical,analytically sound, and damning to the United States.

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Building New Democrats or New Bin Ladens? 3

It is true that democratic engagement with states sensitive to Islamistthought can result in chaotic democracy. That chaos, however, is not for thelong-term and will provide the tools, support, and ideas necessary to emergefrom such chaos if the original engagement is absent hypocrisy. Therein liesthe problem exposed in this article: actual US engagement de facto promotesauthoritarian stability and gives the impression that it is even preferred to afunctional democracy. This is unacceptable because it gives the third way, theradical Islamic way, the ultimate legitimacy amongst local populations.

The long-term answer to terrorism is indeed freedom, prosperity, dignity,and justice. Societies imbued with these characteristics will never be over-whelmed by terrorism. They may be attacked, but they will not be overcome.That is the only achievable victory. However, as long as the US continues tocompromise long-term victory in the name of short-term strategic gain itbetrays democracy in the name of combating terror. This is counter-productivebecause only democracy defangs terror long-term.

Most world hegemons throughout history did not anticipate their down-fall. This was because they were constantly looking for external threats,secure in the stability, and superiority of their own societies. They were neverprepared for a downfall from within. While it is premature to draw parallelsright now, it is nonetheless worth watching: America’s downfall will not comeat the hands of terrorists but it may come because of the hypocrisy and contra-dictions it created while fighting them. It is not yet too late to correct suchflaws. The US only needs to act in accordance with its own declared principlesand back up that program with punitive consequences when it is not adheredto. In the post-9/11 world, long-term democratic development as a remedyagainst terror must no longer be considered a secondary priority comparedwith short-term security.

Choosing Sides in the LiteratureWhile this article asks and answers questions directly affecting policy,

this is not a pure policy piece. It in fact builds upon a growing literature thatis marked by intellectual debate, intense partisanship, and emotion. Thepresent article addresses this literature and aims to mark a mid-pointbetween the warring sides.

Zakaria’s The Future of Freedom calls for a restoration of the balancebetween liberty and democracy and shows how liberal democracy has to bemade effective and relevant for our time.1 The present article builds off this byshowing how American foreign policy is failing to make liberal democracymore effective and relevant. However, it respectfully steps away fromZakaria’s treatise on liberal constitutionalism, where it is only those countriesthat had the benefit of time and gradual change that develop democraticinstitutions. The argument here disagrees with this premise as the US can

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practice foreign policy so that it engenders the development of liberal constitu-tionalism in other places.

Zakaria’s book is more balanced than many of the works that inform thisdebate about democracy and terror. Amy Chua’s World On Fire, for example,argues that America enjoys a wealth and economic power wildly dispropor-tionate to its numbers. This accounts for the visceral hatred of Americansexpressed through terrorism. Chua warns that, far from making the world abetter and safer place, democracy and capitalism are intensifying ethnicresentment and global violence with potentially catastrophic results.2 Myargument builds off of Chua in that her anecdotal evidence is better under-stood by examining the consequences offered here on American hypocrisy inCentral Asia. It differs with Chua, however, in that she purports that suchhypocrisy is by design and that American engagement wants to only produceinequality, suffering, and strife. The argument made here shows this not to betrue.

The same intellectual suspicion can be found in Noam Chomsky’s Hege-mony or Survival, which dissects America's quest for global supremacy. Helays out how this drive for hegemony ultimately threatens global peace.3 Thepresent article does not seek to discredit or dismiss the logic of Chomsky. Itsimply refuses to buy into the conspiracy theory that the US Department ofState purposefully seeks to undermine other countries through democraticengagement. The argument made here shows how such hypocrisy actuallyundermines and subverts American security and power, rather than enhanc-ing and intensifying it. The dangerous consequences from hypocritical policyimplementation are real enough. They are emblematic, however, of a failure toremain true to America’s democratic mission rather than a purposefulattempt to undermine other states.

Tipping the intellectual scales back in the other direction are works likeStatebuilding by Francis Fukuyama. He argues that the well-governed politywas always necessary as weak or failed states are the source of many of theworld's most serious problems. He discusses the consequences of weak stateson international order and the grounds on which the international communitymay legitimately intervene to prop them up.4 The argument made here is notin line with Fukuyama: his untenable position only creates more conflict whenhe says America should encourage democratization solely because it supportsUS dominance. That support should exist because it creates stability andprosperity for other states and gives them the institutions and tools necessaryto add to international peace. Fukuyama overemphasizes the applications ofmilitary intervention and can too often explain away short-term rationaliza-tions that have the US cooperating with dictators and tyrants. The presentarticle reveals how damaging these rationalizations can be.

Natan Sharansky’s The Case for Democracy rounds out the intellectualspectrum. Sharansky takes non-democratic societies and puts them under a

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microscope to reveal the mechanics of tyranny that sustain them. In exposingthe inner workings of a fear society, Sharansky explains why democracy is notbeyond any nation's reach, why democracy is essential for US security, and whythere is much that can be done to promote it around the world.5 There is muchin the present article that agrees with Sharansky. It agrees with the transfor-mative power of real democracy and laments its uneven spread. Sharansky,however, accepts this uneven spreading as unchangeable and focuses more onthe need to push aggressively for the elimination of fear societies by replacingthem with free ones. However, this article shows why any military intervention,as presently conducted by the US, is doomed to failure exactly because it isbased on a hypocrisy that undermines long-term American objectives. As longas it remains this way then Islamic radicals will always have a counter againstthe so-called goodwill of American engagement that cannot be easily refuted.

These works are by no means the only representatives in the ever-enlarg-ing field to examine democracy and terror together. What they do represent,however, is an appropriate sampling of the full spectrum, with authors likeChua and Chomsky on the left, Fukuyama and Sharansky on the right, andZakaria somewhat center-left. Taken together, these works provide the ana-lytical range in the literature. The present article builds off of these workswhile also differentiating itself from them by being firmly in the middle of thespectrum. It aims to eliminate partisanship on this crucial issue.

The United States Democracy StrategyThe Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) is a govern-

mental organization committed to supporting and promoting democracy pro-grams throughout the world. It formally states that the reason for promotingdemocracy is that it is the one national interest that helps secure all the oth-ers. Democratically governed nations are more likely to secure the peace,deter aggression, expand open markets, promote economic development, pro-tect American citizens, combat international crime, uphold human rights, andavoid humanitarian crises.6 For the DRL, this is largely done through itsHuman Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF), which was established duringthe Clinton Administration.

The DRL, hyperbole aside, represents the diplomatic frontline for Ameri-can foreign policy when it comes to spreading democracy. The Bureau con-cisely expresses American priorities without equivocation:

• Assist newly formed democracies in implementing democratic principles

• Assist democracy advocates around the world to establish vibrant democ-racies in their own countries

• Identify and denounce regimes that deny their citizens the right to choosetheir leaders in elections that are free, fair, and transparent.7

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According to the DRL, the United States is pursuing a broad strategy of pro-moting respect for human rights that is both morally self-justifying and stra-tegically beneficial for US security. The US is “persuaded that regimes thatviolate the human rights of their own citizens are more likely to disrupt peaceand security in their region and create a reservoir of ill will that can accrue tothe detriment of the United States.”8 This persuasion is backed up by aNational Security Strategy that lists eight demands of human dignity9:

1. The rule of law

2. Limits on the absolute power of the state

3. Freedom of speech

4. Equal justice

5. Respect for women

6. Religious and ethnic tolerance

7. Respect for private property

8. Freedom of worship

These eight demands of human dignity are not merely words on paper accord-ing to the DRL but are a policy stance matched by action. In other words, theUS engages the world community and performs faithfully according to itsprinciples. This engagement is the primary objective of US foreign policy,pushed forward by at least three additional goals that form the core of Ameri-can strategy:

• Hold governments accountable to their obligations under universal humanrights norms and international human rights instruments.

• Promote greater respect for human rights, including freedom from torture,freedom of expression, press freedom, women’s rights, children’s rights,and the protection of minorities.

• Promote rule of law, seek accountability, and change cultures of impunity.

There is nothing wrong with the philosophy underlying US foreign policy. Onthe contrary, it is almost not debatable in its convictions. The problem is inthe failure of implementation. Results can emerge only if policy is honestlyengaged and implemented. There will be no results, not immediate nor gener-ational, if implementation is not genuine. While the US may claim to be diplo-matically working with regions such as Central Asia it is not truly engaged interms of sincere policy implementation. It declares the right principles inregard to law, accountability, and human dignity, but it chooses to ignorethem if an ally in the war against terror makes a mockery of them. The US

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has not tried to change the culture of impunity and the present work revealshow unwise such games are when connected to terrorism.

The Problems of Democratic Engagement in Central AsiaFrom September 11, 2001 to the present day consistent attention has been

paid to the need for connecting the war on terror with three state-building ide-als: respecting democratic principles, developing civil society, and institutingthe rule of law. The United States says it is not interested in finding conve-nient partners who help it conduct the war against terror but who are not will-ing to produce true positive change within their own societies. It also says it isnot willing to turn a blind eye to transgressions in the latter three goals men-tioned above in exchange for assistance in fighting terror.

This symbiosis between fighting terror internationally while encouragingdemocratic development within allies domestically is clearly America’spresent foreign policy foundation. Ostensibly, this foundation emerged as aconsequence to the harsh lesson learned after the US disengaged fromAfghanistan in the early 1990s: countries must not be left alone and allowedto become breeding grounds for extremism and terrorism.10 To prevent thesedestructive forces from emerging in Central Asia, US diplomacy has suppos-edly intensified its efforts to help the countries of this area become stable,prosperous, and fully integrated into the world community.11

Unfortunately, these claims appear to be hollow. Funding to Central Asiadid indeed significantly increase after 9/11. However, very little on the groundchanged because of this funding increase and in many instances democraticconditions worsened. While the three crucial states of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan,and Uzbekistan have cooperated extensively in the war against terror, insome ways perhaps too enthusiastically inside their own borders, there hasbeen very little progress regarding the three key state-building objectives.

Uzbekistan

In May 2002 the Uzbek government officially abolished its long-held prac-tice of state censorship. In a state that has a vice-like grip over all sources ofmedia since independence in 1991 such a declaration should have beengreeted with applause. The move was undermined, however, by the warninggiven to all the editors in the country about their responsibility for content.12

The chairman of the State Press Committee, Rustam Shagulyamov,explained that all editors would now be accountable for everything they pub-lished. While it was not revealed what consequences would emerge were aneditor to publish something the government deemed improper, members ofthe Uzbek mass media did not miss that the State Secrets Inspectorate, whichhad for years been charged with exclusively censoring newspapers anddefining editorial policies, did not suffer any changes despite the so-called

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abolishment of censorship. In other words, a day trumpeted by the US as asignal of progress toward freedom of expression was seen in Uzbekistan asominous forewarning: the government actually freed its hands to act withmore impunity by relieving itself of the official watchdog tag. It could now bepurely reactionary.

In September 2002 a Tashkent court sentenced Yuldash Rasulov to sevenyears in prison for disseminating anti-government propaganda and for alleg-edly recruiting members into the banned Islamist group, Hizb-ut-Tahrir. Inactuality, Rasulov was a member of the Human Rights Movement of Uzbeki-stan and had been working to persuade several Hizb members to leave theIslamist organization.13 The prosecution, protected and supported by theUzbek government, produced no evidence during the trial that substantiatedthe charges. The subordination of the judicial branch to the executive admin-istration has been a widely-known fact in Uzbekistan for over a decade.

The Uzbek parliament adopted a draft law in April 2003 that effectivelyrendered all former presidents immune from prosecution for life. Under thelaw, former presidents became automatic members of the Senate. This senato-rial appointment had no term-limits and no requirement to actually run foroffice.14 The logic behind this initiative was to be able to tap into the formerpresident’s knowledge of state affairs even after the president had left office.Of course, it seems likely that the draft law was meant more as a gift toprevent future prosecution against what was an administration rife withcorruption.

Human rights groups have consistently estimated the number of politicaland religious prisoners stuck in Uzbek jails without charges or trial dates tobe near 6,500. A UN rapporteur revealed that torture by security forcesappeared to be systematic.15 The protests over human rights raised by theUnited States with the Uzbek government have consistently remained alonglower level diplomatic channels and have never compromised the larger prior-ity of Uzbek cooperation in the US war against terror.

The government in early 2004 began an initiative to tighten control overinternational human rights and democracy organizations, claiming thesegroups often hid secret revolutionary agendas and aimed to create a revolu-tion within Uzbekistan.16 It created a new requirement demanding that allinternational groups must register with the Justice Ministry. Previously,international groups were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Foreign Min-istry. The new process gave the Justice Ministry greater oversight capacity. Ineffect, it granted any agency in the government the right to veto a foreigngroup’s registration and monitor its operations.

Tajikistan

The main Tajik opposition party, the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajiki-stan (IRPT), accused the government of systematically persecuting party

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leaders and randomly arresting its supporters under the guise of preventingthe spread of radical Islam. This became more widespread after 9/11.17 TheIRPT declared that such systemic abuse would only risk reprisals that wouldincreasingly grow more desperate and violent, ultimately destabilizing whatwas an already shaky political situation.

President Rakhmonov strengthened his long-term grip on power in thesummer of 2003 when he pushed forward amendments to be voted on by popu-lar referendum. The amendments allowed him to stand for two more seven-year terms after his term expired in 2006.18 The provisional results revealed aSoviet-like 93 percent of voters approving the amendments with nearly 97percent of all eligible voters supposedly taking part. Though taking place inthe 21st century, Rakhmonov’s referendum was an inside job reminiscent ofthe patently fake “show elections” common during Soviet times. AsliddinSokhibazarov and Shokir Khakimov, deputy heads of the Social DemocraticParty, declared the whole initiative a farce, with documented evidence of indi-viduals voting for every member of their family, thus casting numerous votesat a single time. Fake or not fake, pushing the amendments through popularreferendum gave Rakhmonov an air of democratic legitimacy.

In spring 2004 another Tajik opposition party, Taraqqiyot, was preventedfrom registering for upcoming elections by the Justice Ministry.19 The officialreason for the rejection was falsified information regarding party member-ship. Eleven of the 1,173 people listed as party supporters of Taraqqiyotdenied involvement in the party. Taraqqiyot chairman Sulton Quvvatovclaimed that those eleven members were illegally detained and ultimately tor-tured to force them to renounce their political affiliation. Taraqqiyot hasremained within the legal system for now, having appealed the decision to theTajik Supreme Court and threatening to take their case to the InternationalCourt of Justice in The Hague. But given such appeals are likely to be unsuc-cessful, it is necessary to wonder how long such obvious repression and viola-tion of democratic rights will continue until they move underground andradicalize their positions?

This seemed to be the essence of the message of US Senator John McCain,who expressed outrage over parliamentary elections in both Kyrgyzstan andTajikistan, decrying how election-day was marred by vote buying, de-registra-tion of candidates, media interference, and government hyperbolic warningsabout the dangers of civil war.20 McCain was amazed at the level of informa-tion control that was rampant within both states, not seen since the worstSoviet days. McCain chastised Kyrgyzstan and claimed the abuses were evenworse in Tajikistan. “These two countries can pretend no longer,” railedMcCain, “the governments in these countries present a false choice–-chaoticdemocracy or authoritarian stability.”21

McCain’s concerns echo throughout the present work. In a way it is unfor-tunate that he is the lone voice within American government who seems to

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care. While McCain has built a well-deserved and admirable reputation heremains a maverick known for diplomatically insensitive outbursts. Thismakes him a favorite outside the beltway but severely compromises his politi-cal impact on actual executive policy. Unfortunately, as will be shown later inthe article, his voice alone has not been a guarantee to bring changes withinthe American corridors of power.

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan is little more than two years removed from its so-called demo-cratic revolution in which the entrenched former autocrat, Askar Akaev, wasforced to flee into exile. This was supposedly the latest in a line of governmen-tal turnovers that began in the Caucasus two years before and migrated east.It is considered by the West as further confirmation of the inexorable thirst allpeople have for democracy. The present analysis reveals why this character-ization is far from the truth. Meanwhile, problems have already begun toemerge in Kyrgyzstan, despite the fact that the official afterglow of the demo-cratic revolution has barely died down.

Only three months after Akaev’s removal, police in the capital Bishkekhad to use tear gas and batons to disperse protestors marching toward govern-ment square. The demonstrators were protesting in support of a candidatewho had been barred by the new government from participating in July’s pres-idential poll.22 Kurmanbek Bakiev became acting president (and later wouldwin the presidential election) after a wave of protests following controversialparliamentary elections. Bakiev emphasized that he was not against usingforce to quell protests, conveniently labeling them all as Akaev supportersseeking to disrupt his revolution.

Police and security services followed up the dispersal of the protest withstrategic arrests against Mukar Cholponbaev, a former speaker of Kyr-gyzstan’s parliament, and another would-be presidential candidate Barykta-basov.23 Omurbek Subanaliev, the Bishkek police chief, accused the two offinancing and organizing the protest. The charges were politically motivatedso as to curtail the only real challengers to Bakiev in the upcoming presidentialelections.

In October 2005 the chairman of the Kyrgyz parliamentary Committee onState System and Law, Kambaraly Kongantiyev, began maneuvers to legallycreate a year-long moratorium on protests. “The situation is unstable,”declared Kongantiyev in parliament, “the moratorium is inevitable. It doesmean a deviation from democracy or a violation of civil rights and freedoms,[but] it is an objective necessity and the only way to stabilize the situation inthe country.”24 The official legal process for such a maneuver is for parliamentto draft the resolution and then submit it to the president for approval, whichis quite fortuitous considering most of the protests threatening Kyrgyz societyrevolve around the new President Bakiev.

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Against this background of Kyrgyz democracy stood the OSCE specialenvoy Alojz Peterle, who met with First Deputy Prime Minister Kulov in sum-mer 2005. Peterle commented, “I am more than pleased that the [Kyrgyz pres-idential] elections were done in that way as they were done.”25 In addition, theOSCE envoy felt that the new Kyrgyz government had been preparing them-selves to do “what was necessary” to benefit the country. Considering suchstatements fly in the face of empirical fact, it is hardly surprising why conspir-acy theories emerge amongst radical opposition groups, blaming the interna-tional community in general and the United States in particular as beingcomplicit in all domestic violations of civil liberties and human rights.

Friends of the National Interest, Enemies of Global DemocracyDespite the overwhelming evidence, US governmental actors have contin-

ued to laud supposed improvements while reluctantly admitting to more workbeing needed. This permissiveness is likely not coincidental to the fact thatthese three governments in Central Asia were generous in offering assistanceafter 9/11.The United States formally declares that Central Asian help in thewar against terror does not give the region a free pass on other fronts, butreality challenges that supposition. Does Tajikistan’s corrupt narco-economyor Uzbekistan’s religious inquisition government gain patience and under-standing from the United States because of true efforts to reform or becausethey were the first to offer the use of their facilities to coalition troops andboth played central roles as staging areas for crucial early operations againstAl Qaeda and the Taliban? Is it irrelevant that Kyrgyzstan was chosen to bethe primary base for coalition air support and also had its various democrati-zation problems overlooked? Is it merely fascinating timing that the bombingcampaign in Afghanistan began on October 7, 2001, exactly one hour afterUzbekistan and the United States signed the Status of Forces Agreement thatgave the US the legal right to carry out search and rescue missions fromUzbek sovereign territory?26 This article argues in every case against coinci-dence.

This divergence between philosophy and fact is caused by hypocriticalAmerican engagement. It is as if the US finds it acceptable to ignore theempirical reality of non-democracy while professing continued admiration forthe pseudo-democracy emerging. Reality shows that the United States saysyes to fighting terror but it seems to be saying no to the fostering of function-ing democratic institutions. It seems America needs to be saved from itself.

Unfortunately, as long as the objective of short-term counter-terrorism issecure, then the other supposed priority of real democratic reform is appar-ently allowed to whither while the US, Kyrgyz, Tajik, and Uzbek governmentspublicly proclaim progress. If the United States truly wants to defeat Islamicterrorism it must end this kind of democratic engagement. It must cease

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providing governments with rational justifications for democratic deviation.27

This deviation sows seeds of dissatisfaction amongst the local population notjust with democracy but with the United States. Central Asia is but one ofmany potentially fertile fields that the US itself ignorantly cultivates.

The Problems of US Foreign Aid Funding to Central AsiaThis work is not saying it is fundamentally wrong to fund programs that

exclusively consider short-term American national interests, though it doessuggest that such strategy may not ultimately be the wisest course of action.The real problem with US funding since 9/11 is not just a decided tendency tocontinue assisting questionable states. Rather, it is the increase in funding tostates such as the ones in Central Asia, with the funding earmarked for pro-moting democracy and civil society, even though in reality these states aresimply being rewarded for security cooperation.

Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan clearly make the connectionbetween US funding and what level of cooperation the US deems most crucial.It therefore seems difficult to find justification for the financial increases, con-sidering these three states are nowhere near being functioning democraciesnor do they show any real progress on the ground in terms of democraticdevelopment. How do funds get accounted for? What monitoring mechanismsexist? Accountability, oversight, timetables. These three things are essential ifthe US is sincere in wanting such states to become actual democracies andjoin the global community. In short, money as a reward for helping fight terrorin the short-term is not enough if that money is used domestically in waysthat do not respect democratic principles, do not develop civil society, and donot institute the rule of law. The United States creates its own vicious circle ofterror when its foreign policy is conducted in this manner.

Aspect One: The Freedom Support Act

Thomas C. Adams, acting coordinator to Europe and Eurasia in 2003,gave a perfect example of this problematic engagement when speaking to theHouse International Relations Committee on assistance to Eurasia in Wash-ington DC:

“The picture on democratic reform is decidedly less rosy. Noticeable backslid-ing has occurred in recent years in some countries. While I do not diminish theseproblems I believe that we have achieved tremendous accomplishments in thissphere as well over the past decade and have sown the seeds for future positivechange.”28

Again, despite these statements, the only real definitive accomplishmentsmade in Central Asia since 9/11 have been in the military and securityspheres where these states have allowed US forces almost unfettered access to

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their sovereign territory. Success is always referred to in terms of positivedemocratic change even though there are no real examples to support it. Coor-dinator Adams went on to describe one of the largest assistance programs evercreated in the United States:

“One of our best mechanisms to foster fundamental change is our program ofprofessional and educational exchanges. Freedom Support Act exchange pro-grams have brought slightly over 100,000 business people, journalists, students,and professors to the United States to see for themselves how free people prosperand deal with challenges common to all countries…FSA funds have supported thedevelopment and strengthening of civil society organizations and non-governmen-tal organizations…[and has] also supported the development of political parties,helped to strengthen legislatures as a counter-weight to powerful executivebranches of government, and worked to create or bolster judicial independence.”29

The fact of the matter is that none of these things are happening acrossCentral Asia. Political parties are still nondescript and emasculated. Legisla-tures remain rubber stamp agencies of the hyper-powerful executivebranches. The mere idea of an independent judiciary is inconceivable at thispoint in time in the region. Yet time and time again the highest diplomaticlevels in America speak of progress happening all over the area and largelythanks to the aid and assistance of the United States.

Aspect Two: The Human Rights and Democracy Fund

DRL’s Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF) is used to fulfill theBureau’s mandate to monitor and promote human rights and democracyworldwide. According to its own mission statement, the HRDF supports “inno-vative programming designed to uphold democratic principles, support demo-cratic institutions, promote human rights, and build civil society in countriesand regions of the world that are geo-strategically critical to the US.”30 It hassince 9/11 occupied a major foreign policy niche in financial terms, receivingenormous budget increases and gaining incredible responsibility the worldover for initiating democracy-building programs.

As the funding for HRDF programs in Central Asia skyrocketed, programcontent gradually shifted from democratic state-building agendas to interna-tional law and human rights initiatives. This is a confirmation of the lack ofsuccess in developing a constructive dialogue along with civic participationnetworks across the region. It seems logical to suggest that programs aimed atcivil society and democracy, if they were having any sort of impact whatso-ever, would at least have made inroads against such barbarity as torture.Instead, as US government programs became embedded in the region therewas regression on the ground.

This regression flies in the face of American diplomats like Assistant Sec-retary of State Elizabeth Jones, who lauded all efforts as being “every bit as

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important as our security assistance in dealing with the long-term root causesof terrorism.”31 Closer inspection across the board of American governmentalagencies finds this same illusory satisfaction, inexplicably proclaimingCentral Asian policy as one that was deep, sustained, and coordinated.32

The Problems At Home: The House of Representatives IR CommitteeIf looking for a seminal moment in US foreign policy on Central Asia, then

ironically one of the strongest contenders came on Capitol Hill before 9/11. On6 June 2001 US policy on Central Asia was discussed before the House of Rep-resentatives, before its Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia. Thereason this moment is the defining one is simple: Central Asia’s strategic rele-vance only became more intensified after the World Trade Towers collapsed.Any hope of policy being held to a high standard of oversight would need to bein place before the war against terror began. This opportunity was there insummer 2001 but was unfortunately passed up.

Overall, the members of the House Committee, chaired by Rep. HenryHyde (IL), displayed an expected mixture of facts and falsehoods when dis-cussing Central Asia. Rep. Benjamin Gilman (NY) admitted to “serioushuman rights problems and extremist movements influenced by Afghanistan,”but also lauded the region for its “enormous energy export potential that couldease current US energy problems and for its governments being secular.”33

Gilman’s statement is both prescient and wrong.Central Asia’s energy reserves, though significant, face severe obstacles of cli-

mate, geography, and technology. At present there is some doubt as to the actualenergy reserve estimates and that perhaps estimate inflation has been done inorder to secure more international aid. The inaccuracy of many of Gilman’s obser-vations about the Central Asian governments is frankly embarrassing. Callingthem secular when in fact they manipulate Islam for their own purposes and areruthless in the harassment of Islamic organizations is naïve at best. At worst, itignores the preconditions necessary for creating Islamic terrorism.

The main figure to appear before the House subcommittee that day wasClifford Bond, a career diplomat who at the time was the Acting PrincipalDeputy to the Special Advisor for the New Independent States. He was calledonto the floor as the administration’s official expert witness on Central Asianpolicy. His opening statement was riddled with the hidden problems broughtto light in this work:

“The overarching and the long-term goal of US policy in Central Asia is tosee these states develop into stable, free-market democracies, which can serve asa bulwark against the spread of potential instability and conflict in the region.This broader goal serves three core strategies or interests of the United States:regional security, political and economic reform, and energy development.”

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Here, before 9/11, before the war on terror, the three core values in US policyare made explicit. Since this performance on Capitol Hill it has become clearthat the first and third core interests—regional security and energy develop-ment—overwhelmed the more important second interest—political and eco-nomic reform. Indeed, Bond would go on to discuss this very divergence thatwould come to epitomize US foreign policy:

“All the states of Central Asia have indicated that they welcome securitycooperation with the United States. They see our engagement in the region as anadditional element of stability as they seek to balance their relations with morepowerful neighbors in the region…Only by empowering their citizens throughdemocratization and economic reform can these governments ensure lastingpopular support and stability. This is an integral part of our message to thegovernments of Central Asia.”34

It is ironic how before 9/11 the United States viewed itself as the securityblanket for Central Asia so that governments like Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, andUzbekistan would be able to fend off bigger, more powerful rivals like China,Iran, and Russia. After 9/11 the security relationship was flipped upside downas it was the US that needed Central Asia for its own national security. Thisflip was what most likely empowered these three states to essentially ignoreand dismiss Bond’s second priority of democratic and economic reform. Takingadvantage of this leverage was clearly never in doubt for the three states.

Ultimately, the progress American diplomats proclaimed for Central Asiaonly grew more false after 9/11 as the US desire for democratic reform wasreplaced by the desire for immediate security cooperation. Rep. Joseph Pitts(PA) summed up the oncoming flaws of the 9/11 Central Asian shift with thecommittee’s closing statement:

“Economic prosperity, the growth of democracy, and the establishment of therule of law in the Central Asian states is essential for US national secu-rity…unfortunately, US foreign policy towards the region emphasizes a standback and watch approach…Blatant abuses of human rights have increased. Free-dom of religion is nonexistent in some countries and getting worse in others. Ter-rorist cells of Islamic fundamentalists run free through many countries. The listgoes on…But it is not too late. The US can still affect positive change in theregion by engaging these countries. We must let them know that the US is notgoing to turn a blind eye to the region…If we engage them we can promoterespect for human rights, and increase their understanding and acceptance ofdemocracy and the rule of law.”35

Poetic and prophetic, it was Rep. Pitts who turned a blind eye to Central Asia,as did the rest of Congress, after 9/11. This is unfortunate because only thelong-term resolutions provided by democratic reform offer effective alterna-tives to fight the desperation that creates Islamic radicalism. The anger,shock, and disgust released by the tragedy of 9/11 clouded the judgment of the

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few lawmakers who initially appeared to have a proper grasp of the situationin Central Asia. The emotions are understandable but these emotions compro-mise national interest and endanger long-term security.

Conclusion – Terror and Democracy without Synergy or SincerityThe present analysis of US foreign policy and its problems of implementa-

tion in Central Asia reveals a dangerous divergence that carries potentiallydeadly consequences. While the ideals and power of democratic freedom arecontinually lauded, this verbal commitment is not backed up with diplomaticaction or programmatic implementation. In fact the examination providedhere reveals a very subtle shift since 9/11 in the types of programs funded inCentral Asia—they focus less on democratic institutions and civil society andmore on human rights and trans-national security issues.

This problem is nothing more than the consequences to emerge whenthere is a hypocritical divergence between the philosophical framing of astate’s foreign policy and the empirical reality of its program implementation.There is no justification for this divergence. It is simply wrong and America’sinfluential political actors have confirmed it time and again. Both here athome and abroad before foreign audiences, they have declared a crucial truth:democracy matters not just for freedom but for security.

Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, for example, on a trip through CentralAsia in fall 2005, addressed this very issue with powerful words:

“We understand that the path to democracy is long and imperfect and differ-ent for every country. But make no mistake: the principles of democracy areunanimously desired and universally deserved. Here in Central Asia there ismuch to do but there are reasons for optimism…We all live in a world in whichthere are security concerns. We all live in a world in which terrorism is athreat…[but] you have to have democracy because democracy is, in fact, theanswer to terrorism and to extremism.”36

When seen through the analytical lens offered here, these words ring hollow.The implementation of US programs does not reveal a sincerity of commit-ment. When President Bush spoke in 2003 at the National Endowment forDemocracy he passionately declared that “we know that liberty if notdefended can be lost. By definition the success of freedom rests upon thechoices and the courage of free peoples and upon their willingness to sacri-fice.”37 The present work shows how America, in its fight to supposedly pre-serve its own liberty today, may be turning a blind eye to how allies in thisfight are undermining the liberty of their own peoples. If that remains truethen the sacrifices made in the future by the citizens of those countries may besacrifices that come in the form of suicide bombers at American doorsteps.You reap what you sow in foreign policy and at the moment the US is cultivat-ing a bitter future harvest.

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The hypocrisy inherent in US foreign policy creates new generations ofterrorists whose one true goal will not be in attacking the local regimes withwhich the US selectively engaged but will be in causing pain and sufferingagainst Americans. They will seek out this retribution because the UnitedStates was not simply indifferent to their own repression. It will appear tothem by all objective methods of investigation to be something the US tacitlyendorsed and consistently supported. Central Asia is just the first andperhaps the best positioned of many other potential regions around the globe.

Conditions of poverty, repression, censorship, corruption, and injusticetruly do lead to radicalization. Unfortunately, US engagement with Tajiki-stan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan has not lessened these qualities. In manyways US engagement has brought about their intensification. Yet the US hasnot acted against this so-called coincidence and has spoken out against it onlyweakly and lamely. It does so because it stubbornly adheres to the misplacedthinking that a short-term betrayal of democracy abroad is sometimesnecessary for making sure terror does not strike at home.

Duplicity has long been a common characteristic in foreign-policy propa-gation. One only need read Machiavelli’s The Prince to know just how longsubterfuge has been implicitly if not explicitly endorsed by the internationalcommunity. The problem elaborated here is that American duplicity does notin fact accomplish its security objectives. As Machiavelli himself wrote, if itwere possible to be a beacon of hope and justice and have all of the people loveyou while maintaining power and security, then it would be best to be such abeacon. The problem for Machiavelli was that reality did not seem to providemany such opportunities to be positive and powerful. What the US needs torealize is that long-term victory in the war against terror is the very opportu-nity that Machiavelli deemed unlikely: an opportunity where the steadfastcommitment to justice and liberty, without any space for hypocrisy or contra-diction, actually succeeds in achieving greater success and gaining greatersecurity. The short-term temptations in this war against terror should beignored for the long-term strategies that ultimately produce the greatestresults. The US is indeed served best by being both positive and powerful.

Former Secretary of State Colin Powell declared, “freedom, prosperity,and peace are not separate principles, or separate policy goals. Each rein-forces the other, so serving any one requires an integrated policy that servesall three.”38 Despite these fine words, there is a strange disconnect when itcomes to American foreign policy between the world the US government seesand the world that actually exists on the ground. This is especially so in thethree Central Asian states highlighted here.

The US betrayal of democracy abroad is not just a betrayal of the people ofCentral Asia. The betrayal of democracy is a betrayal of the very essence ofUS hegemony. It destroys the one filament that could arguably justifyAmerican dominance: unilateralism could be acceptable if it was selflessly

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committed for the true betterment of others. Hegemony could be allowable if itwas used to sincerely expand the principles of freedom, liberty, prosperity,dignity, and justice. This type of unilateral hegemonic power is capable ofgaining world acceptance because it would not be about American interestsbut about human ones.

This is what can bring victory over terror: a belief by the world communitythat this is the motivation and inspiration of the United States. That beliefcan only come when the world community consistently sees the US walk thetalk it so eloquently proclaims about liberal democracy. Unfortunately, theworld does not see that consistency. It instead should justifiably fear that theUnited States is pursuing a course with dire consequences. The United States,in trying to inspire new democrats, is instead blindly building new BinLadens.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This article has been exclusively submitted to Democracy and Security. It is not underconsideration at any other venue. The article’s approximate word length is 7700. Mygratitude for advice and assistance go to Thomas Carothers (Carnegie Center), JosephStewart (Clemson U.), Barry Rubin (GLORIA Center, Israel), and Alisher Yunusov(Ferghana State University, Uzbekistan).

NOTES

1. Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad,W.W.Norton & Co., New York, 2003.

2. Amy Chua, World on Fire: How Exporting Free-Market Democracy Breeds EthnicHatred and Global Instability, Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, 2004.

3. Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance,Henry Holt & Co., 2004.

4. Francis Fukuyama, Statebuilding: Governance and World Order in the 21st Cen-tury, Cornell University Press, 2004.

5. Natan Sharansky and Ron Dermer, The Case for Democracy: The Power of Free-dom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror, Public Affairs, 2004.

6. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), ‘Mission Statement,’http://www.state.gov/g/drl/democ/, accessed on 15 March 2005.

7. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), ‘Mission Statement,’http://www.state.gov/g/drl/democ/, accessed on 15 March 2005.

8. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), ‘US Human Rights andDemocracy Strategy,’ http://www.state.gov/g/drl/democ/, accessed on 15 March 2005.

9. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), ‘US Human Rights andDemocracy Strategy,’ http://www.state.gov/g/drl/democ/, accessed on 15 March 2005.

10. Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, ‘Frequently Asked Questions about USPolicy in Central Asia,’ http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/15562.htm, accessed on 28July 2004.

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12. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, ‘UzbekistanAbolishes Media Censorship…,’ http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=1186, accessed 05 October 2005.

13. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, ‘Uzbek HumanRights Activist Sentenced,’ http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=775,accessed 10 October 2005.

14. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, ‘UzbekPresident Granted Immunity for Life,’ http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=1412, accessed 17 June 2004.

15. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, ‘US DiplomatRaises Human Rights Concerns with Uzbekistan,’ http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=1786, accessed 19 September 2003.

16. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, ‘UzbekistanTightens Control Over Groups,’ http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=2089, accessed 12 February 2004.

17. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, ‘Tajik Opposi-tion Party Protests Official Repression,’ http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=996, accessed 21 May 2002.

18. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, ‘Tajikistan’sRakhmonov Strengthens Long-term Grip on Power,’ http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=1545, accessed 30 June 2004.

19. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, ‘Tajik Opposi-tion Party’s Registration Rejected,’ http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=2268, accessed 24 July 2005.

20. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, ‘LawmakerSlams Marred Balloting in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,’ http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=3138, accessed 23 September 2005.

21. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, ‘LawmakerSlams Marred Balloting in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,’ http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=3138, accessed 23 September 2005.

22. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, ‘Kyrgyz ForcesBreak up the Protest,’ http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=3429,accessed 18 August 2005.

23. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, ‘Kyrgyz Author-ities Arrest Ex-speaker of Parliament,’ http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=3433, accessed on 19 August 2005.

24. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, ‘Kyrgyz DeputySuggests Year-long Moratorium on Protests,’ http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=3753, accessed on 09 November 2005.

25. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, ‘OSCE Pleasedwith Kyrgyz Presidential Ballot,’ http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=3521, accessed on 15 November 2005.


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28. Statement to the House International Relations Committee, ‘US Assistance Pro-grams in Europe: An Assessment,’ http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/19203.htm,accessed on 24 March 2005.

29. Statement to the House International Relations Committee, ‘US Assistance Pro-grams in Europe: An Assessment,’ http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/19203.htm,accessed on 24 March 2005.

30. Human Rights and Democracy Fund, ‘Mission Statement,’ http://www.state.gov/g/drl/c7607.htm, accessed 13 October 2005.

31. The United States Mission to the European Union, ‘Assistant Secretary of StateJones on US Policy in Central Asia,’ http://www.useu.be/Terrorism/USResponse/Dec1401JonesUSPolicyCentralAsia.html, accessed on 12 January 2004.


33. US House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommit-tee on the Middle East and South Asia, ‘US Policy on Central Asia,’ http://com-mdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa72975.000/hfa72975_0f.htm, accessed on 12June 2003.



36. Speech by Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice at the Eurasian National University,Astana, Kazakhstan, 13 October 2005.

37. Speech by President George W. Bush at the 20th anniversary of the NationalEndowment for Democracy, Washington DC, November 2003.


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Documents

Building New Democrats or New Bin Ladens? The US Illusion of Spreading Democracy and Fighting Terrorism, Democracy and Security, 2007